The Counterrevolution in Strategic Affairs

Lawrence Freedman

Abstract: Claims from the about a revolution or transformation in affairs are assessed in light of the experience of the in and Afghanistan. The importance of considering political as well as military affairs is stressed. Though the developed evident predominance in capabil- ities for regular war, it was caught out when drawn into irregular forms of warfare, such as terrorism and insurgency. The United States signi½cantly improved its counterinsurgency capabilities. It does not fol- low, however, that the United States will now engage more in irregular conflicts. Indeed, the military cir- cumstances of the past decade were in many ways unique and led to an exaggeration of the strategic value of irregular forms and the need for the United States to respond. Meanwhile, the political legacy of the experience is likely to be a more limited engagement with the problems associated with “failed” and “rogue” states.

War, as Carl von Clausewitz reminds us, is gov- erned by politics, which provides its purpose, pas- sion, and accounting. Yet politics is often treated in military theory as an awkward exogenous factor, at best a necessary inconvenience and at worst a source of weakness and constraint–a disruptive influence interfering with the proper conduct of war. This outlook has featured prominently in American military thought. There has long been a clear preference, reflected in force structure and doctrine, for big, regular wars against serious great-power competition. With the end of the Cold War, this preference came under pressure. The LAWRENCE FREEDMAN is Pro- fessor of War Studies and Vice- United States had no obvious “peer competitor,” Principal at King’s College Lon- and many in the military apparently felt that the don. His recent publications in- sort of operations coming into vogue–tellingly clude The Of½cial History of the Falk- described as “operations other than war”–were lands Campaign (2005), The Trans- beneath them. There was an evident lack of enthu- formation of Strategic Affairs (2006), siasm as the United States was drawn into the se- and A Choice of Enemies: America ries of conflicts connected with the breakup of the Confronts the Middle East (2008), which received the 2009 Lionel former Yugoslavia, culminating in the 1999 cam- Gelber Prize and the 2009 Duke of paign against Serbia over . The withdrawal Westminster’s Medal for Military from Somalia in 1994, like that from Beirut a de- Literature. cade earlier, was taken as a cautionary tale about

© 2011 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 the folly of such involvements. In these particular, the shifting relationship be- Lawrence conflicts, the military could not simply tween the United States and the states Freedman take political direction and then get on that used to be known collectively as the with the ½ghting; rather, it found every third world. Next, I address the problems move full of political sensitivity and its with the rma and the asymmetrical re- freedom of action restrained at each turn. sponses that promotion of the strategy As a symptom of the attitude toward naturally encouraged. As these reactions operations of this type, the proposition included forms of irregular warfare, no- that shaped high-level thinking in the tably terrorism and insurgency over the U.S. defense establishment during the last ten years, I then explore whether the 1990s and into the 2000s disregarded intervention in Afghanistan set a pattern them entirely. The proposition held that for the future in terms of both its objec- a “Revolution in Military Affairs” was tive and its conduct. (The speci½c ori- under way, involving a step change in the gins of the Iraq intervention render that nature of war. It gained suf½cient accep- conflict almost sui generis, although the tance for the acronym rma to become conduct there reinforces the lessons of familiar shorthand for what appeared to Afghanistan.) I argue that, on balance, Af- be an irreversible trend, an inexorable ghanistan does not set a precedent. Com- phenomenon to which all military estab- bined with the political changes dis- lishments must respond. Those which cussed in the ½rst section of the essay, mastered the rma most effectively would the situation in Afghanistan suggests a have a sure route to victory. much more limited engagement with the The roots of the revolution were as- problems associated with “failed” and sumed to be technological rather than “rogue” states. I conclude by hedging my political. Thus, the United States, which bets, in part through an examination of was demonstrably to the fore in the rele- the operation in Libya that began in vant information and communication March 2011. technologies, would be in the vanguard. Even better, the logic of the revolution The term third world was coined in anticipated that the conduct of military in the early 1950s to describe countries affairs would be pushed in a direction that were economically underdeveloped, that most suited the United States: one politically unaligned, and therefore at a favoring high-tempo conventional war- distance from the liberal capitalist ½rst fare. These predictions further reinforced world and the state socialist second the presumption that the United States world. The long-forgotten inspirational could maintain its “hyperpower” status model for the term was the “third estate” for decades to come. The effect was to of French commoners, who eventually, in play down the importance of the political 1789, revolted against the ½rst and second dimension in shaping contemporary con- estates of priests and nobles. The term flict. Making sense of what has changed therefore captured an idea of a coherent over the past decade, therefore, requires group, a coalition of the disadvantaged, looking not only at the lessons of warfare that might one day overthrow the estab- but also at the changing geopolitical en- lished order. It came to include many vironment. states that gained independence as a re- This essay is concerned with “strategic” sult of post–World War II decolonization. rather than purely “military” affairs. The sheer diversity in shape, size, and First, I consider political changes and, in status of this group prevented member

