Crisis Framing and Credibility: The influence of crisis communication efforts of public leaders on political standing after an unexpected private sector disaster
Jieun Gina Park Student number: S1616099 [email protected]
Supervisor: Dr. Ruth S. Prins Second reader: Dr. Joery Matthys
Master Thesis, MSc in Crisis and Security Management Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Universiteit Leiden / Leiden University
Table of Contents 1: Introduction...... 4 1.1. Research Question...... 5 1.2. Concepts to Define...... 6 1.2.1. Crisis...... 6 1.2.2. Crisis Communication ...... 7 1.2.3. Political Standing ...... 8 1.3. Relevance ...... 8 1.3.1. Academic Relevance ...... 8 1.3.2. Practical Relevance ...... 9 2: Theoretical Framework...... 10 2.1. State of the Art ...... 10 2.2. Main models/theoretical framework to be used...... 13 2.2.1. Boin et. al (2009) – Crisis Framing...... 14 2.2.2. Coombs (1998) – Seven Crisis Communication Strategies ...... 15 2.2.3. Additional modelling extension – the Integrated Crisis Communication-Political Standing Model ...... 17 3: Methodology ...... 20 3.1. Research Design and Case Selection ...... 20 3.1.1. Overall Strategy...... 20 3.1.2. Case Study Design ...... 20 3.2. Operationalisation of concepts...... 22 3.3. Data Collection and Analysis...... 25 3.4. Limitations/Quality of the Research ...... 29 4: Case Analysis 1 - The Sewol Case...... 31 4.1. The Sewol Ferry Disaster...... 31 4.2. Crisis Communication, Prime Minister Chung Hong-won...... 32 4.3. Political Standing, Prime Minister Chung Hong-won ...... 36 5: Case Analysis 2 - The Deepwater Oil Spill Case ...... 39 5.1. The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill ...... 39 5.2. Crisis Communication, President Barack Obama...... 40 5.3. Political Standing, President Barack Obama ...... 46 5.4. Case Comparison ...... 50 6: Conclusion...... 53 6.1. Findings...... 53 6.2. Relevance ...... 55 6.2.1. Academic Relevance ...... 55 6.2.2. Practical Relevance ...... 56 6.3. Issues in Data Analysis ...... 57 6.4. Future Considerations ...... 58 7: Bibliography ...... 59 Introduction...... 59 Theoretical Framework ...... 60 Methodology ...... 61 Case Analysis 1 – The Sewol Case...... 62
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 2 Case Analysis 2 – The Deepwater Oil Spill Case...... 63 Appendix I: Yonhap News Data Collection ...... 66 Appendix II: Chosun Ilbo Data Collection ...... 68 Appendix III: CNN Data Collection ...... 70 Appendix IV: Washington Post Data Collection...... 72
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 3 1: Introduction The world today is becoming more interconnected, and perhaps more crisis prone. During these times of crises, the public looks to the government for safety, security and answers; as such, the ability or inability of the leader to provide an appropriate response to this demand determines his or her political standing after the immediate crisis is over. Crises have become another battleground in the political game for the public leader, yet the magnitude of crisis communication has not yet been recognised in proportion to its importance. With the continued globalisation and cooperation of joint-partnerships between the private and public sectors, the actions of one increasingly affect the other; subsequently any crisis that occurs demands appropriate communication from both sectors. In this light, it is crucial that crisis communication is explored for managing reputation and political standing, as it is political, and therefore strategic.
The effect of crises is palpable, both for the actors involved as well as for the overall community at hand. In the public sector, we have seen that bad crisis management can lead to the demise of the politician both through reputational standing and by physical holding of the office, mostly in cases of personal scandals such as the case of New York governor Eliot Spitzer, or after handling of public protests such as the criminal trials of Hosni Mubarak after his resignation (Washington Post, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 2011). In the private sector we see that bad crisis management can lead to the bankruptcy and dissipation of an entire organisation, shown by cases such as Lehman Brothers and Enron (Wiggins et. al, 2014; McLean and Elkind, 2013).
There are also instances where we observe a seemingly private sector incident cause dramatic fallout in the public sector. This is usually due to the uncovering of a connection – often accompanied activities that are illegal or in the grey zone – between a firm and a public leader. Still, there exists a real-world puzzle for situations where no direct connection is observed between the two sectors, and yet still leads to very tangible and striking consequences for the public official. The public leader in these cases may have no personal links to agents surrounding the crisis, and no knowledge of the causes, mechanisms or the scale of the crisis that is unfolding in front of his or her eyes. However, these crises may lead to the downfall, or trigger greater political power for the public official. This paper aims to study this puzzle
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 4 from the perspective of crisis communication, because crisis communication affects the reputational aspect of crisis management.
1.1. Research Question The overall objective of this research is to explore the effect of crisis communication efforts of public leaders about a private sector crisis on their political stance, specifically in relation to their reputation. In particular, the efforts of such leaders during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the United States and the Sewol ferry sinking in South Korea will be examined.
The crisis framing model put forth by Boin et. al (2009) and the Seven Crisis Communication Strategies by Coombs (1998) will serve as frameworks for this study. Framing is key to any portrayal of a complex event such as a disaster. The ability to frame a crisis in a certain way allows the public leader to have a degree of control over the event – and thus his or her reputation - regardless of whether or not the framer possesses the physical resources to actually contain it. As such, successful crisis framing directly relates with the officeholder’s reputation, and thus his or her political standing. The seven crisis communications strategies that Coombs presents is a typical list of actions employed by communicators representing an organisation during a crisis; and when a strategy is used that complements the overall framing, it can have a positive effect on the reputational outcome and the standing of the communicator.
The public sphere is different to the private sector. While officeholders face the same concerns of accountability and responsibility as a CEO, the terms vary. A public incumbent is not subject to financial stakeholder concerns related to corporate activities as a private sector leader may be subject to. This means that corporations have stakeholders such as major investors or members of the board of directors, with different motives and goals that guide their crisis communication. The interests of certain stakeholders may be protecting reputation while others are focused on avoiding economic damage; these various inputs have influence in the goals and thus the subsequent strategies of the communicator to achieve this goal. On the other hand, public leaders are primarily responsible for the safety or cohesion of citizens, and the role of each individual leader is crafted so that financial inputs and other potential stakeholders theoretically do not have such a large influence on the goal of their actions. The metrics of comparison differs, and as such, studies in reputation management or standing from a private sector
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 5 point of view is not relevant or enough to be applied to the public sector in its current state. This means that there is a gap in the study of reputation management and standing of public leaders during times of private sector crises.
With this in mind, my Research Question will be as follows: How do crisis communication efforts of public leaders influence their political standing after an unexpected private sector disaster?
The following sub questions will guide the research process: 1. How is crisis communication related to political outcome in the public and private sector? 2. What strategies did each crisis communication leader employ? 3. What was their political stance after the acute stages of the crisis?
1.2. Concepts to Define
1.2.1. Crisis The concept of a crisis in the public sector is poorly defined among scholars in the field of crisis management. However, the general definition that most scholars agree on is the idea that “crisis is… defined as sudden, unexpected, surprising and unpredictable” (Roux-Dufort, 2007:107). The dominant definitions of a crisis in the public and private sector are similar – but in the public sphere, they also usually contain an element of societal urgency, in particular with regards to the idea of governance. Kouzmin restates the idea of Roux-Dufort from a previous study by Rosenthal, Charles and t’Hart – that there are three distinct characteristics that make up a crisis, whether they are natural or man-made: “a severe threat or an unfavourable, destructive and often life-threatening changes to the victim’s environment; a high degree of uncertainty; and the need for prompt, yet critical and potentially irreversible, decisions” (Kouzmin, 2008:158).
Ulmer et. al (2014) define crises in the private sector as “a specific, unexpected, and non-routine event or a series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and simultaneously present an organisation with both opportunities for and threats to its high-priority goals” (Ulmer et. al, 2014:8). This element of
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 6 threat exists similarly as in the public sector definition presented above, but in the private sector there is also a specific mention of crisis as an opportunity.
The practical realities of crises are often subject to the interpretations or perceptions of the social community. Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1993) argue that crises contain multiple realities, with each stakeholder perceiving different threats and priorities before, during, and after a crisis. Hence it becomes very important that the public leader of a community communicates the understanding and responsibilities involved in a manner that addresses the needs of the public. Where the communication and the perceived threats conflict will define the credibility of the public leader to address the consequences of a crisis. With this in mind, this thesis will use a modified version of Kouzmin’s definition of a crisis: A severe threat or unfavourable, destructive changes with a high degree of uncertainty, and the need for prompt, yet critical and potentially irreversible, decisions including communication regarding the public’s sense of security.
1.2.2. Crisis Communication As with the concept of a crisis, “crisis communication, in contrast, is more typically associated with public relations and the need for organizations to repair damaged images after a crisis or a disaster” (Seeger, 2006:234). For crisis managers and other practitioners in the field of crisis management, the objective of a crisis communication strategy is to reduce harm and contain the crisis. However, these objectives may clash depending on the various actors involved in the crisis. For example, a politician’s desire to minimize an embarrassing public scandal contrasts with the public’s desire to discover all the facets involved (Seeger, 2006).
Sellnow et. al (2015) state that crisis communication involves the design of messages in such a way that it calls the attention of the audience, motivates them to understand the crisis in a certain way, and then influences their behaviour. This coincides with Boin et. al (2009), who states that crisis communication consists of framing the information in certain ways to influence the political agenda and outcome.
For this paper, crisis communication will then be defined as information dissemination that seeks to reduce harm and influence reputational outcome during a disaster.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 7 1.2.3. Political Standing The concept of political standing relies heavily on the idea of reputation management. According to Guisinger and Smith (2002), the choice of words and communication methods employed are critical to the credibility – which translates into reputation – of a political actor. A reputation forms when there is dispositional attribution (the idea that the character of the individual determines action) and instances of past behaviour (Mercer, 2010). Dispositional attribution reflects the believability and acknowledgement of the abilities of the leader; past behaviour reflects the predicted capability of the public leader in the future.
This perspective of political standing is especially important as it also looks to the future political standing of a public leader should a second crisis occur. If the leader’s reputation is tarnished through the first crisis, it will have a direct impact on his or her political standing for the second crisis, extracting harsher judgment from the public. The worst-case scenario on a scale of political stance is resignation or termination of the office; the best-case scenario is promotion of office or increased political clout. Political standing comes from the ability of the leader to act accordingly when an incident occurs, and because they represent the people, the leader derives his or her political standing directly from reputation (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998).
With this in mind, this paper will define the political standing of a leader as the official position or title in the government of the incumbent after the acute stages of a crisis. As a result, a change in position or approval of capacity will define the changes in political standing.
1.3. Relevance
1.3.1. Academic Relevance Despite the numerous research conducted on crisis communication and reputation, there are limited studies that have explained the effects of crisis communication strategies on the political standing of a public leader through a mechanism. Crises are often political battlegrounds, especially when they expose problems in the existing structure or policy (t’Hart and Tindall, 2009). However, studies regarding crises that originate from a private sector incident are nil. The spillover research is unavailable, and this research aims to close the gap in literature regarding what mechanism of communication and political standing exist and work during times of crises - which occur from a private sector - for a public leader.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 8 The results of this research may also provide additional insights into existing literature on how communication strategies affect the political standing of a leader, as well as dive deeper into the public- private connection.
1.3.2. Practical Relevance The role of crisis communication is often overshadowed by logistical actions in crisis management. Crisis communication is seen as a supporting role in the overall management of a crisis, enhancing or accelerating the logistical and psychological attempts to return to normalcy (Seeger, 2002). However, because crisis communication has a direct effect on the political standing of a public leader – even in the face of successful logistical response - it is critical for public leaders to understand the role it plays in political management. The results of this research can be important for nations where the public debate can affect the public office, which is particularly apparent in democratic nations. As the risk society becomes more prone to crisis – whether it is due to climate change of the increased interconnectedness of information sharing – public leaders will face greater pressures and frequencies of crisis communication. It is the hope of this research that any new insights can be used for practitioners in the field to improve their crisis communication strategies, particularly those in the public leadership role who often represent the face of the government.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 9 2: Theoretical Framework
2.1. State of the Art Crisis communication literature rests on five key issues or topics, all of which are discussed below. Crisis communication in both the public and private sectors have its origins in the Thomas Theorem and have been developed through the Theory of Attribution. The public sector focuses its crisis communication on management of the physical crisis, while the private sector studies have focused on protecting business value. However, despite this body of knowledge available, the precise relationship between public sector communication regarding the handling of private sector crises is currently unavailable in literature.
Origins Crisis Communication in general rests on the Thomas Theorem: “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Merton, 1995:380). That is, the perceived responsibility for a crisis drives the reputational damage for that responsible actor, whether or not the actor is actually responsible or not. Currently, the body of knowledge regarding crisis communication has largely been driven by incidents and public relations functions in the private sector, making available a large about of literature that is based on reputation management in the corporate sector, or for individuals (which can be also applied to public figures during times of scandal). Many scholars have looked at the communication strategy of crises that have their beginnings and end in the same industry or sector. For example, numerous studies have analysed the crisis communication strategy and reputational damage of British Petroleum (a private company) regarding the Deepwater Horizon Oil spill, which also began as a private sector incident (De Wolf and Mejri, 2013; Harlow et. al, 2011; Villines, 2011).
