Bálint Magyar Parallel System Narratives—Polish and Hungarian regime formations compared A structuralist essay

The Polish election results of 2015 seem to have brought Hungarian and Polish development into synchronicity again, a congruence that has been apparent many times throughout history. At first glance, it may appear that we are dealing with regimes of an identical nature, especially taking into account the similarities of the authoritarian politics practiced by Jarosław Kaczyński (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and Viktor Orbán (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, Fidesz), characterized by a tendency to eliminate autonomous social forces and control mechanisms, as well as the application of similar ideological frames. But beneath the superficial similarities, these attempts are aimed at establishing different types of autocratic regimes—as this paper ultimately concludes. Orbán’s regime, which I define as a mafia state, is built on the twin motivations of power centralization and the accumulation of personal and family wealth; the instrument of its power is the adopted political fam- ily, freed of the limitations posed by formal institutions. Kaczyński’s regime is better described as a conservative-autocratic experiment, driven by ambi- tions of power and ideological inclinations. The active subject of the Pol- ish experiment in autocracy is the ruling right-wing party, PiS. While the Hungarian regime essentially exploits ideology for pragmatic purposes, the Polish regime is driven by ideology. The widely-held kindred spirit of Polish and Hungarian people is ce- mented in historically extant socio-structural parallels, rather than particu- lar historical links. These include the traditionally high proportion within

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both societies of the middle nobility, the defining role of the feudalistic culture they transmitted, as well as the assimilation of this former nobility into the structure of modern state bureaucracy following the decline in the political and economic influence it previously enjoyed. Their shared histori- cal fates, despite the apparent historical similarities, are based as much in myth as fact. In much of the nineteenth century the lack of sovereignty, the independence struggles against absolutist dynasties, the similarities in the way the nations were formed, the feudal serfdom, and the absence of industrialization were common to both nations. But while Poland, sepa- rated into three parts, was almost homogenously Catholic, Hungary, while being predominantly Catholic, had strong, influential Protestant churches as well. While the Protestant churches were more in favor of independence, the Catholics institutionally stood more for loyalty to the ruling house. The Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 brought Hungary quasi-sovereignty and half a century of extraordinary economic prosperity. The nationalities comprising the majority of the population, however, also faced many re- straints and state-driven efforts of assimilation. World War I concluded very differently for the two countries. Poland regained its territory, independence and sovereignty. Hungary, on the other hand, not only lost two-thirds of its territory and half of its population, but also the middle power status it believed to have as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In addition, it had to pay punishing war reparations and face serious military restrictions. Both countries experienced either perceived or real betrayal by the West (Hungary in 1920, 1947, and 1956; Poland in 1939 and 1945). A long quarter century after regime change in 1989, the rule of both the PiS and Fidesz seem to display certain characteristics that have their roots in the period between the two World Wars. Although the regimes hallmarked by the figures of Horthy and Piłsudski show a good deal of similarity, there were also a number of structural differences between the two. Despite the great difference in the roles the two countries played in World War II, both became communist dictatorships integrated into the So- viet sphere of influence after 1945. At the same time, divergent courses of development in the period from 1945 to 1989 are also apparent, and these continue to determine the different attitudes of their societies today.

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From regaining independent statehood to World War II

At the end of World War I, an indepen- Paradoxically the birth of an indepen- dent, autonomous and sovereign Pol- dent Hungarian state was simultane- ish state was established after a gap of ously entwined with national trauma. one hundred and twenty-three years. In the now sovereign Kingdom of Hun- The borders of the newPoland were the gary (which happened to be a monarchy result of military conflict, uprisings, without a monarch), brought about by and a war fought against the Soviet the Peace Treaty of Trianon following Russian state. The Polish political elite the dissolution of the Austro-Hungar- and society felt they were victors, and ian Monarchy, Hungarian society felt became defenders of the new European beaten and humiliated, and strived status quo. The new Poland had become to change the European status quo. a remarkably heterogeneous state in The Little Entente constructed around ethnic and cultural terms, with no sig- Hungary with French backing isolated nificant number of Polish people outside the country internationally. The new its borders. Only a small segment of the Hungary became an ethnically homo- large Jewish population assimilated, a geneous nation state, but remained majority kept apart both socially and heterogeneous denominationally, while culturally. a quarter of ethnic Hungarians were stranded in the neighboring successor states.

The formation of the Polish state was Miklós Horthy’s authoritarian regime closely tied to the figure of Marshal was limited to the forced path of griev- Józef Piłsudski, though he did not ac- ance politics grounded in Trianon, cept any formal political office. The with growing power for the Regent. No constitution of 1921 was one of the constitution was ratified in Hungary, most democratic constitutions in Eu- and the political praxis shifted weight rope, with the predominance of legisla- towards preponderant executive pow- tive power. ers.

According to Piłsudski’s understanding The politics of the Horthy era realized of nationhood, citizenship conscious- the concept of a homogenous nation ness was more important than a sense state (with Schwab and Jewish minori- of national-ethnic belonging where the ties). In the relationship between the in- relationship of the individual to society dividual and the community the nation

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was concerned, since Poland was a lin- overshadowed everything. Horthy’s guistically and culturally heterogeneous ethno-nationalism gave the regime a state. Piłsudski’s state (rather than unified ideological image proclaiming ethnic) nationalism declined to give a a “Hungarian cultural superiority.” The unified ideological image to the nation. most important factor was not loyalty He considered loyalty towards the state to the state, but ethnic belonging to the of prime importance for all ethnicities. Hungarian state. Though a decisive ma- Piłsudski’s concept of the nation was jority of Hungarian Jewry assimilated, relatively democratic: all who are loyal even this did not make it possible for to the state are members of the nation. them to win acceptance into the state Piłsudski’s chief opponents were the na- apparatus, and did not protect them tional democrats, composed in part of from discrimination, or prevent the ulti- the large land-holding aristocracy, and mate murder of the overwhelming pro- in part of the petite-bourgeois educated portion of them during the Holocaust. classes with close ties to the Church. This was a “controlled democracy,” in At the same time, however, the middle which it was always “the nation” that classes themselves were rather weak. governed: that is, the large landhold- Furthermore, the existence of a five-mil- ing aristocracy and the landed nobil- lion strong Ukrainian minority, which ity. Moreover, the defensive mecha- responded to repression with separatist nisms of the state-dependent gentry ambitions, caused quite a problem, de- elite only strengthened the closed, feu- stabilizing his premise of the state. dal nature of the regime.

• The political system was largely in • Continuing electoral constraints pieces, and due to the democratic and an open ballot (unlike anywhere electoral laws not a single party else in Europe) ensured the operation could gain a majority in the Sejm of a dominant party system over- until 1930. In a system reminiscent seen by the government parties, in of the former Polish “noble repub- which marginal roles were afforded lic,” governments crumbled one to the left, liberal, and until the mid- after the other. Society soon became 1930s, extreme right-wing parties. disillusioned with the unstable po- Mandates of a two-thirds majority litical system, and Piłsudski took were frequent (Unified Party 1922: advantage of this in his 1926 coup. 58%, 1926: 69%, 1931: 64%; Party of Even the communists, forced under- National Unity 1935: 69%; Party of ground, welcomed this turn. Hungarian Life 1939: 73%).

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• At the time, Poland still had the • In 1922, Prime Minister István right to strike and freedom of as- Bethlen forced a pact upon the so- sembly, along with independent cial democrats. In exchange for workers’ unions. The communist official permission to exist, they party was finally brought to its knees renounced recruiting state employ- and liquidated not by Piłsudski, but ees, rail workers, and postal work- the Comintern under Stalin. The ers, limited their propaganda work main opponents of the system among agricultural workers, gave were the radicalized and anti-Se- up organizing mass strikes and re- mitic national democrats (Camp publican propaganda, desisted from of Greater Poland, National Party, criticism of foreign policy, and took National Radical Camp). No anti- up a moderate opposition stance. Jewish laws were passed or Jewish The government also took forceful wealth expropriated and redistrib- steps against extreme right move- uted after the coup, or under the ments after consolidation, though so-called “rule of the generals” after it itself ultimately swung to the ex- Piłsudski’s death. Still, there were treme right. At the 1939 elections, many atrocities committed against however, with the introduction of a Jews during this time, including dis- secret ballot, the Arrow Cross Party criminatory local regulations, the received 14.3%. Between 1938 and “ghetto seats” for Jews at the uni- 1942, four anti-Jewish laws were versities to which the government passed. By means of the anti-Jewish turned a blind eye, and attacks on laws, Jewish properties were robbed shops and markets. After Piłsudski’s and widely redistributed, without death the whole government camp any notable social or agricultural re- also shifted heavily to the far right. form.

• Poland was threatened by Germany • Hungary went out of its way to from the start, a danger that became form a good relationship with Ger- even more stark after Hitler took many and Italy from the start. It power. The German-Soviet Treaty of joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. 1922 in Rapallo constantly hung as This alliance made it possible for the Sword of Damocles over Poland. Hungary to regain a significant por- Piłsudski and Foreign Minister Józef tion of the territory that had been Beck rejected the block policies, handed to successor states (Upper joining neither the Little-Entente Hungary in 1938, Northern-Transyl-

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nor the Anti-Comintern Pact. Beck’s vania in 1940, and South Hungary in Intermarium (between-seas) con- 1941). The Country was swept into cept served the purpose of building war alongside the Germans, and at- an alliance of states between the Bal- tacked the Soviet Union, with cata- tic, Adriatic and Black Seas. strophic consequences.

