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Community Based Recovery and Reconciliation to Stabilise

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Community Based Recovery and Reconciliation to Stabilise UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION Project title: Community based recovery and reconciliation to stabilise Hirshabelle and counter violent extremism amongst vulnerable youth Project number: 170154 Area/Location/Countries Africa, Arab States, Somalia RBM code: EC1 Poverty Reduction Thematic area code EC15 HS & Post-crisis Rehab Starting date: 01 March 2018 Duration: 12 Months Government Co-ordinating agency: Project-linked Government Ministries (Labour and Social Affairs) Counterparts: UNSOM and UN Sister Agencies Executing partner: Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (JCCP) Executing agency/ cooperating agency: UNIDO 884,965 Project Inputs: - Support costs (13 %): 115,045 - Counterpart inputs: In-kind - Grand Total: 1,000,000 USD Brief description: In southern Somalia, civil war, international isolation, and clan-based violence have had a profound and adverse impact on the productive capacity of all sectors of the economy. These destabilizing forces have significantly impacted income and employment creation further hindering socio-economic development in Hirshabelle. Poor access to decision makers, overwhelmed humanitarian distribution networks, high transaction costs, weak government service delivery, tightly controlled labour and product markets rub up against the legitimate aspirations of youth. As a result, youth, in particular rural youth, continue to become engaged in violence and conflict as a tool to address youth disenfranchisement. Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) like Al-Shabaab as well as Clan leaders leverage the alienation felt by youth and channel it towards undermining recent gains made by the national government, the international community, and AMISOM peace support operations. As a result, youth are continually at risk to be induced into armed conflict as the only means for income generation. There is a small window of opportunity to provide alternative livelihoods and conflict minimization skills to empower youth to contribute positively to the recovery of their community and build social and economic cohesion. Approved: Signature: Date: Name and title: On behalf of …………….: On behalf of UNIDO: 1 A. CONTEXT A.1 Background Information Stability and development in Somalia are two of the critical drivers to achieving the strategic priorities that have been agreed upon between Somalia's government and the international community. In the face of weakened security efforts and insufficient state structures, Al-Shabaab and local militia continue to carry out violent activities aimed at de-stabilizing international and national government efforts to move out of its 'fragile state' status. To support this transition, it is essential that current stability operations in the country are accompanied by complimentary efforts aimed at promoting economic development, employment creation, and community reconciliation. Youth constitute 70% of the population of Somalia and are crucial pieces to stabilization efforts in the country. Yet, they face staggering challenges in finding long-term employment and a stable income stream. Poor economic infrastructure, absent technical skills training capacity, local markets controlled by elites, drought, lack of state structure and Al Shbaab dominance in rural areas are some of the critical forces destabilizing the regional economy and which have had a negative impact on youth employment opportunities. President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo in his inauguration address on 22 February 2017 noted the challenge of insecurity and pledged to “uphold the rule of law, strengthen the judiciary, restore confidence of the people in the government and tackle poverty”. In order to further bolster confidence in the Government, UN and Government efforts support expanding government presence throughout the territory. State and district administrations must have the capacity to provide quality services and public goods, represent the normative and legal order, and earn legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the population. These three components of extension of state authority are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. Somalia has seen significant political progress in the successful establishment of four new Federal Member States including the newest Hirshabelle and the evolution of federal structures and systems that reflect the growing political progress in the country. The Government of Somalia has drafted a stabilization strategy to synchronize work of all partners to improve stability in post-conflict areas of Somalia by delivering tangible results that strengthen cohesion within communities and between communities and their government. Central to achieving this goal will be a renewed commitment to a whole of government approach across four inter-connected focus areas: community recovery, social reconciliation, local governance and rule of law. UNIDO’s programming has been designed to focus on component 1 and 2, community recovery and social reconciliation targeting livelihoods and life skills to combat extremism and contribute to community recovery and reconciliation in Hirshabelle, the newest State in Somalia. UNIDOs Community based recovery and reconciliation to stabilise Hirshabelle and counter violent extremism amongst vulnerable youth (hereafter referred to as ‘CSR V’) builds upon the achievements and lessons learned of UNIDO’s Japanese funded projects 14008, 140231, 160134, 150440, CSR I (TF/SOM/14/008), MIPS and SERIES. 2 UNIDO will also synergize activities and approaches with both the Federal Youth Employment Programme and UN Stabilization and Community Recovery / State Authority team (CRESTAA) both of which UNIDO already collaborates closely with. A.2 Project Rationale and Justification The project has been developed based upon the direct request of the State authorities in Hirshabelle to support the development of livelihood opportunities for youth and contribute to community recovery and social reconciliation through vocational technical skills training delivery capacities, contribute to the long term employability and social cohesion of youth in the region. In southern Somalia, civil war, international isolation, and clan-based violence have had a profound and adverse impact on the productive capacity of all sectors of the economy. Hirshabelle has not been an exception. These destabilizing forces combined with recent drought have significantly impacted income and employment creation further hindering socio-economic development in the region. Poor access to decision makers, overwhelmed humanitarian distribution networks, high transaction costs, weak government service delivery, tightly controlled labour and product markets rub up against the legitimate aspirations of youth. As a result, there is a serious risk of at- risk youth becoming engaged in violence and conflict as a tool to address youth disenfranchisement. Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) like Al-Shabaab leverage the alienation felt by youth and channel it towards undermining recent gains made by the national government, the international community, and AMISOM peace support operations. As a result, youth are continually at risk of being induced into armed conflict as the only means for income generation. Simultaneously, those previously engaged or at risk to engage in armed activity with low skill levels must be given the opportunity to reintegrate into the community. Young women face considerable gender barriers to access the formal labour market and find opportunities for improving the quality of life. Central to these efforts will be providing real world economic and employment/revenue-enhancing opportunities to marginalized and at-risk youth to participate in the community development process through technical trainings, technology and knowledge transfers, and enhancing public goods, assets, and infrastructure. Hirshabelle remains at the crossroads towards stabilization. The nascent formation of Hirshabelle as an autonomous state in October 2016 and impeachment of the first president already in August 2017 has weakened efforts to strengthen state structures and make progress towards a more stable security, economic and political environment. However, the State control does not extend past urban city limits where Al Shabaab remains in control and continues to carry out attacks against the local population and authorities to disrupt development. There is a small window of opportunity to provide alternative livelihoods and life skills to empower youth to contribute positively to their community. The risk of disenfranchisement of youth and turn to both political and terrorist violence remains high. Recent military gains 3 against radical armed opposition groups, and a growing commitment on the part the Somali Federal Government authorities to set and pursue tangible development priorities has led to a sharp increase in the demand for technical assistance and community stabilization interventions in southern Somalia for the youth population. UNIDO’s approach stems from a 2013 report entitled “Examining the Links between Youth Economic Opportunity, Civic Engagement and Conflict.” Mercy Corps found when vocational skills training programs integrated conflict resolution and life skills into the curriculum, the result was not only an increase in income generation and reduction in poverty, but also a reduction in participation in violence. The technical, vocational, and livelihoods support integrated with conflict minimization skills is designed as a powerful counter-balance to terrorist ideological frameworks currently
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