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Clearance of Depleted Uranium (DU) Hazards Technical notes for mine action Technical Note 09.30/ 02 Version 3.0 TNMA 1st February 2015 Clearance of Depleted Uranium (DU) hazards i Technical Note 09.30-02/15 Version 3.0 (1st February 2015) Warning This document is distributed for use by the mine action community, review and comment. Although in a similar format to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) it is not part of the IMAS Series. It is subject to change without notice and may not be referred to as an International Mine Action Standard. Recipients of this document are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patent rights of which they are aware and to provide supporting documentation. Comments should be sent to [email protected] with a copy to [email protected]. The content of this document has been drawn from open source information and has been technically validated as far as reasonably possible. Users should be aware of this limitation when utilising the information contained within this document. They should always remember that this is only an advisory document: it is not an authoritative directive. ii Technical Note 09.30-02/15 Version 3.0 (1st February 2015) Contents Contents ........................................................................................................................................ iii Foreword ....................................................................................................................................... iv Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 1 Clearance of depleted uranium (DU) hazards ............................................................................... 2 5. Reasons for DU hazard clearance ....................................................................................... 3 6. The DU threat ...................................................................................................................... 3 6.1 Physical and chemical properties of uranium and DU ......................................................... 3 6.2 Advice and international responsibilities .............................................................................. 4 6.3 DU ammunition .................................................................................................................... 5 6.4 Identification of DU fragments ............................................................................................. 6 7. Hazards and risk reduction .................................................................................................. 6 7.1 Overview of exposure pathways and risks .......................................................................... 6 7.2 External risks - radiation dose rate ..................................................................................... 7 7.3 Internal risks - chemical toxicity and radiation ..................................................................... 7 7.4 Contamination types and exposure pathways for DU dust .................................................. 8 7.5 Risk reduction – external risks ............................................................................................. 8 7.6 Risk reduction – internal risks .............................................................................................. 8 7.7 Personal protective equipment (PPE) .................................................................................. 8 7.8 Risk reduction procedures ................................................................................................... 9 8. Working in areas potentially contaminated with DU ............................................................ 9 8.1 Personal protection .............................................................................................................. 9 8.2 Radiation detection equipment .......................................................................................... 10 8.3 Personal dosimetry and health checks .............................................................................. 11 9. Demining and EOD work in areas potentially contaminated with DU ................................ 11 9.1 In-situ detonation ............................................................................................................... 11 9.2 Community liaison .............................................................................................................. 12 10. DU clearance methodology ............................................................................................... 12 10.1 Detection of DU contamination .......................................................................................... 12 10.2 Collection ........................................................................................................................... 12 10.3 Principles of decontamination ............................................................................................ 13 10.4 Decontamination procedure ............................................................................................... 13 11. Safety brief………………………………………………………………………………………..14 12. Responsibilities .................................................................................................................. 15 Annex A ........................................................................................................................................ 17 Annex C........................................................................................................................................ 18 Amendment record ....................................................................................................................... 24 iii Technical Note 09.30-02/15 Version 3.0 (1st February 2015) Foreword Management practices and operational procedures for humanitarian mine action are constantly evolving. Improvements are made, and changes are required, to enhance safety and productivity. Changes may come from the introduction of new technology, in response to a new mine, UXO or ERW threat, or from field experience and lessons learned in other mine action projects and programmes. This experience and lessons learned should be shared in a timely manner. Technical Notes provide a forum to share experience and lessons learned by collecting, collating and publishing technical information on important, topical themes, particularly those relating to safety and productivity. Technical Notes complement the broader issues and principles addressed in International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Technical Notes are not formally staffed prior to publication. They draw on practical experience and publicly available information. Over time, some Technical Notes may be 'promoted' to become full IMAS standards, while others may be withdrawn if no longer relevant or if superseded by more up-to- date information. Technical Notes are neither legal documents nor IMAS. There is no legal requirement to accept the advice provided in a Technical Note. They are purely advisory and are designed solely to supplement technical knowledge or to provide further guidance on the application of IMAS. Technical Notes are compiled by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) at the request of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in support of the international mine action community. They are published on the James Madison University (JMU) website (http://www.hdic.jmu.edu/) and the GICHD website (http://www.gichd.ch/). iv Technical Note 09.30-02/15 Version 3.0 (1st February 2015) Introduction Since depleted uranium (DU) first came to public attention, there has been a lot of interest in the potential hazards presented by DU contamination in post-conflict environments. Some material online and in the media about the possible risks to health from DU has been speculative and not supported by the existing scientific knowledge of the real health hazards posed by DU. This Technical Note has been written, as an advisory document, to remind mine action managers and field staff of all the potential hazards of DU, and to provide guidance on the establishment of safe operating environments and procedures. This updated version includes more information on the different rounds which contain DU as well as drawing on work by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) undertaken since the technical note was originally published in 2002 The DU clearance tasks should only be undertaken by appropriately qualified EOD personnel or other qualified staff; they are not a task for basic deminers or other field staff. 1 Technical Note 09.30-02/15 Version 3.0 (1st February 2015) Clearance of depleted uranium (DU) hazards 1. Scope This Technical Note establishes principles and provides guidance on the clearance of depleted uranium (DU) hazards encountered during demining operations in a permissive post-conflict environment. 2. References A list of normative references is given in Annex A. Normative references are important documents to which reference is made in this Technical Note and which form part of the provisions of this Technical Note. 3. Terms and definitions A list of terms and definitions used in this Technical Note is given in Annex B. In the Technical Notes series, the words 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance. This use is consistent with the language used in International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)
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