Major Power Managerial Coordination and the Transformation of International Relations, 1715-2001
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FROM WARMONGERS TO PEACEBUILDERS: MAJOR POWER MANAGERIAL COORDINATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1715-2001 BY KONSTANTINOS TRAVLOS DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013 Urbana,Illinois Doctoral Committee: Professor John A. Vasquez, Chair Professor Paul F. Diehl Associate Professor Xinyuan Dai Associate Professor Jake Bowers Senior Professor Peter Wallensteen, Uppsala University ABSTRACT This project is an evaluation of the role major power managerial coordination played in the transformation of the international system from a war-inducing to a peace-inducing system. In pursuit of this goal I develop the concept of the regime of major power managerial coordination and argue that it was a novel innovation in late-18th century great power politics which greatly transformed conflict dynamics in international relations since 1816. Major power managerial coordination is the engagement of the major powers in consultation, multilateralism and the avoidance of adversarial coordination. The goal is to decrease the likelihood of major power military conflicts. Because minor power conflicts can bring in major powers by diffusion, the major powers engaged in managerial coordination also strive to decrease the likelihood of the use of military force by all states in the international system. Major Powers engage in managerial coordination because their ruling elites became wary of war as an instrument of foreign policy due to fear of the consequences of great power war for their domestic political position. Beginning from the argument developed by Paul Schroeder that the Napoleonic wars were the first instance in which the majority of major powers suffered adverse results for domestic power structures, I develop an explanatory story of how the major powers engaged in managerial coordination decrease the likelihood of military conflict onset. This is via three mechanisms. One is denial, the denial of major power diplomatic and military support for the use of military force by other states. The second is discouragement, the threat of major power intervention and censure that may lead states to avoid the use of military force in order to resolve disputes. Finally, the pacification of international relations by major power managerial coordination may indirectly facilitate peace-fostering developments such as democratic reforms within states, and the creation of international organizations. It is thus that the transformation of international politics was brought about. To evaluate the transformation thesis, I develop the scale of major power managerial coordination intensity, a novel replicable instrument that captures how intensely the major powers are engaged in managerial coordination. To permit the comparison of pre-transformation and post- transformation conflict onset dynamics I compiled a new dataset of militarized interstate disputes in the 1715-1815 period. This complements the extant datasets on the 1816-2001 period. I then conducted quantitative evaluations of a number of hypotheses extracted from the explanatory story I presented. The findings supported the arguments that managerial coordination was a novel innovation for late 18th and early 19th century international relations. ii The findings also indicate that increasing managerial coordination decreases the likelihood that two states would experience a military conflict in the 1816-2001 periods. Furthermore this is more likely to be due to denial rather than discouragement mechanisms. Finally, there were indicators that increasing managerial coordination fosters democratic reforms within states, but that it does not make states more likely to join international organizations. These findings will be of interest to those studying the evolution of the international political system, those studying how structural phenomena influence the behavior of states, scholars researching the impact of the Vienna System in the form international relations have today, and scholars engaged in research on conditions that help alleviate the issue of the use of military force in international relations. iii To my father Spyridon, my mother Angelliki and my sister Katerina, who sacrificed so much so that I could pursue this research. Exitus Acta Probat iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many people have provided crucial contributions and support in the long road that has led to this destination. The magnitude of the gratitude that I have for my adviser Dr. John A. Vasquez cannot be overstated. He was the person who supported my entry into graduate school, and encouraged my engagement with history within political science, an endeavor that is not exactly at the cusp of cutting edge research. He supported my choice of topic, and patiently worked with me and advised me through numerous revisions, my problematic writing, and my many times incessant demands, to bring this project to fruition. So to him I offer my deepest thanks and gratitude. None of this would have been possible without his advice and support. Dr. Paul F. Diehl was also instrumental in making sure my project was rigorous both substantively and linguistically. His advice, feedback and support not only helped this project along, but have given me words of wisdom that I shall ever keep in heart and mind. For this he has my gratitude. I must also thank Dr. Peter Wallensteen. Not only did he honor me as a member of my dissertation committee, not only did he advise and guided me during my six-month research fellowship at the University of Uppsala in Sweden, but also for his work on this topic, which stood as example, foundation and guide. I wish to also thank Dr. Xinyuan Dai and Dr. Jake Bowers for honoring me as members of my dissertation committee, and for their crucial feedback. This dissertation was facilitated by a Swedish Institute Research Fellowship in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Sweden during the Fall-Winter 2012-2013 academic period. I wish to thank Magnus Oberg and the faculty, graduate students and staff at the department for their support, feedback and hospitality. I also wish to thank my colleague and friend Gennady Rudkevich for his support, advice and feedback during this long five year period. I know that every minute he spent helping me, was a minute not spent on his own research and that is a debt that I can never repay fully. Thank you my friend from the depths of my heart. My parents made a great sacrifice when they decided to support my dream of graduate studies in the United States of America. They sacrificed money, and they sacrificed something of their happiness. I hope that this dissertation, however imperfect, can validate their choice. I thank them deeply for their support. v TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: THE INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1 CHAPTER 2: THE TRANSFORMATION THESIS .............................................................. 15 CHAPTER 3: THE EXPLANATION ............................................................................................... 45 CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN ................................................................................................ 85 CHAPTER 5: THE TRANSFORMED SYSTEM, 1816- 2001 ...................................... 130 CHAPTER 6: MECHANISMS AND BROADER INFLUENCE, 1816- 2001 .... 147 CHAPTER 7: THE 1715- 1815 PERIOD .................................................................................... 190 CHAPTER 8: BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER, THE 1715- 2001 PERIOD . 226 CHAPTER 9: THE REMAINS OF AN ERA ............................................................................ 260 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................................. 274 vi CHAPTER 1: THE INTRODUCTION A CRIME STORY, A BUSINESS STORY AND A PAINTING A staple of detective stories is that scene situated in a dark, shadowy basement, filled with the acerbic smoke of cheap cigarettes and cigars where rival crime bosses come together to forge a “gentlemen’s” agreement so as to have peace amongst themselves. They come to that table typically after a period of gang warfare has cost them a combination of lives, money, leadership challenges, and raised the “heat” by the hardboiled police detective on their operations. War, initially a lucrative option to cut into other gang’s operations has now become too costly. Maybe it is a stalemate, maybe the increasing dangers to families and neighborhoods, but the gangsters have decided to cut a deal to stop the war. They may divide the city in territories, they may exchange hostages, and they may place some types of activity beyond the pale. They will to put it differently strive to create a regime to help them resolve past and future issues in a pacific manner. They will also defend the regime promising grisly ends to whoever breaks its rules and stipulations. Or alternatively, they might just place certain “tips” to informants of the hard-broiled detective. But they will have peace to enjoy their hard, if ill-gotten gains. Let us move to a better lit conference space, situated not in the dank basement of a seedy establishment but on the top floor of a New York skyscraper. Still ubiquitous is the acerbic smoke of cigars and cigarettes, but this time of much better