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Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) – Front Pembela Islam (FPI) – Ahmadiyah

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Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) – Front Pembela Islam (FPI) – Ahmadiyah Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: IDN34217 Country: Indonesia Date: 21 January 2009 Keywords: Indonesia – Muhammadiyah – Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) – Front Pembela Islam (FPI) – Ahmadiyah This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Questions 1) Please provide information on Islam Muhamadyah (or Muhammadiah) 2) Please provide information on Front Pembela Islam (FPI) 3) Please provide information on the Nahdlatul Ulama Orgainsation of Islam (NU) 4) Please provide information on whether the authorities protect NU over Islam Muhamadyah. 5) Please provide any further information which may be of assistance. RESPONSE Executive Summary Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912, is the second largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia after Nadhlatul Ulama (NU). It is modernist (in the sense that it favours reform of Islam through a return to the authority of the qur’an and sunnah and modern educational methods) in its approach to Islam, and its founder Ahmad Dahlan “advocated the purification of Islamic thought and practice, the defence of Islam against its critics, and the promotion of these aims through a modernised system of Islamic education”. Muhammadiyah is considered the more conservative of the two organisations, as NU is “regarded as more liberal, tolerant, and comfortable with the idea of a secular state, as well as with syncretic patterns of Islam”. Both organisations are ostensibly non-political, predominantly socio-religious organisations, providing education, health services, orphanages, and welfare services; nonetheless, both have associations with Indonesia’s various Islamic political parties. There is little information to indicate that the two organisations are in conflict – other than disagreements over religious practices – or that members of Muhammadiyah are mistreated, or that Indonesian authorities are pressured by the NU to turn a blind eye to any such mistreatment. Neither Muhammadiyah nor NU are formally affiliated with the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), a violent militant Islamic group known for its attacks on individuals and institutions deemed ‘un- Islamic’; bars, clubs, and brothels on the one hand, and religious groups such as evangelical Christians and the Ahmadiyah on the other. Leaders of both Muhammadiyah and NU have openly condemned the FPI for its attack on a June 2008 rally in Jakarta held by a coalition of groups advocating religious tolerance, and the militant youth wing of NU has been involved in clashes with the FPI in response. Nonetheless, both Muhammadiyah and NU have also been accused of reticence in their dealings with militant Islamic groups, and an unwillingness to openly criticise anti-Ahmadiyah and anti-Christian violence. Similar accusations have been made regarding the unwillingness of Indonesian government figures to publicly criticise violent militant Islamic groups, and particularly the FPI, for fear of alienating Muslim voters and political parties in the lead-up to national elections in 2009. There are also accusations of police inaction in the face of FPI violence, and of police and military involvement in the establishment and funding of the group. The available information indicates that the Ahmadiyah have been one of the main targets of FPI violence (for background information on Muhammadiyah and NU, see: ‘Muhammadiyah’ (undated), Division of Religion and Philosophy, University of Cumbria website http://philtar.ucsm.ac.uk/encyclopedia/indon/muham.html – Accessed 15 January 2009 – Attachment 1; Burhani, A. 2004, “Puritan’ Muhammadiyah and indigenous culture’, Islam Within Indonesia blog website (source: The Jakarta Post), 26 November http://islam- indonesia.blogspot.com/2004/11/ahmad-najib-burhani-puritan.html – Accessed 19 January 2009 – Attachment 4; Question 2 of RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response IDN32037, 10 August – Attachment 23; and Eliraz, G. 2004, Islam in Indonesia – Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton & Portland, pp. 86-87 – Attachment 24; for background on the FPI, see: Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library 2003, ‘The Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front– FPI)’ http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/FAD/sea.htm – Accessed 8 January 2009 – Attachment 12; International Crisis Group 2008, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree, 7 July, pp. 13-14 