May - June 2007 Volume 67, Number 3

SITREPSITREPA PUBLICATION OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MILITARY I NSTITUTE

GENDER INTEGRATION IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

PTE. LEONA CHAISSON, BASE IMAGING, CFB ESQUIMALT, CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA Leading Seaman Sonya INSIDE THIS ISSUE Johannesen and Leading Seaman Carole Dubois on The Long Road to Gender Integration in the Canadian Armed Forces ...... 3 board HMCS Regina off Government Procurement is Complex ...... 8 Shanghai. The Human Touch: A Canadian Liaison and Observation Team in Bosnia ...... 10 The King’s Shilling: The British Campaigns in Malaya and Borneo ...... 12 Unconventional Approaches to Diplomatic Theory ...... 15 From the Editor’s Desk

he mission in Afghanistan continues to attract the nation’s attention. The spring Taliban offensive predicted by the me- Tdia has not materialized. Injury and loss of life among our troops continues to result from IED and suicide bomber, not from an ROYAL CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTE increase in Taliban operations. The situation in Afghanistan is im- FOUNDED 1890 proving, yet if one listens to the public critics, one would think the PATRON mission is failing and that Canadian soldiers are somehow complicit Her Excellency The Right Honourable in the alleged mistreatment of Taliban detainees. Michaëlle Jean, CC, CMM, COM, CD Our challenge as discerning consumers of knowledge and information, when trying The Governor General of Canada to probe the murky waters of policy and the ‘opinions of publics’, is to somehow get a VICE PATRONS glimpse of reality. It seems the opposition parties cannot resist the temptation to play poli- The Honourable James K. Bartleman, OOnt tics with Afghanistan. The apparent buck-passing between government departments that The Lieutenant Governor of Ontario share the dossier concerning detainees is not an example of great governance and reflects The Honourable Dalton McGuinty, MPP The Premier of Ontario poorly on the accountability of our federal bureaucracy. General R. J. Hillier, CMM, MSC, CD The lead agency dealing with the Afghanistan file clearly must be the Department of The Chief of Defence Staff His Worship David Miller Foreign Affairs. But DFAIT has taken a back seat to DND. In January the PM named David The Mayor of Toronto Mulroney, an Associate Deputy Minister in Foreign Affairs and the PM’s foreign and de- fence policy adviser, to co-ordinate the all-of-government approach to our Afghanistan OFFICERS & DIRECTORS efforts. However Mulroney has been working only part-time on what is arguably the most LCol (ret’d) J. J. Dorfman, OMM, CD – President Maj Diane M. Kruger,CD – Vice President sensitive issue facing Canada and the present government. Canada deserves better. Lt(N) (ret’d) James P. McReynolds – Secretary The only real ‘escalation’ in the Afghanistan mission appears to be on the political Mr. John J. Ball – Treasurer LCol (ret’d) James Breithaupt, KStJ, CD, QC – Director stage here at home, aided and abetted by uninformed or opinionated media coverage. Those LCol (ret’d) Peter W. Hunter, CD – Director who call for less combat and more reconstruction fail to recognize that most of our recent HCapt(N) Chris Korwin-Kuczynski – Director Michael Wm. Leahy, Ph.D – Director casualties have been sustained by the Provincial Reconstruction Team. Maj (ret’d) David Mezzabotta, CD – Director Recognizing the continuing need for the tank, the welcome announcement to upgrade LCol (ret’d) John A. Selkirk, CD – Director our tank fleet with the Leopard 2A4, has resulted in your ‘Black Hat’ Editor searching for LCol (ret’d) Michael A. Stevenson, CD – Director another “windmill to attack!” EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND EDITOR

Since our last issue, the Defence Studies Committee hosted the Honourable Bob Rae Col (ret’d) Chris Corrigan, CD, MA to a speaker’s luncheon where he shared his views on “Canada’s Military Role Abroad for the 21st Century.” From the Institute’s perspective it was important that a senior Canadian PAST PRESIDENT political actor share with us his views on this important subject. HLCol Matthew Gaasenbeek III

In this issue, Lieutenant-Colonel Jenny Newton explores the long-needed and wel- HONORARIES comed gender integration of the military caused by the evolution in human rights legisla- Col (ret’d) John Clarry, MBE, ED, CD, QC tion and societal change, while Dr. Craig Stone, one of Canada’s leading academics in the Honorary President field of defence procurement, presents a critical status report on the complex nature of LCol (ret’d) Bruce W. Savage, CD Honorary Curator procurement and the lack of a national defence industrial strategy. Dr. Desmond Morton, OC Lieutenant Gabriel Granatstein takes us back to Bosnia with an update on Canada’s Honorary Historian Mr. Arthur Manvell ongoing contribution to the European Union Force mission. Sunil Ram takes a historical Honorary Librarian look at what the British called “Brushfire Wars.” Fought throughout the Imperial period of Chaplains Capt The Rev. Mark L. Sargent, CD the western world, these wars involved small armies fighting desperate and bloody engage- The Rev Michael Bechard ments around the globe. Garrett Jones, a senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research General Manager Institute, provides a refreshing perspective on diplomatic theory and practice through great- Mr. Michael T. Jones power glasses. Director of Communications/Assistant Editor The Defence Studies Committee is always receptive to new members. If you wish to Mr. Eric S. Morse pursue defence and security issues in greater depth, consider joining us. Contributing Editor Prof. Sunil Ram Sincerely, OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

426 University Avenue, Colonel (Ret’d) Chris Corrigan Toronto, Ontario, M5G 1S9 Editor and Chair Defence Studies Committee 416-597-0286/1-800-585-1072 Fax: 416-597-6919 Editorial E-Mail: [email protected] Copyright © 2006 RCMI ISSN 0316-5620 SITREP may be fully reproduced in whole or in part for academic research or Website: www.rcmi.org institutional purposes, provided that the author’s and the institute’s copyright is acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute or its members.

2 SITREP THE LONG ROAD TO GENDER INTEGRATION IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES by LCol Jenny Newton, CD

s a female member of the Canadian Forces Reserves for By 1970, a controlled ceiling of 1500 servicewomen had twenty-six years, I have been directly affected by the been established in the newly unified Canadian Armed Forces Adefence policies surrounding the employment of women and, in the same year, the government had formed a Royal Com- in the Forces. During my service, I have seen barriers denying mission of the Status of Women. One of this commission’s tasks women entry into military colleges and into combat roles, and I was to look at the employment conditions of women in the mili- have seen these same barriers torn down allowing women full tary. By the following year, the Commission had made six sig- access to these educational institutions and to these non-tradi- nificant recommendations in its report governing the employment tional roles. I hypothesize that, until 1989, elitists maintained the of military women. These included: barriers denying Canadian women full access to combat-related units and occupations and that these discriminatory policies were 1. Standardized enrolment criteria [including equal initial eventually removed as a result of the feminist contributions to engagement periods]; Canadian policies. Due to limitations in word length, this article 2. Equal pension benefits for men and women; will cover the historical roles of women between 1970 and 2003. 3. Entry for women into the Canadian Military Colleges; Canadian women have made enormous contributions to the 4. Opening of all trades and classifications to women; Canadian Forces over the last eighty-five years. Not only have 5. Termination of practices of prohibiting married women from they won numerous medals and awards as well as recognition, enrolling; and, they have also sacrificed their lives for the nation. What follows 6. Termination of practices of releasing servicewomen on the focuses on the roles and policies, the impact of the Canadian birth of a child. Human Rights Code, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Royal Commission on the Status of Women on the CF policies At a meeting of the Canadian Forces Defence Council, the between 1970-1989, and the gender policies of today. Minister of National Defence accepted most of these recommen- Although Canadian women served valiantly in all three dations, however, with certain caveats. First, women would be forces between 1919 and 1969, they were nevertheless thought eligible for all trades in the CF except those in the combat arms, of as replacements for servicemen or as additional civilian work- in remote areas and at sea. Second, women would not be allowed ers. Their continued employment in the military was repeatedly to enter the Military Colleges, as these colleges produced combat questioned and on numerous occasions, it was even suggested arms officers, but would be entitled to subsidies at other educa- that their service be terminated. It is my contention that external tional institutions. New policies came into effect regarding mari- forces played a critical role in ensuring the continued service of tal and pregnancy status. Women could now enrol if they were Canadian women in the miliary. married or single, with children or without, and could, once em- ployed, have children without the fear of being released. Many 1970-1989 new trades and positions were now opened to women. In 1978, the newly enacted Canadian Human Rights Act During the period 1970 until 1989, the plight of the Cana- stated that males or females could not be discriminated against dian servicewoman improved as a result of external pressures by virtue of their sex in the area of employment, unless there exerted on the military leadership in Ottawa. From the recom- existed a “bona fide” occupational requirement. By April 1978, mendations made by the Royal Commission on the Status of National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) ordered studies to be Women, to the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and immediately conducted by all services, with the focus of finding"" Freedoms, and finally, to a decision made by the Canadian Hu- man Rights Tribunal, the employment of women in the military LCol Jenny Newton, CD, is Commanding Officer 23 Service Battalion and an RCMI went from quota limitations to full integration. Member. She is currently enrolled in the Master of Arts – Defence Management and Policy Program at RMC. This essay is an excerpt from a research paper.