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 The states from ever coming together as a This was the moment when liberal cap- Counter- coherent whole (or geopolitical force). italism peaked. As an ideology, capital- revolution in Strategic Moreover, while many such states af- ism had always contained many strands Affairs ½rmed the principle of non-alignment, and was often contradictory, yet its core joining the “non-aligned movement” themes–with regard to free markets and founded in 1961, they did so largely as human rights–had been continually in- a means of keeping their options open. fluential for more than two centuries. In practice, they often seemed to lean The collapse of state socialism meant that toward one bloc or the other, typically in capitalism emerged from the Cold War a return for arms sales and diplomatic sup- clear winner. In this narrative, the West’s port. Both Washington and Moscow as- victory was not simply a matter of deter- sumed that the newly independent states rence and political cohesion but also a would need to make their ideological result of intellectual vitality and entre- choices, for either liberal capitalism or preneurial drive. After the Cold War, lib- state socialism, and that their political eral capitalism was promoted as the mod- allegiances would follow. In a number of el to emulate if states wanted to get ahead cases, the superpowers were drawn into in a globalized world. The idea of “glob- civil wars on the assumption (often mis- alization” stressed the breaking down of taken) that the local contest had real boundaries, particularly with regard to links with their global ideological con- capital, goods, and services, but also frontation. The shifting allegiances in the ideas and people. Horn of Africa in the and , as For a while, this vision suggested that Ethiopia and Somalia swapped camps, under the influence of free markets, illustrate the point. countries around the word–including Even before the end of the Cold War, former adversaries–would adopt ½rst the it had become apparent that while con- economic and then the political forms of flicts in the third world might be re- liberal capitalism. The embrace of de- shaped as a result of superpower inter- mocracy was considered particularly im- ference, they were ignited by distinctive portant, not only because it meant that a local factors. Ideological af½nity did not larger proportion of the world’s popula- seem to produce political harmony. In tion would enjoy political rights, but also Asia, shared Marxism-Leninism did not because of the assumption that democra- prevent the Soviet Union, China, Cam- cies do not ½ght one another. Those with bodia, and Vietnam from clashing with regimes resistant to this path, and likely each other. Moreover, the general ap- to pose threats to their neighbors, were peal of state socialism declined as a re- described as “rogue.” Iraq, Iran, and sult of its evident failure in the Soviet fell into this category. Those bloc. A number of the former leaders of unable to cope, often because they were the non-aligned camp that had once ex- torn apart by internal violence, such as hibited socialist inclinations–such as Somalia, Congo, and Yugoslavia, were Indonesia and Egypt–ultimately moved described as “failing.” into the Western camp, though they were It was always likely that many states not exactly liberal in their internal prac- would go their own way, rather than fol- tices. After the implosion of European low a liberal democratic model, without communism, a general continental re- becoming evidently roguish or failing. alignment formed on the basis of the core The main problem was the uncertain re- Western institutions of and the eu. lationship between relatively free econ-

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 omies, with active participation in global cially with states, including Russia and Lawrence trade and ½nancial markets, and relative- China, that wanted no interference in Freedman ly free polities, with support for human their more dissident and troublesome rights and democratic elections. As the regions. example of China vividly illustrates, it is Humanitarian interventions also gen- possible, at least for a substantial period erated long-term and expensive responsi- of time, to combine a strong capitalist bilities to those places where interven- ethos with an authoritarian political sys- tion took place. Initially, the action might tem. Even governments responsive to have been prompted by evidence of acute public opinion and subject to democratic but short-term humanitarian distress, accountability would not always wish to but once engaged, the interveners felt align themselves with the United States, obliged to undertake wholesale recon- especially as the American brand became struction of the target countries by set- more toxic during the 2000s. Liberalism, ting them on the road to . The capitalism, and alignment with the Unit- same impulse was evident in Iraq and ed States turned out not to be inextrica- Afghanistan. But as the United States be- bly linked. Furthermore, the particular came bogged down in Iraq, it let its own capitalist model practiced by the West liberal standards drop in the conduct of suffered a loss of credibility as a result of interrogations and counterinsurgency the ½nancial crisis that began in 2008. As operations. At the same time it demon- a more practical consequence, the crisis strated an inability to reshape local polit- ushered in a more austere age, thereby ical structures according to its own pref- reducing the appetite for expensive mili- erences. Unless a functioning democracy tary interventions and possibly causing was created, it was argued, there could be greater reluctance in the provision of no guarantee that the conditions that cre- economic assistance. ated the problem in the ½rst place would The U.S. appetite for military opera- not recur. Why costly military exertions tions and foreign economic aid was al- should be used to reestablish an authori- ready declining as a result of the cost and tarian regime was hard to explain. The disappointing results of the interven- only way out was to work with the local tions of the past two decades. Humani- political grain, which was not necessarily tarian intervention developed as a re- a natural support for the practices and sponse to failing states, providing a meth- norms on which liberal democracy de- odology for the assertion of liberal values pends and which would be under addi- in areas marked by severe strife. Bosnia, tional strain as a result of the internal Kosovo, and Sierra Leone were cited as violence that had prompted the inter- evidence of how harm could be mitigated vention. On the one hand, walking away by timely intervention; Rwanda was the from a country still in recovery would prime example of the consequences of have been dif½cult; on the other, an ex- abandoning a country in crisis. Interven- tended stay risked creating a local de- tion on humanitarian grounds implied a pendency culture and increasing resis- direct challenge to the post-Westphalian tance and hostility toward the United norms of international behavior by threat- States and its allies. ening to subvert sovereignty through the expressed readiness to interfere in the in- This shifting political context moved ternal affairs of others. Challenges to sov- U.S. military strategy a long way from the ereignty were always controversial, espe- promise of the rma. At the start of the