• Following the Soviet-German oc- • Hungary attacked the Soviet Union cupation of Poland in 1939, armed as an ally of Germany, and suffered resistance organizations were im- a major defeat there. At the same mediately formed. The largest Pol- time, in a Europe mostly under occu- ish armed opposition organization pation, Hungary formally preserved of World War II, the Home Army, its independence, with its inter- was established, but the communists nal set-up unchanged. No signifi- (People’s Guard), the radical national cant resistance movement formed front (National Armed Forces), and within the country: neither against even the peasantry (Peasant Bat- the Horthy regime or the later Ger- talions) had their own armed units. man occupation of 1944, nor against The leadership of the earlier opposi- the discrimination of the Jews or tion parties formed the government even their later deportation. In in exile, which directed resistance at October 1944—after an unsuccess- home from Paris, and later London. ful attempt to exit the war—Horthy Two significant uprisings broke out handed over power to the leader of against the Germans: the Ghetto the Arrow Cross, Ferenc Szálasi. Uprising of 1943, and the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.

Absorption into the Soviet empire

Poland came out of World War II victo- Hungary came out of the war de- rious, but the Allies—in opposition to feated, and branded as Germany’s last Stalin—did not acknowledge the merits ally, continuing to fight on the side of of Poland, and they were not allowed Germany even at the end of 1944. The to take a seat among the victors. After prime ministers responsible for the war they were tried in Moscow, leaders of (Bárdossy, Imrédy) were executed, as the Home Army, which leaned towards

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the West, were executed or given life was Ferenc Szálasi. Horthy, however, sentences by the Soviets, as were the escaped a court trial. delegates sent to Poland by the Lon- don government in exile.

The new Poland established after the After the war, Hungary once again lost war lost significant territories in the the territories it had regained through East, but gained huge western ter- the revisions, territories it only had a ritories as “compensation.” The new chance to keep if it had broken the al- borders were determined by Stalin’s liance with Germany in time. Hungary strategic interests. At the beginning was not of special importance to the of the war, the Soviet leadership had al- Soviet leadership, and although it was ready made up its mind: if any Poland placed under the oversight of the Allied would be left at the end of the war, it Control Commission under Marshal must have Soviet leanings. This was Voroshilov, a checked course for demo- the master plan into which the Katyń cratic development was left open, al- massacres fit, aimed explicitly at the lowing for political pluralism built on a liquidation of the middle-class Polish multi-party system. elite considered to be anti-Soviet.

The adoption of Polish Stalinism began Hungarian Stalinism began with the with the active participation of the “strangling of democracy.” The Soviet- NKVD from the last day of the war. type regime had weak internal support. Having learned from the Hungar- This was proven by the parliamentary ian parliamentary elections of 1945, elections of 1945, where the Indepen- free parliamentary elections were dent Smallholders Party won a land- not even announced—with all prob- slide victory of 57% under the leader- ability, Stanisław Mikołajczyk’s Pol- ship of Zoltán Tildy. The communists ish People’s Party would have won. The were given far greater influence in the Polish Labor Party established in Mos- coalition government than their man- cow formed the government instead date. The internal ministry, the politi- in Lublin, and though under Western cal police, and even the economy came pressure it was made to appear as a co- under their direction, making way alition government, the internal minis- for the salami tactics, directed first try and the police remained in commu- against the Smallholders’ Party, and nist hands. The West accepted the fact later the rest of the political opposi-

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of Soviet occupation, while a serious tion. Even so, they could only secure civil and partisan war was underway 22.2% of the votes in the rigged elec- in the country, against the Soviets and tions of 1947. Power was nevertheless their Polish followers. Finally, in Janu- more and more openly concentrated ary 1947, through electoral fraud the in their hands, though the first com- communists took full control of the pletely communist government was country, later merging with the socialist only formed in December of 1948— party in December 1948. This was when after the annexation of the Social Dem- Gomułka was removed from the post of ocratic Party by the communists. chairman of the communist party, since he would have wished to incorporate the traditions of independence from the so- cialist party into the new party program.

After the war, Poland was considered Immediately after the war, Hungary did the most important area for Stalin, both not have any particular strategic signifi- in geopolitical and military terms. After cance, since Soviet troops were stationed the liquidation of the national forces to its west, in Austria, and Tito’s still and the de facto division of Germany friendly Yugoslavia neighbored it from into two states in 1949, it ceased to be the south. From 1948–49 however, with a frontier country, and became simply a the heightening Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, military staging area. the strategic importance of the country grew from Moscow’s perspective.

In Poland power came to be held by a Power came to rest in the grasp of a trio, trio: Bolesław Bierut, Hilary Minc and Mátyás Rákosi, Ernő Gerő and Mihály Jakub Berman. All three were “Musco- Farkas. All three were “Muscovites” vites,” yet while Minc and Berman were (belonging to the Moscow-based emigré of Jewish origin, Bierut was of Catholic wing of the Party), and of Jewish origin. peasant stock.

In the series of show trials launched In the series of show trials that began in Eastern Europe in 1949, the Polish in Eastern Europe in 1949, the Hungar- communist Władysław Gomułka was ian communist László Rajk was picked marked for the role of chief accused. out for the role of chief accused, and However, Bierut did not show too Rákosi, as “Stalin’s best pupil” led the

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much willingness to organize the tri- way, having him executed by Septem- als. Mass executions did, however, occur ber 1949. Hungarian Stalinism became in the army. Later the trials took an one of the most repressive regimes in anti-Semitic turn, for which Gomułka Eastern Europe. One in ten Hungarians no longer fit the description, but he were prosecuted for a variety of charges. was nevertheless kept under arrest for The church was completely broken, three years from 1951. Polish Stalin- with the Prince Primate, Archbishop of ism had fewer victims in comparison Esztergom, József Mindszenty impris- to the other Eastern European coun- oned as the result of show trials. In ag- tries. Attempts to break the Catholic riculture a “dekulakization” and a vio- Church were unsuccessful; in fact, Pri- lent, though only partially successful, mate Wyszyński signed an agreement collectivization was underway. ensuring the Church relative autonomy, though he was under arrest for three After the 20th Congress of the Soviet years from 1953 onwards without trial. Communist Party, Ernő Gerő became Collectivization also ran aground. General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party instead of Rákosi, After the 20th Congress of the So- while Imre Nagy became the most pop- viet Communist Party, Bierut’s death, ular communist, though he had been and the worker’s uprising of Poznań, thrown out of the party earlier, and his Gomułka became the most popular return raised expectations of loosen- “local” communist, who was expected ing ties of dependence from the Soviet to loosen the ties of dependence from Union and a reform of the Soviet model. the Soviet Union and introduce reforms Following the first Soviet intervention of the Soviet model to Poland. In Octo- in the aftermath of October 23, 1956, ber 1956, Khrushchev finally agreed to and the bloody response from state se- Gomułka’s return, and Stalinism ended curity forces, the revolution turned into with a bloodless revolution. The Polish a freedom struggle. When events got out Stalinists did not defend their posi- of control for the Soviets—and the reti- tions, accepted Gomułka’s leadership, cent stance of the Americans was taken and did not begin bloody rear-guard ac- to mean a continued recognition of the tions. The Soviet defense minister and existing status quo—on October 31 they councilors were sent home. decided to repress the revolution.

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1956: The consequences of the two revolutions

In the year following the events of Oc- As Soviet troops repressed the Hun- tober 1956, further reforms were the garian Revolution of 1956, around two subject of hot debate. Polish society hundred thousand citizens fled the felt more than mere sympathy for the country. In the course of the reprisals Hungarian Revolution—many watched following the Revolution, Imre Nagy, the young people fighting against the the reform-communist prime minister Soviets with envy. They also believed of the Revolution, and hundreds of its that the reforms could be continued, participants were executed. Meanwhile, that Gomułka would carry through with in spite of the Soviet occupation and re- the reforms of the Soviet model, and a prisals, the new leader János Kádár not decentralized, grass-roots, democratic only declined to rehabilitate the first socialism would come into being and line of the earlier Muscovite-Stalinist take into account the specificities of the leadership, but from 1962–63 began Polish nation. Instead, Gomułka pro- to openly distance his economic, social, gressed in the opposite direction, and in and cultural policies from the practices the autumn of 1957 there were protests of the Rákosi regime, both in word and against him for banning the weekly Po deed. Prostu, which supported the reforms.

After 1956, Gomułka took leadership of After 1956, Kádár gained power over a an unbeaten society: beaten society:

• Polish society largely experienced • Hungarian society suffered its third the events of October as a victory; defeat of the twentieth century after • The leadership of the party was November 4, 1956; dominated by moderate communist • Kádár’s political circle was composed forces, and Gomułka was a rather of representatives of the orthodox popular political figure; though of- communist line, and he was reviled ficially maintaining the policy, they both at home and abroad; in fact gave up on the experiment of • Between 1959 and 1962 agricultural forcibly collectivizing private farms, collectivization was completed, fol- but at the same time their modern- lowed later by the modernization of ization was also neglected; agriculture and villages;

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• The Catholic Church held onto its • The communist regime made the integrity and social influence, under Church its vassal; Archbishop Mind- the leadership of the earlier impris- szenty took refuge at the American oned Cardinal Wyszyński, and at a embassy, and was forced into emi- later stage became a pillar of support gration years later. to forces critical of the regime.

Processes of consolidation and deconsolidation from the mid-sixties

The result of the 1956 uprising in Po- The reprisals following the repression of land was not a society degraded and the Revolution of 1956 made it clear to broken to the extreme. The grounds for Hungarian society that there would be negotiation between society and politics no return to either the coalition govern- were not—as in Hungary—the presence ments of the period prior to 1948, or of the Soviet troops, the mass execu- the regime that existed between the two tions, the imprisonments and hundreds world wars. With the acknowledgement of thousands of fleeing émigrés. What of these conditions, there came to exist a followed was not a social compromise new form of unspoken “social contract,” based on constant concessions made by a “compromise” (or as it was called back a hardline dictatorship, but a perma- then, consensus) between the regime nent deadlock between the ruling pow- and society (including a significant ers and society. Though the communist segment of the intelligentsia, and the party maintained its dominance over Church leadership), which developed and society, it could not settle into a mellow functioned until the end of the eighties. sense of security. In order to strengthen Essentially, this compromise meant that its legitimacy, it constantly sought so long as citizens did not interfere with closer relations with the Church. In the politics, the regime would not interfere Polish socialist system, society moved with their private lives, while also prom- constantly in a triangle of resistance- ising citizens increasing, though limited, acceptance-participation, but there prosperity. The foundations for this were was no sharp boundary between these laid in early 1957, with a large increase of three forms of behavior. wages for laborers.