Public Sector In the public sector, existing crises literature focuses on management of the physical crisis rather than management of reputation communication strategies. The goal of public sector crisis management is to contain actual harm to communities; reputation management is in theory, secondary. This means that if crisis communication doesn’t address this goal of containing fear and uncertainty in the community, it fails. As a consequence, any existing crisis communication literature is limited, and revolves largely
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 10 around the public’s emotional response and the need to restore the sense of safety. In line with this reasoning, past studies have concluded that communication should involve advice that instruct and help citizens to adjust (Coombs and Holladay, 2008). Jin et. al (2007) provide a framework for crisis communication strategies based on the level of engagement and main emotional needs required by the public during various types of crises. Casewise, there are a great number of studies on natural disasters analysing the crisis management actions taken by the government to physically contain the disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina and the Japanese Earthquake of 2011 (Farazmand, 2007; Norio et. al, 2011; Özerdem and Jacoby, 2006; Quarantelli, 1986). There are also studies on reputation management of public figures after a political scandal, as well as general communication best practices (Seeger, 2006; Coombs, 2007). However, there are only limited studies on the procedural effects of communication strategies (or failures) on the public leader.
Psychology and Attribution theory A major theory that provides the basis for many subsequent frameworks for crisis communication in general is Attribution theory. Attribution theory is a social psychological theory which states that people make sense of events by trying to explain the cause of the event (Jaspars et. al, 1983). There are three main dimensions to attribution, but the locus (internal vs. external factors of causation) becomes the key concept for crisis responsibility and drives the communication strategy. William Benoit leads the discourse on such reputation management through crisis communication with his Theory of Image Restoration, which states five main strategies that a company can take in the incident of a crisis: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness of the event, corrective action, and mortification (Benoit, 1997). Denial and evasion of responsibility strategies are taken to reject or minimise the responsibility of the company; reducing offensiveness and corrective action attempt to reduce the offensiveness of the crisis. Lastly, mortification is used to try and restore the company’s image by asking for forgiveness. Benoit however states that the company may not necessarily need to attempt such strategies; it must calculate whether it is more important to restore its image or avoid litigation (Benoit, 1997). While this theory is intended to be applied to corporate image crises, the article rests on the context that reputation ultimately drives standing – an idea that could be applied to public leaders and their political stance.
Private Sector and the Situational Crisis Communication Theory
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 11 Crisis communication often depends on the situation at the time, including who is directly responsible for the occurrence of the crisis. In the private sector, communication strategies are usually employed around protecting business value via reputation. Timothy Coombs uses the Situational Crisis Communication Theory to examine eight best strategy guidelines an actor should utilize during a crisis in order to protect their reputation (Coombs, 2007). The idea is that an organisation’s crisis communication response depends on the level of reputational threat that is posed towards the organisation. Coombs’s guidelines are heavily dependent on the assumption that the actor knows exactly what is happening in the situation, and thus is applicable to circumstances where a crisis has occurred in the realm of organizational control or action. It is limited, however, in areas where an organisation is hit with an unexpected situation, not responsible for the crisis itself, and there is lack of information present at the time.
Media In both sectors, the media plays a large role in crisis communication strategies. Kim and Cameron (2011) found that the emotions generated by news frames largely dictated how the recipient of the news viewed the crisis and assigned blame. Hence, it is important for public leaders to find a way to align their communication framing with what the public perceives; and as the media is the main outlet for information, it becomes critical to find methods to influence their framing. A study by Ljungman (2015) looked at crisis framing strategies employed by government officials during the Ferguson Riots in the United States, and concluded that public leaders can influence the media’s definition of a crisis through specific communication strategies, increasing or decreasing the credibility of the public leader in the process. However, the role of media is studied only in contexts of crises that occur in the same sector as the figure conducting crisis communication.
Relationship between the Public/ Private sectors Overall, private sector literature focuses on reputation risk and the management of reputation once a crisis has occurred, with the understanding that the firm or corporation is responsible at least in part for the crisis at hand. Public sector literature on the other hand, focuses on minimising physical impact on communities, with the understanding that public administration requires physical containment first, and communication second. Additionally, any communication taken should eliminate fear and uncertainty in the community whether or not the sector is responsible for the crisis at hand.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 12
However, we do not yet know the linkage between the two. Very few scholars have looked at the relationship between crisis communication efforts (rather than physical management) and the direct reputational impact on public figures, during crises that did not have its direct triggers in the public sector. This research will try to analyse the relationship between the two, specifically how a private sector crisis can have an impact on public political standing through crisis communication.
According to previous research, “the abilities of leaders are second only to the cause of the event itself in determining the outcome of a disaster” (Casto, 2014:vii). Despite this finding, the relatively rare instances of crises have made it difficult to give an in-depth generalization of this claim. This research also aims to provide additional case analysis to contribute to the state of the art from a crisis communication perspective. As crises increase in our risk society – whether it is perceived or real – public leaders will be able to the scope of their actions reflected in the perceived outcome, and use these case studies to gain their own insights in the world of crisis management.
2.2. Main models/theoretical framework to be used This research is about examining effect of crisis communication strategies used by public leaders during a private sector crisis, which then affects the political standing of that public leader. In order to examine such an effect, two existing models – crisis framing by Boin et. al (2009) and seven crisis communication strategies by Coombs (1998) - were employed and combined together into a third model.
The two models were chosen because they present concrete strategies of crisis communication in both the public and the private sector that actors will engage in to protect or enhance their stance. Both consider the engagement of crisis communication with regards to protecting value: for Boin et. al, this value is the public leader him/herself; for Coombs, this value is the organisation that the speaker represents. Then, I will merge these two models into a third model - combining strategies from both sectors – and apply this new model to see how crisis communication by public leaders affects their political standing after a private sector crisis.
1. Crisis framing by Boin et. al (2009) – public sector
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 13 2. Coombs (1998) analytic framework for crisis communication strategies – private sector 3. Integrated Crisis Communication-Political Standing model
2.2.1. Boin et. al (2009) – Crisis Framing Boin et. al’s crisis framing framework shows how politicians engage in different meaning-making strategies to defend their political capital and/or their policy agendas at times of crises. Crisis here refers to a situation where it is possible to have a “‘dislocation’ of hitherto dominant social, political or administrative discourses” (Boin et. al, 2009:82). The authors propose that when such a crisis occurs, the outcome and aftermath of any particular crisis in the public sector can be explained through ‘framing contests.’ Here different actors in the political sphere will engage in one of three ‘frames’ of communication strategies to gain political tract and generate implications for future capital, including the incumbent politician. This model was chosen for this research because it provides concrete communication frames that a leader will employ during a crisis focused on the public sector. It addresses all the communication possibilities that a public leader will take during a crisis, including specific political stances and policy routes:
The three crisis frames allow government actors try and escape blame for the crisis, defend their political stance, and/or try to advance their stance crisis communication and its exploitation. The first crisis frame
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 14 is denial – essentially, the office-holder attempts to convince the public that there is no crisis, but rather an ‘unfortunate incident.’ As such, there is no blame assigned to any actor, and political repercussions and change in policy is avoided.
The second crisis frame is the threat frame; that a crisis is, in fact, occurring, and that it poses a threat to the public and the status quo. The existence of a crisis is acknowledged, but blame will be assigned carefully so that the status quo can be defended.
The third and last frame is the opportunity frame. This frame acknowledges the existence of a crisis, and views it as a chance to change the status quo or existing policies – in essence, maximizing the crisis. As such, blame is assigned heartily towards an actor or policy and attempts are made to mobilize the public against the status quo.
In the political game, both the incumbent and the critics of the incumbent play into crisis framing, and each must take into account the other’s perceived actions and the trade-off. For example, incumbents have two choices: accept or deny responsibility. Critics can absolve or focus blame. Depending on which actions each take, the outcome will be different for the ruling elite; for example, accepting or denying by the incumbent with the absolution of blame on the part of critics will likely lead to elite escape. On the other hand, accepting responsibility in cases where critics focus blame will likely lead to damage to the incumbent. When the incumbent denies responsibility and critics focus blame, there occurs a “blame showdown” where all outcomes are possible, depending on the strength of each actor (Boin et. al, 2009:89).
2.2.2. Coombs (1998) – Seven Crisis Communication Strategies
Coombs (1998) provides a framework of crisis responses from a private sector point of view, stating that one of the goals in crisis management for an organisation is to protect or repair its image. In this capacity, crisis communication strategies are “symbolic resources crisis managers employ in hope of protecting or repairing the organisational image” (Coombs, 1998:178). Crisis situations and crisis communication strategies are inevitably linked by crisis responsibility, and as such strategies employed by the organisation seek to protect or establish its public legitimacy. Stakeholder perception is the central concern during a crisis, and crisis communication employed by the organisation seeks to
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 15 influence this perception.
Coombs provides a guide of seven basic strategies than an actor will take for responsive crisis communication, in order to decrease the negative effects of a crisis. The choice of strategy will depend on the crisis itself; thus it becomes critical that the actor correctly identifies the crisis he or she is experiencing, and choose the appropriate response. This model was chosen as it is the assumption of this thesis that certain communication responses to a crisis will lead to a decrease in credibility, and thus have a negative effect on the reputation and/or political standing of a public leader. The model provides specific strategies of communication for the private sector, but is also applicable for an analysis of public leader communication in this sense. The strategies presented in this model can also be merged together with the previous model by Boin et. al for a more coherent and detailed basis for data analysis (Ljungman, 2015).
Crisis Communication Strategies Defined by Coombs (1998)
1. Attack the accuser Crisis manager confronts the person or group who claims that a crisis exists. This may include a threat to use “force” (e.g., a lawsuit) against the accuser.
2. Denial Crisis manager states that no crisis exists. This may include explaining why there is no crisis.
3. Excuse Crisis manager tries to minimize the organization’s responsibility for the crisis. This can include denying any intention to do harm, claiming the organization had no control of the events that led to the crisis, or both.
4. Justification Crisis manager tries to minimize the perceived damage associated with the crisis. This can include stating there was no serious damage or injuries or claiming that the victims deserved what they received.
5. Ingratiation Actions are designed to make stakeholders like the organization.
6. Corrective action Crisis managers seek to repair the damage from the crisis, take steps to prevent a repeat of the crisis, or both.
7. Full apology Crisis manager publicly states that the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks forgiveness for the crisis. Some compensation (e.g.,
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 16 money or aid) may be included with the apology.
8. Blame Crisis manager publicly places responsibility of crisis to an external actor or organization and pursues request for action on their part.
Ljungman (2015), in her study of the role of media in crisis framing, added another aspect of crisis communication strategy – blame. This is because the above model by Coombs assumes that the crisis manager’s organisation has a direct role in the management of a crisis aftermath. This is applicable to a private sector crisis, where the organisation must have a crisis management operation and communication strategy for its own survival regardless of the cause of the crisis. Here, blame is not so important in terms of an efficient, defensive posture as is getting ‘back to business’ and stabilizing market value as quickly as possible. In the public sphere, while the political reputation of a politician is often dependent on their crisis management skills, it is possible to have a reputational outcome that is removed from logistical actions via the political game. Placing blame can be successful or can backfire, and as it is a factor that contributes directly to the reputation of the politician, it is applicable to have a blame rhetoric included in the above model. This will widen the horizons of crisis communication strategies in reputation management.
2.2.3. Additional modelling extension – the Integrated Crisis Communication-Political Standing Model With the two frameworks by Boin et. al (2009) and Coombs (1998), along with the combined model by Ljungman (2015), the communication strategies taken by a public leader can be divided into three frames regarding attribution of responsibility: No Crisis, Crisis as Threat, and Crisis as Opportunity. Each have a different set of communicative strategies that attempt to achieve the goals of the crisis framing it falls under. No crisis is a meaning-making frame where no blame for the crisis is attributed to any actors (including the incumbent), and the incumbent either denies that there is a crisis occurring, excuses his office of wrongdoing, or attacks any accusers on his/her office as making false accusations. Crisis as Threat refers a frame where the incumbent feels a threat to his/her holding of office. Communication strategies will acknowledge the existence of a crisis and attribute the responsibility to the incumbent office, in the hopes of pre-emptively controlling the negative amount of public perception towards the incumbent. These can include a range of tactics, from justifications of why the crisis is not as large as it is perceived to be, to diverting attention from the crisis, some actions to correct any
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 17 mistakes occurred, to a full apology where the incumbent takes all responsibility for the crisis. The last frame, Crisis as Opportunity, refers to a frame where the incumbent sees an opportunity to advance his political agenda and to attack any groups that threaten his or her ability to hold the office. Strategies of blame are used to place responsibility on an external actor.