The production of SITREP is made possible in part by the generosity of the Langley Bequest, which is made in honour of Major Arthur Langley and Captain Nursing Sister Kathryn Langley.

May - June 07 3 “bona fide” occupational requirements. Maritime Command was air and sea environments as well at Canadian Forces Station Alert given the following tasks: in the Arctic. The purpose of the trials was to “determine the im- pact of employing mixed groups in various environments, and a. Review all seagoing classifications and trades and where the main criterion against which the trials were to be assessed restrictions to the employment of women are considered es- was the effect of mixed gender groups on operational capabili- sential, document the occupational requirements and col- ties.” lateral reasons in support of such restrictions; Further, the trials were “elaborate, empirical tests devised b. Comment on progress and experience to date in the em- by the CF to provide data, verifiable and quantifiable, on a number ployment of women in the CF; of problems that might or would arise if all military occupations c. Advise if women should continue to be excluded from iso- were opened to women without restrictions of any kind.” Finally, lated posts; the SWINTER trials were “undertaken by the CF not only to docu- d. Assist DGPRD in conducting surveys of servicemen and ment any ‘bona fide’ occupational restrictions which might con- servicewomen to determinetheir opinion on elimination of tinue to exclude women from additional duties but also to pro- present restriction to employment of women in the CF. vide for no unreasonable or precipitous implementation of the requirements of the Canadian Human Rights Act.” Air Command was given a similar list of tasks including Between 1980 and 1984, the naval trials were held on HMCS “determine whether employment of women in combat must be Cormorant, “an unarmed fleet diving support ship.” The results an all or nothing situation and, if not, specification of new areas concluded that “servicewomen appeared to perform effectively which can be open to women.” By early June 1978, less than two the duties assigned them over the four-year trial employment; the months after the initial request, NDHQ, having received all the contributions of men and women were not mutually valued as is services’ studies, submitted a consolidated report concluding that necessary for a complete social integration of male and female servicewomen should continue to be excluded from “combat arms crewmembers; factors such as the differential assignment of sea- and related roles.” Every branch, however, did not support this manship taskings to men and women precluded a completely suc- conclusion. Specifically, BGen J Gibbons of the CF Logistics cessful integration; and, the SBS evaluation did not show cause Branch wrote in his report to NDHQ: for excluding women from continuing to serve aboard HMCS “The results of the present study into the employment of Cormorant.” The land trials took place in Germany with two units, women in the CF have the potential for a far-reaching and long a field ambulance and a support unit, participating. The results term impact in the CF. Under the circumstances, it is regrettable indicated that “servicemen and servicewomen in the two trial units that such an important study could only be allotted such a short did not achieve a satisfactory social integration over the four- time for its completion and analysis...Where concern about women year trial period.” The two unit commanders, however, stated in the forces has been expressed it focuses… on Physical Strength. that the unit operational effectiveness had not been compromised. It is accepted that on the average men are stronger than women Women in the air trials were trained as pilots, air navigators and and this difference presents both current and potential problems engineers in training, search and rescue, and transport units. The where strength and stamina are a major factor in effective job results concluded that a “satisfactory social integration was performance. The importance of this factor varies between achieved at four of the five squadrons with a partial acceptance specialties/trades, but it cannot be ignored. The fact is that peo- of women at the fifth squadron.” Finally, the trials held at CFS ple within any given group must be employable interchangeably; Alert “declared that the mixed gender or integrated workforce and, these points bear upon one important factor of particular and workplace was successful both from the point of view of em- importance to the CF. The enshrinement of equality of opportu- ployees of both sexes and the commander.” nity in law does not automatically mean equality for all without Prior to the publication of the final results of the SWINTER any effort on the part of the individual. If there is to be genuine trials in 1985, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) of Na- equality in the CF then all people - male and female- must be tional Defence, in May 1983, issued a paper entitled The Cana- able to perform the jobs assigned to their classification or trade. dian Forces Personnel Concept. The report stated that “the prin- To have equality, women must be able to do anything and serve ciple of operational effectiveness in time of war or national emer- anywhere that the trade or classification demands. If they are not gency was stated to be the fundamental criterion against which able, or if we restrict them, then women are not as useful to the all personnel policies must be developed and continually as- CF as men. In summary, women have enjoyed reasonable suc- sessed.” Although the SWINTER trials were successful in open- cess within the Logistics Branch; a success which has been earned ing up fourteen new trades for women, there was some valid criti- through their own efforts.” cism as to how the trials had been conducted. Not only were the As a result of this study and other studies, it was decided numbers of female participants low and the situations women faced that the Military Colleges would be opened to women and that a non combat-related, “the largely male staff and operational per- series of controlled trials with women in non-traditional roles sonnel, at middle and upper ranks, participated for the first time would be conducted between 1979-1984. These trials, which were in a novel experiment, for which the past did not always supply a known as the SWINTER trials for Service Women in Non-Tradi- context in which to make ‘military or professional judgments’.” tional Environments and Roles, were to be conducted in the land, 4 SITREP Nevertheless, the trials did provide an impetus for further policy which was hastily set up at NDHQ and manned by senior offic- development. ers, was mandated to: Between December 1981 and September 1985, five sepa- ...determine the effect on CF policies of the Government rate complaints under sections 5, 6 and 10 of the Canadian Hu- response concerning the employment of women, sexual orienta- man Rights Act were laid against the Canadian Armed Forces, tion, mandatory retirement, physical and mental disability and four made by women and one made by a man. Section 5 of the marital status; to examine relevant information (such as SWINTER Act “defines a discriminatory practice in the provision of goods trial reports); and to develop options so as to meet Government and services.” Section 7 “defines the discriminatory practice as policy objectives within requirements of operational effectiveness refusal to employ, to continue to employ or to differentiate ad- and efficiency. versely in relation to any employee.” Finally, section 10 states: The Task Force, which was authorized to use whatever re- ...that it is a discriminatory practice for an employer or em- sources it required, had only six months to complete its mission. ployee organization to establish a policy or practice that deprives In its final report, the Task Force’s recommendations “covered an individual or class of individual of employment opportunities the initiation of new environmental support measures, the open- on a prohibited ground, or to enter into an agreement regarding ing of some male units to mixed-gender units, and the inception all aspects of employment, recruitment, referral, hiring, promo- of further trials, the last to include combat units, such as infantry, tion, training, apprenticeship, that would deprive an individual artillery, armour, field engineers, signals, field intelligence and of employment opportunities. destroyers.” New leadership training and the establishment of a By the end of 1985, all five complaints were joined, as they trials project office were also recommended. were comprised of the same issues: that women were refused entry In June of 1986, one month before the Charter Task Force’s into combat or combat support employment and that “the limita- final report was submitted, the Chief of the Defence Staff issued tion of combat duty risk to men discriminates against them.” The two Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAO) to the regu- CAF, on the other hand, challenged that “the existing practices lar force. CFAO 49-14 provided a general employment policy for and policies are discriminatory but contends that such policies the CF by opening all trades and units to women with the follow- and practices are based on a bona fide occupational required, that ing caveat: “any limitation on eligibility for employment result- is, operational effectiveness, a requirement sanctioned by Sec- ing from the requirement that a member’s participation be able to tion 14 of the Act, which provides a defence against a charge of contribute to operational effectiveness will be confined to the discrimination.” minimum that must be imposed in order to achieve the required In April of 1985, Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and standard of operational effectiveness of the regular forces in gen- Freedoms, which supported the principle of equality between the eral.” CFAO 49-15 was much more specific about its employ- sexes, had a profound impact on the policies of the Canadian ment of women reaffirming its rationalizations for the continued Armed Forces (CAF). The report, Equality For All, which had exclusion of women in certain roles and units. This lengthy order been issued by a Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights, included the following passages: recommended that all trades and occupations be open to women Empirical evidence gained throughout history of warfare in the CAF. The Committee’s recommendation was based on the has proven that the operational effectiveness of an armed force is belief that to exclude women from all trades had unfavourable decisively affected by a combination of human factors. In par- consequences. “...it closed to women many well paid jobs after ticular, members of an armed force whose primary role is the military service, because military training was not available to engagement of the enemy in battle are faced with severe hard- them; it hindered their promotion in the Forces because they lacked ship, degrading living conditions, capture and death. The stresses experience in occupations and units that were combat linked; and encountered in battle drive members of the units involved to their it excluded them from experience and training in leadership.” The physical and psychological limits. The ability to continue to per- arguments, which had been put forth in the past to exclude women form effectively under these extreme conditions requires a high from combat roles (lack of integration, lack of privacy, danger to level of physical and mental strength and stamina. Most impor- the cohesion of units, etc), were dismissed by the Committee and tantly, effectiveness in battle is vitally dependent on a strong bond- certainly did not form a proper basis towards a case for ‘bona ing among the members, which is essential to units’ cohesion and fide’ occupational requirement. In 1986, the government stated, morale. Empirical evidence has shown that human stresses are in its response to another committee report, Toward Equality, that compounded by the added complexities of mixed-gender groups. “the Government is fully committed to expanding the role of Concern that such additional stress would seriously jeopardize women in the Armed Forces and will ensure that women will be operational effectiveness has resulted in every major nation in able to compete for all trades and occupations. The Government the world maintaining limits on mixed-gender composition in their shall vigorously pursue this policy in a manner consistent with armed forces, particularly in units, which are most likely to face the requirement of the Armed Forces to be operationally effec- an enemy directly in battle. Consequently, in order not to jeop- tive in the interests of national security.” ardize the operational effectiveness dictated by the needs of na- The final report by the government had an immediate effect tional security, the composition of some units will remain single- on the leadership of the CAF. By April 1986, a Charter Task Force, gender male... ""

