View of War 33 Sweeney, Ernest Moniz, Daniel Schrag, Michael Greenstone, Jon Thomas G

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Protecting the Internet David Clark, Vinton G. Cerf, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba as a Public Commons & Henry E. Brady, R. Kelly Garrett & Paul Resnick, L. Jean Camp, Dædalus Deirdre Mulligan & Fred B. Schneider, John B. Horrigan, Lee Sproull, Helen Nissenbaum, Coye Cheshire, and others Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Summer 2011 The American Denis Donoghue, Rolena Adorno, Gish Jen, E. L. Doctorow, David

Narratives Levering Lewis, Jay Parini, Michael Wood, William Chafe, Philip Summer 2011: The Modern American Military Fisher, Craig Calhoun, Larry Tribe, Peter Brooks, David A. Hollinger, William Ferris, Linda Kerber, and others The William J. Perry Foreword 5 Modern David M. Kennedy Introduction 10 American The Alternative Robert Fri, Stephen Ansolabehere, Steven Koonin, Michael Graetz, Military Lawrence Freedman The Counterrevolution in Strategic Affairs 16 Energy Future Pamela Matson & Rosina Bierbaum, Mohamed El Ashry, James Brian McAllister Linn The U.S. Armed Forces’ View of War 33 Sweeney, Ernest Moniz, Daniel Schrag, Michael Greenstone, Jon Thomas G. Mahnken Weapons: The Growth & Spread Krosnick, Naomi Oreskes, Kelly Sims Gallagher, Thomas Dietz, of the Precision-Strike Regime 45 Paul Stern & Elke Weber, Roger Kasperson & Bonnie Ram, Robert Robert L. Goldich American Military Culture Stavins, Michael Dworkin, Holly Doremus & Michael Hanemann, from Colony to Empire 58 Ann Carlson, Robert Keohane & David Victor, and others Lawrence J. Korb Manning & Financing the Twenty-First- & David R. Segal Century All-Volunteer Force 75 plus Public Opinion, The Common Good, Immigration & the Future Deborah D. Avant Military Contractors & of America &c. & Renée de Nevers the American Way of War 88 Jay M. Winter Filming War 100 James J. Sheehan The Future of Conscription: Some Comparative Reflections 112 Andrew J. Bacevich Whose Army? 122 what Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. The Military-Industrial Complex 135 Martha E. McSally Defending America in Mixed Company: Gender in the U.S. Armed Forces 148 Eugene R. Fidell Military Law 165 Jonathan Shay Casualties 179

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Inside front cover: The Shaw Memorial (1897) by Augus- tus Saint-Gaudens honors the Fifty-fourth Massachu- setts Regiment, the most famous African American regiment of the Civil War. The original bronze-cast version stands on the Boston Common. A gilded plas- ter cast of the monument (1900), photographed here, is part of the National Park Service, Saint-Gaudens National Historic Site collection and is on long-term display at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. Photograph courtesy of the U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Saint-Gaudens National Historic Site, Cornish, New Hampshire. David M. Kennedy, Guest Editor Phyllis S. Bendell, Managing Editor and Director of Publications D Micah J. Buis, Associate Editor Erica Dorpalen, Editorial Assistant

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Committee on Publications Jerome Kagan, Chair, Jesse H. Choper, Denis Donoghue, Gerald Early, Linda Greenhouse, Jerrold Meinwald; ex of½cio: Leslie Cohen Berlowitz

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Dædalus was founded in 1955 and established as a quarterly in 1958. The journal’s namesake was renowned in ancient Greece as an inventor, scientist, and unriddler of riddles. Its emblem, a maze seen from above, symbol- izes the aspiration of its founders to “lift each of us above his cell in the labyrinth of learning in order that he may see the entire structure as if from above, where each separate part loses its comfortable separateness.” The American Academy of Arts & Sciences, like its journal, brings together distinguished individuals from every ½eld of human endeavor. It was char- tered in 1780 as a forum “to cultivate every art and science which may tend to advance the interest, honour, dignity, and happiness of a free, independent, and virtuous people.” Now in its third century, the Academy, with its nearly ½ve thousand elected members, continues to provide intellectual leadership to meet the critical challenges facing our world. Dædalus Summer 2011 Subscription rates: Electronic only for non- Issued as Volume 140, Number 3 member individuals–$43; institutions–$113. Canadians add 5% gst. Print and electronic for © 2011 by the American Academy nonmember individuals–$48; institutions– of Arts & Sciences $126. Canadians add 5% gst. Outside the Unit- Defending America in Mixed Company: ed States and Canada add $23 for postage and Gender in the U.S. Armed Forces handling. Prices subject to change without by Martha E. McSally notice. U.S. Government Document: No rights reserved Institutional subscriptions are on a volume- year basis. All other subscriptions begin with Editorial of½ces: Dædalus, Norton’s Woods, the next available issue. 136 Irving Street, Cambridge ma 02138. Phone: 617 491 2600. Fax: 617 576 5088. Single issues: $13 for individuals; $33 for insti- Email: [email protected]. tutions. Outside the United States and Canada add $6 per issue for postage and handling. Library of Congress Catalog No. 12-30299 Prices subject to change without notice. isbn 978-0-262-75144-5 Claims for missing issues will be honored free Dædalus publishes by invitation only and as- of charge if made within three months of the sumes no responsibility for unsolicited manu- publication date of the issue. Claims may be scripts. The views expressed are those of the submitted to [email protected]. Mem- author of each article, and not necessarily of the bers of the American Academy please direct all American Academy of Arts & Sciences. questions and claims to [email protected]. Dædalus (issn 0011-5266; e-issn 1548-6192) Advertising and mailing-list inquiries may be is published quarterly (winter, spring, summer, addressed to Marketing Department, mit Press fall) by The mit Press, Cambridge ma 02142, for Journals, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge ma the American Academy of Arts & Sciences. An 02142. Phone: 617 253 2866. Fax: 617 253 1709. electronic full-text version of Dædalus is available Email: [email protected]. from The mit Press. Subscription and address Permission to photocopy articles for internal changes should be addressed to mit Press Jour- or personal use is granted by the copyright nals, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge ma 02142. owner for users registered with the Copyright Phone: 617 253 2889; u.s./Canada 800 207 8354. Clearance Center (ccc) Transactional Report- Fax: 617 577 1545. ing Service, provided that the per-copy fee Printed in the United States of America by of $12 per article is paid directly to the ccc, Cadmus Professional Communications, Science 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers ma 01923. Press Division, 300 West Chestnut Street, The fee code for users of the Transactional Ephrata pa 17522. Reporting Service is 0011-5266/11. Submit all other permission inquiries to the Subsidiary Newsstand distribution by Ingram Periodicals mit tn Rights Manager, Press Journals, by com- Inc., 18 Ingram Blvd., La Vergne 37086, and pleting the online permissions request form Source Interlink Distribution, 27500 Riverview fl at www.mitpressjournals.org/page/copyright Center Blvd., Bonita Springs 34134. _permissions. Postmaster: Send address changes to Dædalus, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge ma 02142. Peri- odicals postage paid at Boston ma and at additional mailing of½ces. The typeface is Cycles, designed by Sumner Stone at the Stone Type Foundry of Guinda ca. Each size of Cycles has been sep arately designed in the tradition of metal types. Foreword

William J. Perry

The dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended World War II but ushered in an entirely new form of conflict that came to be called the Cold War. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union each built up enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons designed to deter the other from launching a conventional military or nuclear attack. At the time, deterrence worked in the sense that the United States and the Soviet Union did not come into direct military conflict with each other. But these vast nuclear arsenals did not deter the Soviets from using conventional military force in Czechoslovakia, Hun- gary, or Afghanistan. They did not deter the United States from using military force in Korea and Viet- nam. And they did not preclude both sides from amassing large conventional forces in Europe. WILLIAM J. PERRY, a Fellow of When the Cold War ended, many hoped that a the American Academy since 1989, new era of peace would replace the threat of large- is the Michael and Barbara Ber- scale nuclear war breaking out at any moment. berian Professor at Stanford Uni- versity, where he is also a Codirec- Many believed that this peace would be accompa- tor of the Preventive Defense Proj- nied by a signi½cant global reduction in nuclear ect and Senior Fellow in the Insti- weapons. Instead, new challenges to world security tute for International Studies. At arose. Regional instabilities led to threats of war the U.S. Department of Defense, between India and Pakistan, on the Korean Penin- he served as Secretary of Defense sula, and in the Mideast. These threats contributed (1994 to 1997), Deputy Secretary to and were exacerbated by the proliferation of of Defense (1993 to 1994), and Undersecretary of Defense for nuclear weapons in these regions. Additionally, Research and Engineering (1977 catastrophic terrorism arose as a new threat to to 1981). He received the Presiden- world security, with large-scale attacks on civilian tial Medal of Freedom in 1997. populations in the United States, Russia, India,

5 Foreword Spain, the United Kingdom, and Indone- development facilities capable of build- sia. Nuclear terrorism–the conflation of ing new weapons or modernizing old those two dangers–loomed as a new and ones. The most recent U.S. Nuclear Pos- grave potential security threat. ture Review, released in May 2010, states The occurrence of another global war, that as long as other nations have nuclear while possible, still seems remote. Mili- weapons, the United States should en- tarily, the United States is in a class of its sure the reliability and effectiveness of our own. Today there is no peer competitor deterrent force through a Life Extension for America’s military forces. Yet the Program and a science-based Stockpile public debate in Congress and the Penta- Stewardship Program. Meanwhile, both gon surrounding future U.S. military China and Russia are developing new planning still focuses on the potential nuclear weapons. conventional military threats emerging from a modernized China or resurgent In the ½rst half of the twenty-½rst centu- Russia. China has been making truly ry, we face very different security dangers impressive and sustained gains in its than we did during either the ½rst half of economy and is devoting a signi½cant the twentieth century (two world wars portion of its gdp to modernize its mili- fought with massive conventional forces) tary. However, China is far from being a or the second half (a Cold War character- peer military competitor to the United ized by the buildup of enormous nuclear States. Furthermore, war between China arsenals). Security dangers today must be and the United States appears unlikely, dealt with at least as much with political, with leaders from both countries recog- social, and economic strength (soft pow- nizing that a military conflict would be er) as with military strength (hard pow- disastrous for both societies. And while er). Our need to exert military power can Russia has a large nuclear force similar to no longer be met by the large convention- that of the United States, its conventional forces used during World War II, or the al forces are substantially less capable large nuclear forces accumulated during than those of the United States. the Cold War. Today, our armed forces Since the end of the Cold War, four suc- have been recon½guring to meet these cessive presidential administrations have new demands, but many more changes been unclear as to how the U.S. military are required. We must continue to down- should be restructured to respond to this size our conventional forces and at the new security environment. Although we same time recon½gure them to be more cut back our conventional forces by about agile. Our ground troops need to focus on one-third during the 1990s, we have start- further developing expeditionary forces ed to rebuild our ground forces this past that can be moved quickly to distant decade in response to the ongoing mili- locations and do not need established tary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. military bases nearby to conduct oper- In particular, we have made substantial ations. Our air forces should focus on increases in our Special Operations For- strengthening their long-range strike and ces capabilities. Our nuclear arsenal has unmanned capabilities. Our naval forces been reduced by 84 percent from its peak should continue to focus on their mission during the Cold War, but we still retain of establishing sea control that can be 2,150 deployed nuclear warheads, as well projected worldwide on relatively short as thousands more in reserve or storage. notice. Also, all our military services must In addition, we retain nuclear weapons become more pro½cient in operating in an

6 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences environment of cyber-threats to military The American military has, since William J. technologies. World War II, depended on U.S. industry Perry While the U.S. military will never go for building most of its weapons, includ- back to the large conventional forces ing those developed during the rma. required during World War II, or the This has worked very well because our large nuclear forces amassed during the country’s most advanced technologies Cold War, its operations will continue are created in the private sector. But as to be stretched worldwide, and it will the need for weapons fluctuates, and in have to deal with emerging unconven- particular, as future needs remain uncer- tional threats such as insurgents, terror- tain, it is dif½cult to maintain a stable ists, and pirates. At the same time, it will defense industry. And as military spec- have to maintain effective command and i½cations and procurement regulations control in the face of potential cyber- continue to diverge from those in the attacks. commercial sector, more and more mili- These developments will take place tary procurement will rely on companies while profound technological changes dedicated solely to military work. are occurring in society. Some of these During the wars in Iraq and Afghan- changes can be used against us (cyber- istan, our military complicated this mil- attacks on our military command and itary-industry collaboration by heavily control, or on our civil infrastructure). relying on private security personnel However, they can also be used to our from defense contractors deployed in the advantage, as was the case during the so- battle space to conduct operational tasks called Revolution in Military Affairs usually reserved for members of the (rma), which led to quantum leaps in armed forces. With these private security the effectiveness of technology used contractors operating outside the tradi- to detect enemy targets, avoid detection tional command structure of the mili- of U.S. warplanes by enemy radars tary, their use resulted in signi½cant com- through use of stealth technology, and mand and discipline problems. As a re- provide more accurate readings of loca- sult, the U.S. military in the future will tion through the development of Glob- need to exercise tighter control over what al Positioning System (gps) technolo- operational functions can be performed gy. This rma gave the U.S. military a by contractor personnel. major advantage over other militaries, Another kind of technology, medical as was demonstrated convincingly in technology, has had a profound effect on Operation Desert Storm at the beginning preventing battle½eld casualties. Our of 1991. Unfortunately, these technolo- wounded soldiers in Iraq and Afghan- gies have not been effective in dealing istan have had far better medical treat- with urban insurgencies or global ter- ment than in any other war, resulting in a rorism, and other technologies have not high percentage of soldiers surviving yet been developed to give our military wounds that would have been fatal in ear- a compelling advantage against these lier wars. However, the presence of ad- threats. In the meantime, an entirely vanced weapons on the battle½eld has new application of technology–social also resulted in a much higher number of networking–is having a profound effect veterans with long-term disabilities, in- on political developments throughout cluding Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. the world, and could affect global mil- The need for more and better treatment itary developments as well. facilities has never been greater.

140 (3) Summer 2011 7 Foreword Besides the profound changes to the ture of “jointness” between the military international threat environment and ad- services, has been a successful example of vances in military technology, there have military legislation, and lawmakers are been equally profound changes in the currently considering new legislation to political, economic, and social environ- bring the act up to date. ments within the United States over the Along with these external and domestic last century. Politically, the American political changes, our military is shaped people and their Congress are not as di- by the evolution of society and our ed- rectly engaged with the U.S. military as ucational systems. These changes affect they were during World War II or the the capabilities and attitudes of recruits Cold War. Today, less than 1 percent of for the all-volunteer force. Declining qual- American families have a family member ity of K-12 education will result in declin- in active military service; only 22 percent ing quality of potential recruits at a time of U.S. Senators and congressional repre- when the technological demands on mil- sentatives have ever served in the mili- itary personnel are only getting higher tary. Our military force is composed en- and more complex. This in turn will in- tirely of volunteers, which has many real crease the need for the military services bene½ts, especially in the training and to do their own training, possibly includ- discipline of the force. But it also has one ing remedial training to compensate for great liability: the American people and inadequacies of the K-12 education sys- their elected representatives are more tem. Society is also becoming more ac- detached from their military than at any cepting of gender and racial differences, time this past century. As our body poli- and these changes will be reflected in tic makes decisions about how to use its today’s military services. The military for military force, these decisions should be many decades has been open to all races. made with the understanding that the Women are now accepted in all services people whose lives are being risked are and with increasing responsibilities. Con- the sons and daughters of their constit- gress recently amended the law to allow uents (or their own sons and daughters). gays to serve openly. All these changes There is a potential danger that our all- will bring the face of the military to look volunteer force could eventually be seen more like the face of America. by Congress as a “mercenary” force. Finally, America’s economic power has Congress, under Article 1, Section 8 of strongly influenced its military strength. the U.S. Constitution, is granted the au- U.S. government spending on the mili- thority “[t]o raise and support Armies . . . tary forces has increased over time, paral- To provide and maintain a Navy. To make leling our economic growth. As a result, Rules for the Government and Regula- we have by far the largest military budget tion of the land and naval Forces.” Over in the world; in fact, ours is about equal time, Congress has manifested this re- to the rest of the world’s combined mil- sponsibility by passing laws that set itary budgets in real terms. But we are speci½c standards for civilian control of also the only nation that takes on global the military, for civil-military interfaces, responsibilities for security. Our nuclear and for establishing a military structure umbrella over many allied countries al- that enables effective joint-service opera- lows them to remain non-nuclear, which tions. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, is a bene½t to world security, including which restructured civil-military relations our own. Our naval and air forces in the in the Pentagon and put into place a cul- Paci½c have contributed to peace in that

8 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences historically troubled part of the world, to William J. the bene½t of East Asian countries and Perry our trade with them. The present economic dif½culties facing the United States will generate strong pressures to decrease defense spending. Military and civilian leaders will increasingly be pressed to answer the question, how much spending is enough to meet the requirement? That question could be answered by returning to our historical estimate of appropriate defense spending based on a percentage of gdp. For the last sixty years, our defense budget has been about 3 to 6 percent of our gdp, excluding defense spending during the years of the Korean and Vietnam Wars when it reached a high of 11 percent. Alternatively, defense spending can be measured by an assessment of the threat we face, but that is a highly subjective measurement that can be endlessly debated. But the wind-down of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan may still create an opportunity to decrease military spending without compromising U.S. national security or interests.

The world has been changing in important ways since the end of the Cold War, and new and dangerous threats are emerging every day. But, against all odds, the world has not had a nuclear bomb used in anger since World War II; there has not been, nor is there likely to be, a World War III; and the average standard of living worldwide has increased since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. military has played an important role in these positive results and will be called upon to play that positive role in the future. In order to do so, the U.S. military has to adapt to economic, political, technological, and social changes as well as evolve to meet the changing global threat environment.

140 (3) Summer 2011 9 Introduction

David M. Kennedy

Parvi enim sunt foris arma, nisi est consilium domi. –Cicero, De Of½ciis1

This volume surveys the evolution, character, missions, and possible futures of the modern U.S. armed forces. It proceeds from the conviction that today’s American military is at once increasingly prominent as an instrument of national policy and increasingly detached from and poorly understood by the civilian society in whose name it is asked to ½ght. Since the creation of the all-volunteer force (avf) in 1973, the United States has relied on an ever-smaller proportion of its citizens to shoulder its military burdens, con½guring service members into a standing professional force with formidable capacities to prevail in virtually any conceivable battle space. Whether those developments should be celebrated DAVID M. KENNEDY, a Fellow of or lamented is a question that animates many of the American Academy since 1996, the essays to follow, but all contributors agree that is the Donald J. McLachlan Profes- this is a situation with slender precedent in the his- sor of History, Emeritus, at Stan- ford University, where he is also tory of the American republic. “A standing army, Codirector of the Bill Lane Center however necessary it may be at some times, is al- for the American West and a Se- ways dangerous to the liberties of the people,” nior Fellow in the Woods Institute warned Samuel Adams, a leader in the American for the Environment. His publica- Revolution. “Soldiers are apt to consider themselves tions include Over Here: The First as a body distinct from the rest of the citizens. . . . World War and American Society Such a power should be watched with a jealous (1980) and Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and eye.” For nearly two centuries thereafter, the Unit- War, 1929–1945 (1999), for which ed States accordingly embraced the principle of the he received the 2000 Pulitzer Prize citizen-soldier. Deeply rooted in antiquity, that prin- in History. ciple was axiomatic in the organization of the Amer-

10 ican military well into the twentieth cen- not the Army you might want or wish to David M. tury. It held that all who were able and have at a later time.” His now-notorious Kennedy deemed ½t for service were liable to serve. comment underscored the truth that the As George Washington put it in 1783: “It Army (and Navy, and Marine Corps, and may be laid down as a primary position, Air Force) that this or any country has at and the basis of our system, that every cit- any given time is the product of both his- izen who enjoys the protection of a free tory and prophecy. The size of the force, government, owes not only a proportion the con½guration of its combat and sup- of his property, but even of his personal port arms, the missions for which it is services, to the defense of it.” trained and equipped: all are guided by To be sure, the citizen-soldier principle lessons distilled from the experience of was more an ideal than a reality for much the past and by guesses about what the of the nineteenth century, when the mili- future might hold. And because modern tary usually consisted of a modestly scaled weapons systems and training regimes professional force largely con½ned to fron- take years, even decades, to develop, the tier Indian-½ghting and occasional con- inexorable logic of inertia shapes the mil- stabulary duties. But the ideal remained itary’s state of readiness at any given mo- robust and had a powerful effect in shap- ment, even while the nature of the even- ing the great conscript armies that the tual mission might be largely unantici- United States ½elded in World Wars I and pated. A timeless issue, this phenomenon II, Korea, and Vietnam. has become decidedly more pronounced But since the close of the Vietnam era, in an age of exponentially accelerating so- the United States has sought to wage ma- cial and technological change. jor expeditionary wars with a relatively Recent years have seen striking dis- small professional force. That kind of force junctions between the nature of the force used in that way is something new in the and the tasks it has been assigned. The au- American experience; small wonder that thors in this volume seek to explain just soldiers and civilians alike remain am- how history has deposited the U.S. armed biguous or just plain uninformed about forces where they are today, to clarify what the structure of today’s armed forces and is new and what is not about the twenty- the purposes for which they are used. ½rst-century military and its missions, to The advent of the avf also severed the understand the demography and the psy- link between citizenship and service. No chology of those who serve, and to judge American today is obligated to serve in the the appropriateness of the force to the military. Indeed, the ranks of the armed missions at hand. They also do their best forces now include tens of thousands of to foresee the kinds of adaptations that non-citizens, who receive accelerated ac- are likely to be necessary going forward. cess to citizenship on the basis of their This volume thus aims to shed light both service. So service can earn citizenship, on what today’s military does and what it but citizenship does not require service. is, as well as on what it might become. The implications of that curious asym- Beginning with the foreword by former metry inform the analysis in several of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, all the essays in this volume. the essays that follow take a historical approach to their various parts of the sub- In December 2004, Secretary of Defense ject. They share the premise that Amer- Donald Rumsfeld said: “As you know, you ican forces today are by no means your go to war with the Army you have. They’re grandfather’s or even your father’s mil-

140 (3) Summer 2011 11 Introduction itary. They explore the strategic, techno- generation warfare,” or “war among the logical, and cultural factors that have people.” He predicts a considerably di- made the modern American armed forces minished role for conventional military distinctive, with respect to both their own forces in the coming years. Brian McAllis- national antecedents and other nations’ ter Linn expands on Freedman’s contri- contemporary military establishments. bution by focusing on the uniformed “mil- They emphasize the ever-changing politi- itary intellectuals” who write about stra- cal and ½scal contexts in which the armed tegic doctrine. He tracks the debate with- forces are recruited, trained, and de- in military circles about fourth-generation ployed, and the constantly shifting objec- warfare and ends with a discussion of how tives that they are tasked to achieve, espe- the Petraeus counterinsurgency doctrine cially in the post–Cold War and post-9/11 has been promulgated and implemented. environment. Authors examine threat as- Thomas G. Mahnken also puts the accu- sessments, strategic doctrine, force con½g- racy-and-technology-driven rma at the uration, composition, and training, as well center of his analysis. He describes the as questions about who serves and why; adaptive responses to it as either “emula- the nature of modern warfare; the tacti- tive” or “countervailing,” with special em- cal challenges and ethical dilemmas it can phasis on the latter. He shares Freedman’s generate; gender, legal, and medical is- view that the architects of the rma did not sues in the battle space and beyond; the adequately anticipate what the counter- relation of the military to civil society, in- responses would be, especially the emer- cluding the ways it is depicted in popular gence of asymmetrical warfare. He pro- culture and the health of command-and- vocatively speculates that the evolution- control systems; and its role in the institu- ary pathway of these weapons and the tional structure that constitutes the na- tactical innovations they have spurred on tional security apparatus. the part of adversaries may drive Ameri- All consideration of these topics, of can war-½ghting doctrine back to a greater course, begins with an understanding of or renewed reliance on nuclear weapons. the threats for which the military thinks Turning from what the military is asked it must prepare and the means it deems to do to who actually does it–to the hu- appropriate for coping with them. Law- man face of the force–Robert L. Goldich rence Freedman documents the advent examines the widely held notion that to- of the high-tech Revolution in Military day’s recruits come from the least ad- Affairs, or rma, that drove doctrinal and vantaged corners of American society, and weapon-system changes in the closing he comes up with some surprising an- years of the twentieth century. He takes swers. But he also invokes the example of both the military and civilian leadership the Roman Legionaries to argue that a to task for embracing the rma too un- potentially dangerous gap has opened be- critically, especially in the post–Cold War tween military and civilian cultures. He era when protracted, large-scale conven- focuses not only on the socioeconomic tional warfare among advanced industri- differences between the civil and military al nation-states seemed decreasingly like- sectors but also on the possible divergence ly. He dwells on the inappropriateness of in values between those serving in the rma-driven weapons and tactics in coun- military and civilians, particularly with terinsurgency warfare and the effort, led respect to the legitimacy of violence and by General David Petraeus among others, force. It should be noted that some of his to devise an effective way to wage “fourth- empirical data about who serves is dis-

12 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences puted by Lawrence J. Korb and David R. Winter asks how the public on the home David M. Segal in the immediately succeeding confront forms its image of warfare on the Kennedy tribution–especially with respect to Gold- distant ½ghting front. He discusses some ich’s argument that the educational pro- widely read war novels but focuses on ½le of avf recruits is superior to that in that most accessible and influential of all the comparable civilian cohort. Segal and popular media, ½lm, from the era of the Korb examine the demographic and ½s- silents to the present. He ½nds a persis- cal characteristics of the avf, with spe- tent tension between the rendition of war cial attention to the ½nancial implica- as spectacle and war as the setting for tions of measures taken to meet recruit- psychological and moral drama, with an ment and retention goals. They are par- increasing tendency in our time to focus ticularly critical of the fact that military on stories that are less about war per se health and pension bene½ts have not than about individual warriors and their been budgeted on an accrual basis. They interior lives. Sheehan rehearses the role raise the vexed question of whether it of the military in state formation in might be desirable to restore conscription, Europe over the last two centuries, show- or at least Selective Service registration. ing how most Western European nations They also advocate reforms in veterans’ have become “civilian societies,” with a medical bene½ts, along the lines that Sec- much diminished role for the military. retary of Defense Robert Gates suggested Meanwhile, across an ill-de½ned but dis- in January 2011. Deborah D. Avant and cernible boundary, on the eastern side of Renée de Nevers examine that part of the which lie many of the successor Soviet overall force that is not in uniform: the states, as well as Turkey, the military re- surprisingly large numbers of civilian mains a powerful institution, largely rely- “contractors” who have taken over a ing on conscription. Sheehan’s compara- range of traditional military duties, tive analysis casts the United States into including construction and supply, but clearer perspective as an anomalous hy- armed combat roles as well. In Iraq and brid of the Eastern and Western European Afghanistan the number of contractors models: it has a small and relatively inex- has apparently equaled or exceeded the pensive military that commands unprec- number of uniformed troops. Avant and edented destructive power, and it is a civil- de Nevers probe the implications of those ian state with signi½cant military obliga- numbers for civilian perceptions of the tions–indeed, a greater weight and range size of the force commitment and the of such obligations than any other nation. political ease of defending that commit- Andrew J. Bacevich takes Sheehan’s ment (since its true scale is not altogeth- argument about the relation of the Amer- er apparent). They also analyze issues of ican military to the civilian state still fur- command, control, and accountability ther. He decries what he sees as the ascen- that arise from such heavy reliance on an dant power of the military in national se- “irregular” force component, while not- curity decision-making, what he calls “in- ing that the Defense Contract Manage- side the Beltway” civil-military relations. ment Agency, in charge of overseeing Turning to the “beyond the Beltway” di- those contractors, has actually down- mensions of the subject, he revisits the sized rather remarkably since 2002. long-running debate about the political Jay M. Winter and James J. Sheehan implications of force con½guration among open the supremely important subject of military intellectuals and policy-makers the military’s relation to civil society. from Emery Upton and Elihu Root in the

140 (3) Summer 2011 13 Introduction early twentieth century to John McCau- cludes this volume with reflections on ley Palmer and George C. Marshall in the war’s aftermath for the men and women World War II and Cold War eras. He asks who wage it, and the wounds, physical and how the tradition of the citizen-soldier or psychological, it has inflicted on them. its functional equivalent might somehow He distinguishes between “primary” and be restored, as a way of buttressing civil- “secondary” physical wounds and points ian engagement with the military and un- out that most battle deaths have histori- derwriting political accountability for de- cally resulted from the latter–from in- cisions to resort to force. Charles J. Dun- fection and exsanguination, for example lap, Jr., looks at a special and crucial fac- –and that modern battle½eld medicine et of the civil-military interface by recol- has sharply reduced the incidence of sec- lecting President Dwight Eisenhower’s ondary effects. He explores the implica- famous warning that “we must guard tions of those improved battle½eld med- against the acquisition of unwarranted in- icine techniques that have, in effect, sub- fluence, whether sought or unsought, by stituted long-term disability for mortal- the military industrial complex.” He ar- ity for tens of thousands of service peo- gues that Eisenhower’s warning was heard ple. (By some estimates, if the armed and largely heeded, and that the real dan- forces had practiced Vietnam-era battle ger today is that we may dismantle the re- medicine procedures in Iraq, the U.S. maining industrial infrastructure on which military death toll would have been well military ef½cacy ultimately depends. over 20,000, rather than the approxi- Martha E. McSally, a former ½ghter pi- mately 4,500 dead counted by mid-2011.) lot, examines another of the myriad ways He then draws a parallel with psycholog- that the armed forces are challenged to ical trauma, arguing that the secondary, reflect the norms that are honored in civil or post-battle, effects of what he terms society: in this case, gender equality. Re- “moral wounds” are less well understood viewing women’s role in the military from and currently receive inadequate atten- the Revolutionary era to the present, she tion from the military and the medical concludes that the time has come for giv- profession. ing women unquali½ed access to all combat arms and assignments. Eugene R. Fi- Taken together, the essays in this vol- dell examines yet another aspect of civil- ume paint a comprehensive portrait of the military relations, the relation of the Uni- American armed forces today, and they versal Code of Military Justice (ucmj) to raise several urgent questions, which may civilian law. He argues that although there be summarized as matters of military are problems inherent in the differences ef½ciency, political accountability, and between the two, and in their sometimes social equity. Does the United States have uneasy relation to each other (as in the a well-articulated national security doc- controversy about whether to try suspect- trine that is relevant to the challenges ed terrorists in civil or military courts), ahead, and are the armed forces properly the ucmj is a healthy, defensible corpus con½gured for those challenges? Are the of jurisprudence, whose practitioners de- mechanisms that throughout American serve to be better understood and respect- history have ensured civilian control of ed in the larger society. the military, and held civilian leaders Jonathan Shay, a clinical psychiatrist properly accountable for the decision to who has written extensively about Post- shoulder arms, still operating properly? Traumatic Stress Disorder (ptsd), con- Does the recruitment of today’s force

14 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences honor American notions of fairness and home? On the answers to those questions David M. shared obligations? Perhaps most impor- hangs not only the security of the repub- Kennedy tant, how faithful are we to Cicero’s an- lic, but its political and moral health as cient dictum that arms are of little value well. in the ½eld unless there is wise counsel at endnote 1 “Arms are of little value in the ½eld unless there is wise counsel at home”; Cicero, De Of½ciis, Book I, XXII, par. 76.

140 (3) Summer 2011 15 The Counterrevolution in Strategic Affairs

Lawrence Freedman

Abstract: Claims from the 1990s about a revolution or transformation in military affairs are assessed in light of the experience of the 2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan. The importance of considering political as well as military affairs is stressed. Though the United States developed evident predominance in capabilities for regular war, it was caught out when drawn into irregular forms of warfare, such as terrorism and insurgency. The United States signi½cantly improved its counterinsurgency capabilities. It does not follow, however, that the United States will now engage more in irregular conflicts. Indeed, the military circumstances of the past decade were in many ways unique and led to an exaggeration of the strategic value of irregular forms and the need for the United States to respond. Meanwhile, the political legacy of the experience is likely to be a more limited engagement with the problems associated with “failed” and “rogue” states.

War, as Carl von Clausewitz reminds us, is governed by politics, which provides its purpose, passion, and accounting. Yet politics is often treated in military theory as an awkward exogenous factor, at best a necessary inconvenience and at worst a source of weakness and constraint–a disruptive influence interfering with the proper conduct of war. This outlook has featured prominently in American military thought. There has long been a clear preference, reflected in force structure and doctrine, for big, regular wars against serious great-power competition. With the end of the Cold War, this preference came under pressure. The LAWRENCE FREEDMAN is Pro- fessor of War Studies and Vice- United States had no obvious “peer competitor,” Principal at King’s College Lon- and many in the military apparently felt that the don. His recent publications in- sort of operations coming into vogue–tellingly clude The Of½cial History of the Falk- described as “operations other than war”–were lands Campaign (2005), The Trans- beneath them. There was an evident lack of enthu- formation of Strategic Affairs (2006), siasm as the United States was drawn into the se- and A Choice of Enemies: America ries of conflicts connected with the breakup of the Confronts the Middle East (2008), which received the 2009 Lionel former Yugoslavia, culminating in the 1999 cam- Gelber Prize and the 2009 Duke of paign against Serbia over Kosovo. The withdrawal Westminster’s Medal for Military from Somalia in 1994, like that from Beirut a de- Literature. cade earlier, was taken as a cautionary tale about

16 the folly of such involvements. In these particular, the shifting relationship be- Lawrence conflicts, the military could not simply tween the United States and the states Freedman take political direction and then get on that used to be known collectively as the with the ½ghting; rather, it found every third world. Next, I address the problems move full of political sensitivity and its with the rma and the asymmetrical re- freedom of action restrained at each turn. sponses that promotion of the strategy As a symptom of the attitude toward naturally encouraged. As these reactions operations of this type, the proposition included forms of irregular warfare, no- that shaped high-level thinking in the tably terrorism and insurgency over the U.S. defense establishment during the last ten years, I then explore whether the 1990s and into the 2000s disregarded intervention in Afghanistan set a pattern them entirely. The proposition held that for the future in terms of both its objec- a “Revolution in Military Affairs” was tive and its conduct. (The speci½c ori- under way, involving a step change in the gins of the Iraq intervention render that nature of war. It gained suf½cient accep- conflict almost sui generis, although the tance for the acronym rma to become conduct there reinforces the lessons of familiar shorthand for what appeared to Afghanistan.) I argue that, on balance, Af- be an irreversible trend, an inexorable ghanistan does not set a precedent. Com- phenomenon to which all military estab- bined with the political changes dis- lishments must respond. Those which cussed in the ½rst section of the essay, mastered the rma most effectively would the situation in Afghanistan suggests a have a sure route to victory. much more limited engagement with the The roots of the revolution were as- problems associated with “failed” and sumed to be technological rather than “rogue” states. I conclude by hedging my political. Thus, the United States, which bets, in part through an examination of was demonstrably to the fore in the rele- the operation in Libya that began in vant information and communication March 2011. technologies, would be in the vanguard. Even better, the logic of the revolution The term third world was coined in France anticipated that the conduct of military in the early 1950s to describe countries affairs would be pushed in a direction that were economically underdeveloped, that most suited the United States: one politically unaligned, and therefore at a favoring high-tempo conventional war- distance from the liberal capitalist ½rst fare. These predictions further reinforced world and the state socialist second the presumption that the United States world. The long-forgotten inspirational could maintain its “hyperpower” status model for the term was the “third estate” for decades to come. The effect was to of French commoners, who eventually, in play down the importance of the political 1789, revolted against the ½rst and second dimension in shaping contemporary con- estates of priests and nobles. The term flict. Making sense of what has changed therefore captured an idea of a coherent over the past decade, therefore, requires group, a coalition of the disadvantaged, looking not only at the lessons of warfare that might one day overthrow the estab- but also at the changing geopolitical en- lished order. It came to include many vironment. states that gained independence as a re- This essay is concerned with “strategic” sult of post–World War II decolonization. rather than purely “military” affairs. The sheer diversity in shape, size, and First, I consider political changes and, in status of this group prevented member

140 (3) Summer 2011 17 The states from ever coming together as a This was the moment when liberal cap- Counter- coherent whole (or geopolitical force). italism peaked. As an ideology, capital- revolution in Strategic Moreover, while many such states af- ism had always contained many strands Affairs ½rmed the principle of non-alignment, and was often contradictory, yet its core joining the “non-aligned movement” themes–with regard to free markets and founded in 1961, they did so largely as human rights–had been continually in- a means of keeping their options open. fluential for more than two centuries. In practice, they often seemed to lean The collapse of state socialism meant that toward one bloc or the other, typically in capitalism emerged from the Cold War a return for arms sales and diplomatic sup- clear winner. In this narrative, the West’s port. Both Washington and Moscow as- victory was not simply a matter of deter- sumed that the newly independent states rence and political cohesion but also a would need to make their ideological result of intellectual vitality and entre- choices, for either liberal capitalism or preneurial drive. After the Cold War, lib- state socialism, and that their political eral capitalism was promoted as the mod- allegiances would follow. In a number of el to emulate if states wanted to get ahead cases, the superpowers were drawn into in a globalized world. The idea of “glob- civil wars on the assumption (often mis- alization” stressed the breaking down of taken) that the local contest had real boundaries, particularly with regard to links with their global ideological con- capital, goods, and services, but also frontation. The shifting allegiances in the ideas and people. Horn of Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, as For a while, this vision suggested that Ethiopia and Somalia swapped camps, under the influence of free markets, illustrate the point. countries around the word–including Even before the end of the Cold War, former adversaries–would adopt ½rst the it had become apparent that while con- economic and then the political forms of flicts in the third world might be re- liberal capitalism. The embrace of de- shaped as a result of superpower inter- mocracy was considered particularly im- ference, they were ignited by distinctive portant, not only because it meant that a local factors. Ideological af½nity did not larger proportion of the world’s popula- seem to produce political harmony. In tion would enjoy political rights, but also Asia, shared Marxism-Leninism did not because of the assumption that democra- prevent the Soviet Union, China, Cam- cies do not ½ght one another. Those with bodia, and Vietnam from clashing with regimes resistant to this path, and likely each other. Moreover, the general ap- to pose threats to their neighbors, were peal of state socialism declined as a re- described as “rogue.” Iraq, Iran, and sult of its evident failure in the Soviet North Korea fell into this category. Those bloc. A number of the former leaders of unable to cope, often because they were the non-aligned camp that had once ex- torn apart by internal violence, such as hibited socialist inclinations–such as Somalia, Congo, and Yugoslavia, were Indonesia and Egypt–ultimately moved described as “failing.” into the Western camp, though they were It was always likely that many states not exactly liberal in their internal prac- would go their own way, rather than fol- tices. After the implosion of European low a liberal democratic model, without communism, a general continental re- becoming evidently roguish or failing. alignment formed on the basis of the core The main problem was the uncertain re- Western institutions of nato and the eu. lationship between relatively free econ-

18 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences omies, with active participation in global cially with states, including Russia and Lawrence trade and ½nancial markets, and relative- China, that wanted no interference in Freedman ly free polities, with support for human their more dissident and troublesome rights and democratic elections. As the regions. example of China vividly illustrates, it is Humanitarian interventions also gen- possible, at least for a substantial period erated long-term and expensive responsi- of time, to combine a strong capitalist bilities to those places where interven- ethos with an authoritarian political sys- tion took place. Initially, the action might tem. Even governments responsive to have been prompted by evidence of acute public opinion and subject to democratic but short-term humanitarian distress, accountability would not always wish to but once engaged, the interveners felt align themselves with the United States, obliged to undertake wholesale recon- especially as the American brand became struction of the target countries by set- more toxic during the 2000s. Liberalism, ting them on the road to democracy. The capitalism, and alignment with the Unit- same impulse was evident in Iraq and ed States turned out not to be inextrica- Afghanistan. But as the United States be- bly linked. Furthermore, the particular came bogged down in Iraq, it let its own capitalist model practiced by the West liberal standards drop in the conduct of suffered a loss of credibility as a result of interrogations and counterinsurgency the ½nancial crisis that began in 2008. As operations. At the same time it demon- a more practical consequence, the crisis strated an inability to reshape local polit- ushered in a more austere age, thereby ical structures according to its own pref- reducing the appetite for expensive mili- erences. Unless a functioning democracy tary interventions and possibly causing was created, it was argued, there could be greater reluctance in the provision of no guarantee that the conditions that cre- economic assistance. ated the problem in the ½rst place would The U.S. appetite for military opera- not recur. Why costly military exertions tions and foreign economic aid was al- should be used to reestablish an authori- ready declining as a result of the cost and tarian regime was hard to explain. The disappointing results of the interven- only way out was to work with the local tions of the past two decades. Humani- political grain, which was not necessarily tarian intervention developed as a re- a natural support for the practices and sponse to failing states, providing a meth- norms on which liberal democracy de- odology for the assertion of liberal values pends and which would be under addi- in areas marked by severe strife. Bosnia, tional strain as a result of the internal Kosovo, and Sierra Leone were cited as violence that had prompted the inter- evidence of how harm could be mitigated vention. On the one hand, walking away by timely intervention; Rwanda was the from a country still in recovery would prime example of the consequences of have been dif½cult; on the other, an ex- abandoning a country in crisis. Interven- tended stay risked creating a local de- tion on humanitarian grounds implied a pendency culture and increasing resis- direct challenge to the post-Westphalian tance and hostility toward the United norms of international behavior by threat- States and its allies. ening to subvert sovereignty through the expressed readiness to interfere in the in- This shifting political context moved ternal affairs of others. Challenges to sov- U.S. military strategy a long way from the ereignty were always controversial, espe- promise of the rma. At the start of the

140 (3) Summer 2011 19 The 2000s, hope had been very much alive. also constrain opponents’ ambitions. As Counter- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s a regular conventional war against the revolution in Strategic “transformation” agenda was intended United States appeared to be an increas- Affairs to demonstrate the potential of forces ingly foolish proposition, especially after that were high on quality and relatively its convincing performance in the 1991 low on quantity. Iraq, at least in its ½rst Persian Gulf War, one form of potential stage, was taken as proof of those pre- challenge to American predominance cepts. This new “dominant” form of com- was removed, just as the prospect of bat involved moving with greater speed mutual assured destruction (mad) had and precision, and over longer ranges, earlier removed nuclear war as a serious than was possible for the enemy; disori- policy option. enting as much as destroying; attacking But there was an important difference. only what was necessary; and avoiding With mad, everybody would lose once unnecessary collateral damage to civilian nuclear exchanges began, which meant life and property. In the more enthusiastic that, in principle, the side stronger in versions, the prospect was to lift the fog conventional forces could incur an ad- of war. On land, where the fog was always vantage. The Warsaw Pact countries were the greatest, the rma promised to dispel believed to be in this position during the the inherent confusion caused by ½ght- Cold War, thus putting the onus on nato ing in and around uneven terrain–woods, to escalate to nuclear use if its members rivers, towns, and cities–day and night, were losing the battle. Once the nato in all weather, with the location of friends countries gained conventional superiority, as much a mystery as that of enemies. deterrence was complete–at least against This form of warfare suited the United other great powers. If an aspirant super- States because it played to U.S. strengths: power could in no way expect to ½ght and it could be capital rather than labor in- win (in any meaningful sense) a massive tensive; it reflected a preference for out- conflict along the lines of the two world smarting opponents; it avoided excessive wars, then not only was America’s posi- casualties both received and inflicted; tion more secure, but the risk of another and it conveyed an aura of almost effort- catastrophic global conflagration was di- less superiority. minished. As with nuclear forces (whose Those ideas were deeply comforting, mid-century arrival had also been de- and not entirely wrong. Information and scribed at the time as a “revolution in mil- communication technologies were bound itary affairs”), the rma agenda required to make a difference in military practice. maintaining substantial conventional Perhaps the rma agenda understated the forces designed for a form of conflict that extent to which American predominance the very existence of those forces ren- was dependent on not only the sophisti- dered unlikely. The challenge was to ex- cation of its technology but also the sheer plain the need to pay for expensive forces amount of ½repower–particularly air- that might never be used. delivered–it had at its disposal. None- Yet the rma model was deeply flawed. theless, the formidable cumulative im- Far from representing a real revolution in pact was impressive. Furthermore, while military affairs, it harked back to an ear- the United States’ evident military supe- lier, idealized prototype of modern war- riority in a particular type of war was fare in which a decisive military victory likely to encourage others to ½ght in dif- can settle the fate of nations and, indeed, ferent ways, that military capacity would of whole civilizations. Once its forces have

20 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences been defeated, an enemy government will gence, communications, and navigation Lawrence have no choice but to hand over sover- became widely available as consumer Freedman eignty to the victor. If war is accepted as gadgets could be exploited by otherwise the arbiter, politicians can set objectives crude, small organizations with limited and hold the commanders accountable, budgets. Precision intelligence, instanta- but the military must be allowed to con- neously communicated and combined duct the campaign according to its pro- with precision guidance, made it possible fessional judgment with a minimum role to concentrate ½re accurately on solely for civilians–preferably not as victims military targets in order to cause maxi- and certainly not as strategists. Under the mum disruption to the enemy military most idealized version of this model, the effort. But it did not mandate such at- victory comes quickly. The longer the war tacks. It could support concepts less de- drags on, the more uncertain the situa- pendent on discriminate targeting. In- tion becomes, as both sides increasingly deed, the same systems that made it pos- depend on the performance of allies; the sible to limit damage to civil society test becomes one of social and economic could also be used to ensure that attacks endurance more than military skill; moron civil society were more effective. Even ale suffers; and politicians become impa- on the American model there were always tient. Thus, for military innovators, the dual-use facilities that served both mili- acme of success is a new route to a swift tary and civilian purposes–for example, and politically decisive military victory. power and transportation. They might be This was the claim made for the rma. targeted as part of a military purpose but However, the lack of a political context still led to the disruption of civilian life. was problematic. It ½xed on trends in By the end of the 1990s, the challenge military capabilities and neglected the to the rma was recognized to lie in what types of conflict that might need to be ad- was described as “asymmetrical war- dressed through force of arms. The new fare.” Enemies would refuse to ½ght on doctrine recognized that armed force America’s terms, attempting to turn war- could have a range of purposes other than fare toward civil society rather than away. regular war but tended to set these possi- The approach most feared was the direct bilities to one side, imagining such cases targeting of large population centers with either would be smaller in scale and easi- chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons ly supported by capabilities designed for (of which nuclear are in a category all regular war or would involve goals that their own, although they are lumped could be picked up by lesser powers, such together with other weapons of mass as peacekeeping duties. destruction [wmd]). The approach that A further problem was the assumption was actually largely followed was to that, because the new technologies ½t adopt the various forms of irregular war- so well with American strategic prefer- fare: that is, to rely on the support of a ences, they would not serve different and section of the civilian population as well opposed objectives. If the capabilities as on guerrilla and terrorist tactics. A de- had been purely military in character, gree of overlap between the two approach- this outcome might have been more like- es manifested when terrorists found ways ly. In practice, however, these technolo- of causing mass casualties, particularly gies encouraged a progressive overlap be- using vulnerabilities in transport. The 9/11 tween the civilian and military spheres. attacks, the most spectacular example of High-quality surveillance and intelli- this type of warfare, raised the specter of

140 (3) Summer 2011 21 The terrorist access to wmd, perhaps aided situation demonstrates how much worse Counter- by “rogue” states. The event signi½cantly it is to lose a ½ght than to walk away from revolution in Strategic affected U.S. priorities in the subsequent a ½ght before it has begun. Doctrine and Affairs decade, shaping the two main U.S. mili- tactics have been changed to deal with tary operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. novel, and in some respects unique, situ- In both these operations, enemy regu- ations. The enemy is unlikely to win in lar forces were unable to offer much re- Afghanistan or Iraq in the sense that it sistance to U.S. strength. (The Taliban will not be able to seize the state. But it is was already battling the Northern Alli- also true that in neither case can it be said ance, and U.S. airpower and special forces that the United States’ side clearly won. tipped the balance.) Both conventional Both U.S. occupied countries remain un- campaigns could be considered a vindica- stable and have suffered very high costs tion of rma-type concepts in that quality in lives and depressed social and econom- defeated quantity with remarkable speed. ic development. Their long-term political Thereafter, however, the United States prospects are unclear. With one naturally was stuck dealing with resourceful and centralized and oil-rich and the other frag- determined irregular opponents while it mented and poor, their circumstances are desperately sought to construct sustain- very different. In their own ways, both able indigenous state structures and provide telling reminders that defeating forces. The experience underlined the insurgencies depends on the quality of danger of operating against the local po- government as much as, if not more than, litical grain. military technique. To say that, during the course of the 2000s, the United States mastered coun- Can we assume that recent military en- terinsurgency operations would be an gagements will set the pattern for the fu- overstatement, yet after the severe initial ture? The military history of the 2000s setbacks in Iraq, the United States adapt- was nothing like that of the 1990s, which ed. The group associated with General in turn was quite different from the 1980s. David Petraeus took some of the tech- Why should we expect to be able to pre- nologies associated with the rma, ac- dict the 2010s? Indeed, this decade has cepted that numbers still made a differ- already begun with a reluctant interven- ence, and then brought in a more street- tion in Libya. The combination of high wise grasp of the political circumstances ambition and self-imposed restraints in which the military was operating. The that characterize this engagement is un- strategy emphasized that military actions like any that has come before. must be evaluated by reference to their The main continuity in the post–Cold political effects, not simply by traditional War period, in addition to the reduced metrics geared toward eliminating en- risk of a great-power confrontation, has emy forces, and stressed the importance been in the shift of focus from preparing of reinforcing these effects through what to deal with challenges from strong states are now called “information operations.” to engaging with weak and failed states, This approach has required not only at ½rst under the guise of peacekeeping tenacity but also a commitment of re- and humanitarian intervention and then sources and a tolerance of casualties that under the capacious umbrella of the “war would have been considered excessive, on terror.” even prohibitive, as the campaigns were Unlike the large-scale great-power wars ½rst planned in the aftermath of 9/11. The of the past, in which the stakes were

22 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences clear, the consequences of defeat grim, gy that ran deep and wide in certain Lawrence involving the mobilization of whole soci- countries but was patchy in others. The Freedman eties and international alliances, the stra- resulting violence was largely localized tegic imperatives behind the operations and sporadic. of the past two decades have been more For the moment, at least, the spectacu- controversial. The reason, however, is not lar attacks on the World Trade Center the level of casualties. Those who ½ght are and the Pentagon remain unique. At the largely volunteer regulars. Losses have same time, the insurgencies in both Iraq not approached the industrial scale of the and Afghanistan, and countries where great wars, though in some respects, that the United States and its allies have not difference has made individual sacri½ces made the same military commitments, more personal and poignant. Politically, have been persistent, intensive, and trou- the main issue is whether these lives are blesome. Strategy has become preoccu- being sacri½ced to any good purpose. pied with issues such as the relationship Questions are constantly asked about between military technique and political why and how a war is being fought and legitimacy, the radicalization of popula- the probability of success. tions, the management of intercommu- An attempt was made, notably by the nal violence, governance and corruption, Bush administration, to distinguish the and the role of international opinion. “wars of choice” of the 1990s from the If the recent past has set a pattern that “wars of necessity” of the 2000s. This dis- will continue for some time, we are now tinction, for which I take some respon- entering a period when conflicts will be sibility, is misleading. There is always a dominated by irregular forms of warfare. choice, even if it is a terrible one. Un- Talk of a fourth generation of warfare suf- doubtedly different was how the stakes fers from a historicist fallacy similar to the were perceived. With the humanitarian one affecting the rma concept: namely, interventions of the 1990s, the choice that forms of warfare pass through a nat- was ½rst about whether to pay attention, ural progression. The difference is that and only then to decide what to do. If the the rhetoric behind the rma was buoyed issues that might have prompted, and in by a technological optimism, while the some cases did prompt, these interven- gloom surrounding the notion of the tions were ignored, the consequences for fourth generation reflects cultural and those directly involved might have been political pessimism. Irregular warfare, dire, but others could have carried on as however, is hardly a novel phenomenon. before. Indifference was an option. The It was used in the ½ght against colonial- term “war of necessity” implied the pres- ism to circumvent the evident superiority ence of an existential security threat, the of the metropolitan states in military handling of which would determine a organization and ½repower. During the state’s future position. In these cases, in- course of major regular wars, there were difference was not an option. often irregular elements. The two forms It was dif½cult both before and after are not exclusive and can coexist. One 9/11 to measure the threat posed by Al of the textbooks of irregular warfare, Qaeda. The rhetoric of leaders such as Lawrence of Arabia’s Seven Pillars of Wis- Osama bin Laden was extravagant in its dom, was based on his role in Arab ha- incitement to violence, yet their follow- rassment of Turkish forces during World ers had only occasional successes. They War I. In World War II, German forces made an appeal to an underlying ideolo- in Europe had to defend their territorial

140 (3) Summer 2011 23 The gains from irregular partisan attacks as For the United States, the issue is not Counter- well as from regular allied forces. Regular the war the country is most likely to ½ght revolution in Strategic war supposes that political disputes can but the war for which its military should Affairs be settled through battle with a military prepare. Preparedness is a form of deter- surrender followed by a transfer of sover- rence; it should mean that the war does eignty. But if a suf½cient portion of a pop- not have to be fought, which inevitably ulation refuses to accept the result, popu- leaves open the question of whether the lar militias, along with other forms of re- expenditure and effort were necessary in sistance, may challenge the apparent vic- the ½rst place. This is especially the case tor. At this stage, the conflict is no longer because a defensive preparedness must a regular war. One such popular uprising involve a substantial capability for ma- occurred in France after the 1871 war jor war. Thankfully, America’s strength is with Prussia, eventually leading to the only one of a number of reasons why such Paris Commune. It also happened in 2001 a war remains highly unlikely. Regard- in Afghanistan and in 2003 in Iraq. less, we can assume that the ability to Regular warfare is perceived to be in ½ght and prevail in a war with another decline. This view can be attributed to great power will continue to be the top the likely destructiveness of war between priority for U.S. defense. The key ques- great powers, especially those armed tion is whether the United States will with nuclear weapons; a consequential need to maintain a substantial capacity to readiness to solve great-power disputes ½ght an irregular war. Over the past few by means other than war; and the superi- years, it has added a much more sophisti- ority of Western states in the conduct of cated counterinsurgency capability to its regular war. The increased focus on irreg- repertoire. In the 1970s, the U.S. Army ular war emerged from the apparent considered Vietnam to be exactly the invincibility of U.S. forces, with or with- sort of war it never wished to ½ght again; out their allies, in conventional battle. thus, it turned away from counterinsur- To the extent that states, not necessarily gency in order to concentrate on its core great powers, remain ready to resolve task of preparing for great-power con- disputes through force of arms, regular flict, at that time against the Warsaw Pact war remains a possibility, as Palestine and in the center of Europe. In this setting, Israel, India and Pakistan have shown the rma emerged: indeed, the embrace over the years. For the moment, these of the relevant technologies can be traced particular conflicts are being carried out back to the rediscovery of maneuver war- largely through irregular means, al- fare and the Army’s adoption of “air-land though Israel and India have indicated battle” as core doctrine. they are prepared to use regular forces As Iraq and Afghanistan became more if irregular attacks are pushed too far. demanding in the 2000s, this comfort The conflict in Libya has seen regular zone was no longer so available. A grow- forces taking on a cobbled-together mil- ing sense of a global conflict against a itia that could survive only with support resourceful and ideologically driven op- from nato airpower. Future regular wars ponent suggested another pattern. The that do not involve the United States and messy, prolonged ½ghts in which the its allies directly are possible, even if United States was directly involved, as they take on a cataclysmic form (for ex- well as those in which the United States ample, a confrontation between China had an interest, if a less central role– and India). such as Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Leb-

24 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences anon, and Gaza–appeared to be part of and resilience of the ruling elite and its Lawrence the picture. Instead of an occasional de- external supporters; their authority and Freedman cisive campaign to ward off a challenge con½dence are undermined while an from an aspirant great power, the future audience is created for a rival political would likely be marked by a succession of creed; and eventually, there is suf½cient struggles against Islamist opponents op- support to topple the regime and put a erating in and out of broken, weak states. new, popular government in its place. In most cases where states facing a seri- The crucial moment arrives when the ous Islamist threat looked to the United irregulars gain recruits and support, and States for help, support took the form of the enemy suffers from desertion and intelligence and training as well as spe- popular disaffection. As the balance of ci½c capabilities such as special forces power shifts, the irregulars will be able to and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (uavs). act in a more regular fashion. Iraq, to say the least, was hardly an inev- This aspiration was explicit in Asian itable response to 9/11. The intervention guerrilla theory, including in the cam- in Afghanistan had a greater logic in that paigns of Mao in China or Giap in Viet- regard. Al Qaeda, residing brazenly in Af- nam. Irregular warfare–for example, in ghanistan, could be targeted by means the form of guerrilla tactics–was not a of a reasonably regular military campaign. preferred way of ½ghting: it was for want An available conventional response was of something better. By itself, it could not an unusual feature of this case, but it en- produce victory because it did not allow couraged the perception of the utility of power to be wrested directly from the conventional military force in the “war state. At some point, even if only during on terror.” However seriously we take the the endgame, the irregulars had to gain Islamist threat, it is important to empha- the strength to ensure a decisive victory size that this response is the exception over the state or, if the enemy collapsed, rather than the norm. assert their authority as the armed forces of a state-in-waiting. In this way, Fidel Irregular forms of warfare are favored by Castro and his hitherto ragged bunch of underdogs who know that they have little guerrilla ½ghters marked their victory chance against superior conventional over the regular forces of Batista in Cuba forces. By itself, irregular warfare can- a half-century ago. Once state power is not lead to a decisive victory. Some, of seized, even if relatively little effort is re- course, may acknowledge this point quired, it must be secured against internal while insisting that it is irrelevant. Their and external enemies. Defending state objectives may be no more than to ex- rule requires organizational and oper- press anger, exact retribution, or promote ational forms quite different from those a particular cause, such as animal rights. required to wage guerrilla war, let alone If, however, the objective involves an at- mount random acts of terror. tempt to liberate some territory or seize Regardless of how successful they have political control, then at some point, a been in mounting individual attacks and direct challenge to other regular or mili- embarrassing enemies, irregular cam- tia-type forces will be required, possibly paigns rarely lead to power. For example, leading to open battle rather than to even if successive terroristic attacks on raids, harassment, and ambushes. U.S. targets persuaded the United States This scenario might come about as fol- to disengage entirely from the Middle lows: persistent attacks try the patience East, the responsible group would still be

140 (3) Summer 2011 25 The left ½ghting local opponents and rivals ing if the only intention is to cause hurt; if Counter- for actual power. Note what happened in there is a wider political intention, the revolution in Strategic Afghanistan after the Soviet Union with- effort normally fails. Al Qaeda’s Afghan Affairs drew. In this respect, the Libyan conflict base made it unusual for terrorist groups was almost back-to-front. An anti-Gad- because it was not operating against the da½ mass movement developed quickly, host state and, in fact, was afforded a de- asserted itself in the capital Tripoli, and gree of state protection as it mounted at- soon seized other population centers– tacks elsewhere. When terrorist groups notably, the eastern city of Benghazi. operate within hostile societies, the best Using superior ½repower, crudely ap- option is to consider them to be crim- plied, the regime was able to regain con- inals: that is, offenders to be dealt with trol of Tripoli and would then have rolled through the methods of law enforce- up the rebels had it not been for the un- ment, such as domestic intelligence, the authorized intervention. Ironically, it was police, and the judiciary. Terrorists in- the beleaguered regime claiming that the volved in robbery, extortion, and even rebels were really Islamist terrorists mas- kidnapping to obtain ½nance may ½t this querading as democrats, while nato description literally. De½ning them in countries accepted the rebels more or less this way has bene½ts in terms of propa- at face value, as a loose and largely un- ganda as well as in the choice of counter- coordinated collection of anti-regime measures. It is also likely to be appropri- elements. ate as long as the terrorists consist of The point here is that the great dramas small cells of militants hiding within the of regime change differ signi½cantly; fur- host population. The most basic counter- ther, they often involve substantial armed terrorist work in the West, therefore, in- components as well as terrorist plots. It is volves intelligence gathering, arrests, and not that every two-bit terror group must protecting key targets. If these groups imagine itself as a great army-in-waiting, reach the point where they are best dealt although many do. For most, the ½rst pri- with by military means, then they have ority is survival, perhaps through adver- outgrown the terrorist label and have be- tising their presence with a conspicuous come something altogether more serious. act, which may be geared to recruitment and fundraising as much as to the pursuit Groups with the size and persistence of long-term political objectives. They to challenge state power are usually de- may have intense and contentious described in terms of resistance or insurgency. bates about long-term strategy–indeed, Here, the intent is less to attack civil soci- some do little else–but these are often ety than to use civil society as a base from exercises in futility. Nonetheless, even which to attack the regular forces of the small and simple groups try to present enemy, either demonstrating the weak- themselves as regular forces in develop- ness of the state or inviting the state to ment, distinct from a political wing yet reveal its oppressive nature. Terrorist with military-type command structures acts may play a role in such campaigns as and designations. part of a more integrated strategy involv- This is why it was unusual to be able to ing various types of operations. Strategic respond to Al Qaeda in 2001 by means of resistance, which is essentially defensive, a regular operation. In general, terrorism refers to the methods used to prevent an is the most primitive form of irregular occupying force from establishing itself; warfare. It might be de½ned as succeed- a strategic insurgency, which is essential-

26 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences ly offensive, refers to the methods used If a terrorist group makes progress, it Lawrence to expel a purportedly illegitimate force does so by creating an aura of irresistibil- Freedman from a de½ned territory. ity, suggesting the state’s inability to cope. At either level, the attitude of the local This process generally depends on regu- population is crucial. Success for a resis- lar, incessant attacks. Regularity may be tance movement typically depends on a more important than scale because the supportive population. The task for an in- aim is to demonstrate an ability to oper- surgency is to create support where, at the ate at will–to outsmart the authorities at outset, it is scarce. To do so, the insurgents every turn–which is possible only with a must ½nd a point of political contact with degree of popular support. In this regard, the target community. Support leads to terrorism as a strategy can be de½ned by sanctuaries, supply lines, recruits, and its objective to create the conditions for intelligence, without which either type of resistance or insurgency. By extension, warfare risks defeat and suffers from a the objective of resistance or insurgen- constant fear of informers and a lack of cy is to create the conditions for regular supplies and new recruits. Relations with war. And regular warfare, in turn, seeks the community may be forged on the ba- to create the conditions for a transfer of sis of a shared patriotism or kinship, but sovereignty. they may also be based on intimidation The basic requirement for countering and fear–for example, the consequences opponents who adopt irregular warfare is of known collaboration with the enemy, to take the progression described above or the expectation that even when the in- and push it in the other direction: that surgents disappear, they may return ready is, force the enemy to take the backward for revenge if they ever feel betrayed. step from an insurgency to terrorism. As with any type of warfare, successful This task entails denying the credibility terrorism depends on strong and intel- of irregulars’ claims to be acting on be- ligent leadership and internal discipline half of whole communities. Front-line and organization. The clandestine circum- countering forces must ensure they are stances in which terrorists operate make recognizably local and can play the pa- these qualities much harder to achieve triotic card as effectively as the enemy. than in other forms of warfare. In prac- Further, they must acquire critical intelli- tice, terrorism tends to rely on barely co- gence in order to identify and isolate the ordinated and fragmented attacks by in- militants from their potential sources of dependent cells. It risks alienating likely support. These measures take time and sources of support without denting state put a premium on patience. They require power. These groups, in part because of sensitivity to grievances and fears and their radical, ideological nature, are often attention to culture and anthropology as prone to fragmentation and intense argu- much as technology and tactics. Their ments about political narratives, strategy, boundaries are blurred; there is no con- and tactics. Organizational survival may ½ned military space and time to be set lead to operations undertaken to demon- apart from civilian space and time. On strate leadership of the struggle and main- the one hand, heavy-handed tactics may tain activist morale as much as to hurt the con½rm enemy propaganda and help the enemy. There is always the potential for adversary gain recruits; on the other, an internecine warfare, as different groups overly light touch might allow opponents vie with each other to control a struggle to to establish unencumbered their political which they all are notionally committed. authority–as in no-go areas where state

140 (3) Summer 2011 27 The forces dare not enter and where a parallel addressed, even if attending to this task Counter- government may be established. means upsetting local power structures. revolution in Strategic To ½ght an irregular war outside one’s In part, it may be a matter of civic action Affairs own territory is inherently dif½cult. –repairing roads and building schools, or Indeed, foreign forces can soon appear to securing power and sanitation infrastruc- be an alien force of occupation. This per- tures–but at some point, issues of of½- ception will grow if they adopt harsh meth- cial repression, land reform, or ethnic mix ods. Compared with colonial times, overt may become germane. coercion of civilians is now out of bounds. There is a chicken-and-egg problem. Damage to civilian infrastructure or civil- These strategies can be too dangerous ian casualties that result from attacks on to follow without local security; but until military-related targets are explained as local security is established, they cannot unintended and regrettable “collateral be followed. Without security, foreign damage”; such consequences are not jus- troops and local people will be unable to ti½ed as a means of persuading the enemy interact closely and develop mutual trust. to give up. When an enemy is engaged in Security is not just a matter of immediate irregular methods, however, following the safety. It also requires looking forward to precepts of regular warfare in distinguish- assess the likely future power structure ing at all times between combatants and that will emerge as the conflict develops. noncombatants becomes dif½cult. An en- As the irregulars and the counter-irregu- emy militant may well look like an inno- lars compete for local support, impres- cent civilian. Frightened soldiers are apt to sions of strength may be as important as take few risks when they fear attack. For those of kindness and concern. Support them, it can be frustrating to be forbidden is as likely to be based on convincing peo- to chase enemy ½ghters into their towns ple that you will win as it is on promises and villages, or to allow open supply lines of future goods and services. to avoid creating a sense of civilian siege. Thus, unlike regular warfare, irregular conflicts are unlikely to turn on having The need to win over “hearts and minds” the most advanced technology or over - is a frequent theme in discussions of stra- whelming force. In these conflicts, poli- tegies for irregular wars. It is referred to tics does far more than set the terms for whenever tough methods used by one’s the ½ght: it infuses every move. Incentives own side are questioned and whenever for authorities typically point toward there is a need to persuade people, through minimizing the ½ghting and appearing good works and sensitivity to their con- not to rely on shows of force. The mili- cerns, that the government and the secu- tary role may therefore be quite limited; rity forces really are on their side. The key tasks are instead in the hands of intel- term captures the idea of wars being won ligence agencies, the police, and even po- in the cognitive (intellectual and emo- litical leaders and intellectuals who frame tional) rather than the physical domain. and describe the core issues at the heart Practices that diminish support are not of the struggle. The challenge for exter- hard to discern: arbitrary arrests, dis- nal forces intervening in such struggles, plays of brute force, rudeness, and disre- especially if their role is prominent, is not spectful behavior are likely to generate only to win local support, but also to re- alienation and hostility. Winning sup- tain the public’s favor back home. In both port is harder: the real concerns and respects, a military strategy must be inte- grievances of the local people must be grated with a political one.