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 The 2000s, hope had been very much alive. also constrain opponents’ ambitions. As Counter- Secretary of Defense ’s a regular conventional war against the revolution in Strategic “transformation” agenda was intended United States appeared to be an increas- Affairs to demonstrate the potential of forces ingly foolish proposition, especially after that were high on quality and relatively its convincing performance in the 1991 low on quantity. Iraq, at least in its ½rst Persian Gulf War, one form of potential stage, was taken as proof of those pre- challenge to American predominance cepts. This new “dominant” form of com- was removed, just as the prospect of bat involved moving with greater speed mutual assured destruction (mad) had and precision, and over longer ranges, earlier removed nuclear war as a serious than was possible for the enemy; disori- policy option. enting as much as destroying; attacking But there was an important difference. only what was necessary; and avoiding With mad, everybody would lose once unnecessary collateral damage to civilian nuclear exchanges began, which meant life and property. In the more enthusiastic that, in principle, the side stronger in versions, the prospect was to lift the fog conventional forces could incur an ad- of war. On land, where the fog was always vantage. The Warsaw Pact countries were the greatest, the rma promised to dispel believed to be in this position during the the inherent confusion caused by ½ght- Cold War, thus putting the onus on nato ing in and around uneven terrain–woods, to escalate to nuclear use if its members rivers, towns, and cities–day and night, were losing the battle. Once the nato in all weather, with the location of friends countries gained conventional superiority, as much a mystery as that of enemies. deterrence was complete–at least against This form of warfare suited the United other great powers. If an aspirant super- States because it played to U.S. strengths: power could in no way expect to ½ght and it could be capital rather than labor in- win (in any meaningful sense) a massive tensive; it reflected a preference for out- conflict along the lines of the two world smarting opponents; it avoided excessive wars, then not only was America’s posi- casualties both received and inflicted; tion more secure, but the risk of another and it conveyed an aura of almost effort- catastrophic global conflagration was di- less superiority. minished. As with nuclear forces (whose Those ideas were deeply comforting, mid-century arrival had also been de- and not entirely wrong. Information and scribed at the time as a “revolution in mil- communication technologies were bound itary affairs”), the rma agenda required to make a difference in military practice. maintaining substantial conventional Perhaps the rma agenda understated the forces designed for a form of conflict that extent to which American predominance the very existence of those forces ren- was dependent on not only the sophisti- dered unlikely. The challenge was to ex- cation of its technology but also the sheer plain the need to pay for expensive forces amount of ½repower–particularly air- that might never be used. delivered–it had at its disposal. None- Yet the rma model was deeply flawed. theless, the formidable cumulative im- Far from representing a real revolution in pact was impressive. Furthermore, while military affairs, it harked back to an ear- the United States’ evident military supe- lier, idealized prototype of modern war- riority in a particular type of war was fare in which a decisive military victory likely to encourage others to ½ght in dif- can settle the fate of nations and, indeed, ferent ways, that military capacity would of whole civilizations. Once its forces have

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 been defeated, an enemy government will gence, communications, and navigation Lawrence have no choice but to hand over sover- became widely available as consumer Freedman eignty to the victor. If war is accepted as gadgets could be exploited by otherwise the arbiter, politicians can set objectives crude, small organizations with limited and hold the commanders accountable, budgets. Precision intelligence, instanta- but the military must be allowed to con- neously communicated and combined duct the campaign according to its pro- with precision guidance, made it possible fessional judgment with a minimum role to concentrate ½re accurately on solely for civilians–preferably not as victims military targets in order to cause maxi- and certainly not as strategists. Under the mum disruption to the enemy military most idealized version of this model, the effort. But it did not mandate such at- victory comes quickly. The longer the war tacks. It could support concepts less de- drags on, the more uncertain the situa- pendent on discriminate targeting. In- tion becomes, as both sides increasingly deed, the same systems that made it pos- depend on the performance of allies; the sible to limit damage to civil society test becomes one of social and economic could also be used to ensure that attacks endurance more than military skill; mor- on civil society were more effective. Even ale suffers; and politicians become impa- on the American model there were always tient. Thus, for military innovators, the dual-use facilities that served both mili- acme of success is a new route to a swift tary and civilian purposes–for example, and politically decisive military victory. power and transportation. They might be This was the claim made for the rma. targeted as part of a military purpose but However, the lack of a political context still led to the disruption of civilian life. was problematic. It ½xed on trends in By the end of the 1990s, the challenge military capabilities and neglected the to the rma was recognized to lie in what types of conflict that might need to be ad- was described as “asymmetrical war- dressed through force of arms. The new fare.” Enemies would refuse to ½ght on doctrine recognized that armed force America’s terms, attempting to turn war- could have a range of purposes other than fare toward civil society rather than away. regular war but tended to set these possi- The approach most feared was the direct bilities to one side, imagining such cases targeting of large population centers with either would be smaller in scale and easi- chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons ly supported by capabilities designed for (of which nuclear are in a category all regular war or would involve goals that their own, although they are lumped could be picked up by lesser powers, such together with other weapons of mass as peacekeeping duties. destruction [wmd]). The approach that A further problem was the assumption was actually largely followed was to that, because the new technologies ½t adopt the various forms of irregular war- so well with American strategic prefer- fare: that is, to rely on the support of a ences, they would not serve different and section of the civilian population as well opposed objectives. If the capabilities as on guerrilla and terrorist tactics. A de- had been purely military in character, gree of overlap between the two approach- this outcome might have been more like- es manifested when terrorists found ways ly. In practice, however, these technolo- of causing mass casualties, particularly gies encouraged a progressive overlap be- using vulnerabilities in transport. The 9/11 tween the civilian and military spheres. attacks, the most spectacular example of High-quality surveillance and intelli- this type of warfare, raised the specter of