May - June 07 5 The Order continued in this vein, advising that a number of of command any significant deviations in unit performance that occupations would be restricted to men, that lowered cohesion can be attributed to the conversion of units to mixed-gender com- and morale in a unit would result in grave consequences and that position.” Following this report, another administrative order was all these points could influence the outcome of a battle. The an- issued. CFAO 19-38 - Mixed Gender Relationships involving nexes to this Order further outlined the units, occupations and members of the CF, outlined the conduct to be adhered to in order trades women could not participate in and those that they could to maintain “high levels of discipline, cohesion and morale that enrol in, but only in a limited fashion. As a result of all these are essential to operational effectiveness, and which must con- policy changes, over 7,500 additional positions and 12 occupa- tribute to a positive public version of the forces and conform to tions were designated as mixed-gender. the general standard required of all members.” Other policies in- A Canadian Human Rights Tribunal was convened to adju- volving leadership training, minimum physical fitness standards, dicate the complaints laid against the CF and to arbitrate the fol- spousal education and recruiting promotion, were also being de- lowing issues: veloped. By March 1988, the policies surrounding the employ- 1. Should women be permitted to train for and enter into occupa- ment of women in mixed gender units and occupations were out- tions and to perform roles, which are combat related, occupa- lined in three administrative orders: CFAO 49-14-Employment tions and roles now closed the them? Policy, CFAO 49-15-Mixed Gender Employment within the Regu- 2. Would the operational effectiveness of the CF be adversely lar Force, and, CFAO 49-16-Mixed Gender Employment within affected by the introduction of women into such occupations and the Reserve Force. roles? By 1989, the final decision by the Canadian Human Rights 3. Can this assessment appropriately be made by professional Tribunal, involving the five complaints made against the Depart- military judgment? ment of National Defence and CF, was made. During the trial, the Twenty-four days of hearings were held between October CF contended that their discriminatory policies involving the 1986 and August 1988 with the Tribunal decision being made in employment of women were justified “by the needs and mandate 1989. In keeping with the chronological order of events of this of the Forces to maintain a high level of operational effective- section, the final decision will be discussed shortly. ness” and that the “bona fide” occupational requirements clause In 1987, more policy changes affecting the employment of was substantiated. The Tribunal investigated every aspect of the women were made. Early in the year, the Minister of National CF arguments closely and acknowledged all the policy changes Defence announced the implementation of new mixed gender tri- made during the last fifteen years. als, which had been recommended by the Charter Task Force. These changes were made in response to external develop- These trials, known as the CREW trials (Combat Related Em- ments, even pressures, such as the passage of the legislation (Ca- ployment of Women), were to assess the ‘risks’ of employing nadian Human Rights Act and the Charter of Rights and women in all units and occupations now closed to them, with the Freedoms) and to internal personnel needs...In recognition of these exception of submarines. The air force, however, would not par- developments, we have concluded that on the evidence, a bona ticipate in these trials. In July, the Minister of National Defence, fide occupational requirement did exist in respect of combat roles with the agreement of the Chief of Defence Staff, announced that for women prior to June 1986 and the publication of new em- all units and occupations in the air force would now be open to ployment policies set out in CFAO 49-14 and 49-15. women, eliminating the need for any further trials. Major Gen- Although the restrictions to employment for women had eral Morton, the operational air commander, made this recom- been justified due to a lack of adequate data in this area, the situ- mendation to his superior on the belief that the operational effec- ation changed in 1986. Due to the results of the SWINTER trials, tiveness of the air force units would not be compromised as a a case supporting the discriminatory practices of the military could result of the employment of women. The CREW trials, which no longer be sustained. The Tribunal, in finding that the practice were to begin in the fall of 1989, were designed to evaluate the of restricting women from certain roles and units was discrimina- performance of women on a navy destroyer and in army combat tory (with the exception of women serving on submarines), made and combat support units ( infantry, armour, artillery, engineers the following order: and signals). 1. CF CREW trials to continue as preparation for full integra- In June of 1987, the following statement was made in a re- tion; port prepared by personnel from CF Personnel Applied Research 2. Full integration to take place with all due speed; Unit (CFPARU), NDHQ: “The successful integration of women 3. Remove all restrictions from both operational and personnel into previously all-male occupations and units is of significant considerations; importance in the CF. In terms of operational effectiveness, gen- 4. Internal and external monitoring of policy with appropriate der integration has long-term and far reaching relevance both to and immediate modifications; the units concerned and the CF as a whole.” In September, the 5. CF and CHRC devise a mutually acceptable implementation Chief of Defence Staff made the following statement in a report plan so that integration proceeds steadily, regularly and consist- entitled Implementation of Expanded Mixed Gender Employment ently towards the goal of complete integration of women within Policies: “Command Headquarters are to monitor the operational next ten years. effectiveness of their units and report through the normal chain 6 SITREP The years between 1970 and 1989 were very tumultuous groups, commissioned a report, by the Personnel Research Team, years for women in the forces. Military leaders were forced to to look into the situation. In the final report, known as the Davis make amendments to the roles and units women could enrol in Report, several areas were identified as needing action including while vehemently arguing against these changes. There is no “fitness standards, perceptions of double standards and quotas, doubt, however, that without the external forces and pressures equipment facilities, harassment, discrimination and stereotyp- exerted by the various organizations and laws, the CF would never ing, fraternization and interpersonal relationships and progress have allowed women into combat roles and units. monitoring.” With the various recommendations and federal statutes af- 1990-Present fecting the military, a new organization was created to implement these requirements. The Directorate of Equal Opportunity Poli- After the decision by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, cies and Plans (DEOPP) was formed to coordinate the various changes did not happen as quickly as hoped. The military leader- plans designed to meet the equity issues, to provide guidance and ship’s approach to these required changes was often disjointed direction in the implementation of these plans, and to evaluate and unorganized. The following paragraphs will describe the the results. To monitor the military’s progress in the areas of eq- events, which have taken place from the Tribunal decision until uity employment, the Minister of National Defence appointed a today. nine-member Advisory Board on Employment Equity and Gen- In 1990, an advisory board, later known as the Minister’s der Integration. It was hoped that these two organizations would Advisory Board on Gender Integration, was created to monitor provide a clear direction for the implementation of employment the implementation of the order outlined by the Canadian Human policies, a direction that, for the last nine years, had been piece- Rights Tribunal. Full integration into the all-male units and into meal and uncoordinated. the new combat roles would not and could not happen right away. The attitudes of the military leadership have also started to Appropriate candidates would have to be found in suitable num- change. In 1999, General Baril, the Chief of Defence Staff, wrote: bers in order to create critical mass, a concept central to the suc- “The Canadian Forces is unequivocally committed to gender in- cessful integration of women in formerly closed units and trades. tegration and employment equity. Implementing ‘Building Team- Although the recruiting of women progressed slowly, it was se- work in a Diverse CF’ may be one of the hardest and most chal- verely hampered by the budgetary reductions instigated by the lenging tasks undertaken by the CF. I realize that it may touch a Federal Government in 1992. Recruiting levels were cut and tra- service member’s emotions, values and beliefs and will require ditional ‘women’ trades were restricted in favour of channelling some to question and make changes to their behaviour.”1 Mari- them towards the combat-related occupations. time Command, in its report Vision 2010 - The Integrated Navy, In 1994, the military created a nine-point plan they dubbed sees the employment of women in the Navy as fundamental to its MINERVA. The plan, which was to increase the number of women future. Even the policy restricting the employment of women on participants in these new roles, had the following components: submarines is being reviewed with the introduction of the new 1. Reaffirm the commitment by senior leaders regarding employ- Victoria class submarines to the fleet. Today, 7,470 women, ment equity; 10.76% in the Regular Force and 19.21% in the Reserve Force, 2. Gender awareness training; are enrolled in all occupations and employed in all units of the 3. Conduct analyses of trends concerning women; CF, except for submarines. 4. Provide greater geographical stability; The road to full integration for women in the military has 5. Facilitate discharge of family obligations; been a long and difficult one. The journey, however, is not over. 6. Modify recruiting methods; Although the employment policies of the CF allow for full gen- 7. Ensure key position posting available for women, including der integration in all trades, the attitudes of the servicemen still specialist; play an important role in determining the participation of these 8. Encourage monitoring at all levels; women in these non-traditional occupations. It is important to 9. Target certain women in business and other government de- note that Canada was the model by which other NATO countries partments to hold honorary appointments. opened their units and occupations to women. N The impact of the plan was lower than expected. The fol- lowing year, the Federal Government introduced a policy com- The views expressed are those of the author and do not pelling all departments, including the Department of National necessarily reflect the views of the Institute Defence, to review all future policies and legislations with re- or its members. spect to gender issues. In 1996, another federal act impacted on the employment policies of the CF. The Employment Equity Act’s purpose was to achieve equality in the workplace, especially for Notes disadvantaged groups such as women, Aboriginal Peoples, mem- 1 Minister’s Advisory Board on Canadian Forces Gender Integration and Employment bers of visible minorities and persons with disabilities. The army, Equity. 1999 Annual Report. 1999,p.10. in an attempt to increase the number of participants from these