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/b78_indonesia___implications_ of_the_ahmadiyah_decree.pdf – Accessed 8 July 2008 – Attachment 13; and ‘Front Pembela Islam (FPI)’ 2008, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 8 October – Attachment 14; for the attack on the June 2008 rally in Jakarta and the response from Muhammadiyah and NU, see: International Crisis Group 2008, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree, 7 July, p. 7 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/b78_indonesia___implications_ of_the_ahmadiyah_decree.pdf – Accessed 8 July 2008 – Attachment 13; and ‘Monas square violence is criminal, govt must act resolutely: Muhammadiyah chief’ 2008, The Jakarta Post (source: Antara), 3 June http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/03/monas-square- violence-criminal-govt-must-act-resolutely-muhammadiyah-chief.html – Accessed 19 January 2009 – Attachment 8; for accusations against NU and Muhammadiyah regarding militant Islamic groups, see: Diani, H. 2006, ‘Muhammadiyah seen leaning toward more conservative bent’, The Jakarta Post, 3 February http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/02/03/muhammadiyah-seen-leaning-toward-more- conservative-bent.html – Accessed 19 January 2009 – Attachment 7; for clashes between the FPI and NU youth wing militias, see: Reges, B. 2008, ‘Jakarta on the verge of a civil war as moderate and radical Muslims battle it out’, Asia News, 2 June – Attachment 29; for links between the police, the military and the FPI, see: International Crisis Group 2008, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree, 7 July, p. 7 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/b78_indonesia___implications_ of_the_ahmadiyah_decree.pdf – Accessed 8 July 2008 – Attachment 13; ‘Front Pembela Islam (FPI)’ 2008, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 8 October – Attachment 14; and ‘Indonesian Radicals on a Ramadan Holiday’ 2008, Asia Sentinel (source: Van Zorge Report), 25 September http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1450&Itemid= 175 – Accessed 9 January 2009 – Attachment 17; for government inaction over FPI violence, see: Osman, S. 2008, ‘Religious tension simmers in Indonesia’, The Straits Times, 24 September – Attachment 16; and Nurhayati, D. 2008, ‘Religious freedom, tolerance in jeopardy’, The Jakarta Post, 24 December http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/12/24/religious-freedom-tolerance-jeopardy.html – Accessed 19 January 2009 – Attachment 10; for anti-Ahmadiyah violence perpetrated by the FPI, see: ‘TAPOL Bulletin No. 190, August 2008’, 1 August – Attachment 43; ‘Front Pembela Islam (FPI)’ 2008, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 8 October – Attachment 14; and International Crisis Group 2008, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree, 7 July, pp. 13-14 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/b78_indonesia___implications_ of_the_ahmadiyah_decree.pdf – Accessed 8 July 2008 – Attachment 13). 1) Please provide information on Islam Muhamadyah (or Muhammadiah) Muhammadiyah: beliefs and activities The Division of Religion and Philosophy at the University of Cumbria’s website provides information the history and practices of the Muhammadiyah organisation. It was founded in 1912 as “a reformist socio-religious movement” which “emphasises the authority of the qu’ran and sunnah as…the sole legitimate basis for the interpretation and development of religious belief and practice”. Muhammadiyah “opposes the effects of syncretism, where Islam in Indonesia has coalesced both with animism/spirit worship…and with Hindu Buddhist values of the pre-Islamic period”, and it also opposes the Sufi tradition. Muhammadiyah functions as an ostensibly non-political, socio-religious organisation, with emphasis on education, with an extensive network of institutions ranging “from infant school level right up to its own university”, as well as “the establishment of clinics, hospitals, orphanages, factories and cottage industries, and a range of publications”. The organisation also maintains women’s and youth wings, and this source estimates its membership as around 29 million, “largely urban and middle class in composition”: Doctrines: Muhammadiyah affirms the central doctrines of mainstream Sunni Islam. However, as a reformist socio-religious movement it seeks to heighten people’s sense of moral responsibility, and to purify the faith of what it regards as outdated traditions or corruptions of true Islam. To this end it emphasises the authority of the qur’an and sunnah as supremely normative, and as the sole legitimate basis for the interpretation and development of religious belief and practice, in contrast
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