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 The terrorist access to wmd, perhaps aided situation demonstrates how much worse Counter- by “rogue” states. The event signi½cantly it is to lose a ½ght than to walk away from revolution in Strategic affected U.S. priorities in the subsequent a ½ght before it has begun. Doctrine and Affairs decade, shaping the two main U.S. mili- tactics have been changed to deal with tary operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. novel, and in some respects unique, situ- In both these operations, enemy regu- ations. The enemy is unlikely to win in lar forces were unable to offer much re- Afghanistan or Iraq in the sense that it sistance to U.S. strength. (The Taliban will not be able to seize the state. But it is was already battling the Northern Alli- also true that in neither case can it be said ance, and U.S. airpower and special forces that the United States’ side clearly won. tipped the balance.) Both conventional Both U.S. occupied countries remain un- campaigns could be considered a vindica- stable and have suffered very high costs tion of rma-type concepts in that quality in lives and depressed social and econom- defeated quantity with remarkable speed. ic development. Their long-term political Thereafter, however, the United States prospects are unclear. With one naturally was stuck dealing with resourceful and centralized and oil-rich and the other frag- determined irregular opponents while it mented and poor, their circumstances are desperately sought to construct sustain- very different. In their own ways, both able indigenous state structures and provide telling reminders that defeating forces. The experience underlined the insurgencies depends on the quality of danger of operating against the local po- government as much as, if not more than, litical grain. military technique. To say that, during the course of the 2000s, the United States mastered coun- Can we assume that recent military en- terinsurgency operations would be an gagements will set the pattern for the fu- overstatement, yet after the severe initial ture? The military history of the 2000s setbacks in Iraq, the United States adapt- was nothing like that of the 1990s, which ed. The group associated with General in turn was quite different from the 1980s. David Petraeus took some of the tech- Why should we expect to be able to pre- nologies associated with the rma, ac- dict the ? Indeed, this decade has cepted that numbers still made a differ- already begun with a reluctant interven- ence, and then brought in a more street- tion in Libya. The combination of high wise grasp of the political circumstances ambition and self-imposed restraints in which the military was operating. The that characterize this engagement is un- strategy emphasized that military actions like any that has come before. must be evaluated by reference to their The main continuity in the post–Cold political effects, not simply by traditional War period, in addition to the reduced metrics geared toward eliminating en- risk of a great-power confrontation, has emy forces, and stressed the importance been in the shift of focus from preparing of reinforcing these effects through what to deal with challenges from strong states are now called “information operations.” to engaging with weak and failed states, This approach has required not only at ½rst under the guise of peacekeeping tenacity but also a commitment of re- and humanitarian intervention and then sources and a tolerance of casualties that under the capacious umbrella of the “war would have been considered excessive, on terror.” even prohibitive, as the campaigns were Unlike the large-scale great-power wars ½rst planned in the aftermath of 9/11. The of the past, in which the stakes were

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 clear, the consequences of defeat grim, gy that ran deep and wide in certain Lawrence involving the mobilization of whole soci- countries but was patchy in others. The Freedman eties and international alliances, the stra- resulting violence was largely localized tegic imperatives behind the operations and sporadic. of the past two decades have been more For the moment, at least, the spectacu- controversial. The reason, however, is not lar attacks on the World Trade Center the level of casualties. Those who ½ght are and remain unique. At the largely volunteer regulars. Losses have same time, the insurgencies in both Iraq not approached the industrial scale of the and Afghanistan, and countries where great wars, though in some respects, that the United States and its allies have not difference has made individual sacri½ces made the same military commitments, more personal and poignant. Politically, have been persistent, intensive, and trou- the main issue is whether these lives are blesome. Strategy has become preoccu- being sacri½ced to any good purpose. pied with issues such as the relationship Questions are constantly asked about between military technique and political why and how a war is being fought and legitimacy, the radicalization of popula- the probability of success. tions, the management of intercommu- An attempt was made, notably by the nal violence, governance and corruption, Bush administration, to distinguish the and the role of international opinion. “wars of choice” of the 1990s from the If the recent past has set a pattern that “wars of necessity” of the 2000s. This dis- will continue for some time, we are now tinction, for which I take some respon- entering a period when conflicts will be sibility, is misleading. There is always a dominated by irregular forms of warfare. choice, even if it is a terrible one. Un- Talk of a fourth generation of warfare suf- doubtedly different was how the stakes fers from a historicist fallacy similar to the were perceived. With the humanitarian one affecting the rma concept: namely, interventions of the 1990s, the choice that forms of warfare pass through a nat- was ½rst about whether to pay attention, ural progression. The difference is that and only then to decide what to do. If the the rhetoric behind the rma was buoyed issues that might have prompted, and in by a technological optimism, while the some cases did prompt, these interven- gloom surrounding the notion of the tions were ignored, the consequences for fourth generation reflects cultural and those directly involved might have been political pessimism. Irregular warfare, dire, but others could have carried on as however, is hardly a novel phenomenon. before. Indifference was an option. The It was used in the ½ght against colonial- term “war of necessity” implied the pres- ism to circumvent the evident superiority ence of an existential security threat, the of the metropolitan states in military handling of which would determine a organization and ½repower. During the state’s future position. In these cases, in- course of major regular wars, there were difference was not an option. often irregular elements. The two forms It was dif½cult both before and after are not exclusive and can coexist. One 9/11 to measure the threat posed by Al of the textbooks of irregular warfare, Qaeda. The rhetoric of leaders such as Lawrence of Arabia’s Seven Pillars of Wis- was extravagant in its dom, was based on his role in Arab ha- incitement to violence, yet their follow- rassment of Turkish forces during World ers had only occasional successes. They War I. In World War II, German forces made an appeal to an underlying ideolo- in Europe had to defend their territorial