May - June 07 7 GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IS COMPLEX by Dr. Craig Stone

n Friday 19 January 2007, the media reported that the that argue such positions are being unfair to those civilians that delivery of the Strategic Lift Cargo plane was facing de- are charged with working within the government established pro- Olays because Boeing was embroiled in a backroom battle curement process. Ministers, senior public servants and all those with Public Works Minister Michael Fortier over Quebec’s share individuals involved in defence procurement are fully aware what of economic benefits flowing from the $3.4-billion purchase. The the rules and regulations are and they insist that they be followed. apparent basis for the disagreement was a desire by the Minister Significantly, Canada is the only state that has placed itself in a of Public Works to have a larger share of the industrial benefits position to require, by an internal trade agreement with the prov- directed to Quebec. The same media report indicates that the gen- inces, to follow a specific competitive process. That process is eral manager of the Quebec Aerospace Association indicated that being followed. Quebec had 60 percent of Canada’s aerospace market and there- What has really taken place over the last couple of years fore should get 60 percent of the economic benefits. On Friday 2 within the Department of National Defence is a refreshing return February 2007, the Government formally announced that the to a military that indicates operational requirements and does not Boeing Company had been awarded the contract to supply strate- try to mix those military operational requirements with other gov- gic airlift aircraft to the Canadian Forces. The announcement was ernment development objectives. This is not to say that the other made by The Honourable Gordon O’Connor, Minister of National government objectives, such as regional development, are not Defence, together with the Honourable Michael M. Fortier, Minis- important. They are, and will no doubt remain part of the overall ter of Public Works, and the Honourable Maxime Bernier, Minis- process. However, the inclusion of those requirements is the re- ter of Industry. sponsibility of others within the government and not the military. There has been much comment in the news media over the The difficulty is that the defence industry, which has often de- last few months about military procurement, and most of it is manded that the military reduce their overly detailed specifica- either one-sided, not quite the whole story, or just plain wrong. tions to some broad performance requirements, are not happy that There are three themes to the stories. First, the military and the they cannot meet the military’s broad performance requirements government have been accused of sole sourcing contracts and in the time frame that is being demanded. The defence industry this sole sourcing will apparently cost hundreds of millions of conveniently forgets to mention that those detailed specifications additional taxpayer dollars. Second, there is a lack of civilian exist because broad performance requirements failed to provide oversight over the military because the Minister and the Assist- suitable equipment in the past. ant Deputy Minister (Materiel) are former military officers. The To suggest, as the Globe and Mail’s January 4, 2007 edito- Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) is the senior civil servant in rial comment does, that “Ministers should insist that Defence tinker the Department of National Defence that has the responsibility to with its specifications, reopen the tendering and consider all op- manage procurement on behalf of the Minister and Deputy Min- tions” will expose the Government to legal action and actually ister. Third, there is the politically sensitive issue of industrial moves the process to improve procurement backwards. The rules regional benefits and who should be awarded economic activity. and regulations exist as they do today to keep ministers and other These three themes collectively are symptoms of a much deeper politicians from unduly interfering with the process. For exam- problem in Canadian governance with respect to investing in its ple, under the Agreement of Internal, the government would not military. be able to repeat its 1986 decision to move CF-18 support con- Procurement today is a multifaceted and complex process tract from Bristol Aerospace in Winnipeg to Canadair in Mon- that, unfortunately, cannot be summarized and explained in a brief treal. If the government was to make such a decision, Bristol editorial or a 30 second television story. The public is therefore Aerospace would have recourse to the Canadian International left with comments on small pieces of a larger puzzle. It is also Trade Tribunal, a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal. The last big money for many Canadian defence companies and a regionally thing that Canadian taxpayers need is a return to a process that sensitive issue. The issue deserves real non-partisan debate by allows political interference with the contracting process. the elected members of parliament, the media and the Canadian There are a number of things wrong with the procurement public rather than the partisan and accusatory rhetoric that is be- process within government and that includes the Canadian Forces ing provided. and the Department of National Defence. However, the lack of Based on the recent commentary, the average citizen would civilian oversight is not one of those things. The notion that Ca- be led to believe that there is no civilian oversight of military nadians stand to pay millions of extra taxpayer dollars without a procurement, General Hillier just decides what he wants to buy and goes ahead with the purchase. Aside from forgetting that it is Dr Craig Stone is a retired military officer and an Assistant Professor in the Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) that Department of Defence Studies of the Canadian Forces College. He specializes actually makes purchases for the Government of Canada, those in the Economics of Defence and Canadian Defence Policy.