28 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences This judgment does not change in the unlikely to be improved by the insertion Lawrence two most dif½cult scenarios. In the ½rst, of large numbers of foreign forces. The Freedman groups are able to develop forms of un- commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan conventional attack that could rock the were the result of the direct role the Unit- foundations of society. The main concern ed States played in toppling the previous in this category has been the possibility regime and its responsibility for what fol- of chemical, biological, radiological, and lowed. Without that responsibility, the –most frightening but least likely–nu- more likely inclination will be to limit lia- clear weapons campaigns. Alternatively, bilities and con½ne support to specialist irregulars might be able to attack the in- capabilities. formation networks that sustain core infrastructure. Other than in the particular Attitudes toward the use of force after case where terrorists are acting as agents the Cold War have been shaped from the of, or with substantial support from, an- start by Iraq. When Iraq invaded Kuwait other state, these threats are still best in August 1990, the crudity of the aggres- addressed through intelligence agencies sion and the importance of the region and the police. There may be specialized led to a strong collective response. Desert military capabilities of potential value: Storm was a regular war; Kuwait was lib- intelligence support, specialist sensors, erated by battle; and the vicious repres- and the forms of assistance that may be sion that followed the postwar insurrec- required after any catastrophic incident. tion led coalition forces to set up safe ha- The military tends to play a role in the vens for the Kurds in northern Iraq. This aftermath of any disaster because it can engagement set the precedent for sub- offer ½t and disciplined troops as well as sequent humanitarian interventions. As organizational capacity, including man- Saddam Hussein played games with un aging logistical problems, gathering in- inspectors, the United States used coer- formation, and maintaining complex com- cive means to force him back into line. munication networks over time and in Those efforts culminated in the Decem- adverse conditions. ber 1998 air strikes of Desert Fox. Frus- In the second dif½cult scenario, which tration at the leader’s continued de½ance is already common, a weak state that is and survival led to the 2003 invasion, il- unable to cope with a developing chal- lustrating just how strong the United lenge requests support. There may be States is when ½ghting on its own terms. good reasons for its weakness. Supposed The subsequent irregular warfare, how- counterterrorism operations may just be ever, demonstrated just how dif½cult it part of an attempt to impose political or- ½nds ½ghting on another’s terms. der from the center, as a rationale for The experience of the past decade has wider repression. Given that the parallel provided a far better grasp of both the political processes necessary for a “hearts potential and the limitations of irregular and minds” approach may be absent, forms of ½ghting, from terrorism to in- there is little prospect that grievances will surgency. Unconventional methods can be addressed. The police may be unable create contests of endurance, especially to cope or, if they are corrupt, incompe- for external powers trying to assert content, sectarian in nature, or distrusted by trol in places where they are not entirely the target population, they may be part of welcome and where their strategic inter- the problem. If the supported regime is ests are uncertain. This scenario creates weak for these reasons, the situation is a paradox. In conventional warfare, the

140 (3) Summer 2011 29 The United States and its allies are unbeatable “third world.” Two of them, India and Counter- against countries lacking advanced mil- China, are the most populous countries revolution in Strategic itary capabilities. At the same time, all on earth, and both are wary of each other. Affairs powers struggle when facing resistance India, to some extent, has moved much from a population, or from segments of closer to the West over the past decade, in that population. In the end, the United part because of a shared concern over Is- States and its allies can avoid defeat be- lamism. China, which is now asserting it- cause such a loss would require irregular self, is considered a rising superpower and forces to undergo transformation into a clearly has great economic clout, but it re- regular force capable of seizing power. To mains hampered by a lack of obvious allies win, however, the United States itself de- (other than North Korea) and wide ideo- pends on the regimes it supports, or in logical appeal. Its foreign policy could be the anomalous case of Libya, the rebels described as realist and mercantilist. Rus- it supports, who lacked the wherewithal sia, which has recovered (largely on the to take on the enemy effectively on the back of energy prices) from the shambles ground. There is no reason to doubt that of the 1990s, is sometimes classed with Western forces would have faced far less these emergent powers; but its economy dif½culty in taking out pro-Gadda½ forces, is narrowly based, and Moscow has un- but even the anti-Gadda½ forces, in addi- easy relations with most of its neighbors. tion to the relevant Western governments, The problems the United States has felt that such a response would send the faced may help explain why others are wrong political messages. wary of trying to compete for full great- This analysis suggests three proposi- power status, although they may well act tions. The ½rst, to be blunt, is that after forcefully around their own borders and, two decades of high-tempo and contro- in a number of cases, have already done versial operations, absent any further so. Great-power status implies a responsi- 9/11-type shocks, the United States will be bility and a right to intervene at a distance increasingly wary about entering into any from border areas. Any cost/bene½t analy- more long-term commitments involving sis would encourage caution. For this rea- direct combat. In Libya the Obama ad- son, the rising economic powers might ministration was prepared to accept the turn out to be circumspect when claim- risks of an inconclusive outcome, and it ing such a position for themselves. Brazil, framed U.S. involvement as participation Russia, India, and China, the supposedly in a coalition led from elsewhere, rather ascendant powers, all voted against un than as taking responsibility for another Resolution 1973, which authorized the major operation. Libyan intervention, when the decision The second proposition is that no single came before the Security Council. In- country, however large and resourceful, deed, being a great power is severely can control the rest of the world to suit its overrated. The duties and responsibili- own interests. A new international polit- ties associated with the status are as like- ical con½guration has begun to take shape ly to turn candidate great powers away as with a number of “emerging” powers mak- they are to inspire pursuit of the title. A ing great strides economically, even as es- wiser policy may be less about bossing tablished liberal capitalist states have fal- everyone around and more about helping tered. These emerging powers are unlike- other peoples sort out their quarrels. ly to coalesce into a new bloc–at least, no The third proposition, therefore, is that more than was ever the case with the while the United States is suffering from

30 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences the ½nancial crisis and the cumulative and changing attitudes, we may now be Lawrence effects of its more recent interventions, entering a period in which international Freedman both of which have diminished its stand- crisis management will become progres- ing, it will remain the world’s predomi- sively less energetic and more dependent nant power. When a coalition of coun- on local attitudes and efforts. tries decided to act in Libya, Britain and Libya appears as an exception, yet the France, which were taking the lead, still intervention occurred only because of needed vital American “enablers.” considerable provocation by a regime whose behavior had already been de- The cumulative impact of these con- nounced. Further, a massacre in Benghazi clusions points to a unique situation. For appeared imminent; the Arab League the ½rst time since decolonization, no was urging action; and even with strong evident strategic imperatives draw West- un support, numerous provisos were ern countries into the affairs of the de- designed to limit the liabilities of the out- veloping world. Oil continues to make side actors and ensure that the ½nal some parts of the world more important struggle was between Libyans. Nothing to the West than others; it becomes a fac- in this episode suggests a lack of caution. tor when tensions rise, but not to the ex- In the future we can expect more buck- tent where supply issues mandate certain passing, or looking to others to take the forms of intervention. There is a view lead only to blame them when things go that scarce resources and other problems wrong. In addition, there will be a greater aggravated by climate change, such as stress on diplomatic efforts to encourage population movements, may result in “common sense” among disputants and much more international conflict. It help mediate settlements. This will re- would certainly be unwise to argue that place a readiness to actively knock heads no larger circumstances exist that would together and impose settlements. In the lead to direct military engagement, let face of de½ance, the priority will be to alone less demanding forms of political explore political solutions, and force will or technical assistance. The point is that, be very much a last resort. Major recon- for the moment, the incentives for instruction efforts will be desultory. volvement are much weaker than be- Putting Libya to one side, there is al- fore, a situation that carries risks of a ready evidence for this shifting outlook. political vacuum. It can be seen in the uncertainties over Another view is that this reluctance to what to do about North Korea, Iran, and intervene will be all to the good; that past the Israel/Palestine dispute, or the popu- Western actions have inflicted more lar uprisings in Iran, Egypt, Bahrain, and harm than bene½t, stirring up discontent Syria. It is expressed in the frustration and anti-Western feeling; and that indi- over Afghanistan and the lackluster or vidual countries should take responsi- belated responses to the tragedies of bility for their own regional discontents. Sudan, Congo, and the Ivory Coast. The Even ngos, which have decades of devel- Micawberish hope appears to be that opment experience, are now far more real- something will turn up, perhaps the over- istic than sentimental, emphasizing long- throw of an odious regime or an econom- term capacity building rather than ½nan- ic upturn, that will ease problems by cre- cial subsidies or loans from rich coun- ating a shared interest in prosperity. If this tries. For a variety of reasons having to is the case, and sometimes it is, then in- do with resources, practicality, prudence, ternational order will increasingly de-

140 (3) Summer 2011 31 The pend on good luck rather than good man- Counter- agement. revolution in Strategic Attempting to predict the future con- Affairs fronts the general problem that prospects depend on choices yet to be made. None- theless, in describing matters of degree, tendencies, shifting emphases, and declining capabilities and will, rather than their complete absence, the new norm is one of less activity rather than total pas- sivity. It is no longer possible to think of international politics in terms of simple hierarchies of great powers. Certainly, particular events can change perceptions. The expectations about the Bush administration, which was forecast to follow a cautious “realist” strategy along the lines implied here, were overturned by 9/11. A terrible humanitarian catastrophe or a set of terrorist outrages may prompt surges of diplomatic, developmental, and military activity. If countries are used as sanctuaries for terrorism, or attempt to manipulate energy supplies or maritime trade, defensive measures may not be enough. There will still be arguments to address threats emanating from dangerous parts of the world at the source; in these cases, the prevailing view will be that it is best to nip dangers in the bud before they become critical. As we have already seen with Libya, crude forms of oppression can prompt a revival of the forms of discretionary interventionism that developed during the 1990s under the heading of the “responsibility to protect.” But again as we have also seen with Libya, these claims, and the evidence on which they are based, will have to look extremely strong before they are taken as seriously as they were in 2002–2003. The question of the future of armed force lies in politics rather than technology, and of the two, politics is by far the murkiest. Nonetheless, the ambition of the 2000s is likely to be followed by the caution of the 2010s.

32 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences The U.S. Armed Forces’ View of War

Brian McAllister Linn

Abstract: Many military analysts now argue that the challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted a paradigm shift within the U.S. armed forces. They believe that techno-centric formulaic concepts of warfare, such as effects-based operations, have been replaced by more complex, human-centered approaches, such as those laid out in the 2007 Counterinsurgency Manual. This essay details the evolution of U.S. military thought about warfare. It discusses how lessons from the past shaped current policy, the impact of a technologically inspired Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and the subsequent conviction that properly equipped U.S. armed forces could rapidly and decisively defeat any and all opponents. The inability of U.S. forces to achieve national objectives in either Iraq or Afghanistan despite their success on the battle½eld has caused war intellectuals to seek new lessons from history, question the existence of an RMA, and formulate a new vision of war that stresses uncertainty, adaptation, and innovation.

Despite the continual issuance of buzzwords emphasizing service unity and harmony–such as “jointness,” “An Army of One,” or “The Few, the Proud”–the armed forces’ internal divisions have been vividly displayed during the last decade. A number of important books detail the disagreements between civilian and military leaders and the long struggle to implement the “surge” and the counterinsurgency (coin) strategy.1 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated a radical transformation in military thought: that is, a para- BRIAN MCALLISTER LINN is digm shift from idealized, techno-centric, scien- Professor of History and Ralph R. ti½c formulas–such as “network-centric warfare” Thomas Professor in Liberal Arts at ncw ebo Texas A&M University. His publi- ( ) or “effects-based operations” ( )–to cations include Guardians of Em- more complex, ambiguous, and human-centered pire: The U.S. Army and the Paci½c, visions of war, which were encapsulated in 2007 by 1902–1940 (1997) and The Philip- The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field pine War, 1899–1902 (2000), both Manual.2 This intellectual renaissance has led, ac- of which received the Society for cording to some, to military victory in Iraq and a Military History Distinguished path to eventual success in Afghanistan. This inter- Book Award, and The Echo of Bat- tle: The Army’s Way of War (2007). pretation is attractive because it implies that the His current project is Elvis’s Army: U.S. armed forces are adaptive, learning organiza- Transformation and the Atomic-Era tions that will develop new concepts to replace Soldier, 1946–1965. failed ones. But it begs a number of central ques-

33 The U.S. tions, not least of which is how the armed emerge under a new rubric a decade or so Armed forces and their war intellectuals–broad- later. Forces’ View of ly de½ned in this essay as of½cers who For many war intellectuals, the past is War write on the theory and practice of war prologue to the future. But it is a past that –could have been so wrong about the has been carefully edited to display the nature of warfare going into Iraq and correct lessons, most notably the impor- Afghanistan. Answering this larger ques- tance of military preparedness in peace tion requires looking beyond the imme- and military autonomy in wartime. There diate debate over Iraq-Afghanistan to exis a tendency to interpret the nation’s amine how the U.S. armed forces arrive martial history as a dismal cyclical narra- at their understanding, or vision, of war- tive, or as one Army general staff de- fare, particularly in their use of history scribed it in 1916: “a startling picture of and the role of war intellectuals. faulty leadership, needless waste of lives and property, costly overhead charges . . . Interpretations of the past, perceptions due entirely to a lack of adequate prepa- of the present military situation, and pre- ration for war in time of peace. But we dictions for the future combine to shape have not yet learned our lesson.”6 The cri- the U.S. armed forces’ vision of war. All tique of American society goes far be- three variables are the subjects of intense yond civilians’ unwillingness to fund debate. War intellectuals argue over such adequate military budgets. War intellec- basic questions as whether the preferable tuals have attributed the nation’s physi- strategy is to employ primarily land, sea, cal and moral decline to a variety of fac- or air power; to attack the enemy’s phys- tors: immigration and urbanization prior ical resources or his morale; or to pursue to World War I; paci½sm in the interwar a battle of annihilation or grind away in a period; permissive teachers and parents long war of attrition. One Air Force of½- after World War II; the media, politi- cer identi½ed no fewer than seventeen cians, academics, and pot-smoking hedo- different theories of airpower, noting nists after Vietnam; and, in recent years, that the service had made little effort to the physical, moral, and educational de- reconcile them.3 In a recent issue of Joint ½ciencies that may render 75 percent of Forces Quarterly, two articles by Army of½- American youth un½t for military ser- cers, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In” and vice. In many narratives, civilian feckless- “Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars,” ness is only redeemed by the dedication, simultaneously provided commentaries patriotism, courage, and skill of profes- on Iraq-Afghanistan and engaged in the sional of½cers. Senior commanders’ mem- latest round of almost two centuries of oirs often detail the protagonist’s strug- intra-service debate.4 Few of these inter- gle against inept or corrupt political mas- nal disputes are ever resolved despite re- ters, a tradition spanning more than a cen- current top-down efforts to impose con- tury, from Civil War General George B. formity through “capstone” and “vision” McClellan, to World War II General Doug- statements, doctrine, and other of½cial las MacArthur, to the conqueror of Bagh- pronouncements.5 Perhaps as a result, dad, General Tommy Franks. American military thought tends to be The armed forces’ ambivalence toward cyclical, with concepts (often little more American society and its political repre- than buzzwords) being heralded as rev- sentatives has helped shape military in- olutionary or “transformational,” then tellectuals’ understanding of the present quickly going out of fashion, only to re- as well as their perceptions of future war.

34 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences Since the 1820s, military scenarios deal- warfare. The authors of a 1989 article on Brian ing with foreign attacks have all assumed “fourth-generation warfare” postulated McAllister Linn that the public would be essentially help- that war had passed through three suc- less to defend itself. In the view of many cessive generations and was entering a war intellectuals, civilians are to set poli- new one. Consistent with many other cy, ensure the armed forces have suf½- writings of the 1980s, the article warned cient resources, and let military leaders of the threat from guerrillas and terror- conduct the battles and campaigns that ists but also rhapsodized about futuris- secure victory. Civilian leaders who vio- tic technologies, such as directed-energy late this division, who dare to disregard weapons and robotics, which few would the advice of military professionals–or argue have been the decisive factors in worse, interfere in combat operations– recent insurgencies.8 Drawing on the les- are held in special disdain. One of the ser- sons of the past as a means to anticipate vices’ most bitter historical memories is the future, military intellectuals often that of President Lyndon B. Johnson and claim to be prophets when some of their Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara predictions are realized. micromanaging the war against North The dangers of what the services call Vietnam, even to the extent of charting “lessons learned” from history are evi- the daily bombing sorties, while the su- denced in the use of blitzkrieg. For de- pine commanders in the theater and the cades, the term has been synonymous Joint Chiefs of Staff abrogated their mil- not only with a type of warfare character- itary responsibilities. General Franks as- ized by speed, flanking, encircling move- serts that this lesson from Vietnam ments, and psychological paralysis of the taught him to insist on maintaining his opponent, but also with institutional in- operational independence against polit- novation and transformation. According ical and military superiors who sought to to some American war intellectuals, after interfere in his conduct of the invasions defeat in World War I, Germany learned of Iraq and Afghanistan.7 the correct lessons and recognized the opportunities of a “Revolution in Mili- History also influences the U.S. armed tary Affairs” (rma) de½ned by new tech- forces’ conception of war by providing nologies (tanks, airplanes), new concepts examples to support or criticize current (in½ltration, maneuver, close air support), policies, organizations, equipment, or and new organizations (mechanized for- weapons. In the late nineteenth century, ces). In contrast, France, which had ac- naval of½cer and historian Alfred Thayer cess to the same lessons, the same tech- Mahan, who all but invented maritime nologies, and the same concepts, hid be- history, interpreted the past as demon- hind the Maginot Line. In 1940, Germany strating the need for the United States to launched a whirlwind campaign that acquire global markets and a new steel shattered France in six weeks, thereby battle fleet. Following World War I, cav- demonstrating the consequences of the alry advocates looked particularly to the rma. At this point, the narrative ends; Civil War for evidence to repudiate those rarely mentioned are the Wehrmacht’s who said the horse had no place on the failure against the Soviet Union or its modern battle½eld. For decades, Marine complicity in the Nazi state’s atrocities. Corps war intellectuals have invoked the Indeed, the blitzkriegers were, and are, Gallipoli debacle to highlight their own less interested in history than in prov- service’s superior conduct of amphibious ing that military organizations that seize

140 (3) Summer 2011 35 The U.S. the opportunities offered by an rma net, and so on–geographically dispersed Armed achieve victory, and those that do not are military forces could synchronize their Forces’ View of defeated. movements and ½repower, deploy quick- War This sanitized, didactic, almost mytho- ly, and just as quickly overwhelm their logical blitzkrieg/rma/transformation opponents. New weapons–stealth bomb- narrative has been interjected into virtu- ers, lasers, and precision-guided muni- ally every military reform debate in the tions–would allow a few aircraft to last four decades, from discussions of Ma- achieve effects that previously required rine Corps doctrine to which ½ghters the hundreds of aircraft flying thousands of Air Force should purchase. It has caused sorties and dropping several tons of numerous unanticipated consequences, bombs. In the words of one proponent, not least the fact that it may have led some ebo allowed U.S. armed forces to “domi- U.S. senior commanders unknowingly to nate an adversary’s influence on strate- repeat what historians have identi½ed as gic events” without having to “destroy an a major mistake in the “German way of enemy’s ability to act.” Further, overtak- war”: that is, ½xating on tactics and oper- ing its “operational level systems” would ations while failing to consider how indi- induce systemic paralysis and force the vidually successful battles and campaigns enemy to “acquiesce to the will of the con- will achieve the nation’s war aims (or trolling force or face ever increasing de- strategy).9 This fascination with rapid ma- grees of loss of control.”11 neuvers, tactics, and battles was com- Supporters of this “new American way pounded when the blitzkrieg of 1940 was of war” alleged that rapid blows on care- apparently replayed in the Gulf War of fully selected centers of gravity would 1990 to 1991. The latter victory led many create cascading effects, leading to psy- to conclude, “[T]oday, and in the future, chological paralysis and loss of control; armed conflict is expected to be short, de- collapsing the will of military and politi- cisive, and accompanied with a minimum cal leaders; and resulting in a quick and of casualties.”10 That assumption, in bloodless victory. They even claimed the turn, validated the belief that defeating the ability to predict the increments of vio- enemy’s military forces on the battle½eld lence that would achieve certain results. de½ned victory, while everything else–in- Yet for all their claims of being “outside cluding occupation, reconstruction, and the box” visionaries and futurists, the paci½cation–was not in the dominion of ebo/ncw prophets were, in retrospect, war. remarkably unimaginative in forecast- ing the consequences of their counsel. In the 1990s, many war intellectuals pos- Indeed, the central fallacy of the ebo/ tulated that an “information rma” was ei- ncw vision of war–that U.S. war objec- ther about to occur or already had. They tives would be restricted to destroying pondered its signi½cance in a flood of dif- the armed forces of a centralized nation- fuse and often self-contradictory writing, state–is readily apparent. Its advocates some of which now appears prescient, only considered “effects” in the most im- but much of which, in fact, was wrong. mediate military terms. They did not pon- Supporters of both ncw (primarily in der the intermediate and long-term im- the Navy) and ebo (primarily in the Air pacts of “loss of control” in states that Force) came to agree that by networking were coercive theocracies, dictatorships, the technology of the information age– or fragile tribal alliances–the very “failed computers, sensors, satellites, the Inter- states” the national security strategy con-

36 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences sistently identi½ed as the most likely areas American global hegemony or the West’s Brian of conflict. Nor did they foresee the con- last hope for survival. McAllister Linn sequence of creating, under the mantra of “jointness,” U.S. armed forces that were In 1998, the operational (and perhaps organized, equipped, and trained only for ideological) rationale for military trans- rapid, decisive operations. Most reprehen- formation received of½cial sanction in the sible, they did not consider that if ebo/ Department of Defense’s blueprint for the ncw failed to deliver as promised, the future, Vision 2010. The document states: most likely result would be the very long, “Today, the world is in the midst of an bloody, frustrating attritional struggles rma sparked by leap-ahead advances in they claimed their approach would avoid. information technologies. . . . [The] advent In short, ebo/ncw were tactics in search of the rma provides the Department of a strategy. with a unique opportunity to transform Unfortunately, ideological imperatives, the way in which it conducts the full such as imperialism, neoconservatism, range of military operations” by using and even apocalypticism, too often ½lled “information superiority” to “leverage” this strategic vacuum.12 For instance, mil- the “capabilities” of other technologies itary strategist Thomas Barnett, who as- and assert “dominant awareness of the sisted Admiral Arthur Cebrowski in the battlespace.”15 Vision 2010 assumed that development of ncw, maintained that the U.S. armed forces’ superior access to Cebrowski’s “vision was a fundamentally information would disperse nineteenth- American way of war, one that promised century theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s not just better wars, and not just shorter “fog of war.” Information superiority wars, but perhaps the end of war itself.” would allow commanders at all levels– Barnett envisioned ncw as providing from the four-star general at his desk in more than an ef½cient means to kill ene- Tampa, to the infantry captain on the mies; he further explained: “I wanted to battle½eld, to the pilot in his stealth see it used to short-circuit wars and war- bomber–to have “perfect real-time situ- fare in general. I want wars to be obsolete ational knowledge.” By exploiting the po- because America becomes so powerful tential of experimental technology, one that no one is willing to take it on, and thus cannon could achieve tactical results that America is willing to take on anyone–a previously required hundreds of shells, self-reinforcing deterrence.”13 In anoth- thus allowing the United States to use er example, commentator William Lind far smaller forces, which in turn would claims that his earlier writings on fourth- allow far more rapid movement at all lev- generation warfare anticipated a clash of els. Ideally, each bomb or shell not only cultures between the West and the rest of resolved a speci½c operational task (such the world. In his view, Islamic radicals are as the destruction of an enemy tank), but perhaps less dangerous than domestic also contributed to a cumulative series of “cultural radicals . . . who hate our Judeo- “effects.” In short order, these “massed Christian culture” and promote “multi- effects” would both physically and psy- culturalism.” He predicts that “the next chologically shatter (or shock and awe) real war we ½ght is likely to be on Ameri- the enemy’s command and control orga- can soil.”14 According to these perspec- nization. tives, military transformation was (and For America’s opponents, Vision 2010 perhaps still is) less a plan for reforming promised only rapid and decisive defeat. the services than either a means to achieve Even before the battle began, their com-

140 (3) Summer 2011 37 The U.S. munications would be jammed and their unforeseen consequences of battle½eld Armed access to accurate information disrupted. victory. Forces’ View of Precision attacks on command centers Historians will continue to debate the War would cause further confusion and delay, degree to which the U.S. armed forces’ so that even if an enemy commander were embrace of high-tech warfare, applied able to issue orders to subordinates, those with scienti½c precision, and rapid, de- instructions would have little relevance cisive, and almost casualty-free victory to the situation. Deprived of its guiding contributed to two interminable, indeci- brain, the enemy army would be unable sive wars of attrition in Iraq and Afghani- to coordinate its own ½repower or maneu- stan. Within the war intellectual commu- ver forces effectively. Even if its troops nity, there is little consensus. Some remain survived and its equipment escaped de- convinced that their prewar concepts and struction, the army would be little more technologies were sound; they blame pol- than an armed mob incapable of coher- iticians (particularly Donald Rumsfeld) ent resistance. Unable to control its mili- and the media. Others believe that al- tary forces, the enemy government would though ebo/ncw was fundamentally lose its will and submit to American dic- flawed, innovative and adaptive leaders tates. In short, victory on the battle½eld fought against the rma/Rumsfeld “es- or in the air campaign alone was suf½- tablishment,” reinvented counterinsur- cient to secure U.S. national objectives. gency, and gave the United States the For America’s armed forces, and espe- means to victory in the war on terror. In cially its senior leadership, Vision 2010’s keeping with a long tradition of Ameri- implications were initially intoxicating can military historiography–most clear- yet ultimately stupefying. Proponents ly seen in treatments of Korea and Viet- boasted that commanders would have nam–however much they differ on de- real-time battle space awareness to track tails, both interpretations exculpate the both their own and enemy forces, recog- armed forces and throw the burden of nize threats and opportunities, commu- victory or defeat on the will of the Amer- nicate their decisions, and have them ican public and its political leaders. executed instantly. But precisely because all future wars would be short and deci- Have the conflicts in Iraq and Afghan- sive–with success measured entirely in istan changed the armed forces’ percep- the destruction of enemy military forces– tion of war? The document credited with the services placed little value on strate- breaking the rma stranglehold on mil- gic thinkers. Of½cers skilled at anticipat- itary thought, and perhaps providing a ing long-term implications and conse- path to victory in Iraq and Afghanistan, quences were unnecessary for wars that is The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterin- would last a few weeks and had only one surgency Field Manual of 2007. A project objective. Instead, the services selected directed by General David H. Petraeus and promoted of½cers who were skilled and current U.S. Marine Corps Comman- at managing the complicated control sys- dant James F. Amos, the manual is in many tems of ebo/ncw: commanders who ways an anti-doctrine. It even includes de½ned themselves as “operators.” Epit- such “paradoxes” as “sometimes doing omized by Tommy Franks, such of½cers nothing is the best action,” and “some- proved adept at assembling matrices to times the more you protect your force, destroy enemy military forces but were the less secure you will be.”16 In contrast intellectually unprepared to deal with the to doctrines of the 1990s–which empha-

38 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences sized technology and treated opponents Corps was (and is) far better positioned, Brian as passive recipients of U.S. dominance at least intellectually, to adapt and inno- McAllister Linn –the Counterinsurgency Field Manual in- vate in response to the challenges of the cludes an extensive and respectful analy- post–Cold War security environment. For sis of the nature of insurgencies: who leads the Marines, the challenge in Iraq and Af- and who participates, how they are sus- ghanistan is in the execution of a war½ght- tained, how they use intelligence and me- ing philosophy they believe is inherently dia, and what their capacity is to adapt sound. and innovate. This complex and flexible approach to warfare appears throughout The U.S. Army has been the service most the manual. The chapter on intelligence influenced by the experiences of Iraq and discusses culture, another covers leader- Afghanistan. This was not the case at the ship and ethics, and detailed appendices beginning, when the ½rst Army “histor- provide information on social network- ic” team to reach Iraq after the fall of ing and legal guidance. Not surprisingly, Baghdad reportedly asked participants both military of½cers and civilians have only one question: “What was your role termed this doctrine revolutionary. in the greatest military victory ever The two services most affected by the won?” But the collapse of Iraq into chaos, manual have taken different approaches to the criticism directed at General Franks the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghan- and General Ricardo Sanchez, the scan- istan. The Marine Corps asserts that it has dals of Abu Ghraib, and other irrefutable always engaged in counterinsurgency and evidence led many Army of½cers to ac- stability operations–and has done so knowledge just how poorly their service better than anyone. To add historical justi- had trained for operations beyond the ½cation, Marine intellectuals note that in battle½eld. the 1990s, when the other services were The resulting transformation in the leaping onto the rma/ebo/ncw band- Army’s vision of war goes far beyond the wagon, Commandant Charles Krulak pos- counterinsurgency manual. The service’s tulated that the future would be charac- 2008 capstone combat doctrine, FM 3: Op- terized by the “three-block war”–a sce- erations, repudiates many of the central nario in which military forces would have ideas of its 1993 predecessor, FM 100-5: to deal with a spectrum of challenges si- Operations. The 1993 operational manual multaneously, ranging from convention- was evolutionary, emphasizing its connec- al war to humanitarian aid. The Marines’ tion with earlier operational doctrines two-decade-old capstone statement, War- that (from the Army’s perspective) had ½ghting, is unique both for its longevity and led to victory in the Cold War and the because it presents a theory of war that Gulf War. In the context of war intellectu- emphasizes combat as merely a means to al tradition, FM 100-5 was Jominian, con- a political end; indeed, it maintains that flating the methods of war–particular- the application of violence must be con- ly the preparation and conduct of cam- sonant with strategic objectives.17 Given paigns (or operations)–with war itself. the Marine Corps’ conceptual foundation, Like its predecessors, the doctrine aimed the freedom of inquiry at such elite pro- to achieve a “quick, decisive victory on grams as the School of Advanced War- and off the battle½eld anywhere in the ½ghting, and the willingness to empower world”18; it assumed that “modern war- its commanders at all levels–what Kru- fare” consisted of large-unit convention- lak termed “the strategic corporal”–the al combat between nation-states; and it

140 (3) Summer 2011 39 The U.S. used battle and victory almost synonymous- trate their adaptability, dedication, and Armed ly with war. The few exceptions to the effectiveness. To defeat them, the Army Forces’ View of 1993 manual’s intense battle½eld focus– must create military leaders who have a War such as the comment that “military forc- “tolerance for ambiguity, and possess the es must be prepared to support strategic ability and willingness to make rapid ad- objectives after the termination of hostil- justments according to the situation.”23 ities” and the few sentences devoted to The recently released Joint Operating En- counterinsurgency and peacekeeping– vironment 2010 (JOE 2010) shows evidence provided little preparation for Somalia, of both the transformation and the con- much less Iraq.19 gruence of Army-Marine Corps thought. FM 3 is, in its own words, “a revolution- Its prewar predecessor was essentially an ary departure from past doctrine,” a set engineering manual for the next decades, of guidelines intended for a volatile era of a self-described “conceptual template . . . “protracted confrontation among states, to leverage technological opportunities non-states, and individual actors increas- to achieve new levels of effectiveness in ingly willing to use violence to achieve joint war½ghting” and to allow the U.S. their political and ideological ends.”20 armed forces to achieve “dominance,” The manual is consciously Clausewitzian, which was an end unto itself.24 JOE 2010 not only in its numerous quotations from rejects such determinism; indeed, one of On War, but also in its inclusion of sec- its goals is “guarding against any single tions on “uncertainty, chance, and fric- preclusive view of future war.”25 Where- tion” and its admonitions that of½cers as the prewar vision statement focused must understand the nature of the war on future weaponry, JOE 2010 begins with they are ½ghting. Whereas the 1993 doc- an extensive, rich examination of both the trine was predicated on teaching of½cers nature of war and the nature of change. essential skills to master complex tech- And whereas the prewar joint vision was nology, the 2008 doctrine emphasizes relentlessly optimistic about the capabil- “how to think–not what to think” be- ity of the U.S. armed forces to dominate cause doctrine must be “consistent with any opponent, JOE 2010 warns: “No one human nature and broad enough to pro- should harbor the illusion that the devel- vide a guide for unexpected situations.”21 oped world can win this conflict in the Almost heretically, it states, “[W]inning near future. As is true with most insur- battles and engagements is important but gencies, victory will not appear decisive alone is not suf½cient. Shaping the civil sit- or complete. It will certainly not rest on uation is just as important to success.”22 military successes. The treatment of po- Providing further evidence of the litical, social, and economic ills can help, Army’s transformation, The Army Capstone but in the end will not be decisive.”26 Concept of 2009 dismisses many previously held convictions–for example, the Although the last decade of unconven- inevitability of the rma, the potential of tional warfare had the most influence on “leap ahead” technology, and the ideal of the Marine Corps and the Army, there is “full-spectrum dominance”–as no more considerable internal resistance to both than “labels.” Equally revealing, whereas counterinsurgency as a mission and to the prewar vision statements portrayed mil- methods prescribed in the Counterinsur- itary opponents as hapless victims of gency Field Manual. War intellectual Gian American might, the Capstone Concept Gentile is among the more vocal critics, cites numerous recent examples to illus- arguing that the guidebook draws too

40 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences heavily from the Iraq and Afghanistan ex- sive application of airpower” can win wars Brian amples, and that many of its proponents without a land campaign. This statement, McAllister Linn repeat the conceptual errors they attrib- like the assertion that airpower changes ute to conventional warfare advocates.27 the character of the “American way of Even among those who believe that the war,” dates back to one of the earliest pro- armed forces ½nally have the concepts ponents of airpower, General Billy Mitch- and means to pacify Iraq and Afghan- ell.29 One senior Air Force of½cer who has istan, there are those who believe that engaged in counterinsurgency debate, Ma- neither the United States nor its armed jor General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., views the forces can afford such pyrrhic victories. Army-Marine counterinsurgency manual More discouraging yet, throughout the as flawed by its “infatuation with the in- Iraq-Afghanistan conflicts the Army se- dividual soldier, an af½nity for the close nior leadership has insisted that the ser- ½ght, skepticism toward new technolo- vice’s future is bound to its prewar, rma- gy, and an over-reliance on historical case influenced transformation agenda, a Fu- studies.”30 Dunlap maintains that prewar ture Combat System that seems ideally concepts, particularly information rma designed to re½ght the Gulf War of 1990. and Air Force doctrine, proved themselves The Air Force and Navy visions of war in Iraq; thus, he criticizes his service for have been even less changed by Iraq and failing either to articulate its own contri- Afghanistan. Though adamant that their bution to the current conflicts or to con- contributions to the current conflicts be front the intellectual challenge of insur- acknowledged, they remain committed to gency. their prewar concepts. Central to both services is the same assumption held in the It is too soon to determine whether this 1990s: that is, if they achieve the means last decade of persistent conflict will (capabilities), then the ends (strategy) will result in a major transformation in the sort themselves out. From this assump- armed forces’ vision of war. Perhaps the tion, both services look ½rst to technol- current interest in counterinsurgency is ogy, then to concepts that will allow its no more than an intellectual re-booting application. Recent Navy vision state- prompted by the insurgencies/civil wars ments emphasize sea power’s ability to in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this respect, it deter conflict, to control the littorals, to is well worth remembering that the ini- support expeditions, to protect the home- tial campaigns in both countries were land, and to adapt to a variety of threats.28 hailed as proving both the rma and The foreword to the U.S. Air Force’s 2003 ebo/ncw. They are now cited as proof basic doctrine acknowledges the danger of the fallacies in these visions–in some posed by asymmetric adversaries who cases by the same pundits.31 The last de- threaten the nation with weapons of mass cade has shown that the armed forces’ destruction, terrorism, and information vision of war matters, and that war intel- attacks. But for the most part, it reiterates lectuals have more impact, and deserve earlier concepts, such as ebo and preci- far more study, than they have received. sion strike, viewing the experiences of Iraq The major questions and the most sig- and Afghanistan as further vindication of ni½cant critiques emerging from Iraq and these approaches. While the doctrine rec- Afghanistan are not about the U.S. armed ognizes the importance of cooperation, it forces’ equipment, training, or ability to still maintains “the new view of conflict” adapt at the tactical level. Rather, they are in which “the prompt continued, aggres- directed at the intellectual competence of

140 (3) Summer 2011 41 The U.S. the of½cer corps, particularly the senior or do they provide dangerously simplistic Armed leadership–namely, its critical thinking interpretations of recent changes in war- Forces’ View of skills, its grasp of strategy, and its ability fare? Is there an American way of war War to adapt and innovate. For example, why that predisposes the nation and its armed did it take so long for these experts to forces to certain strategies or methods? understand that the war they were ½ght- Are the services capable of learning from ing was not the war they had prepared to mistakes? How will of½cers assimilate the ½ght? Beyond the speci½c issues raised lessons of the past decade into their new by the Iraq-Afghanistan conflicts lies a visions of war? What form will new chal- host of more general questions. Is mili- lenges to the national interest take? Bear- tary transformation a result of new ideas ing these uncertainties in mind, the role or new technology? Are “big ideas” such of war intellectuals is central to under- as the rma, transformation, or fourth- standing the past, present, and future of generation warfare important concepts, the armed forces.

endnotes 1 David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the U.S. Army (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The Amer- ican Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006); Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008 (New York: Penguin, 2009); Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out in Iraq (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008). For an overview of the development of post-Vietnam U.S. concepts of war, see Fred Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy (New York: Encounter Books, 2006). I thank Gian Gentile, Bryon Greenwald, and Richard Muller for their insight on the service perspectives and the current defense debate. 2 David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare (Arlington, Va.: Aerospace Education Foundation, 2001); James N. Mattis, “usjfcom Commander’s Guid- ance on Effects-based Operations,” Joint Forces Quarterly 51 (2008): 105–108; Edward A. Smith, Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War (Washington, D.C.: dod Command and Control Research Program, 2002); David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 3 James M. Smith, “Air Force Culture and Cohesion,” Airpower Journal (Fall 1998): 40–53; William C. Thomas, “The Cultural Identity of the United States Air Force,” Air & Space Power Journal (January 2004), http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/thomas.html (accessed October 14, 2010); Peter Faber, “Competing Theories of Airpower: A Language for Analysis,” Aerospace Power Chronicles, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/faber.htm (accessed October 14, 2010). For further information on airpower and military thought, see http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-thry.htm. 4 John Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,” Joint Forces Quarterly 52 (January 2009): 20–26; Gian Gentile, “Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars,” Joint Forces Quarterly 52 (January 2009): 27–33. 5 Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970–2009) (Alexandria, Va.: Center of Naval Analysis, February 2009), http://www.cna.org/documents/ D0019819.A1.pdf. 6 “A Proper Military Policy for the United States,” Journal of the Military Service Institute 59 (July–August 1916): 29.

42 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences 7 Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier (New York: Regan Books, 2004), Brian 441. Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, Mass.: McAllister Harvard University Press, 2007), 79–80, 109–110, 236–237; Peter Maslowski, “Army Val- Linn ues and American Values,” Military Review 70 (April 1990): 10–23; H. R. McMaster, Derelic- tion of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997). 8 William S. Lind, Keith Nightingale, John F. Schmidt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, 22–26, http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/lind/the-changing-face-of-war-into-the -fourth-generation.html (accessed November 13, 2010); Antulio J. Echevarria II, Fourth-Gen- eration War and Other Myths (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005); William F. Owen, “The War of New Words: Why Military History Trumps Buzzwords,” Armed Forces Journal (November 2009): 34–35. 9 Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich (Law- rence: University Press of Kansas, 2005); Echevarria, Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths, 14–16; Rolf Hobson, “Blitzkrieg, the Revolution in Military Affairs and Defense Intellectu- als,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33 (August 2010): 625–643. 10 Deptula, Effects-Based Operations, Foreword. 11 Ibid., 5–6. 12 For a provocative interpretation of this confluence of military reformers, militarism, and imperialism, see Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 13 Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004), 328. Arthur K. Cebrowski and John H. Garska, “Network- Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” Proceedings (January 1998), http://www.kinection .com/ncoic/ncw_origin_future.pdf. 14 William S. Lind, “Fourth-Generation Warfare: Another Look,” Marine Corps Gazette, Novem- ber 2001, http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/fourth-generation-warfare-another-look. 15 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (1998), chap. 13, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and Joint Vision 2010,” http://www.dod.gov/ execsec/adr98/index.html (accessed September 23, 2010). 16 Petraeus and Amos, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 48–49. 17 U.S. Marine Corps, War½ghting (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy Headquarters, 1989). 18 Department of the Army, FM 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army Headquarters, June 14, 1993), Preface. Antoine-Henri Jomini was a nineteenth-century military historian and strategist who has been criticized for his allegedly geometric approach to warfare. 19 Ibid., 1–4. For the treatment of counterinsurgency, see 13–18. 20 Department of the Army, FM 3: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army Headquarters, February 27, 2008), Foreword. 21 Ibid., D-1. 22 Ibid., Introduction. 23 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, The Army Capstone Concept: Operational Adapt- ability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict, 2016–2028, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 (Fort Monroe, Va.: Department of the Army Headquar- ters, December 21, 2009). 24 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995).

140 (3) Summer 2011 43 The U.S. 25 General James N. Mattis, “Foreword,” in U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Operating Envi- Armed ronment 2010 (Norfolk, Va.: usjfcom, February 18, 2010). Forces’ View of 26 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Operating Environment 2010, 53. War 27 Gian Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics,” Parameters (August 2009): 5–17. 28 U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, Naval Operations Concept 2010: Imple- menting the Maritime Strategy (2010); U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007); Swartz with Duggan, U.S. Navy Cap- stone Strategies and Concepts, slides 1481–1484. 29 U.S. Air Force, Air Force Basic Doctrine (November 17, 2003), 17; U.S. Air Force, The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan (2003). 30 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman’s Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case of Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Airpower Research Institute, 2008), 18. 31 Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” Foreign Affairs 82 (July–August 2003): 41–58.

44 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences Weapons: The Growth & Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime

Thomas G. Mahnken

Abstract: For two decades, scholars and practitioners have argued that the world is experiencing a Rev- olution in Military Affairs brought on by the development and diffusion of precision-strike and related capabilities. The United States took an early lead in exploiting the promise of precision-strike systems, and the use of precision weaponry has given the United States a battle½eld edge for twenty years. How- ever, these weapons are now spreading: other countries, and non-state actors, are acquiring them and developing countermeasures against them. As the precision-strike regime matures, the United States will see its edge erode. The ability of the United States to project power will diminish considerably. In addition, U.S. forces, and eventually the United States itself, will be increasingly vulnerable to precision weapons in the hands of our adversaries.

For two decades, scholars and practitioners have argued that the world is experiencing a Revolution in Military Affairs (rma) brought on by the development and diffusion of precision-strike and related capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; precision navigation and tracking; and robustly improved command and control. The United States took an early lead in exploiting the promise of precision-strike systems, and the use of precision weaponry has given the United States a battle½eld edge for some twenty years. However, precision-strike systems are now spreading: other THOMAS G. MAHNKEN is the Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic countries, and non-state actors, are acquiring them Geography and National Security and developing countermeasures against them. As at the U.S. Naval War College and the precision-strike regime matures, the United a Visiting Scholar at the Philip States will see its edge erode. The ability of the Unit- Merrill Center for Strategic Stud- ed States to project power will diminish consider- ies at Johns Hopkins University. ably. In addition, U.S. forces, and eventually the Unit- In 2006 to 2009, he served as ed States itself, will be increasingly vulnerable to pre- the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning. His cision weapons in the hands of our adversaries. most recent book is Technology and This essay begins by exploring the concept of an the American Way of War since 1945 rma as well as the general structure of military rev- (2008). olutions. Using this model, the essay then describes

45 The Growth the growth of the precision-strike regime tary doctrine, the demonstrated effec- & Spread to date; speculates on the features of a tiveness of combined-arms armored war- of the Precision- mature precision-strike regime; and con- fare against France and the Low Countries Strike cludes with some implications for the in May and June 1940 convinced partici- Regime United States. pant and observer alike that the character of warfare had shifted, and compelled The evolution of military technology and them to respond by changing their force doctrine has rede½ned the conduct of war structure and doctrine.4 throughout history.1 Defense policy ana- The Embryonic Phase. The ½rst phase of a lyst Andrew F. Krepinevich, for example, new revolution builds on the achieve- has identi½ed ten military revolutions ments of the preceding cycle, while the stretching back to the fourteenth centu- last phase forms the foundation of the ry.2 These include the Napoleonic revolu- next transformation. During the ½rst, or tion of the late eighteenth and early nine- embryonic, phase, military organizations teenth centuries, which saw the advent of re½ne old combat methods and experi- the mass army; the adoption of the rail- ment with new ones in an effort to gain or road, rifle, and telegraph in the mid-nine- maintain advantage against potential teenth century, which marked the indus- adversaries.5 Most major military inno- trialization of warfare; and the develop- vations have, in fact, come about because ment of nuclear weapons in the twenti- of the perception of an operational or stra- eth century. Although each revolution was tegic problem that de½ed a conventional unique in its origin, trajectory, and con- solution. tent, all shared common features. In each New weaponry alone is insuf½cient to case, new combat methods arose that dis- transform warfare.6 Those practices that placed previously dominant forms of have changed the character and conduct warfare by shifting the balance between of warfare have combined weapon sys- offense and defense, space and time, and tems with innovative operational concepts ½re and maneuver.3 The states that ½rst and the organizations necessary to carry adopted these innovations gained a sig- them out.7 Yet determining how new ni½cant advantage, forcing competitors to weapons and concepts will perform with- match or counter them to have any chance out the test of war is exceedingly dif½cult. of prevailing on the battle½eld. Those who In peacetime, military organizations op- adapted, prospered, while those who did erate, in the words of military historian not, declined, often precipitously. Sir Michael Howard, in “a fog of peace.”8 Military revolutions display a com- They must place bets about the effective- mon structure: a cycle of innovation, dif- ness of new and unproven ways of war, fusion, and re½nement. Their develop- but combat is the only, and ½nal, arbiter. ment is driven not just by changes in the In addition, past experience serves as a character and conduct of war, but also by cognitive anchor that limits the ability of the perceptions of both participants and military organizations to comprehend the observers that change is afoot and drastic magnitude of change that is under way action is required. Indeed, the perception and constrains the ability of intelligence of dramatic change and the urgent need organizations to understand foreign mil- to respond to it is a de½ning feature of a itary developments.9 As a result, periods military revolution. For example, although of change in the character and conduct of scholars debate whether something called warfare frequently witness a growing gap blitzkrieg actually existed in German mili- between perception and reality. The mag-

46 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences nitude of this divergence depends on the improvement which gradually or rapid- Thomas G. amount of time that passes between wars ly whittles down its power.”11 Although Mahnken and the amount of technological and doc- technical and operational countermea- trinal dynamism in the interwar period. sures rarely succeed in nullifying the ef- The Immature Phase. The second, or im- fectiveness of new military practices, mature, phase of a military revolution be- they do, over time, erode it somewhat.12 gins with the successful use of new mili- The competition between measure and tary practices in a major war. Success often countermeasure becomes a de½ning fea- takes the form of a decisive battle or cam- ture of the ensuing military regime. paign in which forces that have mastered The process of emulation is typically new combat methods defeat those who neither rapid (let alone automatic) nor remain wedded to traditional approach- complete.13 First, the process of change es. The demonstrated effectiveness of in military organizations is wrenching these methods realigns perception and and painful, reducing their effectiveness reality, convinces belligerent and observ- in the short term even if it promises to er alike of a change in the character of war- increase it in the long term. As a result, fare, and forces both friend and foe to ad- military leaders tend to delay dif½cult just their force structure and doctrine. For change unless and until it is starkly ap- example, revolutionary France’s adoption parent that it is necessary. Second, lead- of the levée en masse not only allowed it to ers may disagree in their perception of survive, but also permitted Napoleon to the threat environment, including debates win a series of decisive battles against his over which contingencies are most seri- foes at Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and Auer- ous and when they might arise. Third, the stadt. Prussia’s embrace of the railroad, path to success is rarely obvious. Military rifle, and telegraph helped it, the least of organizations may have dif½culty per- Europe’s great powers, defeat Austria at ceiving that a military revolution is under Königgrätz and France at Sedan and uni- way even after new practices have ap- fy the German state. And Germany’s use peared on the battle½eld. Because new of combined-arms armored warfare deliv- combat methods often have their roots in ered a series of quick decisive victories in the past, contemporary observers may fail the opening campaigns of World War II. to discern what is new and different about One way military organizations adjust them. Fourth, the organizational culture to new combat methods is by emulating of the military can constrain both how it successful practices. Indeed, the spread of perceives the environment and how it re- new capabilities offers the central mech- sponds.14 Organizations may emphasize anism by which one military regime sup- those events that are in accord with doc- plants another. Military organizations trine and discard those that contradict it. may attempt to import foreign practices The Mature Phase. The spread of success- wholesale; more often, however, they ful practices creates a new style of war- modify them somewhat in the process.10 fare that supplants the existing paradigm. Adversaries may also attempt to devel- The inauguration of a new military regime op countermeasures to new combat meth- marks the third, or mature, phase of a ods, particularly when the barriers to emu- revolution. The basis for competition in a lation are prohibitively high. As British mature regime is different from that in a Army of½cer and military historian J.F.C. developing one. In the latter, advantage Fuller put it, “[E]very improvement in ar- accrues to the military that is best able to mament is eventually met by a counter- exploit an emerging innovation; in the

140 (3) Summer 2011 47 The Growth former, advantage accrues to those pow- mainly against bridges and transportation & Spread ers that are able to replicate an innova- chokepoints.17 of the Precision- tion on a large scale. Whereas a develop- The seeming ease with which the U.S.- Strike ing regime often witnesses wars of ma- led coalition defeated Iraq during the 1991 Regime neuver and quick, decisive victories, a Gulf War caused many observers in the mature regime is characterized by wars United States and elsewhere to conclude of attrition. For example, Germany used that the information revolution was bring- its early lead in developing combined- ing about a new rma.18 In their view, the arms armored warfare to defeat Poland, lopsided battles in the deserts of Kuwait France, and the Low Countries in the early and southern Iraq and the seemingly ef- phases of World War II. However, in an fortless domination of the Iraqi air force example of successful emulation, Ger- signaled that warfare had indeed changed. many was ultimately defeated by a coali- The contrast between prewar expectations tion that was able to ½eld far more tanks of a bloody ½ght and the wartime reality than the Germans were, and to use them of Iraqi collapse struck many as indicat- reasonably well.15 ing a transformation in warfare. The 1991 Gulf War thus marked the tran- The structure of military revolutions is sition between the embryonic and imma- easiest to discern in retrospect, with the ture phases of the precision-strike revolu- bene½t of hindsight once history has ren- tion. The combination of the stealthy F- dered its verdict. It is far more dif½cult 117 Nighthawk aircraft and pgms gave U.S. to comprehend contemporary develop- forces extremely high effectiveness. A typ- ments, not least because we are im- ical non-stealth strike formation in the mersed in them. Nonetheless, we can cast Gulf War required thirty-eight aircraft, in- our gaze backward to the origins of the cluding electronic warfare and defense precision-strike revolution, and we should suppression aircraft, to allow eight planes look ahead to predict, albeit with a sense to deliver bombs on three targets. By con- of modesty, its future course. trast, only twenty F-117s armed with 2,000- The embryonic phase of the precision- lb lgbs were able simultaneously to at- strike revolution stretched from World tack thirty-seven targets in the face of War II to the end of the Cold War. Guided more challenging defenses. As a result, weapons, including the V-1 cruise missile although F-117s flew only 2 percent of the and V-2 ballistic missile, but also the Fritz total attack sorties in the war, they struck X air-to-surface weapon, were ½rst used in nearly 40 percent of strategic targets, combat by Germany during World War II. such as leadership and command and However, the United States took the lead control facilities. In addition, the war in developing precision weapons in the de- witnessed the innovative use of pgms to cades that followed.16 Indeed, many of strike not only ½xed strategic targets and the weapon systems associated with the hardened aircraft shelters, but also Iraqi information revolution–precision-guided tanks in revetments. On one night alone, munitions (pgms), unmanned air vehi- 46 F-111F attack aircraft dropped 184 cles (uavs), and sensors–date back to the lgbs, which destroyed 132 Iraqi armored 1960s and 1970s, and many saw their de- vehicles.19 Despite the fact that pgms but in the Vietnam War. Between 1968 accounted for only 8 percent of the and 1973, for example, the Air Force and bombs dropped over Kuwait and Iraq, Navy expended more than 28,000 laser- televised scenes of U.S. aircraft bombing guided bombs (lgbs) in Southeast Asia, targets with precision, broadcast world-

48 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences wide, became the most evocative images the way U.S. forces ½ght. We must exploit Thomas G. of the war. these and other technologies to dominate Mahnken In the years that followed, the war be- in battle.”23 That same year, the congres- came a central reference point in debates sionally mandated National Defense Panel over the hypothesis that an rma was (ndp) argued even more strongly in favor under way.20 Some of the more breath- of the need to transform U.S. forces. The less rma advocates argued that the infor- panel’s report suggested that an rma was mation revolution marked a complete under way and urged the Defense Depart- break with the past. One 1993 report pre- ment leadership to “undertake a broad dicted: “The Military Technical Revolu- transformation of its military and nation- tion has the potential fundamentally to al security structures, operational con- reshape the nature of warfare. Basic prin- cepts and equipment, and . . . key business ciples of strategy since the time of Machi- processes.” The report stated: avelli . . . may lose their relevance in the We are on the cusp of a military revolution face of emerging technologies and doc- stimulated by rapid advances in informa- trines.”21 The authors of the Air Force’s tion and information-related technologies. of½cial study of the Gulf War were closer This implies a growing potential to detect, to the mark when they concluded, “The identify, and track far greater numbers of ingredients for a transformation of war targets over a larger area for a longer time may well have become visible in the Gulf than ever before, and to provide this infor- War, but if a revolution is to occur some- mation much more quickly and effectively one will have to make it.”22 than heretofore possible. Those who can The United States embraced precision exploit these advantages–and thereby dis- weaponry in the decade that followed the sipate the fog of war–stand to gain sig- Gulf War. Throughout the 1990s, the com- ni½cant advantages. . . . [The Defense De- bination of stealth and precision-guided partment] should accord the highest prior- munitions gave U.S. air forces the ability ity to executing a transformation of the to strike adversaries from the air with near U.S. military, starting now.24 impunity. In addition, airpower seemed uniquely suited to the types of conflicts Much of the discussion of the rma in in which the United States was involved: the 1990s was predicated on opportunity: wars for limited aims, fought with partial the United States should pursue new means, for marginal interests. Airpower ways of war because they would allow it coupled with pgms appeared to offer the to win wars faster, cheaper, and more ability to coerce Iraq, intervene in the Bal- decisively. Characteristic of this view was kans, and retaliate against terrorist groups defense analyst James Blaker’s statement: while avoiding the dif½cult decisions “The potency of the American rma stems associated with a sustained commitment from new military systems that will create, of ground forces. through their interaction, an enormous The congressionally mandated 1997 military disparity between the United Quadrennial Defense Review acknowl- States and any opponent. Baldly stated, edged the existence of an rma and com- U.S. military forces will be able to apply mitted the department to transforming the military force with dramatically greater U.S. armed forces. As Secretary of Defense ef½ciency than an opponent, and do so William Cohen put it: “The information with little risk to U.S. forces.”25 revolution is creating a Revolution in Mili- The con½dence, even hubris, of the tary Affairs that will fundamentally change 1990s permeated the U.S. of½cer corps.

