Clearance of Depleted Uranium (DU) Hazards

Technical notes for mine action

Technical Note 09.30/ 02

Version 3.0 1^stFebruary 2015

TNMA

Clearance of Depleted Uranium (DU) hazards

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Technical Note 09.30-02/15
Version 3.0

(1^stFebruary 2015)

Warning

This document is distributed for use by the mine action community, review and comment. Although in a similar format to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) it is not part of the IMAS Series. It is subject to change without notice and may not be referred to as an International Mine Action Standard.

Recipients of this document are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patent rights of which they are aware and to provide supporting documentation. Comments should be sent to [email protected] with a copy to [email protected].

The content of this document has been drawn from open source information and has been technically validated as far as reasonably possible. Users should be aware of this limitation when utilising the information contained within this document. They should always remember

that this is only an advisory document: it is not an authoritative directive.

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Contents

8.

Working in areas potentially contaminated with DU ............................................................9

8.1 Personal protectio n ..............................................................................................................9 8.2 Radiation detection equipment ..........................................................................................10 8.3 Personal dosimetry and health check s ..............................................................................11

9.

Demining and EOD work in areas potentially contaminated with DU................................11

11. Safety brief………………………………………………………………………………………..14

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Foreword

Management practices and operational procedures for humanitarian mine action are constantly evolving. Improvements are made, and changes are required, to enhance safety and productivity. Changes may come from the introduction of new technology, in response to a new mine, UXO or ERW threat, or from field experience and lessons learned in other mine action projects and programmes. This experience and lessons learned should be shared in a timely manner.

Technical Notes provide a forum to share experience and lessons learned by collecting, collating and publishing technical information on important, topical themes, particularly those relating to safety and productivity. Technical Notes complement the broader issues and principles addressed in International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

Technical Notes are not formally staffed prior to publication. They draw on practical experience and publicly available information. Over time, some Technical Notes may be 'promoted' to become full IMAS standards, while others may be withdrawn if no longer relevant or if superseded by more up-todate information.

Technical Notes are neither legal documents nor IMAS. There is no legal requirement to accept the advice provided in a Technical Note. They are purely advisory and are designed solely to supplement technical knowledge or to provide further guidance on the application of IMAS.

Technical Notes are compiled by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) at the request of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in support of the international mine action community. They are published on the James Madison University (JMU) website (http://www.hdic.jmu.edu/) and the GICHD website (http://www.gichd.ch/).

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Introduction

Since depleted uranium (DU) first came to public attention, there has been a lot of interest in the potential hazards presented by DU contamination in post-conflict environments. Some material online and in the media about the possible risks to health from DU has been speculative and not supported by the existing scientific knowledge of the real health hazards posed by DU.

This Technical Note has been written, as an advisory document, to remind mine action managers and field staff of all the potential hazards of DU, and to provide guidance on the establishment of safe operating environments and procedures. This updated version includes more information on the different rounds which contain DU as well as drawing on work by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) undertaken since the technical note was originally published in 2002

The DU clearance tasks should only be undertaken by appropriately qualified EOD personnel or other qualified staff; they are not a task for basic deminers or other field staff.

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Clearance of depleted uranium (DU) hazards

1.

Scope

This Technical Note establishes principles and provides guidance on the clearance of depleted uranium (DU) hazards encountered during demining operations in a permissive post-conflict environment.

2.

References

A list of normative references is given in Annex A. Normative references are important documents to which reference is made in this Technical Note and which form part of the provisions of this Technical Note.

3.

Terms and definitions

A list of terms and definitions used in this Technical Note is given in Annex B. In the Technical Notes series, the words 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance. This use is consistent with the language used in International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and guides.

a)

b)

4.

'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications. 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.

Background

The primary use of DU in ammunition is as a penetrator material in armour-piercing rounds. The development of DU ammunition began in the 1970s, and the first confirmed use in conflict was during the1991 Gulf War.

Platforms firing DU ammunition can be found in ground, air and sea forces, and although it was developed for use against armoured targets, the use of DU ammunition against non-armoured targets has also been documented. Legacy contamination from the use of DU ammunition may require clearance by demining organisations operating in places where they have been used. At present these are known to include Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kuwait, Kosovo, Iraq, Montenegro and Serbia.

Decontamination work has been undertaken in some affected states, but residual contamination will remain at strike sites in the above territories. The undocumented use of DU ammunition may also have occurred in other conflicts, and may also occur in future conflicts.