8 SITREP guarantee of obtaining the best product is grossly misleading. also argue for their piece of the industrial benefit pie. Regardless Even if there were 5 competitors and one was selected, there is of what anyone might imply, industrial benefits do have costs. In no guarantee of the best product, particularly since “best prod- the first instance, they lengthen what is already a drawn-out pro- uct” is never one of the requirements. Selection of a winning bid curement process because they prevent governments from mak- for a procurement contract is based on best value and not best ing timely decisions about an issue that will be unpopular with product. Best value may be the lowest price but it may also be a someone. In the second instance, they increase the cost of the bid that is more expensive, but cheaper to service over the ex- contract and provide either less military capability to defence pected life of the vehicle. Regardless of whether or not selection (fewer numbers of weapon systems) or cost more for the required is based on lowest price, a weighted score or some other method, capability. the selection criteria are provided when the contract is sent out Many in the defence industry will counter that there is no for tender. extra cost. This is true in the sense that there is not a visible addi- It is also misleading to suggest that the government will pay tional charge added to the contract for IRBs. There is a cost none- hundreds of millions of dollars in extra costs because only one theless. IRBs are a normal part of the defence acquisition market company meets the stated performance requirements. The people and all states demand them when they are purchasing equipment working in the procurement business have a fairly good under- abroad. Defence companies understand the requirement and build standing of what things should cost and the market is small enough the costs associated with developing options and plans into the that those individuals know what a weapon system or aircraft cost of the contract in the same way that other inputs to the pro- will cost. For example, it is unrealistic to expect that our civil duction process are included in the cost of the contract. servants would not know what the cost of the Boeing C-17 air- Unfortunately there is no magic solution to the IRB issue craft is on the world market. In April of 2006, the defense indus- and the public has every right to insist that taxpayer dollars spent try journals and magazines indicted that Australia was purchas- on defence equipment generate benefits in Canada. At the same ing 4 C-17’s and associated equipment at a cost of $1.5 US bil- time, they need to understand that using defence expenditures to lion. The same defense industry daily indicated Canada was pur- achieve government objectives other than defence objectives in- chasing the same number for $1.3 US billion. Neither the Aus- creases the cost for defence and the defence budget should be tralian nor the Canadian figure actually indicated the specific cost compensated for that additional cost. But to which industries and of the aircraft because that is not how procurement contracts are at what cost? Without an overarching industrial strategy it is dif- implemented. Canadians need to be reminded that significant ficult to decide. portions of all procurement costs are tied to the long-term Canada does not have a defence industrial strategy. The sustainment of the equipment and not the actual cost of the spe- United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom all have de- cific item. In the Australian and Canadian example above, both fence industrial strategies. They may not be very good strategies, nations’ contracts included equipment and support. but politicians in those countries have taken an interest and stated Canadians also need to be reminded that Canada’s defence what they want they want their respective defence industries to industry is, for the most part, unable to produce complete weapon be able to do and under what conditions. Politicians in Canada systems. This is not a unique Canadian problem. Very few states have not taken an interest, either because they do not care or they have the ability to develop complete weapon systems. What is do not understand. To be fair, politicians represent the people perhaps somewhat different for Canadian defence industries is who elected them and most Canadians, for a variety of reasons, the industry dependence on exports for economic viability. There have neglected their military for years. Only recently, because are no large defence companies in Canada that exist based on military personnel are coming home in coffins, have Canadians orders from the Canadian Forces. Prior to the recent announce- started to take an interest. Unfortunately, it required 15 to 20 years ments to spend approximately $15 billion on new equipment, the of neglect to reach the current state of affairs with respect to mili- last significant period of capital investment in the Canadian Forces tary equipment and it will require just as long to fix the problems. was in the 1970s and 1980s. Even then, orders were not large Canadians and their elected representatives are incapable of main- enough to be economically viable over the long term. The de- taining interest for such a long period of time and that is the real fence industry had to find other markets or leave the industry. challenge facing Canada. Canadian defence industries today will most likely have a US The lack of a defence industrial strategy is a just one of parent company and will depend on US and other export markets many symptoms within a much larger malaise in Canadian gov- most of its defence business. ernance. As a nation Canada appears unable to make coherent But all of the above issues are simple compared to the poli- long term decisions about many of the complex problems that tics associated with industrial regional benefits (IRBs). Quebec must be addressed. The list is quite lengthy and our elected repre- wants its share of the business based on the percentage of the sentatives cannot get beyond partisan politics to develop long Canadian aerospace sector that exists in the province. Manitoba term plans that require both a strategic vision and more than an wants a competitive market selection process to avoid a repeat of election cycle to implement. On those rare occasions when one the political decision for the 1980s CF-18 maintenance contract. tries, they are shortly removed from office because they haven’t Members of Parliament with a defence industry in their riding Continued on page 14

May - June 07 9 THE HUMAN TOUCH: A CANADIAN LIAISON AND OBSERVATION TEAM IN BOSNIA by Lt Gabriel Granatstein

leven members of the Canadian Forces make up the en- role of the LO Team and the SHQ is to ‘feel the pulse’ of our area tirety of Operation BOREAS, the Canadian contribution of operations and report that to the Multinational Task Force Com- Eto the European Union Force (EUFOR). Our role is to serve mander. We are also tasked with the role of encouraging coopera- as the Liaison and Observation Team (LOT) Sector Headquarters tion and communication among the local authorities, something (SHQ) for Canton 1 (C1) in Bihac, located in the western part of that is not commonplace in Bosnia. It is a very broad mandate Bosnia, part of Multinational Task Force (North West). There are and one that allows each team and each individual within the two important facets of Op team an immense amount of BOREAS; the first is the im- latitude in how they achieve pact that such a small group their mission. This freedom of people is able to have on is amplified by the relatively such a large area; the second, peaceful situation on the is how the composition of the ground which permits us a team, primarily with regards freedom of movement that is to its diversity, can positively essential to mission success. impact the mission. Needless As an LO Team, we to say, our impact in Bosnia collect information through is also directly related to the patrols and meetings with achievements of successive community leaders, police, rotations of Canadian troops Cantonal Ministers, State in the area over the past 12 Border Service, the Euro- years. pean Union Police Mission, The Canadian mission local citizens, and various in Bosnia has been a long other agencies. Our job is to one. Canadian troops have be seen (presence patrols) been on the ground in the and to know as much as pos- former Yugoslavia since the G. L. GRANATSTEIN sible about what is going on UN intervened with the UN in the communities within Protection Force Lt G.L. Granatstein and Capt J.A. Houlihan with two local police our AOR. In the municipal- (UNPROFOR) in the early officers in Kulen Vakuf, Bihac Opstina ity of Bihac, we are respon- 1990s. This mission sible for 35 communities, transitioned to the more robust NATO forces of the Implementa- with an approximate population of 60,000, and meet on a regular tion Force (IFOR) and then the Stabilization Force (SFOR). The basis with community leaders and citizens. latest iteration of the international presence is the European Un- Building trust is a large part of our job as well. If the local ion Force (EUFOR), which curiously also counts Canada, New authorities do not have trust in us as individuals, they will be less Zealand, Chile and other non-EU nations as contributors. This likely to share sensitive information. It is important that we are article will not recount the history of the conflict, nor the history not just seen as ‘EUFOR’ but as people who care about the job of Canadian soldiers in the area – this has been done many times and the country. We foster relationships and often are invited into and certainly far better then I am capable of writing. It will in- homes and businesses for coffee. Given that our houses are lo- stead focus on the LOT role and how it is different from most cated within the community, we also have close relationships with other missions. the local population. In Kulen Vakuf, a town in the south of our The Canadian mission is split into two distinct entities. The AOR, Canadian soldiers helped rebuild a firehouse over the last C1 LOT SHQ staff, commanded by Major Josip Zunic, exercises few years. Our team has coordinated the donation of school sup- command and control over all of Canton 1, coordinating and col- plies from schools in Canada to needy schools here, and at the lating the activities and information obtained by teams within three LOT Houses, which are located in Cazin (manned by Nor- Lt Gabriel Granatstein is an army Reserve logistics officer with 712 Communications Squadron (Montreal) currently serving as a Liaison and wegians), Sanski Most (manned by Chileans), and Bihac. The Observation Officer in Bihac, Bosnia. He holds a B.A. in Political Science second function, which I am part of, the LO Team, is lead by from McGill University and is currently completing a law degree at Université Capt James Houlihan. According to our mission statement, the de Montreal.