140 (3) Summer 2011 49 The Growth Of½cers in the late 1990s perceived the such as the Air Force RQ-1A Predator, for & Spread bene½ts of transformation, but refused to reconnaissance and surveillance. of the Precision- believe that adversaries could acquire At the dawn of the new millennium, Strike precision-strike capabilities themselves. however, concern mounted that the pre- Regime A survey of 1,900 U.S. of½cers attending cision-strike revolution, once an Ameri- professional military education institu- can monopoly, was on the verge of spread- tions conducted in 2000 found that most ing. Of particular concern was China’s tended to believe that the emerging rma development of so-called anti-access/ would make it easier for the United States area-denial capabilities. Reflecting this to use force in order to achieve decisive concern, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Re- battle½eld victories. Most also believed view, issued in the wake of the September that it would allow the United States to 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, argued that the engage in high-intensity operations with Defense Department’s transformation substantially reduced risk of casualties and efforts should focus on overcoming six that it would greatly reduce the duration emerging strategic and operational chal- of future conflicts. They also tended to be- lenges: lieve that the United States would have a • Protecting critical bases of operations, greatly enhanced ability to locate, track, including the U.S. homeland, forces and destroy enemy forces in limited geo- abroad, allies, and friends, and defeating graphic areas.26 By contrast, these same weapons of mass destruction and their of½cers were skeptical of the ability of po- means of delivery; tential adversaries to exploit the precision-strike revolution to harm the United • Assuring information systems in the face States. For example, only 9 percent of of½- of attack and conducting effective infor- cers surveyed in 2000 believed that future mation operations; adversaries would be able to use long- • Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in range precision-strike weapons such as distant anti-access or area-denial envi- ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy ronments and defeating anti-access and ½xed military infrastructure, including area-denial threats; ports, air½elds, and logistical sites; only 12 percent believed they would be able to • Denying enemies sanctuary by provid- use such weapons to attack carrier battle ing persistent surveillance, tracking, and groups at sea.27 rapid engagement with high-volume pre- The 1999 war over Kosovo saw the cision strike against critical mobile and introduction of a new generation of ½xed targets; pgms guided by data from the Global • Enhancing the capability and survivabil- Positioning System (gps) satellite con- ity of space systems and supporting infra- stellation, most notably the gbu-31 structure; and Joint Direct Attack Munition (jdam). The weapon consists of a $20,000 kit, • Leveraging information technology and including a gps receiver, sensors, and innovative concepts to develop an inter- tail½ns, that converts an unguided bomb operable, joint c4isr architecture and into a guided weapon. In contrast with capability that includes a joint opera- the lgbs used in Vietnam and the Gulf tional picture that can be tailored to War, such weapons allow aircraft to strike user needs.28 at night and through inclement weather. The Kosovo war also saw the use of uavs,

50 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences This shift was reflected in of½cer atti- surface missile launched by a Predator Thomas G. tudes. In 2000, the vast majority of of½- destroyed a car carrying six terrorists, Mahnken cers had been unconcerned about the full including Salim Sinan al-Harethi, Al spectrum of threats; those surveyed in Qaeda’s chief operative in Yemen and 2002 and 2006 expressed obvious con- a suspect in the October 2000 bombing cern about a range of future threats over of the destroyer uss Cole. Most of the the next two decades. Of½cers now wor- strikes that followed targeted Pakistan’s ried about the threat from long-range lawless border region. Begun by the precision-strike missiles with respect George W. Bush administration, the pro- to current platforms and deployment gram has reportedly been expanded by schemes, with 69 percent of of½cers sur- the Obama administration. According to veyed in 2002 and 2006 predicting that one estimate, U.S. drones, including the within a decade, adversaries would be Predator and the more powerful MQ-9 able to use ballistic and cruise missiles to Reaper, have carried out more than 150 deny the United States the use of ports, strikes in Pakistan since 2008, killing a air½elds, and logistical sites. Similarly, 73 number of senior Al Qaeda leaders as well percent of of½cers surveyed in 2002 and as Baitullah Meshud, the head of the Pak- 68 percent in 2006 believed that within a istani Taliban. More controversial has decade, adversaries would be able to use been the death toll among innocents re- such weapons to attack carrier battle sulting from the attacks, but these deaths groups at sea.29 appear to be declining dramatically even Between 1991 and 2003, pgms grew as the number of strikes has increased, in from a niche capability to represent a new part due to the deployment of new muni- standard of warfare. Whereas 8 percent tions with an even smaller warhead than of the munitions employed during the that on the Hell½re.31 Gulf War were guided, 29 percent of those used over Kosovo eight years later, Despite–or, in fact, because of–Amer- 60 percent of those used in Afghanistan ica’s success in embracing the precision- ten years later, and 68 percent of those strike revolution, the United States is los- used in Iraq twelve years later were guiding its military edge. Adversaries are ac- ed. In Afghanistan, the jdam became the quiring pgms, as well as the vital sup- weapon of choice for U.S. forces. Between porting capabilities needed to wage pre- October 2001 and February 2002, U.S. cision warfare, including commercial forces dropped 6,600 of the munitions; sources of imagery, precision navigation during just one ten-minute period on and timing, and upgraded command and October 18, 2001, the Air Force dropped a control. Moreover, states are developing hundred of the bombs. Two years later the ability to counter U.S. precision-strike in Iraq, U.S. forces dropped more than capabilities by hardening, concealing, and 6,500 jdams in the march on Baghdad.30 dispersing their forces and infrastructure. Precision weaponry has also assumed We are, in other words, currently experi- an important role in the panoply of weap- encing the maturation of the precision- ons to combat terrorism. The decision to strike revolution and the emergence of the arm the Predator uav and use it against Al precision-strike regime. Qaeda came in 2000, and the weapon was A growing number of actors are acquir- quickly pressed into use after the Sep- ing pgms. These include not only U.S. tember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In No- allies, but also competitors such as China, vember 2002, an agm-114A Hell½re air-to- which has become a leading player in the

140 (3) Summer 2011 51 The Growth precision-strike regime. Unconstrained by are seeking to counter U.S. precision- & Spread the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces strike capabilities. Insurgents in Afghan- of the inf Precision- ( ) Treaty, which prevents the United istan and Pakistan, for example, have Strike States and Russia from deploying land- sought to camouflage themselves and hide Regime based intermediate-range missiles, China among the local population. They have has become the world leader in precision- also sought to constrain the ability of the guided ballistic missiles. According to un- United States to bring airpower to bear classi½ed Defense Department estimates, by falsifying the number of innocents who China has deployed more than one thou- have been killed in air strikes.34 sand precision-guided conventional bal- If history is a guide, the future scope and listic missiles opposite Taiwan. Moreover, spread of the precision-strike regime will it is preparing to ½eld an anti-ship ballistic be uneven. The ability of states and non- missile capable of striking ships at sea up state actors to deploy an effective preci- to 1,500 km from China.32 Nor are states sion-strike capability will depend on their any longer the only actors in the precision- ability not only to ½eld weapons, but also strike revolution. For example, Lebanese to develop or buy the command and con- Hezbollah used anti-tank guided missiles trol and intelligence, surveillance, and re- against Israeli forces in its 2006 war with connaissance capabilities that are needed Israel.33 More recently, Hamas used such to strike with precision as well as to de- a weapon against an Israeli school bus. velop appropriate doctrine and operation- We should not be surprised by the al concepts for their use. They will also spread of precision-strike capabilities. It seek ways to circumvent our precision- was historically inevitable, even if the strike capability. process has been accelerated by the com- At the strategic level, states and non- mercial availability of key supporting state actors alike will be driven to adopt capabilities, such as imagery and com- some combination of precision-strike and mand and control. Of greatest signi½- adaptive countermeasures. At the opera- cance, however, is the universal free access tional level, the interaction between the to precision navigation and timing data, development of precision-strike systems, such as that from the U.S. gps satellite on the one hand, and attempts to protect constellation. Whereas the development against them, on the other, will drive the of precision guidance cost the United maturation of the precision-strike regime. States billions of dollars over the course Precision-guided weapons are putting an of decades, both states and non-state expanding range of targets at risk. It is actors can now strike accurately with a already possible to effectively strike tar- minimum investment. gets that were previously invulnerable. As other states are increasing their pre- That trend is likely to continue. At the cision-strike capabilities, the United States same time, the emergence of precision- is devoting less attention to precision strike systems is already leading adver- strike than it has in the past. Rather, for the saries to try to protect targets by making last half-decade the Defense Department them mobile, as well as hardening, bury- has focused on countering insurgency ing, defending, camouflaging, or conceal- in Iraq and Afghanistan–conflicts where ing them. precision strike plays a role, to be sure, Over time, this offense-defense interac- but not a central one. tion will render some targets dif½cult, if Meanwhile, both states and non-state not impossible, to strike. Mobile weapons actors, such as insurgents and terrorists, based deep in a nation’s territory, deployed

52 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences in the deep oceans or underwater, and lo- to punish an adversary to force him to Thomas G. cated at great distances from attackers may concede–what Thomas Schelling dubbed Mahnken remain for all intents and purposes invul- the “power to hurt”–is likely to become nerable. More broadly, military forces will an increasingly popular theory of victo- adopt measures to reduce their vulnera- ry.35 One potential result of this strategic bility. However, some targets cannot be interaction would be conflicts that in- buried or made mobile and will thus re- volve campaigns whereby each side uses main vulnerable. These will include civil- precision-strike weapons to hold the ian infrastructure such as electrical pow- other’s economic and industrial infra- er distribution and oil re½neries, but also structure at risk. In such a situation, sta- military infrastructure, such as ports, bility would depend on each side pos- bases, and logistical depots. Because of the sessing an assured survivable retaliato- enduring asymmetry between strike and ry capability. Unlike the condition of mu- protection, long-range precision-strike tual assured destruction that obtained campaigns could increasingly come to during the Cold War, however, this retal- target an adversary’s vulnerable home- iatory capability could be based on preci- land infrastructure rather than his less sion-strike systems rather than nuclear vulnerable armed forces. Indeed, the weapons. twenty-½rst century may witness the res- A mature precision-strike regime would urrection, or trans½guration, of doctrines feature a new set of “haves” and “have- of strategic bombing, such as those that nots,” with an actor’s status determined Italian Army General Giulio Douhet es- by the robustness of its precision-strike poused at the beginning of the twentieth capability rather than other attributes, century, and theories of coercion, such as such as the possession of nuclear weap- those economist and strategist Thomas ons. The precision-strike haves will be Schelling advanced during the Cold War. those countries that possess both geo- In a world where many states possess graphic depth as well as the resources to precision-strike systems, traditional con- invest in survivable, effective precision- quest and occupation will become much strike systems. They will likely include more dif½cult. They may, in fact, become the United States, China, India, and po- prohibitively expensive in some cases. tentially Russia. The precision-strike Imagine, for example, if the Iraqi insur- have-nots will be those countries that are gents had been equipped with precision- threatened by precision-strike systems guided mortars and rockets and had reli- but that lack the geographic depth or re- ably been able to target points within sources to invest in a survivable, effective Baghdad’s Green Zone. Or imagine that precision-strike capability, such as Japan the Taliban were similarly armed and were and Taiwan. These states will have incen- thus able to strike routinely the U.S. and tives to invest in other forms of warfare, Afghan forward operating bases that dot such as nuclear weapons. the Afghan countryside. U.S. casualties The growth and diffusion of precision- could have amounted to many times what strike systems could also affect interna- they have been in either theater. tional relations more broadly. To the ex- Because invasion and conquest are tent that U.S. military power in general, becoming increasingly dif½cult, wars in and power projection in particular, has a mature precision-strike regime will underpinned global norms, the emergence likely focus on coercion and limited po- of anti-access capabilities could undercut litical objectives. In this world, the ability world order. For example, the develop-

140 (3) Summer 2011 53 The Growth ment and diffusion of anti-access systems and routinely locate, identify, and track & Spread could undermine the principle of freedom terrorists; sometimes they ½re missiles of the Precision- of navigation. In other cases, actors could and kill them. They then leave work and Strike seek to limit precision-strike capabilities. return home to their families at the end Regime It is not inconceivable, for example, that of every shift. This arrangement repre- states or non-state actors could seek to sents a profound change in the relation- curb precision-strike systems through an ship between the warrior and warfare, one international treaty, much as land mines whose implications are only now begin- have been limited. Amnesty Internation- ning to play out. al has already decried the U.S. drone campaign over Pakistan, and the United The emergence of a mature precision- Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudi- strike regime is likely to have dramatic cial Killings, Philip Alston, has condemned consequences for the United States. Since it and called for greater “accountability” the end of World War II, the United States to prevent what he called a “slippery slope” has based its defense strategy on a combi- of killing.36 Future attempts to proscribe nation of forward-based forces to deter the use of such unmanned systems are not adversaries and reassure allies and friends beyond the realm of possibility. and the projection of power from those Precision-strike systems are already af- bases and the continental United States fecting expectations regarding the use of to defeat foes in wartime. The spread of force, and that trend is likely to continue. precision-strike systems will call that for- The ability of weapons to destroy targets mula into question. reliably and accurately has fostered the no- U.S. bases are increasingly under threat tion in many countries that war is a blood- of precision-strike systems. For example, less and error-free undertaking. In such an some U.S. bases in the western Paci½c are environment, targeting errors–the U.S. now within range of Chinese precision- strike on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade guided conventional ballistic missiles; in 1999, for instance–are likely to be per- others will come in range as China de- ceived as deliberate acts. ploys longer-range weapons. Over time, The advent of precision strike and uavs the vulnerability of these bases will under- has separated warriors mentally and phys- mine the deterrence of aggressors and re- ically from the act of killing. Dropping assurance of allies. unguided weapons required considerable The threat to U.S. forward bases, in skill to ensure that the bomb struck near turn, calls into question the model that the (let alone on) the target. Delivering lgbs United States has relied on for power pro- similarly required the operator to desig- jection in recent decades. Without access nate the target with a laser and keep it illu- to ports and air½elds in Saudi Arabia and minated throughout the bomb’s flight, a across the Persian Gulf region, for exam- process that took seconds. Delivering a ple, it would have become considerably gps-guided bomb merely requires the more dif½cult for the U.S.-led coalition to operator to input the target’s coordinates eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991. A into a computer. Similarly, uav operators future campaign against an adversary are physically removed from combat. The armed with precision-guided missiles, pilots who operate Predators and Reapers rockets, and mortars may more closely launching missiles over Pakistan are as far resemble the Normandy invasion and Iwo distant from the battle½eld as Creech Air Jima than the relatively unopposed attacks Force Base in Nevada. They report for work on Iraq and Afghanistan.

54 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences Finally, over time it is likely that states recent decades. The United States will no Thomas G. will be able to strike the U.S. homeland longer be able to rely on its absolute supe- Mahnken with precision-strike systems, offering riority in precision strike for battle½eld them a way to attack the United States advantage. To compete, the United States directly. This threat could further in- will have to seek new sources of compar- crease the cost of U.S. intervention over- ative advantage. Ironically, it may also seas and potentially offer adversaries a have to revert increasingly to its nuclear way to coerce the United States without arsenal to deter not only nuclear attacks, resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. but also strikes from precision-guided However it manifests itself, the emer- non-nuclear weapons. Here as in other gence of a mature precision-strike regime areas, old ideas may reappear in new form is likely to result in a pattern of conflict as the revolution matures. that will differ considerably from that of endnotes 1 See Bernard Brodie, “Technological Change, Strategic Doctrine, and Political Outcomes,” in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976); J.F.C. Fuller, Armament and History: A Study of the Influence of Arma- ment on History from the Dawn of Classical Warfare to the Second World War (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1946); Karl Lautenschäger, “Technology and the Evolution of Naval War- fare,” International Security 8 (2) (Fall 1983); William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Tech- nology, Armed Force, and Society Since AD 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550–1800 (Lon- don: Macmillan, 1991); Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1996); Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate: Read- ings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); Keith L. Shimko, The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 2010), chap. 1. 2 Andrew F. Krepinevich identi½es the following military revolutions: (1) the infantry revolution of the ½rst half of the fourteenth century; (2) the artillery revolution of the early to mid-½fteenth century; (3) the revolution of sail and shot that stretched from the sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century; (4) the fortress revolution of the sixteenth century; (5) the gunpowder revolution of the seventeenth century; (6) the Napoleonic revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; (7) the land warfare revolution that stretched from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century; (8) the naval revolution that stretched from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century; (9) the interwar revolutions in mechanization, aviation, and information of the early twentieth century; and (10) the nuclear revolution of the mid-twentieth century. Andrew F. Kre- pinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” The National Interest 37 (Fall 1994): 31–36. 3 Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 75 (2) (March/April 1996): 43–44. 4 See, for example, Rolf Hobson, “Blitzkrieg, the Revolution in Military Affairs and Defense Intellectuals,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 33 (4) (August 2010): 625–643. 5 There is a considerable literature on the issue of military innovation. See Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 29 (5) (October 2006): 905–934; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Ger- many Between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Peter Rosen, “New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation,” International Security 13 (1) (Summer 1988); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Mili-

140 (3) Summer 2011 55 The Growth tary (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Kimberly Marten Zisk, Engaging the & Spread Enemy: Organizational Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955–1991 (Princeton, N.J.: of the Princeton University Press, 1993). Precision- Strike 6 The Napoleonic revolution, for example, was not brought about by technological innova- Regime tion, nor did it involve new weaponry. See Peter Paret, “Revolutions in Warfare: An Earlier Generation of Interpreters,” in National Security and International Stability, ed. Bernard Brodie, Michael D. Intriligator, and Roman Kolkowicz (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, 1983), 158. 7 See, for example, the cases in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Inno- vation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 8 Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 119 (1) (March 1974): 4. 9 Anchoring occurs when the mind uses a natural starting point as a ½rst approximation to a judgment. It modi½es this starting point as it receives additional information. Typically, however, the starting point serves as an anchor that reduces the amount of adjustment, so that the ½nal estimate remains closer to the starting point than it ought to be. Amos Tver- sky and Daniel Kahneman, “Anchoring and Calibration in the Assessment of Uncertain Quantities,” Oregon Research Institute Research Bulletin 12 (1972). 10 Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1983), 175. 11 Fuller, Armament and History, 143. 12 Jeune école tactics did not, for example, displace the battleship as the centerpiece of naval warfare. Nor have anti-tank weapons made the tank obsolete. Instead, in each case the development of countermeasures triggered responses that restored the effectiveness of the practice that was being countered. See Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), 27–39; Robert L. O’Connell, Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons and Aggression (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 7–9; Michael Vlahos, “A Crack in the Shield: The Capital Ship Under Attack,” Journal of Strategic Studies 2 (1) (May 1979). 13 Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds., Adaptive Enemies, Reluctant Friends: The Impact of Diffusion on Military Practice (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003). 14 See, for example, Thomas G. Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War since 1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Thomas G. Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Military Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cor- nell University Press, 2002). 15 Thomas G. Mahnken, “Beyond Blitzkrieg: Allied Responses to Combined-Arms Armored War- fare During World War II,” in Adaptive Enemies, Reluctant Friends, ed. Goldman and Eliason. 16 Barry D. Watts, Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2007). 17 Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War, 115. 18 See, for example, William J. Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs 70 (4) (Fall 1991): 66–82; Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer”; and Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare.” 19 Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War, 169, 171. 20 Shimko, The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution, 23. 21 Michael J. Mazarr et al., The Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework (Washing- ton, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), 28.

56 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences 22 Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Wash- Thomas G. ington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1993), 251. Mahnken 23 William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1997), iv. 24 Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century (Arlington, Va.: National Defense Panel, December 1997). 25 James R. Blaker, “The American rma Force: An Alternative to the qdr,” Strategic Review (Summer 1997): 22. 26 Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds, The Limits of Transformation: Of½cer Atti- tudes Toward the Revolution in Military Affairs (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003), chap. 6. 27 Ibid., chap. 7. 28 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001), 30. 29 James R. FitzSimonds and Thomas G. Mahnken, “Of½cer Attitudes Toward Transforma- tion, 2000–2006,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, March 24, 2006, San Diego, California. 30 Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War, 200, 209. 31 Brian Glyn Williams, “The cia’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33 (10) (October 2010): 871–892; “A New Weapon in the War on Terror,” Newsweek blog, http://www .newsweek.com/blogs/declassi½ed/2010/09/10/a-new-weapon-in-the-war-on-terror .html (accessed December 9, 2010). 32 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010). 33 Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Farquar, Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009). 34 Williams, “The cia’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan,” 880–882. 35 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), 2. 36 Williams, “The cia’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan,” 881–882.

140 (3) Summer 2011 57 American Military Culture from Colony to Empire

Robert L. Goldich

Abstract: Until World War II, the peacetime Army’s primary job was not to be ready to ½ght instantly, but to provide a core of military expertise that would enable a wartime force of citizen-soldiers to be built up after war began. Wars were infrequent. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has become a force that deploys and ½ghts on a regular basis. The true citizen-soldier–who serves for only a few years and remains, at heart, a civilian–is no longer with us and is not likely to return in the foreseeable future, despite nostalgia for his passing. In the midst of a civilian society that is increasingly paci½stic, easygoing, and well adjusted, the Army (career and non-career soldiers alike) remains flinty, harshly results-oriented, and emotionally extreme. The inevitable civil-military gap has become a chasm.

In 1963, Theodore R. Fehrenbach published a magisterial, and in many places poetic, history of the Korean War. Nearly ½fty years later, his book remains the seminal treatise on limited frontier wars and the American national psyche. Fehren- bach addressed the incompatibility of America’s changed strategic circumstances after World War ROBERT L GOLDICH II with the traditional American view of the pur- . is a defense pose of an army and how it should be manned. For consultant and military historian. He served for more than thirty- such limited wars, he maintained, the United three years as a defense analyst for States needed “legions”: the Congressional Research Ser- However repugnant the idea is to liberal societies, the vice (crs) at the Library of Con- gress. He has published articles or man who will willingly defend the free world in the book reviews in Army, Armed Forces fringe areas is not the responsible citizen-soldier. The and Society, Military Review, and the man who will go where his colors go, without asking, Journal of Military History, as well as who will ½ght a phantom foe in jungle and mountain dozens of crs studies and analyses range, without counting, and who will suffer and die of U.S. military manpower policy. in the midst of incredible hardship, without com- He is currently writing a book on plaint, is still what he always has been, from Imperial the history of conscription from the ½rst human civilizations to the Rome to sceptered Britain to democratic America. He present, tentatively titled Conscrip- is the stuff of which legions are made. tion in History: Organization, Admin- His pride is in his colors and his regiment, his train- istration, and Context. ing hard and thorough and coldly realistic, to ½t him

58 for what he must face, and his obedience to larger society, receives the greatest em- Robert L. his orders. As a legionary, he held the gates phasis in this essay. The Navy, attached to Goldich of civilization for the classical world; as a the shorelines of North America or at sea, blue-coated horseman, he swept the Indi- has had comparatively little cultural in- ans from the Plains; he has been called teraction with the general population on United States Marine. He does the jobs– a sustained basis. The Marine Corps is the utterly necessary jobs–no militia is small and did not establish its current willing to do. His task is moral or immoral image among Americans until, at the ear- according to the orders that send him liest, after World War I. The Corps’s im- forth.1 age is vivid, but its culture has, arguably, changed little if at all since the turn of the In this essay, I argue that the United twentieth century. The Air Force is new, States has ½nally created Fehrenbach’s and its culture blends that of the Army legions, and that in doing so we have from which it sprang in 1947 and the transformed American military culture technological circumstances that lead to to a degree unprecedented in American comparatively few Air Force personnel history. training and preparing for, or engaging The United States’ geostrategic situa- in, direct combat. The Army expands the tion and the military practices and capa- most in times of major mobilizations; bilities it has required have determined sustains by far the heaviest casualties; American military culture to a much and always comprises the vast majority of greater extent than our political insti- forces deployed for war. In both public tutions and social attitudes. For the pur- and private discussions since the Revolu- poses of this analysis, I de½ne culture as tion, it is the Army infantry soldier who the most signi½cant internal attitudes has instinctively come to the mind of the and mindset of the collective member- American people whenever “the mili- ship of the armed forces. It can be argued tary” has been under consideration. that one should differentiate between of½cers and enlisted, or career and non- career, personnel; in fact, a recent con- From 1815 through 1989, the profession- vergence of the two is one of the central al outlook and doctrine of the Army in- points in this essay. I posit that there volved preparation for periodic conven- has been only one decisive change in the tional wars, although Indian wars occu- country’s geostrategic situation since pied much of the Army’s time and energy American independence from Britain, throughout the nineteenth century. The gained during the Revolutionary War, actual need to wage conventional wars, was rati½ed by the War of 1812; that our however, did not occur very often. The political institutions have been funda- Mexican War of 1846 to 1848, the Civil mentally constant since the adoption of War of 1861 to 1865, the Spanish-Ameri- the Constitution in 1788; and that the ac- can War and subsequent Philippine In- tual effects of changing American social surrection of 1898 to 1902, World War I attitudes on the nation’s military culture, (1917–1918), World War II (1941–1945), particularly with respect to the inclusive- the Korean War (1950–1953), and the ness of hitherto excluded groups, have Vietnam War (1965–1973, in terms of been remarkably small. major American involvement): all in- The Army, at the fore of American mil- volved an intake of vast numbers of citi- itary culture and its relationship to the zen-soldiers by a tiny, peacetime, all-volunteer Army. When the country was not

140 (3) Summer 2011 59 American at war, the Army had minimal contact damental self-image of the Army proba- Military with Americans because so few soldiers bly more than anything else. Certainly, Culture from were on active duty. During the century the Army at times engaged in ongoing Colony to or so that preceded the nation’s entrance missions–principally, the Indian Wars– Empire into competitive international politics other than training and preparing for between 1898 and 1917, most soldiers conventional conflict. The Army’s con- were stationed in the thinly populated sistent view of itself as a conventional frontier as it moved steadily west. force preparing for battle against a com- The contrast with European armies– parable foe was integral to the develop- and others based on the European model, ment of military professionalism in the such as the post-Meiji Restoration Japa- United States.5 However, the Army was nese Army2–is striking. In countries with so small that for any sustained conflict large armies manned almost entirely by against an organized state-based force, conscripts in peacetime as well as during huge numbers of volunteers and/or con- war, tactical units were dispersed through- scripts had to be enlisted or inducted. out their territory. The “garrison town,” Even the Mexican War and the Spanish- with constant contact between soldiers American War (and subsequent Philip- and civilians, was the norm.3 In general, pine Insurrection/Philippine-American this has not been the case in the United War) required large numbers of wartime States. Throughout American history, the volunteers to augment the tiny Regular average American civilian has lived his Army. Such a mobilization, especially in or her life with minimal to nonexistent an egalitarian democracy, required that interaction with soldiers; and soldiers, the conflict be cast in terms of an ideolog- whether in the service for a few years or ical crusade. Campaigns included Man- for a career, have had comparatively little ifest Destiny in 1846 to 1848; preserving day-to-day contact with civilians other the Union and ending slavery in 1861 to than those in small, isolated towns adja- 1865; freeing Cuba and “remembering the cent to bases.4 This civilian-army separa- Maine” in 1898 and its aftermath6; mak- tion was true both before and after brief ing the world safe for democracy against periods of peacetime conscription: name- the Central Powers in 1917 to 1918; and ly, from 1940 to 1941; from 1948 to 1950; crushing Axis totalitarianism in 1941 to and the twelve-year period from the end 1945. After each spasmodic mobiliza- of the Korean War in 1953 to the begin- tion, the citizen forces were demobilized ning of major U.S. ground combat in Viet- en masse. The Army reverted to a small nam in 1965. The American enlistee and cadre force, and a prolonged period of draftee have, in most cases, trained and peace ensued. served in remote areas, far from the The results were twofold. First, the major population, economic, and cultur- Army was not only physically isolated al hubs of American life. The small size of from the citizenry in terms of basing the American military also contributed to structure and domestic deployment, but this isolation. Not until the post-1945 era was functionally isolated as well. In was the U.S. Army more than an insig- peacetime, the Army needed little from ni½cant fraction of the total U.S. populace, the citizenry: it did not conscript or re- except in times of total mobilization such quire many volunteers. Second, the Army as the Civil War and both World Wars. learned to think of itself as a force with But it was the psychology of a cadre- the primary mission of training for infre- mobilization model that affected the fun- quent mobilizations for ideological cru-

60 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences sades based on popular interpretations of mid-1950 and mid-1953, and Vietnam, Robert L. democratic principles. Its primary peace- which involved major U.S. combat par- Goldich time job was not to be ready to ½ght in- ticipation from 1965 through early 1973. stantly, whether on North American soil When the Army was not involved in a or overseas, but to provide a core of pro- major conflict, it was almost entirely at fessional military expertise that would peace, and its mission was to train for a enable a large wartime force of citizen- major, worldwide conflict with the Sovi- soldiers to be built up after wars–fairly et Union and its client states and surro- infrequent events–began. Under this gates–that is, a third world war. The rubric, the Army career force, of½cers number of minor contingency opera- and noncommissioned of½cers (ncos), tions involving Army combat forces (as developed a culture of austere profession- distinct from advisory functions in Viet- alism; cultural introversion; and prepa- nam from 1961 to 1965) between vj-Day ration for war rather than frequent en- and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was gagement in war.7 Men commonly joined remarkably low. The actions in Lebanon the career force, either as of½cers or (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965– ncos, and retired without ever serving 1966), and Grenada (1983) were brief and combat duty. This norm prevailed espe- involved only light casualties. Between cially during the long peace between 1918 1973 and the end of the Cold War, the and 1941, when the Army was engaged in Army remained a training-oriented force no combat whatsoever.8 Wartime service rather than one organized for immediate was expected to occupy only a small por- operations. tion of a military career. Nonetheless, transition to the all-volunteer force (avf) had signi½cant effects The ½rst major change in this culture on Army culture.10 First, it tended to emerged immediately after the end of diminish–but by no means end–the di- World War II, when, for the ½rst time in ametrically opposed views and outlooks American history, the United States main- of the career force on the one hand and tained a large force in peacetime. Mil- junior of½cers/junior enlisted personnel lions of Americans served in the armed on the other. There will always be a large forces, primarily the Army, as part of the gap between those who command and ½rst true peacetime draft in American those who obey. What has changed is that history.9 With its public pro½le raised those who obey at the bottom of both the enormously, the military became a much of½cer and enlisted chains of command more salient institution in the minds of have freely opted into the institution and the American people. Nonetheless, the its characteristics. While most may not cadre-mobilization model still governed plan on having a military career, they are the military, in general, and the Army, in not unwilling participants who seek to particular. After World War II, the tradi- satis½ce rather than succeed. The junior tional American concept of “peace” and of½cer and enlisted ranks are no longer “war” as sharply differentiated realities composed primarily of draftees or draft- continued to govern how the Army motivated volunteers who, more or less, thought of itself. Notably, this attitude did not want to be in uniform, even if they did not change after the abolition of con- accepted their lot and tried to do their scription in 1973. Between 1945 and the best.11 As historian Andrew J. Bacevich end of the Cold War in 1989, the Army has noted in his sadly underused study of fought two major wars: Korea, between the Army of the 1950s, the nature of the

140 (3) Summer 2011 61 American Cold War Army, “far larger than any pre- human beings. In contrast, civilian soci- Military vious peacetime force, composed largely ety increasingly takes the attitude that Culture from of short-service draftees, and dependent physical coercion of, or exertion of influ- Colony to on frequent rotations to man large over- ence on, human beings by other human Empire seas garrisons–virtually ensured that its beings is morally wrong.15 Even the open ethos would be centralized, bureaucratic, expression of remarks considered psy- and impersonal.”12 Under the volunteer chologically, as opposed to physically, force, the average length of service in the harmful–such as verbal “bullying” in Army rose considerably, decreasing the schools–is subject to administrative and, rapid turnover in the ranks. The empha- in some cases, statutory penalties. The sis on rebuilding the Army after Vietnam medicalization of, and requirement to greatly increased the opportunity and em- forcibly change, personality characteris- phasis on systematic professional edu- tics that do not fall within a fairly narrow cation and training for ncos. Pay, bene- range of acceptable behavior, such as As- ½ts, and housing quality went up.13 perger’s syndrome, is an example of the Finally, while scarcely the intimate societal tendency to control behaviors organization that it was before World deemed disruptive. In addition, absolute War II, the post-1973 Army was nonethe- paci½sm has increased steadily in the less much smaller than that which gave West (albeit much less so in the United rise to the conditions Bacevich describes. States than in Western and Central Eu- Massive and bureaucratic it may have rope), an important component of which been compared to just about any other is a theological reassertion among vari- American organization, public or private, ous Protestant and Catholic components but it was less so than the pre-Vietnam of the early Christian paci½st tradition. force. The pre-Vietnam Army of about (Judaism, symbolically but not demo- one million soldiers remained at about graphically important, has tended to mor- 780,000 between 1973 and 1987; shrank ally eschew violence throughout the two slightly to about 750,000 at the end of thousand years of the Diaspora.)16 the Cold War; contracted to 480,000 for The military remains hierarchical and, most of the 1990s; and currently stands at ultimately, authoritarian (although there about 570,000. All these developments is much more give and take, especially have contributed to decreasing the width in combat units and environments, than of the of½cer-enlisted gap in terms of most civilians might believe). It empha- common motivations. sizes organizational and collective effectiveness, discipline, and commitment The end of conscription, combined rather than individual rights, prerogatives, with an acceleration of long-term social and liberties. Given that life is in½nitely trends, meant that the moral, ethical, and less harsh in the industrialized world philosophical outlooks of everyone in the than it was in the past, the individual who armed forces–not just career personnel enlists in the armed forces enters a life- –tended to be more sharply differentiat- style and environment that has become ed from those of civilians.14 The armed far removed from the civilian world. forces, both in peace and in war, are now Before the nineteenth century, the aver- composed mostly, if not almost entirely, age individual was much more accus- of people who accept the social legitima- tomed to having insuf½cient or inade- cy of violence and the infliction of pain, quate food, living without adequate shel- suffering, death, and anguish on other ter and little temperature control, and

62 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences facing the omnipresence of death from moral outlook, more like active-duty mil- Robert L. disease, from infancy onward. He or she itary personnel than their fellow civilians Goldich was commonly confronted with more fre- in the communities in which they work quent day-to-day civil disorder and low- and live. level interpersonal violence than is the The most profound change in Ameri- case in the modern world.17 With most of can military culture, however, has taken these premodern rigors of everyday life place since 1989. The collapse of the Sovi- gone, comparatively unpleasant and rig- et Union and the Warsaw Pact; the dras- orous physical environments in even tic reduction in Soviet and Russian mili- peacetime military training and service– tary power, particularly its conventional especially on the ground–heighten the forces; and the retreat of Russian borders contrast with civilian life. In combat, the to where they had been in approximately variance from the civilian norm is enor- 1500 created the largest transformation mous.18 Furthermore, everyday speech in in the American strategic situation since the services, particularly in the ground 1917. No longer did the U.S. armed forces combat arms, is extreme. Aggressive have a primary mission of planning for males are constantly testing one another war against peer adversaries. At the same through verbal altercations and insults. time, the end of the Cold War released Disagreements are still sometimes re- forces inimical to American national in- solved through barracks ½ghts. This be- terests and influence from the iron lock havior reinforces cohesion and, in fact, of U.S.-Soviet nuclear stalemate. The re- has been fairly normal among men, par- sult? Over the past two decades, the particularly young men, in groups. However, adigm of long periods of peace inter- such physical and verbal aggression is spersed with apocalyptic mobilizations increasingly not tolerated in gender-inte- for war, involving the accession of huge grated civilian society, where harmony numbers of draftees into the force, has and agreement are accorded a higher pri- been replaced by one of fairly continuous ority than any other governing principle. operational deployments. Though some This distinction relates to another dif- engagements involve more casualties and ference between the military and civil- forces than others, all place constant de- ian worlds. That is, despite the vastly mands on the Army to provide units and increased proportion of women in uni- soldiers for expeditionary warfare. form, the military remains an over- It is impossible to overstate how much whelmingly masculine-de½ned institu- this development has changed the entire tion, to which military women must, and set of expectations both of½cers and en- do, adapt. Compare this situation with listed personnel bring to Army service. the developed world in general, where Continuous operations against current gender segregation, social or occupation- enemies have replaced training, plan- al, has largely died out. ning, and education for periodic opera- In passing, it should be noted that al- tions against future ones. Preparations though members of the reserve compo- for raising a citizen force and activating nents of the armed forces are, by de½ni- large numbers of new units, using the tion, “citizen-soldiers,” their very pres- active Army as a cadre, are apparently not ence in the military implies their accept- undertaken at any level within the Army ance of the entire panoply of military- staff. More broadly, although planning institutional characteristics described for both industrial and manpower mobi- above, making them, in psychological and lization beyond the existing force struc-

140 (3) Summer 2011 63 American ture was an integral part of the George The difference from the popular con- Military H.W. Bush administration’s post–Cold ception of the American soldier that dom- Culture 19 from War defense paradigm, when the Clin- inated the draft era of 1940 to 1973 is clear. Colony to ton administration came to power in 1993, The pre-1973 image of the American sol- Empire this component also vanished, and has dier at war, dating all the way back, argu- remained of½cially buried ever since. ably, to the Revolution, and certainly to Therefore, the true citizen-soldier–who the Civil War, was perhaps best exem- serves only during the spasmodic, total- pli½ed by cartoonist Bill Mauldin’s Willie istic, ideological conflicts that last a few and Joe characters. They were infantry- years, and who retains a fundamentally men who were unshaven, possessed good civilian outlook on life–no longer has combat discipline but uneven adminis- any place in the Army’s consideration of trative discipline, were not overly obei- how it must prepare for future war. sant to uniform regulations beyond what was required of them, and, in general, Although nostalgia for the conscripted represented well what they were: men citizen-soldier persists, that soldier is who would rather not be there, but either gone–at least for the foreseeable future. felt a call to serve or realized they had no We have indeed transitioned to Fehren- choice and would therefore do their best. bach’s legions. In my view, the Army’s The last words in Mauldin’s immortal outlook is beginning to resemble that of collection Up Front superbly evoke the the Marine Corps, whose ethos was best American draftee’s attitude: described in Harper’s in 1914. Comment- They are big men and honest men, with the ing on the American occupation of Vera inner warmth that comes from the generos- Cruz, Mexico, the author observes: “Just ity and simplicity you learn up there. Until an order issued . . . and one regiment after the doc can go back to his chrome of½ce and another are on their way to Cuba, or Mex- gallstones and the dogface can go back to ico, or the world’s end. Where they are his farm and I can go back to my wife and going isn’t the Marine’s concern. Their son, that is the closest to home we can ever business is to be always ready to go.”20 get.23 One might also say that American soldiers are becoming more like “soldiers of While Mauldin’s view of the infantry- the Queen [or King]”: that is, without man at war is timeless,24 the concept of immediate ideological concerns.21 This the citizen-soldier who will serve for only development enables frustrating and the duration, then return home, is obso- lengthy counterinsurgency campaigns, lete. So, too, for that matter, is the tradi- or others without immediate grati½ca- tional U.S. Army combat uniform, which tion, to be conducted with much less re- displayed far fewer insignia, decorations, gard for public opinion in the short term. and accoutrements than those of Euro- As French international relations scholar pean armies well into the 1960s, and which Etienne de Durand puts it, “Mobilizing was draped without much tailoring on the population generally comes with a the popular cartoon images of Sad Sack, heavy price tag attached to it; the non- Beetle Bailey, and their fellow soldiers. negotiable need to show quick results.”22 The pre-hyperpower American military A professional force that does not require image of Willie and Joe has been replaced situation-speci½c ideological mobiliza- by combat uniforms with unit insignia tion is much more suited to these kinds of and American flags; close-cropped hair- military operations. cuts; the variety of equipment on load-

64 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences bearing packs and vests; and the goggles Several facts account for much of this Robert L. and flip-down night vision devices on improvement: in the counterinsurgency Goldich angled helmets, all of which betoken a wars we are now ½ghting, troops in com- tough, hard, cold, isolate professionalism. bat are in smaller and more dispersed Although the Army’s career force al- units; the enemy does not have artillery ways maintained a rigid professional with a high rate of ½re; and we have pro- image and an accompanying set of atti- vided ½rst-rate equipment to our troops. tudes, its citizen-soldier enlisted ranks But the key factors are probably the high did not. Conscripts typically did not in- quality of the people and the unprece- ternalize the norms and psychology of dented realism in unit training that have the career force; rather, they accepted been enabled by investment in training them, externally and reluctantly, and facilities and courses and much lower adapted as best they could. Today, broad- personnel turnover. ly similar attitudes permeate the entire The opportunities for disasters at the force, from private to full general, al- platoon and company levels, though though naturally they are stronger in present, have rarely materialized in Iraq those who have been in service longer. and Afghanistan compared to the car- The enlistee and junior of½cer, as well as nage of past twentieth century American the career force member, voluntarily sub- wars, particularly in their initial stages.25 jects himself or herself to military val- The bumbling incompetence of com- ues, which vary considerably from those manders not used to wartime stresses of the civilian culture, rather than accom- and, equally, the super½cial training, in modating them because of events beyond frenetic wartime situations, of hastily con- his or her control. This shift is particular- scripted soldiers by trainers with scarcely ly telling for enlisted men in the ground- more practical experience than the con- combat arms of the Army and Marine scripts have been greatly diminished. (I Corps. Like all enlistees, they choose their do not address the issue of bumbling in- military occupational specialty upon en- competence among the high-level politi- listment; thus, they have volunteered not cal leadership of the country, or the slug- only for military service generally, and gish and reluctant adaptation of senior for their particular armed force, but for military leaders, accustomed to a long that proportion of the force that under- peace, in adapting to war, in general, and takes the most arduous and dangerous irregular warfare, in particular.) The post- tasks in peace and war. 1973, post-Vietnam all-volunteer force is much less tolerant of tactical and opera- What other effects has the transformational failure than its predecessors, a tion to a force of legions had on Ameri- result of vastly enhanced training as well can military culture? It has created a as a deepened ethos of physical and men- force that has immense expertise in the tal toughness.26 conduct of combat operations–and one The downside, perhaps, is that if our that is well aware of this advantage. The legions are always deployed ½ghting the high casualties due to simple inexperi- barbarians on the frontiers, there is less ence, lack of rigorous training, and thin- time for their of½cers to think, reflect, ly spread professional military knowl- and educate themselves in their profes- edge that marked American performance sion, particularly in higher-level strategy. during both World Wars, Korea, and, to The career of½cer corps, by all accounts, some extent, Vietnam, no longer occur. is a much less contemplative institution,

140 (3) Summer 2011 65 American largely (although not entirely) because some Catholics with an af½nity for (to use Military the constant press of deployments and a Protestant term) the “social gospel”; Culture from operations has left much less time in a and Reform Judaism on the one hand, Colony to military career for not only civilian grad- and the willingness to use force for patri- Empire uate education, but even, increasingly, otic American purposes and social con- for the professional military education servatism of evangelical Christianity, that has always been an outstanding part conservative Catholicism, and Orthodox of the American military system. The in- Judaism on the other.28 evitable decrease in the tempo of opera- The advent of the all-volunteer force tions post-Iraq, and then post-Afghan- has also created an attitude among mili- istan, will certainly restore this situation tary personnel that they are, in a variety somewhat, but the long-term conse- of ways, “better” than, or “superior” to, quences could be pernicious. civilians. To a considerable extent, soldiers have always had such an attitude. Notably, American military culture They contrast the courage and resolution has moved sharply from a Cavalier to a their profession demands with a softer, Roundhead conception of social mores. less austere, and less rigorous civilian The hard-drinking, chain-smoking, wom- world–even if they are conscripts eager anizing “Alpha male” has, to a consider- to return to it. This outlook can be traced able degree–especially in the of½cer to ancient times. However, what is new is corps–been replaced by the teetotaling, the extent to which military personnel nonsmoking, family-man paragon of vir- view themselves as superior because of tue. (Indeed, a drunk-driving arrest and the intrinsic human qualities they bring conviction will ruin an of½cer’s career.) with them to military service, in addi- The absence of drinking and smoking re- tion to those they acquire while serving. lates to the need for constant readiness to Although human motivations are dif½- go to war and the associated need for phys- cult to pinpoint, there appear to be two ical health and endurance, which mirrors reasons for these feelings of superiority. similar trends among the more educated First, service members are constantly classes in American society. The change made aware, through both internal com- in sexual mores seems to have more dif- munications and through media report- fuse causes. The increased proportion of age, that most young Americans cannot women in the force, with the exception of meet enlistment standards. This fact un- all-male ground combat arms units, is derstandably makes them feel that they one. Another is the considerable rise, are, in some ways, superior to peers who over the past several decades, of open could not be accepted into military ser- religiosity in the force, especially, but not vice regardless of desire. Certainly, the limited to, evangelical Protestant Chris- quantitative data support this belief. tianity, which has encouraged heterosexu- Most ½rst-term enlistees (like most Amer- al monogamy.27 Much of the latter devel- icans) do not come from the more afflu- opment simply tracks the steady increase ent sectors of American society, but the in the salience of religious commitment conventional wisdom that military ser- throughout most of American society vice is a last resort for the substandard, over the past several decades. But it also however dubious in the past, is utterly reflects the split between the increasing- wrong in the modern American military. ly antiwar, anticoercion, and socially lib- Military personnel are much less likely to eral mainline Protestant denominations; be ill-educated29; are more intelligent

66 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences (or at least show more aptitude when in a century Roman soldiers tramped Robert L. measured on a standardized test)30; gen- through present-day Italy en masse dur- Goldich erally come from higher-income house- ing the yearlong civil war that marked the holds; and are in½nitely more physically “year of the four Emperors,”33 the peace- ½t,31 much less likely to have encounters able civilians remarked on how barbaric, with the criminal justice system, and unlettered, and savage they looked and much less likely to use illegal drugs than acted.34 Two thousand years later, Amer- their civilian counterparts, both in gener- ican legionaries, while as capable on a al and when age, race, and gender are modern battle½eld as those who wield- controlled for.32 ed the gladius (the Roman short sword), Second, there is an utterly unquanti- appear to march through a civilian pop- ½able set of attitudes that may be even ulation that in some ways is more bar- more important in propelling young men baric, less educated, less physically ½t, and women who enlist, or who seek ap- and less disciplined than they are.35 pointments as junior of½cers, to view Where this meritocratic isolation from themselves as superior to their civilian civilian norms of conduct will lead is peers (again, regardless of socioeconom- unclear; nonetheless, it is unprecedent- ic status). The young person who enlists ed, at least as far as the large non-career knows that he or she is opting to leave force the United States now maintains is behind the comfortable, perhaps com- concerned. placent, atmosphere of family, friends, Some have suggested, understandably, and local environment. Even before young that this sense of superiority could lead to enlistees are sworn in, they believe that a greater willingness among service per- they have opted to enter a more danger- sonnel to challenge civilian control of ous and demanding institution, one that the military.36 Do these attitudes indeed is held to higher standards than civilian presage a possible increased tendency society, well-regarded among civilians, toward “putsches and caudillos and the and more exciting and realistic than the Freikorps and Fasci di Combattimento” humdrum world of daily civil life they in the United States?37 Theoretically, the left behind. They are, in a sense, internal answer is yes; practically, probably not. immigrants, emigrating from their famil- The much larger military we have main- iar surroundings to ½nd more opportuni- tained since 1945 has, without question, ty (economic and psychological) in the maintained a correspondingly higher new and, in many ways, utterly alien pro½le in American life, and in American institutional terrain of the armed forces. politics, than ever before. Nonetheless, Whatever their socioeconomic status in the conditions for such an extreme devel- civilian life, young men and women who opment are almost entirely absent from choose military service believe that in the United States. We have lost no wars in doing so, they demonstrate that they are which the slaughter or wounding of huge taking a harder, more arduous, and utter- proportions of the male population was ly different path from their contempo- followed by mass economic depression raries who lack the moral and physical (putsches and Freikorps and Italian Fa- courage to choose differently. scisti); we have no culture of intensive This situation is remarkably anoma- military involvement in partisan national lous compared to the image of soldiers politics (caudillos and putsches); and we who manned professional armies in the do not face a major breakdown of civil past. In ad 69, when for the ½rst time order due to the previous two conditions.

140 (3) Summer 2011 67 American Finally, occasional attempts by members (known colloquially as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Military of the career of½cer corps to justify a Tell,” or dadt) will cause a decisive shift Culture from greater degree of military autonomy vis- in the psychological and emotional under- Colony to à-vis political leadership in the United pinnings of the military. Gay men and les- Empire States are not new, and have rarely, if bians who are out of the closet will, as ever, obtained a coherent following. have gay men and lesbians in the closet, American career military personnel may conform to the larger culture.38 grumble–and have always grumbled– about the alleged character de½ciencies The changes in American military cul- of the society on whose behalf they bear ture over the past few decades, and the arms, but their disdain for such short- extension of the attributes of the career comings inclines them to recoil from of½cer and nco corps to the entire force, involvement in broader political matters are caused not by super½cial traits such as rather than press toward it. First-term en- gender, race, or ethnicity, but by the adap- listed personnel and junior of½cers may tation of the American military, partic- indeed share these attitudes, but they do ularly the Army, to a changed American not guide the institution and are not, at strategic situation. The exertions of large- least in the context of the developed ly drafted American military forces in world, fruitful ground for serious mili- peace and war during most of the twenti- tary repudiation of civilian authority. eth century have provided American so- This is not sub-Saharan Africa, where ciety a long period of extended internal sergeants become presidents or prime peace and prosperity. Without an appar- ministers. ent immediate need to endure the burdens of compulsory military service, the I have made almost no mention of how majority of American civilians have been conventional wisdom de½nes culture in unwilling to enlist, and the public has terms of today’s identity-oriented in- begun to question the practical necessity tellectual discourse. Why? I think the and moral legitimacy of institutionalized diverse distinctions of race, gender, sexu- violence. The U.S. military has become al orientation, or ethnicity that are pres- the shield behind which civilian society ent in the U.S. armed forces have little can hold fast to its paci½st views about or no effect on the more fundamental the absolute supremacy of kindness and aspects of American military culture I compassion. The entire military, in turn, have discussed. The admission of African not just the career force, has become a Americans into a desegregated military refuge for those who question the basic ½fty-½ve to sixty years ago and the steady orientation of civilian society and do not accretion of modern immigrant groups– wish to live within many of its central such as Hispanics and Asians–have done boundaries. There appears to be a gap– nothing to change the austere, isolate, if not a chasm–between an increasingly self-referential traditional masculinity of sensate, amiable, and emotionally narrow the force. Nor has the increased presence civilian world and a flinty, harshly re- of women, who have had to adapt to sults-oriented, and emotionally extreme these underlying characteristics in order military, for career and non-career per- to serve. For that matter, there is little sonnel alike. indication that the recent repeal of the A U.S. Marine infantry lieutenant re- statute (it was not simply a “policy”) ban- cently observed, “For better or worse, ning homosexuals from serving openly real or imagined, the military is one of

68 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences the few organizations that still attracts means nor the psychological will to de- Robert L. people looking for an alternative to the fend itself. The shield itself may turn di- Goldich ‘world of clerks and teachers, of co-ed- rectly or indirectly on those whom it is ucation and zo-ophily, of ‘consumer’s supposed to defend, out of disgust for leagues’ and ‘associated charities,’ of in- their failure to step up and contribute, dustrialism unlimited, and feminism un- either directly or with moral support. abashed,” as philosopher William James This has been an eternal conundrum in described it in his classic essay “The large societies facing threats that are far Moral Equivalent of War.”39 However, if away since at least the days of the later this alienated shield fails, the demilita- Roman and Han Chinese empires, and it rized civil society may have neither the is with us still today.

endnotes 1 Theodore R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: Korea, A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 658. 2 See Edward J. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009); Naoko Shimizu, Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory, and the Russo- Japanese War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Richard J. Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974). 3 For an in-depth discussion of this interaction in one major European country, see David M. Hopkin, Soldier and Peasant in French Popular Culture, 1766–1870 (Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press and Royal Historical Society, 2003). 4 See Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784– 1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); and Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). 5 The literature on this phenomenon is vast. See the still-unmatched Russell F. Weigley, His- tory of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 144–292; and William B. Skel- ton, An American Profession of Arms: The Army Of½cer Corps, 1784–1861 (Lawrence: Universi- ty Press of Kansas, 1992). 6 Many of the men who in 1898 volunteered to free Cuba, avenge the Maine, and punish the supposedly brutal and dastardly Spaniards instead found themselves engaged in a very different war of colonial paci½cation in the Philippines; the cognitive dissonance could be considerable. Rather than liberators (or after they liberated), they were cast in the role of imperial conquerors. Because they were not regular soldiers, their orientation was situation- speci½c rather than professional and organizational; they were often quite bitter, though they performed well in combat throughout their deployment. For a vivid example, see Kyle Roy Ward, In the Shadow of Glory: The Thirteenth Minnesota in the Spanish-American and Philip- pine-American Wars, 1898 to 1899 (St. Cloud, Minn.: North Star Press of St. Cloud, Inc., 2000). 7 For a vivid example of this isolation, see John M. Collins, “Depression Army,” Army, Janu- ary 1972, 8–14. In particular, see Collins’s telling remark, “Intercourse with civilians was just that.”

140 (3) Summer 2011 69 American 8 The small, irregular wars in Central America and the Caribbean to which American forces Military were committed between World Wars I and II were waged entirely by the Marine Corps. Culture from 9 The peacetime draft was the ½rst in substantive, not technical, terms. The draft law enact- Colony to ed in September 1940, ½fteen months before Pearl Harbor was attacked, was clearly rati½ed Empire in response to, and designed to prepare for, possible American participation in World War II, which had erupted in Europe on September 1, 1939. The reenactment of Selective Service in mid-1948–after the armed forces were unable to recruit suf½cient personnel through vol- untary enlistment once the World War II draft expired at the end of 1946–did not result in the enlistment of many draftees because the pre-Korean War military was relatively small. The measure was, in social and cultural terms, a seamless continuation of the World War II draft. See George Q. Flynn, The Draft: 1940–1973 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 88–109. This volume is invaluable for those investigating American military recruiting and manpower from World War II to the present. 10 Three works are essential to a study of the shift from a draft-based Army to the avf: Bernard D. Rostker, I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force (Santa Monica, Calif.: rand Corporation, 2006); Beth Bailey, America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force (Cam- bridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009); and Robert K. Grif½th, Jr., The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968–1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1997). 11 I have never heard an Army or Marine of½cer with personal experience commanding or serving with both draftees and volunteers in combat in Korea and Vietnam state anything other than that the performance of the men in both categories was indistinguishable. Indeed, I have frequently heard that during the peacetime post-Korea, pre-Vietnam years, of½cers found the quality of draftees to be higher than that of volunteers. However, because many of the latter were draft-pressured into enlisting, disaggregating the two groups is dif½cult. I am especially indebted to the insights of the following now-retired of½cers on these particular subjects over the years: U.S. Army General Volney F. Warner; U.S. Army Major General John A. Leide; U.S. Marine Corps Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude; U.S. Army Colonel John D. (Scot) Crerar (an informal manuscript written by Colonel Crerar was particularly useful); and U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Donald Bowman. 12 Andrew J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986), 119. Professor Brian McAllister Linn of Texas A&M University is currently preparing a study of the post-Korea, pre-Vietnam Army, titled Elvis’s Army: Transformation and the Atomic-Era Soldier, 1946–1965, which will be a needed contribution to the literature on post-1945 American military history. 13 The best comprehensive discussion of the post-Vietnam reconstruction of the Army remains Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Of½ce of the Chief of Staff, 1993), 1–39. 14 The essence of this divergence in attitudes is captured by Azar Gat, Victorious and Vulnerable: Why Democracy Won in the 20th Century and How it is Still Imperiled (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Little½eld, 2010). 15 A discussion of the changing meaning of the word imperialism over time seems appropriate here. Scholar Mark Proudman observes in the term “a fastidiousness, even a squeamishness, about power or influence, however attenuated or even consensual”; Mark F. Proudman, “Words for Scholars: The Semantics of ‘Imperialism,’” The Journal of the Historical Society 8 (3) (September 2008): 425. Another interesting example is a Stanford University course in management science and engineering entitled “The Ethical Analyst,” in which “questioning

70 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences the desirability of physical coercion and deception as a means to reach any end” is men- Robert L. tioned in the course description; Stanford University Bulletin, 2008–09, 608–609. Goldich 16 For the Christian component, see Charles C. Moskos and John Whiteclay Chambers II, eds., The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance (New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1993); and Peter Brock, Against the Draft: Essays on Conscientious Objection from the Radical Reformation to the Second World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006). For insightful remarks on the complex relationship of Diaspora Judaism and sanctioned violence, see Martin van Creveld, The Culture of War (New York: Ballantine Books, 2008), 376–394. Modern Israel, of course, is a state, and harbors a culture, in which the military has extraordinary influence, probably more than in any other developed democratic society. However, this does not invalidate the overwhelmingly paci½stic and anti-interhuman-violence attitude that has existed in Judaism worldwide since the Romans crushed the Bar Kochba revolt of ad 132–135. In addition, in recent decades a substantial reassertion of the paci½stic Jewish tradition within Israeli Jewish society has resulted from internal controversy about the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories since 1967. 17 A good summary of all these conditions is in Patricia Crone, Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World (1989; repr., Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003). 18 This distinction could not always be made. What Victor Davis Hanson has said about ancient Greek citizen-soldiers would apply to virtually any soldier, conscript or volunteer, before the Industrial Revolution removed a substantial part of the population of some countries from farming: “Bloodletting, the art of tearing apart flesh and breaking bone, was no strange sight to farmers who butchered their own meat and hunted game”; Victor Davis Hanson, The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 265. 19 See Robert L. Goldich, Defense Reconstitution: Strategic Context and Implementation, Report 92- 832 F (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, November 20, 1992). 20 Cited in Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775–1962 (1962; repr., Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 164. 21 I am indebted to Australian Army Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen (ret.) for this observation, made in an unsaved email message circa 2005. However, see British military historian Richard Holmes’s telling observation regarding the Iraq War: “The British army goes on operations. . . . But the U.S. army is at war”; Richard Holmes, Dusty Warriors (London: Harper Perennial, 2006), 111. 22 Octavian Manea, “Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion: An Interview with Etienne de Durand,” Small Wars Journal, March 3, 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com. 23 Bill Mauldin, Up Front (1945; repr., New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), 228. 24 I sent my original copy of Up Front to my son during his ½rst tour as a Marine infantryman in Iraq in 2006. He said that he and his fellow Marines found it both hilarious and accurate. 25 References to this issue are scattered widely throughout operational histories, but there are some accounts, frequently biographical, that zero in on it more than others. On Korea, see Fehrenbach, This Kind of War; Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came From the North (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010); and Roy E. Appleman, Disas- ter in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989). On World War II, see Henry G. Gole, General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 13–65; and Peter R. Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941–1945 (Lawrence:

140 (3) Summer 2011 71 American University Press of Kansas, 1999), esp. 49–180. On World War I, see Mark Ethan Gro- Military telueschen, The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I (New York: Culture from Cambridge University Press, 2007); Edward G. Lengel, To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, Colony to 1918: The Battle that Ended the First World War (New York: Henry Holt, 2008); William S. Empire Triplet, A Youth in the Meuse-Argonne: A Memoir, 1917–1918, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000). I am not aware of any monographs on U.S. tactical, as opposed to operational and strategic, effectiveness in Vietnam. 26 It is dif½cult to overstate the extent of demoralization, incoherence, indiscipline, and lack of readiness brought on by the results and effects of the Vietnam War, and which in fact characterized the Army throughout much of the 1970s. For examples, see Larry H. Ingraham, The Boys in the Barracks: Observations on American Military Life (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1984); and Michael Lee Lanning, The Battles of Peace (New York: Ivy Books, 1992). I am also indebted to conversations over the years with U.S. Army Colonel James C. Crinean (ret.) on his initial post-commissioning service at Fort Hood, Texas, from 1972 to 1976. 27 Consider this admittedly impressionistic but telling example of this growing religiosity: in the early 1980s, my class at the National War College included one student who was a fer- vent evangelical Christian. He was well liked and did not proselytize, but his open and profound religious commitment was very unusual for the times. When at one bull session someone mentioned the student’s view of an issue, another of½cer said, “Yeah, but he has the sword of righteousness on his side,” and everybody laughed. My sense–which is shared by people in and out of uniform to whom I have related this anecdote–is that thirty years later, the remark would not be made, and if it were, there would be as much criticism as laughter. 28 Too little has been written about this phenomenon, most of which is both super½cial and pejorative. An invaluable exception is Anne C. Loveland, American Evangelicals and the U.S. Military, 1942–1993 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996). See also my review of this work in Armed Forces and Society 24 (1) (Fall 1997): 169–171. The extent to which increased religious commitment shades into active religious intolerance varies sharply by service, with the Air Force having a much higher incidence of the latter than the other services. I must admit that my views on the reasons for this phenomenon are based entirely on impressionistic observations of of½cers of all four services. Given this caveat, I would argue that the greater degree of religious dogmatism among Air Force personnel is due to a hyper- trophic military authoritarianism that derives from overcompensating for the small proportion of their service that actually serves in contact with the enemy; a lack of broader social, political, and intellectual sophistication resulting from the highly technological and managerial orientation of their service; and–I have been told this by a surprising number of individuals–the colocation of the national headquarters of several evangelical Christian organizations in Colorado Springs, the location of the Air Force Academy. For an interesting contrast between the religious atmospheres in one Air Force and one Army institution of professional military education, see Daniel J. Hughes, “Professors in the Colonels’ World,” and Bradley L. Carter, “No ‘Holidays from History’: Adult Learning, Professional Military Education, and Teaching History,” both in Military Culture and Education, ed. Doug- las Higbee (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2010), 164–165, 176. 29 For instance, in 2006 and 2007, only 2 percent of nonprior service enlistees were non–high- school diploma graduates (nhsdgs). Of the general American population, ages eighteen to twenty-four, about 21 percent were nhsdgs. While recruits were much less likely to have had at least some college, or to be a college graduate, compared to eighteen- to twenty-four- year-old civilians (7 percent versus about 39 percent), the difference is due to the fact that, by de½nition, if one is in the military between ages eighteen and twenty-four, one is not in

72 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences college. See Shanea J. Watkins and James Sherk, Who Serves in the U.S. Military? Demograph- Robert L. ic Characteristics of Enlisted Troops and Of½cers, Report CDA08-05 (Washington, D.C.: Her- Goldich itage Foundation Center for Data Analysis, August 21, 2008), 5, http://www.heritage.org/ Research/Reports/2008/08/Who-Serves-in-the-US-Military-The-Demographics-of-Enlisted -Troops-and-Of½cers. The key factor is that the bottom 20-odd percent who are high school dropouts are almost completely absent from the military. I have a personal impression that the proportion of new enlistees with at least some college may well be higher than 7 percent, but these recruits perhaps are embarrassed to tell recruiters why they left higher education. I have been told repeatedly that many young men (much more than young women) enter the military after a comparatively brief time in college, having flunked out due to emotional im- maturity, and that they view the service as a way to attain both that maturity and the gi Bill bene½ts that will be available upon completion of service. 30 Ibid. In 2007, only 2.3 percent of enlisted recruits scored in the bottom 30th percentile of the Armed Forces Quali½cation Test (afqt), the standardized aptitude test given to prospec- tive enlistees–that is, only about 2 percent of those young men and women actually enlisted were in these lower categories, compared to 30 percent of those who took the test. 31 For a scholarly examination of the relationship of obesity to military recruiting, see John Cawley and Johanna Catherine Maclean, Un½t for Service: The Implications of Rising Obesity for U.S. Military Recruitment, National Bureau of Economic Research working paper no. 16408 (Washington, D.C.: nber, September 2010). 32 See Adam B. Lowther, “The Post-9/11 American Serviceman,” Joint Force Quarterly 58 (3) (2010): 75–81. For a plethora of detailed data, see the annual publication of the Department of Defense, Population Representation in the Military Services, which is published on a ½scal- year basis; and Watkins and Sherk, Who Serves in the U.S. Military? 33 See Kenneth Wellesley, The Year of the Four Emperors, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2000). 34 Lawrence Keppie, “The Changing Face of the Roman Legions, 49 bc–ad 69,” in Legions and Veterans: Roman Army Papers 1971–2000 (Stuttgart, Germany: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000), 56. 35 Recent scholarship suggests that the level of literacy, education, social status, and culture among professional volunteer soldiers throughout history may have been substantially understated by historians and contemporary observers, who have mistaken toughness and hardness for intellectual and moral inferiority. Recruiters often looked for, and tried to enlist, men with some education who came from stable backgrounds, as these individuals made better soldiers and posed fewer disciplinary problems. For example, regarding Roman imperial soldiers, see Jean-Michel Carrie, “The Soldier,” in The Romans, ed. Andrea Giardi- na, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 120–130; and Yann Le Bohec, The Imperial Roman Army (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1994), 88–89. A more recent and searching debunking of the volunteer infantryman as “scum of the earth” is in Edward J. Coss, All For the King’s Shilling: The British Soldier under Wellington, 1808–1814 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 29–85. It is therefore possible that the American volunteer soldier is less unique in history in this regard than has been thought to be the case. 36 See, for example, Andrew R. Milburn, “Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Profes- sional,” Joint Force Quarterly 59 (4) (2010): 101–107; and discussion of the article, particularly the response of Richard Kohn and comments on his remarks, “Richard Kohn ½res a warning flare about a Joint Force Quarterly article,” Foreign Policy blog, September 29, 2010, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com. See also David Wood, “Military Of½cers Chafe for Bigger Role in Policy Decisions,” Politics Daily, October 4, 2010, http://www.politicsdaily.com/ 2010/10/04/military-of½cers-chafe-for-bigger-role-in-policy-decisions (accessed October

140 (3) Summer 2011 73 American 29, 2010); and Anna Mulrine, “Can Troops Get Too Much Love? Military Struggles with a Military Dark Side on Veterans Day,” Christian Science Monitor, November 10, 2010, http:// Culture from www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/content/view/print/342309 (accessed November 11, Colony to 2010). For an earlier discussion of such possible tendencies, see the widely circulated and Empire controversial Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012,” Parameters (Winter 1992–1993): 2–20. 37 In an October 26, 2010, email message containing comments on an initial draft of this paper, David Kennedy suggested this question as a framework for this discussion, though he did not endorse the concept. 38 I do not discount the possibility of some disruption of “good order and discipline” and cohesion within the enlisted ranks of the ground combat arms of the Army and Marine Corps. The combat arms’–infantry, armor, ½eld artillery, and special operations forces–highly self-referential masculine combative ethos rather easily tolerates known yet unacknowl- edged homosexuality but feels threatened and disturbed by open acknowledgment. As of this writing, however, such problems, if they have occurred at all, do not appear to be signi½cant. Nonetheless, the lifting of the ban on enlistment of openly homosexual men and women will not take place for several more months, after a lengthy certi½cation process. See David F. Burrelli, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Military Policy and the Law on Same-Sex Behavior,” Report R40782 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, December 20, 2010), esp. 1–2; the report is updated periodically. 39 Sam Jacobson, “The Few, The Proud, The Chosen,” Commentary, September 2010, http:// www.commentarymagazine.com/printarticle/cfm/the-few-the-proud-the-chosen-15507 (accessed September 30, 2010). William James’s original essay can be found in many places; I obtained it at http://www.constitution.org./wj/meow.htm (accessed October 29, 2010).