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The Polish leadership did not have a The Kádár regime’s “national strategy” socialist “national strategy,” because meant that everyone could be a part of it was not able to create the economic the nation so long as they accepted the foundations for the gradual and predict- rules of the game. Yet rather than giving able improvement of its citizens’ living ground to nationalism, this was a strat- standards. egy of antinationalist nation-building.

Polish society did not become depo- The popular epithets found to describe liticized, because it expected further the “soft” communist dictatorship of the reforms, while the regime took the op- following decades reflect the burgeoning posite direction. They turned away from of a depoliticized petite-bourgeoisie: the path of reforms, while the standard among them “gulyás communism,” or of living did not improve, and the cul- “refrigerator socialism.” In the phrase tural freedom that had been secured was “the happiest barracks in the socialist also increasingly curtailed. As a result, camp,” on the other hand, there is a ref- the first opposition debate circles and erence to the forced social acceptance of critiques appeared already in the sixties. geopolitical realities and collusion with There was also no socialist petite-em- power. bourgeoisement such as that in Hungary.

A characterization of the period: A characterization of the period:

• The nationalization program for pri- • The communist party proclaimed a vate farms was never taken off the new, relatively de-ideologized way agenda. In fact, it existed as a threat of building a relationship with soci- throughout; only the time of its ex- ety at its Congress of 1962, stating ecution was continuously delayed that “those who are not against us, by new party decrees. The absence are with us”; of collectivization did not mean the • in education, the system of dis- rehabilitation of the private farms, crimination on the basis of class but merely a hibernation in the state of origin (“class alien”) was ended; that had preceded collectivization. • in agricultural cooperatives—un- Cold collectivization meant that like during the collectivization even if the state could not expropri- efforts of the fifties—the former ate the land, or take it into farming semi-rich or rich farmers (ku- collectives, it expropriated the eco- laks) and their descendants could

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nomic environment of the private advance to leadership positions farms: based on a clear and unequivocal • it prevented the concentration offer from the regime: either you of estates, which meant that the fill the position of a leader in the ownership structure of private collective, or you will be stripped farms remained essentially the of your land and be marginalized. same from 1945–1970; From the mid-sixties onwards, ag- • it upheld the system of compul- riculture was provided with large sorily submitting produce until development resources, and the 1972; collectives functioned increasingly • it continued with the wide use of as independent economic organi- state-set prices; zations rather than as kolkhozes; • the trade in agricultural tools was • in 1963, amnesty was declared for in state hands, along with curbs on the majority of political prisoners, the growth of free market trade. putting an end to the period of re- • The Polish leadership—not hav- prisals; ing a cultural politician of such • party leaders sought to demon- weight as György Aczél—showed strate that there would be no re- a disinterest in cultural issues: turn to the Rákosi-Stalinist period apart from demanding respect for by decommissioning the major- the basic taboos, a relatively free ity of the pre-1956 hardline state cultural life emerged, with great security personnel, transferring variety in genres (jazz, beat, rock, them to the spheres of production; abstract art). This intellectual-cul- • official Marxist-Leninist dogma tural stratum had become the indi- still held primacy in cultural life, rect, or in some cases even direct, but certain “civic” trends were opposition to the regime already also accepted. In a cultural policy by the mid-sixties. directed by György Aczél, the poli- tics of the “three Ts” (in Hungar- The Gomułka-leadership had no strat- ian: támogatjuk [support], tűrjük egy for modernization; it neither could, [tolerate], and tiltjuk [prohibit]) nor desired to substantially change the dominated. The system was able political system, or the mechanism to integrate broad swaths of intel- of economic control. Even though it lectual life placed in the tolerated was clear that further growth of living category, which did not require dis- standards could not continue without a plays of ideological commitment.

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surge of development in agriculture and In order for the compromise of “don’t modernization of the countryside, since politicize, but prosper” to become sus- the PZPR (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Ro- tainable, a restricted marketization of botnicza) never had total control over the economic system had to be carried society, any attempt at decentralization out under the banner of a moderniza- and sharing of decision-making author- tion strategy, that would uphold the ity would have led to further weaken- monopoly of the state and cooperative ing of the establishment. On the other property, and not encroach the least bit hand, the concentration of estates and on the political system. The establish- modernization of the countryside would ment of the socialist market economy have further encouraged the flow of the and fulfillment of the requirement of population to the cities, which was not continuous growth in living standards desirable during an ongoing population was assisted by the introduction, in boom. This boom had caused between 1968, of the New Economic Mecha- two and three hundred thousand new nism (NEM): people to appear on the employment market from the mid-sixties, a cause for • In the field of production and devel- great concern. For this reason, the “well opment the role of central organiza- tried and tested” program remained in tion was reduced, and company in- place: a majority of investments went dependence in decision-making was into construction and other large-scale supported: excepting Yugoslavia, industries that could engage such large this was the only communist coun- labor forces. try where the command economy was abolished (decentralization); The establishment did not have the the price system was reformed, lead- strength to: • ing to an increase in the range of so- • vanquish the peasantry, but could called freely priced products, which prevent the development of peas- contributed to preparing conditions ant farms. By these means it not for the market activity of companies only caused tensions among the (price liberalization); peasantry, but also undermined the • average wage regulation was intro- foundations of food supplies to the duced to the wage system, which cities; made it possible for companies to • earn the loyalty of a majority of decide the salaries of employees workers, but meanwhile shut them based on a provided overall fund for up in the large state corporations, wages (wage liberalization);

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stripping them of any opportunity • an extended system of secondary to earn legal extra income; manufacturing branches and small • win the ideological battle with the farms attached to the cooperatives Catholic Church. In fact, the Church developed. The secondary manu- would ultimately become the most facturing branches simultaneously important support for Polish society; served rural needs for part-time • educate the young intelligentsia to employment and diversification of become followers of socialism, or consumer goods, as well as that of even accept it. It did, however, have flexible suppliers to the rigid state the means to “reward” the young structure. The over one and a half intelligentsia with prison sentences million backyard farms ensured fam- from time to time. ilies comprising both peasants, and industrial laborers working away from home, a stable source of food and income.

In summary, the regime obstructed The New Economic Mechanism was every social layer from pursuing its own strongly influenced by Polish econo- interests, achieving its goals, and fully mists such as Oskar Lange, Michał Kal- playing its roles, but on the other hand ecki, and Włodzimierz Brus, who had in it could not present a positive vision for fact completed the theoretical aspect of the future either. These bleak prospects the work in Poland, but their ideas had led to violent action in 1968, when the never been realized in practice. establishment assaulted the young in- telligentsia, and on the pretext of the The halt called upon the processes of Arab-Israeli War, started a brutal anti- economic reform at the end of the seven- Semitic campaign with which it drove ties, and a partial withdrawal from some away most of the remaining people of changes already introduced, drove the Jewish origin, mostly intellectuals. Two country into a crisis situation. The broad- years later, with the massacre of protest- ening of mechanisms offering means of ing workers, it also turned the laborers self-exploitation served to uphold the against itself permanently. The regime compromise based on continuous growth remained successful in turning the vari- of living standards: within state compa- ous social layers against one another at nies, surreptitious small-scale production this time, but by 1976 it no longer had (fusizás), often during official working strength even to achieve this. After the hours and using the tools and resources

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brutal repression of the summer strikes, of the company, was legalized by the the workers and intellectuals found an creation of the so-called economic work alliance. partnerships (GMK). The introduction of this form of economic association was In the seventies, the regime tried to prompted by a fear of the spread of the dampen social tension through renewed demands of the Polish Solidarity move- investment in—outdated—large-scale ment. This simultaneously increased the industry, financed by Western loans. income of the more resourceful workers, While the Hungarians spent their West- while simultaneously reducing the inflex- ern loans on maintaining the growth of ibility of the rigid state companies. But living standards, Poland used them to the mid-seventies also gave way to an bring about outmoded large-scale indus- increasing reliance on Western loans, ne- trial concerns. cessitated by the continuous increase of consumption and the provision of state- subsidized services. Furthermore, these loans also came to be employed to stave off financial bankruptcy, and made the Hungarian economy comparable to a col- lapsing house of cards.

The social foundations of anti-regime politics, or its absence

The lesson Poland took away from 1956 In Hungary, the reprisals that followed was that as long as public demands do 1956 taught society that resistance to not challenge the country’s position in the power establishment was futile, and the Soviet Bloc, it is possible to effect that they would have to make their lives change. At the same time, the system more comfortable within the framework did not bestow the masses with paths of the communist system. At the same to individual happiness: it restricted time, the leadership of the Kádár regime peasants in their role as private farm- learned from 1956 that a peaceful soci- ers, while shutting the labor force up in ety could not be sustained through total large state enterprises. Due to the lack repression. With the lack of fundamen- of reforms and continuous decline in tal freedoms, the improvement of liv- living standards, the groups that can be ing standards and conditions became a considered as the “opposition” already necessity. The Kádár consolidation and

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appeared by the mid-sixties, with the “compromise” embodied in part by the seventies bringing the masses to radical constant growth of general consumption manifestations of social discontent. established safety valves for the release of social tensions, giving those critical • In 1968, a series of protests by stu- of the regime private means of escape dents began; the regime took brutal through individual accumulation of action against intellectuals. wealth and other deals within the frame- work of the system. All of this ruled out • In 1970, strikes in Gdańsk protest- mass support for any initiative critical to ing drastic hikes in food prices were the regime. Society was immunized to violently repressed. 44 people were oppositional thinking, so the opposition fatally injured, and over a thousand movements critical of the regime were more wounded. Edward Gierek re- limited to rather small circles. placed Gomułka at the helm of the party in the aftermath. • In 1968, a small group of philoso- phers protested against the occupa- • In 1976, protests broke out in a tion of Czechoslovakia. number of cities due to rising food • In 1977, a few dozen dissident intel- prices; these were brutally repressed lectuals acclaimed the formation of by the regime, and many workers the Czechoslovak Charter ’77. were imprisoned. In the aftermath • In 1979, approximately 250 indi- of these events, an organization of viduals, largely intellectuals, signed intellectuals aiming to help those a petition against the imprisonment who suffered repression was estab- of Václav Havel. This event can be lished, called the KOR (Komitet Ob- considered the first step towards the rony Robotników). institutionalization of the anti-com- munist dissident movement.