Ammunition including DU is thought to be in the arsenal of around 20 countries worldwide, but is only known to be produced by six countries: China, France, Russia, Pakistan, the UK and US. A full list of DU rounds, states known to possess DU munitions and conflicts where they have been used can be found in Annex C. DU is known to have been used in the following types of ammunition:

a)

Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) tank and armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) ammunition in calibres including 25mm,105mm, 115mm,120mm and 125mm;

b)

20mm cannon rounds for the U.S. Navy's Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), commonly

referred to as "Phalanx";

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c)

Cannon rounds, both 25mm and 30mm cannon rounds, for U.S. ground attack aircraft,

including the A-10 "Warthog" and the AV-8B "Harrier";

d) e) f)
At least one Russian 125mm High Explosive Anti-Tank Fin Stabilised (HEAT-FS) round; Some variants of a Russian infrared guided air to air missile; and US-made M86 and Area Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM) anti-personnel mines.
It should be emphasised that in many cases the DU element of the munition is a sub-calibre long rod penetrator, so even intact pieces of DU encountered in the field will have a smaller diameter than the calibre size. The calibre size refers to the complete round prior to firing.

DU is also used as a component in the armour fitted to some US tanks. Modern tank armour is typically comprised of a number of layers of different materials and DU is known to be used as one layer in the armour of US M1 Abrams tanks manufactured after 1988. It is not known if other nations have also included DU in their tank armour. Sites where tanks with DU armour have been damaged should be treated in the same way as sites struck with DU munitions.

5.

Reasons for DU hazard clearance

There are numerous reasons why the clearance of DU hazards may be desirable in a post-conflict setting. These include:

a) b) c) d) e) f) to reduce risks to human health; to allow destruction of unserviceable or unstable ammunition; to safeguard the environment; to permit environmental clearance of the area; to allow EOD clearance of armoured fighting vehicles (AFV); and to provide reassurance to local people that risks from contamination have been minimised.

6.

The DU threat

6.1

Physical and chemical properties of uranium and DU

Natural uranium is a material of low radioactivity, which can be handled, worked and stored with simple safety precautions. When enriched uranium is manufactured from natural uranium, a residue of DU is left,¹which is less radioactive than the initial uranium; and is chemically toxic.

Natural uranium exists as three isotopes with different half-lives and different levels of radioactivity in the following proportions:

¹For more details, see http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/nuclear-fuel-cycle/uranium-resources/uranium-and-depleted-uranium/

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ISOTOPE

²³⁸U

ABUNDANCE RADIOACTIVITY HALF-LIFE

REMARKS

(ATOM %)

(Bq/mg)

(YEARS)

99.200%

12.44

10⁹

The parent of the natural uranium

series.

²³⁵U

0.720% 0.006%

80

10⁸

10⁵
The parent of the natural actinium series.

²³⁴U

2.31x10⁵

A daughter product of ²³⁸

decay.
U
Of the isotopes, ²³⁵U and ²³⁴U are more radioactive and are therefore more useful to the nuclear industry. The standard used by the commercial uranium industry considers uranium containing 0.711 weight% (wt%) of ²³⁵U to be natural uranium. ²³⁵U was chosen for this standard because it is the most relevant isotope for use as fuel in nuclear reactors.

To be sufficiently radioactive to be commercially useful, uranium requires processing to concentrate

the more radioactive isotopes. The process is known as “enrichment”, with the end product being called “enriched uranium" and containing more than 8.0wt% of ²³⁵U. The remaining uranium is DU,

because it is depleted in ²³⁵U compared to natural uranium. Enrichment is usually carried out on uranium which has first been converted to a gas. DU used in weapons has to be converted back into a solid metallic form and is usually alloyed with a small quantity of other metals. DU in munitions is typically 0.75% titanium.

Not all countries that produce DU ammunition have access to metallurgical facilities that can undertake this kind of work, and ammunition produced by France and the UK use DU metal sourced from the US. Laboratory analysis of material from UK and US- produced DU weapons has shown a ²³⁵U content of 0.2wt% or less². This analysis has also shown that DU material from US stocks contains small amounts of other radioactive elements, because it contains reprocessed uranium from nuclear reactors. Much less is known about the composition of DU used in the munitions produced by other countries, and it may not conform to the above description.

Historically DU metal has also been used as ballast or counterbalances in ships and aircraft and, while it is no longer widely used for this purpose, vehicles containing DU counterweights will remain in service for some time. DU is also used as radiation shielding and in non-nuclear civil applications requiring high-density material.

DU is comprised almost entirely of the isotope ²³⁸U; it is initially 60% as radioactive as natural uranium but increases in radioactivity as its ages. DU behaves chemically and physically in the same way as natural uranium. Nevertheless DU metal is a far more concentrated form of uranium than exists in nature.

The uranium industry has been operating for more than 50 years and the experience gained from handling uranium in its raw, enriched and depleted state over this period provides the basis for recommendations that reduce the potential hazards of handling and using DU to a minimum.

6.2

Advice and international responsibilities

Advice on radiation safety and on the disposal of radioactive waste can be obtained from either:
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Vienna International Centre

²McLaughlin et al., ‘Actinide Analysis of a Depleted Uranium Penetrator from a 1999 Target Site in Southern Serbia’.

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PO Box 100 1400 Vienna, Austria

Tel: (+43) (1) 2600-0

Fax: (+43) (1) 2600-7

E-Mail: [email protected] http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/features/du/du_qaa.shtml