10 SITREP request of a local leader, helped facilitate contact between or- The ‘human touch’ is often hard to come by in many ganizations at home and here to raise the funding required to re- militaries; however it is essential to this mission. It is also some- build an abandoned Jewish cemetery in the area. thing that I believe we have achieved in this mission. Whether by The EUFOR mandate does not permit us to rebuild schools design or by chance, our team is incredibly diverse and it is that or roads or provide any monetary assistance. We have no budget diversity which allows us to succeed. Previous iterations of Ca- for that. The LO Teams are not the Civil-Military Cooperation nadian rotations here were composed, for the most part, of formed Teams (CIMIC) of the past, who were perceived by the local popu- infantry units. These units were excellent for the task at hand – lace to roam the country with large sums of money to hand out. providing security in a dangerous and volatile tactical situation. When we meet with community leaders, they often ask for this The CF has seen fit to move away from this type of unit for this kind of assistance. It can be very frustrating to listen to the prob- mission. It moved from formed units of combat soldiers to select- lems of thousands of people and not be able to help. The common ing volunteer ‘augmentees’ from across the Forces. The nature of refrain from community leaders is, “Why am I meeting with you this selection is the key to our diversity. We are split almost evenly if you can’t do anything for me?” On the other hand, giving the between Reserve and Regular Force personnel. Our OC is an Air public a voice is often very Force Logistics officer of gratifying for the local com- Croatian descent who speaks munities. They see us as im- the local language fluently partial observers and our but more importantly has an meetings as forums to voice innate understanding of the their concerns about their culture. The chief clerk is elected officials and law en- from the Navy. The LO forcement agencies. Team Leader is a 42 year-old In general, the popula- commissioned from the tion does not trust their ranks Logistics Captain, elected officials. Over dozens who has 25 years of service of meetings, we have heard in the CF and served on pre- the same criticisms. “The vious overseas tours. I am politicians are corrupt. They his subordinate, a 25 year- are only in politics for per- old Reserve Lieutenant from sonal gain. There is no Montreal, with a degree in progress.” For the most part, Political Science and half- they are right. The system is way through a law degree structured institutionally so and four years in the Army. G. L. GRANATSTEIN that little is accomplished. We are completely different For example, the executive Orthodox church, destroyed during the war, and our disparate back- function of the country is in Pritoka, Bihac Opstina grounds allow us to ap- composed of a tri-partite proach problems from differ- presidency, with one presi- ent angles and arrive at dis- dent from each ethnic group. Each president serves eight months tinctive solutions. Our different educational backgrounds also give as the chair of the presidency. Each president can undo the changes us an advantage in dealing with economic and political issues. of the president before him. These inefficiencies are replicated in There are some people we meet who prefer the “grey hair” ap- different ways at the federal and municipal levels. The local popu- proach of an older Captain with years of experience. There are lation sees this and is extremely frustrated by it. Compounded by others who like the enthusiasm of a “young Lieutenant.” We both high employment, there is a general feeling of despair. The en- have our roles to play and we both bring different skills to the demic corruption has created a micro-society of extremely wealthy table. This dynamic is replicated throughout the Canadian con- people. It is not uncommon to see a horse and buggy sharing the tingent. road with Porsche or Mercedes. Living here, one can understand As Canadians, we have a tendency to measure our success the feeling of despair and inequity. However, from the perspec- by the impact we have or the changes we make. Have we made tive of the international community in Bosnia, things have pro- an impact here? Is that even the goal? On the large scale, I do not gressed significantly. There is no war and there are relatively few believe that we have been able to effect any major changes, but I incidents of ethnic violence. From a military perspective, Bosnia also do not think that this is our mission. Nevertheless, from a now enjoys a relatively safe and secure environment. From a po- EUFOR mission perspective, I believe we have been successful. litical and economic standpoint, there are still major unresolved We have our ‘finger on the pulse of the community’ and we con- issues. As soldiers, getting to this kind of information from the tinue to have the necessary situational awareness. We have coor- local community has required a different approach. Continued on page 14

May - June 07 11 THE KING’S SHILLING: THE BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN MALAYA AND BORNEO By Sunil Ram

o understand Malaya and Borneo it must first be put in its what was watching you, the trees in the Malayan jungle were historical context. The traditional idea or concept of sometimes hundreds of feet high, blocking most of the day light T“Brushfire Wars” originates from the so-called “forgot- out which created a strange and dark atmosphere.”1 ten” or “Small Wars,” what the French called “Empire Wars” or The British Malayan campaign was in two distinct phases, what the British called “Brushfire Wars.” These wars were fought the first from 1948 to 1960 (in Malaya) and the second, from throughout the Imperial period of the western world, wars that 1962 to 1966 (the conflict with Indonesia in Borneo). What has involved small armies fighting desperate and bloody engagements become known as the Malayan Emergency began in February in the far reaches of the empire. 1948 with Communist guerrilla (known as Min Yuan or CTs)2 The modern aspect of these brushfire wars were those nasty attacks in the Malayan peninsula on European settlers, police and little engagements fought throughout the second-half of the 20th military patrols, government posts, and economic sites like tin century; wars that eventually led to the collapse of the majority mines and rubber plantations. These and other incidents led to of the European imperial colonies and en- the declaration of an ‘Emergency’ in July claves. Names such as Oman, Malaya, of the same year. Congo, Algeria, and Indo-China are but a The response of the British caught the few of the places that still resonate in the Communists by surprise, as they had not minds of present day military thinkers and been prepared for such aggressive British planners. In many cases these wars were counter-attacks and search-and-destroy not initially fought by large conventional tactics. The Min Yuan were nearly wiped military forces, but rather by small units out, but their assassination of the British and Special Forces. They tended to be High Commissioner in 1951 combined harsh, brutal and unforgiving in their na- with a delay in receiving reinforcements ture and in many cases were an extension caused the British to pause their campaign of Cold War rivalries; so called proxy wars. against the insurgents. This brief pause in One factor that was generally consist- operations allowed the Min Yuan to ent in these conflicts was the slow, but even- regroup. tual build up of military forces to combat a Aside from terrorist attacks, the Min guerrilla force or small invading army ar- Yuan also tried to run a ‘hearts and minds’ rayed against the colonial power. If one program which formed a carrot and stick looks at the case of the surrounding region approach, where a combination of threats, of the South China Sea, many great em- intimidation and fear were used in conjunc- pires have come and gone over the past tion with some limited aid and support for UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE millennia. Yet, in a matter of a few short locals. The program failed, as there was years after the end of World War II the Gurkha Independent Parachute little sympathy for the insurgents amongst French, British, Americans, and the Dutch Company Borneo 1963 the native Malay population. all experienced the bitter taste of failure in classic brushfire war The British also used a ‘hearts and minds’ program in Ma- scenarios. Though it must be said that the British did “win” in laya. They gathered together some 300,000 displaced Chinese Malaya and subsequently in Borneo- the process took some two mine and plantation workers (the source of Min Yuan recruits) decades! It is worth keeping in mind that the British lost or had to and resettled them into “new villages.”3 Under secure but harsh come to terms in brushfire wars in other colonies like Aden, Cy- government control, these people were offered health care, sani- prus, and mandated territories like Palestine. tary living conditions and other facilities and services. Also eve- In the post-WW2 era, all across the Empire, Britain fought ryone was issued with an identity card; this gave the displaced a multiplicity of brushfire wars. Yemen, Oman, Palestine, Ma- Chinese population proof of residency and citizenship, thus al- laya, Northern Ireland, the Falklands, to name a few of them, are ienating them from the Min Yuan cause as they now had an offi- all names that still echo in the halls of White Hall today. The cial investment in Malaya. The reality that the local population campaigns in Malaya and Borneo represent the seminal British had ceased to provide even food for the Min Yuan drove many of example of a Cold War brushfire war. One writer observed of the them to surrender to the British. As Major Hugh Wilmer, observed: British experience in Malaya that: “…for a young man used to the wide open spaces of the Prof. Sunil Ram teaches military history and land warfare at American Military English home counties or large cities of England the jungle seemed University in West Virginia. He is currently teaching graduate courses on a very hostile environment where you were never sure who or conflict resolution and peace studies.