The relationship between the radical The Hungarian anti-communist dissi- workers and the system-critical intel- dent movement led by János Kis fol- lectuals was, thereafter, institutional- lowed the Polish opposition’s strategy, ized and permanent in Poland. The KOR without it gaining any form of broader was not merely an aid organization; social support. For in Hungary, unlike through a work by Adam Michnik, A Poland, the sort of social deadlock ar- New Evolutionism, it was also ideo- rived at by constant conflict with the re- logically and strategically formative. As gime had never come into existence. So-

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such it rejected the dilemma between ciety, with its peculiar compromise not whether to improve the operation of the only tolerated, but accepted the soft dic- system while remaining integrated in it, tatorship ruling over it. In the spirit of or to try to overthrow it from outside. the adopted Polish strategy, the “flying Instead it proposed the building of par- (underground) universities” and samiz- allel civil structures, thereby also dem- dat literature began to spread more onstrating that it had understood the quickly with the greater visibility of the geopolitical power situation that kept Polish Solidarity movement, though it the communist system in place for the remained always more restricted, sin- moment, but neither recognized nor le- gle-centered, and with fewer copies in gitimized it. The institutions of the par- circulation. allel society generated by the intellectu- als were the so called flying universities Though the Hungarian communist and independent publishers. Both were party observed the rise of Solidarity mass based and multi-centered. with some concern, its fall in 1981 only resulted in a temporary surge of repres- By 1980, the Solidarity movement, sion against opposition movements. growing out of the shipyard of Gdańsk Nonetheless, while avoiding imprison- under the leadership of Lech Wałęsa, ing dissident intellectuals, every effort was no longer just a parallel society, was made to impede the logistics of the but also an embodiment of a parallel samizdat publications and the mate- political power. The Solidarity move- rial wellbeing of the few dozen opposi- ment was unique in the region, not only tion leaders. The contact of the isolated, for its vast size (ten million members), small opposition movement with the but also its heterogeneity. It joined in- broader “masses” was ensured by Radio dividuals and groups of various world Free Europe, which reported on opposi- views, of different social positions, and tion actions and publications. Hungar- was strongly supported by the Catholic ian society at large did not participate in Church as well as Pope John Paul II, for- the system-critical movements and was, mer archbishop of Kraków. A constel- at most, an audience. lation of this sort was unimaginable Apart from the system-critical anti- in any other socialist country. In the communist dissident movement, from course of the one-and-a-half-year exis- the eighties onwards there were also tence of Solidarity, it became clear that the environmental protection groups this deadlock could not be sustained taking action against the dams of and would have to go in one direction Bősnagymaros, who however kept their

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or the other. Though Jaruzelski’s coup criticism within the “paradigm of public defeated Solidarity at significant cost, it policy,” without politically challenging was not able to reinstate the legitimacy the regime. Others involved in politics of the regime even to its previous level. included the activists of the peace move- After the introduction of a state of ment Dialogue, who kept their distance emergency, the Jaruzelski leadership fell from the radical opposition groups, and into complete international isolation, the Catholic grass-roots community, at a point when it would have severely which came into confrontation with the required Western loans. On the other Catholic Church. The circle of so-called hand, the economist intellectuals of népi (folk) writers did not think in sys- Solidarity had had enough of collectivist tem-critical terms either, but wholly in illusions, and a program promoting lib- terms of protecting the rights of the eralization of the economy grew increas- Hungarian minority across the border ingly popular among them. After joining within the system, remaining undecided the IMF in 1986, no other course was between joining the opposition and bar- left open for the leadership of the party gaining with the reform communists either. even in the last third of the eighties. In Hungary, in spite of the eco- nomic crisis, few concrete propositions for the transition materialized. A “social market economy” grew to become a pop- ular formula.

1989–1990: the two peaceful, negotiated regime changes of the Eastern Bloc

The demolition of the communist party in the Soviet Union was carried out by the communist party itself, with the leadership of Gorbachev, as a continua- tion of Perestroika—a process beginning in the second half of the eighties and lasting over many years. In the rest of the East-Central European countries with a hard dictatorship—the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria— regime change took the form of a sudden break, without negotiations. Among the satellite states of the Soviet sphere of influence, a negotiated regime change was only conducted from 1989–90 in the two soft dictatorships of Po- land and Hungary, between the ruling communist parties and the actors of the

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political opposition. In both countries, the segment of the communist party ready to accede to talks, was the one ready to face reality. In neither country was transition or regime change the aim of these members of the communist party, but rather the legitimization of measures required to deal with the eco- nomic crisis made it seem worthwhile to involve an opposition they perceived as weak. Regarding Solidarity, they assumed that seven years after the state of emergency, it would not be capable of the show of force it had in 1980–81. The Hungarian democratic opposition lacked broad social support. One must add that these events did not unfold simultaneously in the two countries, but the Hungarians (both the reform communists and the opposition) followed the Polish developments. The adoption of the form of roundtable talks and then the results of the semi-free Polish elections, along with the Soviet response to them, showed that regime change had become a real possibility.

In Poland, it was the broadly supported The program of the democratic oppo- Solidarity, as the pioneer of the process sition in 1987, the “Social Contract,” and a movement gathering actors criti- still represented the Polish strategy cal of the system, who negotiated with of power sharing. However, after the the regime—with the mediation of the international thaw and transforma- Catholic Church. Peaceful transition and tion in Poland, the opposition parties regime change was meanwhile guaran- established in 1988 brought about the teed by a conditionally free electoral sys- Opposition Roundtable in the spring of tem, which ensured the Polish commu- 1989, unifying the opposition for talks nist party and its allies retained power with the communist party to ensure a in the Sejm, while fully opening the peaceful transition. But the Hungarian reinstated Senate to free political com- opposition parties, lacking real links petition. This is where the first semi- with the masses, represented the vari- free elections of the eastern bloc took ous trends in the opposition intellectual place in the summer of 1989. Solidarity elite. The two most significant forma- set out to win 35% of the mandates in tions were: the Hungarian Democratic the Sejm, and the seats in the Senate Forum (MDF), grouped around the népi under the name of Citizens’ Committee. (folk) writers and representing a popu- Though neither the PZPR, nor Solidar- lar, national and Christian ideology with ity, believed that the latter could win a a conservative identity; and the Alliance landslide victory, this did in fact occur. of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), which had In the two-round election system Soli- grown out of the anti-communist dissi-

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darity won everything it could. Solidar- dent movement, with a Western orien- ity, therefore, ran for the elections as a tation and a leftist, liberal approach that unified but heterogeneous movement, represented radical system-criticism. In with the existing internal differences this case, therefore, the differentiation only bringing about permanent divi- and institutionalization of opposition sions after the elections. forces with different ideological foun- dations had concluded even before free Following the elections, Solidarity suc- elections were held. ceeded in splitting earlier followers of PZPR, the Democratic Party, and the In the course of the negotiations, the United People’s Party away from the al- reform communists no longer had the liance, which made coalition formation chance to ensure themselves a guaran- necessary. Adam Michnik came up with teed powerbase unaffected by political a proposal: “we will delegate the prime competition, as the Polish Sejm did. minister, and you delegate the presi- Instead, they aimed to create a semi- dent.” Thus, in exchange for Jaruzelski strong presidential position with simi- being elected president by a majority lar authority vested in it. A separate deal of one vote in the Sejm and the Senate, between the MDF and the reform com- in September 1989, Tadeusz Mazow- munists was forestalled by a referen-

Figure 19.1: The intersecting cycles of economic growth in Poland and Hungary (in percentage of annual growth of GDP)

8

6

4

2

0

–2

–4

–6

–8 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Hungary Poland

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iecki became the first non-communist dum at the end of 1989 initiated by the prime minister in the region since 1947. SZDSZ, that preceded the first free elec- After the elections, a number of parties tions in the spring of 1990 and resulted emerged out of the Solidarity Move- in the victory of the MDF, leading to the ment, while Solidarity began to function formation of the national-Christian co- as a real labor union. alition.

Hungary 2010, Poland 2015: the second regime changes

The first time Viktor Orbán came to power, in 1998, he summed up his goals in his party’s campaign slogan: “More than change of government, less than change of regime.” The PiS, led by the Kaczyński brothers, voiced a similar demand from 2005. Orbán’s government remained for one full term, while Jarosław Kaczyński’s stayed for less than two years. Their return to power took place eight years later. Orbán defined Fidesz’s return to power in 2010 as a ballot box revolution, and his government as a second change of regime, while Kaczyński also made claims of regime change on a similar scale upon his return to power in 2015. They consider themselves the keepers of a tradition of Polish- Hungarian historical friendship. Poland symbolically supported the pro-gov- ernment demonstrations in Budapest expressing loyalty to Orbán (called the “peace marches”) by transporting Polish PiS activists to Hungary for the oc- casion, and Orbán also ensures the new Polish government of his solidarity through exercising his veto against any EU sanctions which threaten it. In spite of the similar ideological models and political language, however, the immedi- ate antecedents of these governments and their natures are quite different.