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 The gains from irregular partisan attacks as For the United States, the issue is not Counter- well as from regular allied forces. Regular the war the country is most likely to ½ght revolution in Strategic war supposes that political disputes can but the war for which its military should Affairs be settled through battle with a military prepare. Preparedness is a form of deter- surrender followed by a transfer of sover- rence; it should mean that the war does eignty. But if a suf½cient portion of a pop- not have to be fought, which inevitably ulation refuses to accept the result, popu- leaves open the question of whether the lar militias, along with other forms of re- expenditure and effort were necessary in sistance, may challenge the apparent vic- the ½rst place. This is especially the case tor. At this stage, the conflict is no longer because a defensive preparedness must a regular war. One such popular uprising involve a substantial capability for ma- occurred in France after the 1871 war jor war. Thankfully, America’s strength is with Prussia, eventually leading to the only one of a number of reasons why such Paris Commune. It also happened in 2001 a war remains highly unlikely. Regard- in Afghanistan and in 2003 in Iraq. less, we can assume that the ability to Regular warfare is perceived to be in ½ght and prevail in a war with another decline. This view can be attributed to great power will continue to be the top the likely destructiveness of war between priority for U.S. defense. The key ques- great powers, especially those armed tion is whether the United States will with nuclear weapons; a consequential need to maintain a substantial capacity to readiness to solve great-power disputes ½ght an irregular war. Over the past few by means other than war; and the superi- years, it has added a much more sophisti- ority of Western states in the conduct of cated counterinsurgency capability to its regular war. The increased focus on irreg- repertoire. In the 1970s, the U.S. Army ular war emerged from the apparent considered Vietnam to be exactly the invincibility of U.S. forces, with or with- sort of war it never wished to ½ght again; out their allies, in conventional battle. thus, it turned away from counterinsur- To the extent that states, not necessarily gency in order to concentrate on its core great powers, remain ready to resolve task of preparing for great-power con- disputes through force of arms, regular flict, at that time against the Warsaw Pact war remains a possibility, as and in the center of Europe. In this setting, Israel, India and Pakistan have shown the rma emerged: indeed, the embrace over the years. For the moment, these of the relevant technologies can be traced particular conflicts are being carried out back to the rediscovery of maneuver war- largely through irregular means, al- fare and the Army’s adoption of “air-land though Israel and India have indicated battle” as core doctrine. they are prepared to use regular forces As Iraq and Afghanistan became more if irregular attacks are pushed too far. demanding in the 2000s, this comfort The conflict in Libya has seen regular zone was no longer so available. A grow- forces taking on a cobbled-together mil- ing sense of a global conflict against a itia that could survive only with support resourceful and ideologically driven op- from nato airpower. Future regular wars ponent suggested another pattern. The that do not involve the United States and messy, prolonged ½ghts in which the its allies directly are possible, even if United States was directly involved, as they take on a cataclysmic form (for ex- well as those in which the United States ample, a confrontation between China had an interest, if a less central role– and India). such as Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Leb-

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 anon, and Gaza–appeared to be part of and resilience of the ruling elite and its Lawrence the picture. Instead of an occasional de- external supporters; their authority and Freedman cisive campaign to ward off a challenge con½dence are undermined while an from an aspirant great power, the future audience is created for a rival political would likely be marked by a succession of creed; and eventually, there is suf½cient struggles against Islamist opponents op- support to topple the regime and put a erating in and out of broken, weak states. new, popular government in its place. In most cases where states facing a seri- The crucial moment arrives when the ous Islamist threat looked to the United irregulars gain recruits and support, and States for help, support took the form of the enemy suffers from desertion and intelligence and training as well as spe- popular disaffection. As the balance of ci½c capabilities such as special forces power shifts, the irregulars will be able to and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (uavs). act in a more regular fashion. Iraq, to say the least, was hardly an inev- This aspiration was explicit in Asian itable response to 9/11. The intervention guerrilla theory, including in the cam- in Afghanistan had a greater logic in that paigns of Mao in China or Giap in Viet- regard. Al Qaeda, residing brazenly in Af- nam. Irregular warfare–for example, in ghanistan, could be targeted by means the form of guerrilla tactics–was not a of a reasonably regular military campaign. preferred way of ½ghting: it was for want An available conventional response was of something better. By itself, it could not an unusual feature of this case, but it en- produce victory because it did not allow couraged the perception of the utility of power to be wrested directly from the conventional military force in the “war state. At some point, even if only during on terror.” However seriously we take the the endgame, the irregulars had to gain Islamist threat, it is important to empha- the strength to ensure a decisive victory size that this response is the exception over the state or, if the enemy collapsed, rather than the norm. assert their authority as the armed forces of a state-in-waiting. In this way, Fidel Irregular forms of warfare are favored by Castro and his hitherto ragged bunch of underdogs who know that they have little guerrilla ½ghters marked their victory chance against superior conventional over the regular forces of Batista in Cuba forces. By itself, irregular warfare can- a half-century ago. Once state power is not lead to a decisive victory. Some, of seized, even if relatively little effort is re- course, may acknowledge this point quired, it must be secured against internal while insisting that it is irrelevant. Their and external enemies. Defending state objectives may be no more than to ex- rule requires organizational and oper- press anger, exact retribution, or promote ational forms quite different from those a particular cause, such as animal rights. required to wage guerrilla war, let alone If, however, the objective involves an at- mount random acts of terror. tempt to liberate some territory or seize Regardless of how successful they have political control, then at some point, a been in mounting individual attacks and direct challenge to other regular or mili- embarrassing enemies, irregular cam- tia-type forces will be required, possibly paigns rarely lead to power. For example, leading to open battle rather than to even if successive terroristic attacks on raids, harassment, and ambushes. U.S. targets persuaded the United States This scenario might come about as fol- to disengage entirely from the Middle lows: persistent attacks try the patience East, the responsible group would still be