74 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences Manning & Financing the Twenty-First- Century All-Volunteer Force

Lawrence J. Korb & David R. Segal

Abstract: The transition from a conscription-based to a volunteer force after 1973 required a force of reduced size that could compete ½nancially with the civilian labor market. To compensate for these changes, the Department of Defense took three steps: developing the Total Force, which integrated the reserve component with active duty; maintaining the Selective Service System, which could be activated in case of prolonged and manpower-intensive conflict; and civilianizing as many support functions as possible. Despite this original blueprint, political pressures prevented military and civilian leadership from activating the Selective Service after it became apparent that the Bush administration’s national security strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan required prolonged, large-scale deployments. The result has been enormous physical and psychological strain on personnel, especially in the Army and reserve components; diminishing standards for the quality of recruits; and severe ½nancial strain related to pay raises, retention bonuses, retirement, and health care bene½ts.

In 1973, in the wake of the Vietnam War, the Unit- ed States transitioned from a conscription-based military to an all-volunteer force (avf).1 Faced with new challenges of cost and recruitment, the military substantially reduced the size of its active forces, particularly the Army. Previously, the Selec- tive Service System had made accessing the required number of entry-level military personnel relatively easy. The system drafted young men who frequently served simply to comply with the law and motivated others to volunteer for service to LAWRENCE J. KORB is a Senior avoid being drafted. Once the draft ended, attract- Fellow at the Center for American ing the requisite number of quali½ed recruits each Progress and an adjunct professor year became much more dif½cult. Now subject to at Georgetown University. the dynamics of the labor market, the military con- DAVID R. SEGAL is Professor of fronted competition from other employers, espe- Sociology and Director of the cially in times of low unemployment, and from in- Center for Research on Military stitutions of higher education, as increasing num- Organization at the University of bers of young men and women attended college. Maryland. Thus, the force had to be downsized. (*See endnotes for complete contributor Except for brief periods during the twenty-½ve biographies.) years of Cold War conscription, the Army was the

75 Manning & only service that had to rely on the draft in the percentage of Hispanic men and Financing to ½ll its ranks. The other three services women in the U.S. military have been the All- Volunteer met their quotas with draft-induced vol- dramatic, with rates more than doubling Force unteers; indeed, many men “volunteered” in the last twenty years. Not only is the for the Air Force, Navy, or Marines to avoid Hispanic population larger, but the frac- being drafted into the Army. By volun- tion of Hispanics who meet entrance exam teering, they gained some control over and education requirements for military when they served, in what service, and, service has increased. In 1985, less than frequently, in what occupational special- 4 percent of the enlisted force was His- ty they would be trained. In the absence panic, compared to almost 7 percent of of conscription, the services lost both the civilian labor force, aged eighteen to draftees and draft-motivated volunteers. forty-four, that identi½ed as Hispanic. As the military began to downsize after By 1994, less than 6 percent of enlisted the end of conscription and the Cold War personnel were Hispanic, while the civil- in Europe, the demography of the force ian proportion of Hispanics had grown to also started to change, in both composi- more than 10 percent of the total U.S. pop- tion and patterns of utilization. The young, ulation. As of fy 2000, Hispanics made predominantly unmarried male conscrip- up 13 percent of the military-age civilian tion force was replaced by an older, more labor force but only 9 percent of enlisted professional, more likely to be married personnel. In 2006, though the civilian force. It became more diverse in terms of labor force was 17.1 percent Hispanic, race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orien- only 12.8 percent of the enlisted force tation.2 President Nixon’s Commission on identi½ed as Hispanic. (Table 1 shows the an All-Volunteer Force (the Gates Com- shares of black and Hispanic military permission), which drafted the initial blue- sonnel in recent years.)5 print for the volunteer force, had as- Representation of Hispanics in the mil- sumed that the end of the draft would not itary has not kept pace with the rise in His- alter racial composition and made virtu- panic eighteen to forty-four year olds in ally no mention of women in uniform.3 the civilian labor force. However, the ci- In fact, with the end of conscription, the vilian ½gure includes men and women military immediately began to recruit dis- who do not meet requirements for enlist- proportionately from the African Ameri- ment based on education and immigra- can community. In the early years of the tion status. Until recently, enlistees had to avf, more than one-quarter of new re- have a high school degree; almost all en- cruits, and in some years, as many as one- listed personnel (99 percent) in fy 2001 third of new recruits in the Army, were were either high school graduates or had black. Moreover, black service members earned a comparable credential, such as a have been more likely than white soldiers General Education Development certi½- to reenlist; thus, the proportion of Afri- cate (ged), with the services considering can Americans in the force increased. In graduation more favorable than a ged. 2006, 12.6 percent of the civilian labor Until recently, enlistment also required force aged eighteen to forty-four was Afri- that immigrants be citizens or legal per- can American, compared to 19.3 percent manent residents. Using these quali½ca- of active-duty enlisted personnel.4 tions to determine the eligible Hispanic Although Hispanics were too few to be population, Hispanics may have actually regarded as a signi½cant recruitment pool been overrepresented among enlisted per- in 1973, changes in the past two decades sonnel. For instance, in 2006, the share of

76 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences Table 1 Lawrence J. Percent of Black and Hispanic Representation among Nonprior-Service Military Accessions, Korb & 2003 to 2008 David R. Segal

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Black 15.0 13.5 13.1 13.0 13.6 15.0

Hispanic 11.5 13.2 13.9 13.3 13.5 14.3

Source: David J. Armor and Curtis L. Gilroy, “Changing Minority Representation in the U.S. Military,” Armed Forces & Society 36 (2) (2010): 242.

Hispanics in the civilian labor force aged Legal and regulatory changes have also eighteen to forty-four with at least a high opened new occupations to women. In school degree was 10.9 percent, compared 1991, Congress repealed the provisions of to 11.2 percent of active-duty enlisted per- a 1948 law that prohibited women from sonnel. Given that not all high school grad- flying combat aircraft; since 1994, wom- uates are citizens or even legal immigrants, en have been allowed to serve on Navy Hispanics most likely are enlisting and surface combatant ships. Moreover, the remaining in the military at rates greater Navy is now training the ½rst cohort of than their share of those in the labor force women of½cers who will serve on subma- who meet the minimum quali½cations for rines. Although occupations and positions service. that involve direct offensive ground com- With regard to gender, military service bat have remained closed to women, in in most countries and throughout much both Iraq and Afghanistan, military wom- of history has been viewed as a masculine en have been attached (but not assigned) occupation. Women have been excluded to ground combat units. Given that male entirely, or have served with an auxilia- American soldiers cannot search or inter- ry status or in segregated branches. They rogate Muslim women without greatly of- have faced restrictions on the highest rank fending cultural and religious sensitivities, they can achieve and the military occupa- women have ½lled an important role in a tions they can pursue.6 The culture of the population whose support we are trying American military is still predominantly to win. masculine, and although women compose Thus, the transition from conscription half of the American labor force, they re- to a volunteer force shaped by the dynam- main a minority in the military. However, ics of the labor market led to a reduction as has been the case in other countries in the size of the force as well as increased that have substituted volunteer forces for recruitment among segments of the pop- conscription, as the size of the military has ulation that were relatively disadvantaged contracted, the proportion women repre- in the civilian market. sent has increased.7 At the beginning of the current volunteer force, women com- To compensate for the smaller size of the posed about 2 percent of military person- active force, the Department of Defense nel; they now make up 14 percent. (dod) took three steps. First, it developed

140 (3) Summer 2011 77 Manning & the Total Force concept to integrate the of the avf or the Total Force. Moreover, Financing reserve component (the state-based Na- once conscription was ended, men and the All- Volunteer tional Guard and the federal reserves) with women who joined the reserve compo- Force the active-duty component in those areas nent were also volunteers. Therefore, mo- where the reserves had unique capabili- bilizing the reserve has not had a signi½- ties that were not needed on a full-time cant impact on the willingness of Congress basis, such as civil affairs. During the draft or the American people to raise the thresh- period, reservists were only marginally in- old for going to war, as was the case dur- volved in contingency planning and did ing Vietnam, when many men, including not receive the equipment and training future leaders of the country, joined the necessary to maintain the proper level reserves to avoid the draft. of readiness for deployment. Thus, the re- Second, to prepare for a long war or an serve components played a very minor extended or major conflict, the country part in the Vietnam War. still required men to register with the Se- This arrangement also minimized the lective Service when they turned eighteen. role of Congress, which must authorize Thus, if the Total Force could not handle long-term or large-scale reserve mobili- a particular contingency by itself or with- zations, in Vietnam. But when the dod out putting undue stress on the Total transitioned to the avf, the reserves were Force, the president and Congress could fully integrated into the Pentagon’s war quickly activate the Selective Service. Put plans and, for the most part, were given differently, in case of a signi½cant conflict, the training and equipment necessary the Guard and reserve would be a bridge to carry out their new responsibilities. to conscription. The reserve components Beginning in 1973, the dod no longer would serve as pre-trained citizen-soldiers, planned for separate active-duty and re- to be mobilized in order to buy time while serve components. Instead, it stipulated the conscripts who would join the other that a Total Force would be maintained at components of the Total Force on the bat- an appropriate level of readiness so that tle½eld were being trained. Thus, if the na- its reserve component could be mobilized tion became involved in a war resembling quickly and effectively. In the context of Korea or Vietnam, which would require the Cold War, the avf was intended to maintaining a signi½cant number of be a deterrent force, albeit one that was troops on the ground for a prolonged pe- prepared to address small-scale military riod in a war or combat zone, the Selec- contingencies. During the ½rst, relative- tive Service would be engaged so that the ly short Gulf War, for example, the Army active-duty volunteers would be able to had to mobilize some National Guard spend at least two months at home for combat brigades and some reserve com- every month they spent in a combat zone bat support units to carry out its mission, (as was the case during the ten-year war in although none of these units served more Vietnam). Moreover, the National Guard than six months on active duty. and reserve personnel would not have to While some analysts have argued that be mobilized more than one year out of having to mobilize some reserve compo- every six. Not only would this arrange- nents (as part of what is mistakenly called ment ease the strain on the troops, but it the Abrams Doctrine) would weaken the would prevent the ground forces from president’s ability to engage in a large or having to lower their standards to meet re- extended conflict, this potential outcome cruiting and retention goals in prolonged was not the major impetus for the creators conflicts–a necessary step, given that

78 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences Americans tend to become impatient and After a bumpy start that led many civil- Lawrence J. less supportive when wars drag on. ian and military leaders to call for a return Korb & David R. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (jcs) made the to the draft, the avf came into its own in Segal point forcefully in 1981 when the Reagan the mid-1980s. The force performed so administration was on the verge of revers- well in the ½rst Persian Gulf War in 1991 ing President Carter’s action to reinstitute that many who had been skeptical about draft registration, which had been tempo- ending the draft became convinced that rarily suspended between 1975 and 1980. the avf was the best model for the Unit- In a memo to the secretary of defense, the ed States. Moreover, when the Cold War jcs stated, “The avf provides peacetime ended in Europe in the early 1990s, the manpower.” In their view, “Selective Ser- military was able to reduce the size of the vice registration supports mobilization active force from 2.2 million to 1.3 mil- for war.”8 lion, or by 40 percent, and thus meet its Third, to allow the now more costly mil- recruitment and retention goals at a com- itary personnel to focus on their core paratively low cost during a period of low missions and competencies, the Penta- unemployment and an economic boom in gon would privatize, civilianize, or con- the private sector. Between fy 1990 and tract out as many support functions as fy 1999, the cost of maintaining military possible. New recruits would no longer personnel declined by $31 billion, or 26 be required to perform such nonmilitary percent, in real dollars. tasks as cooking and cleaning (kp, or “kitchen police,” as it was then known). The second reason for the reduction in The use of civilians has been part of the active-duty forces was that, in order to American way of waging war since before compete in the marketplace for person- the Civil War.9 However, the downsizing nel, the military had to substantially raise of the military, coupled with the increase basic pay, particularly for new recruits. in the number of U.S. missions and de- From 1948 to 1973, when the draft was in ployments in the wake of the Cold War existence, the Pentagon could pay those resolution in Europe, has resulted in an individuals it compelled to serve only unprecedented number of civilians sup- subsistence wages. In fy 1968, the aver- porting the active-duty military, including age pay of an individual on active duty was in the battle space.10 $5,780. With 3.4 million people on active After 1973, if the Pentagon had a task to duty in that year (the peak year for the be performed, it would look ½rst to pri- size of the force), the total cost of mili- vate contractors, as long as doing so did tary personnel for military annual com- not compromise national security. If the pensation (basic pay and bene½ts) was job was an inherently governmental func- $19.9 billion. By 1974, the number of peo- tion, the dod would assign it to a civilian ple on active duty had been slashed to 2.2 government employee. If it required a mil- million, a 35 percent reduction. Yet mili- itary person, the dod would recruit a tary personnel costs had gone up. By 1974, member of the reserve component. Using expenses had risen to $24.2 billion, a 22 active-duty military personnel would be percent jump from 1968, and the person- a last resort; indeed, recruiting and re- nel portion of the budget grew from 28 to taining avf members were much more 35 percent. The cost per individual had ris- costly and dif½cult than outsourcing tasks en to $10,895, a 90 percent increase com- to members of the private sector, civil- pared with the days of the draft. The ser- ians, or the reserve component. vices could not simply raise the pay of new

140 (3) Summer 2011 79 Manning & service members to attract volunteers. To not equally distributed among the servic- Financing maintain pay equity and avoid pay comes. The Marine Corps, which places a pre- the All- Volunteer pression among the ranks, basic pay was mium on youth, prefers the great majori- Force increased across the board. ty of its personnel to serve for less than ten However, the civilian leadership failed years. The Air Force, which invests heav- to use the period from the end of the Cold ily in technical training, seeks to retain War to 9/11 to bring military pay and personnel to realize a return on its invest- bene½ts under control. In fact, senior of- ment. Between 20 percent and 30 percent ½cials took steps or allowed policies to be of Air Force separations have been retire- adopted that made the force more expen- ments since the 1980s, and fewer than 30 sive. One of the major military personnel percent have been simply ful½llment of expenses, the military retirement system, enlistment contracts. was designed in an era when active-duty Given that neither the Pentagon nor in- pay was comparatively low, very few peo- dividual service members put money into ple served on active duty until retire- a trust fund to pay for the cost of retirement, and Social Security and Medicare ment, the dod paid these bene½ts off the did not exist. Nor was life expectancy very top of each year’s budget. By the 1980s, high. Until 1986, the system allowed a per- the unfunded liability of the military re- son who spent twenty years on active duty tirement system had grown to almost $1 to receive an immediate annuity of 50 per- trillion, while retirement funds for civil- cent of his or her base pay, indexed to in- ian federal employees and social security flation, and free medical care (including were running surpluses because workers for dependents) for life. A member who had to contribute to these plans. To bring served for at least thirty years would re- this situation under control, Congress di- ceive 75 percent. Most military personnel rected the dod to switch to an accrual sys- did not serve long enough to earn retire- tem and reduce bene½ts after twenty years ment. In the 1980s and early 1990s, fewer of service to 40 percent, for those joining than 10 percent of separations were retire- the military after August 1, 1986. ments, with most people leaving because However, in 1999, under pressure from they had completed contractual periods lobbyists for military retirees, the dod of service, or for disciplinary, medical, or reversed the decision and went back to other reasons. However, in 1993, after allowing those who completed twenty twenty years of the avf, the retirement years once again to receive 50 percent. At ½gure reached 15 percent of separations, about the same time, the dod also per- showing that while most people did not mitted retirees and their dependents who serve for a full career, the size of the career turned 65 to retain their medical bene½ts force had grown signi½cantly. And with in- even after they became eligible for Medi- creased longevity, the people who served care. Finally, after 1995, the dod and Con- for a career were likely to draw retire- gress stopped raising premiums for the ment pay for more years than they served military health care program, tricare,11 active duty. Enlisted personnel who joined and allowed individuals to pay $19 a at age eighteen could start drawing retire- month, or $38 for a family, a rate that is ment pay at thirty-eight, while of½cers, still in effect. who were likely to have been commis- sioned upon graduation from college at After the attacks of 9/11, the Bush ad- age twenty-two, could draw retired pay at ministration made preventive war the age forty-two. Moreover, retirements are cornerstone of its national security strat-

80 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences egy to win what it labeled the “war on ter- The services also found that the racial Lawrence J. ror.” It invaded Afghanistan in October and ethnic composition of the force was Korb & David R. 2001 and Iraq in March 2003. Although the changing. Recruitment among African Segal administration declared the “mission Americans, who had high propensities to accomplished” in both theaters in Spring serve and had been overrepresented in 2003, it became clear that the United the volunteer force since its inception, States would have to keep hundreds of declined. Recruitment among Hispanic thousands of troops on the ground in both Americans, who form the most rapidly countries for a signi½cant period of time. growing sector of the population (but How would the military provide vast were not recognized as numerically im- ground forces within the con½nes of the portant in 1973), increased. Women in the avf? If the Joint Chiefs had followed the military, who are barred by law from as- original blueprint for the avf, they would signment to small ground combat units, have demanded that the secretary of de- found that the nonlinear battle spaces of fense and the president activate the Se- Iraq and Afghanistan placed them in com- lective Service, which, by 2000, had on ½le bat: the highways on which they operat- some twenty million men between the ed military vehicles became the most ages of eighteen and twenty-four. But they dangerous places to be; and they have lacked the political will to challenge their accompanied infantry units conducting civilian superiors. Moreover, when Gen- patrols in hostile territory because, un- eral Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, like male soldiers, they can both search told Congress that the administration and interrogate Muslim women without seriously underestimated the number of offending the local population. troops that would be needed to stabilize As a result of waging these two large Iraq after the invasion, he was marginal- ground wars, which required the deploy- ized by his civilian superiors. ment of about two hundred thousand Similarly, the Bush administration’s na- troops to Iraq and Afghanistan on a con- tional security team did not want to raise tinuous basis from 2003 to 2009, the ci- the issue of Selective Service with Con- vilian and military leaders overstretched gress and the American people for fear and abused the active and reserve compo- that they might ask more questions about nents of the avf, particularly the ground the necessity and cost of regime change forces. Not only did this overextension and nation-building in Iraq. And Congress undermine the readiness of the Army and did not want to broach the subject with- Marines, but it was a moral outrage perpe- out support from the military or the ad- trated against the troops and their families. ministration. Thus, the American military began to To understand how much strain the fail- rely on the reserve forces to a degree not ure to activate the Selective Service has seen since World War II, but in this case put on the troops, consider the horrendous without the support of conscription. It situation of the Army, which bore the deployed both reserve and active forces brunt of the wars in Iraq and Afghani- more frequently, and for longer periods of stan. The Army has reorganized so that time, than it knew was optimal for combat the brigade combat team (bct), rather performance. It accepted more recruits at than the division, has become its major the lowest mental and moral standards maneuver unit in ground combat. A bct deemed acceptable since the advent of the consists of a combat arms brigade along volunteer force. with its artillery and support units and

140 (3) Summer 2011 81 Manning & contains about two thousand soldiers, ployed overseas at least once, and two Financing with some variation based on the type of were deployed twice. Moreover, by the end the All- Volunteer combat unit at its core. In Spring 2007, at of 2007, four more enhanced brigades Force the height of the so-called surge in Iraq, were sent to Iraq even though none of the Army had twenty of its forty-four com- them had been demobilized for less than bat brigades on the ground in either Iraq three years.15 The members of the Guard or Afghanistan. had signed up to serve as part of a strate- Of these twenty brigades, nine were al- gic reserve, training one weekend a month ready on second tours, seven were serving and two weeks each summer to maintain a third tour, and two were on a fourth de- their skills. They expected to serve primar- ployment of at least twelve months. More- ily if needed for domestic contingencies over, of the twenty-four brigades not de- such as natural disasters. Like their col- ployed in Spring 2007, ten had already leagues in the federal reserves, they could been deployed for two tours, and three had also serve as a strategic reserve for the ac- been deployed three times in the previous tive component until the Selective Service ½ve years.12 could be activated, or they could serve Of the twenty brigades in Iraq or Af- short tours in peacekeeping operations in ghanistan in Spring 2007, none had been places like the Balkans, or in short con- back home for a full two years between de- flicts, such as the ½rst Gulf War. But now ployments–the time period regarded as they had effectively become an operational optimal for recovery from combat–and expeditionary force. four had one year or less at home between combat tours. Of the twenty-four brigades This abuse of the Total Force’s Army not in theater, eleven had less than two component had severe repercussions on years between deployments, and ½ve had the service, the effects of which can be less than one year. Moreover, ten of the grouped into four categories. First, in brigades had served longer than one year order to meet its recruiting goals, the in theater. All told, by Spring 2007, forty- Army had to raise its recruiting budget as three of the Army’s forty-four brigades well as the bonuses paid to new recruits. had served at least one tour (see Table 2; It also had to increase the proportion of only the brigade in Korea was not deployed personnel it recruited at the lowest accept- to one of the combat zones).13 able mental and moral standards for in- The reserve component, which in- coming soldiers. In the early years of the cludes the National Guard and the ser- volunteer force, recruits were drawn large- vice or federal reserves, was also severely ly from the middle range of the socioeco- overstretched. Fifty-three percent of the nomic structure. That is, the bottom quar- Army’s combat forces are in the National tile was underrepresented because its Guard14; by early 2007, about 600,000 members disproportionately did not qual- reservists had been mobilized and about ify for service based on educational, apti- 420,000, or 80 percent of the Guard and tude, or legal grounds, and the upper strata reserve, had been deployed to Iraq or disproportionately elected not to serve.16 Afghanistan, with an average of eighteen This pattern held throughout the remain- months per mobilization. Of these ser- der of the twentieth century,17 a period in vice members, about 85,000, or 20 per- which the services recruited above the cent, had been deployed more than once. minimum standards set by the dod. Every one of the Army National Guard’s From fy 2005 through fy 2008, the sixteen enhanced brigades had been de- Army did not achieve its goal of bringing

82 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences Table 2 Lawrence J. Deployment History of Currently Deployed U.S. Army Combat Brigades, as of Spring 2007 Korb & David R. Segal

Combat Brigades Combat Brigades Combat Brigades Combat Brigades Serving 1st Tour Serving 2nd Tour Serving 3rd Tour Serving 4th Tour

1st Cavalry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 10th Mountain Divi- 4th Brigade 1st Brigade 1st Brigade sion, 2nd Brigade 2nd Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Divi- 4th Brigade 2nd Brigade 2nd Brigade sion, 2nd Brigade 1st Cavalry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade 3rd Brigade 1st Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Divi- 2nd Brigade sion, 1st Brigade 1st Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Divi- 4th Brigade sion, 3rd Brigade 2nd Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Divi- 2nd Brigade sion, 4th Brigade 2nd Infantry Division, 173rd Airborne Bri- 3rd Brigade gade Combat Team 25th Infantry Divi- sion, 3rd Brigade 25th Infantry Divi- sion, 4th Brigade

Source: Lawrence J. Korb, Peter Juul, Laura Conley, Myles Caggins, and Sean Duggan, “Building a Military for the 21st Century: New Realities, New Priorities” (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2008). in 90 percent Tier I recruits (those with The Army compounded the problem by high school diplomas and who scored at increasing the number of moral waivers least average on the Armed Forces Qual- that it issued. In fy 2004, about 12 percent i½cation Test). In fact, in fy 2007, it did of the recruits received waivers, including not even reach 80 percent.18 The percent- for criminal convictions and even felonies. age of high school graduates recruited by In fy 2006, the Army approved waivers the Army dropped from 92 percent in fy for 8,219 recruits; in fy 2007, the number 2004 to 87 percent in fy 2005, and this rose to 10,258. Waivers for felony convic- downward trend continued.19 The Army tions for serious crimes, such as theft and also reported a decline in recruits scoring assault, increased from 249 to 511.20 high on its aptitude tests, from 72 percent By fy 2008, the number of waivers ex- in fy 2004 to 67 percent in fy 2005; at the ceeded 25 percent. All told, the Army gave same time, it accepted more recruits in eighty thousand moral waivers in the fy the lowest acceptable mental category. 2005 to fy 2008 period. Even though it

140 (3) Summer 2011 83 Manning & lowered its standards and increased waiv- Fourth, repeated tours to combat zones Financing ers, the Army had to increase its maximum without suf½cient dwell time, or time be- the All- fy Volunteer enlistment bonus from $6,000 in 2003 tween deployments, also took a toll on the Force to $40,000 by fy 2008.21 Recruit quality individual men and women serving and improved toward the end of the decade, as their families. Close to ½ve hundred thou- unemployment, particularly among young sand soldiers developed mental problems, people, increased dramatically with the and divorce and suicide rates skyrocket- economic recession. As the economy im- ed.23 For the ½rst time since the advent of proves, and as unemployment decreases, the avf, the Army suicide rate surpassed recruit quality may once again decline. that of the comparable civilian popula- Second, to meet its retention goals, the tion. Prior to 2001, the military suicide Army increased promotion rates for of- rate rarely reached ten per one hundred ½cers and enlisted personnel as well as thousand personnel. By 2009, a year in retention bonuses. By 2008, virtually all which more than three hundred soldiers ½rst lieutenants and captains not only took their own lives, the rate had doubled were promoted to captain and major, re- to more than twenty per one hundred spectively, but also were promoted early thousand personnel. and with signi½cant bonuses. Typically, Finally, beyond repercussions for the only 75 percent of captains are promoted force, failure to activate the Selective Ser- to major and 90 percent of ½rst lieu- vice substantially increased military man- tenants to captain, but by 2008, close to power costs. Partly motivated by guilt over 100 percent of captains and ½rst lieu- what they were doing to the troops, the tenants were promoted to major and cap- administration and Congress gave mili- tain, respectively. Thus, the Army lost a tary personnel raises larger than required decision point that it had used to weed by the Employment Cost Index, and nei- out low performers among junior of½- ther branch wanted to raise tricare cers. For most of the volunteer-force era, premiums. As a result, the dod’s budget company of½cers (lieutenants and cap- for military personnel rose from $77 bil- tains) competed for promotion. Some who lion in fy 2001 to almost $160 billion by would have preferred to remain in service fy 2009, and health care costs jumped were passed over for promotion and had from $19 billion to $50 billion. These costs to leave under an up-or-out management are projected to rise by at least 8 percent policy. With a 100 percent promotion each year. rate, the criterion for retention became Both the secretary of defense and the simply a desire to remain in service. Rates chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rec- of promotion to lieutenant colonel and ognize that neither the Pentagon nor the colonel increased as well. For majors pro- country can afford these exploding per- moted to lieutenant colonels, the rate sonnel costs. The 2010 Quadrennial De- jumped from 60 percent to 90 percent. fense Review Independent Panel, a board For lieutenant colonels promoted to colo- composed of military and civilian personnel, the rate rose from 40 to 60 percent.22 nel experts and approved by the secretary Third, in 2007, to compensate for of defense, recommended establishing a the failure to activate the draft, the Army commission to evaluate these costs. But and Marines increased their permanent there is no need for elaborate study. To end-strength by 92,500, or 15 percent. bring personnel costs under control, the The Army also added another 22,000 on following actions must be taken: a temporary basis in 2009.

84 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences • First, require that military retirees who cal elites–including the current and for- Lawrence J. have access to health insurance through mer vice presidents and the forty-second Korb & David R. their job or the job of a family member and forty-third presidents–avoided com- Segal use that system rather than tricare. Of bat service, conscription was ended in about 4.5 million military retirees and 1973. their families, roughly three-quarters are To ensure that America could go to war estimated to have access to health insur- but would not take the decision to do so ance through civilian employers. How- lightly, the creators of the avf kept the ever, half of them remain on tricare Selective Service in place. In their view, because of its dramatically lower cost. As draftees would augment the volunteers private health insurance costs increase, in the active and reserve component, who this percentage is likely to go up as well.24 would handle small contingencies or the opening days of signi½cant conflicts. Not • Second, apply a means test for deciding only would activating the Selective Ser- whether retirees and their family mem- vice compel citizen involvement in war bers older than sixty-½ve are eligible for making, but it would prevent the country tricare for life as opposed to sole re- from putting undue strain on volunteers. liance on Medicare. Despite the fact that the George W. Bush • Third, raise tricare premiums from administration deployed more than two $460 a year to $1,000 for a military fam- hundred thousand people on a continu- ily, and then adjust that ½gure annually ous basis in Iraq and Afghanistan, and al- to reflect the rising costs of health care. though Congress approved these conflicts, our political and military leaders did not • Fourth, use military annual compensa- have the courage to activate the draft. tion (the combination of base pay, hous- Many of the volunteers in the active and ing and subsistence allowances, and the reserve ground forces were abused, phys- tax advantage of the two), rather than ically and psychologically, while Ameri- just base pay, as a basis for deciding the cans went shopping. The military and the size of the annual pay raise. nation will pay the costs of this moral fail- • Fifth, after the United States withdraws ure for a long time. Let us hope that the from Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the next time we engage in large campaigns, size of the ground forces to pre-9/11 lev- political and military leaders will not again els and commit to using the Selective Ser- forget their obligations to the country and vice if America is again required to en- those who serve it. gage in a large-scale and protracted war.

In the twentieth century, citizens of the United States believed that when Ameri- ca’s army went to war, America went to war. Thus, when we engaged in signi½cant conflicts, like the two World Wars, or even more limited conflicts like Korea and Vietnam, we drafted men to augment the standing force. But because our civilian and military leaders misled us about Vietnam, and because many of the politi-

140 (3) Summer 2011 85 Manning & endnotes Financing LAWRENCE J KORB the All- * Contributor Biographies: . is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Volunteer Progress and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. His publications include Force Reshaping America’s Military: Four Alternatives Presented as Presidential Speeches (2002); A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003), and Serving America’s Veterans: A Reference Handbook (2009). DAVID R. SEGAL is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Center for Research on Mil- itary Organization at the University of Maryland. His publications include Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy (1989); The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (coedited with Charles C. Moskos and John Allen Williams, 2000); and “Changing Conception of the Military as a Profession” (with Karin DeAngelis), in American Civil-Military Relations: Fifty Years after The Soldier and the State (edited by Suzanne Nielsen and Don Snider, 2009). 1 For an excellent analysis on this topic, see Beth Bailey, America’s Army: Making the All-Vol- unteer Force (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009). 2 David R. Segal and Mady W. Segal, “America’s Military Population,” Population Bulletin 59 (2004): 1–40. 3 David R. Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 36–38. 4 Mady W. Segal, Meridith Hill Thanner, and David R. Segal, “Hispanics and African Ameri- cans in the U.S. Military: Trends in Representation,” Race, Gender & Class 14 (3–4) (2007): 48–64. 5 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007. 6 Mady W. Segal, “Women’s Military Roles Cross-Nationally: Past, Present, and Future,” Gen- der & Society 9 (6) (1995): 757–775. 7 Michelle Sandhoff, Mady W. Segal, and David R. Segal, “Gender Issues in the Transforma- tion of an All-Volunteer Force: A Transnational Perspective,” in The Decline of Citizen Armies in Democratic States, ed. Stuart Cohen (New York: Routledge, 2010), 111–131. 8 Bailey, America’s Army, 227. 9 Deborah D. Avant, “Selling Security: Post-Cold War Security Services in Historical Perspec- tive,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001. 10 Deborah D. Avant, “From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War,” International Organization 54 (2000): 41–72. 11 tricare is the current health care program of the dod military health care system. It was formerly known as champus (Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Ser- vices), which was established in 1966 as part of the legislation that established Medicare. 12 Lawrence J. Korb, Peter Rundlet, Max Bergmann, Sean Duggan, and Peter Juul, “Beyond the Call of Duty: Report Reviews Army’s Overuse” (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2007). 13 Lawrence J. Korb, Peter Juul, Laura Conley, Myles Caggins, and Sean Duggan, “Building a Military for the 21st Century: New Realities, New Priorities” (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2008). 14 The National Guard consists of units that evolved from state militias and that therefore have responsibilities to state governments. Guardsmen in peacetime generally train for one weekend each month and two weeks during the summer and can be mobilized by the governors of their states in the event of natural disasters or civil unrest. They also are members of the armed forces mobilization base and can be activated and called to federal service by the president. Members of the federal reserve forces, by contrast, have no state responsibilities.

86 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences 15 Lawrence J. Korb and Sean Duggan, “Caught Off Guard: The Link Between Our National Lawrence J. Security and Our National Guard” (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2007). Korb & David R. 16 Thomas J. Burns, David R. Segal, Michael P. Silver, William W. Falk, and Bam Dev Sharda, Segal “The All-Volunteer Force in the 1970s,” Social Science Quarterly 79 (1998): 390–411. 17 Jerald G. Bachman, David R. Segal, Peter Freedman-Doan, and Patrick O’Malley, “Who Chooses Military Service? Correlates of Propensity and Enlistment in the United States Armed Forces,” Military Psychology 12 (1998): 1–30. Cf. Robert L. Goldich, “American Mil- itary Culture from Colony to Empire,” in this issue. Drawing on data reported by the Her- itage Foundation, which uses census tract data where available to estimate the socioeconomic status of volunteers, Goldich suggests that the highest strata of society are overrepresented in the American military. However, while census tracts exist for the most part in urban or high-population-density areas, the military recruits primarily in rural or low-density areas. Only six states and the District of Columbia are fully tracted. Existing tracts range from about 2,500 to 8,000 people, and while they are initially designed to be relatively homogeneous demographically, there is still considerable internal variance. Moreover, there has been great resistance to changing tract boundaries, which would eliminate the ability to make compar- isons across decennial censuses. Thus, the homogeneity of tracts might well decrease with increasing population diversity. Methodologists refer to imputing geographical measures to estimate individual characteristics as the “ecological fallacy.” The Heritage Foundation reports that recruits who cannot be located in a census tract are randomly assigned to one based on zip code data. Other survey-based research agrees that recruits from the bottom of the socioeconomic scale are underrepresented because of the military’s education-based selectivity, but it disagrees with the interpretation at the top of the scale. Census-tract estimates of individual status require an assumption that recruits’ income is at the mean for their tract or is randomly distributed around that mean. We ½nd these assumptions problematic. See Shanea J. Watkins and James Sherk, Who Serves in the U.S. Military? Demographic Characteristics of Enlisted Troops and Of½- cers (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation Center for Data Analysis, August 21, 2008). 18 Korb, Juul, Conley, Caggins, and Duggan, “Building a Military for the 21st Century.” 19 Ibid. 20 See Karin K. De Angelis and David R. Segal, “Building and Maintaining a Post-9/11 All-Vol- unteer Military Force,” in The Impact of 9/11 on Politics and War: The Day that Changed Every- thing, ed. Matthew J. Morgan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 43–60. 21 Korb, Juul, Conley, Caggins, and Duggan, “Building a Military for the 21st Century.” 22 Ibid. 23 Korb, Rundlet, Bergmann, Duggan, and Juul, “Beyond the Call of Duty.” 24 Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “Gates Seeking to Contain Military Health Costs,” The New York Times, November 28, 2010.

140 (3) Summer 2011 87 Military Contractors & the American Way of War

Deborah D. Avant & Renée de Nevers

Abstract: Contractors are deeply intertwined with the American military and U.S. foreign policy. Over half of the personnel the United States has deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 have been contractors. Their relationship with the U.S. government, the public, and domestic and international law differs from that of military personnel, and these differences pose both bene½ts and risks. America’s use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) can provide or enhance forces for global governance. Yet PMSCs can also be used to pursue agendas that do not have the support of American, international, or local publics. Thus far, the use of PMSCs has proved a mixed bag in terms of effectiveness, accountability, and American values. Moving forward in a way that maximizes the bene½ts of contractors and minimizes their risks will require careful management of the uncomfortable trade-offs these forces present.

More than one-half of the personnel the United States has deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 have been contractors. Part of the global private military and security industry, contractors are deeply intertwined with the American military and U.S. foreign policy.1 Whatever one chooses to call them–mercenaries, contractors, or private military and security companies (pmscs)–they have a different relationship to the U.S. government, the DEBORAH D AVANT American public, and domestic and international . is Professor law than do military personnel. These differences of Political Science and Director of the program and Center for pose both bene½ts and risks to the effectiveness, International Studies at the Uni- accountability, and values represented in American versity of California, Irvine. actions abroad. In the best case, American use of pmscs can pro- RENÉEDENEVERSis an Associ- vide or enhance forces for global governance. ate Professor of Public Adminis- pmscs can recruit from around the world to quick- tration at the Maxwell School of ly mobilize expertise as needed. If their employees Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. are instilled with professional values and skills and engaged in a way that is responsive to the demands (*See endnotes for complete contributor of the U.S. public, the international community, biographies.) and local concerns, these forces could contribute to

88 managing a global demand for security tion’s announcement of the troop surge Deborah D. that U.S. forces alone cannot meet. In the in Afghanistan, contractors made up an Avant & Renée worst case, pmscs can provide a means estimated 62 percent of the U.S. presence de Nevers for pursuing agendas that do not have in that country.4 The use of contractors the support of American, international, in these conflicts represents a dramatic or local publics. They may siphon off expansion in the U.S. military’s reliance U.S. dollars for practices that are waste- on pmscs. During the 1991 Gulf conflict, ful, are antithetical to U.S. interests, or the ratio of troops to contractors was undermine global stability. Thus far, the roughly ten to one; in 2007, the ratio of use of pmscs has produced mixed troops to contractors in Iraq was roughly r results: it has increased effectiveness one to one.5 In Afghanistan in 2010, there somewhat, but often at the expense of were roughly 1.43 contractors for every w accountability and with dubious atten- American soldier.6 The Commission on

tion to the values the United States and Wartime Contracting (cwc), established the international community hold dear. by Congress in 2008, estimates conserva- Moving forward in a way that maxi- tively that at least $177 billion has been mizes the bene½ts of contractors and obligated in contracts and grants to sup- minimizes their risks will require care- port U.S. operations in Afghanistan and ful management of the uncomfortable Iraq since 2001.7 trade-offs these forces pose. Pmscs offer a wide range of services, The degree to which the United States including tasks associated with military relies on private security vendors has operations, policing, and the gray area become clear during the hostilities in between the two that is an increas- Iraq and Afghanistan, as contractors have ingly large part of twenty-½rst-century provided logistical support for U.S. and conflict. Common services include sup- coalition troops. Less well known is that port for weapons systems and equip- as U.S. forces were stretched thin by the ment, military advice and training, lo- lawlessness resulting from the fall of Sad- gistical support, site security (armed dam Hussein in 2003, the ½rst “surge” and unarmed), crime prevention, police involved private personnel mobilized to training, and intelligence.8 While some protect expatriates working in the coun- ½rms specialize in a speci½c area, others try and train the Iraqi police force and provide an array of services, and a few army; and a private Iraqi force was hired offer the entire range. The cwc divides to guard government facilities and oil the services provided by contractors into ½elds.2 Retired military or police from three categories: logistics, security, and all over the world, employed by a wide reconstruction.9 array of pmscs, worked for the U.S. gov- Logistics services include the supply of ernment (and others) throughout the food, laundry, fuel, and base facility con- country. struction. Kellogg Brown and Root (kbr) Although precise ½gures are dif½cult to held the U.S. Army’s logistics civil aug- determine, by 2008, the number of per- mentation contract (logcap) in the sonnel in Iraq under contract with the early years of the Iraq and Afghanistan U.S. government roughly equaled or was conflicts. In June 2007, the new contract greater than the number of U.S. troops on (logcap iv) was awarded to three the ground.3 In September 2009, two companies: DynCorp International llc, months prior to the Obama administra- Fluor Intercontinental, Inc., and kbr. In

140 (3) Summer 2011 89 Military Iraq alone, the logcap contract paid out tory of providing military training in Contractors $22 billion between 2003 and 2007.10 Saudi Arabia; mpri, a ½rm that gained & the American Security services include guarding peo- prominence by training Croatian and Way of ple, buildings, and convoys. Many securi- then Bosnian troops in the 1990s; and War ty contractors are armed; in carrying out usis, which was established as the result their duties, they routinely shoot and are of an Of½ce of Management Personnel shot at.11 The Congressional Budget Of- privatization effort in 1994.16 Parsons ½ce estimated that in 2008, 30,000 to Corporation, another older ½rm with 35,000 of the contractors working in Iraq a long record in the building of infra- were armed; in early 2010, private se- structure, has worked on many large curity contractors numbered roughly infrastructure projects. Myriad others 11,000.12 Blackwater (now Xe) employ- have delivered various capacity-building ees, recruited to support both the mili- services.17 tary and the U.S. State Department, have Though their use in Iraq and Afghan- received the most notoriety for their istan dominates the discussion of con- security work in Iraq and, more recently, tractors in the U.S. context, pmscs are in Afghanistan. Working under the State important players in all aspects of the Department’s Worldwide Personal Pro- U.S. military and U.S. foreign policy.18 tective Services (wpps) contract in Iraq, Contractors working for the Depart- Blackwater personnel carried weapons, ments of Defense (dod) and State con- had their own helicopters, and defended tribute signi½cantly to U.S. foreign policy against insurgents in ways hard to distin- projects aimed at enhancing develop- guish from military actions.13 They were ment and security in a number of states; later joined by newer companies such as they also support U.S. troops and dip- Triple Canopy, Crescent Security Group, lomats. Their tasks cover all three cat- and Custer Battles.14 egories noted above. Consider, for in- Reconstruction services incorporate every- stance, the contractor support for U.S. thing from building physical infrastruc- foreign assistance policies in Africa and ture (for roads, communication, water, Latin America. and power) to strengthening institutions In Africa, the United States has relied (for example, by training government on the private sector to support missions employees, including military, police, such as military training and peacekeep- and justice personnel at the national, ing operations. These programs fall with- provincial, and local levels; supporting in africom, the U.S. military command civil society groups; and promoting rule for Africa established in 2007, and the of law and democratization). A wide State Department’s Africa Peacekeeping range of pmscs, along with other con- program (africap), which is similar in tractors, have delivered these services. structure to the army’s logcap con- DynCorp, an old company with roots in tract. In 2008, africap’s stated objec- technical support and an increasing pres- tives were to enhance regional peace and ence in policing and police training, has stability in Africa through training pro- trained Iraqi police, constructed police grams in peacekeeping and conflict man- and prison facilities, and built capacity agement and prevention for African for a justice system.15 Three companies armed forces, as well as through logistics that provided training for the new Iraqi and construction activities in support of Army early in the conflict are Vinnell peacekeeping and training missions.19 Corporation, a company with a long his- africom’s stated purposes are “to build

90 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences strong military-to-military partnerships,” ed about 20 percent (38,700) U.S. citi- Deborah D. to help African countries better address zens, 37 percent (70,500) Iraqis, and Avant & Renée the threats they face by improving Afri- 43 percent (81,006) third country nation- de Nevers can military capacity, and to bolster als.25 In March 2010, the total number peace and security there.20 Since its in- of contractors had dropped to 95,461, ception, africom has awarded con- 26 percent of which were U.S. citizens, tracts for training, air transport, informa- 56 percent third country nationals, and tion technology, and public diplomacy to 18 percent Iraqis.26 The number of locals companies such as DynCorp, which is working as private security contractors training Liberia’s armed forces, and pae, (as opposed to logistics or reconstruction a company specializing in infrastructure, contractors) in Iraq has been relative- mission support, and disaster relief.21 ly low: about 10 percent of private securi- U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, ty contractors in 2010 were Iraqi. In dominated since at least 2000 by anti- Afghanistan, the dod has relied more narcotics and counterterrorism efforts, heavily on locals. The total number of also relies heavily on contractors.22 contractors in March 2010 was 112,092, Plan Colombia, the central element of a 14 percent of which were U.S. citizens, counterdrug initiative focused on the 16 percent third country nationals, and Andean region, has sought to reduce drug 70 percent Afghans. Also, the numbers production in Colombia and strengthen of locals who work in private security Colombian security forces to better are higher than those who provide other secure the state against threats posed by services. About 93 percent of the pri- terrorists, drug traf½ckers, and paramili- vate security contractors in 2010 were tary groups. The program has failed to Afghans.27 slow drug production there, but military When the United States hires pmscs to and police training conducted by both train militaries abroad, the contractor U.S. troops and civilian contractors has may take a small team of U.S. personnel led to security improvements.23 Roughly (as mpri did in Croatia), or it may recruit half of the military aid to Colombia is an international team (as DynCorp did in spent on private contractors funded by Liberia). Companies providing logistics the dod and the State Department. Like support abroad often rely on locals or Plan Colombia, the 2007 Mérida Initia- third country nationals to cut costs. Hir- tive, a U.S.-Mexico assistance agreement, ing locals or third country nationals can seeks to disrupt drug-traf½cking activi- also avoid a variety of political restric- ties by providing equipment and training tions and diminish visibility when the to Mexican security forces.24 United States is undertaking more controversial missions. For instance, Con- Pmscs are incorporated in many coun- gress restricted the number of American tries and employ a mix of U.S. citizens, contractors the United States could use local citizens, and “third country nation- under Plan Colombia to three hundred als” (recruits from neither the United (raised to four hundred in 2001); pmscs States nor the host state). That combi- bypassed this restriction by hiring per- nation changes over time and from con- sonnel from Peru, Guatemala, and other tingency to contingency. For example, Latin American countries.28 an April 30, 2008, census by the U.S. In addition to nationality, personnel Army Central Command found that the hired by pmscs vary in their employ- 190,200 contractors in Iraq includ- ment backgrounds. pmscs that offer

140 (3) Summer 2011 91 Military military training primarily hire former lize civilian police forces, ½rst for Haiti in Contractors military of½cers. Those that offer armed 1994, and then for contingencies in the & the American security services hire a broader range of Balkans, via contracts with DynCorp. Way of military veterans. Those that offer police Different concerns regarding effective- War training often hire former police of½cers. ness emerge with contracting for logis- As the number of companies and the tics, security, and reconstruction servic- range of services they offer have expand- es. Logistics services are fundamental to ed to meet market demand, companies the military’s ability to operate. Without have hired employees with more diverse personnel to provide logistics services, experience. the U.S. military simply cannot go to war. Contracting for logistics also requires Contracting for military and security strong oversight. Early in the Iraq con- services has raised questions about the flict, serious concerns were raised about effectiveness of using force, political adequate staf½ng for logistics contracts. accountability for the use of force, and General Charles S. Mahan, Jr., then the the social values to which force adheres. Army’s top logistics of½cer, complained Some concerns vary according to which of troops receiving inadequate support service is provided, while others apply because of problems deploying contrac- more generally across different tasks. tors.30 After the Coalition Provisional Military effectiveness rests on a range of Authority appointed him the new Head components, including skill of person- of Contracting Authority in February nel, quality of materiel, and military 2004, Brigadier General Stephen Seay responsiveness to contextual or external hired more acquisition staff, enabling constraints. A critical component noted overburdened contracting of½cers to in recent research is integration: that is, do their jobs more effectively.31 More the degree to which military plans follow recently, military personnel have ex- from overarching state goals and to pressed general satisfaction with the which activities are internally consistent quality of logistics services.32 Many wor- and mutually reinforcing.29 ries over logistics contracting in Iraq and Contracting can influence both the Afghanistan have focused on lack of over- military’s effectiveness and its broader sight (particularly inadequate numbers mission. For example, when U.S. goals of contract of½cers), along with waste change, as they did after the Cold War’s and fraud.33 But logistics contracts re- end, contracting enhances the military’s quire fewer skills speci½c to military per- ability to integrate forces with (new) sonnel, and logistics contractors do not political goals. Speed and flexibility are need to work as closely with military per- the hallmark bene½ts of contracting, sonnel on the ground as do security and and contractors can quickly provide reconstruction contractors. tools or skills for new missions that The activities of contractors who pro- regular military forces may lack–or can- vide security services are most similar not identify rapidly within their ranks. to those performed by soldiers. Many Using a contract with mpri, for instance, are armed and, in carrying out their the Africa Crisis Response Initiative duties, pose deadly risks to those work- (acri) military training courses for ing around them. Periodic tensions be- French-speaking African countries were tween contractors and regular forces– staffed with employees who spoke French. aggravated by disparities in pay and The U.S. military was also able to mobi- responsibilities–have raised the issue

92 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences of whether these two types of forces can In today’s conflicts, reconstruction Deborah D. work together effectively. A recent survey tasks–particularly training–are often Avant & Renée of dod personnel and their perceptions more crucial for achieving the goals of de Nevers of private security contractors suggests the war effort than either logistics or that combining these forces in conflict security services. Often, reconstruction zones is problematic. Lower-ranking and tasks must be coordinated so that police younger personnel in particular claim training and justice reform, for instance, that pay disparities between military per- complement one another, and so that sonnel and contractors are detrimental to civilian leaders understand the military the morale of their units in Iraq.34 How- they are expected to oversee. Contractors ever, many security services tasks do not who provide reconstruction services require close interaction with military must not only deliver quality work but personnel. Roughly one-third of military coordinate that delivery with other con- personnel surveyed in Iraq, for example, tractors, the U.S. military, and other gov- had no ½rsthand experience with private ernment agencies. Thus, these services security contractors.35 These tasks are are among the most crucial for U.S. goals also frequently less crucial to the per- and the most challenging to coordinate. formance of military units than are lo- Moreover, concerns have been raised gistics services. about the military’s ability to ensure Nonetheless, the behavior of contract- that these tasks are carried out effective- ed security personnel matters to the overly when they have been outsourced. all U.S. mission. The hazards of question- Notably, DynCorp’s training of the able behavior were demonstrated most Afghan National Police and Army is vividly in the September 2007 Blackwater widely regarded as a failure, but the dod shoot-out in Nisoor Square. Both Iraqis has been unable to move the training and Americans, however, had consis- contract to a different company because tently reported this type of behavior long of DynCorp’s legal protest regarding before that dramatic incident. Private contract competition.37 Yet these jobs are forces have tended to focus on the strict less important to the functioning of mili- terms of their contracts (protecting par- tary units than logistics support, and they ticular people or facilities) rather than pose less deadly risk than security oper- on the overarching goals of the United ations do. Problems with integration States (effectively countering the insur- of activities–or unity of effort–were gency). Some of the tactics developed to among the most signi½cant challenges to protect clients, such as driving fast reconstruction, as noted by the cwc’s through intersections and rapid resort to 2009 interim report.38 force, alienated the local population in Thus, the overall picture of how con- ways that undermined the broader coun- tractors shape effectiveness is compli- terinsurgency strategy. Similar problems cated. Clearly, contractors can quickly persist in Afghanistan. Among military deploy skilled personnel, and the majori- personnel who had experience with secu- ty of contractors are good at what they rity contractors, approximately 20 per- do. But the United States does not have cent reported ½rsthand knowledge of the capacity to oversee these contracts pmsc failure to coordinate with military successfully, and this failure has led to forces “sometimes”; another 15 percent waste, fraud, and particularly with regard of this population witnessed such coordi- to security contracts, abuse. Further- nation problems “often.”36 more, the level of integration needed for

140 (3) Summer 2011 93 Military the most effective delivery of services has claim contracted forces can be more re- Contractors lagged in Iraq and Afghanistan. sponsive (given the potential for losing & the American their contracts) than the military bureau- Way of How does contracting for military and cracy. Flexibility in how contracts are War security services affect the United States’ written can accelerate mobilization in capacity to take political accountability for ways that military organizations often forces? Mobilization via contract oper- cannot deliver. Certainly, contractors are ates differently than military enlistment, designed to deliver whatever the client with consequences for the relationship wants. They are thus much less prone to between the force and civilians–the standard operating procedures or organi- political elite and the public included. zational bias that can inhibit responsive- The U.S. experience in Iraq suggests that ness in military organizations. forces raised via contract operate much Not at all apparent, however, is the U.S. more opaquely than military forces. government’s capacity to oversee con- Largely because of this reduced trans- tracts in a manner suf½cient to generate parency, Congress has struggled to exer- responsiveness. Even as dod contract cise constitutional authorization and transactions increased by 328 percent oversight. Furthermore, the public has between 2000 and 2009, the staff respon- less information about the deployment of sible for reviewing contractor purchasing contractors. Though evidence suggests at the Defense Contract Management that the public is just as concerned about Agency declined from seventy in 2002 to the deaths of contractors as it is about fourteen in 2009.40 Contracting in indi- military deaths, statistics on the former vidual service branches faced similar are much less likely to be known.39 problems. The dearth of contract of½cers Using contractors speeds policy re- makes it dif½cult to effectively oversee sponse but limits input into the policy contracts at home, but concerns about process. As the insurgency grew in Iraq, adequate oversight are even more press- for example, the United States mobilized ing when pmscs are operating abroad. 150,000 to 170,000 private forces to sup- The relevant contracting of½cer is often port the mission there, all with little or no not even in theater. Inadequate contract congressional or public knowledge–let staf½ng and oversight have been impor- alone consent. President Bush was not tant complaints in both Iraq and required to appeal to Congress or the Afghanistan and have been tied to public for these additional forces, which numerous problems–from poor per- doubled the U.S. presence in Iraq. As evi- formance to waste, fraud, and abuse. dence from the reaction to the request for Though the risks of poor oversight vary a mere twenty thousand troops for the according to task, dif½culties in oversee- 2007 surge suggests, the president may ing contractors have been common to all well not have been allowed to deploy three areas of contract services. The chal- additional personnel if he had been lenge of overseeing expeditionary oper- required to obtain permission. Because ations may undermine companies’ re- the use of pmscs garners little attention, sponsiveness to contractual obligations. their employment reduces public arous- Overall, then, the use of contractors al, debate, commitment, and response to has skirted accountability, making half the use of force. of U.S. mobilization largely invisible to How contracted forces relate to civilian Congress and the public; as a result, it leaders is an important question. Some has masked the number of conflict-relat-

94 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences ed casualties.41 Though one could argue bring an even more diverse array of pro- Deborah D. that contractors are more responsive to fessional norms. Concerns about lax in- Avant & Renée political leaders, this likelihood can only dustry vetting of employees have raised de Nevers be the case once political leaders know the question of whether pmscs are what contractors are doing–and evi- increasingly hiring employees with less dence shows that this has not been the distinguished service records.43 Finally, case in Iraq and Afghanistan. many pmscs also hire local personnel. In addition to lower costs, these forces A ½nal point of evaluation is to look bring many bene½ts: local knowledge at whether contractors allow the exer- and ties that can aid companies’ effec- cise of force in a way that is consistent tiveness. However, they also bring local with the larger values, culture, and expec- values that may not be consistent with tations of the society they represent. democracy, liberalism, or the laws of war. Over the course of the Cold War and in For instance, evidence suggests that local its aftermath, military professionalism companies hired by the United States to within advanced industrial states in- provide convoy security in Afghanistan creasingly enshrined principles drawn funneled money to Taliban forces or from theories of democracy (civilian were otherwise engaged in corrupt prac- control of the military and abidance by tices that promise to undermine U.S. the rule of law), liberalism (respect for goals and the values it seeks to support in human rights), and the laws of war.42 Afghanistan.44 Though marginal differences exist, the Even if all contractors were well-social- values that govern U.S. military person- ized military or police professionals, they nel are largely shared with their Western nonetheless operate in a different envi- partners. The ease of mobilization that ronment–vis-à-vis both the law and contracting offers is viewed by some as command and control–than troops do. consistent with the United States’ evolv- Commanders are less likely to notice or ing concerns with global security and to punish offenses committed by con- global governance. But in practice, the tractors than offenses committed by use of pmscs has not ½t well within the troops. Over time, a lack of punishment normative and legal frameworks that can be expected to lead to more lax underpin global security. behavior; indeed, many have claimed Two factors strain the impact of con- that this outcome is the case in Iraq and tracting on the values represented by mil- Afghanistan. Though reliable, systematic itary forces. First, precisely which profes- evidence is not yet available, a wealth of sional norms inform the pmsc industry anecdotal evidence lends credibility to remains unclear. Americans employed by this conclusion.45 Military of½cers have pmscs have a range of military and law expressed their concern that the “culture enforcement backgrounds–some distin- of impunity” surrounding pmscs has be- guished and others less so. However, come a real problem.46 the industry increasingly recruits from a global market. As recruiting and sub- The increasing U.S. reliance on con- contracting have become more transna- tractors suggests that national military tional, personnel are from countries as forces are unsuited to meet the foreign diverse as the United Kingdom, Nepal, policy goals that U.S. leaders consider Fiji, South Africa, El Salvador, Colombia, vital to national security. It may also re- and India. These geographic differences flect the degree to which leaders believe

140 (3) Summer 2011 95 Military public support does not exist for the kind promise to improve behavior but may Contractors of foreign policy they deem necessary. also limit reliance on local residents in a & the American The fact that leaders can turn to contrac- way that could increase costs and inhibit Way of tors has allowed them to pursue their the input of local knowledge. To the ex- War goals nonetheless. tent that U.S. standards are perceived as While potentially bene½cial to effec- national rather than global, they may tiveness, the availability of contractors omit a large portion of the global indus- has also permitted leaders to avoid rec- try. The effort now under way to coordi- onciling foreign policy with national val- nate regulatory and legal mechanisms ues and institutions. Enhancing effec- and create global standards of behavior tiveness in this way has undermined the for personnel and companies in the accountability of U.S. forces. Even as the pmsc industry is a promising develop- United States works to make the use of ment, but its implementation will re- contractors more ef½cient and effective, quire a good deal of cooperation between part of the attraction is that private forces the United States, other governments, are accountable to leaders, not publics ngos, journalists, industry groups, and or their representatives, thereby allow- additional stakeholders.48 ing elected representatives to pursue a Reliance on contractors has generated global mission without ½rst convincing tensions between the effectiveness of the electorate to make the sacri½ces re- forces, their accountability, and the de- quired. gree to which they represent U.S. values. Efforts to make contractors more These tensions, though not insurmount- broadly accountable, though, can under- able, are not easily resolved. They require mine the flexibility that makes them persistent management by U.S. leaders effective. For instance, spelling out more in cooperation not only with the Ameri- clearly in each contract the limits of can public but also with other govern- action can address congressional con- ments and the variety of additional stake- cerns and enhance accountability, but it holders that have an interest in how con- diminishes the flexibility that pmsc per- tractors behave. Thus, while contracting sonnel can deliver on the ground. Fur- is likely to remain, it is also likely to con- thermore, contractors are even more tinue to generate unease in U.S. foreign important to the State Department than policy. they are to the dod. Attempts to rein in contractor numbers, then, would further fuel questions about the appropriate balance between civilian and military activities in U.S. foreign policy initiatives. Although interagency efforts have sought to ensure that U.S. assistance in Africa, for example, extends beyond military training, the budgetary and personnel imbalance between the dod and the State Department makes such a realign- ment of programs unlikely to occur in the near future.47 Finally, efforts to implement professional and legal standards for contractors

96 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences endnotes Deborah D. DEBORAH D AVANT Avant *Contributor Biographies: . is Professor of Political Science and Director & Renée of the program and Center for International Studies at the University of California, Irvine. de Nevers Her publications include Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (1994), The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (2005), and Who Governs the Globe? (with Martha Finnemore and Susan Sell, 2010). RENÉEDENEVERSis an Associate Professor of Public Administration at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. Her publications include Regimes as Mechanisms for Global Governance (1999), Comrades No More: The Seeds of Change in Eastern Europe (2003), and Combating Terrorism: Strategies and Approaches (with William Banks and Mitchel Wallerstein, 2007). 1 The contemporary “total force concept” explicitly includes contractor personnel. For general overviews of the private military and security industry, see Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Deb- orah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 2005). For a discussion of the role of contractors in U.S. foreign policy more generally, see Allison Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of Amer- ican Power and the Future of Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009). 2 David Isenberg, “A Government in Search of Cover: Private Military Companies in Iraq,” in From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies, ed. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 83. 3 Determining exact numbers is dif½cult because the Department of Defense (dod) did not begin to collect reliable information on the contractors it employed until 2007. Furthermore, contractors were hired by many other government agencies in addition to the dod; Moshe Schwartz, “Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, December 14, 2009), 4. 4 In Afghanistan’s case, this percentage represents a drop in the ratio of contractors to uniformed personnel, from a high of 69 percent contractors in December 2008; ibid., 5–13. 5 This ratio was at least 2.5 times higher than the ratio during any other major U.S. conflict; Congressional Budget Of½ce, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq” (Washing- ton, D.C.: cbo, August 2008). 6 T. X. Hammes, “Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strate- gic Impact,” Strategic Forum no. 260 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 2010). 7 Commission on Wartime Contracting, “At What Risk? Correcting Over-reliance on Con- tracting in Contingency Operations” (Washington, D.C.: cwc, February 2011), 1. 8 Avant, The Market for Force. 9 Commission on Wartime Contracting, “At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Washington, D.C.: cwc, June 2009). 10 Congressional Budget Of½ce, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq.” 11 Ibid. 12 Schwartz, “Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan,” 6. 13 Dana Priest, “Private Guards Repel Attack on U.S. Headquarters,” The Washington Post, April 6, 2004. 14 See descriptions of these companies in Steve Fainaru, Big Boy Rules: America’s Mercenaries Fighting in Iraq (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2008); T. Christian Miller, Blood Money: Wast- ed Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq (New York: Little, Brown, 2006); and Tom Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006).