Antecedents: the electoral defeat of the Polish government parties and the collapse of the third Hungarian republic

• The concept of “welfare regime • The coalition between the former change,” used with predilection in reform-communist MSZP (Hungar- Hungary, is unknown in Poland. ian Socialist Party) and the liberal Three right-wing, or center-right, SZDSZ that came to power in 2002, governments carried out shock following the program of “welfare re-

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therapy reforms, which had a so- gime change” declared by the Social- cial cost that cannot be dismissed. ist Party, went on a spending spree The first shock therapy program was that the economy could not afford: initiated by the finance minister of it raised the wages of public employ- the Mazowiecki government, Leszek ees by fifty percent, introduced an Balcerowicz, in 1990, which helped extra month’s pension for Decem- complete a relatively quick switch ber, and various social benefits were from a state socialist shortage econ- also raised significantly. The program omy to market competition based on could not be made sustainable even private ownership. The second round with a growth in debts, and so the of shock therapy is attributed to the policies of halfheartedly and neces- Buzek government (1997–2001), in sarily accepted austerity began. In which Balcerowicz was deputy min- contrast to the logic of the Kádár ister and finance minister. Signifi- consolidation—in which the harsh cant reforms were introduced in four reprisals and sanctions once applied major fields: education, pensions, were followed by the politics of con- public administration, and health- tinuous, incrementally introduced care. Finally, under the first PiS gov- little “rewards,” concessions and im- ernment (2005–2007), new radical provements in living standards—in changes were introduced in the bat- this case the one-time boost in wel- tle against corruption, for lustration, fare spending, which would be for- and to “clean up” the secret services. gotten in a few months, was followed • The leading politicians and intellec- by a constant policy of austerity. This tuals-experts of the PiS, in govern- undermined faith in the future of the ment between 2005 and 2007, and government and its credibility. the Civil Platform, in government • The reform of large social welfare from 2007–2015, all followed in the systems also stalled, partly because footsteps of the Mazowiecki and its implementation would have re- Buzek administrations. The Polish quired the support of two-thirds of right wing has believed in the free the parliament, and partly because market and capitalism right from Fidesz’s so-called “welfare referen- the start. They have not changed dum” of 2008 excluded the institu- these fundamental principles even tional introduction of market ele- after both the Mazowiecki and the ments in health-care and education. Buzek governments suffered huge In its aftermath, the government co- electoral defeats. alition fell apart, and the following

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• Following the failure of the first two years up to the 2010 elections PiS government, the coalition of passed with a minority government. the center-right Civil Platform and • A few months after the electoral vic- the agrarian—ideologically na- tory of the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition tionalistic, economically slightly in 2006, a speech given by Ferenc left-leaning—Polish People’s Party Gyurcsány to the MSZP faction be- formed a government in 2007. The came public: in it, he admitted the politics of the government led by manipulation of budget deficit fig- Donald Tusk was calm and predict- ures in a statement paraphrasing the able. The Polish economy was in full slogan of 1956 (“we lied morning, swing; even in the worst year of the noon and night”), causing an irrepa- economic crisis (2009), it could still rable breach of confidence. The vio- produce growth of 1.8%. By 2010 lent anti-government protests that this figure was 3.9%, and in 2011 erupted in the aftermath, and the had risen to 4.5%. Tusk’s defeat was police reaction to them, were merely due to the fact that significant social the prelude to a period of cold civil groups were left out of this prosper- war—which composed the essence ity: notably those in small cities, vil- of Fidesz’s politics in opposition. lages, and the eastern regions. • Fidesz’s strategy of cold civil war • The World Bank’s “Doing Business in opposition replaced the neces- 2015” index ranked Poland in 32nd sary consensus that had been built place. This means that conditions into the constitutional order with a for investors are constantly im- politics of bribery and liquidation. proving in Poland; indeed, they are On the one hand, they did not sup- the best among the East-Central port systemic reforms requiring a European members of the European two-thirds majority in the national Union. Thanks to EU funds directed assembly, whatever compromises to Poland, more than 160,000 proj- they may have included; on the ects have been successfully com- other, when it came to the election pleted in the period between 2004 of heads or members of the institu- and 2013. The huge infrastructural tional control mechanisms of liberal development is highly apparent. democracy, they either approved the Poland can avail itself of 120 billion appointment of their own nominee euros of the EU budget from 2013– only, or paralyzed the operation of 2020, the greatest total value among the institution by withdrawing their all the EU member states. cooperation.

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• Poland has achieved significant • Going beyond the—at times justly prestige in international politics critical—tenor and norms of po- as well, primarily on account of its litical battles until then, they used consistent commitment to a Euro- character assassination and the in- Atlantic alliance, and stable, pre- fluence of the prosecutor’s office to dictable governance. In 2014, Prime paint government politicians in dia- Minister Donald Tusk was elected to bolical colors. lead the European Council. Jarosław • Initially, the erosion of any ability Kaczyński personally congratulated to govern, followed by the govern- him on his appointment. ing parties’ loss of credibility and • In 2015, the defeat of the PO-PSL paralysis, revelatory cases of corrup- government surprised many, but it tion, the economic crisis of 2008, as bequeathed a prosperous economy well as the political climate of cold and an internationally respected civil war, finally brought about the Poland to the incoming PiS admin- collapse of the third republic in istration. Hungary.

The effect of different electoral systems on the concentration of power and the extent of regime conversion

• The regional list electoral system • The mixed election system effec- results in a relatively proportional tive in Hungary until 2011 (a single distribution of mandates. The PiS chamber parliament of 386 seats, won the 2015 elections with 37.6%, filled by 176 representatives elected gaining a 51% majority in the Sejm. from single-member constituencies, The results were distorted in favor a minimum of 58 mandates from the of PiS, as the United Left did not national list and a maximum of 152 win any mandates despite achieving seats from the regional lists) made it 7.6% of the vote; as such, if the SLD possible for Fidesz to secure a two- had appeared on the ballot alone, thirds majority in Parliament with the PiS would not even have a ma- only 52.7% of the vote in 2010, pro- jority in the Sejm. In 2011, the Civil viding it with practically unlimited Platform won the elections with political power. On the one hand, it 45% of the mandates, after gaining could rewrite the Constitution alone 39.2% of the total vote. Neverthe- (which it did in 2011, amending it

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less, even with this distorted distri- multiple times since as its political bution of the mandates, the PiS was needs dictated), and could easily pass only capable of a simple change of any legislation. On the other hand, government, and not a complete it was able to directly appoint the appropriation of political power. heads and other officials of institu- A change of constitution (requiring, tions meant to serve as balances of unlike in the Hungarian system, the power in a liberal democracy (Con- support not of two-thirds of all the stitutional Court, Media Authority, members of parliament, but only of National Council of Justice, election those present for the vote) would overseeing bodies and so on) without have required extreme manipula- any need for consensus with the op- tion. Appointments in the institu- position, simply installing its own tions of political control, however, cadres. Moreover, the terms in office do not require a two-thirds con- for numerous positions were unre- sensus, and the limits for changes alistically extended: the Chief Pros- are set instead by the fixed terms ecutor, along with the President and of their appointment. At the same members of the Media Council have time—not having the cardinal Acts terms of 9 years, while the President that can only be changed by two- and Vice-President of the State Audit thirds of the parliament—it has Office of Hungary are appointed for more leeway in introducing broader terms of 12 years each. Therefore, changes to the system, though all the systemic changes wrought by the such changes can be just as easily Fidesz government are virtually ir- undone by a new government. revocable even after the government is defeated, since the currently scat- tered opposition would be unable to gain a two thirds majority, but • Changes to Polish electoral law, the people appointed by Fidesz will along the lines of the Hungarian remain in their positions even after ones, are not allowed by the consti- any change in government. tution, which demands proportion- • Through changes to the electoral ality. Moreover, PiS already enjoys law (increasing the disproportional- a comfortable majority in the Sejm, ity of the system, redrawing single- and a switch to a mixed election member constituencies, introducing system (individual and list) would a shorter time-period for the collec- in any case have unpredictable con- tion of signatures required to stand

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sequences. Since it is impossible to for elections, establishing a one- change the proportionality of the round election system (that forces electoral system, power machina- opposition parties to form a coali- tions are limited mainly to a state- tion prior to the elections), giving owned public media. ethnic Hungarians outside Hungary the right to vote, and so on) by 2014 Fidesz could secure a two-thirds ma- • The legal system and the PiS’ lack of jority in Parliament with only 44.9% a two-thirds majority prevent any of the votes. The parliamentary ma- change to the constitution, and by jority was only lost later, as a result extension, the overthrow of demo- of defeats in by-elections. cratic institutions. As such, the new • The two-thirds majority Fidesz se- regime turns to open violation of cured in Parliament allowed it to the constitution, or modifies the conduct a constitutional coup old institutions in such a way as to through the new Constitution and be able to give positions to its own its continuous amendments. If new cadres (as demonstrated, for ex- laws it had passed were declared un- ample, by the current alteration of constitutional by the Constitutional the court system and the media). Court, then rather than adjusting Yet these laws cannot be cemented the laws to the Constitution, it ad- across governmental terms. justed the Constitution to the laws.

Various attempts to dispense with liberal democracy: attempted Polish conservative autocracy vs. established Hungarian mafia state • Kaczyński’s politics is motivated by • Orbán’s politics is motivated by power and ideology: the concentra- power and wealth: the concentra- tion of power goes hand in hand with tion of power and the accumulation the goal of achieving hegemony of the of wealth in the political family. “Christian nationalist” value system, which is not to be confused with the value system of Christian democracy. • The regime is more driven by ide- • The system is not ideologically driven, ology, and its “inconsistencies” do its approach to ideology is utilitar-

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not mean a multitude of 180 degree ian. Its ideological “coherence” is not turns, as in the case of Hungary. As achieved by the representation of a conceived by Jarosław Kaczyński, definite value system. Its ideological the state and the Catholic Church “consistency” is ensured through its operate in concert (“the Church is an use of ideological frames that fit with organic component of being Polish.”) the patterns of enacted power tied It follows from this that the liberal to the patriarchal head of the family. value system built on the auton- Naturally, it follows that the liberal omy of the individual is viewed as value system built on the autonomy an enemy, since the interests of the of the individual is considered an Polish collective nation are seen as enemy. But it only picks and chooses higher than the interests of the indi- from the leftwing-collectivist values vidual. At the same time, the regime with caution. When necessary, it re- still endorses free market competi- lies on the frames of social populism. tion and respect for the freedom of It pragmatically uses conservative, enterprise, because it considers the collectivist values (“God, fatherland, collectivist economy a “communist family”), which can be attached to a invention” that destroyed Poland. It centralized chain of command built should be noted here that the major- on a patron-client network of vas- ity of Polish society also rejects col- salage (for example, respect for the lectivism. sanctity of private property—which could be considered conservative—is alien to it.) • They wish to break with the values • Under the guise of breaking with of liberal democracy, but at the same the communist legacy, they actually time, they take the break with the want to do away with the values of communist legacy seriously. liberal democracy.