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 The left ½ghting local opponents and rivals ing if the only intention is to cause hurt; if Counter- for actual power. Note what happened in there is a wider political intention, the revolution in Strategic Afghanistan after the Soviet Union with- effort normally fails. Al Qaeda’s Afghan Affairs drew. In this respect, the Libyan conflict base made it unusual for terrorist groups was almost back-to-front. An anti-Gad- because it was not operating against the da½ mass movement developed quickly, host state and, in fact, was afforded a de- asserted itself in the capital Tripoli, and gree of state protection as it mounted at- soon seized other population centers– tacks elsewhere. When terrorist groups notably, the eastern city of Benghazi. operate within hostile societies, the best Using superior ½repower, crudely ap- option is to consider them to be crim- plied, the regime was able to regain con- inals: that is, offenders to be dealt with trol of Tripoli and would then have rolled through the methods of law enforce- up the rebels had it not been for the un- ment, such as domestic intelligence, the authorized intervention. Ironically, it was police, and the judiciary. Terrorists in- the beleaguered regime claiming that the volved in robbery, extortion, and even rebels were really Islamist terrorists mas- kidnapping to obtain ½nance may ½t this querading as democrats, while nato description literally. De½ning them in countries accepted the rebels more or less this way has bene½ts in terms of propa- at face value, as a loose and largely un- ganda as well as in the choice of counter- coordinated collection of anti-regime measures. It is also likely to be appropri- elements. ate as long as the terrorists consist of The point here is that the great dramas small cells of militants hiding within the of regime change differ signi½cantly; fur- host population. The most basic counter- ther, they often involve substantial armed terrorist work in the West, therefore, in- components as well as terrorist plots. It is volves intelligence gathering, arrests, and not that every two-bit terror group must protecting key targets. If these groups imagine itself as a great army-in-waiting, reach the point where they are best dealt although many do. For most, the ½rst pri- with by military means, then they have ority is survival, perhaps through adver- outgrown the terrorist label and have be- tising their presence with a conspicuous come something altogether more serious. act, which may be geared to recruitment and fundraising as much as to the pursuit Groups with the size and persistence of long-term political objectives. They to challenge state power are usually de- may have intense and contentious de- scribed in terms of resistance or insurgency. bates about long-term strategy–indeed, Here, the intent is less to attack civil soci- some do little else–but these are often ety than to use civil society as a base from exercises in futility. Nonetheless, even which to attack the regular forces of the small and simple groups try to present enemy, either demonstrating the weak- themselves as regular forces in develop- ness of the state or inviting the state to ment, distinct from a political wing yet reveal its oppressive nature. Terrorist with military-type command structures acts may play a role in such campaigns as and designations. part of a more integrated strategy involv- This is why it was unusual to be able to ing various types of operations. Strategic respond to Al Qaeda in 2001 by means of resistance, which is essentially defensive, a regular operation. In general, terrorism refers to the methods used to prevent an is the most primitive form of irregular occupying force from establishing itself; warfare. It might be de½ned as succeed- a strategic insurgency, which is essential-

26 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 ly offensive, refers to the methods used If a terrorist group makes progress, it Lawrence to expel a purportedly illegitimate force does so by creating an aura of irresistibil- Freedman from a de½ned territory. ity, suggesting the state’s inability to cope. At either level, the attitude of the local This process generally depends on regu- population is crucial. Success for a resis- lar, incessant attacks. Regularity may be tance movement typically depends on a more important than scale because the supportive population. The task for an in- aim is to demonstrate an ability to oper- surgency is to create support where, at the ate at will–to outsmart the authorities at outset, it is scarce. To do so, the insurgents every turn–which is possible only with a must ½nd a point of political contact with degree of popular support. In this regard, the target community. Support leads to terrorism as a strategy can be de½ned by sanctuaries, supply lines, recruits, and its objective to create the conditions for intelligence, without which either type of resistance or insurgency. By extension, warfare risks defeat and suffers from a the objective of resistance or insurgen- constant fear of informers and a lack of cy is to create the conditions for regular supplies and new recruits. Relations with war. And regular warfare, in turn, seeks the community may be forged on the ba- to create the conditions for a transfer of sis of a shared patriotism or kinship, but sovereignty. they may also be based on intimidation The basic requirement for countering and fear–for example, the consequences opponents who adopt irregular warfare is of known collaboration with the enemy, to take the progression described above or the expectation that even when the in- and push it in the other direction: that surgents disappear, they may return ready is, force the enemy to take the backward for revenge if they ever feel betrayed. step from an insurgency to terrorism. As with any type of warfare, successful This task entails denying the credibility terrorism depends on strong and intel- of irregulars’ claims to be acting on be- ligent leadership and internal discipline half of whole communities. Front-line and organization. The clandestine circum- countering forces must ensure they are stances in which terrorists operate make recognizably local and can play the pa- these qualities much harder to achieve triotic card as effectively as the enemy. than in other forms of warfare. In prac- Further, they must acquire critical intelli- tice, terrorism tends to rely on barely co- gence in order to identify and isolate the ordinated and fragmented attacks by in- militants from their potential sources of dependent cells. It risks alienating likely support. These measures take time and sources of support without denting state put a premium on patience. They require power. These groups, in part because of sensitivity to grievances and fears and their radical, ideological nature, are often attention to culture and anthropology as prone to fragmentation and intense argu- much as technology and tactics. Their ments about political narratives, strategy, boundaries are blurred; there is no con- and tactics. Organizational survival may ½ned military space and time to be set lead to operations undertaken to demon- apart from civilian space and time. On strate leadership of the struggle and main- the one hand, heavy-handed tactics may tain activist morale as much as to hurt the con½rm enemy propaganda and help the enemy. There is always the potential for adversary gain recruits; on the other, an internecine warfare, as different groups overly light touch might allow opponents vie with each other to control a struggle to to establish unencumbered their political which they all are notionally committed. authority–as in no-go areas where state