140 (3) Summer 2011 97 Military 15 See http://www.dyn-intl.com/history.aspx. Contractors 16 & the See the discussion of Vinnell Corporation in Avant, The Market for Force, 18, 114, and 148. American mpri stands for Military Professional Resources Incorporated; the company is now a part Way of of L-3 Communications. For a discussion of its role in the Balkans, see The Market for Force, War chap. 3. For the history of usis (us Investigations Services), see http://www.usis.com/ Fact-Sheet.aspx. 17 See http://www.parsons.com/pages/default.aspx. 18 Stanger, One Nation Under Contract. 19 Of½ce of Logistics Management, AFRICAP Program Re-Compete (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, February 6, 2008), https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode= form&tab=core&id=4fbad7bde428a5595aca7bfe3cdbc02d&_cview=1 (accessed May 6, 2010). 20 Government Accountability Of½ce, “Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command,” gao Report #gao-09-181 (Washington, D.C.: gao, February 2009). 21 See http://www.paegroup.com. 22Connie Veillette, Clare Ribando, and Mark Sullivan, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin Amer- ica and the Caribbean,” Congressional Research Service Report #RL32487 (Washington, D.C.: crs, January 3, 2006), 2. 23 Government Accountability Of½ce, “Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved,” gao Report #gao-09-71 (Washington, D.C.: gao, October 2008), 15. 24 Clare Ribando, “Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 19, 2010), 1–3. 25 Congressional Budget Of½ce, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq” (Washing- ton, D.C.: cbo, August 2008), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/08-12 -IraqContractors.pdf. 26 Moshe Schwartz, “Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Back- ground and Analysis” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 10, 2010), 9. 27 Ibid., 12; Moshe Schwartz, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contrac- tors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress” (Washing- ton, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 21, 2011), 10. 28 Lora Lumpe, “U.S. Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues,” Foreign Policy In Focus Special Report, May 2002, 11–12. 29 Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley-Mitchell, eds., Creating Military Power: The Sources of Mil- itary Effectiveness (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007). 30 This complaint was aired in a draft of what became Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, Tex.: Combat Institute Press, 2004). In the ½nal version of the document, however, the discussion of the dif½culty with logistics did not mention contractors. General Mahan’s complaints were also reported by Anthony Bianco and Stephanie Anderson Forest, “Outsourc- ing War,” Business Week, September 15, 2003; and David Wood, “Some of Army’s Civilian Contractors are No-Shows in Iraq,” Newhouse News Service, July 31, 2003. 31 Of½ce of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Recon- struction Experience (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of½ce, 2009), 172–173. Another example of the negative consequences of poor oversight is seen in the contractor abuses at Abu Ghraib prison; see Steve Schooner, “Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government,” Stanford Law and Policy Review 16 (2005): 549–572.

98 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences 32 On troop satisfaction, see Commission on Wartime Contracting, “At What Cost?” 45. Deborah D. 33 Avant Ibid., 39–59. & Renée 34 Sarah Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q. Burkhart, Meghan Zander-Cotugno, de Nevers Edward O’Connell, and Michael Webber, Hired Guns: Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Santa Monica, Calif.: rand Corporation, 2010), Figure S1. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Christine Spolar, “Military Training of Afghan National Police Mired in Contract Dispute,” The Huf½ngton Post Investigative Fund, February 22, 2010, http://huffpostfund.org/stories/ 2010/02/military-training-afghan-national-police-mired-contract-dispute (accessed Febru- ary 23, 2010). 38 Commission on Wartime Contracting, “At What Cost?” 3. 39 Deborah D. Avant and Lee Sigelman, “Private Security and Democracy: Lessons from the us in Iraq,” Security Studies 19 (2) (2010). 40 Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “Defense Agencies Must Improve Their Oversight of Contractor Business Systems to Reduce Waste, Fraud, and Abuse,” cwc Special Report 1, September 21, 2009, http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/ index.php/reports. See also, Jacques S. Gansler et al., Urgent Reform Required: Army Expedi- tionary Contracting (Washington, D.C.: Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, October 31, 2007), 4. 41 T. Christian Miller, “Contractors in Iraq are Hidden Casualties of War,” ProPublica, Octo- ber 6, 2009, http://www.propublica.org/feature/kbr-contractor-struggles-after-iraq-injuries -1006 (accessed December 31, 2009). 42 See Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 43 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private Se- curity Contractors in Afghanistan, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., September 28, 2010, http://info .publicintelligence.net/SASC-PSC-Report.pdf (accessed October 15, 2010). 44 Dexter Filkins, “Convoy Guards in Afghanistan Face an Inquiry: U.S. Suspects Bribes to Tal- iban Forces,” The New York Times, June 7, 2010. 45 See, for instance, Fainaru, Big Boy Rules. 46 Schwartz, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan,” 19. There are international efforts to establish standards for pmscs, codes of conduct for personnel, and standards for the legal responsibilities of companies and individuals that may begin to address some of these concerns. See International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “The Montreux Docu- ment on Private Military and Security Companies” (Montreux, Switzerland: icrc, Sep- tember 17, 2008); Swiss Directorate of Political Affairs, “International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers” (Bern, Switzerland: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, November 9, 2010). 47Government Accountability Of½ce, “Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Im- prove Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command.” 48 See International Commission of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal Department of For- eign Affairs, “The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies”; Swiss Directorate of Political Affairs, “International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers.”

140 (3) Summer 2011 99 Filming War

Jay M. Winter

Abstract: In the century since the outbreak of war in 1914, ½lm directors have alternated between two approaches to ½lming war: the spectacular approach, aiming at a kind of realism, and indirection, drawing away from realism. The balance between these choices varies over three periods. The ½rst is the era of silent ½lms from 1914 to roughly 1930, including the overflow of silence into the ½rst talkies. Silent ½lms used indirection out of necessity, though the search for the spectacular was evident as well. The second is the era of World War II and after, extending roughly to 1970, when spectacular techniques brought a kind of realism to the cinematic representation of the “good war.” The third is the era of asymmetrical wars, since 1970, when many ½lms used indirection at times more than spectacle to capture the moral ambiguity of warfare, and when the Holocaust entered the cinematic narrative of World War II.

The portrayal of military conflict in ½lm is a main- stay of the industry. Box of½ce considerations are never absent in the framing and gestation of commercial ½lm, and the perennial popularity of ½lms about combat–terrestrial or extraterrestrial– requires us to take measure of their power to represent war and men at war. The ½lm industry came of age as a centerpiece of mass entertainment at precisely the moment industrialized war arrived in 1914. That ½rst world war helped globalize American ½lm, which saw ex- ponential growth at the same time the U.S. position in the war remained neutral.1 Many national industries flourished in the interwar years and JAY M. WINTER is the Charles J. after. It is impossible, however, to treat ½lm in Stille Professor of History at Yale strictly national terms because the upheavals of the University. His recent publica- 1930s produced a massive hemorrhage of talent tions include Dreams of Peace and from continental Europe to London and Holly- Freedom: Utopian Moments in the wood, among other destinations. European ½lm- Twentieth Century (2006), Remem- makers such as Fritz Lang, Ernst Lubitsch, and bering War: The Great War between Billy Wilder brought their art with them, and Memory and History in the Twenti- eth Century (2006), and Shadows of braided it together with American approaches to War: A Social History of Silence in the the medium. In this essay, I examine representa- Twentieth Century (edited with Efrat tions of war from a transnational perspective, but Ben-Ze’ev and Ruth Ginio, 2010). all the while recognizing the signi½cance of nation-

100 al institutions and codes, many of which would take up arms again: ½rst in Man- Jay M. are explicitly political in character. churia, then in Ethiopia, next in Spain, Winter In this effort, I identify roughly three and ½nally throughout Europe. European periods in the cinematic history of war. ½lmmakers who later fled the Continent, The ½rst is the silent epoch, from about such as Jean Renoir, did some of their 1900 to 1930. I extend this ½rst period greatest work in the later 1930s. This peri- beyond 1926, when sound was initial- od also saw the production of some of the ly introduced, because many directors few paci½st classics in the history of the schooled in silent ½lm imported silence medium. into the talkies. They framed sound by its I have somewhat arbitrarily chosen absence, and did so in dramatically im- 1970 as the end of this second phase of portant ways. Consider the famous scene the cinematic history of war, but I base in Fritz Lang’s classic ½lm M (1931), in my decision on two interlaced develop- which a child murderer, played by Peter ments. First, the Holocaust assumed a Lorre, faces a kangaroo court made up of central place in the history of World War hundreds of Berlin criminals. The faces II and, increasingly, became a subject of of those criminals are scanned in a forty- powerful cinematic treatment in and of ½ve-second tracking shot that seems to itself. Second, the Vietnam moment ar- last for hours. Silence did not disappear rived, both repeating many of the hero- with the talkies; it entered into and in- ic stereotypes of the World War II era, flected the medium in a host of ways, and to a degree, subverting them. Films even years after the introduction of sound. of Vietnam drew on World War II tropes We frequently lose sight of the advan- but went beyond them, too. Defeat mat- tages to be had from silence. Suggestion tered, yet so did dissent and disaffection, is more hypnotic than instruction. When muting the unflinchingly patriotic pos- the great radio personality Alistair Cooke ture of early Vietnam ½lms, such as The was asked, after forty years of presenting Green Berets (1968), and producing in the Letter from America on bbc radio every next, third period of war ½lms much Sunday morning, why he did not work darker and more ambiguous treatments in television, his answer was revealing. of the conflict: for example, The Deer Radio, he said, had better pictures. And Hunter (1978), Apocalypse Now (1979), and silent ½lm, I believe, delivered better Full Metal Jacket (1987). For these reasons, sound, by drawing on viewers’ pulse and it makes sense to separate war ½lms made heartbeat and internal voices. It is best to between 1933 and 1970 from silent ½lms treat silent ½lm not as a simple precursor before and from the ½lms of asymmetri- of the talkies, but as a powerful art form cal war that came after. in its own right, one that launched the The third phase of representations of cinematic history of war.2 war in ½lm covers the period from the The second phase takes place in the 1970s to our own times, when changes in lead-up to World War II and its after- the face of war itself inflect the face of math, from 1933 to 1970. I include prewar in ½lm. Historian Charles Maier has 1939 ½lms because the fear of the return described the end of the age of territo- of total war is evident in 1930s cinema. riality,3 which forces us to see war not War was both unthinkable and just in national terms alone, but in subna- around the corner. Images of war in the tional and transnational terms as well. 1930s were seen by audiences that includ- War is no longer primarily a classic mili- ed millions of veterans, many of whom tary encounter between nation-states and

140 (3) Summer 2011 101 Filming armies, but rather a messy and chaotic locaust became more and more impor- War array of violent clashes between national tant as time went on. Here, the cinematic troops, say, American forces in Somalia, tools of indirection were necessary be- Iraq, or Afghanistan, and a wide variety cause the problem of representing the of insurrectionary groups–not nations. Holocaust de½es direct solutions. Since the 1970s, war has often meant The third, post-1970 generation of war “dirty wars” waged by military elites ½lms did not leave World War II behind, against their own people, including in but instead oscillated between morally Central America, South America, Africa, simplifying war and recognizing its hor- and the Middle East. Not surprisingly, rors and moral predicaments. These ½lms ½lm has followed the tides of war into are one important source of the moral am- these destinations, too. biguity with which the public has come Asymmetrical war also means civilian to view war in the last few decades. As casualties on a scale, and as a proportion war has changed, it has been increasingly of all losses, greater than ever before. dif½cult to construct moral certainties This distinction matters in the history of about its meaning. Yet ½lms that show ½lm because the shadow of the Holocaust the ugliness of war in recent years stop is also cast on the victims of wars remote short of paci½sm. They suggest not that from those of Nazi-occupied Europe. war is always immoral, but rather that it War as horror is not new, but the horror is out of control and leaves men broken in is no longer limited to the battle½elds: it its wake, whatever the outcome. If these is present in cities, in the countryside, ½lms have anything positive to say, it is indeed, everywhere. One reason the Ho- to visualize the camaraderie, courage, locaust has become metonymical, stand- and sacri½ce of war, af½rming its power ing for victims of war and violence else- to bring out both the best and the worst where, is that no one of Jewish origin was in ordinary people. Over the course of a safe anywhere within the Nazis’ reach. century, war ½lms have developed from Wars of extermination are wars without studies of conflict to studies of combat- limits; for that reason, among others, the ants, their loves, their hatreds, their inner war against the Jews was a transforma- lives. tional event. Within this chronological framework, In each of these three phases of war- I note what may be termed a pendulum ½lm history, ½lmmakers have operated in theory in the choices directors of war one of two registers: spectacle or indirec- ½lms make. Early ½lmmakers’ ½rst forays tion. Film has always flourished in the were not realistic; they were indirect, al- atmosphere of the spectacular drama of lusive, suggestive, performative. They had war.4 But the power to convey the specta- to be so, because the roar of war–the cle was limited in the ½rst phase by the sound of battle and of artillery and of absence of sound, and in the third phase airpower–was not reproducible. The by the absence of moral transparency ½lms’ technological weakness was their between “good” and “evil.” World War II strength. They gestured toward images of was the cinematic “good war” par excel- battles rather than pretending to show lence in that its power to simplify and war “as it really was.” No one could, and dramatize latched on to a cause that no one can, do that. was clearly intelligible in precisely those In the second generation of war ½lms, terms: the war of good against evil. In the the quest for “realism” dominated. Over evolution of that moral calculus, the Ho- and over, audiences saw combat, sacri-

102 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences ½ce, and killing and were led by ½lmmak- War stories were at the core of D. W. Jay M. ers to believe they “were there,” on Gua- Grif½th’s The Birth of a Nation (1915), Winter dalcanal, in Iwo Jima, on Bataan. Techni- which wandered through the Civil War cal effects and massive injections of cash and Reconstruction with a romantic produced this mighty canvas of war, but brush, memorably presenting heroism in however hard they tried, ½lmmakers battle, the assassination of President Lin- could as little show the face of war realis- coln, and the “chivalry” of the Ku Klux tically as they could show the dark side of Klan. From that time on, silent ½lmmak- the moon. In the World War II period, the ers turned to the 1914 to 1918 conflict, pendulum swung too far toward what which formed the perfect setting for was taken to be verisimilitude. adventure stories, melodramas, love sto- That urge to show the “real face of war” ries, and the like. Whenever a director is still apparent, but it exists alongside needed a handy separation or tearful re- another powerful impulse, one that moves union, the war could provide it; if the away from realism and toward sugges- virtues of heroism or loyalty were to be tions of the unrepresentability of war. In the vehicle for the celluloid star of the part, the emergence of this new element moment, why not use the war? But aside reflects the literariness of cinematic cul- from good box of½ce entertainment, cin- ture. War literature, from Ernest Heming- ema contributed to popular narratives of way’s A Farewell to Arms, to e. e. cummings’s the war by locating it within identi½able The Enormous Room, to Joseph Heller’s and mundane themes, thereby human- Catch 22, has made the madness of war izing it. By suggesting the monumental part of our cultural landscape. The liter- scale of the conflict, in a way prose rarely ary witnessing of the victims of the Holo- could do, cinema mythologized the war caust, from Anne Frank, to Primo Levi, as a vast earthquake against the backdrop to Elie Wiesel, has brought that madness of which the petty conflicts and hopes of into an even more haunting register that ordinary mortals were played out. John is increasingly at the heart of World War Dos Passos’s novel 1919 (1932) used col- II narratives. But the change in represen- lage and indirect narration to paint his tations of war is also a consequence of vast canvas; ½lm could do the same, and the change in war itself: its civilianiza- in an instant. And while Dos Passos’s tion, its transformation into the asym- novels reached a literary public, ½lm metrical struggle between men in uni- reached a much larger audience. form and ordinary people, brutalized, If, as historian Paul Fussell famously mutilated, killed by the millions since the showed, war novels stood on the knife- 1970s. In this period of new forms of war- edge between realistic and ironic modes fare, war ½lms introduce us to different of narrative, war ½lms oscillated between kinds of landscapes of violence, doing so the realistic and the epic, or what I call in new, and indirect, ways. There is very the cinema of indirection and the cinema of little in the pre-1970 period to match the spectacle.5 Yet the realistic genre was per hallucinatory effects of the Israeli ½lm force indirect because sound was absent, Waltz with Bashir (2008), a cartoon explora- and silence was either preserved or re- tion of shell shock. Innovative approaches placed by impromptu or arranged piano have the power to move beyond realism or organ music. Audiences brought their to explore the face of war–at a tangent, at own sound effects with them, and there- an angle, indirectly, and with great power. by were drawn into the story in even more And that face is of a soldier, not of war. compelling ways. Consider the contrast

140 (3) Summer 2011 103 Filming after 1926, when the score, inscribed on Indeed, the introduction of sound effects War a sound track, told us (and still tells us) enabled viewers to believe that they could how to react to what we see. With sound actually imagine war. What is thinkable is came emotional dirigisme, a kind of au- what is doable, and one rami½cation of thorial instruction that we should feel the introduction of the talkies was that suspense later, relief later still, and reso- war ½lms helped domesticate a set of vio- lution at last. lent events that, at their core, resist accu- In 1916, the British government pro- rate representation. To be sure, all ½lms duced a ½lm entitled The Battle of the misrepresent war; but talkies do so with Somme, which was distributed and shown gusto and with even more powerful effect. while soldiers were still engaged in this Part of the reason for the unrepre- staggering six-month operation. Perhaps sentability of war in all ½lm is its chaotic two million people saw it in six weeks, character. Battle has no vanishing point, the equivalent of ½fteen to twenty mil- no center of gravity, and the rubble of lion Americans today going to the same destruction accompanying industrialized ½lm at roughly the same time. At the cen- warfare in 2011–just as in 1916–makes ter of the ½lm was an entirely false recon- it dif½cult to see what is happening and struction of what it meant to “go over the why. Films have a proscenium arch, just top.” A line of soldiers in a trench crawl like the theaters and music halls out of up to its lip, then stand and proceed which they were born; they frame action through smoke and ½re to engage the and draw our eyes to some central point enemy. One man is “hit” and slides down of action. Yet the oddness of war, the the trench. Entirely silent, without any weird, uncanny sights it presents to sol- musical accompaniment, the scene had a diers, is frequently beyond even today’s staggering effect on the audience, many special effects. of whom had relatives serving in the If the physical landscape of battle is war at that very moment. Women faint- almost always trivialized or reduced to ed; others cried out and had to be escort- mundane proportions, the emotional ed from the cinema. Silence provided the landscape of battle also eludes cinematic visceral punch.6 portrayal. We cannot capture the smell of Sound ½lms framed audience reactions cordite or decaying bodies, or the stench in ways that tended to reduce their own of the detritus war brings in its wake. affective choices to the ones the cineaste Fear can be suggested but never tasted in or his composer provided. Silent ½lms ½lm, and without that dimension, cine- were more open-ended emotionally, and matic representations of war always hence potentially more powerful. Yet remain stylized or worse. Thus, both the whatever the sound or silence accompa- material and this affective framing of war nying the scene, those screen images in ½lm tend to reduce it to formulae or carried a kind of authenticity, a surface clichés. realism, with them. They appeared to be Silence had another major advantage about real people: a real man hit on the in the early interwar years. Silent ½lm, lip of a trench, who could have been the which can be de½ned as a set of cinemat- husband, brother, or son of someone in ic nonspeech acts,7 framed the mourning the audience. The power of ½lm to lie process in ways rarely, if ever, matched about war was revealed at its inception, by talkies. Music and banal dialogue fre- though the power of sound expanded quently turn ½lmic treatments of this this ½eld of invention in signi½cant ways. theme into kitsch and worse. By saying

104 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences less, and leaving viewers to create the senting war to cinematic audiences. Jay M. words and voices in their own minds, World War II ½lms were certainly pro- Winter silent ½lm had the power to portray the duced long after 1970,9 and I return to predicament of men and women alive in this matter below. In addition, there were the aftermath of wars that took life, and nonrealistic, indirect, and unusual war not by the scores but by the millions. ½lms in this era. One such ½lm, René Clé- Spiritualism had wide appeal in Ameri- ment’s Jeux interdits (Forbidden Games) ca both before and after World War I, and from 1952, directs our attention away it gave a mournful character to many war from the battle½eld of 1940 and to the ½lms. When viewers reached the end of ways two children, aged four and seven, Lewis Milestone’s All Quiet on the Western deal with war and death in the French Front (1930), they encountered the faces countryside. Another is the Japanese of the dead looking back at them before masterpiece Biruma no tategoto (The Bur- they marched off to eternity. This was, mese Harp), ½rst released in 1956 in black in a sense, a very American ½lm, spoken and white and re-released in color in with American accents and without in- 1985. Kon Ichikawa’s tale concerns a Jap- flection. Five years earlier, King Vidor’s anese soldier who, at the end of the war, The Big Parade had also offered a down- is sent by his Allied captors to persuade beat version of war, including the hero’s his comrades not to ½ght on after the loss of a leg in combat and his rejection Armistice. He fails in his mission and is by his prewar sweetheart. His French nearly killed. In his effort to rejoin his petite amie managed to come to the rescue comrades, he traverses old sites of com- afterward. The Big Parade was the biggest bat and is horri½ed by the hundreds of box of½ce hit of the silent era.8 unburied Japanese corpses he sees. He In the 1930s, a number of talking ½lms decides to put on the robes of a Buddhist presented the dread of war to a public monk and stays to tend the graves of his more and more concerned with the men- fellow soldiers. His lonely vigil trans- ace of a new war. Frank Borzage’s 1932 forms the landscape of war into an eter- ½lm A Farewell to Arms was downbeat, as nal landscape of mourning. was Sidney Franklin’s The Dark Angel Stanley Kubrick’s Paths of Glory (1957) (1935). More elegiac, but marked by a is a devastating portrait of evil or incom- sense of the futility of war was Jean petent commanders saving their careers Renoir’s masterpiece La Grande Illusion by executing soldiers for cowardice in (1937). Sympathetic to German soldiers, World War I. Charged with failing to suc- ½lled with the ½erce and de½ant patriot- ceed in a senseless and impossible opera- ism of French prisoners of war, Renoir’s tion, the three men shot are chosen at ½lm humanized not war but the men random; none was a coward. What con- trapped in it. I am not alone in consider- stitutes courage or cowardice had al- ing it in a class of its own as a war ½lm. It ready made American cinematic history said so much about war without showing in Borzage’s A Farewell to Arms, starring a single battle scene. That is indirection Helen Hayes and Gary Cooper. Cooper, as cinematic genius. who plays an American volunteer ambu- lance driver in Italy in 1917, deserts from It is indeed arbitrary to choose to brack- the chaos of the Italian defeat at Caporet- et ½lms about World War II in the period to to ½nd his lover, a British nurse. They from 1940 to 1970, and to claim that most are reunited, but Hayes’s character dies of them adopted a realist’s pose in pre- in childbirth. Indirection, indeed, plays

140 (3) Summer 2011 105 Filming out in the story of loss of life in wartime. posed their will on it and on the enemy; War The ½lm was remade in 1957 by Charles no one did that with more panache than Vidor. Patton.11 While death is ever-present in most The presentation of the home front was ½lms set in World War II, it is not the cen- another matter entirely, and in William tral element in this body of work. As his- Wyler’s The Best Years of Our Lives (1946), torian John Bodnar has recently shown, the troubled return of veterans emerges the movie industry presented many dif- without much sugar-coating. Most of the ferent facets of World War II, but the pri- women awaiting these soldiers’ return mary focus was internal, in the sense that in the ½lm were loyal to them, whatever what mattered was what Americans had their disability, but the challenge of de- done in the war “and what type of peo- mobilization was not brushed aside even ple they were.” This guiding theme left at this intimate level. The ½lm generated room for both national celebration and twice the box of½ce earnings of Sands of meditation on the rocky road many vet- Iwo Jima (1949), demonstrating that ½lm- erans faced in returning to civilian life.10 goers were prepared to deal with the Here, we see an important transition in dif½cult aftermath of military service, ½lm from a focus on war to a focus on though within certain conventional lim- men at war. Once again, this is a matter its.12 Indeed, the theme of return and re- of emphasis, not precision, but it may be covery unites ½lms spanning from the si- useful to bear in mind nonetheless. lent era–The Big Parade, for instance–to However nuanced their positive view later cinematic work such as Hal Ashby’s of World War II as “a good war,” most 1978 ½lm Coming Home. Ashby’s ½lm de- ½lmmakers aimed at a kind of verisimili- velops the theme, even going so far as to tude that made audiences believe they explore recovery in the sexual life of a could actually know “what it had really Vietnam vet amputee. The ½lm presented been like.” The most spectacular in- an issue that was treated earlier, but did stance of this approach is The Longest Day so in a new and more daring manner. (1962), directed by Ken Annakin and (Below, I return to Clint Eastwood’s sensi- Andrew Martin. Filming in black and tive handling of psychologically disabled white to highlight the ½lm’s “authentici- veterans.) ty,” producer Darryl Zanuck managed to What I term the direct or realistic ap- acquire substantial support and military proach to presenting war in ½lm had hardware from Britain and France as well plenty of room for nuance and contradic- as from American authorities. Cameo per- tion. By no means were all World War II formances by an array of stars helped ½lms formulaic presentations of sadistic make this ½lm the biggest box of½ce suc- Japanese or snarling Nazis, subdued in cess before Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s turn by simple, small-town, honest gis. List (1993), a classic of the third genera- Most audiences would probably not have tion of war ½lms (which I discuss below). paid to see such junk. Instead, many pow- Similarly admiring of the swagger of mil- erful ½lms brought the war home, largely itary masculinity and the American way forgetting the rest of the world and the of waging war was George C. Scott’s por- price other nations paid for victory in 1945. trayal of Patton in Franklin Schaffner’s This insularity in ½lmic representa- eponymous ½lm of 1970. Bringing view- tions mirrored a narrow construction of ers onto the battle½eld meant bringing World War II in two respects. The ½rst them into the minds of the men who im- was to limit the years depicted to 1941 to

106 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences 1945, ignoring the devastating early phase like France were recovering from defeat, Jay M. of combat, from the invasion of Poland, humiliation, and collaboration.14 Ameri- Winter to the Blitz, to the invasion of the Soviet can ½lms returned time and again to the Union. But starting at Pearl Harbor was Resistance, though with less realism and only part of the problem. There was also more romance. From Casablanca (1942), the tendency to reduce the victory to the to 13 Rue Madeleine (1947), which was result of American intervention alone, based very loosely on “Wild Bill” Dono- thereby playing down the staggering van and the U.S. Of½ce of Strategic Ser- human cost the Soviet Union paid. vices, to Betrayed (1954), Hollywood re- Unsurprisingly, the Russians are absent peatedly took up the subject of the Resis- from virtually the entire corpus of “real- tance, thereby internationalizing the war istic” American ½lms about the conflict; Americans saw on the screen. “our war,” presented as spectacle and a test of national character, stood out alone. After 1968, ½lmic representations of Realism in war cinema was not exclu- World War II changed in important ways. sively the domain of American ½lms. It The lid came off the story of collabora- marked British approaches to the ambition and the Holocaust, both on-screen guities of war, too. In Bridge on the River and in wider discussions of the war. The Kwai (1957) and In Which We Serve (1942), effect of Marcel Ophüls’s 1969 ½lm Le both directed by David Lean, we ½nd Chagrin et la pitié (The Sorrow and the Pity) counterparts to the American ½lmic pre- was palpable. The narrative of collabora- sentation of “realistic” war scenes and tion and resistance turned from one of “realistic” approaches to the home front. black and white to many shades of gray.15 In one controversial ½lm, which Winston The rewriting of the World War II nar- Churchill tried to scrap, a vision of Brit- rative to include the Holocaust in a cen- ish decency as an obstacle to victory was tral role coincided with American defeat presented in terms of getting rid of the in Vietnam. The combination opened up old guard who were too old school and a new phase in the history of war ½lms. not nasty enough to win the war. Chur- The focus shifted from the war the sol- chill took the message personally, but diers waged to the victims of violence in Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburg- the midst of a new kind of asymmetric er’s The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp warfare. This new form of war ushered in (1943) survived anyway. Like many ½lms a renewed and deepened concentration of the realistic generation, it does not on the psychological and moral effects of avoid the ugliness of war but still focuses war on combatants themselves. on the men of character who see the ½ght In this way, the meaning of asymmetric through to victory.13 war was inflected by its growing linkage Other pre-1970s European ½lm presen- to the Holocaust, the only war the Nazis tations of the war are similarly heroic and won, namely, by exterminating the large realistic in their account of combat. Jean- centers of Jewish life in Poland, the Baltic Pierre Melville’s 1969 ½lm L’armée des states, and the ussr. Asymmetric wars ombres (Army of Shadows) in effect sum- of a different kind emerged after the end marized a gritty, harsh, unvarnished pre- of the Vietnam conflict, pitting Western sentation of the awful choices Resistance forces, mostly American, against insur- ½ghters had to face. Their war was indeed gents in many parts of the world.16 a dark one, and honoring it was the least Film followed the flag, ½rst into Viet- the ½lm industry could do while nations nam and then into these transnational

140 (3) Summer 2011 107 Filming or subnational conflicts. I have already Holocaust and managed to save hundreds War noted the transition from The Green Berets of Jews thereby. World War II is only the to the much more complex landscape of backdrop of the story, but there are few The Deer Hunter. At the end of the latter portrayals more powerful of precisely ½lm, the group of young, working-class what Hitler’s war against the Jews meant men and women at the heart of the story than the Aktion (or murderous round-up) wind up singing “God Bless America.” in Krakow. The horror is palpable, and so One is paraplegic, another is scarred men- is the miracle of the survival of “Schind- tally, and one of their circle, who lost his ler’s Jews.” In Saving Private Ryan, war is mind in Vietnam, has just been brought the central subject. Spielberg starts with home and buried. The tone of the anthem blood and guts, in a boldly realistic man- is muted: are they still patriotic? Proba- ner, leaving little to the imagination in bly, but the message can be read another his portrayal of the Normandy landings, way. In a world of ugly choices, God had and then segues to a more conventional better bless America, for Americans can- account of the rescue of a surviving sol- not ½nd answers in the old patriotic tags. dier whose three brothers had died in War as madness takes over in Apocalypse combat. The ½lm ends with the survivor Now and in Full Metal Jacket, both tales of asking his wife, in the cemetery where disillusionment and savagery. one of the men who rescued him is bur- Oliver Stone’s Platoon (1986) added a ied, if he is a good man–if the loss of life different dimension to the cinema’s rep- in his rescue had produced something resentation of the Vietnam War. Stone good to ennoble it. drew on his own service in Vietnam. His This sentimental ending shows that ambivalence about the war emerged in nostalgia for the “greatest generation” his treatment of two sergeants: one hu- pervaded the third generation of war mane, the other a brute who commits ½lms, though it was diluted by greater war crimes with impunity. Open the Pan- attention to war’s physical brutality. This dora’s box of war, Stone says, and who combination brought American war knows how any of us will be transformed ½lms closer to European ones, which had by it? Atrocities are built into war, he never had any dif½culty focusing on de- shows; no one is unscarred by it. Here, struction and senseless killing as central Stone echoes many literary accounts of to the story of World War II. the passage in wartime from innocence Once the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to experience; the ½lm both recalls World began, moral ambiguity became dislocat- War I poetry and anticipates Tim O’Bri- ed from nostalgia, and ½lms increasingly en’s The Things They Carried, published portrayed war as cruelty, bloodshed, and four years later in 1990. (at times) butchery without redemption. The link with the Holocaust is especial- In Sam Mendes’s Jarhead (2005), set in ly evident in the work of Steven Spiel- the ½rst Gulf War, the brutality of Marine berg. His masterpiece Schindler’s List was Corps training echoes Kubrick’s Full Met- followed ½ve years later by Saving Private al Jacket; but this time, the men itching Ryan. The ½lms both show the essential to get into the action “only” manage to elements of the new cinema of war. The mutilate corpses and do not even shoot ½rst is a powerful and realistic account of at the enemy. The Air Force gets in ½rst, the morally ambiguous ½gure of Oskar and the frustrated Marines ½re off a fusil- Schindler, who lived on the tightrope of lade only at the end of the ½lm. Impotent the Nazi bureaucracy surrounding the killers indeed.

108 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences The lies about weapons of mass de- Spielberg’s 2005 ½lm Munich. Spielberg Jay M. struction are the subject of Paul Green- tells the story of the assassination squad Winter grass’s Green Zone (2010), which features that liquidated the men who master- Matt Damon as a decent gi betrayed by minded the Munich massacre at the those in the cia and higher up who in- Olympics of 1972. After the killings have vented the story. Ultimately, all the kill- been avenged, the Israeli agent who is the ing and suffering are for nothing. Rendi- central ½gure in the story tells his boss tion (2007) tells the story of the Bush that he is through with assassination administration’s complicity in torture by because it changes nothing of impor- allies through the ½ctionalized tale of one tance. He walks away from his mission man mistaken for a militant who disap- against the backdrop of the World Trade peared into the Bush administration’s Center. The script says nothing about twilight zone. In a much more poignant, the juxtaposition of words and scene; it though downbeat, account of the costs of doesn’t have to. Silence does it better. the Iraq War, The Messenger (2009), di- The spiral of killings in the “war on ter- rected by Oren Moverman, focused on ror” leads nowhere, Spielberg suggests, the work of the U.S. Army’s Casualty No- except to more terror. ti½cation Service–the men who brought home the news of a soldier’s death on In this all too brief survey of ½lm and active duty. This wrenching task is por- war, many facets of the cinematic history trayed sensitively, but it is hard to answer of military conflict have been omitted. the question in the faces of the bereaved: Andrzej Wajda’s account of the murder for what purpose did their loved ones of his father and thousands of other Pol- die? ish of½cers in Katyń (2010) is a realistic The theme of decent soldiers locked in war ½lm of dignity and power. So is An- an indecent war recurs in Kathryn Big- drei Tarkovsky’s Ivan’s Childhood (1962). I elow’s The Hurt Locker (2008). The ½lm could not write of war ½lm without pay- features a bomb disposal unit composed ing tribute to the genius of Akira Kuro- of men whose primary aim is to get home sawa’s Dreams (1990), one part of which alive. Their sergeant, William James, follows a failed of½cer, pursued forever played by Jeremy Renner, is a more puz- by the men he commanded and who lost zling man, someone who seizes danger their lives because of his incompetence. by the throat. He appears to enjoy the Sergei Eisenstein’s Alexander Nevsky (1938) Russian roulette of disarming booby- was blatantly a World War II ½lm avant trapped bombs, and even when he makes la lettre. it back home, he cannot reembrace civil- I have omitted, too, the vexed question ian life. At the end of the ½lm, we see him of ½lmmakers as ideologues, as represen- returning for another tour of service in tatives of certain powerful interests that Iraq. Whether or not he was suicidal want to “sell” war to the public. Consider before the war, he certainly was during as one example Gary Cooper’s paci½st- and after it. War as a home for suicidal turned-sniper in Howard Hawks’s 1941 men is hardly an advertisement for the ½lm Sergeant York. A World War II ½lm military, and yet The Hurt Locker won the placed in a World War I setting, it was Oscar for both best director and best pic- good propaganda material in the effort to ture of the year. bring America into the war against The unending character of the “war on Hitler. It is not central to my argument terror” was also the subject of Steven because my purpose is to leave aside ½lm

140 (3) Summer 2011 109 Filming as propaganda, which is a subject deserv- fore less about soldiers and more about War ing separate and lengthy treatment. victims. Terry George’s Hotel Rwanda My aim is more modest. It is to point to (2004) is a ½lm about genocide, and the certain trends in the way ½lmmakers in hotelier, Paul Rusesabagina, who saves America and elsewhere have tried to por- hundreds of lives, is a Schindler without tray war. I have emphasized the choices the moral shadows. The friendship be- ½lmmakers make, which are embedded tween two men is at the heart of the 1984 in the medium itself. Their business has ½lm The Killing Fields, and despite the mon- been to choose the cast, to ½nd ways to strous evil he faces, Dith Pran’s survival interchange silence and dialogue, to se- is what leaves us with hope, even now. lect a particular musical setting, to try to Surveying such ½lms, we can see the “re-create” a battle½eld or base camp, to force of Fuller’s plea for dignity. Films turn a rough cut into a ½nal product. Some can portray men and women at war, do better than others. But all, in my view, whose dignity, integrity, and existence fall short of faithfully representing war. are threatened, but who, if they are lucky, Samuel Fuller, the director of The Big emerge from war as recognizable human Red One (1980), was once asked what con- beings nonetheless. We are left, there- stituted a good war ½lm. His answer was fore, with a modest conclusion: war de- “one which cultivates dignity and does ½es simple representation, but men at not pursue voyeurism.” He saw service in war can be presented, with clichés or Africa, Sicily, Normandy, Belgium, and human qualities attached, depending on Czechoslovakia, and was present at the the actor, the director, and the audience liberation of the Falkenau concentration the producers want to reach. camp. He was one of the few directors In a vast array of nondocumentary with extensive combat experience.17 Dig- ½lms, American soldiers have been repre- nity without voyeurism is indeed a good sented as frail, complex men as well as measure of the balance war ½lms aim to cartoon-strip ½gures. What differs is the achieve. And yet few succeed. The reason framing of the wars in which these sol- is that showing war without terror is a diers ½ght. Here, we can take note of an recipe for voyeurism, and cinema rarely evolution. Film in the silent age stood makes terror come alive. Here is the cen- back from realism: it could hint, suggest, tral point about silence: it carries terror gesture, but without sound, it could not within it much more readily than the scar- portray war. In the World War II gener- iest movie score does. Stop the sound and ation, realism took over, with mixed terror is one of the elements of the story effects. Phony wars were presented as that rushes to the surface. This truth has real wars, and given the moral clarity of endured since the beginning of ½lm, and it the 1939 to 1945 conflict, in most cases persisted once those men who trained in that was enough. But from the 1970s on, silent ½lmmaking went on to make talkies. soldiering was framed differently. It was The subject of terror is present in all war darker, more tragic, more morally ambig- narratives, but it is differently con½gured uous, more focused on victims than on in the age of asymmetrical wars. The ter- heroes. Heroic images of war were still on ror of children, women, and the aged is offer, but the colors of war grew somber, etched into the history of the Holocaust, muted. Thus, the portrait of the soldier, and into the story of brutality from Biafra and particularly the American soldier, in 1968 to the Sudan, Somalia, or Afghan- came to be more important than the war istan today. Post-national warfare is therein which he served.

110 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences In a country with a volunteer army, that the 1970s, public support for the men Jay M. was not a negative outcome; masculine who wage war became uncertain, too. Winter virtues still matter. One television ad for Supporting the men but not the war is a enlistment offers not to make men strong, hard act to pull off. It usually winds up but to make them “Army strong.” Yet once in disillusionment and disengagement. the broader public began to see war as Here is a legacy of one hundred years of morally precarious, as it did beginning in war ½lms, which we ignore at our peril.

endnotes 1 Jay M. Winter, The Experience of World War I (London: Macmillan, 1988), 238. 2 Kevin Brownlow, The War, the West, and the Wilderness (New York: Knopf, 1979). 3 Charles Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” Forum Essay, American Historical Review 105 (3) (June 2000): 807–831. 4 James Chapman, War and Film (London: Reaktion Books, 2008). 5 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 211. 6 Roger Smither, “‘A Wonderful Idea of the Fighting’: The Question of Fakes in The Battle of the Somme,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 13 (2) (1993): 149–168. 7 Jay M. Winter, “Thinking about Silence,” in Shadows of War: A Social History of Silence in the Twentieth Century, ed. Efrat Ben-Ze’ev, Ruth Ginio, and Jay M. Winter (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 2010), 1–30. 8 Michael T. Isenberg, War on Film: The American Cinema and World War I, 1914–1941 (London: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981), 118–122. 9 Carl Boggs and Tom Pollard, The Hollywood War Machine: U.S. Militarism and Popular Culture (London: Paradigm, 2007). 10 John Bodnar, The “Good War” in American Memory (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 165. 11 Ibid., 144–145. 12 Ibid., 151. 13 Robert Murphy, British Cinema and the Second World War (London: Continuum, 2000). 14 Sylvie Lindeperg, Les écrans de l’ombre: La Seconde Guerre mondiale dans le cinéma français (1944–1969) (Paris: cnrs, 1997). 15 Henry Rousso, Le syndrome de Vichy: 1944–198-- (Paris: Seuil, 1987). 16 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). 17 Norbert Multau, “Quand la guerre est un spectacle,” in Le Cinéma et la guerre, ed. Philippe d’Hugues and Hervé Coutau-Bégarie (Paris: Economica, 2006), 148.

140 (3) Summer 2011 111 The Future of Conscription: Some Comparative Reflections

James J. Sheehan

Abstract: This essay provides a historical and comparative perspective on contemporary American military institutions. It focuses on the origins, evolution, and eventual disappearance of conscription in West- ern Europe. By the 1970s, Europeans had developed civilian states in which the military’s traditional role steadily diminished; the formal abolition of conscription after 1989 was the ½nal step in a long, largely silent revolution. A brief survey of military institutions outside of Europe suggests why mass conscript armies will remain politically, culturally, and militarily signi½cant in many parts of the world. Seen in a global context, the American experience appears to combine aspects of Western European civilian states with the willingness and ability to project military power.

[Conscription] is always a signi½cant index of the society where it is found; to view it solely as a method of conducting war is to see very little of it. –Victor Kiernan1

When Alexis de Tocqueville listed the advantages of democracy in America that came “from the peculiar and accidental situation in which Providence has placed the Americans,” he had no doubts about which was most important. Ameri- cans, he wrote, “have no neighbors, and consequently they have no great wars. . . nor great armies, nor great generals.”2 Shielded from potential ag- JAMES J. SHEEHAN, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1992, gressors by its two great ocean glacis, the United is the Dickason Professor in the States was, for much of its history, able to avoid Humanities and Professor of building those mass armies on which European Modern European History, Emeri- states lavished so much energy and resources. tus, at Stanford University. His When, during the Civil War and World War I, great publications include Where Have armies were built, they were dismantled as soon as All the Soldiers Gone?: The Transfor- the war was over. We should not underestimate the mation of Modern Europe (2008), Museums in the German Art World reluctance with which Americans abandoned this from the End of the Old Regime to the tradition: the Selective Service Act of 1940 was Rise of Modernism (2000), and Ger- renewed a year later with a one-vote majority in the man History, 1770–1886 (1989). House of Representatives and included a prohibi-

112 tion on sending draftees out of the West- tence, of the nation might be at stake. James J. ern Hemisphere. The abolition of the Among the great powers, only Britain did Sheehan draft and the creation of an all-volunteer not adopt conscription, relying instead army in 1973 were in response to the on naval power and a small professional immediate crisis of Vietnam, but these army. Outside of Europe, Japan was the actions also represented a return to ½rst non-Western state to adopt con- deeply rooted traditions in American scription, based on a careful study of the political culture. Prussian model. In 1873, as part of a larg- In the 1830s, as Tocqueville was writing er program of political and social mod- his great book on American democracy, ernization, Japan introduced compulsory European states were in the process of military service, including three years on creating new kinds of armies, founded on active duty and four in the reserves. From e some form of conscription. The term then on, the army became the key instru- y itself ½rst appeared in a French law of ment in Japan’s initially successful but t 1798 that called for compulsory military ultimately doomed attempt to be a great service for all young men between twen- power. In the twentieth century, govern- ty and twenty-½ve. The system evolved in ments throughout the world imported the nineteenth century, ½rst in Prussia the idea of conscript armies, which, like and then throughout Europe. The theory so many other European institutions, and practice of conscription were insepa- seemed to be an essential part of what it rable from the larger ideals and major meant to be a modern state.4 institutions of the modern state. First, conscription is essentially democratic Although the creation of mass armies because every male (in theory, although was an essential function of European rarely in practice) is liable to be called on states, their uses were limited. Through- to ½ght. Military service is linked to citi- out the nineteenth and early twentieth zenship, that complex blend of rights and centuries, governments were unwilling obligations that binds people to their to dispatch their citizen-soldiers to ½ght state. The citizen army, therefore, is not “small wars” of colonial conquest or simply a military institution, but also a paci½cation. “Conscripts,” the German way of expressing and acquiring those statesman Otto von Bismarck once re- patriotic commitments essential for the marked, “cannot be sent to the tropics.” nation’s survival. Second, conscription Like Britain, whose army was constantly requires the administrative capabilities deployed in defense of its empire, every and material resources that states did not colonial power left these overseas battles possess until the modern era. For the sys- to professionals or, whenever possible, to tem to work, governments had to be able native forces recruited from local popula- to identify, select, assemble, train, equip, tions but usually commanded by Euro- and deploy a signi½cant percentage of pean of½cers.5 their male population, retaining some of Yet conscripts fought the two world them on active duty for several years with wars of the twentieth century and, the rest on reserve status for several despite the horrendous losses suffered by more.3 their citizen armies between 1914 and In the nineteenth century, European 1918 and again between 1939 and 1945, states developed conscript armies to pre- every European state either retained or pare for massive territorial conflicts in restored conscription after World War II. which the fate, perhaps even the exis- Britain, which had only belatedly and

140 (3) Summer 2011 113 The reluctantly introduced a draft in both amount of lethal hardware in history. Future of world wars, preserved national service Nevertheless, to more and more Euro- Conscription until 1960. Perhaps even more remark- peans, the possibility of a continental ably, Nazi Germany’s three postwar suc- land war seemed increasingly remote. cessor states–West and East Germany The sort of limited war that had been and the Austrian Republic–eventually fought in Korea and was still going on in reintroduced conscription. On both sides Vietnam hardly seemed possible in the of the Iron Curtain, therefore, the mem- only place in the world where the super- bers of nato and the Warsaw Pact pre- powers directly confronted one another. pared mass armies in anticipation of a The risk of escalation to nuclear catastro- new land war between East and West. At phe was simply too high.6 the same time, Western European states These changing assessments of the mil- all sent conscripts in a succession of ½nal, itary situation are clearly reflected in futile efforts to defend their overseas pos- public opinion polls: when asked what sessions. Of the 135,000 troops dis- they wanted their governments to do, patched to the Dutch East Indies in 1945, Europeans consistently stressed domes- two-thirds were draftees; conscripts also tic issues–a stable currency, education, represented a signi½cant percentage of health care, retirement bene½ts, law and the French army stationed in Algeria in order–and rarely mentioned national 1961. Political opposition engendered by defense or effective military institutions. the loss of citizen-soldiers in defense of These polls do not suggest that Euro- colonial rule was one reason why govern- peans no longer cared about being con- ments were forced to abandon those quered; they simply didn’t think that it campaigns–as well as, eventually, their was going to happen.7 empires. Not accidentally, Portugal, the The end of imperial wars and the wan- least democratic of the colonial powers, ing salience of security concerns pro- was also the last to surrender its overseas duced a silent revolution in European possessions. politics, a revolution that can be mea- By the end of the 1960s, the security sured in budgets, where defense spend- environment in Europe had begun to ing stagnated, in popular attitudes to- change. Except for Portugal’s struggles in ward the military, and in the symbols and Africa, the colonial powers had already ceremonies of public life. The army, once liquidated their imperial enterprises, regarded as essential for both national some of them centuries old, and had defense and national identity, moved to done so with remarkable speed and rela- the margins of most people’s conscious- tively little political resistance. Equally ness. “Security” ceased to denote issues important, the Cold War order imposed of national defense and came to be iden- by the two superpowers essentially ti½ed with individual welfare. removed the danger of conventional war This revolution in Europeans’ views between European states; in the West, of security gradually–and once again, this new state of affairs made possible silently–transformed their conscript the growing cooperation of national armies. Every Continental country re- economies and rising aspirations for tained conscription until the 1990s. But political integration. Of course, the everywhere its character changed. Ar- potential for armed conflict persisted, mies reduced the time required in active especially on the German-German bor- service as well as conscripts’ reserve obli- der, which bristled with the largest gation. Exemptions from the draft be-

114 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences came much easier to get, as did the right mission. As Bismarck had warned in the James J. to perform alternative service, both of nineteenth century, such missions were Sheehan them ways to drain off potential political not for conscripts.9 opposition to the military. The percent- In The Netherlands, where the number age of those actually conscripted and of conscripts had plummeted since the the size of the armed forces declined 1950s, the draft was abolished in 1993; throughout Europe. Within the armies two years later Belgium ended it. France, themselves, regulations were eased, pun- despite the powerful historical memories ishments made less severe, and training of the revolutionary nation in arms and a less rigorous. In a few states, enlisted deep distrust of professional soldiers, men were allowed to form unions, work a announced the end of the draft and intro- forty-hour week, and even receive over- duction of an all-volunteer army in 1996. time pay. The semi-of½cial motto of the Spain, Italy, and most of the former Com- Dutch armed forces was said to be “As munist states of Eastern Europe soon fol- civilian as possible, as military as neces- lowed. By the beginning of the twenty- sary.” In fact, where European armies ½rst century, the overwhelming majority had once been seen as a way of instilling of nato’s armed forces were profession- discipline and patriotic commitment in als. The speed and ease with which Euro- civilian society, by the 1970s they were pean states abandoned compulsory mili- becoming increasingly “civilianized,” tary service reflected the long erosion of the products of a gradual but unmistak- conscription’s political, cultural, and able readjustment of the citizen’s sense military signi½cance.10 of obligations to the nation.8 Germany has held onto conscription longer than the other major European During the 1990s, after more than two states. In part this is because of postwar decades of gradual decline, conscript Germany’s historically rooted anxiety armies were ½nally abolished in most of about professional soldiers and pride in Europe. The most obvious reason was the the democratic army created after the end of the Cold War and the subsequent war. Signi½cantly, as the proponents of withdrawal of Soviet forces, which re- conscription also pointed out, the in- moved even the remote possibility of a creasing number of those choosing alter- territorial threat from the East. Fiscal native service provided the relatively pressures, too, encouraged governments inexpensive caregivers and hospital or- to take a hard and critical look at their derlies who are essential for the Federal defense budgets. Most important, it had Republic’s welfare system. Without a become painfully clear that Europe’s military draft, Germany’s civilian insti- armed forces, while quite large, were mil- tutions might suffer. In practice, howev- itarily worthless, especially for the kind er, conscription in the Federal Republic of technically sophisticated, fast-mov- has already come close to disappearing: ing, and intensive combat made possible between 2000 and 2009, the total num- by the so-called Revolution in Military ber of men performing military service Affairs. European states no longer need- dropped by more than half, from 144,647 ed mass armies to defend the homeland, to 68,304. In any case, it was dif½cult to but rather a relatively small number of describe as compulsory a system in professionals who could, if necessary, be which a civilian alternative was now sent on expeditions abroad, perhaps as granted automatically, making the Ger- part of a multinational peacekeeping man army what one expert called “an all

140 (3) Summer 2011 115 The volunteer force in disguise.” Needless to the army has always had a signi½cant Future of say, the German troops serving as part of role, as a deterrent to aggression and as a Conscription the nato contingent in Afghanistan are source of national identity. There are all professionals.11 indications, however, that in the current At present (February 2011), conscription security environment, both of these in Germany seems to be on the way out. functions are losing their central place in Under severe pressure to cut his budget Swiss politics. It may be that among and recognizing the need for a smaller European states, only Finland retains a but more effective force, the energet- conscript army on the traditional model. ic minister of defense, Karl-Theodor zu In a country where 80 percent of the male Guttenberg, sought to suspend the draft population has served in the military, the (abolition would require a constitution- prestige and importance of the armed al amendment) and introduce substan- forces remains high. Moreover, the Finn- tial reforms in the composition of Ger- ish military’s strategic objective remains many’s armed forces. It is striking that in territorial defense, a purpose persistently the current German discussions, as had nourished by memories of the heroic been the case in debates about ending Winter War against the Soviet Union in conscription in other European states, 1940 and recently reinforced by the the level of engagement, both among example of Russia’s invasion of Georgia politicians and their constituents, is low. in 2008.12 Well before they were abolished formal- With few exceptions, European mili- ly, Europeans’ conscript armies had tary institutions continue to be pro- ceased to be politically or culturally foundly affected by the global economic salient, either as a source of positive com- crisis that began in 2008. In fact, expendi- mitment or a target of active opposition. tures for defense, which were stagnant If, as seems very likely, the German for decades, have been in sharp decline parliament agrees to suspend conscrip- since the turn of the century: the Euro- tion, then only a handful of Western Eu- pean members of nato spent 2.05 per- ropean states will still have a draft. These cent of gdp for defense in 1999, 1.65 per- include Norway and Denmark, where cent in 2008. This trend is not likely to military service continues to be a part of be reversed in the austerity budgets now a citizen’s duty to the nation. In neither being formulated throughout Europe. country, however, does conscription The British government, for example, have a military purpose. There are, for announced drastic cuts in troop strength example, no conscripts in the small, but and equipment in a comprehensive de- quite effective, unit that Denmark has fense review published in October contributed to the nato mission in Af- 2010.13 One result of these budgetary ghanistan. In addition to Norway and pressures may be greater cooperation Denmark, three of the ½ve Cold War neu- among European states. Britain and trals–Austria, Switzerland, and Finland France, Europe’s two most important –still have conscript armies. (Ireland military powers, have already taken steps always had a small professional force; in this direction. But since the road to Sweden abolished conscription in Sum- effective transnational military institu- mer 2010.) Austria requires six months of tions is bound to be long and dif½cult, active duty in what has traditionally been the most likely consequence of these an underfunded and poorly equipped budgetary problems is a continuation army. In Switzerland, on the other hand, of Europeans’ dependence on the United

116 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences States, a dependence most dramatically ill-de½ned–frontiers are, by de½nition, James J. expressed in the remarkable survival of contested and imprecise–there is good Sheehan nato decades after the disappearance of reason to suppose that it runs directly the common adversary against which the through the former Soviet imperium. On alliance was founded.14 the peaceful side are the Soviet Union’s An unspoken assumption behind Euro- former Eastern European satellites and peans’ budgetary debates is that military the three newly autonomous Baltic re- spending has become discretionary, an publics. Despite some hesitation and expense to be weighed against a variety of reluctance on both sides, these states other demands on the state’s resourc- eventually joined nato; with the excep- es–not, as was long the case, a necessary tion of Latvia and Lithuania, they, like price to ensure national survival. Euro- their new allies in the West, have abol- pean governments recognize that they ished conscription in favor of small pro- still face profound dangers: terrorism, fessional forces. In 2008, there were only organized crime, and in some countries, 4,000 conscripts among the 317,000 mili- increasingly violent social protests. And tary personnel in the new nato mem- there are occasions when states may want bers from the East. Moreover, again as in to project power by sending an expedi- the West, military expenditure in the tionary force abroad. But the preserva- East has continued to decline: except for tion of order and the deployment of Bulgaria (2 percent), Poland, and Roma- troops on some distant mission are very nia (each 1.9 percent), the Eastern Euro- different from the defense of the nation pean states are well below the stated from existential threats, the purpose for nato goal of allocating 2 percent of gdp which the mass conscript army had orig- to defense. What the eminent military inally been created. sociologist Martin Shaw once called “the last bastions of classical militarism in the Soon after the end of the Cold War and northern industrial world,” the former the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe American political scientist Robert Keo- have become, within little more than a hane remarked that “one of the most vex- decade, civilian states on the Western ing questions in Europe today is where European model.16 the frontier between the West European On the other side of the frontier are the zone of peace and Eurasian zone of con- remaining Soviet European and Central flict will be.”15 On the western side of Asian successor states. All these states this line, conscription has largely disap- retain conscript armies. Some, such as peared and military service has become Belarus, are among the most militarized limited to a relatively small group of pro- states in the world. Where there are still fessionals who are compensated, like external threats and ongoing territorial ½re½ghters and police of½cers, for the disputes, as in Georgia, Armenia, and risks they are asked to take on behalf of Azerbaijan, military institutions have an their fellow citizens. On the other side of importance far greater than in the civil- the line, however, where the survival of ian West. the nation might still be at stake, military With just over half of the old Soviet service remains both a political obliga- Union’s population and three-fourths tion and a strategic necessity. of its territory, the Russian Federation But while the line between the peaceful is far and away its most important suc- and conflictual parts of Eurasia may be cessor state. Russia’s military capacity

140 (3) Summer 2011 117 The was among the casualties of the Soviet tary budget has not dramatically de- Future of Union’s extraordinary implosion. Even clined; conscription remains in force, Conscription before the ussr disappeared in 1991, the exemptions are rare, alternative service is Soviet military suffered a series of stun- virtually impossible. Militarily and polit- ning blows, including defeat in Af- ically, the army played a central role in ghanistan and the loss of its bases in East- the emergence of the Republic from the ern Europe. After 1991, morale and cohe- ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Despite sion deteriorated precipitously, attended recent efforts by the Erdogan govern- by endemic corruption, criminality, and ment to limit the army’s influence, the brutality. At present, Russia is supposed generals continue to be a powerful politi- to have over one million men on active cal force. Indeed, the sharp differences duty, with another twenty million reserv- between civil-military relations in Tur- ists, but in practice only a small percent- key and Europe represent another barrier age of these forces are deployable. Since to Turkey’s absorption into the European the 1990s, there have been several efforts Union. Unlike the rest of the eu, Turkey at reforming the military, the latest and is not a fully developed civilian state; most ambitious of which was introduced the possibility of international and do- in September 2008, following the rather mestic violence remains very much a part mixed results of Russia’s brief invasion of Turkish political life.18 of Georgia that summer. Although con- In most of Eurasia, the political role of scription remains in effect (early in 2008 the army is closer to the Turkish model the length of service was reduced to one than to the civilian states of Western year), the reformers want to create a Europe. In a few places like Myanmar the smaller, better trained and equipped military rules directly; sometimes, as in force that is permanently ready for Thailand, its power is veiled by a di- deployment. But formidable barriers to aphanous curtain of civilian authority. effective reform remain, including the Most often, the army acts, as it tradition- pervasive weakness of the Russian ad- ally did in the Turkish case, as a kind of ministrative apparatus, the economic “deep state,” using the threat of a coup to problems created by the global decline in set limits on what governments can and energy prices, and, perhaps most serious cannot do. Nowhere is this situation of all, the long-term effects of Russia’s more dramatically clear than in the polit- devastating demographic decline. Ac- ical crisis now unfolding in Egypt. Thus cording to the Chief of the Russian Gen- far (early February 2011), the army has eral Staff, in 2012 the number of draft- played a cautious role, refusing to use eligible males will be half of what it was deadly force against demonstrators but in 2001.17 not abandoning the government. Where Among the members of nato, only the loyalties of Egypt’s conscripts lie Turkey clearly occupies a position on the remains uncertain, but for the army’s conflict side of Keohane’s frontier. Turk- leaders, more than three decades of pow- ish troops have long defended a contest- er and influence are at stake. (“It is,” ed border on Cyprus and fought a long, notes one well-informed observer, “an bloody civil war against the Kurds. How open question how much power the mil- the creation of a semi-autonomous Kurd- itary has, and they might not even know ish territory in Iraq will affect Turkey is themselves.”)19 by no means clear. In any case, unlike its In North Korea, where Kim Jong Il is European counterparts, Turkey’s mili- seeking to extend his family’s control

118 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences into the third generation, his heir appar- once made military service inseparable James J. ent was made a four-star general before from citizenship. But in many parts of Sheehan he was appointed to the Central Commit- Eurasia, especially on the wrong side of tee of Korean Workers’ Party, a sequence the frontier separating zones of peace that underlined how the army has con- and conflict, conscript armies designed solidated its hold on political power. to protect the territorial interests of With terms of active duty from ½ve to states are still centrally important and a twelve years and reserve obligations up war between states remains a constant to the age of sixty, North Korea has what danger. Here, civilian states on the Euro- is perhaps the world’s most extensive and pean model have not developed: military socially intrusive system of conscription. service remains an important part of The border between the two Korean young men’s lives, conscript armies have states may be the most heavily forti½ed, political and cultural signi½cance, and but it is by no means the only contested the of½cer corps often plays an important frontier in East Asia. Some of the territo- role. In countries such as Egypt, North ries involved in these disputes are very Korea, Thailand, Burma, and Pakistan, small, and in others the conflict is largely conscription still has a future, which will inert; but there are some–Kashmir, for help shape the future of these nations. instance, or parts of the Sino-Indian bor- Where does the United States ½t into der–that remain volatile enough to this picture? With its massive military erupt into large-scale international vio- budget and globally deployed armed lence. With two major powers, India and forces, it is surely not a civilian state on China, and a number of unstable and the European model. However divided potentially aggressive smaller states, the they may be on the use of force in speci½c rivalries and tensions within East Asia situations, most Americans agree that as somewhat resemble the European inter- a world power, the United States must be national system before 1914. Not surpris- willing and able to project military power ingly, it is here that the mass conscript to defend its interests throughout a dan- army continues to provide the founda- gerous world. And yet, unlike those states tion of national defense. where military service remains a national obligation, the United States counts on In the past few years, a number of ex- professionals to meet its extensive global perts have argued that conscription, like commitments. The burden of America’s the modern state from which it devel- mission in the world, therefore, is carried oped, was on its way to historical obliv- by a relatively small portion of the popu- ion. The international studies scholar lation, whose sacri½ces are honored but Eliot Cohen, for example, recently de- not shared by the larger society. In a clared that “the age of the mass army is sense, the United States is a civilian state over.”20 Perhaps. There is no question with signi½cant military obligations. that in many parts of the world, conscript Many of the other essays collected in this armies have been dissolved or dimin- volume examine the tensions that arise ished; quality, represented by the ability from this uneasy mix of values and aspi- to use complex new weapon systems, has rations. replaced quantity as a measurement of military power. In much of Europe, the rise of civilian states has changed the balance between rights and duties that had

140 (3) Summer 2011 119 The endnotes Future of 1 Conscription Victor Kiernan, “Conscription and Society in Europe before the War of 1914–1918,” in War and Society: Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J. R. Western, 1928–1971, ed. M.R.D. Foot (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1973), 141. 2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1994), 288–289. 3 The classic analysis of conscription’s political signi½cance is Morris Janowitz, “Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies,” in The Military and the Problem of Legiti- macy, ed. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Jacques Van Doorn (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publica- tions, 1976), 77–92. 4 See David Ralston, Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Tech- niques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600–1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 5 See Bruce Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830–1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998). 6 On the changing security environment in postwar Europe, see James J. Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?: The Transformation of Modern Europe (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), chap. 7. 7 For some examples, see the data in Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977). 8 See Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?, chap. 8. The best collection of information on military institutions is The Military Balance, published annually since 1959 by the Inter- national Institute for Strategic Studies in London. On The Netherlands, see F. Olivier and G. Teitler, “Democracy and the Armed Forces: The Dutch Experiment,” in Armed Forces and the Welfare Societies: Challenges in the 1980s, ed. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (New York: St. Mar- tin’s Press, 1983), 54–95. 9 For changing patterns of conflict, see Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Con- flicts, 1946–2009,” Journal of Peace Research 47 (4) (2010): 501–509; Andreas Wenger et al., Strategic Trends 2010 (Center for Security Studies, eth Zürich, 2010); and the essays in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, eds., Rethinking the Nature of War (London: Frank Cass, 2005). 10 See James Burk, “The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Compulsory Military Service,” Defense Analysis 8 (1) (1992): 45–59; and Curtis Gilroy and Cindy Williams, eds., Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries (Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press, 2007). There is a careful study of the French case in J. Justin McKenna, “Towards the Army of the Future: Domestic Politics and the End of Conscription in France,” West Euro- pean Politics 20 (4) (1997): 125–145. 11 Enlistment data from Der Spiegel, July 29, 2010. Quotation from Gerhard Kümmel in Gilroy and Williams, Service to Country, chap. 8. 12 Henning Sørensen, “Conscription in Scandinavia during the Last Quarter Century: Devel- opments and Arguments,” Armed Forces & Society 26 (2) (2000): 313–334. Pauli Järvenpäa, “Finland’s Defence Policy: Sui Generis?” Baltic Defence Review 11 (1) (2004): 129–134. 13 See Judy Dempsey, “The Peril that nato Can’t Ignore,” The New York Times, November 10, 2010, and “Brie½ng. The Cost of Weapons,” The Economist, August 28, 2010, 20–21. 14 While the persistence of nato points to the enduring importance of the United States for European security, nato’s continuing effort to de½ne its military and political objectives underscores the inherent dif½culties in sustaining the Atlantic relationship. The most recent effort to shape the alliance to meet the challenges of a post–Cold War world was the Strate- gic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010; for a concise analysis, see

120 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences two ½ne articles on “The Future of nato,” in The Economist, November 13, 2010, 27–30, and James J. November 25, 2010, 24–25. Sheehan 15 Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., After the Cold War: International Institutions and Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 6. 16 Martin Shaw, Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization, and War at the End of the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 163. On the armed forces of the former Communist states, see the data in The Military Balance 2010 and the useful summary by Jeffrey Simon, “nato’s Uncertain Future: Is Demography Destiny?” Strategic Forum no. 236 (October 2008): 1–7. 17 On the dif½culties of reform, see Carolina Pallin, Russian Military Reform: A Failed Exercise in Defence Decision Making (London: Routledge, 2009). For the most recent efforts, see the chapter on the Russian Federation in The Military Balance 2010. 18 On the Turkish armed forces, see The Military Balance 2010 and “A Special Report on Turkey,” The Economist, October 23, 2010. 19 Thanassis Cambanis, “Succession Gives Army a Stiff Test in Egypt,” The New York Times, September 12, 2010. 20 Quoted in Colin Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld & Nicol- son, 2005), 172.