The divergent approaches of the two autocratic tendencies to ideology (namely ideology driven vs. ideology utilizing) do not, in the meantime, exclude the possibility of the common ideological frames they use being closely related: • they define their administrations not as changes of government, but as changes of regime; • accordingly, they distance themselves from the regime change of a quar- ter century ago, and interpret the history of the peaceful, negotiated

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change of regimes as a deal between elites, concluded over the heads of society at large. Moreover, they attempt to use this to legitimize the necessity for the actual regime change they represent; • the new constitutive legislation also serves to distance their new auto- cratic regimes, on a symbolic level, from the repudiated legacy of the regime change. This is true of Poland even though the country had for- mally ratified a new constitution in 1997; • by “nation” they mean a community of people committed to an ideology rather than autonomous citizens, a concept which they use to create a basis of legitimacy and an argument for excluding citizens critical of their regime from the nation, painting them as representatives of alien interests; • they share a particular form of Euro-skepticism, and continue a “na- tional freedom struggle against the Brussels dictatorship” on the basis of historicized grievance politics, while continuing to expect EU re- sources. This behavior is no less than the realization of a rent-seeking policy on an international scale, without moral qualms; • fear and suspicion of refugees, migrants and aliens is exceptionally high in both countries, which populist politics easily transforms into active xenophobia.

The similarities between these ideological frames only demonstrate that they are equally adaptable to the needs of two different types of autocratic regimes.

• The actual decision-making remains • Real political and economic deci- centered within the framework sion making is removed from the of formal institutions in Poland. world of legally defined, formal- Kaczyński occupies the peak of the ized organizations and social con- power pyramid as the president trol. Important decisions are not of the PiS. The prime minister, the made within the formalized, legiti- ministers of defense, and the secret mate framework of parties, govern- services are the vice-presidents of ment, parliament, or fora of mutual the party. The leaders of the Sejm consultation. These institutions are and the Senate, as well as other merely the transmission belts of de- ministers, are members of the presi- cisions made outside them, trans-

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dency of the party. The PiS is a cen- ferring them into the sphere of le- tralized party, serving as a center gality. The transformation of Fidesz of power. Anyone with real power as a party went through the follow- must, first and foremost, be found ing shifts: alternative movement, an appropriate position in the party Western-oriented party, centralized hierarchy, and fill a function in pub- party (excluding representatives of lic office through this position. This rival trajectories within the party), form of organization is focused on vassal party (the party president has the concentration of power, applied the legally arraigned prerogative to using the classical instruments of appoint candidates for membership autocratic systems. A twenty-four of parliament and mayoral seats), member government, made up by and finally transmission belt party ministers with real competencies, (filling up the leading bodies with operates this system, unlike in the insignificant stooges, while they Hungarian case, where governance is cease to be actual decision-making concentrated in a few top ministries. fora). • Relationships in the power struc- • The decision-making “organ” of the ture—unlike in the clan-like mafia informally exercised power is the state, with its ruling structure adopted political family, or rather stretched beyond the formal offices its topmost reaches composed of a of public authority—are not con- score of members. This cannot be secrated as “family” or “blood” ties. compared either to the former So- Party political nepotism means viet nomenclature, the “politburo,” the distribution of state-political, or the formalized, transparent, ac- and state-commercial, media posi- countable institutional system of tions and sinecures among the par- modern democracies. The members ty’s own cadres. To facilitate this, of the “chief patron’s court” are the they have lowered the professional ministers attached to the pater fa- requirements to fill certain posi- milias/prime minister (Antal Rogán, tions. Meanwhile, there are no oli- János Lázár), the minister of the garchs, stooges, or advisors around interior, the oligarchs or stooges, Kaczyński who have significant in- and advisors. This narrow center of fluence on the decisions of the party power broadens in concentric circles, president. Even demands coming with the inclusion of formal public from the Church (for instance, the offices of authority, positions in the complete ban on abortions) are not private sector of the economy, and

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necessarily unconditionally sup- individuals whose position is diffi- ported by PiS. cult to ascertain. • State dirigist control is being estab- • With the eradication of individual lished: a sweeping away of the Civic and institutional autonomies based Platform is underway, meaning the on equality before the law, a system purge-like replacement of those ap- of patron-client relations is being pointed by the previous government built: shaping civilians into clients to positions in administration, pub- dependent on individual political lic services and the state corporate decisions. This is not accomplished sector. However, the regime is not with the homogeneously repressive able to spread beyond the spheres of instruments of classical dictator- state administration, state institu- ship, but a wealth of forms suitable tions, and state corporations. There to the requirements of “democratic are areas of social autonomy that, legitimation.” for the moment, it cannot reach. • Kaczyński’s anti-corruption stance • The Orbán regime does not fight cor- is not motivated by any intent to ruption, but monopolizes it through centrally expropriate corruption. centralization. In its case, we are not The war on corruption lies behind speaking about state capture, but the party name, Law and Justice, the capture of the oligarchs. Cor- as well. Lech Kaczyński, the now de- ruption does not work against the ceased brother of the current party state, but the state itself works as president, had been minister of jus- a criminal organization. The mafia tice in the Buzek government when state is simply the privatized form of he was confronted with the extent of the parasite state. corruption and vast role of the old- type secret service networks. This was what gave the twins the impetus • Politically selective law enforce- to form the PiS after the fall of the ment, as practiced in the mafia Buzek administration. state, ensures loyalty to the adopted • In its first term (2005–2007) the political family. The Governmen- PiS moved towards combatting tal Control Office, the State Audit corruption, introducing a new lus- Office, the tax authorities and the tration law in 2006, establishing an Prosecutor’s Office are not neutral, Anti-Corruption Bureau, and dis- impartial institutions taking action banding the Military Intelligence against illegal activity, but actors

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Agency. At the time, these acts were integrated into the criminal orga- also supported by the Civil Platform, nization in government. They oper- and with the exception of the 2006 ate not under the law, but under the lustration law, they are still effec- political and economic interests of tive today. Kaczyński even used the Viktor Orbán: when required, they Anti-Corruption Bureau against his are part of the Fidesz campaign ma- own coalition partners, exposing his chine, or the concealers of economic coalition ally, Andrzej Leppert. Para- crimes committed by central com- doxically his own government fell as mand. a result. • To date, there is no evidence that • The regime not only occupies posi- the PiS would seek to replace the tions of public authority, and ma- economic elite, to expropriate, redis- nipulates the sphere of politics, tribute, and channel private property but acquires family wealth through into its own fields of interest. Yet the the replacement of the leading unification of the posts of minister of economic elite and its methodi- justice and chief prosecutor is not an cal stripping of properties. The es- encouraging sign, since this measure sence of the mafia state is that the will make prosecutions more readily adopted political family accumu- subject to political orders. Nonethe- lates wealth through the blood- less, there is no sign in Poland that less instruments of state coercion. law enforcement authorities might This centrally directed activity as a act as protectors of economic inter- criminal organization involves the ests close to the regime. concerted operation of Parliament, • PiS is preparing to withdraw the government, the tax authorities, public education reform that was the Governmental Control Office, introduced at the end of the nine- the Prosecutor’s Office, and the ties (the shift, in particular, from police. Traditional corruption is an 8+4-year educational system to suppressed: it is not state officials a 6+3+3-year system has resulted who are offered bribes, but the state in East-Central Europe’s only last- criminal organization that takes ing educational success, through protection money. The fortunes of extending the period in which basic the political family are piled up by competencies are taught). Its goal, it the stooges and oligarchs belonging would seem, is boosting the position to the internal circle, laundering it of the Church colleges in comparison through means supported by the

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to the secularized schools of public state, and the introduction of off- education. shore companies. • Loyal members of the power pyra- • The new elite brandishes its wealth mid are rewarded with office, not unabashedly. The godfather/prime wealth. Kaczyński lives alone in minister builds a football stadium a rented apartment in Warsaw in in the neighborhood of his country extremely austere conditions. His house, transferring billions into his wealth declaration shows that he football foundation, while his family had to borrow money from a friend piles up land and fortunes through in order to adapt his home to meet stooges, buying palaces and country his ailing mother’s medical needs, mansions. He will soon move into and then to create a small memo- the royal castle in Buda. The visible rial to her after her death. Since its wealth of the stooges and oligarchs formation, the PiS has campaigned who can be tied to him is in excess of under the slogan of “the inexpensive 110 billion forints (350 million euro). state,” and to date, no costly prestige The amounts siphoned off to mem- investments can be tied to it. The bers of the political family are on the president of the party is, in any case, scale of millions–billions, and the weary of public appearances, and public revelation of such acts is an rarely appears in the media. unremarkable, everyday occurrence.