These three frames and their corresponding strategies can lead to a variety of outcomes for the political incumbent, with the understanding that political credibility during a crisis affects the standing of the incumbent after the acute stages of a crisis. This paper aims to provide an innovation to the earlier models to reflect the consequences of crisis communication on the public leader’s end political outcome regarding a private sector crisis. The following model adds the political outcomes that are possible for a public leader after the conduction of crisis communication:
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 18
If a politician or public leader is not credible, they do not represent the people and do not fulfil the functions of the public office. This is poignant even during private sector crises that threaten to affect the community that the public leader’s office is responsible for. The communication leads to three outcomes of political standing: the most positive scenario of the public leader keeping office with increased reputation or a promotion of office; a middle ground where the leader stays in office but suffers a decrease in political standing, and; the worst-case scenario where he or she is removed from the office, is forced to resign, or a submitted resignation is accepted by the governing body of the office. These outcomes can be measured by the status of the public leader, and political approval ratings can be an indicator to reflect the degree to which a certain outcome came about. As this study will only at the outcome after the acute stages of a crisis, these approval ratings can also serve as indicators for future direction, should research concerning stages after the acute period are made.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 19 3: Methodology
3.1. Research Design and Case Selection
3.1.1. Overall Strategy This research is exploratory, and a qualitative research with a comparative case analysis will be used to fully understand the depth of the context and situation in which the crisis communication took place. A qualitative methodology is able to produce analysis at a deeper level for a more dynamic understanding of a phenomenon than through a quantitative methodological research model. This is because the perception of whether a crisis management has been good or bad through communication strategies are subjective, and primarily engages analysis at the ‘human’ level. Some quantitative data of approval ratings employed in the data analysis section is employed to enhance the coherence of the conclusion. This in-depth analysis will allow the examination of who is responsible, what types of communication strategies are employed and how that directly translates to the reputation of a specific public leader.
A case study approach that studies the data in context will be employed, looking at two crises and comparing the communication strategies and the end consequences for a public leader. The case study method was chosen because it “allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events,” a crucial element of this research in allowing application of findings for practical usage (Yin, 2009:4). Case studies are frequently used in social science disciplines – including public administration – and allow an exploration of how and why phenomena occurred without requiring control of behavioural events (Yin, 2009). The research question of this paper requires an analysis of communication and links over a period of time without the ability to control the events, and a case study is the most appropriate method for this study. The two crises chosen are the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, which occurred in the United States in 2010, and the sinking of a privately operated Sewol Ferry in South Korea in 2014. The public leaders chosen in the cases are President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Chung Hong-won respectively.
3.1.2. Case Study Design The case in this study is defined as the conducting of crisis communication by a public leader after the occurrence of a private sector disaster. This research is a study of how the crisis communication by a
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 20 public leader in the two cases chosen – South Korea and the United States during the Sewol disaster and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill respectively – affected his or her political standing. In order to answer this question, this research will use a most similar case analysis, based on the independent variable. The most similar method “employs a minimum of two cases...and is similar in all respects except the independent variables of interest” (Seawright and Gerring, 2008:304). For the study, the variable of interest is the crisis communication strategies that each leader engaged in.
The two cases were selected regarding the following criteria: • Cases from similar political contexts; highly functioning democratic societies, with a stable government accepted by its citizens. Citizens of case countries will have a high degree of freedom of speech towards the government. • Cases of man-made, maritime disasters originating in the private sector. • Cases occurring in developed nations that have a standard, functioning crisis management agency within the government. • Cases with high media exposure – widely televised – during the acute stages of the incident. Incident will remain in the national psyche long after the incident. Crisis will be widely referenced in the political rhetoric (climate change for Deepwater Horizon, and safety regulations for Sewol), and this large social impact means that a large body of information will be accessible for research, making the study feasible. • Cases with a top-level public leader, in charge of operational conduct, conducting crisis communication on behalf of the government. The public leader must hold the responsibility of office for the emergency management agency or coordination at the federal or national level.
Political standing is highly affected by the context of political structure, and so it is paramount that the above controls are held constant across all cases. The countries of both cases (South Korea and the United States), while geographically far apart, both have highly functioning democratic societies as a political context where citizens and societal pressure can (and do) affect the political standing of a public leader. South Korea’s democracy was also created with a large influence by the United States, and thus the values in both countries are similar in its core. These controls provide a valid study from a research design point of view, allowing the assumption that a difference in crisis communication strategies is the influential factor for the outcome in political standing. Gerring (2006) states that, “exact matching [of
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 21 cases] is often impossible” (p135). Thus this study uses approximate matching, where cases are considered “close enough” in the relevant factors applicable to the study.
While the two incidents are not the same (one was an oil spill and the other a ship sinking), both cases were maritime incidents that started out as a purely private incident without direct connections with the government official that conducted the crisis communication in its aftermath. The criteria chosen also further narrows the selection of cases to a very specific situation. This allows any findings of this thesis to be considered to have greater validity than if the criteria had applied to a more expansive selection of cases. This paper does recognise that while the internal validity is high due to an intensive study of the cases, the external validity is low due to its small-N study. However, it is the hope that engaging in a deep analysis of these cases – similar in its core - will reveal the factors that differ across these cases, and thus the connection between communication and political standing for further studies in the future.
3.2. Operationalisation of concepts
Frame/ Concept Definition - Indicators Data Source Outcome adapted from Coombs (1998) • Official written Attacking the Public leader • Words of anger statements accuser confronts the against accuser • Oral statements person or group • Threat to use News reports with who claims that a force (e.g. • direct quotes No Crisis crisis exists. lawsuit) against Case1: Yonhap accuser o News, Chosun Ilbo o Case2: CNN, Washington Post • Official written Denial of a crisis Public leader states • Words such as statements that no crisis exists, “there is no Oral statements and no blame is crisis,” “this • News reports with placed on any incident” • direct quotes actor. This may • No words of Case1: Yonhap include explaining blame on any o News, Chosun why there is no actor – “nobody’s Ilbo crisis. Outrage may fault,” Case2: CNN, also be present. “unfortunate o Washington accident” Post
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 22 • Official written Excuse Public leader tries • Words such as statements to minimize the “we had no way Oral statements government’s of knowing” • • News reports with connection to the • “This crisis could direct quotes crisis. This can not have been Case1: Yonhap include denying prevented” o News, Chosun any intention, Ilbo claiming there was Case2: CNN, no control of the o Washington events that led to Post the crisis, or both. • Official written Justification Public leader tries • “Impact is statements to minimize the minimal” • Oral statements perceived damage • Words relating to News reports with associated with the quick and full • direct quotes crisis. This can recovery o Case1: Yonhap Crisis as include stating • “The victims News, Chosun Threat there was no knew the risks” Ilbo serious damage or Case2: CNN, injuries or claiming o Washington that the victims Post deserved what they received. • Official written Ingratiation Public leader takes • Words that statements actions to increase highlight Oral statements approval and achievements • News reports with likeability of during the crisis • direct quotes himself/herself that • Words that Case1: Yonhap may or may not be highlight actions o News, Chosun related to the crisis. of “going above Ilbo and beyond” o Case2: CNN, • Words that Washington highlight Post achievements unrelated to the crisis • Official written Corrective Action Public leader seeks • Stating flaws in statements to repair the the current policy Oral statements damage from the or system • • News reports with crisis, take steps to • Words of the direct quotes prevent a repeat of need for change – Case1: Yonhap the crisis, or both. “this system must o News, Chosun Public leader by be improved” Ilbo also seek to push Case2: CNN, his or her agenda. o Washington This may include Post policy change or an advocacy of a
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 23 policy change.
• Official written Full apology Public leader • Words of taking statements publicly states that full responsibility Oral statements the office or – “it is our fault”; • News reports with government takes “we assume full • direct quotes full responsibility responsibility” o Case1: Yonhap for the crisis and • Words of apology News, Chosun asks forgiveness – “we are deeply Ilbo for the crisis. Some sorry” o Case2: CNN, compensation (e.g., • Words stating Washington money or aid) may provision of Post be included with compensation the apology. • Official written Crisis as Blame Public leader • Statements of statements Opportunity publicly places blame on external Oral statements responsibility of actor – “it is the • News reports with crisis to an external fault of [actor x]” • direct quotes actor or • Statements of the Case1: CNN, organization and need for change o Washington pursues request for in external actor – Post action on their part. “[actor x] must Case2: CNN, do [action y]” o Washington Post • Polls regarding crisis Positive Incumbent stays in Public leader • Public leader Approval ratings of Outcome office with increased remains in the stays in the office • public leader before or continued level of office or is • Public leader is and after the crisis political reputation, promoted, and promoted to a or is promoted to a public opinion higher office higher office reflects approval of • Approval ratings public leader rise through polls or • Polls show approval ratings. positive view on public leader’s capability of crisis • Polls regarding crisis Middle Incumbent stays in Public leader • Public leader Approval ratings of Outcome office, with remains in the stays in the office • public leader before decreased political office, and public • Approval ratings and after the crisis reputation opinion reflects decline disapproval of • Polls show public leader negative or through polls or neutral view on approval ratings. public leader’s capability of crisis • Government press Negative Incumbent is Public leader is no • Public leader release regarding public
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 24 Outcome removed from office longer in office; resigns or is leader’s office by impeachment or speeches of removed from • News media resignation resignation or office reports of impeachment announced.
3.3. Data Collection and Analysis Data will be collected from responses of leaders through official written statements, oral statements, and direct quotes gathered through news reporting, including press releases. For the case of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, statements from the President, Barack Obama, will be used; these include press statements and official statements from the Presidential website, as well as news outlets CNN and the Washington Post. To gather more data where official statements may not be available on record, news articles will be used to get direct quotes. For the Sewol case, the same official statements by Prime Minister Chung Hong-won will be gathered (available in Korean) and translated into English for this study. An issue here may be that the Korean translations that the author provides could run the risk of decreasing the quality of the research with bias. In order to eliminate this bias, direct quotes from selected news agencies – Yonhap News and The Chosun Ilbo (English: The Chosun Times) - that provide articles in both English and Korean will also be used. This triangulation of data sources will provide a more robust analysis of data, leading to greater accuracy and validity of this study.
CNN was chosen as a news agency that often takes into account political agendas when reporting. It also has an international focus, which will provide a broader understanding of issues in the United States. The Washington Post was chosen not only as a major newspaper across the United States, but also as a news source whose reporting closely centres around the political sphere in Washington, DC. Both sources of crisis communication data will provide a broad and mostly accurate context of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Similarly, Yonhap News was chosen as the largest news agency in South Korea with broad coverage of events occurring in and out of the country. Chosun Ilbo was chosen as another major newspaper, with one of the largest website visits daily. Both sources will again, provide a broad and mostly accurate context of the Sewol ferry incident.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 25 The keywords used to search for news reports regarding the Sewol crisis were ‘정홍원’ [Chung Hong- won], ‘국무총리’ [Prime Minister], ‘진도 여객선’ [Jindo Passenger Ship], ‘세월호’ [Sewol Ferry], ‘Chung’, ‘Prime Minister’, and ‘Sewol Ferry’. The keywords used to search for news reports regarding the Deepwater Horizon oil spill were ‘Obama’, ‘Deepwater Horizon’, and ‘BP Oil Spill’.
The acute phase of the crisis will determine the time period of data collection and analysis for this study; that is, the time period from the incident itself to the when crucial crisis management decisions are made. An acute phase of the crisis is often the initial and only moment to frame a crisis, especially from a political standpoint, and will be the most appropriate phase for data collection and analysis of this study. Thus the time period of news reports will be 12 days for Sewol ferry disaster, from the sinking of the vessel to the resignation of the Prime Minister (16 April 2014 – 27 April 2014). For the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the time period will be 87 days for Deepwater Horizon, from the first day of the oil rig explosion to date when the majority of the leak was ‘capped,’ ending the immediate spillage of oil into the ocean (20 April 2010 – 15 July, 2010). Although the two datasets present a large difference in timescale, it is the belief of the author that the differences in time will not affect the identification and analysis of major crisis communication strategies that each public leader took.
Thus the data collected will be from the following criteria: a) For the Deepwater Horizon oil spill: • Direct crisis communication conducted by President Obama and his office; and/or • Direct quotes of President Obama and his office reflected in the news agencies CNN and The Washington Post; • During the 87 day period of oil rig leakage; • Relating directly to the oil spillage in the Deepwater Horizon oilrig. b) For the Sewol Ferry disaster: • Direct crisis communication conducted by Prime Minister Chung Hong-won and his office; and/or • Direct quotes of Prime Minister Chung Hong-won and his office reflected in the news agencies Yonhap News and the Chosun Ilbo in Korean or English; • During the 12 day period immediately following the sinking of the ferry; • Relating directly to the sinking of the Sewol Ferry and its aftermath.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 26
Then, the data will be mapped along the Integrated Crisis Communication Model, which provides a multi-level understanding of crisis communication strategy undertaken by each public leader built upon existing frameworks discussed in Chapter 2. The information will be coded along the indicators from the operationalisation table, and interpreted using the integrated model, linking the framing and strategy of the public leader’s crisis communication to the results of their political standing. Coding is commonly applied in qualitative research to analyse text data, allowing the researcher to come to a clear conclusion based on the designed scheme (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). The results section will see how closely the crisis communication strategies aligned with the chosen models and a comparison will be made with how the public viewed the public leader, available through polls and approval ratings.
The coding scheme was created by placing each strategic element of the integrated model from ‘denial’ to ‘blame’ into a table. Definitions from Coombs’ crisis communication strategies (1998) were placed after some alterations to fit in a public sector context. Then, indicators to deduce how to identify such a strategy from crisis communication text – essentially, the language that could reflect such a strategy – were created. This coding scheme will then be applied to the existing data. First, specific language will be analysed, using words from the communication that have direct connotations to a certain strategy, matching the indicators to the operationalisation table, and cannot be interpreted in any other way in context. For example the word “I’m sorry” is clearly an apology, and cannot be considered to match with any of the remaining seven strategies. Words or phrases that fall under two or more categories on their own will be skipped. Most communication conducted by a public leader is the product of an effort to send a certain message, and as such, there will be clear indicators that will allow us to pinpoint towards a certain strategy. If another strategy is seen, then it will be determined which strategy is the major point of the article, and the minor strategy will be coded as a secondary strategy (Appendix).