140 (3) Summer 2011 121 Whose Army?

Andrew J. Bacevich

Abstract: The ideal of civilian control vis-à-vis actual civil-military relations corresponds to the ideal of the common good vis-à-vis actual politics. It represents an aspiration rather than a fact. It will never de½ne reality. A competitive and frequently unseemly relationship between senior U.S. military of½cers and senior American civilian of½cials is inevitable. Meanwhile, an unharmonious relationship between the military and society is not inevitable. Here, Americans should view dysfunction as intolerable. Yet since the demise of the tradition of the citizen-soldier, dysfunction in this realm has become endemic and pervasive, contributing to the widespread and misguided militarization of U.S. policy. If Americans are unhappy with the way their army is used, they need to reclaim it. This outcome can arise only by reassert- ing the connection between citizenship and military service.

As a public policy issue, U.S. civil-military relations suffer from perennial neglect. Given the importance that the United States assigns to maintaining and wielding military power, such neglect is not only surprising but deeply unfortunate. Civilians and soldiers interact in two distinct domains. On the one hand is the relationship between senior military of½cers and senior civilian of½cials. We might call these interactions “elite” or “inside the Beltway” civil-military relations. On the other hand is the relationship between the U.S. armed forces and American society as a whole. These civil-military relations for the rest of us take place, for the most part, beyond the Washington Beltway. At the elite level, the well-known principle of ANDREW J. BACEVICH is Profes- civilian control, implemented jointly by Congress sor of History and International and the chief executive, is said to exercise a govern- Relations at Boston University. ing influence. Article I, section 8, of the Constitu- His publications include The New tion assigns the legislative branch the power to American Militarism: How Americans declare war and to raise, support, and regulate the Are Seduced by War (2005), The Lim- its of Power: The End of American Ex- nation’s armed forces. Article II, section 2, desig- ceptionalism (2008), and Washing- nates the president as commander in chief of fed- ton Rules: America’s Path to Perma- eral forces and state troops “when called into the nent War (2010). actual Service of the United States.” The president

122 also commissions and promotes of½cers, as president former generals, several of Andrew J. albeit with the advice and consent of the whom evinced few quali½cations for high Bacevich Senate. of½ce other than having achieved passing Adherence to the principle of civilian fame as war heroes. Winning a World Se- control by no means guarantees effective ries, a Nobel Prize, or an Olympic medal national security policy. It does, however, won’t earn you a place in the quadren- guard against takeover by a military dic- nial White House sweepstakes, but have tatorship. In this sense, students of civil- a hand in winning a war, and you can be military relations view civilian control as sure to see your name floated as a poten- foundational–as that which needs to be tial chief executive. preserved and protected at all costs. Moreover, although General Washing- In the realm of civil-military relations ton himself conscientiously deferred to for the rest of us, another well-known civilian authority during his tenure in principle once exercised a governing in- command of the Continental Army, the fluence: namely, the conviction that na- history of the United States features any tional defense quali½es as a collective number of examples of senior of½cers responsibility. According to this prin- who have marched to a decidedly differ- ciple, citizenship and military service ent drumbeat. Some dabbled in partisan are inextricably linked. In 1783, General politics or bridled against the temerity of George Washington put it this way: “It civilians who would meddle in military may be laid down as a primary position, matters. Others asserted the prerogative and the basis of our system, that every of deciding exactly what U.S. policy Citizen who enjoys the protection of a ought to be. A partial list of offenders free Government, owes not only a pro- includes such outsized personalities as portion of his property, but even of his Andrew Jackson, Win½eld Scott, George personal services to the defence of it.”1 In McClellan, Fighting Joe Hooker, Nelson 1792, President Washington signed legis- Miles, Leonard Wood, Billy Mitchell, lation that incorporated this principle and, most persistently and notoriously, into law. The Uniform Militia Act de- Douglas MacArthur. clared that “each and every free able- Likewise, in terms of the bond between bodied white male citizen of the respec- the military and society, principle has tive States, resident therein, who is or tended to be honored in the breach. Note shall be of age of eighteen years, and that the citizen’s obligation to serve, as under the age of forty-½ve years . . . shall legislated in 1792, mandated enrollment severally and respectively be enrolled in in the militia, not in the regular army. the militia.”2 This stipulation is signi½cant for several In the implementation of these princi- reasons, most of them lost to memory. To ples, Americans have always played fast begin, from the founding of the Republic and loose. Whether in the elite domain or until World War II, the militia was the out in the hustings, the realities of civ- nation’s primary ½ghting force. Ameri- il-military relations have seldom con- cans relied chiefly on the militia (to- formed to the reigning theories. For ex- day’s National Guard), not on the regular ample, Americans have never, in practice, army to defend the country and its insti- paid much attention to ensuring that the tutions. Throughout the nineteenth cen- commander in chief has an unambig- tury and well into the twentieth, the uously civilian identity. They have rou- U.S. Army was neither organized nor tinely voted for and sometimes elected equipped for serious large-scale combat.

140 (3) Summer 2011 123 Whose It served chiefly as a constabulary force, far edges of the frontier, Americans slept Army? assisting in the project of territorial ex- soundly, unworried about a possible in- pansion and internal development. If the vasion by alien hordes. Practically speak- militia was the varsity in the eyes of most ing, for most Americans most of the time, Americans, the small regular army qual- the notion of a civic obligation to defend i½ed as the B team. the country was more symbolic than real. Yet the varsity seldom suited up and Yet the obligation to serve retained a almost never practiced. Existing threats psychic signi½cance (much as the idea of to the United States ranged from negligi- obligatory Sunday Mass remained a hall- ble to nonexistent; thus, Americans had mark of Roman Catholicism long after little incentive to treat seriously the re- most self-identi½ed Catholics had ceased quirement to keep the militia in ½ghting to honor any such obligation). Although trim. Although imposing enough on pa- largely ignored and unenforced, the Mili- per, its actual capabilities were few, a fact tia Act remained the law of the land for that suited most citizens just ½ne. They more than a century, the basis of a mili- didn’t much cotton to armies as such any- tary system that, in a formal sense, hard- way, didn’t want to spend money support- ly quali½ed as a system at all. ing them, and fancied themselves a peace- The small regular army produced a few loving people to boot. dissenters who railed against this system. One such dissident, Emory Upton, is an Even peace-loving Americans periodi- important but largely forgotten ½gure in cally waged war: launching ethnic cleans- U.S. military history. A fascinating, char- ing campaigns against Native Americans ismatic, and ultimately tragic individual, or giving in to the impulse to invade Upton graduated from West Point in 1861 Canada, Mexico, or Cuba, for example. In and, as a young of½cer, performed great these cases, they extemporized the forces feats of heroism during the Civil War. Yet needed for the task at hand. Rather than the bloodletting Upton had witnessed ap- relying on none-too-ready militiamen or palled him. Amateurism and sheer in- barely more capable army regulars, fed- competence, in his view, had needlessly eral authorities called on volunteers to wasted tens, perhaps hundreds of thou- rally to the colors. Notwithstanding their sands of lives. He advocated replacing general antipathy for things military, the tradition of the citizen-soldier with a Americans responded to each such sum- much larger professional army. The point mons with surprising alacrity. Never was was to put of½cers who devoted their this more vividly the case than in 1861, lives to the study of war in charge of con- when Americans from the South and the ducting it. North formed two very large volunteer Upton dedicated the remainder of his armies and spent the next four years kill- life to a crusade that aimed to junk the ing one another in staggering numbers. existing military system and replace it In short, when the nation required a with a new one–this at a time when the ½ghting force, it conjured one up. When American people were as interested in the exigency passed, the citizen army military reform as most are today in re- vanished, and Americans returned to citing Elizabethan poetry. The few people other more pressing priorities. Upton persuaded included members of For all its evident inef½ciencies, this the of½cer corps itself. Succeeding gener- arrangement worked tolerably well. The ations of army regulars came to regard country prospered. Except perhaps on the him as a prophet; Upton’s aspirations

124 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences became theirs.3 In the country as a whole, postwar era, military demands (the term Andrew J. however, Upton’s legacy was negligible. is not inappropriate) produced continu- Bacevich In America, “We the People”–not hired ous and remarkably open discord be- guns or mercenaries–continued to bear tween the leadership of the armed ser- primary responsibility for safeguarding vices and the president. Issues that be- the nation. came the subject of civil-military conflict included the size of the Pentagon bud- In the ½rst half of the twentieth centu- get, the design and procurement of major ry, U.S. participation in two successive weapons, control of the nation’s nuclear world wars transformed America’s role arsenal, service roles and missions, and in world politics. It also transformed even racial integration. American civil-military relations. Both Faced with decisions or guidance not inside the Beltway and far removed from to their liking, military leaders com- Washington’s orbit, the implications plained, stalled, shirked, or simply disproved to be enormous–and almost en- obeyed. The Navy and Marine Corps tirely problematic. waged bureaucratic warfare to frustrate Change did not come all at once. At the President Harry Truman’s efforts to uni- conclusion of World War II, for exam- fy the armed services. The Air Force like- ple, consistent with past practice, the cit- wise strove to prevent the newly estab- izen army raised up to ½ght Germany lished Atomic Energy Commission from and Japan almost instantly dissolved. taking possession of the nation’s stock- American citizen-soldiers responded to pile of atomic bombs. For their part, the end of hostilities in 1945 much as they Army leaders took umbrage when the had in 1848, 1865, 1898, and 1918: they commander in chief ordered the Penta- clamored to shed their uniforms and go gon to abolish racial separation and, at home. Yet events soon revealed this to be ½rst, made only token efforts toward in- a valedictory homage to a tradition that tegrating the Army’s ranks. would soon be obsolete. Only with the onset of the Korean War During World War II, military elites had in Summer 1950, and Truman’s approval gained access to the inner circles of Amer- of major increases in military spending, ican power, obtaining an influence they did civil-military conflict subside. The would not willingly surrender. After 1945, views promoted by senior military lead- Washington’s newly asserted role in glob- ers had prevailed, and U.S. foreign pol- al leadership af½rmed the elevated status icy became unambiguously militarized. that senior admirals and generals had ac- As the United States garrisoned forces quired in the war. These of½cers used around the world, it built a global pres- their positions to press for the creation of ence, con½guring each of the armed ser- a large and powerful standing military es- vices as an instrument of global power tablishment, an institution that was en- projection. The United States developed tirely alien to the American experience. a penchant for global intervention, both Rather than a sometime thing, war was overt and covert, with mere national becoming an anytime thing in their esti- defense amounting to an afterthought. mation. Instead of raising up forces in This “sacred trinity” of military practice response to a particular emergency, the became the hallmark of American state- brass (and their civilian allies) saw a need craft during the Cold War, and it remains for forces held ready for rapid deploy- fully intact today, never having been sub- ment. During the ½rst half-decade of the jected to serious reconsideration.

140 (3) Summer 2011 125 Whose The vast apparatus of the national secu- concerns, render disinterested advice Army? rity state af½rmed and institutionalized when asked, and loyally implement what- the exalted status that senior military ever decisions competent civilian au- of½cers now enjoyed. In the 1950s and thorities may make. For their part, civil- 1960s, when presidents ventured into ian authorities should treat their mili- the White House Rose Garden to make tary counterparts with the respect owed portentous national security announce- to professionals. They should allow the ments, they took care to have the Joint military wide latitude in matters pertain- Chiefs of Staff (jcs), festooned with rib- ing to war. To use a term that acquired all bons, lined up behind them. The message manner of negative connotations during was clear: “Look,” the photo op seemed the Vietnam era, civilians should avoid to say, “I have consulted the Chiefs; they “meddling” in soldiers’ business. Theory, concur; therefore, my decision deserves however, does not conform to reality. to be treated with respect.” Conflict exists between the top brass and That the ultimate loyalty of the of½cer top civilian of½cials for precisely the corps to the Constitution remained in- same reason that conflict pits Repub- tact was beyond question. Yet the im- licans against Democrats, the White plausibility of an outright coup made all House against Capitol Hill, and the Sen- manner of shenanigans permissible. Like ate against the House of Representatives: the married man who flirts outrageously because power is at stake. with women, aware that he could never Reality is, for instance, the fact that actually cheat on his wife, as long as top when Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki of½cials adhered to some neat, legalistic speculated to a Senate committee–just de½nition of what wrongdoing entailed, prior to the invasion of Iraq–that occupy- their integrity remained intact. Within ing the country could well turn out to be that self-de½ned boundary, they were a costly mess requiring “several hundred free to do as they pleased. thousand troops,” Secretary of Defense If civil-military disharmony eased after Donald Rumsfeld and his Deputy Secre- 1950, it by no means disappeared. Indeed, tary, Paul Wolfowitz, instantly retaliated, the civil-military tug-of-war enshrined publicly rebuking Shinseki and declaring itself as a permanent feature of Washing- him persona non grata within the Penta- ton politics. At the upper echelons of the gon (an object lesson to of½cers inclined military profession, effectiveness has to speak their minds). Reality is also the come to require political savvy. The “sim- chorus of retired and retiring senior of- ple soldier”–if such a creature ever ex- ½cers who subsequently saddled Rums- isted–will not go far in the E-Ring of the feld and Wolfowitz with the blame for Pentagon. The making of national securi- everything that went wrong in Iraq, giv- ty policy is nothing if not political, with ing the generals in command a free pass. blood and treasure, power and access, Reality is the fact that General Stanley ego and ambition all on the line. Senior McChrystal’s highly sensitive assessment of½cers learn to lobby, leak, ally with of how to proceed in Afghanistan some- strange bedfellows, manipulate the me- how found its way into the hands of Wash- dia, and play Congress against the White ington Post reporter Bob Woodward, there- House. In Washington, that’s how the by hijacking the Obama administration’s game is played. internal review process. Furthermore, Theoretically, the top brass should reality is McChrystal’s enlisting various place national interest above parochial known commodities from Washington

126 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences think tanks as “consultants” to promote appropriate conduct leading to defective Andrew J. his views in op-eds and television talk policy becomes evident, op-ed writers Bacevich show appearances; it’s McChrystal’s pub- and commentators decry the latest civil- lic presentations–including a speech in military “crisis.” This is necessary and London and an interview on 60 Minutes honorable work. Once critics raise a suf- –in which he declared that alternatives ½cient ruckus, the system’s mechanism to his plan simply did not exist. In this for internal self-correction kicks in. The way, the general handcuffed the presi- same corrective force applies to public dent. And when the Pentagon respond- objections to unrepaired potholes or ed to Obama’s request for options on lousy service at the bureau of motor ve- Afghanistan, it offered three variations of hicles. To quiet complaints (and preserve a single path: the one McChrystal insist- their status and prerogatives), those in ed on implementing. charge eventually respond. The ideal of civilian control relates to Indeed, the decades since World War II actual civil-military interactions in the have seen recurring efforts to ½nd legis- same way that the principle of the com- lative remedies to civil-military dysfunc- mon good relates to actual politics: it is tion. At regular intervals, Congress has an aspiration, not a fact; it will never de- passed “landmark” legislation aimed at ½ne reality. Both sides are to blame for bolstering civilian control while provid- this unhappy circumstance. To insist that ing policy-makers with improved access senior of½cers and senior civilians should to cogent, timely military advice and cre- ½nd a way to work in harmony recalls ating mechanisms to ensure the effective Rodney King’s plaintive appeal during conduct of war. Three themes have dom- the 1992 Los Angeles riots, when the inated these efforts: concentrating ever- now-famous victim of police brutality greater authority in the hands of the sec- asked, “Can’t we all just get along?” retary of defense; empowering the chair- When applied to politics, any such expec- man of the jcs at the expense of the ser- tation of human behavior flies in the face vice chiefs; and emphasizing “jointness” of history. In the same way poverty en- as the antidote to crippling parochialism dures, so, too, will the competition for among military branches.5 power persist. With the 1986 passage of the Goldwa- When generals overreach, they deserve ter-Nichols Act, this penchant for insti- to have their hands slapped; indeed, tutional tinkering reached a climax. The Obama eventually handed General reorganization stripped the service chiefs McChrystal his walking papers.4 When of their advisory function, designating the ignorant or arrogant civilians ignore jcs chairman as the principal military ad- their military advisers and thereby com- viser to the secretary of defense and the mit costly blunders, they, too, should be president. It also enhanced the standing held accountable. To the delight of the of senior ½eld commanders, who since of½cer corps, George W. Bush ultimately then have reported directly to the secre- replaced the bumbling Donald Rumsfeld tary of defense. Finally, it elevated joint- as Pentagon chief. Yet inside the Beltway, ness to the level of theological precept. civil-military conflict is not a problem to Henceforth, the armed services were to be solved; it is a situation to be managed. be “intellectually, operationally, organi- zationally, doctrinally, and technically” Elite civil-military relations require con- joint, the operative assumption being stant policing. Whenever evidence of in- that “jointness” provided “the key to op-

140 (3) Summer 2011 127 Whose erational success in the future.”6 For a the American people. Toward that end, Army? time during the 1990s, Washington per- Marshall enlisted the help of Palmer, a suaded itself that it had ½xed the prob- retired brigadier general who had long lem. However, events since 9/11 have told before been put out to pasture. Marshall a different story, with calls for a “Gold- restored Palmer to active duty and charged water-Nichols II” the predictable result.7 him with laying the basis for a postwar My point is not that legislative efforts military establishment. have been a waste of time. Rather, the di- Palmer contributed to American mili- lemma is that results routinely fall short tary thought and practice what union of reformers’ promises. The earnestly leader and prominent socialist Eugene sought panacea remains elusive. Still, V. Debs bestowed on American political even if corrective action is only partial thought and practice. Like Debs, he was or cosmetic, reforms initiated in Wash- a romantic and a radical of gentle mien; ington suf½ce to quiet the clamor and he diligently argued against tendencies restore a semblance of order. Those out- that, in his eyes, subverted authentic comes are probably the best we can hope American ideals; and, though his sub- for regarding civil-military relations in- stantive impact turned out to be negli- side the Beltway. Yet there is a larger gible, he left behind an intellectual leg- point to be made here: that is, the pre- acy worth pondering. occupation with dysfunction in elite civ- Also like Debs, Palmer was a son of il-military relations distracts attention the Middle Border. He was born in 1870 from the more signi½cant problem of in downstate Illinois to a family that dysfunction in the realm of civil-military played a prominent role in state politics. relations for the rest of us. Instead of entering the family trade, how- Put simply, more or less contentious ever, John McAuley graduated from West civil-military relations within the Belt- Point in 1892 and entered the military way are inevitable. Within limits, such profession. There he found considerable contention is also tolerable. Meanwhile, satisfaction and achieved modest success an unharmonious relationship between even as he cultivated views that were at the military and society is not inevitable. odds with the prevailing beliefs of the Here, Americans should view dysfunc- of½cer corps. The army to which Palmer tion–which has become endemic and devoted several decades of service was pervasive–as intolerable. well into its Uptonian moment. Indeed, Elihu Root, a reform-minded secretary of Consider the story of George C. Mar- war from 1899 to 1904, had drawn explic- shall, army chief of staff throughout itly on Upton’s writings in reorganizing World War II, and his old friend John Mc- and modernizing the War Department. Auley Palmer. A great soldier, Marshall The prophet had received a posthumous was also an adept politician. Long before vindication. the war’s end was visible and without Among regular of½cers, Palmer was a consulting his civilian masters, Marshall rare anti-Uptonian. With a passion equal began to put in place his own plan for post- to Upton’s, he defended the citizen-sol- war U.S. civil-military relations. Rather dier tradition. Not only was that tradition than address how his successors would sound, Palmer insisted, it also expressed interact with presidents and cabinet secre- fundamental and irreplaceable American taries, he instead sought to strengthen the ideals. Advocating for and striving to connection between the U.S. Army and update the citizen-soldier tradition be-

128 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences came his life’s work. In his 1916 book An From the dawn of history wise men have Andrew J. Army of the People, his ½rst work on the seen that the perpetuation of free institu- Bacevich subject, Palmer spun a tale in which the tions depends on the power of self- United States embraced the Swiss con- defense. To be permanent, democratic cept of the people in arms as the basis of political institutions must include a demo- an impregnable defense. cratic system of military security. . . . A free Neither the army’s leadership nor Pres- state cannot continue to be democratic ident Woodrow Wilson was much inter- in peace and autocratic in war. Standing ested in impregnable defenses, however. armies threaten government by the people, Within a year, the United States was rais- not because they consciously seek to per- ing up a new army of citizen-soldiers. Yet vert liberty, but because they relieve the this army’s purpose was not to defend people themselves of the duty of self- America per se, but to ½ght Germans defense. A people accustomed to let a spe- in far-off France, a campaign in which cial class defend them must sooner or later Palmer himself participated. become un½t for liberty. An enduring gov- Following World War I, the issue of ernment by the people must include an military reform briefly commanded at- army of the people among its vital institu- tention in Congress. Palmer’s views had tions. For this reason, the maintenance of a made him suf½ciently well known that, single professional soldier more than nec- in 1919, he was seconded to the Senate essary threatens the very groundwork of Committee on Military Affairs, where he free institutions.8 assisted in drafting the bill that became In Palmer’s view, recent German histo- the National Defense Act of 1920. Much ry provided an example of what the Unit- to the dismay of the Uptonians, this leg- ed States needed to avoid: that is, as Ger- islation reaf½rmed the primacy of the cit- many’s “military power extended, its izen-soldier. With that issue settled, Con- political aims expanded.”9 To maintain gress proceeded to ignore the practical military power in excess of that needed requirements of national defense, and for self-defense was to pave the way for the United States’ military readiness de- militarism and empire. However inad- clined during the interwar period. The vertently, means could end up dictat- National Guard, repository for the citi- ing–and perverting–ends. The citizen- zen-soldier tradition, was underfunded, soldier, in Palmer’s view, served not only untrained, and unready; the regular as a safeguard of democracy but also as a army, now with its own reserve, was too bulwark against imperial adventurism. small and too poorly equipped to qualify Americans, Palmer wrote in 1930, had to as a serious ½ghting force. choose one of two military visions: that When Palmer retired from the Army in of “[George] Washington or [Emory] 1926, he turned full time to campaigning Upton.”10 for a modern and capable citizen-soldier In America in Arms, published on the eve army and published a series of books that of U.S. entry into World War II, Palmer might be classi½ed as “advocacy history.” declared, “We should never maintain Essentially, he ransacked the past, telling professionals to do things that can be different versions of the same story and done effectively by citizen soldiers.”11 reaching the same conclusion every time. Military policy that looked to the regular As he argues in his 1927 book Statesman- army as the primary instrument of ship or War: national defense, he insisted, “could have

140 (3) Summer 2011 129 Whose no congenial place among the political Notably, Palmer’s use of the term Army? institutions of a self-governing free peo- “peace establishment” echoes George ple.” Such an approach was at odds with Washington’s 1783 writing, “Sentiments the dictum that “a nation’s military insti- on a Peace Establishment.” tutions should be in harmony with its In his ½nal report as chief of staff, Mar- political traditions.”12 shall expanded on Palmer’s admonition. “War has been de½ned by a people who Given the paper trail that Palmer had have thought a lot about it–the Ger- left over a period of three decades, mans,” he wrote. The German view held George Marshall knew what to expect that “an invincible offensive military when he recruited his old comrade to force . . . could win any political argu- de½ne the parameters of postwar mili- ment.” He continued: tary policy. The seventy-year-old Palmer This is the doctrine Hitler carried to the holed up in a small of½ce in the Library of verge of complete success. It is the doctrine Congress and went to work. The results of Japan. It is a criminal doctrine, and like of his labors appeared in “Military Estab- other forms of crime, it has cropped up lishment,” or, more prosaically, War De- again and again since man began to live partment Circular 347, a document issued with his neighbors in communities and over Marshall’s signature on August 25, nations. There has long been an effort to 1944. At a moment when the war was far outlaw war for exactly the same reason that from over in either Europe or the Paci½c, man has outlawed murder. But the law pro- Circular 347 declared: hibiting murder does not of itself prevent There are two types of organization murder. It must be enforced. The enforcing through which the manpower of a nation power, however, must be maintained on a may be developed. One of these is the strictly democratic basis. There must not standing army type. . . . This is the system be a large standing army subject to the of Germany and Japan. It produces highly behest of a group of schemers. The citizen- ef½cient armies. But it is open to political soldier is the guarantee against such a mis- objections. . . . It, therefore, has no place use of power.14 among the institutions of a modern demo- Creating a citizen army reserve would cratic state based on the conception of gov- require Universal Military Training (umt). ernment by the people. The idea was not to turn every able-bod- The second type of military institution ied citizen into a fully equipped warrior, . . . is based upon the conception of a pro- but to provide individuals with rudimen- fessional peace establishment (no larger tary training, thereby facilitating the mo- than necessary to meet normal peacetime bilization of the citizen reserve when it requirements) to be reinforced in time of was needed. Palmer described the concept emergency by organized units drawn from thus: a citizen army reserve, effectively organized for this purpose in time of peace. . . . [E]very able-bodied young American This is the type of army which President should have a course of recruit training Washington proposed to the First Con- during his nineteenth, twentieth, or twen- gress as one of the essential foundations ty-½rst summer. After his recruit training of the new American Republic. . . . It will he would be enrolled in one of the local therefore be made the basis for all plans for units of the National Guard or the Orga- a post-war peace establishment.13 nized Reserves formed in the vicinity of his

130 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences home. Twice during this four-year period society, umt could not satisfy immedi- Andrew J. each soldier in the Organized Reserves ate military requirements. As World War Bacevich would be required to attend maneuvers for II came to an end, the United States had two weeks with his company.15 to station large occupation forces in Eu- rope and the Paci½c. umt could not have General Marshall also fervently be- ful½lled this mission. The onset of the lieved that umt should form the corner- Cold War further emphasized this short- stone of U.S. military policy after World coming as the forward deployment of War II. He considered it the key to har- U.S. forces became a core element of na- monizing a new military establishment tional security policy. with American political traditions. “The Second, although proponents described entire idea,” one historian has aptly writ- umt as inherently democratic and a safe- ten, “resembled the old nineteenth-cen- guard against militarism, wary Ameri- tury militia program, except it would be cans did not necessarily subscribe to that run by the national government rather view. After all, umt implied compulsion. than the states.”16 In the eyes of critics, it looked like a back- By the end of World War II, Marshall door way of impressing the entire male had persuaded President Truman, him- population into military service, making self a former citizen-soldier from Mis- permanent the system of conscription souri, to sign on. Dwight D. Eisenhower, that Americans had accepted as a war- who succeeded Marshall as army chief of time emergency measure. In short, umt staff, concurred, albeit with reservations. was hard to explain and hard to sell; thus, But the idea went nowhere in Congress; Congress rejected it. Responding to the umt was stillborn. The United States in- perceived imperatives of the Cold War, it stead chose the course that spelled the opted instead for “Selective Service,” a demise of the citizen-soldier tradition: system of peacetime conscription that that is, rather than a peace establish- was not universal and eventually proved ment, Americans opted for a war estab- to be anything but democratic. lishment. Over time, the concept of a Selective Service provided federal standing army lost its negative connota- authorities with mechanisms to manage tions. Moreover, creating an impregna- the entire military-age male population. ble defense was no longer enough. The The prospect of being drafted spurred phrase national security, which was dis- some young Americans to volunteer for placing national defense in the lexicon of military service; meanwhile, General everyday political discourse, implied Lewis Hershey, director of the Selective more expansive and ambitious require- Service System, protected others with de- ments. The prospect of creating “an ferments and augmented the supply of invincible offensive military force” that willing recruits by adjusting monthly “could win any political argument” draft quotas upward or downward. In found favor with many Americans. this guise, a vestige of the citizen-soldier tradition survived through the 1950s and Why did efforts by Palmer and Mar- into the 1960s (this was the era of Ser- shall to revise and sustain the citizen-sol- geant Elvis Presley, after all). Yet it was a dier concept fail? Two factors stand out system that neither George Washington as especially important. First, in spite of nor Emory Upton would likely have its merits in forging a harmonious rela- found completely satisfactory. tionship between the armed forces and

140 (3) Summer 2011 131 Whose Then came Vietnam. Under the strain federal innovation since the self-adhesive Army? of an unpopular and protracted war, the postage stamp. entire system collapsed. Vietnam handed Emory Upton a belated triumph and In 2004 and 2005, after 9/11 and in the dealt John McAuley Palmer a seemingly wake of two unpopular and protracted decisive defeat. President Richard M. wars–one in Iraq and another in Afghan- Nixon killed the citizen-soldier tradition istan–Americans began awakening to the once and for all. Disregarding concerns real implications of having deep-sixed voiced by the Joint Chiefs, he persuaded the citizen-soldier. Inside the Beltway, it Congress to terminate the draft. became apparent that the United States Out of the wreckage of Vietnam emerged faced the problem of having too much the so-called all-volunteer force. This was a war and too few warriors. To ease the bur- standing army par excellence, existing den on a badly overstretched force, and apart from American society. For a time, with few allies stepping up to the plate to divorcing the American military from the help, the Pentagon turned increasingly to American people seemed a masterstroke. mercenaries, referred to euphemistically Rather than harmonizing military policy as “private security ½rms.” No one much with political values, the all-volunteer cared for the result except the contractors force appeared to resolve a much thorn- who raked in huge pro½ts at taxpayer ex- ier issue. It reconciled American culture, pense. Even then, sending troops back for which had come to celebrate unencum- a third or fourth combat tour became bered individual autonomy, with polit- commonplace, and the sustainability of ical elites’ dogged insistence that exer- the situation seemed precarious. cising global leadership made it essential Outside the Beltway, the American for the United States to have available people retained negligible say in the for immediate use immensely capable employment of an army over which they armed forces. Rather than a state-based had forfeited any ownership. Long since militia activated in emergencies, the Na- cast as spectators, citizens found that tional Guard became an adjunct of the they had little voice in deciding when standing military. In the Pentagon’s view, Team America suited up or where it guardsmen were part-time regulars, ex- played. If there remained any doubts on pected to conform fully to professional that score, President Barack Obama’s standards. This, at least, was the prem- decision to escalate the Afghanistan War ise informing the so-called Total Force in December 2009 ended them. Having doctrine. promised to “change the way Washing- The creation of a new class of warrior- ton works,” Obama instead conformed to professionals made everyone happy. Those the dictates of standard practice. residing outside the Beltway could live “We the People” need to understand: their lives, unbothered by the prospect it’s no longer our army; it hasn’t been of receiving a telegram from the likes of for years; it’s theirs and they intend to General Hershey. Inside the Beltway, keep it. The American military belongs meanwhile, elites could still ½nd satisfac- to Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright, tion in sending American soldiers to to George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, to Beirut, Panama, Somalia, or elsewhere. Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates. Civil- By the 1990s, something close to unanim- ian leaders will continue to employ the ity existed: the military created after military as they see ½t. If Americans do Vietnam was perhaps the most successful not like the way the army is used, they

132 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences should reclaim it, resuscitating the tra- Yet as long as the tradition of the cit- Andrew J. dition of the citizen-soldier and reassert- izen-soldier remains moribund, revers- Bacevich ing the connection between citizenship ing the militarization of U.S. foreign and military service. Bluntly, Americans policy will be a pipe dream. In the na- should heed the counsel of George Wash- tion’s capital, the halls will resound ington, George Marshall, and John Mc- with calls for peace, but war is likely to Auley Palmer. remain a permanent condition. In Wash- The likelihood of such an outcome is ington, people will wring their hands nearly nil. With rare exceptions, mem- over the unseemly state of relations bers of the national security establish- between civilian and military elites, as ment remain wedded to the all-volunteer brass hats and politicians maneuver force and adamantly oppose any mea- against the other for advantage. That’s sure that would increase popular influ- their problem. ence on policy. Worse, American civic cul- The problem for the rest of us is a far ture continues to evince a very low toler- greater one: grasping the implications, ance for anything that smacks of collec- moral as well as political, of sending tive obligation. The few willing to enter- the few to engage in endless war while tain the notion that military service the many stand by–passive, mute, and should constitute an obligation tend to yet, whether they like it or not, deeply be long in the tooth–aging veterans of complicit. World War II, mostly. endnotes 1 George Washington, “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment” (1783), http://www .potowmack.org/washsent.html (accessed May 11, 2010). 2 U.S. Congress, The Militia Act of 1792, 2nd Cong., 1st sess., May 8, 1792, http://www .constitution.org/mil/mil_act_1792.htm (accessed May 11, 2010). 3 The Uptonian bible is The Military Policy of the United States, a history left un½nished at the time of Upton’s death and published several decades later at the behest of Secretary of War Elihu Root; Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Gov- ernment Printing Of½ce, 1904). 4 What cost General McChrystal his job was not aggressive policy promotion but a willingness to tolerate among his immediate subordinates casual expressions of contempt for senior civilians. For the Rolling Stone article that led to his ½ring, see http://www.rollingstone .com/politics/news/17390/119236 (accessed November 30, 2010). 5 Although not included in the of½cial Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associ- ated Terms, jointness identi½es seamless inter-service collaboration as the sine qua non of military effectiveness. 6 U.S. Congress, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., October 1, 1986; available at the National Defense University Library, http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html (accessed December 22, 2010). 7 See Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, a project undertaken by the Center for Strategic and Inter- national Studies, http://csis.org/program/beyond-goldwater-nichols (accessed November 30, 2010). 8 John McAuley Palmer, Statesmanship or War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1927), 74. 9 Ibid., 29.

140 (3) Summer 2011 133 Whose 10 John McAuley Palmer, Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: Three War Statesmen (Garden City, N.Y.: Army? Doubleday, 1930), 361. 11 John McAuley Palmer, America in Arms: The Experience of the United States with Military Orga- nization (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1941), 203. 12 Quoted in I. B. Holley, Jr., General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democ- racy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), 89. This volume combines Palmer’s un- ½nished and previously unpublished memoir with a biography that takes up where the memoir leaves off. 13 Ibid., 659–660. 14 United States War Department General Staff, Biennial Report of the Chief of Staffof the Unit- ed States Army July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1945), 117. 15 Palmer, America in Arms, 174. 16 George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940–1973 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 90.

134 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences : The Military-Industrial Complex -

- Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. - e

Abstract: In his 1961 farewell address, President Eisenhower cautioned against a future in which a powerful military-industrial complex manipulated policy to the detriment of American interests. Dunlap - argues that, ½fty years later, Eisenhower’s fears have not been realized; in fact, the military-industrial y enterprise is in decline. Certainly, the U.S. military owes its continued preeminence to both the quality of its combatants and the superiority of its weaponry. Yet as the manpower-centric strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq replaced technology-centric operations; as complicated defense acquisitions laws deterred companies from obtaining contracts; and as the economic downturn and rising national de½cit have strained budgets, the defense industry has become less robust than it was in the Cold War era. Consequently, the services are constrained by aging equipment and outdated technology, even as other countries are strengthening their defense capabilities. While it is important to keep U.S. military and industrial power in check, we should also be concerned about the weakening of innovative collaborations between our nation’s military and industrial sectors.

[The] conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the Ameri- can experience. . . . [W]e must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., is Visit- exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of ing Professor of the Practice of Law this combination endanger our liberties or democrat- and Associate Director of the Cen- ic processes. ter on Law, Ethics and National Se- 1 curity at Duke University School –President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1961) of Law. He served thirty-four years in the U.S. Air Force and retired as a Major General in 2010. His publi- When President Eisenhower uttered this warn- cations include “The Air Force and ing in his farewell address, he forever ½xed in the 21st Century Conflicts: Dysfunc- public mind the idea–in its most histrionic mani- tional or Dynamic?” in Lessons for a festation–of an ever-present menace posed by Long War: How America Can Win on grasping arms merchants in league with war-mon- New Battle½elds (edited by Thomas gering generals. This cabal, so the theory goes, Donnelly and Frederick Kagan, lurks in the shadows waiting for an unguarded 2010); and “Airpower,” in Under- moment in which to subvert the American way of standing Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges (edited by life for its own venal purposes. To writer James Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney, Ledbetter, the stereotype of the shady arms 2010). merchant is still alive and well. In a New York

135 The Times article from late 2010, he contends, a target.” Further, if military spending is Military- “It is not a stretch to believe that the ar- inadequately examined, he argues, it will Industrial Complex maments industry–which pro½ts not exacerbate the U.S. budget crisis that is only from domestic sales but also from “bankrupting the nation and destroying tens of billions of dollars in annual ex- our own currency.”5 ports–manipulates public policy to per- To what extent do the concerns raised petuate itself.”2 by Ledbetter, Pfaff, and Paul reflect Eisen- With total annual U.S. defense expen- hower’s original thinking? If America’s ditures now exceeding $700 billion, Ei- powerful military is popular and trusted senhower’s celebrated caution seems by the electorate, does its reputation indi- to many observers to be as apt today as cate the “proper meshing” of military and ever. Indeed, in the November/Decem- industry that the farewell address calls ber 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs, political for? Or should we be as concerned today commentator William Pfaff argues that as Eisenhower was ½ve decades ago? the full-time, professional military– Eisenhower was apparently thinking “supplemented by a nearly equivalent of the future, not accusing contemporary number of civilian mercenaries”–sub- institutions of malevolence. Referring to stitutes for the “citizens’ army” he be- “unwarranted influence” both “sought” lieves conscription produced in the past. and “unsought,” he took care not to cast The result, he declares, is a force “direct- aspersions on anyone. In fact, recent ly accountable only to the Pentagon [and scholarship reveals that Eisenhower de- one that] exists primarily to augment the liberately toned down his language from national ‘military-industrial complex’ that of more antagonistic earlier drafts.6 against which President Dwight Eisen- As the former ½ve-star general who led hower warned.”3 the allied effort to defeat the Nazis, he, of Pfaff’s concerns are hardly limited to all people, appreciated the need for a the “military” portion of Eisenhower’s powerful military buttressed by a strong dictum. He also asserts that “defense and and creative industrial infrastructure. security industries,” “the most impor- Rather than criticizing either the mil- tant” components of the U.S. manufac- itary or the arms industry, Eisenhower turing sector, are positioned to “domi- merely pointed out that the Cold War had nate Congress, as well as an inexperi- created for the ½rst time in American his- enced administration” via the industries’ tory a need to maintain, in a period of pu- “corporate interests.” To Pfaff, the Unit- tative peace, a very large military estab- ed States is “a state owned by its army.”4 lishment as well as an equally sizable Ledbetter and Pfaff are not alone in arms industry. To Eisenhower, this un- their critique of the interplay between precedented phenomenon required con- military money and American policy and stant scrutiny by the electorate. An “alert stature abroad. In a May 2010 speech, and knowledgeable citizenry,” he said, Republican Representative Ron Paul of was necessary to ensure “the proper mesh- Texas railed against “blank checks to the ing of the huge industrial and military military-industrial complex,” which, he machinery of defense . . . so that security maintains, does little to defend against and liberty may prosper together.”7 authentic threats. Paul contends that costly overseas military operations “in The prescription for an “alert and knowl- many cases foment resentment that does edgeable citizenry” is perhaps the stron- not make us safer, but instead makes us gest rationale for the continuing vitality

136 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences of Eisenhower’s speech–albeit for rea- dation over the past decade, conceding Charles J. sons he may not have anticipated. In further that “the pace of these consolida- Dunlap, Jr. truth, a robust “military-industrial com- tions does not seem to be slackening.”9 plex” remains an essential element of a Consolidation does not, as Eisenhower’s democracy facing diverse and existen- admonition might have supposed, trans- tial threats in a dangerous world. In the late into an even more powerful and unit- twenty-½rst century, however, America’s ed military-industrial establishment; to citizenry needs to be alert not just to the the contrary, consolidation reflects the risk of capitalism cum militarism run complex’s declining fortunes. amok, but also–paradoxically–to the Decline? With a budget of over $700 perils of a declining military-industrial billion? How can the military-industrial enterprise. Surprisingly, accumulating complex be eroding given that the U.S. evidence shows that the complex’s once- share of defense spending amounts to feared power is rapidly and dangerously nearly 48 percent of the worldwide total? ebbing. Virtually all experts agree that While these ½gures may seem remark- America’s armed forces have achieved– able, military spending as a percentage and continue to maintain–their martial of gdp has dropped strikingly since the dominance not just because of the quali- Eisenhower era. In 1961, defense spend- ty of their combatants, but also because ing constituted 9.4 percent of gdp10; by of the superiority and abundance of their 2010, it had fallen by half, to 4.7 percent, weaponry and equipment. Those attri- and much of that is not headed to arms butes, in turn, are the result of the crea- makers’ coffers. tivity and productivity that a highly com- This shift is caused in part by changes petitive free-enterprise system generates. in how the Pentagon identi½es and re- In the defense sector, however, that com- sponds to threats. In the latest version of petitiveness is evidently waning. In 2008, the congressionally mandated Quadren- the Defense Science Board glumly noted nial Defense Review, the Pentagon de- how the military-industrial complex had clares that “America’s interests and role transformed since Eisenhower expressed in the world require armed forces with his qualms: unmatched capabilities”; nevertheless, it narrows that globally oriented perspec- The U.S. Defense industrial base changed tive by de½ning its top objective as pre- signi½cantly . . . since the end of the Cold vailing in “today’s wars” in Afghanistan War. . . . From ½fty major defense contrac- and Iraq. tors at the beginning of the 1990s, the de- The focus on Iraq and Afghanistan has fense industry consolidated into six large signi½cant implications for the defense in- defense ½rms by the end of the decade. dustry because the strategy employed in While competition still occurs between a those wars is manpower-intensive and in- few ½rms in each sector, the Government clined toward low-tech solutions. Based buyer can no longer bene½t from a highly on the highly acclaimed counterinsur- competitive defense market.8 gency doctrine authored largely by the In its 2010 report to Congress on in- popular and politically savvy General dustrial capabilities, the Pentagon insists David Petraeus, the strategy eschews tech- that it still relies on market forces to main- nology, arms, and equipment. Instead, tain the vitality of the industrial base. At the approach favors deploying masses of the same time, it reiterates concerns foot soldiers, each one prepared to be- about the loss of competition to consoli- come a “social worker, a civil engineer, a

140 (3) Summer 2011 137 The school teacher, a nurse, a boy scout.”11 standing the influential status supposed- Military- Embraced by liberals and conservatives ly enjoyed by arms makers. Secretary Industrial Complex alike, the doctrine justi½ed a huge expan- Gates plainly states that “any major sion of American ground forces.12 weapons program, in order to remain vi- A manpower-centric strategy is, howev- able, will have to show some utility and er, extremely costly. The military spends relevance to the kind of irregular cam- about $1 million to deploy a single soldier paigns that . . . are most likely to engage to Afghanistan for one year.13 Moreover, America’s military in the coming de- the cost of military personnel, deployed cades.”17 Irrelevant, it seems, are the big- or not, is soaring. With expenditures for ticket, high-technology air and naval military health care alone now topping platforms that enriched many defense $50 billion a year, Defense Secretary ½rms in Eisenhower’s day. Robert Gates understandably claims that To be sure, equipment still plays a vital such expenses are “eating the Defense role in irregular warfare. Retired Army Department alive.” Unlike Eisenhower’s General Barry McCaffrey argues that the era of poorly compensated conscription combined effects of such developments forces, today the Department of Defense as unmanned drones and hyper-accurate (dod) must fund a growing panoply of munitions have “fundamentally changed bene½ts and inducements enacted to sup- warfare.”18 However, many of those ad- port the all-volunteer military since the vances do not necessarily reflect new pro- draft ended in 1973. grams that stimulate industry to produce Financing this new kind of military is particularly inventive or revolutionary creating what one Pentagon of½cial has technologies. Rather, these innovations called a looming “½scal calamity.” The more often represent a repurposing of consequences for the arms industry are existing equipment designed and built clear: an unnamed of½cial told The Wash- for use against Cold War adversaries. ington Post that the “government’s gen- Notably, one of the largest new equip- erosity [toward military personnel] is ment programs speci½cally designed to unsustainable” and that such expenses address the “irregular campaigns” that will leave the Pentagon with “less money Secretary Gates refers to did not emanate to buy weapons.”14 Few of what dollars from the machinations of the military- remain will be allocated to the expensive industrial complex or, for that matter, the “Cold War” weaponry and missiles that Pentagon. Congress initiated the $35 bil- concerned Eisenhower.15 lion Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected The producers of intercontinental bal- (mrap) vehicle program in response to listic missiles, for example, are unlikely constituent complaints about horri½c to acquire the “misplaced power” Eisen- injuries to soldiers from improvised ex- hower feared. To the contrary, Ilan Ber- plosive devices (ieds) in Iraq and, later, man of the American Foreign Policy in Afghanistan. In terms of impact on the Council warns: “[P]ractically every de- industrial base, the mrap venture pro- clared nuclear weapon state is engaged in duced few new or dramatic innovations. a serious modernization of its strategic Why did the program fail to encourage arsenal. The United States, by contrast, technological advancement? The urgen- has allowed its strategic infrastructure to cy of the acquisition program required it atrophy since the end of the Cold War.”16 to rely “only on proven technologies Sophisticated weaponry does not ap- and commercially available products.” pear to be a Pentagon priority, notwith- Further, in order to rapidly “expand lim-

138 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences ited production capacity,” contracts were government employees, including man- Charles J. spread to nine commercial sources.”19 aging other contractors.” Consequent- Dunlap, Jr. Even with these precautions, the program ly, Gates directed the dod to “reduce is not without dif½culties. Indeed, the funding for service support contractors Congressional Research Service recent- by 10 percent each year for the next three ly reported that “almost 5,000 mraps in years.”24 Accordingly, much of the work Afghanistan are not being used because formerly done by outside contractors is of their size and weight” as well as “pos- being in-sourced to dod employees.25 sible redundancies” with other equip- All this activity portends the weakening ment.20 This excess inventory all but guar- influence of contractors in the Pentagon antees that the manufacturers will not co- and elsewhere. alesce into a permanent military-indus- The complexities of defense acquisi- trial entity capable of the overreaching tion laws and regulations put in place Eisenhower feared. since 1961 also diminish the cohesion that would facilitate the accumulation of Initially, contractors providing services “unwarranted influence” by the military- seemed to fare better than arms makers industrial complex. According to Patrick in pro½ting from Gates’s “irregular cam- Wilson, the director of government af- paigns.” Counterinsurgency expert T. X. fairs for the Semiconductor Industry As- Hammes argues that the extensive use of sociation, the “defense acquisition pro- such contractors–including those that cess is so cumbersome that many high- provide armed security services–in con- tech ½rms shun government sales.” The flict areas “aligned with previous deci- bureaucracy of the procurement system, sions and the administration’s faith in he says, is “ridiculous.”26 the ef½ciency and effectiveness of private Calling the acquisition system “ridicu- business compared to governmental or- lous” may be an exaggeration, but not by ganization.”21 However, widely reported much–even when the stakes are very allegations of abuse and fraud obliged high. For example, the Air Force has been Congress to intervene. Beginning with trying since 2002 to replace its aging ae- the creation, in 2004, of the Of½ce of the rial tanker fleet, whose aircraft, on aver- Special Inspector General for Iraq Re- age, are more than forty-seven years old. construction,22 Congress used investiga- Yet a variety of legal and technical issues tions, hearings, and new laws to rein in stymied the project for years, despite its contractors in war zones.23 With more being valued at as much as $35 billion.27 regulation likely to be forthcoming, it A sophisticated military-industrial com- seems clear that even if this assemblage plex endowed with treacherous proclivi- of contractors had designs on “unwar- ties toward excessive influence would be ranted influence,” recent events have con- expected to have greater success in bring- spired to prevent such an outcome. ing such a lucrative opportunity to fru- Additionally, the halcyon days for ser- ition sooner. vice support and advisory contractors Another factor diminishing the ability stationed away from the battle½eld of major defense ½rms to accrete un- appear to have ended as well. Secre- bounded power is the maze of legally tary Gates concludes that the dod has mandated acquisition polices intended “grown over-reliant on contractors.” He to serve social purposes as much as suggests they “may be performing func- strengthen national security. For in- tions that should be done by full-time stance, The Washington Post reports that a

140 (3) Summer 2011 139 The “tiny, inexperienced ½rm” received a of the war in Afghanistan will make it Military- $250 million contract “without competi- more dif½cult for the government to Industrial Complex tion, under special set-aside exemptions address the problems facing the United granted by Congress to help impover- States at home.”30 Likewise, an abc ished Alaska natives.” At the time of the News/Washington Post poll in early De- contract award, the company had only cember 2010 found support at historic eighteen employees and $73,000 in rev- lows, with 60 percent of Americans char- enue the previous year.28 However one acterizing the war, in ½scal terms, as “not views the wisdom of set-asides, adher- worth ½ghting.”31 ence to such exemption policies seems to Secretary Gates, who gamely insists counteract concerns about the dangerous that “the truth of the matter is when it influence of huge corporate monoliths. comes to the de½cit, the Department of Defense is not the problem,”32 supports a Of all the factors emasculating Ameri- series of cost-saving initiatives to address ca’s military-industrial complex, howev- potential defense spending reductions, er, none is as signi½cant as current eco- including cuts in selected weapons sys- nomic conditions. The arms industry is tems. Although he wants to invest the caught in the throes of forces vastly more savings in fewer but higher-priority sys- powerful than it could aspire to wield: tems, hopes are dimming in the defense the severe global economic downturn; industry that arms purchases of any kind the near meltdown of the U.S. ½nancial will escape the budgetary ax, especially system; and the ballooning de½cit all com- given that the president’s highly influen- bine to spark calls on both sides of the tial National Commission on Fiscal Re- political aisle for sharp cuts in discretion- sponsibility and Reform recommends ap- ary spending–a major portion of which plying any savings generated by the dod is the defense budget. to de½cit reduction, not weapons.33 Military spending distressed and frus- While “despondent” would be too trated Eisenhower. His melancholia is cap- strong a word, there is little evidence that tured in a 1953 remark that, though less arms manufacturers are bullish about the well known than his farewell address, is future of arms sales. They are likely to powerful and thought-provoking: embrace the blunt advice issued by defense analyst Loren Thompson in late Every gun that is made, every warship 2010. Commenting on a recent solicita- launched, every rocket ½red signi½es, in tion for a new Army ground combat vehi- the ½nal sense, a theft from those who cle, Thompson surmised: hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. This world in arms is not [D]efense companies need to start thinking spending money alone. It is spending the seriously about diversifying their product sweat of its laborers, the genius of its sci- mix away from a capricious government entists, the hopes of its children.29 customer. Diversi½cation is the “D” word defense investors are loathe to voice, but Although the American people have look at what General Dynamics accom- generally endorsed expanding military plished by its foray into business jets and budgets since 9/11, that support may be you begin to see a way forward for defense flagging–especially with respect to war companies in what could be a very bleak costs in Afghanistan. According to a usa decade.34 Today/Gallup poll in late November 2010, 60 percent of Americans worry that “costs

140 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences Clearly, the industrial part of the mili- Furthermore, affection for and con½- Charles J. tary-industrial complex has not developed dence in those serving in uniform does Dunlap, Jr. in a way that might have caused Eisen- not necessarily translate into political hower great alarm. Given the relative power. General Wesley Clark’s 2004 pres- impotence of the defense industry, then, idential campaign foundered despite ex- how wary are the American people today emplary military service, including suc- of the military’s potential for per½dy? Not cessful leadership of nato forces in the very, it seems. 1999 Kosovo conflict. Recent elections, While no formal assessments of the including the November 2010 midterms, views of the U.S. body politic have asked have witnessed a growing number of this question explicitly, several polls shed congressional candidates who were vet- some light. For example, among the insti- erans of the wars in Iraq and Afghan- tutions in which Americans had the most istan; most, however, have lost their con½dence in 2010, small business ranked bids.39 Perhaps the veterans’ electoral second only to the military.35 However, inexperience plays a role in these losses, big business–the type one would asso- but the results nevertheless intimate an ciate with Eisenhower’s admonition– electorate that readily distinguishes be- ranked almost at the bottom. Military of- tween the quali½cations of uniformed ½cers also headed the list of institutional military personnel and those of political leaders in whom the public had the most leaders. con½dence, with small-business man- Additionally, a series of laws and regu- agers right behind them.36 The execu- lations enacted in the aftermath of Wa- tives of major companies, meanwhile, tergate and other scandals pose signi½- trailed both groups signi½cantly. cant obstacles to the kind of military-in- On values, a November 2010 Gallup dustry collusion that underpinned Eisen- poll found that only nurses were more hower’s 1961 warnings. The 1978 Ethics highly rated in the public’s esteem than in Government Act40 and accompanying military of½cers. Indeed, 73 percent of regulations formalized conflict-of-inter- Americans rated the honesty and ethical est rules and ½nancial disclosure require- standards of of½cers in the armed forces ments designed to limit untoward influ- as high or very high. Only 15 percent of ences. In a celebrated case, a senior civil- the public gave business executives such ian Air Force acquisition of½cial was con- high marks.37 Ironically, despite high convicted for giving Boeing, a major defense ½dence in–and deep respect for–the contractor, “preferential treatment in ex- military, a majority of Americans also change for a job.”41 said in 2010 that they do not believe the Rules limiting the activities of retired United States will be the top military of½cers were expanded in Fall 2010. A se- power in twenty years. Strikingly, many ries of reports in USA Today and other hold this view alongside the further be- media highlighted the role of “military lief that the nation “will continue to have mentors,” retired generals who provide combat troops regularly involved in ½ght- consultation services for defense pro- ing around the world over the next two grams. USA Today claimed that 89 percent decades.”38 How to reconcile these two of the mentors it found “also had ½nan- predictions is unclear; nonetheless, the cial ties to defense contractors, who survey results suggest that the public could pro½t from the mentors’ connec- does not foresee an ascent of U.S. mili- tions.”42 As a result of those ½ndings, tary power. Secretary Gates–who himself made a

140 (3) Summer 2011 141 The fortune in his post-cia career43–im- stitutes a “puny force against any serious Military- posed a series of new rules that limited adversary.”47 Even so, historian Michael Industrial Complex the annual dod compensation of re- Auslin of the American Enterprise Insti- tired generals for mentoring services to tute says that today’s budget restrictions $179,000. The policy further obliges are hitting airpower especially hard; con- them to publicly disclose their ½nancial sequently, he says, “[S]ome of the stun- information and business connections to ning joint creations of the Air Force and the same degree that those still serving America’s defense industrial base . . . will on active duty are obliged to do.44 likely never be repeated.” If budgetary trends are not reversed, he warns, the Air What do all the developments of the Force’s “future will look even grimmer past half-century mean after the ½ftieth than it does now.”48 anniversary of Eisenhower’s exhorta- The deterioration of America’s defense tion? Ledbetter claims that the warning infrastructure has captured the attention “is as urgent today as ever.” He points not of Congress. During hearings on the de- only to the “mounting long-term costs” fense industrial base in Fall 2010, Con- of defense but also–somewhat discon- gress acknowledged “the security chal- nectedly–to the alleged “use of martial lenges posed by a shrinking defense power” for the detention of terrorism industrial base and domestic supply suspects at Guantánamo Bay and wire- chain.”49 Furthermore, Congress recog- taps of Americans.45 While Eisenhower nized that U.S. arms makers face the might have been disturbed by such events, “proliferation of foreign-made and coun- Ledbetter seems to conflate these con- terfeit parts, outdated technology, and a temporary issues with the gravamen of depleted manufacturing workforce.”50 Eisenhower’s concern: that is, the emer- But there are still too few tangible indi- gence of a near-conspiratorial alignment cations that “an alert and knowledge- of military leaders and their analogues in able citizenry” will compel the necessary the arms industry. steps to ensure the appropriate level of That combination does not exist. In- military-industrial muscle is met and deed, one might say that Eisenhower’s maintained. warning was heard and heeded–with Meanwhile, we must not ignore the unintended consequences. The fading of fact that other nations–including poten- the American military-industrial com- tial adversaries–are strengthening their plex impacts U.S. military capability; the industrial base. The Pentagon’s 2010 re- effect on America’s Air Force is but one port reveals that China’s defense indus- illustration. Whatever influence the Air tries have undergone a “broad-based Force may have enjoyed in Eisenhower’s transformation” since the 1990s. In fact, day is long gone. Consider Air Force Lieu- “[a]ugmented by direct acquisition of tenant General David Deptula’s dismal foreign weapons and technology, these assessment from Fall 2010: “[W]e have a reforms have enabled China to develop geriatric bomber force,” Deptula con- and produce advanced weapon systems cludes, and “a geriatric ½ghter force. We that incorporate mid-1990s technology have a geriatric Air Force, quite frankly.”46 in many areas, and some systems–par- Aircraft age is not the only issue; num- ticularly ballistic missiles–that rival bers and sophistication are also a con- any in the world today.”51 Ominously, cern. For example, Defense News surmised China’s industry is developing air capa- that America’s current bomber fleet con- bilities to a degree that suggests China’s

142 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences intention to challenge “U.S. air power in military counterparts addressed the im- Charles J. the region.”52 peratives of the Cold War confrontation Dunlap, Jr. In other developments that show the with the Soviet Union. That the perils of internationalization of the arms industry, “misplaced power” were largely avoided Russia and India have signed a deal to is a critically important lesson. That is, build hundreds of new “½fth generation” inevitability need not be part of the lexi- warplanes designed to best America’s con of this issue. most advanced ½ghters.53 In light of such Were he alive today, Eisenhower un- reports, many experts are concerned that doubtedly would have recognized that any additional cuts in U.S. defense spend- dismissing the military-industrial coming “will dangerously erode the techno- plex as the inveterate enemy of democra- logical edge that America’s armed forces cy is wrong and dangerous. Thanks large- depend upon, and deserve.”54 As Ilan ly to Eisenhower’s eloquent expression Berman puts it, “Stagnation [in the de- of caution, the United States has shown fense industry] threatens U.S. arms supe- that it can effectively limit the reach of riority.”55 Some analysts go further. Ac- the military-industrial establishment. cording to political commentator Zbig- Now the question may be whether con- niew Mazurak, “[T]he U.S. is no longer trolling influences–“sought or unsought” unrivalled in terms of conventional –have taken us too far. weapons. Conventional threats are real Writing in The Wall Street Journal in late and growing.”56 2010, novelist Mark Helprin warns: The problem, however, may run deep- [History] tells us that, entirely indepen- er. Some analysts observe an “anti-mod- dent of economic considerations, although ern warfare prejudice” within the U.S. mil- not a dime should be appropriated to the itary itself.57 Perhaps an outgrowth of the military if it is not necessary, not a dime manpower-intensive counterinsurgency should be withheld if it is. The proof of strategy in vogue today, this trend runs this, so often and so tragically forgotten, is counter to the “high-technology” empha- that the costs of providing an undauntable sis that strategist Colin Gray calls “the defense, whatever they may be, pale before American way in warfare.” Indeed, Gray blood and defeat.59 contends, American society “cannot possibly prepare for, or attempt to ½ght, its Even the most ardent advocate of Ei- wars in any other than a technology-led senhower’s farewell address would be manner.”58 But the ability to maintain wise to ponder that sentiment. such an approach depends on the existence of a vigorous, innovative, and pro½table military-industrial enterprise.