The difference between the two autocratic experiments’ foreign policy

• Kaczyński’s relationship with Ger- • Orbán is not fighting Germany, he many is ambivalent. During the is fighting Merkel, and he looks for PiS’s first term in government, he allies in this struggle even among fostered good relations with Angela members of her party. The slogan Merkel; these relations developed “Give Hungarians respect,” used in a further during the governance of major billboard campaign, expresses the Civil Platform. Merkel’s sup- how offended he was at not being port was likely necessary for Don- shown the respect he believes he ald Tusk to become the President of deserves in the Western world. His the European Council. On the other critique is not ideologically based; hand, many historical grievances it is merely revenge for the lack of

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are deeply engrained in Kaczyński respect demonstrated towards the (his father fought in the Warsaw godfather, and is a means to posi- Uprising, and he was born in 1949 tion himself, rather than his coun- in a city leveled to the ground by try. Meanwhile, he acknowledges the Germans). In his opinion, Ger- that Germany is Hungary’s number man capital should play a larger role one economic partner, with which in the revival of Poland. Once in a it cannot engage in an economic while, the politicians of the PiS bring battle. up these historical debts they believe the Germans owe. • Kaczyński is unflinching in his • Orbán has ejected all politicians commitment to the Atlantic Al- and diplomats committed to the liance. He considers the USA and Atlantic Alliance from his foreign NATO the chief guarantors of Polish affairs team. There is no Atlantic independence and sovereignty. The commitment, only bargains with country’s first PiS foreign minister, the USA and NATO. With regard to Witold Waszczykowski, is an Ameri- Hungary’s NATO obligations, they can university educated individual are met at the lowest possible level, who had worked in Geneva and at merely to prevent the USA taking a the Brussels office of NATO. His stronger line against the autocratic successor, Jacek Czaputowicz, has a regime in Hungary. This, of course, similar orientation. It is one of the does not stop government propa- main aims of the PiS to allow NATO ganda from publicizing all sorts of to establish permanent bases in Po- anti-Hungarian conspiracy theories, land, achieved partially at the 2016 among them stories of secret societ- NATO Summit in Warsaw. In addi- ies controlling the world, interna- tion, he continues to work on Poland tional banking offensives, sabotage being added to the NATO Nuclear by George Soros—adding to all of Sharing program, thereby further in- this a splash of anti-Semitism for creasing the security of the country. good measure. • One of the cornerstones of Polish • The program of Eastern Opening foreign policy—irrespective of the in Hungarian foreign policy aims to government—is that Russia is a secure socially unchecked, freely ex- threat to Poland at all times. The Pol- pendable resources for the adopted ish people believe that dependence political family through its connec- on Russian energy has a political tions to Putin and other autocrats.

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cost, and so every effort must be This, it must be added, is not classi- made to avoid it. Poland carries on cal commerce, for the chief merchan- expansive commercial activities with dise is Hungary’s disloyalty to the the countries of the Far East, but EU, for which the adopted political business does not signify political family gains financial favors. Rus- legitimacy for any anti-democratic sian gas-diplomacy, the renovation regime. The current PiS government of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, takes up the cause of any country and other similar deals put Hungary or people fighting against Russia in an obliged, dependent position (Ukraine, Chechnya, Georgia), and in exchange for private benefit. It is supports maintaining the sover- not the countries and nations, but eignty of the Baltic states by every the autocrats between whom the means it has at its disposal, as well Eastern Opening serves to create an as Ukraine’s intent to distance itself intimate, familial atmosphere. Fi- from Russia. Accordingly, Warsaw desz tries to present its position of usually criticizes the West for not staying within the EU while opening fully backing these causes. towards the East as bridging East • Kaczyński’s opposition to Brussels is and West. In reality, however, its po- motivated by a repositioning of Po- sition mostly involves doing “family” land’s status within the EU. But this business with the East, while black- does not mean Warsaw has any in- mailing the West. tent to leave the EU. Quite the oppo- • To strengthen its position against site: Poland would like to have more Brussels, Orbán seeks allies in the of a say in matters, and wishes to be framework of the Visegrád Four. in the mainstream of the EU. Natu- With a collective stance opposed to rally, it needs allies to achieve this, Brussels’ strategy for dealing with and Warsaw has recognized that the the refugee crisis in the form of Visegrád Four (V4) are not strong compulsory relocation quotas, he enough for it to achieve its aims. This also tries at the same time to turn is why it has resurrected Piłsudski’s it into a stronger community with a concept of the Intermarium intro- stronger bargaining position. Such duced between the two World Wars, a group would offer protection and which would have joined the coun- support to the other participants tries of the East-Central European in cases where, citing a democracy region, stretching from the Baltic deficit,Brussels wished to take mea- Sea to the Adriatic and the Black Sea. sures against moves toward autoc-

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Kaczyński would not envisage such racy within the EU. In the case of the an alliance to win protection and V4, Orbán insists on a role as leader: support against Brussels’ claims of a if not for Hungary, then for himself. democratic deficit, but rather to have His personal ambition reaches be- its status as a regional middle power yond the intent to bring about this within the EU recognized. It was no regional community of shared inter- coincidence that Poland took a mid- ests: he wants to be the provider of a dling, wavering position on the com- model and a program opposed to the pulsory quota system for the place- community of values that comprises ment of asylum seekers, since it did the EU. At the same time, Hungarian not want to antagonize Brussels and foreign policy is either wholly “deaf” Berlin in this matter. to the Polish initiatives—mainly be- • Various organizations within the EU cause they also have an anti-Russian reacted strongly—even threatening component—or simply cherry-picks to activate Article 7 of the Lisbon those elements that could be useful Treaty—to those political changes or- for its propaganda. chestrated by Kaczyński, which were • Orbán’s “Europe of Nations” pro- aimed at a concentration of power gram is simply a demand for a new and violated the constitution. This relationship with the EU: to make surprised the government, and com- sure that the EU maintains the pelled it to partial retreat. The ampli- transfer of convergence funds, while fication of the nationalist ideological at the same time securing the au- strain is not part of a larger strategy, tonomy necessary for the building but a spontaneous reaction to the up of “national democracies,” that criticism aimed at his government. is, autocracies.

Chances of a restoration of liberal democracy: party structure

• Polish party structure has been in • After the electoral victory of Fidesz in constant motion since the regime the 2010 elections, the party struc- change: some parties disappeared, ture that had been stable since the while other new organizations regime change—even rigid, in a formed. PiS, which won the 2015 certain sense—collapsed. The two elections, had only formed in 2001. large parties emerging from the re-

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This does not, however, mean that gime change, the national conser- a large number of new faces made vative MDF and liberal SZDSZ, dis- it into the political mainstream. integrated. The socialist party split Jarosław Kaczyński is one of the into two: the legal successor MSZP, longest currently active politicians, an eclectic party with its politics already being actively involved in grounded in inherited relationships the opposition movement in the rather than common principles, seventies. Typically, though parties and the social-liberal Democratic may have failed or been discredited, Coalition (DK), led by the former this has been less true of their poli- prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány. ticians. Only the leftist successor However, both parties held on to party seems to be disappearing from the discredited personal makeup of the political stage, both in organiza- the party’s figureheads. A new left- tional and personal terms. Clearly, wing green party, LMP (Politics Can however, new arrivals are taking be Different), was elected to parlia- their place. ment, but also later split in two, pro- ducing PM (Dialogue for Hungary). • In spite of constant change, Pol- They now compete, along with an- ish political life can basically be other minor party formed after divided into two sides: the Chris- 2010, Együtt, for the votes of the tian-nationalist and the liberal-con- left-wing electorate who won’t vote servative sides. In the last fifteen for MSZP or DK. years, this has meant a division be- • A three-party system replaces the tween PiS and PO. The former usu- two-party system that preceded ally call the latter leftists, or “com- 2010. Fidesz managed to occupy munists”—without foundation. The what Orbán has termed a “central third side could be the disappearing arena of power” (centrális erőtér), old left, and the new left now in for- referring to its dominance in the po- mation. Characteristically, however, litical arena, rather than its position neither the PiS, nor the PO, occu- on the political spectrum. Jobbik, an pies the central arena of power, de- ideology-driven, extreme-right radi- spite the fact that for a long while it cal party is positioned to its right, seemed like the PO would be able to while the divided socialist and liberal do so. The PiS—though it holds it- parties are to its left. This party align- self the only ideologically legitimate ment rather resembles the situation representative of the nation—is not under the Horthy regime, where the

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holding the center ground, but is po- government party in the center also sitioned on the extreme right. Even constantly saturated elements of organizationally it integrates the extreme-right ideology in order to extreme right-radical formations, hold the right-wing camp together. individuals and voters. While Fidesz largely absorbs the ide- ological frames and language of the • The PiS does not dominate the radical right in order to keep its sup- right-wing political field, since the port base, it does not integrate the PO is still a major party of the lib- voters of the extreme right. eral-conservative right. Moreover, • Since 2010 there has been neither a not only did Nowoczesna, a new lib- moderate center right party, nor a eral party make it into parliament liberal party that could be taken se- in 2015, but its support has grown riously in Hungary. Therefore, voters a great deal since. The forces of the disillusioned by Fidesz, which com- civil middle-ground, therefore, have mands most of the right, do not have a serious, institutionalized power a natural party environment where and base in Poland. Besides them, they could find representation on the another stable presence is the Pol- right of the political ground without ish People’s Party (PSL), which gains the mafia state elements. Therefore, its main support among the strata their break with Fidesz would also of provincial officials and civil ser- have to mean a break with their vants. right-wing values. This, however, is not a viable option for them, since it • The electoral list system does not would mean much more than simply exclude the possibility of defeating changing party preferences. PiS even without a united opposi- • The one-round, disproportional tion. Since PiS is considered unsuit- election system would only allow able for coalition by most of the for the replacement of Fidesz political parties, if it is unable to se- through elections if the multitude cure more than half of the mandate of opposition parties—which justly alone, it will conceivably lose its see each other as unsuitable, and chance to form a government. exclude one-another based on val- ues and voter base—would form an • In Poland, the governing party can- electoral alliance. This is what en- not bring opposition parties into a sures Fidesz its stability in power, al- position where they depend on the though its popularity rises and falls.

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governing party, and either openly • In the mafia state, politicians are or latently become its vassals. If a stigmatized and criminalized, while political party is discredited, another opposition parties are marginal- is immediately formed in its place. ized or domesticated.

