Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland – Second World War Switzerland and Gold Transactions in the Second World War Interim Report This version has been replaced by the revised and completed version: Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz – Zweiter Weltkrieg: Die Schweiz und die Goldtransaktionen im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Zürich 2002 (Veröffentlichungen der Unabhängigen Expertenkommission Schweiz – Zweiter Weltkrieg, vol. 16). Order: Chronos Verlag (www.chronos-verlag.ch) Edited by Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland – Second World War P.O. Box 259 3000 Bern 6, Switzerland Fax ++41-31-325 11 75 ISBN 3-908661-00-5 Internet www.uek.ch Original version in German Distributed by EDMZ, 3000 Bern Art.-Nr. 201.280 eng 6.98 3000 41249 Switzerland and Gold Transactions in the Second World War Interim Report Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland – Second World War Members of the Commission/Overall Responsibility Jean-François Bergier, Chairman Sybil Milton, Vice-Chairman Joseph Voyame, Vice-Chairman Wladyslaw Bartoszewski Georg Kreis Saul Friedländer Jacques Picard, Research Director Harold James, Primary Author Jakob Tanner, Primary Author General Secretariat Linus von Castelmur Coordination/Editorial Team Benedikt Hauser, Project Coordinator Jan Baumann Stefan Karlen Martin Meier Marc Perrenoud Research Assistants Petra Barthelmess, Geneviève Billeter, Pablo Crivelli, Alex Fischer, Michèle Fleury, James B. Gillespie III, Christian Horn, Ernest H. Latham III, Bertrand Perz, Hans Safrian, Thomas Sandkühler, Hannah E. Trooboff, Jan Zielinski Secretariat / Production Estelle Blanc, Regina Deplazes, Armelle Godichet Acknowledgements The Independent Commission of Experts: Switzerland – Second World War received assistance from many quarters in compiling this interim report. Thanks are due in particular to the following persons, companies, and associations for their cooperation and valuable advice and suggestions. Professor William Z. Slany, US Department of State, Washington, DC; Greg Bradsher, US National Archives, College Park, M.D.; Gill Bennett, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London; Vladimir Nikolaevich Kuzelenkov, Director of the «Centre for the Preservation of Historical-Documentary Collections» («Special Archive»), Moscow; Minister Vladimir P. Kozlov, Director of the Ross Archives, Moscow; Professor Dieter Lindenlaub, Head of the Archives of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt; Maria Keipert, Political Archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Bonn; Krystyna Oleksy, State Memorial Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau, Oswiecim; Professor Christoph Graf, Daniel Bourgeois, and other staff members at the Swiss Federal Archives, Bern; Professor Klaus Urner, Historical Institute, Archive for Contemporary History, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich; Jean-Pierre Roth, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, Vincent Crettol and Patrick Halbeisen, Swiss National Bank, Bern/Zürich; Piet Clement, Bank for International Settlements, Basel; Professor Willi Boelcke, Stuttgart; Hersch Fischler, Düsseldorf; Credit Suisse Group, Zürich; Swiss Bankers Association, Basel Swiss Bank Corporation, Basel; Union Bank of Switzerland, Zürich; Swiss Life, Zürich; Swiss Re-Insurance, Zürich; Swiss Insurance Association, Zürich; Zurich Group, Zürich; BMP Translations AG, Basel; Gary Fliszar, Fribourg; Mary Louise Mettler, Basel (Translations into English); Gary Fliszar, Fribourg (Proofreading). July 1998 Jean-François Bergier Interim Report on GoldI Preface Preface Gold played an essential role in the financial transactions carried out during the Second World War. It is a metal that can assume a multitude of forms: bar, coins, pieces of jewelry. It can be smelted and resmelted, disguising its origin. It was also a universally accepted means of inter- bank payment, a form of money easily exchanged for more liquid currencies, and thus very valuable to the belligerent states. Since the autumn of 1996, gold has again taken center stage, this time in international discussions concerning the responsibility borne by both countries and individuals for their activities during World War II: gold has become emotionally and symbolically linked to the suffering of the victims of Nazism. Switzerland’s participation in the war-time gold trade − the participation of its financial center as the hub of gold transactions – has become a focus of debate. It is now imperative that Switzerland’s complex and sometimes controversial activities be brought out into the open. The Independent Commission of Experts: Switzerland – Second World War, set up in December 1996 with the mission of carrying out an in-depth investigation of the conduct of