Eisenhower’s dictum will always serve as a useful bellwether for the disquieting prospect of an unchecked confederation of military and industrial power. Still, in twenty-½rst-century America, the importance of context is becoming ever more evident. During Eisenhower’s presidency, a robust industrial base working effectively (if not always ef½ciently) with its

140 (3) Summer 2011 143 The endnotes Military- 1 Industrial President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Military-Industrial Complex Speech,” January 17, 1961, Complex http://www.h-net.org/~hst306/documents/indust.html. 2 James Ledbetter, “What Ike Got Right,” The New York Times, December 13, 2010, http://www .nytimes.com/2010/12/14/opinion/14ledbetter.html. 3 William Pfaff, “Manufacturing Insecurity,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66869/william-pfaff/manufacturing-insecurity. 4 Ibid. 5 Ron Paul, “More Blank Checks to the Military-Industrial Complex,” Antiwar.com, May 25, 2010, http://original.antiwar.com/paul/2010/05/24/more-blank-checks-to-the-military -industrial-complex. 6 Sam Roberts, “Eisenhower’s ‘Military-Industrial Complex’ Evolution,” The New York Times, December 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/11/us/politics/11eisenhower.html. 7 Eisenhower, “Military-Industrial Complex Speech.” 8 Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Industrial Structure for Transformation, “Creating an Effective National Security Industrial Base for the 21st Century: An Action Plan to Address the Coming Crisis” (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, July 2008), http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/dsb_task_force_on_def_ind_structure_for_transf.pdf. 9 Of½ce of Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Industrial Pol- icy, “Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress” (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 2010), http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/annual_ind_cap_rpt_to_congress -2010.pdf. 10 http://www.truthandpolitics.org/military-relative-size.php. 11 Both the Army and the Marines have released versions of the doctrine: U.S. Army Head- quarters, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual No. 3-24 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, December 15, 2006); Marine Corps Development Command Headquarters, Coun- terinsurgency, Marine Corps War½ghting Publication No. 3-33.5 (Washington, D.C.: Depart- ment of the Navy, December 15, 2006), http://www.scribd.com/doc/9137276/US-Army -Field-Manual-FM-324-Counterinsurgency. 12 For a discussion of the 2006 decision to increase the Army by 65,000 troops and the Marine Corps by 27,000 troops, as well as the 2009 announcement of an additional increase of 22,000 Army troops, see Robert M. Gates and Michael Mullen, “dod News Brie½ng with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon,” news transcript, U.S. Department of Defense, July 20, 2009, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4447. 13 Christopher Drew, “High Costs Weigh on Troop Debate for Afghan War,” The New York Times, November 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/us/politics/15cost.html. 14 See Craig Whitlock, “Pentagon: Troop Raises Too Generous,” The Washington Post, May 8, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/07/AR2010050703054 .html. 15 Stephen F. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990). 16 Ilan Berman, “Stagnation Threatens U.S. Arms Superiority,” Defense News, January 4, 2010, 21. 17 Robert M. Gates, Remarks to the Heritage Foundation, Colorado Springs, Colorado, May 13, 2008, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1240.

144 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences 18 Barry R. McCaffrey, “After Action Report,” memorandum for Colonel Mike Meese, U.S. Mil- Charles J. itary Academy, October 15, 2007, http://www.mccaffreyassociates.com/pages/documents/ Dunlap, Jr. AirForceAAR-101207.pdf. 19 Michael J. Sullivan, “Rapid Acquisition of mrap Vehicles” (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Of½ce, October 8, 2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10155t.pdf. 20 Andrew Feickert, “Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (mrap) Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 24, 2010), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA523574. 21 T. X. Hammes, “Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strate- gic Impact,” Strategic Forum no. 260 (October 2010), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/ SF%20260_½nal%20for%20Web.pdf. 22 See Of½ce of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, http://www.sigir.mil/ about/index.html. 23 Moshe Schwartz, “Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2010), http://www .fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf. 24 Robert M. Gates, “dod News Brie½ng with Secretary Gates from the Pentagon,” news transcript, U.S. Department of Defense, August 9, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/ Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4669. 25 Robert Brodsky, “Defense Insourcing to Continue at Military Services,” Government Exec- utive.com, September 7, 2010, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0910/090710rb1.htm. 26 Sandra Erwin, “U.S. Military Headed the Way of Detroit?” National Defense, December 7, 2010, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=268. 27 Jeremiah Gertler, “Air Force KC-X Tanker Program: Background and Issues for Congress” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, December 2009), http://www.fas.org/ sgp/crs/weapons/RL34398.pdf. 28 Robert O’Harrow, Jr., “Alaska Native Status Gave Tiny, Inexperienced Firm a $250 Million Army Contract,” The Washington Post, November 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost .com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/25/AR2010112503333.html. 29 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “The Chance for Peace,” speech delivered before the American Soci- ety of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php ?pid=9819#axzz1GnCTPVnY. 30 usa Today/Gallup Poll, November 19–21, 2010, http://www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm. 31 “Assessment of Afghanistan War Sours; Six in 10 Say It’s ‘Not Worth Fighting,’” abc News/Washington Post Poll: The War in Afghanistan, December 16, 2010, http://www .langerresearch.com/uploads/1119a6%20Afghanistan.pdf. 32 Julian Barnes, “Gates Warns Against Defense Cuts,” The Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/ceo-council/2010/11/16/gates-counter-punches-on-de½cit-commission -proposed-defense-cuts. 33 Nathan Hodge, “Defense Suppliers Fear Cuts,” The Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704447604576007681035741532.html. 34 Loren B. Thompson, “Army Vehicle Solicitation: A Clear Signal Contractors Need To Con- sider Diversi½cation” (Arlington, Va.: Lexington Institute, December 1, 2010), http://www .lexingtoninstitute.org/army-vehicle-solicitation-a-clear-signal-contractors-need-to-consider -diversi½cation?a=1&c=1171.

140 (3) Summer 2011 145 The 35 Lydia Saad, “Congress Ranks Last in Con½dence in Institutions,” Gallup, Inc., July 22, 2010, Military- http://www.gallup.com/poll/141512/Congress-Ranks-Last-Con½dence-Institutions.aspx. Industrial Complex 36 Alyssa Hall, “Virtually No Change in Annual Harris Poll Con½dence Index from Last Year,” Harris Interactive, March 9, 2010, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive -Poll-Research-Education-Con½dence-2010-03.pdf. 37 “Honesty/Ethics in Professions,” November 19–21, 2010, Gallup, Inc., http://www.gallup .com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-professions.aspx. 38 Frank Newport, “Americans See U.S. Military as No. 1 Now, but not in 20 Yrs.,” Gallup, Inc., February 26, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/126218/Americans-Military-No-Not -Yrs.aspx. 39 Donn M. Kurtz II, “Veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan as Congressional Candidates,” Foreign Policy Journal, November 9, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/11/09/veterans -of-iraq-and-afghanistan-as-congressional-candidates. 40 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Public Law 95-521, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. (October 26, 1978), sec. 701 et seq. 41 Kimberly Palmer, “Former Air Force Acquisition Of½cial Released from Jail,” Government Executive, October 3, 2005, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1005/100305k2.htm. 42 “Our View on Defense Spending: Pentagon Stumbles Again on Military Mentor Program,” USA Today, August 12, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2010-08-13 -editorial13_ST_N.htm. 43 Sharon Theimer, “Gates’ Assets Include Defense Stock,” The Washington Post, December 6, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/06/AR2006120600188 .html. 44 Tom Vanden Brook, “Full Disclosure for Military Members,” USA Today, October 14, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20101014/1amentors14_st.art.htm. 45 Ledbetter, “What Ike Got Right.” 46 David Deptula, “Anticipating a Change,” conference address, Annual Air & Space Conference and Technology Exposition, September 13, 2010, http://www.afa.org/events/conference/ 2010/scripts/AFA-100913-Deptula.pdf. 47 “Build a New Bomber,” Defense News, September 13, 2010, http://www.defensenews.com/ story.php?i=4775549. 48 Michael Auslin, “Beware a Hollow Air Force,” National Review (online edition), November 22, 2010, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/253487/beware-hollow-air-force-michael -auslin?page=1. 49 Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Hearing, “Made in the usa: Man- ufacturing Policy, the Defense Industrial Base, and U.S. National Security,” U.S. House of Representatives, September 22, 2010, http://www.archive.org/details/gov.house.ogr.ns .20100922. 50 Ibid. 51 Of½ce of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop- ments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010 _CMPR_Final.pdf. 52 Wendell Minnick, “Experts: China Looks To Expand Air Power, Take on U.S. in Region,” Defense News, November 9, 2010, 30.

146 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences 53 Vivek Raghuvanshi, “5th-Generation Aircraft Deal,” Defense News, October 11, 2010, 38. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. 54 “Defending Defense: A Response to Recent De½cit Reduction Proposals,” The Defending Defense Project, November 23, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/½les/uploads/images/ Defending%20Defense%20De½cit%20Response.pdf. 55 Berman, “Stagnation Threatens U.S. Arms Superiority.” 56 Zbigniew Mazurak, “Downgrading Defense Capabilities,” American Thinker, December 27, 2010, http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/12/downgrading_defense_capabiliti.html. 57 Tom Samples and Jim Blaker, “The Prejudices of Anti-modern Warfare,” Defense News, No- vember 23, 2010, 29. 58 Colin S. Gray, The Airpower Advantage in Future Warfare: The Need for Strategy (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University, 2007), 32, http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf/paper/ Gray_Airpower_Advantage_in_Future_Warfare.pdf. 59 Mark Helprin, “America’s Dangerous Rush to Shrink Its Military Power,” The Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2010, 17, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870372780 4576017513713585854.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.

140 (3) Summer 2011 147 Defending America in Mixed Company: Gender in the U.S. Armed Forces

Martha E. McSally

Abstract: Women have voluntarily served to defend America since the birth of our nation, often driven by necessity or the ½ght for equal opportunity, but always limited by law or policy grounded in accepted gender roles and norms. Today, women compose 14 percent of the total active-duty military, and more than 255,000 have deployed to combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. Despite their exemplary service and performance in combat, women are still restricted from serving in more than 220,000 military positions solely because of their sex. Women also continue to be exempt from the Selective Service System, for which their male counterparts are required by law to register. Are these continued inconsistencies between the sexes in the area of national defense incongruent with democratic tenets? Have we gone too far or not far enough in allowing or compelling women to defend the nation if required?

May all our citizens be soldiers and all our soldiers citizens. –A toast by Sarah Livingston Jay, the wife of John Jay, at a ball celebrating the end of the Revolution (Fall 1783)1

Women have served as volunteers in the defense of America since the birth of our nation, often driv- MARTHA E. MCSALLY is Profes- en by necessity or the ½ght for equal opportunity, sor of National Security Studies at but always limited by law or policy grounded in the George C. Marshall European accepted gender roles and norms. Today, women Center for Security Studies. After make up more than 14 percent of the active-duty more than twenty-two years of ac- military force; since 2001, more than 255,000 have tive duty, she retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Colonel in August deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom or Oper- 2010. She was one of seven women ation Iraqi Freedom, in which more than 130 have ½rst selected to become ½ghter pi- been killed and almost 700 wounded.2 As of April lots after Congress repealed the 2011, despite their exemplary performance in direct restriction in 1991 and the Depart- combat roles in the air, sea, and on the ground, ment of Defense changed its poli- women as a group are still banned by Department cy in 1993. She was the ½rst woman of Defense (dod) policy from being assigned to in U.S. history to fly a ½ghter in combat and to command a ½ght- more than 220,000 of the 1.4+ million authorized er squadron. Her military awards active-duty positions–regardless of their individ- include the Defense Superior Ser- ual abilities and quali½cations.3 While every Amer- vice Medal and the Bronze Star. ican male is required by law, as a basic obligation of

U.S. Government Document: No rights reserved

148 citizenship, to register for Selective Ser- the occupations of civil life. The constitu- Martha E. vice within one month of his eighteenth tion of the family organization, which is McSally birthday (or potentially suffer ½nes, im- founded in the divine ordinance, as well as prisonment, and denial of educational in the nature of things, indicates the do- and employment opportunities),4 wom- mestic sphere as that which properly been continue to be exempt from this re- longs to the domain and functions of wom- sponsibility of citizenship. anhood. . . . The paramount destiny and mis- Current dod policies are rife with in- sion of woman are to ful½ll the noble and consistencies and inef½ciencies, result- benign of½ces of wife and mother. This is ing in confusion, inflexibility, and out- the law of the Creator. right violations of the self-imposed –U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Brad- restrictions by the military. The male- ley, Bradwell v. State of Illinois (1873)7 only Selective Service law and dod policies are also incongruent with three of War and the military ethos required to America’s democratic tenets: 1) a fun- ½ght and win wars have traditionally damental obligation of full citizenship is been considered masculine in nature, the requirement to defend the nation with peace and the need to be protected if needed; 2) the armed forces, whether de½ned as feminine. Men take life and conscripted or volunteer, should reflect women give life. Men protect and wom- the society they defend; and 3) the U.S. en are protected. Men are strong and cou- Constitution is now interpreted to pro- rageous and women are weak and emo- hibit discrimination or lack of equal op- 5 tional. Men are responsible to the state portunity based solely on gender. and women to their family. Men are mo- U.S. national security is not being pur- tivated to function in the horror of war by sued in mixed company consisting of all the thought of returning to the normalcy quali½ed American citizens; instead, ex- of home as symbolized by mother, wife, isting restrictions have limited women’s 6 sweetheart, and the nurses who care for full participation in the military. This them in battle. The increasing integra- essay will explain the gender norms that tion of women in the military has con- continue to curtail women’s rights and fused and contradicted these gender obligations to national defense; elabo- norms and roles. Nonetheless, female rate on the three democratic tenets that Americans’ participation in defense has should drive the composition of Ameri- been and is still limited by these general- ca’s armed forces; review the history of izations about what women as an entire women’s participation in U.S. defense class could and should do.8 and consideration for Selective Service in Take, for example, statements by Kath- light of these tenets and gender norms; leen Teague of the Eagle Forum. Testify- discuss the current gender situation in ing before a House Armed Services Com- the U.S. military; and make recommen- mittee in 1980 on women’s potential in- dations for the future. clusion in Selective Service registration, Teague said, “We expect our servicemen * * * to be tough enough to defend us against Man is, or should be, woman’s protector any enemy–and we want our women to and defender. The natural and proper ti- be feminine and human enough to trans- midity and delicacy which belongs to the form our servicemen into good hus- female sex evidently un½ts it for many of bands, fathers, and citizens upon their re-

140 (3) Summer 2011 149 Gender in turn from battle.” She also warned that quently, that the Citizens of America (with the U.S. “she and her colleagues were not about to few legal and of½cial exceptions) from 18 Armed Forces give up the right to be free from a military to 50 Years of Age should be borne on the obligation ‘just because a handful of Militia Rolls, provided with uniform Arms, women, unhappy with their gender, want and so far accustomed to the use of them. 9 to be treated like men.’” –General George Washington, “Sentiments In 1991, General Merrill McPeak, then on a Peace Establishment” (May 1783)11 chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, tes- ti½ed to a Senate Armed Services Com- The democratic tenet that binds the mittee (which was deliberating potential rights of citizenship with the obligation repeal of the law that excluded women to defend the state is rooted in the writ- from flying combat aircraft) that he ings of America’s founding fathers and re- would pick a less-quali½ed male pilot flected in our Constitution and laws. This over a more-quali½ed female pilot for relationship was central to the suffrage a combat mission. He conceded that his and civil rights movements, grounding view did not make much sense, but it was the arguments that women and African simply the way he felt. A year later, he Americans served in defense of the Unit- told a House Committee: “I believe the ed States and should therefore be granted combat exclusion law is discrimination all rights of citizens.12 The principle re- against women. And second, that it works mains strongly present in immigration to their disadvantage in a career context. law: past applicants for citizenship, male . . . And I still think it is not a good idea for and female alike, had their applications me to have to order women into combat. rejected if they refused to take an oath Combat is about killing people. . . . Even that they would bear arms to defend the though logic tells us that women can nation. The current law mandating males [conduct combat operations] as well as ages eighteen to twenty-½ve to register men, I have a very traditional attitude for Selective Service requires even those about wives and mothers and daughters males living in the United States as aliens being ordered to kill people.” At the time, to register as a reflection of obligations of McPeak was responsible for organizing, residency and a possible path to citizen- training, and equipping the Air Force to ship.13 Indeed, honorable service in the fly, ½ght, and win in defense of America, military is today a guaranteed road to cit- yet he was willing to accept a less-capable izenship,14 further evidence of our belief force to ½t with his personal attitudes on 10 in the link between military service and the proper role of women. These are just citizenship. two illustrations from the last thirty years The citizen-soldier connection is re- of how gender norms drive opinions (even inforced in contemporary discussion of ones from otherwise educated profession- whether to continue required Selective als) of women’s place in national defense. Service registration for American males. In 1999, Congress debated the elimina- * * * tion of the Selective Service System It may be laid down as a primary position (sss) and the requirement for registra- and the basis of our system, that every citi- tion. During the debate, the late Charles zen who enjoys the protection of a free Moskos, a well-known military sociol- government, owes . . . even of his person- ogist, stated that if registration was not al services to the defense of it, and conse- mandatory for all American eighteen-

150 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences year-old male citizens, “it will mean a cut- In 2009, the Pentagon reported that 75 Martha E. off of citizenship responsibility. This is percent of young American men and McSally the one time in a man’s life he has to sign women are ineligible for entering mili- a document saying he has citizen obli- tary service based on minimum health, gation.” The sss 2009 Annual Report to weight, educational, and aptitude stan- Congress struck a similar chord: “By reg- dards, as well as other restrictions includ- istering with Selective Service, every ing criminal records and parenthood. Of young man is reminded of his potential the 25 percent eligible, 15 percent go on to obligation to serve our Nation in an college, leaving approximately 10 percent emergency.”15 There is little serious dis- of the young population as potential mil- cussion about exactly how American itary recruits. In 2005–2006, the Army women express this citizen obligation.16 signi½cantly lowered educational, medical, aptitude, and criminal standards to * * * meet its recruitment goals during a strong economy and while ½ghting two wars.20 [M]y fundamental belief is that we, as a To ½ll an all-volunteer force or to guaran- military, must represent our country. We tee a high-quality conscripted force, it is must represent the demographics of it. It is logical to recruit and select from the larg- the greatest strength of our country. est pool of applicants to ensure the high- –Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the est aptitude of those responsible for de- 17 Joint Chiefs of Staff (2009) fending America. Setting realistic standards, removing restrictions on whole Another democratic tenet posits that a classes of people, and recruiting people military force should reflect the society it as individuals who can be placed where defends. Women are now almost 51 per- they are best quali½ed to serve raises the cent of the U.S. population, but just over overall quality of the force. 14 percent of the all-volunteer force and only 6 percent of senior of½cers. In 2009, * * * Congress directed the creation of the Military Leadership Diversity Commis- There can be no doubt that our Nation has sion to address the reality that military had a long and unfortunate history of sex power structure and leadership in a vol- discrimination. Traditionally, such discrim- unteer force consist predominately of ination was rationalized by an attitude of white men and to make recommendations “romantic paternalism” which, in practi- for developing more diversity in the force cal effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but and leadership.18 in a cage. An additional consideration regarding –U.S. Supreme Court, Frontiero v. Richard- the composition of the armed forces as a son (1973)21 full reflection of society is the “business model.” In order to have the most capa- The Fifth Amendment of the Constitu- ble force, standards should be set for tion guarantees that no citizen be “de- the positions, and individuals should be prived of life, liberty, or property, with- recruited from the widest pool possible out due process of law.” The Fourteenth across society. These efforts result in high- Amendment bars states from the same er overall aptitude and the flexibility to actions, adding a prohibition against pick the best individual for any position, denying citizens equal protection of the regardless of sex.19 laws. The courts have extended the equal

140 (3) Summer 2011 151 Gender in protection principle to cover the feder- mentation,” which only results in a less ef- the U.S. al government as well, usually under the fective military.24 This argument is based Armed Forces Fifth Amendment due process clause. In on the alleged importance of high social co- applying the principle to federal or state hesion (that is, male bonding) among white gender discrimination, the courts now em- male heterosexuals, especially in combat ploy “intermediate scrutiny” to decide units. Studies of cohesion in general and whether discrimination based on gender the performance and cohesion of integrat- classi½cations is lawful. Under this level ed military units in particular have dis- of scrutiny, the government must provide proved this assumption. Diversity in the an “exceedingly persuasive justi½cation” force can potentially be challenging for that a gender classi½cation is designed to leadership, but ultimately it is found to meet “important governmental objec- have a positive effect on mission success tives” and that “the discriminatory means across civilian and military organizations. employed are substantially related to the Studies have shown, and experts agree, achievement of those objectives.”22 that task cohesion–a shared commitment Although scrutiny and judicial opin- to the group’s mission or goals–is most ions have evolved over time, the courts important for mission effectiveness. In are now especially likely to strike down a fact, too high a level of social cohesion can gender classi½cation that seems to be be detrimental to performance.25 based on faulty generalizations or stereo- In September 2010, the U.S. District types about the varying abilities and Court for Central California ruled that interests of the two sexes. The most re- the ban on homosexuals serving openly cent Supreme Court opinion on the mat- in the military was unconstitutional, ter, the 1996 ruling that Virginia violated rejecting the inverse relationship be- the Fourteenth Amendment by prohibit- tween equal opportunity and military ing women from attending the Virginia effectiveness. Based on empirical evi- Military Institute, stated, “Generaliza- dence to the contrary, the court strongly tions about ‘the way women are’ or esti- rejected the government’s argument that mates of what is appropriate for ‘most homosexuals need to be excluded from women’ do not justify denying opportu- the military to protect unit cohesion.26 nity to women whose talent and capacity In December 2010, Congress then replace them outside the average descrip- pealed the law that banned homosexuals tion.” Furthermore, the government’s jus- from serving openly–also rejecting the ti½cation for discrimination “must not premise that “[t]he presence in the armed rely on over-broad generalizations about forces of persons who demonstrate a the different talents, capacities, or prefer- propensity or intent to engage in homo- ences of males and females”; the govern- sexual acts would create an unacceptable ment has “no warrant to exclude qual- risk to the high standards of morale, good i½ed individuals based on ‘½xed notions order and discipline, and unit cohesion concerning the roles and abilities of that are the essence of military capabili- males and females.’”23 ty.” In contrast to previous justi½cation, Some critics erroneously assume that at the signing of the new bill into law equal opportunity and military effective- later that month, President Obama stat- ness have an inverse relationship. They ed, “This law . . . will strengthen our na- argue that inclusion of minorities such as tional security and uphold the ideals that African Americans, women, and homo- our ½ghting men and women risk their sexuals in the military is “social experi- lives to defend.”27

152 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences Despite this change in understanding the concept of coverture that the revolu- Martha E. of the positive relationships between di- tionaries brought with them from Eng- McSally versity, equal opportunity, and national land. Coverture rationalized that women security, many of the cohesion argu- could be called citizens but left out of the ments continue to be used to justify the new social contract between the gov- exclusion of women from full participa- erned and those who govern because the tion in the military. Just as homosexuals man has an obligation to the state; the in the military were successfully, but woman has an obligation only to the man invisibly, performing their duties under by whom she is “covered”: her husband “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” women are in- or father, if she is unmarried. Once mar- volved in ground combat and are neces- ried, a woman’s civic identity transferred sary to the success of the mission, but are from her father to her husband. The con- denied the open acceptance of their ser- cept of coverture was “incompatible with vice in this capacity. Revolutionary ideology” but was justi- ½ed and defended by male decision- In this next section, I move chronologi- makers.29 Ideas about coverture and the cally through U.S. history, summarizing primary obligation of women to the fam- women’s key contributions to the mil- ily continue to shape American laws, life- itary during various eras.28 At the same styles, and military policy. time, I explore these contributions in light World War I through World War II. Thirty- of the legal and social practices that four thousand U.S. women wore the uni- de½ned and circumscribed gender at dif- form in World War I; four hundred of ferent points in American history. these women died while serving their The Revolutionary War to Pre-World War I. country, despite not yet having obtained In the Revolutionary War and Civil War, the right to vote. Coverture logic and the women served not only as cooks, laun- connection between citizenship rights dresses, and nurses but also as spies and and obligations came to a head in the suf- saboteurs. Some, like Deborah Sampson frage movement. Some men argued that of Massachusetts, also disguised them- women did not have the right to vote selves as men and fought in battles. A few because they did not have the obligation earned pensions and many earned awards to risk their lives in defense of the state. for their service, including the Congres- Meanwhile, some suffragists argued that sional Medal of Honor. In the Spanish women served in the military in World American War, 1,500 women were con- War I and therefore deserved the right tracted as nurses (without military status) to vote.30 The suffragists eventually pre- due to the typhoid outbreak. Congress vailed; however, even after earning the authorized permanent Army and Navy right to vote, women continued to be ex- Nurse Corps as a result of these women’s empt from the right and obligation to de- contributions. fend the nation if capable and required. Although women were called citizens Out of sheer necessity, World War II re- from the birth of the Republic, most of the sulted in an unprecedented utilization of early citizen rights and obligations were volunteer women in uniform. More than reserved for white male landowners. At four hundred thousand women served; the time, the justi½cation for not allow- eighty-½ve became prisoners of war ing women to vote, not calling on women (pows) and more than ½ve hundred wom- to serve on juries, and not requiring women lost their lives, sixteen of whom were en to register for the militias was based on killed in action. Although not trained to

140 (3) Summer 2011 153 Gender in ½ght, be under ½re, or to survive as a pow, of proper gender roles and the reliance on the U.S. many women demonstrated courage in the draft. The tide began to turn in the Armed Forces all theaters during this war. However, the late 1960s. Restrictions on the number of United States struggled with the limits of women and the rank they could achieve women’s military functions, wrestling were lifted by Congress in 1967. By 1972, with how to adapt as women proved suc- both the House and the Senate passed the cessful in an expanding number of roles. equal rights amendment to the U.S. Con- Women flew all aircraft in the inventory stitution (although it was never rati½ed as ferry pilots, instructor pilots for men, by enough states), which had an enor- and target-towing for antiaircraft (aa) mous impact on the roles of women in gunner training, but unlike Russia, the America. In 1973, as it was recovering United States would not allow women to from the Vietnam War and the draft, the fly in combat.31 After the British began to United States transitioned to the all-vol- train and utilize women to operate land- unteer force. As a result, more women based aa guns (they were allowed to do were aggressively recruited in order to ½ll everything but ½re the weapon, a role left the ranks without lowering the stan- to men), the United States conducted dards. Military leaders acknowledged that a secret experiment to see if American female recruits were performing better women could ½ll these positions. The on aptitude tests and had fewer discipline mixed-gender units performed better problems than male recruits. Both mili- than all-male units, but the experiment tary necessity and the equal rights move- was terminated because it was “not be- ment had an impact on women in the mil- lieved that national policy or public opin- itary. Several important court cases and ion [was] yet ready to accept the use of congressional mandates required the mil- women in ½eld force units.”32 itary to abandon the “business as usual” Although most women were demo- stance they failed to adjust to in the wake bilized quickly after World War II, the of the all-volunteer force. Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948 for- In 1973, the Supreme Court ruled in mally authorized a permanent cadre of Frontiero v. Richardson that the military women in the military for the ½rst time. policy that denied equal housing and The law, however, severely restricted the medical bene½ts to families of service- number of women, the number of of½- women violated the Fifth Amendment cers, the rank they could achieve, and the due process clause. In 1975, Congress di- roles in which they could serve. Women rected all military service academies to were banned from serving in combat air- open their doors to women. In 1976, a craft and all ships except transport/hos- U.S. court of appeals ruled that discharg- pital ships; they were not speci½cally ing women for pregnancy violated the banned from ground combat because Fifth Amendment due process clause this was an assumed restriction. During since it was founded on the impermis- congressional testimony, General Eisen- sible assumption that pregnant wom- hower expressed that women would be en were permanently un½t for military critical in any future war and should duty.34 In 1978, a group of Navy women therefore be subject to conscription. His ½led a suit challenging the law that views were dismissed.33 banned women from serving on ships. The 1950s through 1990. Women’s oppor- The judge ruled that the exclusion statute tunities in the military were curtailed in violated the Fifth Amendment and “was the 1950s and 1960s due to cultural views premised on the notion that duty at sea

154 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences is part of an essentially masculine tra- banned from ground combat positions, Martha E. dition” and suggested “a statutory pur- actual combat troops (versus combat sup- McSally pose more related to the traditional way port) are a signi½cant minority of the to- of thinking of women than to the de- tal force.39 Some constitutional experts mands of military preparedness.”35 By the have strongly criticized the Supreme end of the 1980s, women could attend the Court’s ruling on the grounds that the military academies, earn a Reserve Of½- deference to the legislative and executive cer Training Corps (rotc) scholarship, branch on military affairs should not have serve on a noncombatant Navy ship, be applied in this case because the issue was assigned to a Titan missile crew, and about rights of civilians, not internal pol- become military pilots again for the ½rst icies of the military. Interestingly, con- time in more than thirty years. However, gressional justi½cation for the exclusion they were still excluded from serving in of women was ½lled with statements combat roles in the air, sea, or on land. about the stereotypical role of women in In 1980, President Carter announced society and family, statements previous- in his State of the Union address that he ly ruled as an unacceptable basis for dis- would reauthorize the Selective Service, criminatory legislation by the courts.40 in accordance with the Military Selective In the 1980s and 1990s, the military Service Act (mssa) of 1948.36 Registra- increased opportunities for women but tion had been discontinued since 1975, continued to justify restrictions by saying but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan women would not be “in combat.” The provided the political impetus for rein- Army coded all their positions based on stating the practice. Although President the probability of being in direct combat Carter requested funds from Congress to and prohibited women from being as- include women in the registration process, signed to those with the highest prob- Congress authorized funds for a male- ability. In 1988, the dod adopted the so- only registration. called risk rule, which stated that the In March 1981, the Supreme Court ruled “risks of exposure to direct combat, hos- in Rostker v. Goldberg that the male-only tile ½re, or capture are proper criteria for draft registration did not violate the equal closing noncombat positions or units to protection principle. In its decision, the women, provided that . . . such risks are Court expressed the need for “healthy def- equal to or greater than experienced erence to legislative and executive judg- by combat units in the same theater of ments in the area of military affairs.” The operations.”41 These policies endeavored Court sidestepped a full equal protection to draw clean lines between combat and analysis of the male-only draft restric- noncombat, keeping women in jobs away tion, reasoning that because women were from the risks of combat. not eligible to serve in combat, men and On the battle½eld, these lines were not women were not “similarly situated” for so clearly drawn. In 1989, 770 women de- the purposes of the registration exemp- ployed to Panama, serving in various tion.37 The mssa never speci½ed that the “combat support” positions as then de- purpose of registration was to draft only ½ned by the dod. They included Army combat troops: in fact, its focus is to de- helicopter pilots who earned air medals liver untrained manpower and trained for combat missions and the commander of health care personnel in the event of a a military police company who led her national emergency.38 Additionally, even team in ½re½ghts. In 1990 and 1991, more though women were then (and still are) than forty thousand U.S. military wom-

140 (3) Summer 2011 155 Gender in en deployed for Operation Desert Shield/ that ‘cohesion is enhanced by uniformity, the U.S. Desert Storm, constituting 7 percent of the by adherence to a common sense of values Armed 43 Forces total deployed force. Two women in com- and behaviors.’” The success of mixed- bat support jobs were captured as pows, gender units in combat since then,44 the and thirteen women were killed. Predic- decision to allow homosexual individuals tions that there would be public outcry to serve openly in the military, and the re- when women were taken as pows or came sults of studies on task cohesion discussed home in body bags did not materialize. earlier all make these arguments suspect. 1991 through the Present. Based on wom- In 2005, while the all-volunteer military en’s performance in Panama and Desert was stretched thin ½ghting two wars and Storm, Congress repealed the law that was lowering standards as it struggled to prohibited women from flying combat meet recruitment goals in a strong econo- aircraft (enacted December 5, 1991) and my, Republican Representatives Duncan serving on combat ships, except subma- Hunter, of California, and John McHugh, rines (enacted November 30, 1993). Con- of New York, introduced an amendment gress also directed the dod to provide to the annual defense bill that would have ninety-days notice for any changes to its codi½ed a ground combat exclusion for ground combat exclusion policy, includ- the ½rst time in U.S. history and prohibit- ing analysis of implications for the male- ed women from serving in Army forward only draft. The dod then removed re- support companies. If the measure had strictions on women flying combat air- passed, the Army estimates that 21,925 craft or serving on combat ships, rescind- positions currently open to women would ed the risk rule, and adopted a new ground have been closed. The amendment gained combat exclusion policy. This policy is still immediate public attention and provoked in effect today; it states, “Service members strong objections from Army and dod are eligible to be assigned to all positions leadership as well as many members for which they are quali½ed, except that of Congress. In the end, Hunter and women shall be excluded from assign- McHugh’s efforts were thwarted; the ½- ment to units below the brigade level nal amendment was a signi½cant com- whose primary mission is to engage in di- promise, only mandating that the dod rect combat on the ground.” The policy notify Congress of any opening or closing goes on to de½ne direct combat as “en- of positions or units under the ground gaging an enemy on the ground with indi- combat exclusion policy or any change vidual or crew served weapons, while be- that opened or closed a career ½eld relating exposed to hostile ½re and to a high ed to military operations on the ground.45 probability of direct physical contact with As during World War II and with the re- hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground cruitment of the all-volunteer force in combat takes place well forward on the the 1970s and 1980s, the need to ½ll the battle½eld while locating and closing with ranks in order to ½ght two wars drove the the enemy to defeat them by ½re, maneu- ½nal decision not to decrease women’s ver, and shock effect.”42 participation in uniform, despite a desire The decision “to keep Army combat by many to do so because of their views units closed to women was justi½ed in of proper gender roles. terms of the ‘unique bonds’ necessary for mortal combat, which are ‘best developed in a single gender all male environment.’ The U.S. Army Chief of Staff said in 1993

156 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences * * * quired for the mission.49 This account- Martha E. ing practice degrades combat ef½ciency McSally We are a nation that says “out of many, we and effectiveness. As one prior combat are one.” We are a nation that welcomes arms battalion commander explained, the service of every patriot. We are a nation “[T]he policy is legal ½ction . . . and while that believes that all men and women are it is useless, it is not harmless.”50 Com- created equal. These are the ideals that gen- manders and human resources personnel erations have fought for. These are the ideals must make signi½cant efforts to assign we uphold today. women only to positions open to women. –President Barack Obama, remarks before Combat cohesion is also degraded: assigning the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t signing women to a “legal” position on Tell” (December 2010)46 paper, and then deploying and employ- ing them ad hoc with combat units, pre- In 2008, the dod informed Congress that cludes these mixed-gender teams from the Marines planned to open counterin- training together prior to deployment, a telligence and human intelligence spe- necessity for building the trust and team- cialties to women, and in 2009, the dod work required in a complex combat envi- informed Congress that it intended to ronment. After one female medic earned open submarine duty to women, negat- the Silver Star for her valor in battle in ing the previous argument that privacy Afghanistan, she was sent home due to issues prohibited quali½ed women from elevated publicity about her role and ac- serving in jobs requiring close quarters tions, despite her importance to the mis- and little privacy.47 However, women sion and her unit. Female combat veter- today are still excluded from more than ans have also suffered from inadequate one hundred thousand positions in com- veterans bene½ts and services upon re- bat-arms career ½elds (for example, in- turning from war because they are tech- fantry, armor, pararescue, combat engi- nically prohibited from being in ground neers, and special forces) and support po- combat.51 sitions within ground combat battalions In 2007, the rand Corporation con- (for example, medic, logistics, and intel- ducted a study on whether the Army was ligence). Also, women cannot be assigned actually complying with its own policies to combat support units that are “re- and those of the dod in Iraq. Because the quired to collocate” with ground combat policies focus on what positions women units. This policy accounts for nearly one are assigned to instead of where and how hundred thousand additional positions they are employed, rand concluded that being closed to women.48 the Army is complying with its prohibi- The current restrictions on women in tion on assigning women to ground com- combat are gamed by commanders on a bat positions and units. rand also con- daily basis. The prohibition states that cluded that the Army is probably violat- women cannot be “assigned” to these ing its own collocation policy, depending units, but they can be “attached” or “em- on how it is interpreted. The report rec- ployed” virtually anywhere. At a time of ommended that the dod and the Army strained resources, the Army is going to re-craft the policy or rescind it altogeth- great lengths to assign women to posi- er based on current realities and lessons tions that, on paper, meet the restric- –and clearly state its actual objective, tions, when in reality women are being which is not obvious to most of the lead- attached or employed in any way re- ers tasked to enforce it.52

140 (3) Summer 2011 157 Gender in Not only have women been necessary gender norms and the potential that the U.S. to ½ll the ranks, the nature of combat in women would be required to register for Armed 53 Forces Iraq and Afghanistan speci½cally requires Selective Service. In 2010, Democratic women to do some jobs, such as searching Representative Loretta Sanchez, of Cali- women and children. This requirement re- fornia, introduced an amendment to the sulted in the creation of “Lioness” teams annual defense authorization bill aimed that accompany all-male combat soldiers not at directly repealing the combat ex- to perform this function. Women troops clusion policies, but rather allowing com- are also critical in winning the population manders in the ½eld the flexibility to as- over as part of counterinsurgency strategy. sign women to combat positions if they Previously, U.S. military efforts focused on were quali½ed to accomplish the mission. engaging with local men only, ignoring Even though the amendment did not 50 percent or more of the population they seem to differ much from current realities, were trying to protect, engage, and em- it did not survive a Democrat-controlled power. The U.S. military recently formed Armed Services Committee. Democratic “female engagement teams” to interact Representative Ike Skelton of Missouri, a with local Afghan women in order to un- consistent supporter of the ground com- derstand concerns, gain critical informa- bat exclusion and then-chairman of the tion, help meet their needs, and empower House Armed Services Committee, re- the locals. These are roles that military placed it with another amendment that men cannot ½ll due to cultural sensitivities. directed the dod to review military occu- There is no line between combat and pations and policies on servicewomen.54 noncombat, no place called “well for- Although there was no such provision in ward” on the battle½eld, and no sanctuary the Senate version, the ½nal bill contained from combat risks in Iraq and Afghan- additional language requiring the secre- istan (or in foreseeable future combat op- tary of defense to “review applicable law, erations). Although women are not of- polices, and regulations . . . that may re- ½cially assigned to positions under the strict the service of female service mem- seventeen-year-old dod ground combat bers and determine whether changes are exclusion policy, they are employed every needed to ensure that female members day in combat: as truck drivers, gunners, have an equitable opportunity to compete military police, medics, and other sup- and excel in the armed forces.” The bill port roles that make them vulnerable to called for the secretary to report the re- attack and require them to be trained and sults to Congress by April 15, 2011.55 equipped to ½ght. They are demonstrating The Military Leadership Diversity Com- their ability to lead and ½ght under ½re, mission made a recommendation to Con- kill the enemy, and show courage in battle. gress in March 2011 that the dod should Arguments that women and men cannot completely repeal the ground combat be together in small teams in a combat en- exclusion policy, but it is not yet clear vironment because of privacy or cohesion what weight that will have.56 Liberal and issues have proved ½ctitious. Many com- feminist interest groups united with sig- manders and service members report that ni½cant manpower, resources, and polit- the current ground combat exclusion pol- ical pressure to help repeal “Don’t Ask, icies are either confusing or unknown. Don’t Tell.” Perplexingly, they are provid- Despite these realities, there is little po- ing little to no effort to remove the re- litical will to repeal the restrictions owing maining restrictions on women.57 to the ultimate impact it would have on

158 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences * * * cluding women from more than two hun- Martha E. dred thousand jobs in the military. The McSally There was a time when African-Americans recent repeal of the ban on homosexuals weren’t allowed to serve in combat. And yet, in the military was driven by democratic when they did, not only did they perform tenets of equal opportunity and the “busi- brilliantly, but . . . they helped to change ness case” for ensuring the highest quali- America, and they helped to underscore ty force. It is time for America to decide that we’re equal. And I think that if women that its democratic philosophy should are registered for service–not necessari- also shape the role of women in the mili- ly in combat roles, and I don’t agree with tary and national security decision-mak- the draft–I think it will help to send a mes- ing, rather than archaic beliefs about sage to my two daughters that they’ve got proper gender norms. With that in mind, obligations to this great country as well as I make the following recommendations: boys do. 1) The dod should notify Congress that it –Senator Barack Obama, answering a ques- will rescind the current ground combat tion about whether women should regis- exclusion policy for women and modify ter for Selective Service, Democratic Pres- its accessions, placement, and other pol- idential Debate (July 23, 2007) icies as required for a gender-neutral assignment system. “Women are already serving in combat [in 2)If the dod itself does not rescind the Iraq and Afghanistan] and the current poli- dod cy should be updated to reflect realities on exclusions (historically, the has the ground,” said Wendy Morigi, Mr. Oba- not taken this kind of initiative until ma’s national security spokeswoman. “Ba- directed to do so by the president, Con- rack Obama would consult with military gress, or courts), Congress should di- commanders to review the constraints that rect the repeal. remain.” 3) If neither the dod nor Congress acts to –Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (October 13, 2008)58 repeal the ground combat exclusion policy in fy 2011, quali½ed and capable females aspiring to serve in combat roles omen have served and continue to W should ½le litigation based upon the serve in the defense of America, never equal protection principle. Such a suit under compulsion, despite often being has never been ½led and would require treated as second-class troops and citi- the government to justify exclusion of zens without the same bene½ts of service all women from these roles. or obligations of citizenship. By and mssa large, gender roles have driven the his- 4)Congress should amend the to toric and contemporary restrictions on require female citizens and those fe- American women in uniform. Nonethe- males living in the United States as less, the arguments that women are not ca- aliens, ages eighteen to twenty-½ve, to pable of ½ghting or enduring the stresses register for Selective Service and should of combat have been disproved. authorize the funding and personnel for sss 59 It has been almost three decades since the to administer this change. Americans have engaged in any serious If these actions are taken, the toast that national discussion about the male-only Sarah Jay gave 228 years ago will ½nally nature of Selective Service registration. be ful½lled, and America’s national de- Nearly twenty years have passed since fense will indeed be fully pursued in any review of the rationale behind ex- mixed company.

140 (3) Summer 2011 159 Gender in endnotes the U.S. 1 Armed The title of this essay derives in part from the statement “national defense can be pursued Forces in mixed company,” as included in Mary Ann Tetreault, “Gender Belief Systems and the Integration of Women in the U.S. Military,” Minerva Quarterly Report on Women and the Mil- itary 6 (1) (1988): 44–62. Toast from Sarah Livingston Jay quoted in Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 236. 2 Information on women serving active duty provided by Lory Manning at the Women’s Research and Education Institute, July 2010. Due to the increase in Army and Marine combat units since 2002, and the prohibition on women serving in those units, the total percentage dropped from 15 percent in 2002 to 14.3 percent in 2009. Information on women serving in Afghanistan and Iraq from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, HR 5136, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (June 28, 2010): sec. 534. For updated numbers, see http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41083172/ns/us_news-life/. 3 See “Direct Ground Combat De½nition and Assignment Rule,” a memorandum from Sec- retary of Defense Les Aspin to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, et al., January 13, 1994; and General Accounting Of½ce (gao), National Security & International Affairs Division, Gender Issues: Information on DOD’s Assignment Policy and Direct Ground Combat De½nition (Washington, D.C.: gao, 1998), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99007.pdf. Because the Army and Marines have increased their numbers of combat units since this gao study, the number of positions closed to women is now higher. 4 Military Selective Service Act (as amended), 50 USC Appendix 451–472. Although no one has been prosecuted for failure to register since the mid-1980s, denial of federal employment and ½nancial assistance is still enforced at the federal level, and several states have laws mandating denial of bene½ts as well. 5 On this third tenet, see the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. Gender was not always considered as a class covered by the equal protection clause, and the failure of the equal rights amendment to be rati½ed resulted in women having no constitutional protection from discrimination for almost two hundred years. The courts have only recently included gender under the Fourteenth Amendment, with less stringent scrutiny than classi½cations such as race. Gender is now covered under “intermediate scrutiny.” The most recent Supreme Court guidelines on this issue will be addressed later in this essay. 6 The United Nations Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) was passed in October 2000; among other recommendations, it urged “member states to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-levels in national, regional, and international institutions and mechanisms for prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.” In the declaration at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, twenty-eight nato members agreed to an action plan to mainstream UNSCR 1325 into nato-led operations and missions. Currently, nato’s focus is on gender training and deployment of gender advisors. These often awkward efforts would be less necessary if there simply were more women serving in the military and security sector in all ranks throughout the power structure. They would then naturally and competitively earn seats at the decision-making tables at all levels. 7 Frontiero v. Richardson 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (citing Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 16 Wall. 130, 141 [1873]). 8 For more detailed analysis and discussion of gender and war, see Joshua S. Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2001). For more detailed discussion of the arguments against women in the military, see Lorry M. Fenner, “Moving Targets: Women’s Roles in the U.S. Military in the 21st Century,” in Lorry M. Fenner and Marie E. deYoung, Women in Combat: Civic Duty or Military Liability? (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001). 9 Quoted in Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies, 286–287.

160 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences 10 See Jeanne Holm, Women in the Military: An Un½nished Revolution, rev. ed. (Novato, Calif.: Martha E. Presidio Press, 1992), 483; and “Military Resisting Women Top Of½cers, Cite the Male McSally ‘Combat Spirit,’” Los Angeles Times, July 31, 1992. In April 1993, I stood next to General McPeak at a press conference, where he announced that the Air Force would remove the restrictions barring women from flying combat (½ghter/bomber) aircraft and introduced three of us who would now become ½ghter pilots based on our performance in pilot training. He was queried about his earlier testimony and simply replied, “There is always a small chance I was wrong.” Today, the Air Force has more than ninety female active-duty, reserve, and Air National Guard combat pilots who have completed gender-blind training and certi½cations, flown thousands of combat missions in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, earned hundreds of combat medals, and served as instructor pilots and commanders of combat units without issue–proving that McPeak was in fact wrong. 11 George Washington, “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,” a letter to Alexander Hamilton, written from Newburgh, New York, May 1, 1783; George Washington Papers, Library of Congress, 1741–1799: Series 3a Varick Transcripts, Letter Book 7, image 69, http://memory .loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=mgw3&½leName=mgw3a/gwpage007.db&recNum =70&tempFile=./temp/~ammem_aQSS&½lecode=mgw&next_½lecode=mgw&itemnum =1&ndocs=100. 12 For detailed analysis of the relationship between gender, civic obligations, and military service, see Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies. See also Fenner and deYoung, Women in Combat, 54–55. 13 See 50 USC Appendix Sec. 453. The Selective Service Agency website encourages even illegal male immigrants to register for Selective Service as a potential path to future legal status; see http://www.sss.gov/default.htm. See also Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies, 246–250. 14 See 8 USC Sec. 1439. 15 Charles Moskos, as quoted in Jessica Lee, “Draft Agency’s Number May Be Up, Some Ques- tion Need for Selective Service,” USA Today, August 24, 1999. See Selective Service Agency, Annual Report to the Congress of the United States Selective Service System Fiscal Year 2009, http://www.sss.gov/PUBLIC.HTM#anrepcon (accessed December 7, 2010). 16 Kathleen Teague’s congressional testimony from 1980 (mentioned above) represents a different tenet that somehow women as a class have a right to be exempt from this obligation. She stated that the right to be excused from the draft was a “right which every American woman has enjoyed since our country was born and wanted to know what they would get for giving up their ‘constitutional right to be treated like American ladies’”; see Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies, 287. In my limited study of the U.S. Constitution, I have not been able to locate a reference to this right. 17 Michael Mullen, speech to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, September 17, 2009; transcript at http://mldc.whs.mil/index.php/activities/meeting-september09 (accessed December 10, 2010). 18 See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for fy2009, Public Law 110-417, 110th Cong., 2nd sess. (2008), 596. Information on the proportion of women in the United States taken from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/ 2008-nat-res.html; ½gures on women in the military from Admiral Mullen’s speech to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission. 19 On the topic of standards and aptitude, opponents of opening ground combat positions to women focus on the physical strength requirements for ground combat and the fact that women, on average, are not as strong as men. While this is true, the argument fails to treat people as individuals. It also neglects the fact that an effective soldier is not one who pos- sesses just brute strength, but a combination of qualities and skills, including strength, endurance, agility, intellect, aptitude, judgment, courage, restraint when required, and, more recently, cultural and language skills. In the contemporary age of the “strategic corpo-

140 (3) Summer 2011 161 Gender in ral” ½ghting a “three block war,” skills other than strength can be more signi½cant. For the U.S. more discussion of these issues, see Martha McSally, “Women in Combat: Is the Current Armed Policy Obsolete?” Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy 14 (2007). Forces 20 See Curtis Gilroy, testimony before the House Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee, Recruitment, Retention, and End Strength, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 3, 2009; Associated Press, “Lower Standards Help Army Meet Recruiting Goal,” USA Today, October 9, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-10-09-army-recruiting_x.htm?csp =34; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Directorate for Manpower and Personnel (JCS/J1), Recruiting, Retention, and End Strength Report from October 11, 2006 (on ½le with author). The JCS/J1 produces this report weekly and monthly for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 21 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 22 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 23 Ibid. Despite this recent judicial ruling related to a state-funded military school and gender, the courts often defer to Congress and the military in cases of speci½c military policies tout- ed as necessary for combat capability. For example, the courts have deferred to Congress and the military in all challenges to the male-only Selective Service registration, as discussed later in this essay. 24 For example, see Martin Van Creveld, Men, Women, and War (London: Cassell, 2001). 25 Social cohesion refers to the nature and quality of the emotional bonds of friendship, liking, caring, and closeness among group members. A group is socially cohesive to the extent that its members like each other, prefer to spend their social time together, enjoy each other’s company, and feel emotionally close to one another. Task cohesion refers to members’ shared commitment to achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group. A group with high task cohesion is comprised of members who share a common goal and who are motivated to coordinate their efforts as a team to achieve that goal. See Laura L. Miller and John Allen Williams, “Do Military Policies on Gender and Sexuality Undermine Combat Effectiveness?” in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Securi- ty, ed. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press, 2001); and Admiral Mullen’s speech to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission. 26 Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, Case No. CV 04-08425-VAP (Ex). 27 See 10 USC 654 (15). For the quote from President Obama, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-of½ce/2010/12/22/remarks-president-and-vice-president-signing-dont-ask-dont -tell-repeal-a. 28 For the most detailed book on women in the U.S. military, see Holm, Women in the Military. Unless otherwise cited, all historical information presented in this section was derived from Holm’s book. See also Darlene Iskra, Women in the United States Armed Forces: A Guide to the Issues (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010). 29 Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies, 12. 30 Some also argued that women’s obligation to the family puts them at high risk of death during childbirth; therefore, all citizens risked their lives in some way for the perpetuation of the nation, and accordingly, women should gain the right to vote. See ibid., 244–245. 31 In Russia’s case, national survival and defense took precedence over gender norms in World War II. After the German invasion in 1942, women fought in startling numbers in all capacities in the air and on the ground. For example, Russia trained three regiments of pilots: the 586th regiment of ½ghter pilots, the 587th bomber pilots, and the famous 588th night bombers, nicknamed the “night witches” due to their effectiveness in hitting their targets. According to Soviet records, these women flew “a combined total of more than 30,000 combat sorties, produced at least 29 Heroes of the Soviet Union (of the 33 female aviators and 93 total women who received that medal) and included in their ranks at least three ½ghter aces.” Russian women also fought extensively in ground combat. See Reina Pennington,

162 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences “‘Do Not Speak of the Services You Rendered’: Women Veterans of Aviation in the Soviet Martha E. Union,” in A Soldier and A Woman: Sexual Integration in the Military, ed. Gerald J. DeGroot and McSally Corinna Peniston-Bird (New York: Longman, 2000), 152–153. 32 D’Ann Campbell, “Women in Combat: The World War Two Experience in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union,” Journal of Military History 57 (2) (1993): 305. 33 Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies, 265. 34 Seaman Anna Flores v. Secretary of Defense, 355 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Fla. 1973). 35 Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 306 (1978). 36 Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies, 278. 37 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 38 Military Selective Service Act of 1948, sec. 451, 62 Stat. 604 (80th Cong., 2nd sess. 1948). 39 gao, Gender Issues. Only approximately one hundred thousand of the 1.4 million positions in the active-duty military are closed due to classi½cation as “direct combat” roles. 40 See Ellen Oberwetter, “Rethinking Military Deference: Male-Only Draft Registration and the Intersection of Military Need with Civilian Rights,” Texas Law Review 78 (1) (Novem- ber 1, 1999): 191–192, 195, n.129. 41 Holm, Women in the Military, 433. 42 The policy also provides guidance to the military services on the establishment of their speci½c regulations on the matter: “These policies and regulations may include restrictions on the assignment of women: where the Service Secretary attests that the costs of appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements are prohibitive; where units and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women; where units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and Special Operations Forces missions; and where job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast majority of women service members”; see “Direct Ground Combat De½nition and Assignment Rule.” 43 Goldstein, War and Gender, 195. 44 Steven Lee Meyers, “Women Transform Life on U.S. Military Bases; Women Transform Combat: A Preserve of Men Gives Way, and Without Worst Fears Materializing,” Interna- tional Herald Tribune, August 18, 2009. 45 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 336 (2006). 46 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of½ce/2010/12/22/remarks-president-and-vice -president-signing-dont-ask-dont-tell-repeal-a. 47 Lance Corporal Stefanie C. Pupkieicz, “Counter, Human Intel mos Opens to Female Marines,” United States Marine Corps News, September 12, 2008; Jennifer Grogan, “Female Future Submariners Say They’re Eager to Get the Job Done,” The Day (New London, Conn.), May 7, 2010. 48 gao, Gender Issues. 49 rand, Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women (Santa Monica, Calif.: rand Corpo- ration, 2007). 50 Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, email message to author, December 6, 2010. For a com- pilation of articles on the issue of women in combat and how the policies are employed in the ½eld from the perspective of contemporary Army of½cers, see Michele M. Putko and Douglas V. Johnson II, eds., Women in Combat Compendium (Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Stud- ies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army .mil/pdf½les/pub830.pdf.

140 (3) Summer 2011 163 Gender in 51 See Ann Scott Tyson, “Woman Gains Silver Star–And Removal from Combat,” The Wash- the U.S. ington Post, May 1, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ Armed 2008/04/30/AR2008043003415.html (accessed September 23, 2010); Meg McLagan and Forces Daria Sommers, “The Combat Ban and How It Negatively Affects Women Veterans,” http://www.pbs.org/pov/regardingwar/conversations/women-and-war/the-combat-ban -and-how-it-negatively-affects-women-veterans.php. 52 rand, Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women, 63–66, 68. 53 There are some who believe that the dod and Army would be open to doing away with restrictions on women in order to increase combat ef½ciency and flexibility but are concerned that sending noti½cation to Congress to repeal restrictions could spark new efforts like Representatives Hunter and McHugh’s to further limit women. (McHugh is now Secre- tary of the Army, so he would not be likely to pursue such a tactic.) Recruitment and retention have improved since 2005 (most likely due to the economic crisis), and women are being employed in combat with no backlash; thus, the status quo seems the road of least resistance. In October 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that he foresees a day when women will be admitted into special operations, speaking as if he were not the one who could make that decision now: the prohibition is his policy. 54 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, HR 5136. See also Dena Bunis, “Sanchez: Let Women into Combat: Current Rules Limit Advancement in the Military Ranks, Lawmaker Says,” Orange County Register, May 20, 2010. 55 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committees of Armed Services of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives on HR 6523, Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d111:2:./temp/~bdPRsE::|/ home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=111|. April 15 has now come and gone, with no sign of the requested report. 56 Military Leadership Diversity Commission, “From Representation to Inclusion, Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century,” March 15, 2011, http://mldc.whs.mil/index.php/½nal -report. 57 In my view, this is because women’s groups are not united on this issue, and radical femi- nists strongly object to women serving in combat or registering for the draft. While some groups or politicians have taken a position that the ground combat exclusion should be repealed, they often include the caveat that women would be placed in combat positions only if they quali½ed and desired to do so. Critics then argue that even in a volunteer force where an individual can enlist with a guarantee of a specialty, once a man takes an oath to enlist in the Army or Marines, he has the potential of being ordered to a combat arms job if required, regardless of his desires. Thus, if women want equal opportunity, they need to be subject to the same risk. Should the ground combat exclusion policy be rescinded, then women should also be subject to Selective Service registration and the potential for individual women to be drafted into ground combat if required. This ½nal clash between full integration of women in the military and gender norms remains a barrier for any change from the status quo. 58 Democratic Presidential Debate, July 23, 2007; transcript at http://www.cnnstudentnews .cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0707/23/se.01.html; Jerome L. Sherman, “Candidates Differ on Female Draft,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 13, 2008, http://www.post-gazette.com/ pg/08287/919582-470.stm?cmpid=elections.xml. 59 In 1998, the gao studied the requirements to register women for Selective Service. It concluded that the mssa would naturally have to be amended to direct women to register, which at that time would have increased the number of personnel in the registry from 13 million males to 27.4 million citizens; see gao, Gender Issues: Changes would be Needed to Expand Selective Service Registration to Women, gao/nsiad-98-199 (Washington, D.C.: gao, 1998), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/.

164 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences Military Law

Eugene R. Fidell

Abstract: Military justice–the system for ensuring good order and discipline within the armed forces– remains the military legal establishment’s bedrock activity. Court-martial and nonjudicial punishment rates are down, but major breaches of discipline arising both on deployment and at home continue to demand attention by civilian leaders, commanders, and judge advocates. Important legal and public policy issues remain to be resolved with respect to the limited availability of review by the Supreme Court, the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians, the use of military commissions to prosecute un- lawful belligerents, increasing reliance on high-tech weaponry, and repeal of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy. As technology, national policy, and expectations of proper treatment (of our own personnel, of civilians, of enemies of various kinds) evolve, this will be an increasingly dynamic era for law and legal institutions in the realm of national defense.

Two recent events dramatically highlight the complexity of Americans’ vision of military law. In one, Congress enacted legislation to make the senior uniformed lawyers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force three-star of½cers.1 In the other, the Chief Justice of the United States, writing for himself and three other justices, dismissed military justice as “a rough form of justice.”2 Chief Justice Roberts’s comment was both a dis- service to the military and a sign of how easy it is to fall prey to incorrect preconceptions. In fact, he could not have been further from the truth, not only as to courts-martial but as to the role of law in general within the armed forces. Law plays a powerful role in the conduct of military affairs. Dif½cult issues lurk, such as the con- stitutionality of subjecting government contractors and other civilians to courts-martial for offenses EUGENE R. FIDELL is a Senior committed during contingency operations. But Research Scholar in Law and the these will be resolved through the orderly and trans- Florence Rogatz Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School. He is President parent processes of the law and a balance struck be- of the National Institute of Mili- tween the insistent call of operational needs, on the tary Justice and served in the U.S. one hand, and the constraints imposed by the Con- Coast Guard from 1969 to 1972. stitution and laws, on the other. While the tension

165 Military between the two may at times be worri- cer’s cogent argument against doing so,6 Law some, and while in important respects a new maximum security military pris- American military justice differs from ci- on was constructed at Fort Leavenworth, vilian federal criminal justice3 and is out Kansas, in 2002. As of November 29, 2010, of step with contemporary international the prison, which has a capacity of 460, norms, military law and lawyering have housed 433 men.7 (Women who are con- never stood taller than they do today as victed by courts-martial are con½ned bulwarks of our democracy. elsewhere.)