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 The forces dare not enter and where a parallel addressed, even if attending to this task Counter- government may be established. means upsetting local power structures. revolution in Strategic To ½ght an irregular war outside one’s In part, it may be a matter of civic action Affairs own territory is inherently dif½cult. –repairing roads and building schools, or Indeed, foreign forces can soon appear to securing power and sanitation infrastruc- be an alien force of occupation. This per- tures–but at some point, issues of of½- ception will grow if they adopt harsh meth- cial repression, land reform, or ethnic mix ods. Compared with colonial times, overt may become germane. coercion of civilians is now out of bounds. There is a chicken-and-egg problem. Damage to civilian infrastructure or civil- These strategies can be too dangerous ian casualties that result from attacks on to follow without local security; but until military-related targets are explained as local security is established, they cannot unintended and regrettable “collateral be followed. Without security, foreign damage”; such consequences are not jus- troops and local people will be unable to ti½ed as a means of persuading the enemy interact closely and develop mutual trust. to give up. When an enemy is engaged in Security is not just a matter of immediate irregular methods, however, following the safety. It also requires looking forward to precepts of regular warfare in distinguish- assess the likely future power structure ing at all times between combatants and that will emerge as the conflict develops. noncombatants becomes dif½cult. An en- As the irregulars and the counter-irregu- emy militant may well look like an inno- lars compete for local support, impres- cent civilian. Frightened soldiers are apt to sions of strength may be as important as take few risks when they fear attack. For those of kindness and concern. Support them, it can be frustrating to be forbidden is as likely to be based on convincing peo- to chase enemy ½ghters into their towns ple that you will win as it is on promises and villages, or to allow open supply lines of future goods and services. to avoid creating a sense of civilian siege. Thus, unlike regular warfare, irregular conflicts are unlikely to turn on having The need to win over “hearts and minds” the most advanced technology or over - is a frequent theme in discussions of stra- whelming force. In these conflicts, poli- tegies for irregular wars. It is referred to tics does far more than set the terms for whenever tough methods used by one’s the ½ght: it infuses every move. Incentives own side are questioned and whenever for authorities typically point toward there is a need to persuade people, through minimizing the ½ghting and appearing good works and sensitivity to their con- not to rely on shows of force. The mili- cerns, that the government and the secu- tary role may therefore be quite limited; rity forces really are on their side. The key tasks are instead in the hands of intel- term captures the idea of wars being won ligence agencies, the police, and even po- in the cognitive (intellectual and emo- litical leaders and intellectuals who frame tional) rather than the physical domain. and describe the core issues at the heart Practices that diminish support are not of the struggle. The challenge for exter- hard to discern: arbitrary arrests, dis- nal forces intervening in such struggles, plays of brute force, rudeness, and disre- especially if their role is prominent, is not spectful behavior are likely to generate only to win local support, but also to re- alienation and hostility. Winning sup- tain the public’s favor back home. In both port is harder: the real concerns and respects, a military strategy must be inte- grievances of the local people must be grated with a political one.

28 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 This judgment does not change in the unlikely to be improved by the insertion Lawrence two most dif½cult scenarios. In the ½rst, of large numbers of foreign forces. The Freedman groups are able to develop forms of un- commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan conventional attack that could rock the were the result of the direct role the Unit- foundations of society. The main concern ed States played in toppling the previous in this category has been the possibility regime and its responsibility for what fol- of chemical, biological, radiological, and lowed. Without that responsibility, the –most frightening but least likely–nu- more likely inclination will be to limit lia- clear weapons campaigns. Alternatively, bilities and con½ne support to specialist irregulars might be able to attack the in- capabilities. formation networks that sustain core in- frastructure. Other than in the particular Attitudes toward the use of force after case where terrorists are acting as agents the Cold War have been shaped from the of, or with substantial support from, an- start by Iraq. When Iraq invaded other state, these threats are still best in August 1990, the crudity of the aggres- addressed through intelligence agencies sion and the importance of the region and the police. There may be specialized led to a strong collective response. Desert military capabilities of potential value: Storm was a regular war; Kuwait was lib- intelligence support, specialist sensors, erated by battle; and the vicious repres- and the forms of assistance that may be sion that followed the postwar insurrec- required after any catastrophic incident. tion led coalition forces to set up safe ha- The military tends to play a role in the vens for the in northern Iraq. This aftermath of any disaster because it can engagement set the precedent for sub- offer ½t and disciplined troops as well as sequent humanitarian interventions. As organizational capacity, including man- played games with un aging logistical problems, gathering in- inspectors, the United States used coer- formation, and maintaining complex com- cive means to force him back into line. munication networks over time and in Those efforts culminated in the Decem- adverse conditions. ber 1998 air strikes of Desert Fox. Frus- In the second dif½cult scenario, which tration at the leader’s continued de½ance is already common, a weak state that is and survival led to the 2003 invasion, il- unable to cope with a developing chal- lustrating just how strong the United lenge requests support. There may be States is when ½ghting on its own terms. good reasons for its weakness. Supposed The subsequent irregular warfare, how- counterterrorism operations may just be ever, demonstrated just how dif½cult it part of an attempt to impose political or- ½nds ½ghting on another’s terms. der from the center, as a rationale for The experience of the past decade has wider repression. Given that the parallel provided a far better grasp of both the political processes necessary for a “hearts potential and the limitations of irregular and minds” approach may be absent, forms of ½ghting, from terrorism to in- there is little prospect that grievances will surgency. Unconventional methods can be addressed. The police may be unable create contests of endurance, especially to cope or, if they are corrupt, incompe- for external powers trying to assert con- tent, sectarian in nature, or distrusted by trol in places where they are not entirely the target population, they may be part of welcome and where their strategic inter- the problem. If the supported regime is ests are uncertain. This scenario creates weak for these reasons, the situation is a paradox. In conventional warfare, the

140 (3) Summer 2011 29

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 The United States and its allies are unbeatable “third world.” Two of them, India and Counter- against countries lacking advanced mil- China, are the most populous countries revolution in Strategic itary capabilities. At the same time, all on earth, and both are wary of each other. Affairs powers struggle when facing resistance India, to some extent, has moved much from a population, or from segments of closer to the West over the past decade, in that population. In the end, the United part because of a shared concern over Is- States and its allies can avoid defeat be- lamism. China, which is now asserting it- cause such a loss would require irregular self, is considered a rising superpower and forces to undergo transformation into a clearly has great economic clout, but it re- regular force capable of seizing power. To mains hampered by a lack of obvious allies win, however, the United States itself de- (other than North Korea) and wide ideo- pends on the regimes it supports, or in logical appeal. Its foreign policy could be the anomalous case of Libya, the rebels described as realist and mercantilist. Rus- it supports, who lacked the wherewithal sia, which has recovered (largely on the to take on the enemy effectively on the back of energy prices) from the shambles ground. There is no reason to doubt that of the 1990s, is sometimes classed with Western forces would have faced far less these emergent powers; but its economy dif½culty in taking out pro-Gadda½ forces, is narrowly based, and Moscow has un- but even the anti-Gadda½ forces, in addi- easy relations with most of its neighbors. tion to the relevant Western governments, The problems the United States has felt that such a response would send the faced may help explain why others are wrong political messages. wary of trying to compete for full great- This analysis suggests three proposi- power status, although they may well act tions. The ½rst, to be blunt, is that after forcefully around their own borders and, two decades of high-tempo and contro- in a number of cases, have already done versial operations, absent any further so. Great-power status implies a responsi- 9/11-type shocks, the United States will be bility and a right to intervene at a distance increasingly wary about entering into any from border areas. Any cost/bene½t analy- more long-term commitments involving sis would encourage caution. For this rea- direct combat. In Libya the Obama ad- son, the rising economic powers might ministration was prepared to accept the turn out to be circumspect when claim- risks of an inconclusive outcome, and it ing such a position for themselves. Brazil, framed U.S. involvement as participation Russia, India, and China, the supposedly in a coalition led from elsewhere, rather ascendant powers, all voted against un than as taking responsibility for another Resolution 1973, which authorized the major operation. Libyan intervention, when the decision The second proposition is that no single came before the Security Council. In- country, however large and resourceful, deed, being a great power is severely can control the rest of the world to suit its overrated. The duties and responsibili- own interests. A new international polit- ties associated with the status are as like- ical con½guration has begun to take shape ly to turn candidate great powers away as with a number of “emerging” powers mak- they are to inspire pursuit of the title. A ing great strides economically, even as es- wiser policy may be less about bossing tablished liberal capitalist states have fal- everyone around and more about helping tered. These emerging powers are unlike- other peoples sort out their quarrels. ly to coalesce into a new bloc–at least, no The third proposition, therefore, is that more than was ever the case with the while the United States is suffering from