This paper acknowledges that there may be more than a single message seen in each piece of crisis communication, as the public leader may have multiple agendas that they wish to discuss, or because the public leader simply does not know his or her own agenda. With this in mind, the coding will be done at two levels - primary coding and secondary coding – to see what other strategies were seen. This will provide a better context and nuance for the analysis stage. Primary coding will consist of the main
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 27 message, seen by repeated indicators. Secondary coding will be applied to indicators that are present but lack emphasis or strength to designate it a main strategy.
Poll and approval ratings will be taken directly from the source – and polls that show approval ratings of the leaders as well as additional polls regarding the handling of the crisis itself will be used when available. The approval ratings directly correlate with how the public views the leader’s reputation; and as discussed above, because the leader derives his or her political standing directly from reputation, approval ratings will allow us to measure the degree to which the leader’s political standing was eroded or enhanced. In order to measure the impact that the crisis communication had on the public leader’s standing, these measurements will also be made before the crisis occurred. Polls relating to the crises provide a more direct reputational feedback; because other issues that are separate from the crisis may affect approval ratings of a public leader, these polls can decrease some of the bias that may be present by its focus. Thus, this paper will look at the approval ratings of the public leaders in question (Obama and Chung) both before and after the respective crises. Public polls regarding the crisis in its aftermath will also be employed when available, and these will provide the scale of change political standing for these two leaders.
The technique for data analysis will be deductive coding of each instance of crisis communication conducted by the offices of Obama and Chung. Indicators from the theoretical model will be used to code each piece of information. The codes will be mapped out along the metrics indicated in the operationalisation table, and secondary codes of strategy will also be mapped out in order to provide a more intensive analysis. These will then be put together at the end to see which strategy each public leader engaged in most frequently. Then, polls and approval ratings will be used (if required and available) along with the visible end political standing of each leader to determine the degree of outcome present in the incumbent’s final standing. Patterns in communication will be matched, and a comparison will be made between the major crisis communication strategies to the political standing to determine the link between the two.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 28
3.4. Limitations/Quality of the Research The two major limitations affecting the quality of this research is the availability of primary data (particularly for the Sewol crisis) and the time constraint of this study. Because the aftermath of both crises are still present in current political debates, the author has chosen to limit the study to a 12-day period for Sewol and an 87-day period for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill; in other words, the acute stages of each crisis. The limited access to primary data means that research may not be as robust as it could be.
The difficulty in gaining access to primary data is present particularly in South Korea, where full transcriptions or videos of remarks and statements by a public leader are not readily available or even recorded. Only official statements given in front of the press at a conference are available, and other remarks are found through snippets of quotations in media coverage. This extends to approval ratings, which are limited to the Presidential office.
A usual problem for a case study research is that results are unable to be generalised as it is based on one or a few cases, rendering them specific to their situation and context – the very reason why the case study research is also an advantage for this study. However, this research study looks at how the crisis communication strategies of a government leader influence a political outcome or policy change, rather than the specific characteristics of the case context. Another critique of the case study approach in this method is that the case study may be conducted at an abstract level; however, this research has been design to minimize this issue through specific measurements, indicators, and data. The clear protocol for data collection was set to increase the validity for the analysis. This research does not predict that the findings of this study will present a pure causal mechanism, but it is the aim of the research to explore potential connections as a first study. This study can be reapplied and tested with a greater number of cases across all types of crises that affect the public sphere and its leader in a similar political context.
A final limitation regarding the quality of research may be that the Korean-English translation skills of the author may not be at a level of academic expertise. However, it is the opinion of the author that any
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 29 minor mistakes in direct translation will not affect the detection of the implied communication strategy, and thus will not have an impact on the quality of the analysis of this paper.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 30 4: Case Analysis 1 - The Sewol Case 4.1. The Sewol Ferry Disaster On April 16, 2014 at 1030am, a ferry – the MV Sewol - that carried 476 people, mostly high school students on a school trip from Danwon High School, sank off of the coast of South Korea en route from Incheon to Jeju Island. The incident led to 295 deaths and nine (9) missing out of 476 on board, along with widespread political and social reactions both in Korea and abroad (Yonhap News, n.d.). The ferry was operated by a private company – Cheonghaejin Marine – and investigations led to the conclusion that: a) the vessel was past its lifetime and should not have been in operation, and; b) the modifications constructed on the vessel by the company to accommodate more passengers was illegal and severely affected the stability and safety of the boat. However, the MV Sewol had previously passed an inspection by the South Korean Coast Guard.
The sinking of MV Sewol was complicated in the immediate aftermath by a series of communication mishaps regarding false information from all channels. Major newspapers and media outlets such as the Joongang Ilbo initially reported that all students were safe, then revised their reports to include those who were found to be deceased. The government also revised the numbers of those aboard several times in press releases (Yonhap News, 2014a). Crisis management coordination was slow in its initial stages, as emergency agencies could not mobilise rescue efforts quickly enough, losing precious time.
The Sewol incident led to a prosecution of members of Cheonghaejin Marine, along with other members related to ensuring the safety of the vessel’s passage. Captain Lee Jun-Seok was initially found guilty of negligence, then for murder, which resulted in life imprisonment. Fourteen other crewmembers were also found guilty on lesser chargers and also imprisoned (Evans, 2015).
The government also faced tremendous backlash in its regulation of the safety laws and industry governance. The responsibility of the regulation of shipping in Korea lies with the Korean Shipping Association, an industry trade group, and criticisms also occurred regarding the conflict of interesting safety and business. The Sewol disaster is widely regarded as one of the worst maritime disasters in South Korean history, both in the number and young ages of the people dead, but also in the social and
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 31 political reactions that followed. The vice principal of Danwon High School - who was among those rescued - committed suicide after taking responsibility for the organisation of the school trip (Park and Kim, 2014). Yellow ribbons, initially used to commemorate those who had died, has now become a symbol of national mourning and is dotted around various large monuments in Seoul and elsewhere today.
4.2. Crisis Communication, Prime Minister Chung Hong-won Prime Minister Chung Hong-Won conducted the bulk of crisis communication representing the Park administration during the crisis. In South Korea, the Prime Minister’s office – as a representative and executive assistant to the President - is responsible for the coordination and supervision of various ministries. As such, the office of the Prime Minister acts as the logistical executive for the Ministry of Security and Public Administration, of which the National Emergency Management Agency is a part. The Prime Minister’s office directly represents the President and the administration, and in this capacity serves as the top-level office responsible for emergency management ("Organization Chart", 2013).
On the afternoon of April 16, 2014, the same day of the sinking of the ship, the Prime Minister returned from his diplomatic trip abroad and immediately called for an emergency meeting, stating that “I feel an infinite responsibility” regarding the ongoing sinking of the ship and the missing on board (Chosun Ilbo, 2014a).
The next day on April 17th, Chung visited the families of the missing gathered in southern Korea offering words of condolence and a personal commitment, such as “I know how you feel” and “I will do my best” to find the missing. However, when the families lashed out at him, pelting him with water bottles, his words turned to repeated apology as he backed out of the auditorium: “I’m sorry, I’m sorry” (Chosun Ilbo, 2014b).
These words of apology continued during his next two public appearances regarding the sinking of the ship, as he explained what was hampering the search and rescue missions: "Confusion as ministries concerned failed to share information…without coordination” (Oh, 2014a). He followed up with an apology for the confusing and scattered government communication that had occurred through various
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 32 agencies, citing a mishap in the system and stating that actions have been taken to address the issue (Yonhap News, 2014b). The day after, on the 20th, he explicitly stated that he felt “like a criminal” and that all methods for search and rescue missions will be analysed and employed (Chosun Ilbo, 2014c).
On the following day, Chung took a break from communicating his sense of responsibility as Prime Minister to praise the rescue efforts of volunteers in the crisis. This ingratiation method complemented his announcement to deem the area of the ship’s sinking to a ‘special disaster area’ to compensate the efforts of the volunteers of the search and rescue, and he asked that the volunteers “please continue to help us” as a vital asset to the operations (Chosun Ilbo, 2014d). He then acknowledged the system failure of the safety plan the day after, and vowed to restructure the existing model for better safety in the future. However, an element of conflicting apology and blame was apparent in his speech, rendering a mixed message: “a stern punishment of those responsible…I feel sorry for the confusion in the government’s initial responses and the failure” (Oh, 2014b).
Finally, on the 27th of April, he gave a final speech of resignation in his address to the nation, taking full personal responsibility for the Sewol disaster: “I apologise to the nation…my head is bowed…I believe I should take full responsibility for the tragedy…I have seen too many flaws in this system” (Prime Minister’s Secretariat, 2014). This full apology appropriated all government responsibility and logistical operational failure personally to Chung, as he tried to spare the President of blame.
Figure 1: Crisis Communication Strategies of Prime Minister Chung Hong-won during the Sewol disaster, 16 Apr-27 Apr 2014
Other Primary Secondary Date Article Name Articles Language Coding Coding Citing Quote
[진도 여객선 침몰] 정홍원 "1분1초도 주저하지 말라" 16- Full [Jindo Passenger Ship “I feel an infinite responsibility.” Apr Sinking- Chung Apology Hong-won: "Do not be idle for a single second or minute"]
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 33 정홍원 국무총리, 세월호 피해가족에게 거센 항의…물병에 깡통 17- 세례까지 “I know how you feel” / “I will do Full
Apr [PM Chung Hong- my best” / “I'm sorry.” Apology won faced with aggressive protests from family of Sewol victims: water bottles and cans thrown]
(5th LD) Rescue “Confusion as ministries concerned 19- efforts continue as Full failed to share information…without Apr death toll rises from Apology coordination.” sunken ferry
<여객선침몰> 정홍원 총리 "정부 "I apologise for the confusion in 발표 혼선 죄송 " announcements" / "From now on we 19- [Passenger Ship have made sure that all Full Corrective Apr Sinking: PM Chung announcements will be made at the Apology Action Hong-won 'apologise same time from the task force…with for confusing confirmed information." government announcement']
[세월호 참사] 정홍원 국무총리 “I feel like a criminal” / “I will 20- "죄인 된 심정" Full analyse all method sand employ Apr [Sewol ferry sinking: Apology PM Chung Hong-won them for search and rescue.” "I feel like a criminal"]
[세월호 참사] To the volunteers: “Your effort is 鄭총리, '자원봉사' contributing enormously to the 진도군민에 사의 search and rescue effort” / “The 21- 표시 government has designated the area Ingratiation Apr [Sewol ferry sinking: as 'special disaster area' to PM Chung expresses compensate for the efforts” / “Please thanks to volunteers continue to help us.” of Jindo]
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 34 "Learning a lesson from the tragedy, the government will come up with an Full PM vows safety innovative safety master plan" / "A Apology; 22- Corrective master plan to prevent stern punishment of those some Apr Action deadly disaster responsible" / "I feel sorry for the elements confusion in the government's initial of Blame responses and the failure..."
Yonhap News – "I apologise to the nation" / "My 국무총리 English (27- Apr); head is bowed" / "I believe I should 27- 기자회견문 Full Corrective take full responsibility for the Apr Chosun Ilbo Apology Action [Prime Minister Press tragedy" / "I have seen too many – Korean Conference] flaws in this system." (27-Apr)
Given analysis of all of the above, we see that out of the eight (8) crisis communication conducted over a 12-day period, six (6) of those fell under Full Apology, and one (1) each under Ingratiation and Corrective Action. Applying the findings to the model, we can conclude that the framing strategy that Chung engaged in was Crisis as Threat, as all coding falls under this frame.
According to Boin et. al (2009), the Crisis as Threat frame is used to defend the incumbent office holders of the status quo against criticism – in this case, the office of Chung and his policies. It is interesting to find that the government immediately took responsibility for the crisis instead, although the initial cause of the incident was due to the fault of Cheonghaejin Marine Company. Upon further inspection, we see that Chung did not differentiate public opinion from responsibility for the crisis itself, to responsibility for emergency response; his first public words were “I feel an infinite responsibility” without specifications on what he felt responsible for (Chosun Ilbo, 2014a). Thus the discourse quickly focused on the fault of the government, and specifically the Office of the Prime Minister, and his consistency in using the Full Apology strategy served to strengthen the discourse.
There was also no strong statement of attribution of fault to the private company during the initial framing. By the time Chung finally deemed an external actor as the responsible party on April 22 – “a stern punishment of those responsible” – it was already past the crucial time frame to attribute responsibility, after six occasions of consistent apology (Oh, 2014b). There was also a lack of
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 35 information given on the operational aspects of the crisis, perhaps further questioning the knowledge and credibility of the Prime Minister.
4.3. Political Standing, Prime Minister Chung Hong-won The Prime Minister’s office in Korea does not have a measurement of its job approval ratings, unlike that of other nations such as the United States. Thus the data to indicate the level of his political standing from a public opinion metric does not exist. The data that indicates the level of performance of the administration as a whole also is not available, as Korean politics equate the government with the President. The Prime Minister also did not appear before any court hearings or other indicators of political standing regarding the crisis. However, this case has an extreme outcome: after eleven days of conducting communication, Chung formally resigned from his office in a televised announcement. The President accepted his resignation the same day (Oh, 2014c). Therefore, with this information, we can lay out the progress of his political standing in the chart below, using the first date of his crisis communication as the starting point.