12 SITREP “by 1953 starvation brought CTs in almost everyday to our posi- “The mountains were twice as high [as the Brecon Bea- tions.”4 cons]7 anyway, and the physical effort alone of keeping constantly By 1960, the effect of the aggressive military operations on the move with wasted bodies and months of accumulated wea- (known as “jungle bashing”), the ‘new village’ initiatives, and riness, trying to forestall the enemy by being everywhere at once, the identity cards all combined to cut off popular support for the was not comparable. In addition there was the mental stress of Min Yuan. After 12 years of conflict, the Min Yuan were eventu- always expecting to be ambushed, a particularly disturbing ele- ally driven into the Thai border region, where their remnants ment of which was nagging anxiety lest one should react incor- fought on till their formal surrender in 1989.5 rectly.8 The British hearts-and-minds campaign was successful, sub- At the time little about this undeclared brushfire war was sequently the Americans used many aspects of it in Vietnam,6 but exposed in the headlines back in England or elsewhere. All in all, their efforts were an abysmal failure in comparison to the British. the Indonesians never were able to get the upper hand and were Some fundamental differences must be considered when looking systematically forced onto the defensive in their own territory. at the British and American experiences. First, the Min Yuan even In March of 1966 Sukarno was overthrown in a coup led by at their height of power numbered no more than 8000 fighters. General Suharto, who immediately sent out secret peace feelers. Secondly, they were drawn from a distinct ethnic group, the Chi- The conflict officially ended on 11 August 1966. What the Brit- nese, the majority of whom did not support the Min Yuan cause. ish showed during, what became known as, ‘The Borneo Cam- Also the majority of the Chinese population was physically sepa- paign’ was how elite professional infantry, supported by all the rated from the Min Yuan in the other military arms and services, ‘new villages,’ further distanc- could win a decisive victory ing them from contact with the against a well trained, armed and rebels. Furthermore, the major- aggressive enemy in a brushfire ity population of Indians and war scenario. However, the Malays did not support the Min reader should be aware that these Yuan, but in fact actively op- campaigns do not offer any real posed them. Finally, the British insights into the current brushfire engaged in aggressive “jungle wars in Iraq or Afghanistan—as bashing”-foot patrols throughout tempting as this thought may be. the countryside and into the jun- It is important to remem- gles, thereby keeping control of ber the temporal reality of territory and being in a position brushfire wars like Malaya, in to directly engage the Min Yuan. that they were the Cold War con- Estimates run from as low as flicts and were about retaining 10,704 to as high as some 13,000 control rather than taking con- insurgents killed. While the Brit- UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE trol as we see in Iraq and Af- “A COY” Somerset Light Infantry Regt- Jungle patrol ish lost some 519 soldiers and ghanistan. In the case of Malaya during Malayan Emergency ca.1953 1346 police killed in action. there is one critical issue that The Malaya crisis returned in 1962, but this time with Indo- makes the whole 20-year campaign functionally different; thus nesian military incursions into Malaysian Borneo and into the the strategy and tactics used cannot be applied directly to Iraq or Malay peninsula. Achmed Sukarno, the President of Indonesia, Afghanistan. That single significant difference is the CT’s were in an effort to deflect public opinion away from economic trou- seen as foreigners and the Malayan and Indian populations did bles at home began a low level war with Malaysia. The recently not provide support nor did they sympathize with the political independent Malaya requested British military support to stop agenda of the CT’s. the incursions into Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah), which This is simply not the case in Iraq where the majority of the had been British colonies until 1960 (when they were ceded to insurgency is indigenous9 and overall the civilian population (both the new state of Malaysia). Sunni and Shiite) supports attacks against coalition forces.10 We The British fought a short hard campaign against the Indo- find a similar situation evolving in Afghanistan, where the Taliban nesians, where Special Forces in the form of the Special Air Serv- represent an indigenous force that has after nearly five years of ice (SAS) and elite infantry units, like the Gurkhas, were utilized war had a major military resurgence and has growing local sup- extensively in intensive counterinsurgency jungle warfare. Much port.11 And as US forces are seen in Iraq, NATO forces are being of the conflict involved incursions into Indonesia (code named seen more and more as the enemy. As early as 2005, Richard “Claret”) to attack Indonesian forces guarding the frontier or form- Armitage, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State (2001-2005) stated “… ing to enter Malaysian Borneo. One SAS account sums up the we’re facing a resurgent Taliban, one that feels blusty and bold experience for all concerned: enough to travel sometimes in company or larger-sized units.”12 ""

May - June 07 13 The Malaya and Borneo campaigns in context of their time and that followed the British pattern of the “new villages” and “jungle bashing.” 7. The southern end of the Cambrian Mountains in Wales used as the training ground for place in history were undoubtedly a success. As the then British the SAS and other British units. Secretary of State for Defense, Dennis Healey, noted to the House 8. Peter Dickens. SAS: the Jungle Frontier, 22 Special Air Service Regiment in the of Commons: Borneo Campaign, 1963-1966, London, Arms & Armour Press, 1983, p. 93. 9 According to CENTCOM, 90 percent of the insurgency was Iraqi and Sunni, with a “When the House thinks of the tragedy that could have fallen maximum of 10 percent foreign contribution to insurgent manpower. Anthony H. on a whole corner of a continent if we had not been able to hold Cordesman. “Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War,” Rough Working the situation and bring it to a successful termination, it will ap- Draft for Outside Comment, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 22 June 2006, pg. iv. preciate that in the history books it will be recorded as one of the 10 About 61 percent approved of the attacks as of the end of September 2006, which most efficient uses of military force in the history of the World.”13 N was up from 47 percent in January 2006. Almost four in five Iraqis said the US military force in Iraq provokes more violence than it prevents. Barry Schweid. “Poll: Iraqis Back Attacks on U.S. Troops” AP, in the Washington Post, The views expressed are those of the author and do not 27 September 2006. 11 “Afghan Country Stability Picture (ACSP) 30 Nov 2006, ISAF IX, declassified PPT necessarily reflect the views of the Institute provided to the Author by NATO HQ. Also see “Afghanistan Five Years Later: The or its members. Return of the Taliban”, Senlis Council Spring/Summer 2006 http:// www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/014_publication/chapter_01 [ 20 March 2007]. Notes Spring/Summer 2006. In combination these reports clearly show a trend that NATO is losing support from local people. 1. Virgin Soldiers- Malaya 1948-1960 “The Men in the Jungle” http://www.britains- 12 “Return of the Taliban”, Interview with Richard Armitage, Frontline, aired in PBS 3 smallwars.com/malaya/jungle.html [Jul 23, 2003]. October 2006. 2. CT stands for Communist Terrorist (Charlie-Tangos)- term used by the British. The 13 Dennis Healey, UK House of Commons transcript 11 August 1966. Also see Peter CTs called themselves the Min Yuan. It is important to note that the CTs were all Dickens. SAS: The Jungle Frontier p. 229. Chinese, and part of the animosity between them and the Malayan and Indian populations had been created by the Japanese during their occupation of Malaya during WWII. 3. After the Emergency these villages became thriving communities as the Chinese now BOSNIA owned their own land and homes and by default were now part of Malaya society. 4. Personal interview, Toronto, Canada 1 Oct , 2003. Major Wilmer served in the Continued from page 11 Malaya campaign with the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) from late 1950 to 1953, being promoted to Captain while in Malaya. He was also ADC to the Chief of Staff in dinated conferences bringing together different governmental Singapore. 5. The Communist Party of Malaya laid down its arms. Some 500 CTs (though the actors from the three ethnic groups and brought local authorities number of 1200 has been cited) laid down their arms in 1989 and were repatriated to together to discuss issues that they would have otherwise dealt civilian life. with alone. We have succeeded in that regard. In order to meas- 6. The US used the “Strategic Hamlets” program and “Search and Destroy” missions ure our success, we need to re-evaluate what success is. I do not believe that our achievements here should be gauged by our ef- PROCUREMENT fect on the ‘big picture.’ Bosnia is at a point in its recovery where Continued from page 9 for a change to be successful, it must come from within, and not from without. done anything in the short term. The irony is that despite its com- The mantra we have heard since deploying to theatre is, plexity, re-equipping the military is one of the more simple chal- “Bosnian solutions for Bosnian problems.” For example, the in- lenges facing the government and Canadians. ternational community can only provide the structure for elec- I am not an expert in developing operational military re- tions, it cannot tell the citizens whom to vote for. It can only quirements but I believe that if the individuals whom the Cana- provide the political structure, not ensure that it is efficient or dian electorate has put in harm’s way indicate what the opera- devoid of corruption. There are however differences to be made. tional requirement is, a civilian bureaucrat or an elected politi- From a Canadian mission perspective, we do make small and cian, who are not about to risk their lives, should not be able to important impacts. We show people that you can live a life with- change the requirement. They should be able to choose among out religious or ethnic tension. By simply waving the Canadian those who do meet the requirements and if only one competitor flag and being here, we are making a difference. The act of coor- meets the requirement that should be accepted. Unfortunately, dinating the donation of school supplies from a Jewish school in this is big money for defence companies and they do not like the Montreal to a Muslim school in Bihac may seem minor, but by results. Although political interference and lobbying may not have showing a group of children here that religion does not make a mattered as much in the 80s and early 90s, it is an important issue difference, we have a hand in molding the future of Bosnia. That today. The Canadian electorate is sending its military into harm’s type of act, repeated over the history of Canadian involvement way today and it matters deeply that the military’s operational here has made a profound impact and makes our total contribu- requirements come first. N tion to Bosnia a real success. N

The views expressed are those of the author and do not The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members. or its members.