Switzerland and of its financial center, has chosen to treat the gold trade issue as a priority, and to dedicate to this topic its first interim report. The convocation of the International Conference on Nazi Gold, held in London from December 2 to 4, 1997, provided us with a special impetus. Despite all our efforts, we were unable to complete this report in time for that event. Our research work on a number of archival sources had not progressed sufficiently, and it was our desire to take advantage of the questions as well as the information contributed at the conference by the delegates coming from some forty countries and organizations. We therefore limited ourselves to submitting a working document which proposed a broadly applicable definition for the various categories of Nazi gold as a function of its origin, be it legal or criminal, and to providing a global, statistical balance sheet (in a revised and enhanced form, this same document constitutes Chapter I of the present report). Other reasons also justify the priority that the Commission has given to gold. The transactions carried out with this precious metal relate to and elucidate a number of other aspects of our research: Switzerland’s commercial and financial relations with the belligerent powers and with the other neutral countries; the use put to Swiss francs by Switzerland’s trading partners; the role played by the commercial banks and, to a certain degree, that of the insurance companies in the war-time economy; and the manufacture of articles destined for export. In a more indirect manner, the examination of gold policy makes it possible to observe the behavior of both the economic and political key players of the time. It illustrates the tensions between the Interim Report on GoldII Preface technocrat whose primary concern was to execute the duties inherent in his position, and the politician responsible for the country’s foreign security and its domestic tranquillity. Conflicts of interest and power clashes centered around gold came to a head in Switzerland itself. For these reasons, the Commission deems the gold issue to be an appropriate starting point for the entire spectrum of its research topics. Though the Swiss were largely spared the ravages of the war on their lives and property, they did suffer many of its evil effects. They experienced the anxiety of a country besieged by the Axis powers, which remained threatening even after the final outcome of the war had become apparent. The Swiss lived through the war with all of the personal and civil privations which it imposed on their lives. During those years, they also shared an ever-vivid collective memory of the painful experiences of the past, particularly of the First World War and of the 1930’s. Without further insistence on this point, it is essential to place the transactions which we are attempting to reconstitute into this longer-term historical context. Following a general analysis of Switzerland’s war-time gold transactions, the report accords a preferential place to the gold shipments of the German Reichsbank to the Swiss National Bank (Chapter II). This is due not only to the fact that these shipments were large and therefore important, but because they give rise to the most delicate questions. What were the motives of the Swiss National Bank in continuing its purchases until the very end of the war? What interests was it taking into consideration in doing so? Did the National Bank act solely to carry out monetary policy, or out of larger economic, political, or even personal concerns? Did those involved in the transactions earn a profit? What did they really know about the doubtful origin of a large part of the gold they purchased, and did they inform the government in time? At the same time, the Swiss National Bank also bought gold from the Allies, albeit in a chronological context that renders any comparison misleading (Chapter III). The origin of this gold causes no problems. However, other questions emerge. In 1941, Swiss gold in the United States was frozen and thereby rendered almost useless. What concerns or coercion instigated purchases from the Allies after this point? What were the respective roles of the Swiss National Bank, the Confederation, and the private sector in dealing with Allied financial policy-makers? How did the Allies use Swiss currency obtained through sales of gold? Gold can be used for any and everything. It is not a prerogative only of the central banks; and in Switzerland, commercial banks also performed operations with gold (Chapter IV). On the whole, one-eighth of the German shipments was meant for them. How was this gold used? After 1942, their latitude for maneuver was drastically diminished: regular transactions were thereafter the sole domain of the Swiss National Bank. The commercial banks consequently Interim Report