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Ripe for Rivalry Or Ready for Peace : Understanding the Reasons for the Success and Failure of the Peace Process in Aceh

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Ripe for Rivalry Or Ready for Peace : Understanding the Reasons for the Success and Failure of the Peace Process in Aceh RIPE FOR RIVALRY OR READY FOR PEACE: UNDERSTANDING THE REASONS FOR THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN ACEH Doctoral Thesis Supervisors: Professor Timo Kivimäki, Senior I Professor Liisa Laakso, Senior II -------------------------------------------------------- Faculty of Social Sciences University of Helsinki DELSY RONNIE, M.Sc. 19 April 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... v LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................... vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................... vii ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1 1.1 Background ...................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Motivation ........................................................................................................ 2 1.3 Research Plan ................................................................................................... 3 1.4 Dependent Variables (DV): Definition and Operationalization ....................... 4 1.5 Organization of the Thesis ............................................................................... 9 CHAPTER 2 EXISTING LITERATURE ................................................................. 11 2.1 Classification of Existing Literature .............................................................. 11 2.2 Theories Based on the Precondition and Negotiation Process ....................... 12 2.2.1 Precondition ............................................................................................... 12 2.2.1.1 Ripeness ........................................................................................... 12 2.2.2 Domestic Political Settings ....................................................................... 15 2.2.2.1 Democratic Peace ............................................................................. 15 2.2.2.2 Political Change toward Democratization ....................................... 16 2.2.2.3 New Leaders .................................................................................... 18 2.2.3 International Context ................................................................................. 19 2.3 The Negotiation Process ................................................................................ 21 2.3.1 Pre-Negotiation ......................................................................................... 22 2.3.2 Negotiation Process and Mediation Success ............................................. 23 2.3.2.1 Probability of Victory and Cost of Conflict ..................................... 24 2.3.2.2 Duration of Conflict ......................................................................... 25 2.3.2.3 Willingness and Motivation ............................................................. 25 2.3.2.4 Cohesiveness of the Party ................................................................ 26 i 2.3.2.5 The Role of a Third Party as Mediator ............................................ 26 2.3.2.6 Characteristics of the Mediator ........................................................ 27 2.3.2.7 Mediator Behavior ........................................................................... 28 2.3.2.8 The Nature of Issues and Negotiation Strategy ............................... 30 2.3.2.9 Dynamic Relationship between the Parties ...................................... 34 2.4 Theories on Outcome of Agreement .............................................................. 35 2.4.1 Mechanisms within the Agreement ........................................................... 39 2.4.1.1 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Process (DDR) .. 40 2.4.1.2 Third-Party Guarantees .................................................................... 43 2.5 Political Settlement ........................................................................................ 46 2.5.1 Power Sharing ........................................................................................... 47 2.6 The Grand Theory of Peace Preparedness ..................................................... 48 CHAPTER 3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ......................................................... 52 3.1 Research Design ............................................................................................. 52 3.2 Readiness in the Pre-Condition and Negotiation Process .............................. 52 3.2.1 Pre-Condition ............................................................................................ 52 3.2.2 Negotiation Process ................................................................................... 54 3.2.3 Readiness in the Outcome of the Agreement ............................................ 56 3.3 Data Collection and Personal Involvement .................................................... 58 3.4 Analysis of Data ............................................................................................. 64 3.5 Process Tracing and Comparison Methods .................................................... 65 CHAPTER 4: COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF THE TWO PRE- CONDITIONS OF THE PEACE PROCESSES ................................................. 67 4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 67 4.1.1 The Roots of the Movement ...................................................................... 67 4.1.2 The Reform Era and the Open Dialogue with GAM ................................. 70 4.1.3 Military Operation and the Helsinki MoU ................................................ 73 4.2 Ripeness, Readiness, and Motivation ............................................................. 75 4.2.1 The Precondition Process for the CoHA ................................................... 76 ii 4.2.2 The GoI: Perception of the Cost of Conflict and Future Catastrophe ....... 77 4.2.2.1 Escalating Violence and Tension ..................................................... 77 4.2.2.2 The Pro-Referendum Movement ..................................................... 80 4.2.2.3 Risk of Future Catastrophe: Economic Impact and International Pressure ............................................................................................ 81 4.2.3 GAM: Feasibility of Winning ................................................................... 85 4.2.4 Precondition Process of the Helsinki MoU ............................................... 87 4.2.4.1 The New President‘s Perception of the Ripeness ............................ 87 4.2.4.2 Cost of Conflict and Infeasibility of ‗Truly‘ Winning ..................... 89 4.2.4.3 GAM‘s Internal Dynamics: Transition of Leadership ..................... 92 4.2.4.4 GAM‘s Perception of Ripeness: Weaknesses in International Diplomacy ........................................................................................ 94 4.3 Infeasibility of Victory ................................................................................... 99 4.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 102 CHAPTER 5 MEDIATION AND NEGOTIATION DURING THE CoHA AND HELSINKI PROCESSES .................................................................................. 104 5.1 Introduction: Optimism for the Success of the Negotiations ....................... 104 5.2 The First Negotiation Process: Geneva Peace Talks .................................... 104 5.3 The Pre-Negotiation Process: A Winding Road towards the CoHA ........... 105 5.3.1 Preliminary Meeting: Precondition for Formal Negotiation ................... 106 5.3.2 The Dynamic Options for Solution ......................................................... 108 5.4 Negotiation and Mediation Process ............................................................. 109 5.4.1 Process Leading to the CoHA ................................................................. 109 5.4.2 Starting Political Dialogue ....................................................................... 112 5.4.3 Positional Bargaining .............................................................................. 114 5.4.4 HDC: Obstacles as Facilitators ................................................................ 116 5.5 The Helsinki Peace Process ......................................................................... 118 5.5.1 Pre-Negotiation: The Road to Helsinki ................................................... 119 5.5.2 Preparation for Peace Talks: A Comprehensive Plan.............................. 122 5.5.3 The Influencing Condition: the Tsunami as a Strengthening Factor ....... 125 iii 5.5.4 The Negotiation and Mediation Process: Reciprocity of Optimism ....... 128 5.5.4.1 Trust as the Basis of Negotiation ................................................... 128 5.5.4.2 Negotiation Strategy: Self-Government, between Autonomy and Independence ................................................................................. 131 5.5.4.3 The Mediator: Directive Behavior and a Clear Dialogue Frame ... 135 5.5.4.4 Back-Channel Approach: Heart-To-Heart Negotiation ................. 139 5.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................
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