Date Political Standing 16-Apr In office 27-Apr Resignation, accepted
Looking at the operationalisation table, the public leader resigns from office, along with a government press release announcing his intentions and the subsequent reflections in the media regarding the acceptance from the administration (Oh, 2014c). Consequently we can conclude that the outcome in this case was extremely negative – an accepted resignation. However, it must be noted that while his resignation was officially accepted, he remained in office per se until the search-and-rescue efforts of the crisis was concluded in order not to disrupt the process; and he actually left the office on February 16, 2015. The author does not believe this to affect the validity of this study, as his resignation was officially accepted and he operated strictly on a temporary basis due to crisis circumstances. Furthermore, there was no room or opportunity for change in resignation status in any given time frame. On the other hand, this does present a peculiar state of affairs, as this stay in office for crisis operations shows that he was still considered as a capable administrator. Thus, while the outcome is still extremely negative, the public’s perception of his credibility can be viewed as less harsh.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 36
With these indicators, we can conclude that Chungs’s political standing after his communication strategy was to frame the crisis as a threat which led to an extremely negative outcome of accepted resignation, based on the Integrated Model in Chapter Two.
Chung’s eventual negative outcome of accepted resignation can be seen with three factors present in communication, stemming from the choice of strategy. The Full Apology strategy falls under the framing of Crisis as Threat, which acknowledges that a crisis exists and that it poses a threat to the public and the status quo. Responsibility is assigned to carefully so that the status quo can be defended. According to Boin et. al (2009), the use of Crisis as Threat has two preferred scenarios of elite escape by blame minimization or avoidance, and a worst-case scenario of elite damage by blame acceptance. When the incumbent accepts responsibility, critics can absolve or focus blame; should they absolve blame, blame minimisation occurs and elite escape is likely. Should critics focus blame, the scenario of blame acceptance occurs and elite damage is likely. In accepting responsibility – using Full Apology - Chung’s strategy became dependent on external actors choosing not to focus blame. However, the most emotional
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 37 group of the crisis – the families of the victims – chose to focus the blame on his office (shown by acts such as throwing water bottles at the Prime Minister), with political opponents quickly following suit. Deviating from the expectations about intended framing outcomes as presented in Boin’s model, Chung did not attribute the initial incident of the ferry sinking to an external actor, leading an establishment of responsibility squarely to his office. In fact, Chung directly pinpointed the blame to himself. Finally, Chung consistently made these messages throughout the entire initial response phase. The incumbent accepted responsibility, and his critics focused blame, leading to a negative outcome of resignation.
In this case, Chung used the framing strategy of Crisis as Threat, employing the use of Full Apology in his communication. This led to a worst-case scenario of accepted resignation, because he did not externalise any responsibility and his critics focused the blame on his office. Thus it can be concluded that his strategy was unsuccessful in achieving the goal of diffusing blame and protecting of the status quo, the intended outcome of this framing strategy (Boin et. al, 2009). The relationship between crisis communication and outcome here is that accepting full responsibility by communicating Full Apology under the Crisis as Threat frame will lead to elite damage, and a worst case outcome. However, it must also be noted that this paper acknowledges the limitations of using crisis communication solely as the basis for the end political standing of Chung; and that this outcome was affected by other factors such as physical search and rescue efforts.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 38 5: Case Analysis 2 - The Deepwater Oil Spill Case
5.1. The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill On the evening of April 20, 2010, a gas explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon oilrig situated in the Gulf of Mexico, killing 11 people and injuring several others (BP United States, n.d.). Those killed were among 126 workers who were in the process of temporarily closing the Macondo oil well, an exploratory well operated by British Petroleum (BP) in collaboration with contractors Halliburton and Transocean (Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, 2011). Subsequently, the rig sank and leaked oil into the ocean at a rate of about 53,000 barrels of oil per day, which was finally blocked by the capping of the well on July 15. It is considered the largest accidental maritime oil spill in the world’s history (Robertson and Krauss, 2010).
Immediately after reports of the explosion was received by the United States Coast Guard, a search and rescue mission was dispatched along with a pollution and marine casualty case investigation. 115 out of 126 workers were accounted for by April 26 – six days later – and the remaining 11 were deemed missing, suspected to have been present in the immediate area of the explosion. Nine days later, on April 29, the incident was declared a ‘Spill of National Significance’ (US Coast Guard, 2011).
Lawsuits were filed by both individuals and the Obama administration against: BP, the oil company; Halliburton, the largest offshore drilling company in the world; Transocean, the oil service firm; Cameron, the manufacturer of the rig’s unsuccessful blowout preventer, and other companies in the joint-venture with BP (Mufson and Eilperin, 2010; Pelofsky and Vicini, 2010). These lawsuits are still going on today.
Later in the aftermath of the crisis, the Obama Administration also created an independent National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling to investigate the incidents, which found that the disaster could’ve been prevented, and that the fault lay with BP, Halliburton and Transocean (National Commission, 2011:vii).
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 39 Cleanup logistics were spread across a wide geographical area, divided into four zones: the source of the spill, offshore, near the shore, and in-shore, by volunteers and officials alike. Logistics included dispersants to break down the oil present in the water, in situ burning to burn off the oil, the use of skimmers to collect the oil into a single area, and protecting the shoreline to stop the spread of oil onto land (US Coast Guard, 2011). However, many of these efforts were hampered by the fact that the leak in the well was unable to be secured, and was continuously spilling thousands of barrels of oil into the ocean day after day. When the well was capped on July 15 – 87 days after the explosion - the response “involved approximately 47,000 responders, more than 6,870 vessels…approximately 4.12 million feet of boom, [and] 17,500 National Guard troops from Gulf Coast states” (US Coast Guard, 2011).
5.2. Crisis Communication, President Barack Obama In the United States, the Office of the President holds the power over emergency management at the federal level, with the authority to activate the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) through a disaster declaration of an emergency. FEMA is also part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2015).
President Obama made 17 official statements and remarks specifically regarding the Deepwater Horizon oil spill from April 20 to July 15. This does not include statements made as part of other political events or occasions such as interviews that the President’s office regularly engages in – two (2) are included in the chart below, bringing the total count to 19 pieces of crisis communication for analysis.
On the 30th of April, ten days after the initial explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oilrig, President Obama conducted his first official statement on the crisis as it became clear that this incident was escalating to become a serious disaster. He immediately pointed to BP as the responsible party for the incident and thus the consequences – “BP is ultimately responsible for funding the cost of response and cleanup operations.” However, the President also emphasised that the federal government intended to inject a large pool of resources to help American communities affected, despite this lack of fault on the part of the government: “…we are fully prepared to meet our responsibilities to any and all affected communities” (The White House, 2010a).
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 40 The rest of Obama’s crisis communication strategy follows this idea of blaming BP and other affiliated companies for the disaster. Along with this strategy, Obama continuously emphasised the seriousness of the impacts on the environment and reinstated the active command of the federal government in providing aid to communities. Statements such as “this oil spill is the worst environmental disaster America has ever faced” and “from the moment this disaster began, the federal government has been in charge of the response effort…” were made to emphasis these points (The White House, 2010b; The White House, 2010c). These elements of communication are consistent throughout the entire period of examination, through the 15th of July.
There are, however, moments when Obama acknowledged some responsibility of the crisis, as shown by his remarks in late May: “but...I ultimately take responsibility for solving this crisis. I’m the President and the buck stops with me.” However, this element of apology is always accompanied by a specific statement of blame on BP such as “BP is the responsible party for this disaster,” somewhat negating the impact of a full apology and delegating it to a secondary strategy in light of other communication observed (The White House, 2010d).
Ultimately during the course of his crisis communication from April to mid-July, Obama engaged in 15 counts of the Blame strategy, two (2) counts of Ingratiation and two (2) counts of Corrective Action.
Figure 2: Crisis Communication Strategies of President Obama during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 20 Apr – 15 Jul 2010 Article Article Name Supporting Language Primary Secondary Date Article Coding Coding
30-Apr Statement by the "BP is ultimately responsible for Blame President on the funding the cost of response and Economy and the cleanup operations" / "But we are Oil Spill in the Gulf fully prepared to meet our of Mexico responsibilities to any and all affected communities."
2-May Remarks by the CNN (3-May) "Let me be clear: BP is Blame Ingratiation President on Oil responsible for this leak; BP will Spill be paying the bill." / "I'm not going to rest" / "...to determine who is behind this potentially deadly act, and to see that justice is done."
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 41 14- Remarks by the Washington "BP has committed to pay for the Blame Corrective May President on the Post (15-May) response effort, and we will hold Action Ongoing Oil Spill them to their obligation" / "That Response includes...the federal government. For too long, for a decade or more, there has been a cosy relationship between the oil companies and the federal agency that permits them to drill...issued based on little more than assurances of safety from the oil companies... will not happen anymore."
22- Weekly Address: "What led to this disaster was a Blame May President Obama breakdown of responsibility on Establishes the part of BP and perhaps others, Bipartisan National including Transocean and Commission on the Halliburton. And we will continue BP Deepwater to hold the relevant companies Horizon Oil Spill accountable." and Offshore Drilling
27- Remarks by the "BP is responsible for this horrific Blame Ingratiation May President on the disaster, and we will hold them Gulf Oil Spill fully accountable on behalf of the United States as well as the people and communities victimized by this tragedy" / "From the moment this disaster began, the federal government has been in charge of the response effort" / "BP is operating at our direction"
28- Remarks by the Washington "BP is the responsible party for Blame Apology; May President After Post (28-May) this disaster. What that means is Ingratiation Briefing on BP Oil they’re legally responsible for Spill stopping the leak and they’re financially responsible for the enormous damage that they’ve created. And we’re going to hold them accountable, along with any other party responsible for the initial explosion and loss of life on that platform" / "But...I ultimately take responsibility for solving this crisis. I’m the President and the buck stops with
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 42 me."
29- Statement by the "Every day that this leak Blame May President on the continues is an assault on the Latest Efforts to people of the Gulf Coast region, Contain the BP Oil their livelihoods, and the natural Spill bounty that belongs to all of us. It is as enraging as it is heartbreaking" / "We will not relent until...until the people unjustly victimized by this manmade disaster..."
1-Jun Remarks by the Washington "We’ve ordered BP to pay Blame President After Post (1-Jun) economic injury claims, and we Meeting with BP will make sure they deliver." Oil Spill Commission Co- Chairs
4-Jun Remarks by the Washington "But I want BP to be very clear, Blame President After Post (5-Jun) they’ve got moral and legal Briefing on Gulf obligations here in the Gulf for Oil Spill Update the damage that has been done."
5-Jun Weekly Address: "We’ve also ordered BP to pay Blame Corrective President Obama economic injury claims, and we Action Outlines will make sure they pay every Administration single dime owed to the people Response Efforts to along the Gulf Coast / "...to hold the BP Oil Spill BP and other companies from Grand Isle, accountable for damages" / "If LA laws are inadequate –laws will be changed. If oversight was lacking – it will be strengthened."
7-Jun Remarks by the "I do not want to see BP nickel- Blame President After and-diming these businesses that Meeting with are having a very tough time" / Cabinet Members "There is going to be damage to Discuss the done to the Gulf Coast and there Deepwater Horizon is going to be economic damages Oil Spill that we’ve got to make sure BP is responsible for and compensates people for."
8-Jun Obama looking for "I don't sit around talking to Blame 'whose ass to kick' experts because this is a college seminar" / "We talk to these folks
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 43 because they potentially have the best answers, so I know whose ass to kick."
14-Jun Remarks by the CNN (15- "...And we’re going to continue to Blame Ingratiation President After Jun); CNN hold BP and any other responsible Touring Theodore (15-Jun b); parties accountable for the Staging Facility disaster that they created." / Washington "Members of the Coast Guard Post (14-Jun) have been doing outstanding work each and every day, and so I just want to say to all of them that the country is proud of you, grateful to you. "
15-Jun Remarks by the CNN (16-Jun "...This oil spill is the worst Blame Corrective President to the b); environmental disaster America Action Nation on the BP has ever faced...We will make BP CNN (16-Jun Oil Spill pay for the damage their company c) has caused" / "I will meet with the chairman of BP and inform him that he is to set aside whatever resources are required to compensate the workers and business owners who have been harmed as a result of his company’s recklessness" / "The tragedy unfolding on our coast is the most painful and powerful reminder yet that the time to embrace a clean energy future is now"
15-Jun President Obama "For a decade or more, the cosy Corrective Announces relationship between the oil Action Bromwich to Fix companies and the federal agency Oil Industry was allowed to go Oversight unchecked...That cannot and will not happen anymore."
15-Jun Remarks by the "I will be their fierce advocate in Corrective President After a making sure that they are getting Action Briefing with the compensation they need to get Admiral Thad Allen through what is going to be a and Local Officials difficult season." on the BP Oil Spill
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 44 16-Jun Statement by the CNN (16-Jun) "Now, that’s not good enough. Blame Ingratiation President After So we will continue to press Meeting with BP BP…" / "BP’s liabilities for this Executives spill are significant -- and they acknowledge that fact. We will continue to hold BP and all other responsible parties accountable" "I'm pleased to announce that BP has agreed to set aside $20 billion to pay claims for damages resulting from this spill."