14 SITREP UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACHES TO DIPLOMATIC THEORY by Garrett Jones

n my years of government service, I have spent quite a bit of a juicy disaster (insert pitiful pictures of starving children here.) time as a briefcase carrier and “go-fer” for some pretty capa- This is not most of the folks you will run into, but such people are Ible and talented diplomats in the U.S. Foreign Service. While out there. A rough guide is how many superlatives they use to being a diplomat was not my primary job, I did pick up a few describe the situation on the ground. If they use more than half a pointers from these diplomats on how the game of international dozen in a 15-minute conversation, either the end is near or you diplomacy is played between nations. It appears either that these need to take a firm grip on your wallet. sorts of basic points did not make the criteria for inclusion in Foreign Service training or that the State Department’s guardian Dictatorships are Personal. In a dictatorship, there is no space of the “tribal memory” has retired. between the Supreme Leader and the government of the county. Whatever one may think of current U.S. foreign policy in Criticizing the Big Man’s necktie will go over about the same as general, even its supporters will admit to the appearance of clumsy calling all the citizens buffoons. In many places, it is far worse to execution, poorly briefed officials and a focus on short-term spin impugn the omniscience of the Great Leader than sending a nasty vs. long-term policy goals. In short, despite being a superpower, diplomatic note. He might never know about the note, but some- we have not won many lately. North Korea and Iraq are the head- one will tell him the American called him names. This rule also liners in what seems to be a widespread uncertainty of where the applies to de facto dictatorships, it does not matter what the na- foreign policy ship of state is headed next. tional constitution of the country says. If the Padrone thinks he Most Foreign Service officers operate at a level far above owns the government, then comments on the national soccer side their pay grade, with little or no thanks from anyone. But despite can be the moral equivalent to breaking diplomatic relations. The their hard work, there seems to be an ignorance of “street smarts inverse sometimes applies. “Wow” the Grand Jefe and you can for diplomats.” At the risk of being called “cheeky”, here are a then get away with the diplomatic equivalent of larceny with few things they might not have covered when going through ba- threats. If the Big Guy likes you, no one working for him is going sic diplomat training in Northern Virginia. If you already know to throw too much of a fit. They understand the game, even if you this stuff, then make sure you pass it on to the next generation. do not.

Enthusiasm vs. Competence. Do not confuse the two concepts. Money is Fungible. Even by giving aid to the victims it is abus- Just because an individual agrees with you on everything, they ing, you are in fact supporting a repressive government. Money still may lack competence. First, you have to get it done. Then not spent on either feeding or repressing its restive citizens is you can explain at length how your correct thinking deserves the money available to the regime. These funds are then used for credit. The corollary to this is: do not confuse ideology with com- corruption or other means of propping up the government. This petence. It is much easier to live with a competent heretic than it may not be what you want to do, but understand your charity is in is a witless zealot. effect going into the government’s pocket.

Aid and Charity Organizations Lie. You cannot place much Get Over Yourself. You were sent overseas to lie, steal, and cheat confidence in the reporting of any U.S. government aid agency for your country. If you are uncomfortable with that, then you do or international charity group about what the conditions on the not understand your job. You are not there to do good; you are ground are at any location. They are only human. They often there to do well while looking good. We hope that your being an work in terrible conditions with those who are very needy. It is advocate for the U.S.’s interests will result in good things, but not understandable that they often view their own clients or situation always. Have you considered hiring on with a charitable organi- as “the worst off.” There are more in need than there is money zation? Many of them do “good work.” available to help. Your job as a U.S. diplomat is always to give the policymakers in Washington accurate information on which Hierarchy of Needs. There are four basic levels of interest for a to base a rational decision. Another reason to be a little leery of sovereign country that are taught in academia and then one un- situation reports from the charity and aid folks is not mentioned spoken interest that trumps everything else. In more or less de- in polite company, but it is true. Careers are made, promotions scending order, survival interest (preventing a nuclear attack, for are gained and organizations expand when they can identify with instance); vital interests (ensuring access to oil or water); national interest (protecting a country’s citizens and corporations); and Garrett Jones is a senior fellow of Foreign Policy Research Institute general interests - promotion of a country’s ideals, etc. The one www.fpri.org . This article previously appeared in the FPRI e-notes. A 1993 that triumphs all other interests is the political survival of the graduate of the U.S. Army War College, he served as a case officer with the government in power. Long-term vital interests, citizens and eve- CIA in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. He retired in 1997 and now lives rything else will usually be sacrificed to permit a government to in the northwestern United States. "" May - June 07 15 continue in power. This is true for the U.S., as much as it is any- your country is responsible for creating and establishing a re- where else. placement government. Unfortunately, in the twenty-first centaury this rule is not working out very well (see the Balkans, Iraq, Pal- Second Law of Thermodynamics. All systems tend towards estine, Somalia and other cases). This idea needs to be rethought. entropy, including political systems. The longer a government or The old model of conquering a country and then making it a vas- political party has been in power, the greater the level of corrup- sal state against the will of its citizens is well past its expiration tion and incompetence among the people in charge. Individuals date. Some problems need to be eliminated by military force, but improve their skills and competency over time; political admin- subsequent rebuilding may be best left to someone other than the istrations do not. original military organization.

Talk to Anybody. I have often thought there should be a Deputy Many International Boundaries are not Real. Sometimes, nei- Assistant Undersecretary of State in Charge of Talking to Any- ther are the countries they delineate. More governments than any- body Who Walks in the Door. Often the prohibition on talking to one would care to admit hold sway over their capital cities and some faction or government comes from the top, but it is almost little else. While the international community limits itself to the always wrong. Someone, at some level, should always talk to “recognized” government of the day, the people who can actually whoever will talk to us, even if it is just to get an accurate copy of affect the conditions on the ground are foisted off on the abusive press release. Interesting things can happen when dia- nongovernmental groups. While this may make shaky govern- logue is opened. ments around the world breathe easier, ignoring reality generally causes more problems than it solves. The international commu- Envy and Spite as Motives. Never underestimate national envy nity needs to come up with a new designation or category, not and personal spite as motives in international relations. Simply to quite a sovereign government, but not to be ignored, either. The be seen as opposing the U.S. is good politics in some countries. politically correct term would be “legitimizing all the Some societies view the U.S. as a country of mixed breeds and stakeholders.” are annoyed that it exists and continues to be successful, despite having an “inferior” culture. More than a few diplomats have At Some Point, It is History. At some point in time, every cul- been bested by the U.S.’s economic or military power, our sup- ture, ethnic group or nationality has been done an injustice by posed allies included. Their egos are every bit as big as ours are. some other group. But squabbling about historical wrongs is al- We should also remember that modesty is not one of our cultural most never useful. The international community needs to put a strong points. cap on how far back one can reach to raise a legitimate grievance. A hundred years, two hundred years? At some point, no matter Just Because They are Crazy Does Not Mean They Aren’t in how justified, the grievance is the stuff of history books, not le- Charge. One of the more difficult things for many U.S. diplo- gitimate international discussion. It will not stop the domestic mats to accept is that the intelligent, articulate, well-educated scoundrels from exploiting the argument or issue, but tying this person across the table from them can and will act in an irrational principle to international aid and loans will certainly slow it down. manner on some subjects. On many occasions, I have read re- ports where diplomats assure Washington that some country’s Cry Havoc! Get a Grip on the Laws of War. The laws of war leadership will act in their country’s best interest, only to watch clearly need to be reassessed and brought up-to-date by new treaty the same country doing the exact opposite. Sometimes, on some language in the Geneva Convention. Transnational and armed issues, the cultural divide is not rational. Keep that in mind the civilian militias have rendered many of the old notions of “com- next time you think something is a slam dunk. batant” meaningless. Indeed, some groups make it part of their strategy to use groups or locations protected by the Law of War Having pointed out some concepts that may have been for- to further their ends. Unless modern definitions and the responsi- gotten, let me now presume to suggest some longstanding con- bility for committing certain acts are brought up-to-date, the cur- cepts that desperately need a visit from the diplomatic version of rent muddle will get worse, not better. N “Extreme Makeover”. The views expressed are those of the author and do not The Pottery Barn Rule of International Relations. In the twen- necessarily reflect the views of the Institute tieth century, international law operated on the basis of you break or its members. it, you own it. If your country overthrows a government, then

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