30 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 the ½nancial crisis and the cumulative and changing attitudes, we may now be Lawrence effects of its more recent interventions, entering a period in which international Freedman both of which have diminished its stand- crisis management will become progres- ing, it will remain the world’s predomi- sively less energetic and more dependent nant power. When a coalition of coun- on local attitudes and efforts. tries decided to act in Libya, Britain and Libya appears as an exception, yet the France, which were taking the lead, still intervention occurred only because of needed vital American “enablers.” considerable provocation by a regime whose behavior had already been de- The cumulative impact of these con- nounced. Further, a massacre in Benghazi clusions points to a unique situation. For appeared imminent; the Arab League the ½rst time since decolonization, no was urging action; and even with strong evident strategic imperatives draw West- un support, numerous provisos were ern countries into the affairs of the de- designed to limit the liabilities of the out- veloping world. Oil continues to make side actors and ensure that the ½nal some parts of the world more important struggle was between Libyans. Nothing to the West than others; it becomes a fac- in this episode suggests a lack of caution. tor when tensions rise, but not to the ex- In the future we can expect more buck- tent where supply issues mandate certain passing, or looking to others to take the forms of intervention. There is a view lead only to blame them when things go that scarce resources and other problems wrong. In addition, there will be a greater aggravated by climate change, such as stress on diplomatic efforts to encourage population movements, may result in “common sense” among disputants and much more international conflict. It help mediate settlements. This will re- would certainly be unwise to argue that place a readiness to actively knock heads no larger circumstances exist that would together and impose settlements. In the lead to direct military engagement, let face of de½ance, the priority will be to alone less demanding forms of political explore political solutions, and force will or technical assistance. The point is that, be very much a last resort. Major recon- for the moment, the incentives for in- struction efforts will be desultory. volvement are much weaker than be- Putting Libya to one side, there is al- fore, a situation that carries risks of a ready evidence for this shifting outlook. political vacuum. It can be seen in the uncertainties over Another view is that this reluctance to what to do about North Korea, Iran, and intervene will be all to the good; that past the Israel/Palestine dispute, or the popu- Western actions have inflicted more lar uprisings in Iran, Egypt, , and harm than bene½t, stirring up discontent Syria. It is expressed in the frustration and anti-Western feeling; and that indi- over Afghanistan and the lackluster or vidual countries should take responsi- belated responses to the tragedies of bility for their own regional discontents. Sudan, Congo, and the Ivory Coast. The Even ngos, which have decades of devel- Micawberish hope appears to be that opment experience, are now far more real- something will turn up, perhaps the over- istic than sentimental, emphasizing long- throw of an odious regime or an econom- term capacity building rather than ½nan- ic upturn, that will ease problems by cre- cial subsidies or loans from rich coun- ating a shared interest in prosperity. If this tries. For a variety of reasons having to is the case, and sometimes it is, then in- do with resources, practicality, prudence, ternational order will increasingly de-

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00095 by guest on 23 September 2021 The pend on good luck rather than good man- Counter- agement. revolution in Strategic Attempting to predict the future con- Affairs fronts the general problem that prospects depend on choices yet to be made. None- theless, in describing matters of degree, tendencies, shifting emphases, and de- clining capabilities and will, rather than their complete absence, the new norm is one of less activity rather than total pas- sivity. It is no longer possible to think of international politics in terms of simple hierarchies of great powers. Certainly, particular events can change perceptions. The expectations about the Bush admin- istration, which was forecast to follow a cautious “realist” strategy along the lines implied here, were overturned by 9/11. A terrible humanitarian catastrophe or a set of terrorist outrages may prompt surges of diplomatic, developmental, and mili- tary activity. If countries are used as sanc- tuaries for terrorism, or attempt to manipulate energy supplies or maritime trade, defensive measures may not be enough. There will still be arguments to address threats emanating from danger- ous parts of the world at the source; in these cases, the prevailing view will be that it is best to nip dangers in the bud before they become critical. As we have already seen with Libya, crude forms of oppression can prompt a revival of the forms of discretionary interventionism that developed during the 1990s under the heading of the “responsibility to pro- tect.” But again as we have also seen with Libya, these claims, and the evidence on which they are based, will have to look extremely strong before they are taken as seriously as they were in 2002–2003. The question of the future of armed force lies in politics rather than technolo- gy, and of the two, politics is by far the murkiest. Nonetheless, the ambition of the 2000s is likely to be followed by the caution of the 2010s.

32 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences

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