30-Jun Remarks by the "But when I was sworn in, we Ingratiation Blame President at a Town were losing 750,000 jobs a Hall Meeting on the month...Today, it’s growing Economy in again. Today, we’ve added Racine, Wisconsin private sector jobs for five months in a row." / "And our government has a responsibility to hold those who caused it [Deepwater Horizon oil spill] accountable."
8-Jul Remarks by the "These policies are bad for Ingratiation Blame President at America. Grassroots Event And that's why, when I was sworn for Senate in, we took a different path" / "BP Candidate Robin has got to pay...And so we -- so I Carnahan met with BP."
Given the findings above, we see the strategy that Obama engaged in most frequently was the strategy of Blame. Matching this to the Integrated Model, we can conclude that he framed the Deepwater Horizon oil spill as an opportunity – Frame 3 of ‘Crisis as Opportunity’ - focusing blame and responsibility onto an external actor.
According to Boin et. al (2009), the Crisis as Opportunity frame is used by opposition of the incumbent to maximise the significance of an event, in order to pinpoint blameworthy behaviour and garner support for their removal. Instead, in this case, Obama – as the incumbent – used this strategy to pinpoint blame to an external, private actor – BP – sometimes referring to the need for a change in existing policies towards clean energy.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 45 5.3. Political Standing, President Barack Obama The table below presents the approval ratings collected on President Obama specifically, separate from the ratings that use the government as an entity. The weekly approval ratings from April 12-18, before the Deepwater Horizon explosion, is used in order to be able to see changes in Obama’s political standing. All data were gathered from Gallup, a global performance-based consulting company that collects information on public polls and approval ratings in several countries including the United States.
The questions used in the polls – under ‘Type of Approval Rating’ in the table below – are as follows:
Type of Approval Rating shown on chart Question used at time of polling
Presidential capacity “Do you approve or disapprove of the job Barack Obama is doing as President?” (Gallup, n.d.a)
Handling of Oil Spill (a) "How would you rate the job of Barack Obama in responding to the oil spill, as very good, good, poor, or very poor?" (Gallup, n.d.b)
Handling of Oil Spill (b) "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico?” (Gallup, n.d.b)
Approval ratings of certain dates were chosen in order to observe the effect of certain crisis communication strategies identified in the coding chart above. For example, the first date was selected as the pre-incident rating. The next date, Apr 19-25, show the political standing of the President at the initial moment of the incident. The next two Presidential capacity approval ratings show the standing of the President after he brings in new strategy alongside Blame, which is the occurrence of Ingratiation, in order to analyse any changes in the effect. Two sets of dates were chosen as the communication occurred on May 27, and logistically, it may take time for people to access, read, and then form opinions on the communication made.
The last two Presidential capacity ratings, dated on 2010 Jul 12-18 and Jul 19-25, portray the political standing of Obama after the well was ‘capped’ on the 15th, at the end of the study period for this research paper:
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 46 Date Type of Approval Rating Political Standing Approve - 48% 2010 Apr 12-18 Presidential capacity Disapprove - 45% No opinion - 7% Approve - 50% 2010 Apr 19-25 Presidential capacity Disapprove - 43% No opinion - 7% Approve - 46% 2010 May 24-30 Presidential capacity Disapprove - 46% No opinion - 8% Approve - 47% 2010 May 31- Jun 6 Presidential capacity Disapprove - 45% No opinion - 8% Approve - 46% 2010 Jul 12-18 Presidential capacity Disapprove - 46% No opinion - 8% Approve - 45% 2010 Jul 19-25 Presidential capacity Disapprove - 47% No opinion - 8%
The data of the political standing show that President Obama’s political standing went through relatively minor change, from a 48% approval rating in mid-April to a 45% approval rating by the end of July – a 3 point dip - with little fluctuation in between. Following the indicators from the operationalisation table, we see that Obama has remained in office, with a slight/minor decline in approval ratings.
The table below shows polls taken by Gallup regarding Obama’s performance in the handling of the crisis – separate to the government – along four key dates. This shows the changes in progress within the overall timeline, showing the nuance of crisis intensity:
Date Type of Approval Rating Political Standing
Very good/good - 43% 2010 May 24-25 Handling of oil spill (a) Poor/very poor - 53% No opinion - 4%
Approve - 40% 2010 Jun 5-6 Handling of oil spill (b) Disapprove - 46% No opinion - 13%
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 47 Very good/good - 44% 2010 Jun 11-13 Handling of oil spill (a) Poor/very poor - 53% No opinion - 3%
Approve - 44% 2010 Jun 19-20 Handling of oil spill (b) Disapprove - 48% No opinion - 8%
The polls of the handling of the oil spill show a slightly more positive finding, since the increase in approval is larger than the increase in disapproval, despite the overall strength of disapproval. The incline/decline in approval ratings indicator is not applicable here, as the oil spill handling data did not exist prior to the crisis by its nature. In the poll regarding the oil spill, we see that Obama is much more unpopular in the initial stages, in comparison to the polls regarding presidential capacity. A large percentage of those who viewed Obama’s handling of the oil spill as poor/very poor or dissatisfactory in this early stage of the crisis (53% and 48% respectively), and we see that this changes relatively little as time progresses, although it increases by 2% in poll set (b). However, satisfaction had increased slightly (44% and 44% respectively) by late June, with a 1% and 4% increase in favourable reputation of the President’s handling of the crisis. While this shows some inclination of positivity, as the data for pre- crisis standing does not exist, we cannot use this data as a basis to judge the overall political standing of the President. Obama gained some approval in his specific handling of this crisis during the study period, but mixed reviews occurred and ultimately his disapproval remained greater than his approval.
However, these changes in attitude are important in gaining insight into how Obama’s strategies were successful, and this could be attributed to a varying use of strategies. In mid-June, we see that there was a break in the primary strategy of blame, and instead, elements of Corrective Action are seen. This may reflect the idea that an outstanding concern of the crisis that was not addressed by the blaming strategy was dealt with. While the consistent use of blame gave a clear attribution of responsibility to an outside actor (in this case, primarily BP), the Corrective Action strategy shows that any remaining causal factors generated by the government or its policies will be changed. This strategy deflects the outlying criticisms against the government for the future; Obama’s communication is also very clear on the exact problems that may have originated from the government, directing the focus on what he would like to highlight as the problem within his control.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 48 Despite the improvements in Obama’s approval, we see that the majority of the population still disapproved of Obama’s handling of the oil crisis, showing a negative view on the public leader’s capability as indicated by the operationalisation table.
With these indicators, we can conclude that Obama’s political standing after his communication strategy was to frame the crisis as an opportunity which led to a middle outcome of staying in office with a decrease in political reputation, based on the Integrated Model in Chapter Two. However, it is important to note that a 3-point dip is a minimal decrease in political standing, and this shows that the crisis did not impact his standing in a particularly major way.
The Blame strategy – the framing of Crisis as Opportunity – acknowledges the existence of a crisis, and use the opportunity to change the status quo or existing policies. Blame is made strongly towards an actor. According to Boin et. al (2009), the use of Crisis as Opportunity has a preferred scenario of elite escape by blame avoidance, and a showdown scenario where all outcomes – elite escape, damage, or rejuvenation – are all possible. When the incumbent denies responsibility, critics can absolve or focus
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 49 blame; should they absolve blame, blame avoidance occurs and elite escape is likely. Should critics focus blame, the incumbent can escape, but can also experience damage.
In this case, Obama has certainly framed the crisis as a major disaster: “this oil spill is the worst environmental disaster America has ever faced.” He has also placed the responsibility on BP in the strongest terms, again and again, placing responsibility on an external actor. Critics were mixed in their reaction, but mostly focused their blame onto BP. In terms of changing the status quo regarding policy advocation, his attempts have been less obvious. There are hints of pushing green energy: “The tragedy unfolding on our coast is the most painful and powerful reminder yet that the time to embrace a clean energy future is now” - but there is no strong agenda that is being advocated (“Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill”, 2010). It is not frequent in his communication, and thus is not his main point of strategy. Therefore, he did not use his strategy of Blame as a prime opportunity to change the status quo from oil dependent policies to policies of renewable energy; a rhetoric rather than action.
In short, during the acute stages of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, Obama used the framing strategy of Crisis as Opportunity, employing the use of Blame in his communication. This led to a middle outcome of remaining in office with a decrease in political standing, because while he exogenised responsibility to an external actor, he did not have a clear agenda in terms of advocation of his interests. His strategy was mostly successful because it gave him the outcome of keeping the office with relatively unhurt standing, which is the intended outcome (Boin et. al, 2009). Thus the relationship between crisis communication and outcome here is that denying responsibility by communicating Blame onto an external actor without a strong agenda for changing the status quo in policy under the Crisis as Opportunity frame will lead to elite escape, and a middle case outcome. However, as with the Sewol disaster, it must also be noted that this paper acknowledges the limitations of using crisis communication solely as the basis for the end political standing of Obama; and that this outcome was affected by other factors such as the logistical clean-up process. This is not a causal mechanism.
5.4. Case Comparison In this research paper, two cases of a public leader framing a crisis after a private sector disaster were selected. In both cases, the initial stage was the same situation of a maritime incident that led to missing
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 50 people and deaths, in a democratic nation with a designated and functioning crisis management agency. Both cases also had wide media coverage of the incident as it progressed, with a top-level public leader in charge of operational conduct engaging in crisis communication.
In these same circumstances of a private maritime disaster, each leader chose a different strategy to frame the crisis. The Sewol Ferry case saw the framing of Crisis as Threat, using Full Apology as a primary strategy of communication, which led to a worst case outcome on political standing. The relationship between crisis communication and outcome showed that accepting full responsibility by endogenising blame under the Crisis as Threat frame will lead to elite damage, and a worst case outcome. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill case saw the framing of Crisis as Opportunity, using Blame as a primary strategy with a middle outcome. The relationship between crisis communication and outcome showed that denying responsibility by exogenising blame without a strong agenda for changing the status quo in policy under the Crisis as Opportunity frame will lead to elite escape, and a middle case outcome.
Moreover, cross case comparison shows that there were three key links between the communication conducted and the political stance that emerged from this study: attribution of responsibility, consistency, and the focus on specific problems of the government. In the Sewol case, the public leader directly attributed the responsibility of the crisis to himself. There was a lack of exogenising blame and selection of a specific actor, along with a focus on blame on the incumbent by the critical group in the political game. This meant that the crisis responsibility of the entire disaster was placed on the incumbent and his office. There was also a consistency in the attribution of this responsibility; the strategy chosen was prominent throughout the entire crisis communication period studied. This solidified the initial messages of responsibility, eroding political standing to a level that was unsustainable. Every crisis needs a responsible actor who is accountable for the consequences of public emotion, and here it became the incumbent. In addition, there was no focused dissemination of information, which served to highlight any specific problems in the existing government structure. No system is perfect – particularly in political institutions, and it is important to recognise this aspect during crisis communication. Although the crisis may have a major primary cause that is external, the role of the government in protecting and serving its people have been compromised if the community is affected. Therefore, any problems within the government that enabled the occurrence of such a crisis must be carefully selected and
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 51 acknowledged accordingly. In the Sewol case, there was lack of information on all aspects of government operations and failures until the speech of resignation, which even then lacked focus.
In the case for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, there was an aggressive exogenisation of responsibility from the initial moment of the disaster. A specific actor was selected for the attribution of blame, and the critical groups in the political game mostly followed suit in focusing blame on the same external actor. These messages of blame were consistently made throughout the entire acute stages of the crisis, and this consistency solidified the initial messages of responsibility, leading to a continued stable standing of the office. Furthermore, the indicators of public opinion show that the public community had mostly followed their initial reactions of blame. Lastly, the incumbent acknowledged the role of the government in enabling the crisis to a certain degree; while the major responsible party was external, there was also communication focusing on mechanisms of the government that contributed to the context of the crisis. Here we see the advocacy of political agendas that ‘better’ the future.
These outcomes allow the paper to gain some reflections in the possibilities in strategy for a public leader during a private sector disaster. First, viewing the Crisis as a threat and engaging in taking responsibility is not conducive to increasing or even maintaining current political stance. The incumbent must attribute blame to an external actor when there is no direct origins of the crisis within the government. Secondly, we see that depending on certain strategies of crisis communication, even public leaders who have no linkage to the private sector incident can have their reputations dramatically affected. Public opinion requires an assignment of blame, and when this is not given or is taken by the public leader, the public leader will bear the responsibility. This also shows the critical importance of perceived blame in crisis responsibility. Finally, we see that the strategies under the frame of Crisis as a Threat – such as Full Apology - should be avoided, whereas strategies under the frame of Crisis as Opportunity can save the public leader from a worst case scenario during the same situation.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 52 6: Conclusion 6.1. Findings The two cases are both instances of how a public leader with no direct connection to the occurrence of a private sector incident conducts crisis communication using different strategies, and end up with very different outcomes in political standing. For Prime Minister Chung, framing the Sewol disaster as a threat became a means to his official resignation less than two years into his time in office. For President Obama, framing the Deepwater Horizon oil spill as an opportunity was a crisis that enabled a chance to shift blame and criticise the existing agenda – although it was not fully taken advantage of - emerging with relatively unscathed outcome, although his political standing declined slightly.