The municipal hinterland for the protection of liberal democracy

• Since 2015, not only the capital • In contrast to Fidesz’s 1998–2002 and the major cities, but even the term in government, by 2010 practi- majority of rural municipalities in cally the whole of the municipal sec- Poland are under the leadership of tor had come under the influence of opposition forces. As such, it is im- Fidesz. This made it impossible for possible to administratively limit the municipalities to form a sort of the influence of the parties, or to hinterland, or base, for the parties take away the financial indepen- of the democratic opposition. Fi- dence of its followers; there are sig- desz openly socializes the electorate nificant obstacles to forcing them to expect that if they do not elect a into positions dependent on the leadership loyal to the government, government. they will be divesting themselves of Due to Poland’s size and hetero- all central and EU development re- geneity, there is an extraordinarily sources. Moreover, municipalities strong regional consciousness, which also depend on the central budget manifests itself in political choices for a decisive majority of their cur- as well. In the northern, western, rent revenue. Meanwhile, the vas- and Silesian metropolises of the sal status of mayors dependent on country, a majority of the electorate Orbán has made it possible for the supports the liberal-conservative municipalities to be stripped of their camp, and the plebeian-populist PiS education and healthcare institu- finds it very hard to address them. tions without opposition, even as The clerks of the rural towns in the their free handling of their budgets east also prefer to vote for the PSL. has been curtailed. As a result, the Moreover, the next municipal elec- municipalities have become essen- tions will only be in 2018, which tially custodians, extensions of the means the PiS is forced to govern power of government. Political and

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against the strong tide of opposi- cultural life is heavily centered on tional municipal governments. Budapest, and the few cities num- bering between one to two hundred thousand have never played an in- dependent role of political conse- quence for the whole country.

The chances of an independent media

• The PiS had made efforts to bring • With the Media Act passed in 2010, public media under party control the media, which had been under as early as the end of 2005. With multi-party control until then, minor amendments, the same law was placed under the jurisdiction was in effect while the PO was in of one party, meaning that public government. As such, the public radio, television, and the central media, though not a government news agency essentially became un- mouthpiece, nevertheless tailored checked propaganda tools of Fidesz. its broadcasts according to the val- • In redistributing frequencies, the ues of the PO. one-party media authority serves • In line with the Hungarian model, frequency owners loyal to the gov- the PiS set its sights on the creation ernment, and throws owners of fre- of a one-party media authority, so it quencies who are not committed to is to be expected that they will try to the government out of the media redistribute radio frequency conces- market. sions as well. • With the establishment of the Na- • According to the government pro- tional Office of Communications, the gram of the PiS, the next step will communications tasks of the public be to establish a centralized organ sector and the public procurement of through merging the former National state advertisement were centralized, Radio and Television Committee, the allowing the state to fundamentally Office of Electronic Communications, limit the freedom of the media market. and the Office of Competition and • Fidesz has made attempts to gather Consumer Protection. two major commercial television • The two largest Polish commercial channels (RTL Klub and TV2) into TV broadcasters (TVN and Polsat) its own circle of clients using the

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are in the hands of committed lib- tools of state coercion. In the case eral democrats. The TVN Agency of TV2, its efforts were successful: belongs to the international TVN the acquisition by one of Orbán’s Group, which is currently the larg- stooges was made possible through est advertising company in Poland. a state loan, and the repayment of Until now there has been no attempt the loan is assisted by the provision to force them out of the market. of state advertisements.

Civil resistance and the political parties

• Civil movements challenging the • Most of the civil demonstrations anti-democratic actions of the PiS- called against the actions of the Fi- led government manifest them- desz government were about pro- selves in regular demonstrations, tecting collective interests, or of bringing tens of thousands, or oc- a government-critical nature, and casionally over a hundred thousand, altogether failed to culminate in a protesters out on the streets. Their nationwide political movement that moves to protect liberal democracy would formulate a general critique and the constitution are fundamen- of the system itself. Generally, the tally of a political and system-crit- protests concerned harm to per- ical nature, since they are usually sonal material interests: the with- organized by the urban middle class drawal of early retirement pensions, and intellectuals. Actions to protect the nationalization of private pen- collective interests usually belong to sion funds, the situation of people the sphere of labor unions in Poland. with foreign currency loans, the na- But since the union with the larg- tionalization of tobacco shops, the est membership and a reach across redistribution of state land leases, sectors, Solidarity, is bound closely or the losses caused by the broker- to the PiS both politically and ideo- age scandals. A partial exception to logically, it is unlikely to be willing this rule were the mass actions in re- to continue the hard line it took in sponse to the elimination of auton- the protection of collective interests omy in public and higher education; under earlier administrations. Nev- nonetheless, these movements also ertheless, it is possible that the good remained within the paradigm of economic results of earlier years may government criticism. Two govern-

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allow the government to turn to the ment initiatives with an impact on politics of distribution. middle-class lifestyle and consumer • During the renewed waves of dem- habits were withdrawn in the face of onstration, the KOD (Committee massive popular opposition. The ban for the Defense of Democracy) on shops opening on Sundays lasted was formed, evoking the traditions little over a year, while the planned of the organization formed by dis- introduction of an internet tax was sident intellectuals in the mid-sev- dropped altogether after mass dem- enties, the KOR (Workers’ Defense onstrations. Committee). On the part of the cur- rent opposition movements, this The flash-mob demonstrations bringing signifies an open commitment to tens of thousands of people onto the the regime-changing traditions of streets were not brought into existence the past, and places current actions by old civil organizations or political against the government in this posi- parties, and the spontaneous mobiliza- tive historical tradition. KOD was tions were not able to institutionalize or the announcer and organizer of the produce leading opposition figures. latest mass demonstrations; it tries • The majority of the demonstrations to function not only as an umbrella were critical of the entire postcom- organization, but also focuses on munist period, and did not reach building an extensive, largely rural back to the regime-changing tradi- network. tions of the anti-communist dissi- • The huge demonstration by demo- dent movement. In paradoxical uni- cratic forces in June was already sup- son with the government ideology, ported by three former presidents of they considered the 1989 regime the republic (Lech Wałęsa, Aleksander change itself a deal concluded by Kwaśniewski and Bronisław Ko- the elites, bypassing society at large. morowski). Komorowski established This may of course be a consequence his own institute after he left office, of the fact that the Hungarian anti- with its chief aim being the preserva- communist dissident movement— tion and support of the achievements unlike the Polish example—contin- won after the change of regime. ued in the liberal party (SZDSZ), both in terms of the individual ac- At the same time, KOD invited the tors and its institutionalized form. Polish opposition parties to ally with With its loss of credibility and ul- it, cooperating to protect democracy. timate disappearance, it virtually

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Most opposition parties joined this call, blocked any route of return to the though the PO has kept its distance traditions of democratic opposition. thus far. KOD was also supported in • László Sólyom, the Fidesz-sup- its call for an alliance of the opposition ported president of the republic be- by the fact that although the right-of- tween 2005 and 2010, and one of center PO lost the elections, it was not the leading legislators of the consti- discredited, while other opposition par- tutive establishment of the change ties, such as the liberal Nowoczesna, are of regimes, remained detached growing in popularity. from movements critical of the government, aside from a few small • The institutionalization of the civil gestures. movement and its promising coop- • As the left-wing parties of the dem- eration with the political parties of ocratic opposition had largely been the opposition is extending the re- discredited, and its new, green par- sistance movement and its institu- ties were insignificant, a trap formed tional base, countering the PiS with for the new civil movements. Coop- a dynamism that shows no sign of eration with these parties would slowing. place them into a quarantine with no perspective, while a refusal to cooperate isolates them from the base of minimal, but extant, active, system-critical voters. At the same time, the civil resistance mobilized from time to time is also unable to constitute a new party, because their aims are always focused on a single issue, rather than against the system as a whole. • The wavering, self-extinguishing fu- turelessness of the movements after 2010 resulted neither in the insti- tutionalization and stabilization of civil movements as political forces of consequence, nor the renewal of the parties in democratic opposition.

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In summary

• The chances of the conservative Polish attempt at building an autoc- racy being defeated are strong even under the current democratic insti- tutional framework. This is ensured by a number of factors: the propor- tional electoral system, which constitutionally prevents excessive power concentration; the social traditions of resistance to authority; the civil movement building on these traditions; the existence of moderate right and liberal parties constituting the main part of the opposition forces; PiS being forced onto the extreme right of the political spectrum; the political diversity offered by municipal governments; and the strong media platforms for freedom of expression. At the same time, the pos- sibility of a Hungarian scenario unfolding in Poland is also prevented by the very character of the PiS, its personal composition, principles, and program, as well as the tradition and actuality of the Polish right. In its current form, the PiS is not capable of following the Hungarian model; that is, many circumstances and components are missing for it to do so. • Conversely, the chances of overcoming the Hungarian mafia state within the framework of the given institutional system are far more limited. Factors preventing the supplanting of the mafia state include: the disproportional and manipulative electoral system that makes elec- tion fraud a real possibility; a lack of social traditions of resistance to authority; the historical culture of individual, detached bargaining with the regimes in power; the lack of a moderate right-wing or liberal party for any voters abandoning Fidesz; the central position of Fidesz in the tripartite political field; the uniformity of the political-institutional map, since the municipalities have integrated into the ruling system; as well as the elimination or ghettoization of spaces for freedom of expres- sion. All of this will likely result in a continued decline in the chances of a change of government through free elections and the re-establish- ment of liberal democracy in Hungary. Hungary is on a calamitous track towards the course of development undergone by former Soviet repub- lics after the end of communism, reaching the point of no-return, where electoral possibilities for change have been exhausted, and only vibrant revolutions following rigged elections made it possible for the reigning regimes to fall.

Stubborn Structures 00 könyv.indb 654 2019.03.01. 12:59 Parallel System Narratives—Polish and Hungarian regime 655

(I am much indebted for constructive and critical advice to Attila Ara-Kovács, András Bozóky, András Domány, Csilla Frank, Góralczyk Bogdan, András Kardos, Márton Kozák, László Lengyel, Maziarski Wojciech, Iván Pető, So- bolewska Elżbieta, and János Széky.)

Translation by Bálint Bethlenfalvy

Stubborn Structures 00 könyv.indb 655 2019.03.01. 12:59