Military justice–the system for en- The picture, however, is far from perfect. suring good order and discipline–is the Sadly, a handful of military members con- core legal activity within the military tinue to get into very serious trouble. At establishment. Its current record is im- present, six men are on military death row pressive. Despite, or perhaps because of, at Fort Leavenworth, and additional cap- the fast tempo of current operations in ital cases are in the pipeline. All these cas- Iraq and Afghanistan, court-martial and es involve extremely violent acts, and it nonjudicial punishment4 rates are down is not surprising that they wound up with signi½cantly from where they were ten capital sentences. How many of these men years ago (see Figure 1). will in the end be executed remains to be There are three kinds of courts-martial. seen. Under the Uniform Code of Mili- Summary courts-martial are intended for tary Justice (ucmj), no execution can oc- minor offenses, and are not viewed as cur without the personal af½rmative ap- criminal proceedings. They can impose proval of the president,8 and our chief ex- only one month’s con½nement. Special ecutives have been in no hurry to grant courts-martial are misdemeanor-level that approval, perhaps in part because a courts, and can impose a year’s con½ne- surprising number of military death row ment and a bad-conduct discharge. Gen- inmates have been members of racial mi- eral courts-martial are felony-level courts norities. President George W. Bush ap- and can impose any punishment up to and proved a death sentence (that of Army including the death penalty.5 In the ½s- Specialist Ronald A. Gray) in 2008, but all cal year ending September 30, 2010, the the others are still in the review process. services tried 2,816 special and general To put military capital punishment in courts-martial and 2,840 summary courts. perspective, the U.S. armed forces have A decade earlier, the comparable data not conducted an execution since April were 4,723 and 2,699, respectively. At the 13, 1961, when Private John A. Bennett second appellate stage, during the Term was executed for the rape and attempted of Court that ended on August 31, 2010, murder of a young girl in occupied Aus- the court of appeals received 721 petitions tria. President Eisenhower approved the for discretionary review and decided a sentence, and President Kennedy de- mere 43 cases by full opinion. The com- clined to interfere after taking of½ce. parable data for ten years earlier were Even after approval, military death cas- 753 and 110, respectively. Even allowing es remain subject to habeas corpus review for the use of administrative separations in the federal courts; one such case is now to weed out men and women not suited pending. Habeas corpus review can con- to military service, our current military is sume as much time in military death pen- widely viewed as a highly disciplined alty cases as it does in civilian capital cas- force. Despite a well-regarded Army of½- es. For example, Private Dwight J. Loving,

166 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences Figure 1 Eugene R. General Courts-Martial and Bad-Conduct Special Courts-Martial in the United States, 2000 to 2010 Fidell

Source: Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. one of the current death row inmates, was Rule of Law. Outcomes, from charging de- convicted in 1989. Another, Master Ser- cisions, to verdicts, to sentences, have geant Timothy Hennis, was convicted in been puzzling. Initial steps have been tak- 2010.9 When the time comes for the next en,11 but a full analysis of the administra- military execution, as one must assume it tion of justice in these combat settings re- will, the method of execution will be le- mains to be done. thal injection10 and the place of execu- Happily, despite the political divide in tion will likely be the Federal Correction- which the country ½nds itself, no com- al Complex at Terre Haute, Indiana. missioned of½cers have been charged Capital cases, invariably involving ter- with speaking contemptuously of either rible crimes of violence, represent only a President George W. Bush or President small part of the business of courts-mar- Obama,12 although dismissive treatment tial. The system adjudicates a range of of President Obama led to the early re- noncapital cases as well. Sex crimes, of- tirement of General Stanley W. McChrys- fenses against children, drug offenses, and tal and, presumably, adverse evaluations cases involving child pornography loom for of½cers on his staff.13 There have been large in the military justice dockets. high-pro½le cases involving members There have also been serious noncapital who have resisted deployment either for cases of violence directed at citizens of political reasons or because of family Iraq and Afghanistan. A number of these, responsibilities, and one “birther” of½cer from places such as Haditha, Hamdaniya, –an Army doctor–has been prosecuted and Mahmudiyah, have understandably for refusing to deploy without proof that attracted substantial attention and at President Obama met the constitutional times raised questions as to whether the eligibility requirement of native birth.14 so-called fog of war was supplanting the A military justice investigation has been

140 (3) Summer 2011 167 Military opened as a result of apparently political- sible and law-abiding. Nonetheless, a Law ly motivated leakage of classi½ed docu- certain amount of contractor miscon- ments and combat video.15 Only a few in- duct–some of it very disturbing both to service conscientious objector cases have Americans and to local nationals–has gone to court; most have been resolved occurred. Given the constitutional cloud within the military personnel and record- hanging over court-martial jurisdiction correction systems. for these individuals, Congress has looked Most courts-martial are resolved by to other means to ensure their account- guilty pleas involving pretrial agree- ability, such as expanding the “Special ments. While this is desirable because it Territorial and Maritime Jurisdiction”19 reduces costs and uncertainty, it has the and passage of the Military Extraterrito- undesirable side-effect of reducing the rial Jurisdiction Act of 2000.20 However, overall courtroom experience level of those measures have rarely been put to the judge advocates. Conviction rates in contest, and have already been shown to suf- tested courts-martial remain high. fer from serious loopholes. Since it appears improbable that the United States In addition to the traditional core of mil- will be fully able to wean itself from re- itary justice–that is, cases involving uni- liance on contractors in the foreseeable formed personnel–two other categories future, further attention to contractor in- have received attention in recent years, al- discipline is warranted. though in each instance it remains uncer- The second unusual category of mili- tain whether they will play a signi½cant tary criminal prosecutions is the military role. The ½rst of these involves the exer- commission system. These tribunals– cise of jurisdiction over civilians. In a se- unlike courts-martial–are concerned ries of cases beginning with United States with crimes committed by persons other ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,16 the Supreme Court than American forces and civilians work- rejected efforts to subject former military ing with them.21 Military commissions personnel, dependents, and civilian em- have been controversial in the past, as, ployees to trial by court-martial. Courts- for example, when used during the Civil martial for civilians for offenses commit- War to prosecute Confederate sym- ted in Vietnam were rejected on the basis pathizers in the North even though the that that was not a declared war.17 In 2006, civilian courts remained open.22 Com- Congress modi½ed the ucmj to permit missions were always recognized in the courts-martial for persons serving with ucmj, but until President George W. or accompanying an armed force in the Bush revived them in 2001,23 they had ½eld in time of declared war or contingen- not been used since World War II, when cy operation,18 a term that includes U.S. one was convened, for example, to try operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. German saboteurs.24 The ½rst genera- This power has almost never been used, tion Bush administration commissions and it remains unknown what would hap- were invalidated by the Supreme Court in pen if such a prosecution were subjected Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,25 leading Congress to constitutional challenge under the ear- to enact Military Commissions Acts in lier Supreme Court jurisprudence. 2006 and 2009.26 The resulting commis- Contractors have played an enormous sions have produced only an unimpres- role in Iraq and Afghanistan. Like uni- sive handful of convictions, none of them formed personnel, the vast majority of (so far) involving so-called high value contractor personnel are highly respon- detainees, such as Khalid Sheikh Moham-

168 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences med. Even the few convictions that have tor, even though he had previously given Eugene R. been obtained have been severely criti- a newspaper interview and, indeed, had Fidell cized. One case, involving Omar Khadr, been prosecuted for misconduct as an a Canadian national who pleaded guilty interrogator.33 to killing a U.S. soldier with a grenade But if the U.S. military justice system in Afghanistan, was resolved with a plea continues to enjoy an excellent reputation, agreement requiring that he be turned it remains imperfect34 and suffers from a over to Canadian authorities in a year’s lack of sustained, knowledgeable over- time. The case proved especially contro- sight by Congress.35 As more Iraq and Af- versial because Khadr was underage at ghanistan veterans attend law school and the time of the offense, thus raising an enter public life, the number of knowl- issue of international law.27 edgeable federal legislators can be expect- The Obama administration has devoted to increase from its current low level. ed considerable attention to establishing criteria for deciding which Al Qaeda It has been said that “due process en- cases should be tried by military commis- hances discipline.”36 But what process is sion and which in the federal district due? In a number of respects, the U.S. courts. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani was ini- military justice system does not comport tially set to be tried before a military with contemporary international stan- commission28 but wound up being pros- dards. Those standards disfavor the use ecuted in the U.S. District Court in Man- of military courts to try civilians or re- hattan.29 Controversy continues to rage tired military personnel. Similarly, they over where other Guantánamo detainees disfavor the use of military courts to try should be tried, prompting legislation civilian-type offenses that lack service that would preclude the transfer of connection, even if the offenses are com- detainees into the United States even for mitted by active-duty military person- the purpose of trial.30 In 2011, the admin- nel.37 The military justice system is “com- istration announced that several high- mand centric” in that key decisions as value detainees would be tried by mili- to who should be prosecuted, on which tary commission after all. charges, and at which level of court-mar- In recent years, under pressure from tial are in the hands of commanders the Reporters Committee for Freedom of rather than prosecutors or independent the Press and the National Institute of court administrators. The Supreme Court Military Justice,31 the armed forces have found that the Constitution does not taken steps to make information about require military judges to have the pro- pending military justice cases available tection of ½xed terms of of½ce.38 They in to the public in order to facilitate media effect serve as judges at the pleasure of the coverage and public attendance. On the service, with “the needs of the service” as other hand, the Defense Department ig- the controlling consideration. Although nored requests for notice-and-comment the Army and the Coast Guard have vol- rule-making when it issued a new Manual untarily instituted judicial terms of of- for Military Commissions in 2010.32 It also ½ce,39 their regulations have signi½cant needlessly added to doubts about the mil- loopholes, and the other branches have itary commission system by barring from not even done that.40 Guantánamo four journalists who re- This interservice disparity is itself a ported the name of a witness, Sergeant useful reminder that, despite its name, Joshua Klaus, who had been an interroga- the ucmj does not provide a uniform sys-

140 (3) Summer 2011 169 Military tem; in important respects the adminis- defensible that the U.S. system denies Law tration of military justice is organized persons who have served the country and regulated on a service-by-service ba- the same chance–slight though it may sis. A remarkable example is the fact that be–as any other American of having the services cannot even agree on a single the highest court of the land review their burden of proof for nonjudicial punish- case. ment41 or a single set of rules of professional responsibility. The services con- Management of the military legal pro- tinue to maintain separate major train- gram has had its ups and downs in recent ing facilities for judge advocates. These years, but for the most part, it has en- are located at Charlottesville, Virginia joyed success. The Defense Department (Army), Newport, Rhode Island (Navy- has benefited from a tradition of highly Marine Corps), and Montgomery, Ala- quali½ed attorneys called from private bama (Air Force). That Congress contin- life to serve as general counsel. That tra- ues to tolerate such an extravagance is dition was violated during the Bush ad- astounding, especially in an era of auster- ministration, with devastating effects in ity. As long as the central governing doc- connection with the use of torture on ument of military law purports to estab- detainees. To their credit, the judge advo- lish a uniform system, judge advocate cates general stood ½rm, although per- instruction should be “purple”–that is, haps too discreetly, in resisting the then- truly integrated. general counsel’s efforts to secure their Perhaps the ucmj’s most glaring de- agreement to interrogations that violated ½ciency is the fact that most courts-mar- Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven- tial are never eligible for review by the tions44 as well as the Convention Against U.S. Supreme Court. Until Congress pro- Torture.45 None of them resigned in vided for direct Supreme Court review protest, but they still deserve credit: their of court-martial cases in the Military efforts helped protect American service Justice Act of 1983, courts-martial could members by permitting us to argue to only reach the highest court by the cir- others that as a matter of policy and prin- cuitous means of habeas corpus peti- ciple we do not abuse prisoners. Unfortu- tions or other forms of collateral review nately, Congress has effectively granted in the federal courts. This changed in the impunity to those who violated both pol- 1983 Act, but that measure excluded from icy and principle and did torture detain- direct Supreme Court review cases in ees in the country’s name.46 There is no which the then-Court of Military Ap- serious congressional or executive branch peals had exercised its power under the movement to ensure a full accounting ucmj to deny discretionary review.42 (much less punishment). That limitation distinguishes courts- In 2008, Congress provided that judge martial from all other criminal cases advocates general would serve in the decided by the federal and state courts grade of lieutenant general and vice ad- and should be repealed. The U.S. situ- miral,47 on the theory that this would af- ation is not as dismal as, for instance, ford them a stronger voice in the highest that of Pakistan, where the government councils of their branch. Even though the has thwarted access to that nation’s number of flag and general of½cers seems supreme court by refusing to release the to rise inexorably, this change reflects the necessary court-martial records of trial constructive role these of½cers played in in sensitive cases.43 Nonetheless, it is in- fending off what might have been an

170 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences even more catastrophic injury to Ameri- compliant institutions of higher learn- Eugene R. ca’s international reputation as a result of ing,52 some law schools refused to permit Fidell the Bush administration’s willingness to military recruiting through normal place- indulge in torture under the euphemism ment channels on the grounds that dadt of “enhanced interrogation techniques.” made the military a discriminatory em- For many years, controversy smoldered ployer. The government ultimately pre- over the respective roles of the judge ad- vailed in the Solomon Amendment liti- vocates general and the civilian service gation,53 and it is to be hoped that rela- general counsels. Which of these of½cials tions between these two important insti- was the service secretary’s primary legal tutions will continue to improve. Part of advisor?48 This was the subject of a con- the healing process may lie in the increas- gressionally directed49 panel cochaired ing flow of talented recent veterans into by former Secretary of the Army John O. law schools–as students and, in a few Marsh and former Secretary of the Air cases, as faculty. The number of schools Force F. Whitten Peters. The resulting re- offering courses in military law is increas- port had a calming effect, but its only ing. This is an important development be- speci½c recommendations were to elevate cause, in a democratic society, the mili- the judge advocates general to three-star tary should not have a monopoly on rank and retain the requirement that gen- learning in the ½eld of military justice.54 eral counsels be appointed by the pres- The military is a microcosm–albeit ident and con½rmed by the Senate.50 a big one–of American society. As a re- Congress also mandated a review of the sult, many of the legal issues that con- provision of legal services within the Navy front Americans generally also appear and Marine Corps.51 The results of that within the armed forces. For example, review remain under study. legal issues are likely to emerge within Recruitment and retention of judge ad- the services as a result of such broader vocates appear to be satisfactory. In part, societal phenomena as large-scale gangs55 this clearly reflects patriotic sentiment. and other forms of extremism; the con- To some extent, however, it also reflects tinuing upsurge in religious (especially, the general economic downturn and re- but not only, Evangelical) fervor; and the duced professional opportunities for at- sudden appearance of the Tea Party. At torneys in the private sector. times, these developments may inter- With respect to personnel-related legal act in powerful ways. In the next several issues within the force as a whole, the years, we may face resistance by chap- “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (dadt) statute lains from some faith groups to the repeal Congress enacted in 1993 was controver- of dadt. Reconciling personal belief sys- sial until its repeal at the end of 2010. It tems with the need for a disciplined, co- caused unimaginable pain to serving per- hesive ½ghting force will continue to oc- sonnel and the loss of more than twelve cupy the military lawyers on whom com- thousand members, many of whom pos- manders increasingly rely. sessed urgently needed language and other skills, or ½ne combat records, or Operational law is “[t]hat body of do- both. In addition to the direct impact mestic, foreign, and international law on the services, dadt was an enduring that impacts speci½cally upon the activi- source of friction with the legal academy. ties of U.S. forces in war and operations Despite the Solomon Amendment’s pro- other than war. . . . It is a collection of division for cutting off federal funds to non- verse legal and military skills, focused on

140 (3) Summer 2011 171 Military military operations. It includes military better equipped to uphold the United Law justice, administrative and civil law, legal States’ commitment to meticulous com- assistance, claims, procurement law, na- pliance with international law. tional security law, ½scal law, and inter- A further aspect of operational law con- national law.”56 Operational law can no cerns lawfare. Major General Charles J. longer be described as “a growth area.” It Dunlap, Jr., the concept’s leading exposi- has grown. With the years-long conflicts tor, describes it as a “strategy of using– in Iraq and Afghanistan, vast numbers of or misusing–law as a substitute for tra- judge advocates have supplemented their ditional military means to achieve an training at service and civilian law schools operational objective.”60 The virtues of with practical experience advising com- this form of power include reduced risk manders at all levels of their duties under to the wielder and to human life in gener- the law of armed conflict. In operational al. It is also likely to decrease the taxpay- settings as volatile as those in which the ers’ burden. A major question surround- United States and its allies have been ing lawfare is its impact on the division of engaged since 9/11, utmost care is critical labor and authority between the com- in targeting and other decisions, since mander and the commander’s legal advi- the slightest miscue can have devastating sor. Unless carefully monitored by both and virtually immediate effects not only attorney and client, there could be a dan- on the battle½eld but around the world as ger of legal mission creep. a result of contemporary instantaneous Military operations also have post-op- communications. New ways of exerting erational aspects. One is the obscure but military force, such as drones operated at important task of examining and paying an enormous remove from the tradition- claims and making ex gratia payments. al battle space, have triggered heated de- The timely and intelligent performance of bate, especially if the operators are not this largely thankless task can pay hand- uniformed personnel.57 The decision to some dividends in mitigating the hard employ drones to target an American cit- feelings that inevitably arise from the col- izen has raised additional concerns.58 lateral damage caused by military opera- Two important developments in operations, even where local sentiment favors tional law highlight the partnership be- those operations. tween the government and universities. The ½rst of these, the Manual on Interna- A ½nal indicator of the role of law with- tional Law Applicable to Air and Missile War- in the military ironically takes us outside fare (and its accompanying Commentary) the military. It concerns the extent to was developed by the Program on Hu- which the federal courts defer to military manitarian Policy and Conflict Research decision-making. Congress long ago ex- at Harvard University. The second is the cluded certain military actions from the long-awaited Department of Defense Law of Administrative Procedure Act.61 Deci- War Manual, the product of a decade- sions on security clearances remain off- long effort spearheaded by Colonel W. limits.62 Nonetheless, a good deal of mil- Hays Parks.59 Together, the publications itary decision-making is subject to judi- mark a new chapter in which–notwith- cial review for compliance with the Con- standing the many changes that warfare stitution, statutes, and agency regula- and the law of armed conflict have wit- tions, or to ensure that decisions are sup- nessed in recent decades–commanders ported by substantial evidence and are in the ½eld and their legal advisors will be not arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of

172 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences discretion.63 Important personnel mat- The end of the Cold War did not bring Eugene R. ters, such as the correction of military an end to military law any more than it Fidell records or discharge upgrades, remain brought an end to military readiness or subject to judicial review, although the operations. The new era is one in which courts have in recent years tended to new challenges have already arisen with adopt a highly deferential standard.64 remarkable rapidity and kaleidoscopic While the extent of deference varies from variety. As technology (including weap- circuit to circuit and, on the Supreme ons and intelligence-gathering systems, Court, from justice to justice,65 it is ever- cyberwarfare, ubiquitous Internet access, present and works powerfully in the gov- digital photography, cellular telephones, ernment’s favor. Barring the kind of and the blogosphere), national policy, grave issues that have repeatedly been and expectations of proper treatment (of presented in the Guantánamo detention our own personnel, civilians, and ene- and military commission cases,66 the mies of various kinds) evolve, this will be military typically has little to fear from an increasingly dynamic era for law and the federal courts.67 And when it does legal institutions in the realm of national lose, some powerful reason is almost cer- defense. tainly at work.68

endnotes 1 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law 110-181, 110th Cong. (2008), sec. 543, 122 Stat. 3, 114. 2 United States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213, 2225 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1957) (plurality opinion)). At issue was whether a former Navy enlisted man who was a Nigerian citizen could invoke the ancient writ of error coram nobis in order to obtain review of his claim that he had been misadvised about the immigration implications of pleading guilty in a special court-martial. The Chief Justice’s dismissive char- acterization of military justice prompted one of the judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces to respond in another case. Loving v. United States, 68 M.J. 1, 28 n.11 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (Ryan, J., dissenting). In the interest of full disclosure, I should state that I was one of Petty Of½cer Denedo’s attorneys in the Supreme Court. 3 See U.S. Const. amend. 5 (no requirement for indictment by grand jury for cases arising in the land and naval forces and in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger). Article 36(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (ucmj) states that except as otherwise provided in the statute, court-martial procedures shall, so far as the president con- siders practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in civilian federal criminal trials; see 10 U.S.C. sec. 836(a). 4 Nonjudicial punishment is summary discipline imposed by commanders for minor offenses. It is authorized by article 15 of the ucmj; see 10 U.S.C. sec. 815. Depending on the branch of service, it may be called “njp,” “Article 15,” “captain’s mast” (as it is referred to in the Navy and Coast Guard), or “of½ce hours” (as it is known in the Marine Corps). It is not a criminal proceeding, although it can only be imposed for offenses under the ucmj. 5 Each level of court-martial may also impose additional kinds of punishments. See generally arts. 16, 18–20, ucmj, 10 U.S.C. sec. 816, 818–820; Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2008 edition), Rule for Courts-Martial 1003.

140 (3) Summer 2011 173 Military 6 Lawrence J. Morris, “Our Mission, No Future: Closing the United States Army Disciplinary Law Barracks,” The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy 6 (1996): 77. 7 Email message to the author from U.S. Army Colonel Shawn Shumake, Director of the Of- ½ce of Legal Policy, Of½ce of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, November 30, 2010. The original plan, in 1994, was for a facility with the slightly higher capacity of 510. See Peter J. Grande, Images of America: United States Disciplinary Barracks (Charleston, S.C.: Arcadia, 2009), 8. Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Peter Grande is Chief of Staff of the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks. 8 Art. 71(a), ucmj, 10 U.S.C. sec. 871(a). 9 I am indebted to Colonel Dwight H. Sullivan, the leading expert on the military death penalty, for information about past and current military capital cases. 10 Military Police, U.S. Army Corrections System: Procedures for Military Executions, Army Regu- lation 190-55 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 17, 2006), sec. 3-1. 11 See Major Franklin D. Rosenblatt, “Non-Deployable: The Court-Martial System in Combat from 2001 to 2009,” The Army Lawyer, Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-448 (Sep- tember 2010), 12, 15 n.14. Major Rosenblatt discusses analyses by the Army Center for Law and Military Operations of after-action reports. 12 See art. 88, ucmj, 10 U.S.C. sec. 888. 13 Where the fault lies remains a matter of dispute; see Thom Shanker, “McChrystal Article In- quiry Leaves Questions Open,” The New York Times, September 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes .com/2010/09/23/world/asia/23military.html?ref=stanley_a_mcchrystal. 14 Associated Press, “Maryland: Obama-Doubting Army Doctor Sentenced,” The New York Times, December 17, 2010. See U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 1, cl. 5. 15 On the arrest of Army Specialist Bradley Manning, see Elisabeth Bumiller, “Army Leak Sus- pect Is Turned In, by Ex-Hacker,” The New York Times, June 8, 2010. To see the full video of civilians killed in Baghdad that was released by WikiLeaks, visit http://www.youtube.com/ verify_age?next_url=http%3A//www.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3Dis9sxRfU-ik. Subsequent leaks have involved vast quantities of U.S. diplomatic reports. Reactions to the leaks have included pursuit of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, efforts by various governments and private entities to thwart fundraising and further dissemination of the leaked documents, and threatened as well as actual retaliation by WikiLeaks supporters. See, for example, Ravi Somaiya, “Activists Say Web Assault for Assange is Expanding,” The New York Times, Decem- ber 11, 2010. 16 350 U.S. 11 (1955). 17 United States v. Averette, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 363, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970). 18 Art. 2(a)(10), ucmj, 10 U.S.C. sec. 802(a)(10). 19 18 U.S.C. sec. 7. 20 18 U.S.C. sec. 3261 et seq. 21 General courts-martial may also try “any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal”; see art. 18, ucmj, 10 U.S.C. sec. 818, but they have not been used for this purpose since the ucmj took effect in 1951. Military commissions now have their own statute and procedural manual and are subject to appellate review by courts other than those established by the ucmj.

174 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences 22 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). After prevailing in the Supreme Court, Milligan won nomi- Eugene R. nal damages against those responsible for his arrest, trial, and imprisonment; Milligan v. Fidell Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380 (Cir. Ct. D. Ind. 1871). He was represented in that case by Benjamin Har- rison, who later served as twenty-third president of the United States. 23 Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (2001). 24 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 25 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 26 The current statute is codi½ed at 10 U.S.C. chap. 47A. 27 See United States v. Khadr, 1 M.C. 223 (2008) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction). 28 See United States v. Ghailani, 1 M.C. 387 (2009) (amended trial schedule). 29 United States v. Ghailani, Crim. No. S10 98-1023 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). See generally Charlie Savage, “Terror Verdict Tests Obama’s Strategy on Trial,” The New York Times, November 18, 2010. 30 Charlie Savage, “Holder Denounces a Bill to Bar Detainee Transfers,” The New York Times, December 10, 2010. 31 The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, “Military Dockets: Examining the Pub- lic’s Right of Access to the Workings of Military Justice” (Arlington, Va.: rcfp, August 2008), http://www.rcfp.org/militarydockets/whitepaper.pdf. 32 Jonathan Tracy, “Revise Army Manual in Public,” The Miami Herald, March 31, 2010, http:// www.miamiherald.com/2010/03/31/1555969/revise-army-manual-in-public.html. 33 “Veteran Reporter Barred from Guantanamo,” On the Media, npr, May 14, 2010, http://www .onthemedia.org/transcripts/2010/05/14/01. 34 See, for example, Kevin J. Barry, “A Face Lift (And Much More) for an Aging Beauty: The Cox Commission Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military Justice,” Law Review of Michigan State University–Detroit College of Law 57 (2002). 35 Donald N. Zillman, “Where Have All the Soldiers Gone II: Military Veterans in Congress and the State of Civil-Military Relations,” Maine Law Review 58 (2006): 135. 36 Lieutenant General Richard C. Harding, Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force, “A Revival in Military Justice,” The Reporter 37 (2) (Summer 2010): 4–5. 37 See, for example, Commission on Human Rights, Draft UN Principles Governing the Adminis- tration of Justice Through Military Tribunals, E/CN.4/2006/58, January, 13, 2006. The Supreme Court abandoned the service-connection requirement in Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). The decision overruled O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). 38 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994). This ruling dramatically highlights the stark distinction between military justice and civilian criminal justice. Justice Scalia observed in his concurring opinion: [N]o one can suppose that similar protections against improper influence [as provided in the ucmj] would suf½ce to validate a state criminal-law system in which felonies were tried by judges serving at the pleasure of the Executive. I am con½dent that we would not be satis½ed with mere formal prohibitions in the civilian context, but would hold that due process demands the structural protection of tenure in of½ce, which has been provided in England since 1700, see J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 145–146 (2d ed. 1979), was provided in almost all the former English colonies from the time of the Revolution, see Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Prece- dents, 1969 S. Ct. Rev. 135, 138–147, and is provided in all the States today, see National Center for State Courts, Conference of State Court Administrators, State Court Organization 1987, pp. 271–302 (1988). (It

140 (3) Summer 2011 175 Military is noteworthy that one of the grievances recited against King George III in the Declaration of Indepen- Law dence was that “he has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their of½ces.”) Id. at 198–199 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 39 Legal Services, Military Justice Army Regulation 27-10, sec. 8-1g, 13-13 (November 16, 2005) (“AR 27-10”); U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant Inst. M5810.1E, Military Justice Manual sec. 6.E (May 2011). The disparity was upheld in Oppermann v. United States, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43270 (D.D.C.), aff’d mem., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26169 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 40 The disparity was upheld in Sanford v. United States, 586 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 41 Only the Army requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt (the standard for civilian criminal trials and courts-martial) in Article 15 proceedings; AR 27-10 secs. 3-16d(4), 3-18l, and Ap- pendix B-2 n.2. Another discrepancy is that because of the “vessel exception,” Navy and Coast Guard personnel often lack the right to reject nonjudicial punishment. See art. 15(a), ucmj, 10 U.S.C. sec. 815(a); see generally Major Dwight H. Sullivan, “Overhauling the Ves- sel Exception,” Naval Law Review 43 (1996): 57. A recent proposal would also deny the re- fusal right to those serving in a combat zone. Rosenblatt, “Non-Deployable,” 32–34. 42 28 U.S.C. sec. 1259(3); art. 67a(a), ucmj, 10 U.S.C. sec. 867a(a). The ucmj still requires “good cause” for the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces to grant review; art. 67(a)(3), ucmj, 10 U.S.C. sec. 867(a)(3). This is in sharp contrast to the geographical courts of appeals, whose appellate jurisdiction is not discretionary: a litigant in those courts need not show good cause to secure review of ½nal judgments in criminal cases; 28 U.S.C. sec. 1291; Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(b) (criminal appeals as of right). 43 See Akram v. Federation of Pakistan, S.P. Nos. 04/I/1993, 44/I/1993 (Pak. Fed. Shariat Ct. 1993) (directing government to amend rules to ensure right of court-martial defendants to copies of case records). The case is discussed in Umar Cheema, Military Courts vs. Supreme Court?, Commandos Seek Supreme Court’s Intervention, http://forum.pakistanidefence.com/index .php?showtopic=89239. The journalist who prepared this story was later abducted, beaten, and publicly humiliated; see Bob Dietz, “The Signi½cance of Umar Cheema’s Abduction,” Committee to Protect Journalists, September 9, 2010, http://cpj.org/blog/2010/09/the -signi½cance-of-umar-cheemas-abduction.php; Jane Perlez, “Pakistani Journalist Speaks Out After an Attack,” The New York Times, September 25, 2010. See also “Who Attacked Umar Cheema?” The New York Times, September 29, 2010. In Anderson v. Harrison, Misc. Dkt. No. 20051419 (A.C.C.A. Feb. 2, 2006) (dismissed as moot), a soldier con½ned at the U.S. Dis- ciplinary Barracks had to seek an extraordinary writ in order to be able to retain his art. 54(d), ucmj, 10 U.S.C. sec. 854(d), copy of the record of trial in his cell. 44 Geneva Conventions of 1949, Common Article 3. 45 un Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun- ishment, G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. gaor Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984); entered into force June 26, 1987. 46 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law 109-148, sec. 1004, 119 Stat. 2740 (2005), codi½ed at 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000dd-1. This provision for the “Protection of United States Gov- ernment personnel” “relates to actions occurring between September 11, 2001, and Decem- ber 30, 2005.” See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Public Law 109-366, sec. 8(b), 120 Stat. 2636 (2006), reproduced in 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000dd-1 note. 47 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law 110-181, 122 Stat. 3, 114 (2008).

176 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences 48See generally Lieutenant Commander Kurt A. Johnson, “Military Department General Coun- Eugene R. sel as ‘Chief Legal Of½cers’: Impact on Delivery of Impartial Legal Advice at Headquarters Fidell and in the Field,” Military Law Review 139 (1) (1993). 49 See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Public Law 108-375, sec. 574, 118 Stat. 1811 (2004). 50 See Independent Review Panel to Study the Relationships Between Military Department Gen- eral Counsels and Judges Advocates General, Legal Services in the Department of Defense: Advanc- ing Productive Relationships, September 15, 2005, 68 and 68 n.189, http://www.wilmerhale.com/ ½les/Publication/35196dbc-fad7-45ad-bc44-5c27d03b4897/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 745b0324-5de9-4d69-8d6f-5fec9cf3761f/Preston_DODReport_0905.pdf. The senior uniformed lawyer position in the Marine Corps–the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant–would be elevated to Major General. 51 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-84, sec. 506, 123 Stat. 2190, 2274 (2009). 52 10 U.S.C. sec. 983(b)(1). 53 Rumsfeld v. F.A.I.R., 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 54 See generally Eugene R. Fidell, “Military Justice Instruction in Civilian Law Schools,” Journal of Legal Education 60 (1) (2011). 55 See Gustav Eyler, “Gangs in the Military,” Yale Law Journal 118 (2009): 696. 56 International and Operational Law Division, The Judge Advocate General’s School of the Army, Operational Law Handbook A-1 (1994). 57 Peter Singer identi½es some of the thorny legal questions that may arise from the use of robotics for military purposes in Peter W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New York: Penguin, 2009), chap. 20. 58 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 59 See generally W. Hays Parks, Senior Associate Deputy General Counsel (International Af- fairs), Department of Defense, “National Security Law in Practice: The Department of De- fense Law of War Manual,” remarks at a meeting of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, University Club, Washington, D.C., November 18, 2010, http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/hays_parks_speech11082010.pdf. 60 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?” remarks at the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center War Crimes Research Symposium on Lawfare, Case Western Re- serve School of Law, September 10, 2010. General Dunlap’s remarks are published in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 43 (March 2011). See also U.S. Army Brigadier General Mark Martins, “Reflections on ‘Lawfare’ and Related Terms,” Lawfare, November 18, 2010, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/11/reflections-on-%E2%80%9Clawfare%E2%80 %9D-and-related-terms. General Martins notes alternative meanings, such as unfair, “War”- fare, and counterinsurgency. 61 5 U.S.C. sec. 551(1)(F)–(G) (courts-martial, military commissions, military authority exercised in the ½eld in time of war or in occupied territory). 62 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 63 5 U.S.C. sec. 706. At times, the Constitution can even stand in the way of what seems to be the clear demand of military personnel legislation. Thus, in Dysart v. United States, 393 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and its progeny, what certainly seemed to be a requirement of the

140 (3) Summer 2011 177 Military Defense Of½cer Personnel Management Act that promotions improperly or unduly delayed Law would take effect by operation of law, see 10 U.S.C. sec. 624(a)(2), fell afoul of the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 155–156 (1803). 64 See, for example, Kreis v. Secretary of the Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 65 See generally Eugene R. Fidell, “Justice John Paul Stevens and Judicial Deference in Military Matters,” UC Davis Law Review 43 (2010): 999. 66 See, for example, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 67 See, for example, Winter v. NDRC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (effect of antisubmarine warfare exercises on marine mammals). The Supreme Court shows no signs of overruling its own decision in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), which effectively immunizes the government from tort claims by military personnel. Efforts to secure corrective action from Congress have also fallen on deaf ears despite the terrible facts of a number of cases (involving, for example, medical malpractice) in which it seems impossible to justify denying conventional tort damages. 68 See generally John F. O’Connor, “Statistics and the Military Deference Doctrine: A Response to Professor Lichtman,” Maryland Law Review 66 (2007): 668.

178 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences Casualties

Jonathan Shay

Abstract: Privation and disease have mainly killed soldiers until very recently. Now that enemy action predominates, faster and better control of bleeding and infection before and during evacuation spares ever more lives today. This essay focuses on psychological war wounds, placing them in the context of military casualties. The surgeon’s concepts of “primary” wounds in war, and of wound “complications” and “contamination,” serve as models for psychological and moral injury in war. “Psychological injury” is explained and preferred to “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” being less stigmatizing and more faithful to the phenomenon. Primary psychological injury equates to the direct damage done by a bullet; the complications–for example, alcohol abuse–equate to hemorrhage and infection. Two current senses of “moral injury” equate to wound contamination. As with physical wounds, it is the complications and contamination of mental wounds that most often kill service members or veterans, or blight their lives.

The veterans I served for twenty years were rigorous, generous, and patient teachers on what had wrecked their lives and what might be done to protect the new generation of American kids who go into harm’s way for our sakes.1 They made me their missionary to the U.S. forces on prevention of psychological and moral injury. So, practicing full disclosure, this essay has the veterans’ missionary agenda as its energy source, and speaks with my personal voice, not detached, god-speak from the edge of the universe. Some history puts current physical casualties in context. In 1861, the French civil engineer Charles Minard published a brilliant, if misleading, graphic JONATHAN SHAY served as a staff of losses from Napoleon’s army during its hellish psychiatrist at the Boston Depart- round trip from the Polish border to Moscow and ment of Veterans Affairs Outpa- back, 1812 to 1813. Most non-historians today know tient Clinic for twenty years. He is of this chart through Edward R. Tufte’s classic, The the author of Achilles in Vietnam: Visual Display of Quantitative Information. The subze- Combat Trauma and the Undoing ro cold prevailing during the retreat from Moscow of Character (1994) and Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and rivets attention, both because of the black, dramat- the Trials of Homecoming (2002). ically thick, but rapidly thinning line drawn west- Through the end of 2012, he is ward across a map of Russia to graphically repre- a MacArthur Fellow. sent troop strength during the winter retreat, and

179 Casualties the prominent temperature scale linked of war by air for “diseases/other medi- to this ever-dwindling line. However, in cal” roughly equaled the number evacu- his “Combat Trauma Overview” for the ated for physical injuries. War zones re- Anesthesia and Perioperative Care volume of main dangerous, unhealthy places.3 the Textbook of Military Medicine, Colonel But the enemy does matter, and in past Ronald F. Bellamy, a retired U.S. Army centuries many, many more eventually Medical Corps surgeon,2 points out that died from wounds than died immediate- Napoleon lost two-thirds of his 400,000- ly on the battle½eld. Homer’s portrayal plus army, primarily to heat, disease, and of virtually every wound as instantly fatal starvation before reaching Borodino, not is one of the very few glaring untruths far from Moscow. You can see this stagger- about war in the Iliad. The true medical ing attrition during the approach march “miracle” of today’s military medicine is in Minard’s graphic, if you look for it past how few of the wounded die, if they can be the eye-catching, “it was not Bonaparte’s brought alive out of the ½ght. This mir- fault” visual narrative. acle continues to evolve, with develop- But one needn’t go so far back as Napo- ments in the ability to call for help; speed leonic warfare to see what a hostile phys- of evacuation to comprehensive treat- ical environment can do to an army: dur- ment; prevention of exsanguination, ing World War II in North Africa, far- wound contamination, and hypothermia; famed Rommel had twice as many troops and concentration on the tedious basics in hospital for sickness as killed, wound- of “damage control” surgery and resus- ed, or missing. citation, even while airborne en route to a It is hard for us in the twenty-½rst cen- fully equipped and staffed surgical hospi- tury to recall that the main killers of tal. To this specialized military medical troops throughout history have been the progress one must above all add recent privations of the nonhuman physical progress in training all troops to be life- environment: heat, cold, dehydration, savers, providing them with means to hunger, and above all, disease. The fact stop bleeding; training, equipping, and that Homer’s Iliad opens with a plague empowering the lowest echelon med- –“and the funeral pyres burned day and ics/corpsmen to make critical next steps night”–is entirely realistic, not merely before the wounded service member’s the poet’s evocation of the gods’ heavy physiology has completely collapsed. As hands. Americans are brilliant and cul- brilliant as American forces are at the turally lavish at logistics, provisioning logistics of supplying what soldiers need our troops with everything material they to stay ½t in harsh environments, and need to stay functional and whisking moving the wounded quickly to surgical them away from danger when they are treatment and physiological support, hurt or sick. Today’s ever more abundant there may be no “golden hour” on the supply of safe drinking water and food to battle½eld, maybe only a golden ½ve min- U.S. troops deployed in the harsh envi- utes during which self- and buddy-care ronments of Iraq and Afghanistan prob- make all the difference. ably improves their fate over Rommel’s troops in North Africa far more than Even laymen know that when a high- antibiotics and air evacuation when the velocity bullet or shell fragment takes off enemy has inflicted wounds. Still, as of a soldier’s or marine’s arm, severing ar- early 2008, the number of service mem- teries, it is not the primary wound that bers evacuated from the current theaters kills, but the complication of hemorrhagic

180 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences shock. If the bleeding is controlled, but Traumatic Stress Disorder–rather than of Jonathan nothing further is done, the complication wound. Shay of wound infection in this contaminated What is the primary psychological wound, loaded with foreign bodies and wound of war? Here I mean primary not devitalized tissue, will bring death a few as “most important,” but rather, in the days or weeks later. Napoleon’s troops sense of “no complications.” Recall how knew enough to stop bleeding if they the primary traumatic amputation did could, as did Agamemnon’s troops. Achil- not kill the service member, but the com- les was revered by the troops for his surgi- plications of hemorrhage and infection cal knowledge, in addition to his ½ghting did. prowess. But Homeric or Napoleonic, the In this sense, the primary psychologi- wounded were largely doomed by infec- cal injury from war is the persistence into tion. civilian life (or life in garrison) of the I draw this distinction between compli- valid physiological, psychological, and cations and primary injury to segue from social adaptations that promoted sur- physical wounds of war to the psycholog- vival in the face of other human beings ical wounds of war, where complications trying to kill you. Measured against the and “wound contamination” take greater descriptive criteria for a diagnosis of tolls than the primary injury. ptsd, the ½t is pretty good: the mobili- For years I have agitated against the zation of the mind and body for lethal diagnostic jargon, Post-Traumatic Stress danger, the shutting down of activities, Disorder (ptsd), because transparently thoughts, and emotions that do not di- we are dealing with an injury, not an ill- rectly support survival in the ½ght, the ness, malady, disease, sickness, or disor- intrusive hyper-remembering of what the der. My insistence comes from awareness danger looks, smells, or sounds like, to that within military forces it is entirely never be taken unprepared. honorable to be injured, and that if one is For example, a primary psychological injured and recovers well enough to be ½t injury from the current theater in Iraq: for duty, there is no real limit to one’s ac- A valid survival strategy against road- complishments, even if a prosthesis is em- side improvised explosive devices (ieds), ployed. Witness the honored career of while driving a vehicle in Iraq, is to drive General Eric Shinseki, who lost a foot in down the center of the road as fast as pos- Vietnam, and eventually retired from the sible. This is a rational survival strategy: U.S. Army as chief of staff. We do not de- a fast-moving vehicle is harder to hit scribe him as suffering “Missing Foot Dis- with a command-detonated explosion order.” than a slow-moving vehicle; it is impossi- To fall ill in the service of one’s country ble for a driver to know on which side of is not dishonorable, but it sure is unlucky. the road the bomb might be; explosive Nobody wants to share a ½ghting hole or force declines as the inverse square of the vehicle with an unlucky soldier or marine, distance; the largest average maximum a ship’s watch with an unlucky sailor, or distance from both roadsides is the cen- aircraft with an unlucky airman. It is stig- ter of the road. Upon return to garrison matizing in that culture. Among other at, say, Camp Lejeune or Fort Hood, a ser- reasons as well, my agitation has been vice member who, while driving (especial- against the gratuitous stigma conferred ly if sleep-deprived), momentarily loses in the diagnostic name by its location the distinction between here-and-now in the semantic range of disease–Post- and there-and-then may well die in a high-

140 (3) Summer 2011 181 Casualties speed head-on collision on the roads respond to danger–is an obviously valid around Jacksonville or Kileen. The valid adaptation to an active war zone. If it is adaptation is, in a post-danger setting, no not safe to shut out sounds and shadowy longer adaptive, and in this instance fa- movements, they are not shut out, but tal, not only to the service member! Such instead are acknowledged in the soldier’s examples abound, especially when the sleep. When this adaptation persists outcome is less dramatic, often resulting afterward and disrupts sleep, two ex- only in inconvenience, other people’s puz- tremely common complications super- zlement, or embarrassment. vene: ½rst, use, then abuse of alcohol to In the absence of complications, pri- promote sleep, and second, loss of emo- mary psychological injuries from war tional and ethical self-restraint and of usually do not wreck veterans’ lives. social judgment. The disastrous pharma- Many adapt to the injury in much the cology of alcohol as a sleep medicine is same way as physically injured veterans widely known. Less known is impair- adapt to injury: they learn skills and ment of frontal lobe function by sleep workarounds; they use prostheses. For loss, per se, which does terrible damage example, I had a patient who was a Viet- to the lives of veterans and their families. nam War Marine infantry veteran who Sleep is fuel for the frontal lobes of the had a non-negotiable aversion to show- brain. When you are out of gas in your ing up in the open in a crowd because it frontal lobes you become a moral moron read as “bunching up”: that is, making and unable to control your behavior in oneself a target for enemy snipers and the face of emotions such as anger. Alco- mortarmen. He could not sit in the stands hol problems and loss of authority over to watch his son’s Little League games, emotion can thus be seen as complica- even though he rationally knew there tions–akin to hemorrhage and infection were no snipers. He was simply too un- –of the primary injury. As with physical comfortable to endure it. So his work- wounds, the complications may be far around was to watch the game from his more destructive than the primary injury, truck parked far out the third baseline off such as fatalities connected with alcohol left ½eld. This same veteran worked for and fatalities in ½ghts connected with the gas company. His direct supervisor loss of authority over anger. Repetitive was also a veteran and made a “work- combat nightmares are prodigious de- place accommodation” to my patient’s stroyers of sleep. I view traumatic night- disability: instead of requiring him to mares as an evolutionarily ancient form muster in the open truck yard at 7 a.m. of remembering about lethal danger, a with the other gas service-technicians “primary injury.” These nightmares them- to receive work orders, the supervisor selves, avoidance of going to sleep because would leave my patient’s work orders in of them, and self-medicating with alcohol a box where he would pick them up at to suppress them are further examples of 5 a.m. when no one was around. He would complications to a primary injury. then have breakfast and begin his day’s work. One category of psychological injury The most common and disastrous com- –moral injury–has recently lit up both in plications of primary psychological injury military professional circles and in the from war flow directly from persistence clinical literature. I adumbrated the con- of combat sleep patterns. A soldier’s vigi- cept in Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma lant sleep–a light doze, instantly ready to and the Trials of Homecoming:

182 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences When I speak of prevention of moral inju- their direct leaders know their stuff Jonathan ry in military service, this Homeric episode and know their people. Sacri½ce falls Shay [Agamemnon’s public dishonor of his most most heavily on their people. effective and revered subordinate, Achilles, While I have had bully pulpits before in Iliad Book 1] is an example of what I want receptive military groups, I cannot point to prevent: betrayal of “what’s right” in a to much change in policy and practice high stakes situation by someone who holds that would signi½cantly reduce the prev- power. The consequences for those still on alence of leadership malpractice. Some active duty range from a loss of motivation examples of changes not made: change and enjoyment, resulting in attrition from “up-or-out” to “up-or-stay” (subject to the service at the next available moment, rigorous performance evaluation), broad- to passive obstructionism, goldbricking, en the who and the how of performance and petty theft, to outright desertion [for ex- evaluation (for example, “360-degree eval- ample, Achilles in the Iliad], sabotage, frag- uation”), stop imagining of½cership as a ging [Achilles almost kills Agamemnon in form of “general management,” where Book 1], or treason. In a war, the conse- no speci½c functional expertise is re- quences are catastrophic.4 quired.7 When the term moral injury has sur- I devote the ½nal ½fty pages of Odysseus in faced in recent psychological research lit- America to prevention of psychological erature, it has been used somewhat dif- and moral injury in military service. My ferently: “Potentially morally injurious current most precise (and narrow) de½- events, such as perpetrating, failing to pre- nition has three parts: moral injury is pres- vent, or bearing witness to acts that trans- ent when (1) there has been a betrayal of gress deeply held moral beliefs and ex- what’s right (2) by someone who holds pectations may be deleterious in the long- legitimate authority (3) in a high-stakes term, emotionally, psychologically, behav- situation. When all three are present, mor- iorally, spiritually, and socially.”8 The al injury is present and the body codes it cited clinicians/researchers have shown in much the same way it codes physical an elevated risk of domestic violence and attack. suicide, if moral injury is present. Our I emphasize the element of leadership two meanings of moral injury differ malpractice because it is something we mainly in whether leadership malprac- can do something about. The prevalence tice is part of the de½nition. The view of of leadership malpractice5 is extremely the above researchers could be para- sensitive to policy, practice, and culture phrased as what happens (1) when some- in a military organization. My activities one “betrays what’s right” and (2) the vio- with military forces have been directed lator is the self (3) in a high-stakes situa- that way. They have given me a hearing tion. I have focused where the betrayer of and appear somewhat receptive,6 largely what is right holds legitimate authority. because they recognize that ethical lead- Moral injury in my meaning can lead to ership is a combat strength multiplier. moral injury in the above clinicians/ When a leader betrays “what’s right,” he researchers’ meaning. An example would or she demotivates vast swaths of troops be for a soldier or marine to be ordered to and detaches whole units from loyalty to murder civilians or disarmed, unresisting the chain of command. Stated positively, prisoners (likely a moral injury in my troops do want to know that what they sense), and then, feeling compelled to are doing has a constructive purpose, that carry it out, to incur moral injury in their

140 (3) Summer 2011 183 Casualties sense. Our junior enlisted ½ghters do not of seventeen disarmed and nonresisting want to know themselves to be murderers. Vietnamese prisoners. As the sergeant was Ethical philosophers such as Bernard leaving the scene he said over his shoul- Williams and Martha Nussbaum have der, “We don’t need no prisoners,” which addressed the situation that these clini- my patient understood to be an instruc- cians/researchers and I report on, under tion to kill them. My patient discovered the somewhat opaque term moral luck. that the other marines were reluctant to Nussbaum has written with great force murder the prisoners. My patient egged on the deteriorating impact of (bad) them on and was the ½rst to open ½re. He moral luck on good character and con- calmly carried the certainty that he per- nection to others, particularly in her sonally was damned (his understanding classic, The Fragility of Goodness: “Annihi- of his religious tradition), but found it lation of [ethical] convention by anoth- impossible to live with the knowledge er’s acts can destroy. . . stable character.”9 that he had led the other marines into Unfortunately, war itself creates an mortal sin. abundance of “moral (bad) luck” that What does leadership malpractice add cannot be completely prevented short to the elements visible in betrayal of of ending the human practice of war what’s right by the self in a high-stakes –which many combat veterans in and situation? Primarily, it destroys the capacity out of uniform long for. A recent inci- for social trust in the mental and social dent, told to me as having happened in worlds of the service member or veteran. Fallujah, involved a Marine scout-sniper I regard this as a kind of wound contam- who was supporting an engaged infantry ination in the mind, preventing healing unit, which had losses to a very effective, and leaking toxins. well-concealed enemy sniper. When the When the capacity for trust is de- Marine sniper ½nally discovered and pos- stroyed, its place is ½lled by the active itively identi½ed the enemy sniper, the expectancy of harm, exploitation, or hu- marine could see that he had a baby miliation. We do not learn one iota more strapped to his front in what we would about the human being before us by hang- call a Snuggli baby carrier. The marine ing the psycho-jargon word paranoid on interpreted this as use of the baby as a this expectancy. “human shield.” Regardless of whether There are three common strategies for that was true, the marine understood the dealing with a situation in which harm, ex- Law of Land Warfare and the Rules of ploitation, and humiliation are foreseen: Engagement permitted him to ½re on the strike ½rst, get away to complete isolation enemy sniper, and he understood his duty from others, develop effective deception and his loyalty to his fellow marines to do and concealment. All three of these strat- so. He did ½re, and saw the round strike. egies are formidable destroyers of a flour- He will live with that for the rest of his ishing human life. They are also barriers to life. service members or veterans ever obtain- One of my former patients, a well-edu- ing or keeping meaningful mental health cated Roman Catholic, opened with the care. In the modern medical setting, this words, “I led them into sin,” when he be- means trusting a clinician on the basis of came willing to tell the clinical team the his or her credentials and institutional posi- most tenaciously painful experience he tion. The credentials and institutional po- had had in Vietnam. He and his three- sition of the original military perpetrator man Marine ½re team were left in charge of moral injury were often impeccable, so

184 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences the situation of being asked to trust some- ment Disorder,” a phenomenon de½ned Jonathan one purely on that basis (“Hello, I’m Dr. and proposed as a diagnostic construct Shay Shay. I’m a Staff Psychiatrist here . . .”) is by Professor Michael Linden and his col- likely to be a traumatic trigger, a new leagues at the Charité in Berlin, has not danger. And if the strike ½rst, run away, (yet) been exposed to the Platonic ½lter of or deceive strategies are not enough of an the apa. obstacle to obtaining and keeping care, The key to clinical success in working the clinician often takes offense at not with such veterans and service members being automatically trusted, and chases is their peers. This is a post-service paral- the veteran away or retaliates. lel to the psycho-protective bene½t in the Many of the veterans I worked with had service of cohesion. Cohesion is military- histories of having done great harms to speak for the concrete face-to-face famil- others, some with heavy criminal careers iarity, mutual love, reliance, obligation, since Vietnam, often carrying prior diag- and visceral sense of being part of each noses such as “sociopath,” “borderline other’s future that arise spontaneously in personality disorder,” or “character disor- a stable, well-trained, and well-led unit der.” The general consensus of American that has been through hard things together. mental health has been that no bad expe- Credentialed mental health profession- rience in adulthood can turn someone als, myself included, have no business with good character into someone with taking center stage in the drama of recov- bad character. This is a broadly and deep- ery from moral injury. We can be good ly held philosophic position, which has stagehands and bit players, but the real a brilliant pedigree going back to Plato, stars are other veterans who have walked through the Stoics, to Kant, and to Freud. in their shoes. Working with veterans car- Plato said that if you make it out of child- rying such injuries is a constant lesson in hood with good breeding (we would say humility. We clinicians earn trust; we “good genes”) and good upbringing, then learn to go naked; we listen with the heart your good character, your virtuous behav- as well as the head. ior will form as hard, unbreakable, and Before ½nishing, a public policy item immovable as rock. American psychiatry relating to moral injury deserves thought- has consistently rejected attempts to diag- ful debate. Morally injured veterans are nostically recognize deformities of per- vulnerable to recruitment by tight crim- sonality or character arising from bad ex- inal, or coercive religious or political perience. The American Psychiatric Asso- groups. This is not a “liberal anti-military” ciation (apa) has rejected two attempts riff on a supposed association between to get such phenomena recognized in the military service and right-wing extrem- nosology: “Persistent Personality Change ism. The historical record is clear: German after Catastrophic Experience” and “Dis- World War I front veterans who were orders of Extreme Stress, Not Otherwise demobilized together and returned togeth- Categorized.” The former is part of the er to the town in which their division was World Health Organization nosology; the raised, generally settled peacefully back latter, under the less opaque label “com- into civilian society, even when their home plex ptsd,” is very widely accepted by towns were now on the other side of new- clinicians who work with morally injured ly drawn national borders. They rarely populations, such as survivors of incest gravitated to the Freikorps, extremist politi- or political torture, despite its lack of of½- cal gangs of both the Left and the Right that cial blessing. “Post-Traumatic Embitter- sometimes functioned as “death squads.”

140 (3) Summer 2011 185 Casualties Instead, an “elective af½nity” for such pel these ½rms to provide mental health groups was discovered by veterans of coverage, I regard that as very imprudent special Reichsheer formations, such as the for us as a nation to rely upon. The Vet Jaegers and the Naval Infantry, which Centers, even more than the va, have the recruited individual volunteers from reg- peer-tradition to offer meaningful sup- ular army units. Members of these elite port to this demographic group, although units were demobilized as individuals and some va facilities have developed signi½- scattered to the winds. cant peer support and community-of- Why raise this historical curiosity here? experience based programming. Because we have a sociologically analo- To conclude, I want to dispute the habit- gous situation with repatriated “trigger- ual mind-body distinction that I myself puller” contractors from the current the- implicitly made early in this essay by dis- aters of war, who have neither home sta- tinguishing physical from psychologi- tion to return to nor military unit associ- cal injuries. This distinction is often use- ation nor clear-cut va eligibility for health ful, but at its root, incoherent. “The body care and disability pension bene½ts. The keeps the score,” as traumatologist Bessel fact that many, or most, have prior mili- van der Kolk has so resonantly said. The tary service will prove a most capricious body codes moral injury as physical attack entitlement to call upon. The essay by and reacts with the same massive mobi- Deborah Avant and Renée de Nevers in lization. If you doubt that, try the follow- this issue gives an up-to-date overall pic- ing very unpleasant thought-experiment: ture of military contractors in Iraq and Imagine, as vividly as you can, a situation Afghanistan, although the number carry- that applies to your life circumstances ing and using ½rearms remains very hard that ½ts my de½nition of moral injury: a to come by. betrayal of what’s right, by someone with Who will offer social support and men- legitimate authority, in a situation with tal health services to trigger-puller con- high stakes to you. I guarantee that your tractor veterans? I am not saying that I heart rate and guts will respond. We are know that the Weimar Republic would just one critter: brain/body, mind, social still exist today, with all that implies about actor, and culture inhabitant at every in- a different course to history, if Germany stant. None of these has ontological pri- had had Vet Centers and va Mental Health ority. Clinics. But historians generally agree that the Freikorps contributed to the weakening of the new German political fabric in the immediate aftermath of World War I. Obviously, not all psychologically and morally injured trigger-puller military contractors will ask for help. But as a matter of public policy, it will be a very good investment to make them eligible to receive it, without a lot of hoops to jump through. This is not a handout to the contracting ½rms, who might be supposed to be obligated to provide medical bene½ts to injured former employees. Whether or not current law can be construed to com-

186 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences endnotes Jonathan Shay 1 In addition to my experience working as a psychiatrist for veterans, I have served in various capacities for the U.S. military, including Commandant of the Marine Corps Trust Study (1999–2000); Chair of Ethics, Leadership, and Personnel Policy in the Of½ce of the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (2004–2005); and 2009 Omar Bradley Chair of Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College (2010). I have also worked with Canadian Forces, U.K. Royal Marines, U.K. Royal Navy, Bundeswehr, other nato, and Israel Defense Force personnel. 2 The Textbook of Military Medicine is a vast multivolume, periodically updated work published by the Army Surgeon General. I commend the reader to the whole U.S. Army Medical Department Borden Institute website, http://www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/, where the following are available in their entirety as free downloads: all the massive current volumes of the Textbook of Military Medicine; various monographs, such as Water Requirements and Sol- dier Hydration and War Surgery in Afghanistan and Iraq, A Series of Cases, 2003–2007; and Emer- gency War Surgery, 3rd rev. ed. (2004). 3 The data in this paragraph were current as of January 5, 2008. The number wounded in action (that is, by enemy action) in Operation Iraqi Freedom (oif) and Operation Endur- ing Freedom (oef) was 9,801. This number represents only those injured severely enough to require medical air transport out of theater, which I take as a proxy for the severity of injury. (The number is 2.3 times higher when taking into account those wounded by hostile action, but whose wounds could be treated within theater without evacuation. However, this latter proportion applies only to oif; the “more austere” medical facilities of oef have meant that the wounded there are, proportionally, evacuated more frequently.) Adding roughly an equal number of nonhostile injuries severe enough to require medical air transport brings the number of those injured in oif and oef, as of January 5, 2008, to a combined total of 19,522. Adding “diseases/other medical” requiring medical air transport roughly doubles the combined total, as of January 5, 2008, from oif and oef to 46,751 (that is, the total of all who have been medically air transported out of theater for medical/surgical reasons). Lest the reader speculate that the number of “diseases/other medical” has been inflated by mental health evacuations, note two facts: First, current military medical doctrine calls for treating combat stress reactions as close as possible to the service member’s unit, using brief and simple interventions such as “Three Hots and a Cot”: that is, physiological replenish- ment of food and water (three hots) and sleep (the cot). The doctrine discourages evacuation from theater because evacuation is believed to freeze the psychological injury in place, at a time when it is still reversible. This view has some empirical foundation. Second, a Jan- uary 30, 2005, report from mhat ii (oif-11 Mental Health Advisory Team) estimated that all mental health diagnoses together accounted for 6 percent of evacuations, and of these 11.7 percent were Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (ptsd) and Acute Stress Disorder (asd), narrowly and strictly diagnosed. 46,751 x 0.06 x 0.117 = 499. A narrow de½nition of ptsd used by the Department of Defense Task Force on Mental Health produced an estimate that 10 percent of those deployed in oif and oef had ptsd; see Department of Defense Task Force on Mental Health, An Achievable Vision: Report of the Department of Defense Task Force on Mental Health (Falls Church, Va.: Defense Health Board, 2007). Using the Dole-Shalala Commission’s round number of 1.5 million of service members deployed (the number is now larger), this yielded 150,000 with narrow ptsd. The broad de½nition, encompassing all signi½cant psychological injuries, produced an estimate by the dod Task Force on Men- tal Health of 38 percent, or 570,000. If the above number of those evacuated for “diseases/other medical” is inflated at all, it is more likely that it is from the policy of evacuating service members for diagnosis and treatment of conditions for which no appropriate specialist or sub-specialist had been deployed in the theater. 4 Jonathan Shay, Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming (New York: Scribner, 2002), 240.

140 (3) Summer 2011 187 Casualties 5 Within military circles, the tag “toxic leadership” is commonly used. 6 I still get goose bumps when I recall that during the break at a Commanders’ Conference at the 101st Airborne, where I spoke, several battalion commanders came up to me and told me that they had required their troopers to read my book Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (New York: Atheneum, 1994) prior to deployment, and that they could overhear admonishments among them, “Don’t betray what’s right!” 7 Rivers of ink have been spilled on the Of½cer Personnel Management System and related practices and culture. My most important teachers have been Faris Kirkland, Carl Bernard, Bruce Gudmundsson, Donald Vandergriff, Franklin “Chuck” Spinney, James N. Mattis, Donn Starry, Walter Ulmer, Richard Trefry, Greg Pickell, John Tillson, Dan Moore, Chet Rich- ards, Mick Trainor, Chris Yunker, and John Poole. 8 Brett T. Litz, Nathan Stein, Eileen Delaney, Leslie Lebowitz, William P. Nash, Caroline Silva, and Shira Maguen, “Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy,” Clinical Psychology Review 29 (8) (December 2009): 695–706. 9 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philoso- phy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 417.

188 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences Chair of the Board & Trust Louis W. Cabot President Leslie Cohen Berlowitz Treasurer John S. Reed Secretary Jerrold Meinwald Editor Steven Marcus Cochair of the Council Gerald Early Cochair of the Council Neal Lane Vice Chair, Midwest John Katzenellenbogen Vice Chair, West Jesse H. Choper

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