This paper aimed to answer the following research question: How do crisis communication efforts of public leaders influence their political standing after an unexpected private sector disaster?
In order to answer this question, the paper examined three sub questions:
! 1. How is crisis communication related to political outcome in the public and private sector? In both the public and private sector, crisis communication is directly related to the political outcome of the leader in question. In the public sector, public opinion is critical to the political standing of the office-holding incumbent. As such, crisis communication requires information that contains fear and uncertainty in the community, including attribution of a responsible actor, regardless of whether or not the incumbent possesses the physical resources to actually contain the crisis. The critical element is perceived responsibility; if crisis communication does not address the above elements, public perception will hold the public leader as responsible, erode his or her reputation and thus negatively impact his or her political standing.
In the private sector, financial stakeholder concerns are critical to the standing of the corporate leader. Crisis communication requires information that addresses what went wrong in the system, measures to contain the crisis at hand, and estimations or projections on how much damage has/ or will have occurred by the end of the crisis. Different stakeholders have different interests to protect in an
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 53 emergency; the leader must determine whether protecting the reputation of the company is more important than plugging economic damage, depending on which stakeholder has more power (inside stakeholders, or consumers). If crisis communication does not address the goal of the stakeholder with greater power, the leader will be pressured to step down, or be forcibly removed by the corporate hierarchy.
! 2. What strategies did each crisis communication leader employ? The Sewol Ferry disaster and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill saw different employments of crisis communication by the leader in charge. The Sewol Ferry case saw the framing of Crisis as Threat, using Full Apology as a primary strategy of communication; out of the eight (8) crisis communication pieces conducted over a 12-day period, six (6) fell under Full Apology, and one (1) each under Ingratiation and Corrective Action. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill case saw the framing of Crisis as Opportunity, using Blame as a primary strategy; out of the 19 crisis communication pieces conducted over an 87-day period, 15 fell under Blame, and two (2) each under Ingratiation and Corrective Action.
! 3. What was their political stance after the acute stages of the crisis? In the Sewol Ferry disaster, the public leader saw an extremely negative outcome of accepted resignation from office, although the fact that he was allowed to remain in place until the end of the disaster’s search and rescue operations suggests that he was still seen as a capable administrator by the government. In the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the public leader saw a largely middle outcome of remaining in office with a minor decline in political standing.
In this study, it was clear that public leaders have embraced private sector crises and felt the need to frame these crises. In the same context of a private maritime crisis, they adopted different strategies, which led to different outcomes. The results of this thesis show that private crises matter, and the strategy that a leader employs is critical to their political standing. The relationship between crisis communication and outcome showed that denying responsibility by exogenising blame without a strong agenda for changing the status quo in policy under the Crisis as Opportunity frame will lead to elite escape, and a middle case outcome. Three aspects of crisis communication affect the end political result from the strategy chosen: attribution of responsibility, consistency, and the focus on specific problems of the government. For an outcome which enables the incumbent to retain his/her office, there was be an
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 54 external attribution of responsibility, consistency in this message of blame, and a focused highlight on issues in the overall government structure that may have enabled the contextual background of the crisis to occur.
Furthermore, this thesis has found that depending on specific framing, crisis communication efforts of public leaders do influence their political standing after an unexpected private sector disaster. In the case for Sewol, the incumbent’s framing showed the public a lack of control over the event, and did address their emotional needs, nor advice for adjustment. This led to a worst-case outcome of accepted resignation. In the case for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the incumbent’s framing showed the public a sense of control over the aftermath of the event, addressed their need for blame assignment, and contained advice that instructed and helped citizens to adjust.
The role of crisis communication in the public sector is to disseminate information about crisis that seeks to reduce harm and influence reputational outcome during a disaster. This study has shown that for crises that have its origins in the private sector, using the Threat framing does not allow the public leader to influence their reputational outcome. However, when blame can be correctly attributed to an external actor, the crisis can be used as an opportunity to reduce harm and influence reputational outcome to avoid a negative outcome.
6.2. Relevance
6.2.1. Academic Relevance Currently, limited studies exist which try to explain the effects of crisis communication strategies on the political standing of a public leader through a certain mechanism; the research that explains these effects in cases that originate from the private sector does not exist. This study attempted to fill in this existing gap of knowledge regarding what mechanism of communication and political standing exist and work during times of crises - which occur from a private sector - for a public leader. The thesis found that there are three key links between the communication conducted and the political stance that emerged from this study: attribution of responsibility, consistency, and the focus on specific problems of the government. These three aspects of communication strategy used by the incumbent will affect the outcome of his or her political standing after the acute stages of a crisis, particularly in the context of the
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 55 political game and perceived blame. For a successful outcome, attribution of responsibility must be made away from the government, and consistent in its approach from the outset. This will allow critics and the incumbent to focus their blame onto a designated actor, enabling elite escape. Furthermore, should an external responsible party be identified, any focussing of government issues that may have enabled such a context will allow the incumbent to choose what critics will focus on when they look to problems with the political structure.
Additionally, this research applied the Crisis Framing model by Boin et. al (2009) and the Seven Crisis Communication Strategies by Coombs (1998), which provide the frameworks for crisis communication strategies in the public and private sector respectively. The study showed that private and public sector models were similar in its core, and could be melded together to create a dynamic gauge of crisis communication that exist between the public and private sector. When studying the crisis communication strategies of public leaders during crises that originate in the private sector, it was found that both models were needed in order to provide a coherent framework for analysis.
6.2.2. Practical Relevance
In the increasing risk society, public leaders will face greater pressures of successful communication as the frequencies – and perhaps the magnitude - of crises increase. Private sector crises are often a surprise to the government. For nations where the public debate can have a large effect on the political standing of a leader, it is even more critical that leaders understand the risks that these crises pose to their office. This research showed that private sector crises do require a response from the government, and the response that the crisis communicator crafts will affect their reputation.
Furthermore, this research showed that differentiating the cause of the crisis to the aftermath of the crisis was very important for a public leader. Most crises that occur at a significant scale require a physical reaction from the government in order to contain the harm to the community or the environment, regardless of whether it occurred naturally or in the private sector. For a public leader that leads the crisis or emergency management capacities of the government, the ability to differentiate the responsibility for substandard physical response to the responsibility of the incident is critical in order to maintain reputation. If the differentiation is not made, the public leader shoulders the responsibility for the entire crisis, from its causes to its end, as perceptions of blame shift to the leader. As shown by this research, taking responsibility will likely lead to a negative outcome for the public leader.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 56
This thesis recommends from its findings that public leaders should avoid endogenising blame, and place the primary responsibility of the crisis to an external actor. In addition, public leader should also examine faults in the current government structure that may or may not have enabled such a crisis to occur, and focus some elements of communication to show the correction of these mistakes. This can also be used as an opportunity to advance the incumbent’s policy agenda. Finally, consistent communication in this approach is critical, as public opinion can shift throughout the acute stages of a crisis. These strategies will allow a greater likelihood of escaping elite damage after a crisis, and may even allow scope for a positive change in political standing. However, as these findings are based on two cases, this paper recommends future research with a greater number of cases from the selection criteria to provide greater validity.
6.3. Issues in Data Analysis The biggest issue in data analysis was the reliability of the news media in reporting an objective reflection of what each public leader said. The paper saw that data or quotes taken from the media did contain instances of ‘cherry-picking’ by the media; that is, picking out parts of quotes of the public leader’s communication that did not correctly convey the intended message. This was particularly seen in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill case – for example, the CNN data of 27 May indicates that Obama had engaged in a strategy of Full Apology, taking full responsibility (CNN, 2010). However, when the full context of the speech is taken into account, it is clear that his strategy was Blame. These articles were not included in the data analysis or were relegated to secondary coding when appropriate, as the complete transcript of all of Obama’s official communication was available for an accurate analysis.
This does extend the question of reliability of the news media to the Sewol case as well. Here this concern may be less applicable, as multiple sources were chosen – all of which reflected equal strategies (Appendix I, II) - and Chung’s statements were hard to perceive in a different manner. However, this issue of reliability is still a consideration for future studies.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 57 6.4. Future Considerations This paper has exposed several elements to refine for future study. The Seven Crisis Communication Strategies set by Coombs is not applicable to cover all phenomena in the public-private crossover. There is a need to distinguish between ‘Apology’ and ‘Full Apology.’ In this crossover of two fields, the public leader conducting crisis communication may not be responsible for the direct occurrence of the crisis, as shown by the two cases of the study. This means that there may be instances where an apology that the incident occurred and that the government was unable to control the stages leading up to the crisis is needed, but it is not appropriate to take responsibility of the crisis itself. This paper recommends that here, ‘Comfort’ or ‘Reassurance’ as a strategy should be added to make it applicable and unique to the public-private sphere.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 58 7: Bibliography
Introduction
Boin, A., 't Hart, P., & McConnell, A. (2009). Crisis exploitation: political and policy impacts of framing contests. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(1), 81-106.
Coombs, W. T. (1998). An analytic framework for crisis situations: Better responses from a better understanding of the situation. Journal of public relations research, 10(3), 177-191.
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Seeger, M. W. (2006). Best practices in crisis communication: An expert panel process. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 34(3), 232-244.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 59 Sellnow, D. D., Limperos, A., Frisby, B. N., Sellnow, T. L., Spence, P. R., & Downs, E. (2015). Expanding the Scope of Instructional Communication Research: Looking Beyond Classroom Contexts. Communication Studies,66(4), 417-432. t Hart, P., & Tindall, K. (2009). Understanding crisis exploitation: leadership, rhetoric and framing contests in response to the economic meltdown.
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Theoretical Framework
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Coombs, W.T. (2007). Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: The development and application of situational crisis communication theory. Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3), 163- 176.
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2008). Comparing apology to equivalent crisis response strategies: Clarifying apology's role and value in crisis communication. Public Relations Review, 34(3), 252-257.
De Wolf, D. & Mejri, M. (2013). Crisis Communication failures: The BP case study.International Journal of Advances in Management and Economics, 2(2).
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 60 Farazmand, A. (2007). Learning from the Katrina crisis: A global and international perspective with implications for future crisis management. Public Administration Review, 67(s1), 149-159.
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Quarantelli, E. L. (1986). Disaster crisis management.
Villines, A. N. (2011). Communicating During Crisis: A Case Study of the 2010 BP Gulf Oil Spill.
Methodology
Baxter, P., & Jack, S. (2008). Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and implementation for novice researchers. The qualitative report, 13(4), 544-559.
Gerring, J. (2006). Case study research: principles and practices. Cambridge University Press.
Hsieh, H., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), 1277-1288.
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 61 Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case selection techniques in case study research a menu of qualitative and quantitative options. Political Research Quarterly, 61(2), 294-308.
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: Design and methods. Sage publications.
Case Analysis 1 – The Sewol Case
Chosun Ilbo. (2014a) [진도 여객선 침몰] 정홍원 "1분1초도 주저하지 말라" [Jindo Passenger Ship Sinking- Chung Hong-won: "Do not be idle for a single second or minute"]. Retrieved November 12, 2015, from http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/04/16/2014041604221.html
Chosun Ilbo. (2014b). 정홍원 국무총리, 세월호 피해가족에게 거센 항의…물병에 깡통 세례까지 [PM Chung Hong-won faced with aggressive protests from family of Sewol victims: water bottles and cans thrown]. Retrieved November 12, 2015, from http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/04/17/2014041700827.html"
Chosun Ilbo. (2014c). [세월호 참사] 정홍원 국무총리 "죄인 된 심정" [Sewol ferry sinking: PM Chung Hong-won 'I feel like a criminal']. Retrieved November 12, 2015, from http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/04/20/2014042000067.html
Chosun Ilbo. (2014d). [세월호 참사] 鄭총리, '자원봉사' 진도군민에 사의 표시 [Sewol ferry sinking: PM Chung expresses thanks to volunteers of Jindo]. Retrieved November 12, 2015, from http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/04/21/2014042102083.html
Evans, S. (2015, April 28). Sewol ferry: S Korea court gives captain life sentence for murder. BBC. Retrieved November 28, 2015, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32492263
Oh, G. (2014a). (5th LD) Rescue efforts continue as death toll rises from sunken ferry. Yonhap News. Retrieved November 12, 2015, from http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20140419001255315
Oh, G. (2014b). PM vows safety master plan to prevent deadly disaster. Yonhap News. Retrieved November 12, 2015, from http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20140422004400315
Oh, G. (2014c). (4th LD) Park to accept PM's resignation after ferry disaster is under control. Yonhap News. Retrieved December 2, 2015, from
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 62 http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2014/04/27/91/0200000000AEN20140427000753315F.ht ml
“Organization Chart”. (2013). Retrieved November 2, 2015, from http://www.pmo.go.kr/en/government/ogran_chart.jsp
Park, M., & Kim, S. (2014, April 21). Funeral for vice principal who killed himself after ferry sinking. Cable News Network. Retrieved November 28, 2015, from http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/21/world/asia/ferry-vice-principal-funeral/
Yonhap News. (2014a). <여객선침몰> 선사 '462명' vs 정부 '459명'…탑승인원 혼선 [Passenger ship sinking: Ferry company ‘462’ vs. government ‘459’…passenger count confusion]. Retrieved 2015, November 13 from http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/society/2014/04/16/0701000000AKR20140416210200065.HTML
Yonhap News. (2014b). <여객선침몰> 정홍원 총리 "정부 발표 혼선 죄송" [Passenger ship sinking: PM Chung Hong-won 'apologise for confusing government announcement']. Retrieved November 12, 2015, from http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2014/04/19/0200000000AKR20140419031300054.HTM L
Yonhap News. (n.d.). 세월호 침몰참사 [Sewol Ferry Disaster]. Retrieved November 13, 2015, from http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/medialabs/shipsink/index2.html
국무총리 비서실 [Prime Minister's Secretariat]. (2014, April 27). 국무총리 기자회견문 [Prime Minister Press Conference] 국무조정실 [Office for Government Policy Coordination]. Retrieved November 12, 2015, from http://www.pmo.go.kr/pmo/prime/prime03_03.jsp?mode=view&article_no=69112&board_wrap per=%2Fpmo%2Fprime%2Fprime03_03.jsp&pager.offset=70&board_no=34
Case Analysis 2 – The Deepwater Oil Spill Case
BP United States. (n.d.). Deepwater Horizon accident and response. Retrieved November 14, 2015, from http://www.bp.com/en_us/bp-us/commitment-to-the-gulf-of-mexico/deepwater-horizon- accident.html
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 63 Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. (2011). Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team Releases Final Report. Retrieved November 14, 2015, from http://www.bsee.gov/BSEE- Newsroom/Press-Releases/2011/Deepwater-Horizon-Joint-Investigation-Team-Releases-Final- Report/
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (2015) About the Agency. Retrieved November 26, 2015, from http://www.fema.gov/about-agency
Gallup. (n.d.a). Presidential Approval Ratings - Barack Obama. Retrieved November 27, 2015, from http://www.gallup.com/poll/116479/barack-obama-presidential-job-approval.aspx
Gallup. (n.d.b). Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Retrieved November 26, 2015, from http://www.gallup.com/poll/140978/oil-spill-gulf-mexico.aspx
Mufson, S., & Eilperin, J. (2010, May 17). Lawyers lining up for class-action suits over oil spill. The Washington Post. Retrieved November 25, 2015, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2010/05/16/AR2010051603254.html?sub=AR
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. (2011). Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Driling - Report to the President. Retrieved November 25, 2015, from http://www.iadc.org/archived-2014-osc- report/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf
Pelofsky J., & Vicini, J. (2010, December 15). Obama administration sues BP, others over Gulf spill. Reuters. Retrieved November 25, 2015, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/16/us- oilspill-obama-lawsuit-idUSTRE6BE59J20101216#2XTRd3M6TMba40tc.97
Robertson, C., & Krauss, C. (2010, August 2). Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say. The New York Times. Retrieved November 14, 2015, from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03spill.html?_r=1&fta=y
The White House. (2010a). Statement by the President on the Economy and the Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Retrieved November 27, 2015, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/statement-president-economy-and-oil-spill-gulf-mexico
The White House. (2010b). Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill. Retrieved November 26, 2015, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president- nation-bp-oil-spill
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 64 The White House. (2010c). Remarks by the President on the Gulf Oil Spill. Retrieved November 26, 2015, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-gulf-oil-spill
The White House. (2010d). Remarks by the President After Briefing on BP Oil Spill. Retrieved November 26, 2015, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-after- briefing-bp-oil-spill
US Coast Guard. (2011). On Scene Coordinator Report Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Retrieved November 14, 2015, from http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/fosc_dwh_report.pdf
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 65 Appendix I: Yonhap News Data Collection
Article Primary Secondary Article Name Link Language Date Coding Coding
(4th LD) Rescuers "Confusion as ministries concerned http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/sea Did not use - fight time to find failed to share 19-Apr rch1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20 dual/outdated hundreds missing in information…without 140419001254315 version sunken ferry coordination."
(5th LD) Rescue "Confusion as ministries concerned http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/sea efforts continue as failed to share 19-Apr rch1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20 Full Apology death toll rises from information…without 140419001255315 sunken ferry coordination."
(3rd LD) Rescuers "Confusion as ministries concerned http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/sea Did not use - fight time to find failed to share 19-Apr rch1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20 dual/outdated hundreds missing in information…without 140419001253315 version sunken ferry coordination." <여객선침몰> 정홍원 총리 "정부 "I apologise for the confusion in 발표 혼선 죄송" announcements" / "From now on http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulle we have made sure that all [Passenger Ship Corrective 19-Apr tin/2014/04/19/0200000000AKR20 annoucements will be made at the Full Apology Sinking: PM Chung Action Hong-won 'apologise 140419031300054.HTML same time from the task for confusing force…with confirmed government information." announcement'] "Learning a lesson from the tragedy, the government will come PM vows safety Full Apology http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/sea up with an innovative safety master master plan to Corrective ; some 22-Apr rch1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20 plan" / "a stern punishment of those prevent deadly Action elements of 140422004400315 responsible" / "I feel sorry for the disaster Blame confusion in the government's initial responses and the failure..." (LEAD) Prime "Witnessing the pains of families of Minister Chung http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/sea the victims and grief and anger of Did not use - 27-Apr Hong-won offers to rch1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20 the people, I think the right thing dual/outdated resign over ferry 140427000800320 for me to do is to take all version sinking responsibility and resign."
"Witnessing the pains of families of (2nd LD) PM offers http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/sea the victims and grief and anger of Did not use - 27-Apr to resign over ferry rch1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20 the people, I think the right thing dual/outdated sinking 140427000751315 for me to do is to take all version responsibility and resign."
"Witnessing the pains of families of (3rd LD) PM offers http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/sea the victims and grief and anger of Did not use - 27-Apr to resign over ferry rch1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20 the people, I think the right thing dual/outdated sinking 140427000752315 for me to do is to take all version responsibility and resign."
(4th LD) Park to "Witnessing the pains of families of accept PM's http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/sea the victims and grief and anger of 27-Apr resignation after ferry rch1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20 the people, I think the right thing Full Apology disaster is under 140427000753315 for me to do is to take all control responsibility and resign…"
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 67 Appendix II: Chosun Ilbo Data Collection
Article Primary Secondary Article Name Link Language Date Coding Coding
[진도 여객선 침몰] 정홍원 분 초도 주저하지 말라 "1 1 " http://news.chosun.com/site/data/htm "I feel an infinite 16-Apr [Jindo Passenger Ship l_dir/2014/04/16/2014041604221.ht Full Apology responsibility." Sinking- Chung Hong-won: ml "Do not be idle for a single second or minute"]
정홍원 국무총리, 세월호 피해가족에게 거센 항의…물병에 깡통 세례까지 http://news.chosun.com/site/data/htm "I know how you feel" / "I 17-Apr [PM Chung Hong-won faced l_dir/2014/04/17/2014041700827.ht will do my best" / "I'm Full Apology with aggressive protests from ml sorry." family of Sewol victims: water bottles and cans thrown]
박근혜, 정홍원 ‘진도 여객선 http://news.chosun.com/site/data/htm Did not use - "I'm sorry" / "I will do my 17-Apr 세월호 참사’에…“최선 l_dir/2014/04/17/2014041700970.ht dual/outdated best." 다하겠다” ml version
[진도 여객선 침몰] 정홍원 http://news.chosun.com/site/data/htm "I know how you feel" / "I Did not use - 17-Apr 총리, 현장 방문해 물 깡통 l_dir/2014/04/17/2014041701662.ht will do my best" / "I'm dual/outdated 세례…"최선을 다하겠다" ml sorry." version
[세월호 참사] 정홍원 "I feel like a criminal" / "I 국무총리 "죄인 된 심정" http://news.chosun.com/site/data/htm will analyse all method sand 20-Apr l_dir/2014/04/20/2014042000067.ht Full Apology [Sewol ferry sinking: PM employ them for search and ml Chung Hong-won "I feel like a rescue." criminal"]
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 68 To the volunteers: "Your [세월호 참사] 鄭총리, effort is contributing enormously to the search and '자원봉사' 진도군민에 사의 http://news.chosun.com/site/data/htm rescue effort" / "The 표시 21-Apr l_dir/2014/04/21/2014042102083.ht government has designated Ingratiation [Sewol ferry sinking: PM ml the area as 'special disaster Chung expresses thanks to area' to compensate for the volunteers of Jindo] efforts" / "Please continue to help us."
정홍원 총리, 세월호 참사 http://news.chosun.com/site/data/htm Did not use - 27-Apr 11일만에 사의…朴 “사고 l_dir/2014/04/27/2014042701888.ht dual/outdated 수습 후 사표 수리 ml version
정홍원 국무총리 사의 표명, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/htm Did not use - 27-Apr "세월호 참사 초동 대응 l_dir/2014/04/27/2014042700426.ht dual/outdated 문제, 사과드린다 ml version
정홍원 국무총리 사의 표명 http://news.chosun.com/site/data/htm Did not use - 27-Apr "세월호 참사 책임지고 l_dir/2014/04/27/2014042700483.ht dual/outdated 물러나겠다" ml version
정홍원 국무총리 사의 표명 "I apologise to the nation" / "잘못된 관행 너무 많다는 걸 http://news.chosun.com/site/data/htm "My head is bowed" / "I 뼈저리게 느꼈다 27-Apr " [Chung l_dir/2014/04/27/2014042700770.ht believe I should take full Full Apology Hong-won PM resignation “I ml responsibility for the have truly felt the faulty tragedy." system”]
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 69 Appendix III: CNN Data Collection
Article Primary Secondary Article Name Link Language Date Coding Coding
"I'm not going to rest, and none of the gentlemen and women who are here are Obama vows http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US going to rest or be satisfied, until the leak 3-May 'relentless' response /05/02/louisiana.oil.spill/index. is stopped at the source, the oil on the Ingratiation to oil spill html Gulf is contained and cleaned up and the people of this region are able to go back to their lives and their livelihoods."
Could oil spill sap http://edition.cnn.com/2010/PO Did not use - appetite for Obama's 3-May LITICS/05/03/obama.oil.strateg dual/outdated offshore drilling y/index.html version plans?
Obama clamps http://edition.cnn.com/2010/PO Did not use - 27-May down on offshore LITICS/05/27/obama.drilling.m dual/outdated drilling oratorium/index.html version
Did not use - http://edition.cnn.com/2010/PO Obama looking for dual 8-Jun LITICS/06/07/gulf.oil.obama/in 'whose ass to kick' version/not dex.html applicable
Obama says Gulf http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US "Full resources of the federal Coast will bounce 15-Jun /06/14/gulf.oil.disaster/index.ht government are being mobilized to Ingratiation back from oil ml confront…" disaster
Obama: 'Gathering http://edition.cnn.com/2010/PO [structure so that processing claims] "are 15-Jun(b) up facts' on BP LITICS/06/14/obama.gulf.trip/i Ingratiation dealt with justly, fairly, promptly." compensation ndex.html
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 70 BP to set up $20 http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US "The people of the Gulf have my 16-Jun billion cleanup fund, /06/16/obama.bp.escrow/index. commitment that BP will meet its Blame Obama says html obligations to them…"
"We will fight this spill with everything Transcript: Obama http://edition.cnn.com/2010/PO we've got for as long it takes. We will 16-Jun(b) talks about oil spill LITICS/06/15/transcript.obama. Blame make BP pay for the damage their response speech/index.html company has caused."
"set aside whatever resources are Obama details oil http://edition.cnn.com/2010/PO required to compensate the workers and 16-Jun(c) spill response, calls LITICS/06/15/obama.speech/in business owners who have been harmed Blame for energy reform dex.html as a result of his company's [BP's] recklessness."
Master’s Thesis Crisis and Security Management – J. Gina Park | 71 Appendix IV: Washington Post Data Collection
Article Primary Secondary Article Name Link Language Date Coding Coding
As oil spill hits Did not use - http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- Louisiana coast, critics dual 30-Apr dyn/content/article/2010/04/29/AR2 assail Obama's offshore version/not 010042902290.html drilling plan applicable
"For too long, for a decade or more, A major test for http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- there has been a cozy relationship President Obama: Corrective 15-May dyn/content/article/2010/05/14/AR2 between the oil companies and the Contain the oil spill and Action 010051403688.html federal agency that permits them to the fallout drill…"
"This is our highest priority" / "You Obama visits Gulf http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- are not alone...You will not be 28-May Coast, pledges long-term dyn/content/article/2010/05/28/AR2 Ingratiation Apology abandoned. You will not be left federal help on cleanup 010052803496.html behind."
"We will bring those responsible to justice on behalf of the victims of Obama meets with http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- this catastrophe and the people of Corrective 1-Jun leaders of new oil spill dyn/content/article/2010/06/01/AR2 Blame the Gulf region." / "If oversight was Action commission 010060101416.html inadequate to enforce these laws, oversight has to be reformed."
"I want BP to be very clear they've Obama knocks BP for http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- got moral and legal obligations here 5-Jun paying out dividends dyn/content/article/2010/06/04/AR2 Blame in the gulf for the damage that has after spill 010060400127.html been done."
Obama vows to resolve http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- "We're going to continue to hold BP 14-Jun complications with BP's dyn/content/article/2010/06/14/AR2 and anyone else responsible for the Blame damage claim payments 010061403148.html disaster they created accountable."
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