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A/75/607 General Assembly United Nations A/75/607 General Assembly Distr.: General 24 November 2020 Original: English Seventy-fifth session Agenda item 170 Financing of the activities arising from Security Council resolution 1863 (2009) Budget performance of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia for the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 Report of the Secretary-General Contents Page I. Introduction ................................................................... 4 II. Mandate performance ........................................................... 4 A. Overall ................................................................... 4 B. Budget implementation ...................................................... 6 C. Mission support initiatives ................................................... 12 D. Regional mission cooperation ................................................ 13 E. Partnerships, country team coordination and integrated missions ................... 13 F. Results-based budgeting frameworks .......................................... 14 III. Resource performance ........................................................... 28 A. Financial resources ......................................................... 28 B. Summary information on redeployments across groups ........................... 29 C. Monthly expenditure pattern ................................................. 29 D. Other revenue and adjustments ............................................... 30 E. Expenditure for contingent-owned equipment: major equipment and self-sustainment .. 30 F. Value of non-budgeted contributions ........................................... 30 IV. Analysis of variances ........................................................... 31 V. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly ........................................ 34 VI. Summary of follow-up action taken to implement the decisions and requests of the General Assembly in its resolution 74/295 .......................................... 35 20-15865 (E) 080121 *2015865* A/75/607 Summary The total expenditure for the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) for the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 has been linked to the objectives of UNSOS through a number of results-based budgeting frameworks. During the reporting period, in spite of the restrictions in connection with the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, UNSOS continued to implement the key elements of its mandate by effectively supporting the mandates of the African Union Mission in Somalia and by enabling the expansion of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and supporting its programmatic work. UNSOS also completed implementation of the reconfiguration of its organizational structure, as recommended by the 2018 independent review of UNSOS. UNSOS incurred $522.5 million in expenditure for the reporting period, representing a resource utilization rate of 92.5 per cent, compared with $557.4 million in expenditure and a resource utilization rate of 99.9 per cent in the 2018/19 period. The unencumbered balance of $42.1 million was attributable mainly to reduced requirements under military and police personnel and for operational costs, offset in part by increased requirements under civilian personnel. The reduced requirements for uniformed personnel ($30.8 million) were attributable mainly to lower-than-budgeted costs for the provision of rations, contingent-owned equipment, travel on emplacement, rotation and repatriation and the delayed deployment of formed police units. The increased requirements for civilian personnel ($2.4 million) were attributable mainly to higher-than-budgeted costs for national staff, owing to the implementation of interim salary survey recommendations in Somalia and to accelerated recruitment against new posts that had been approved for the 2019/20 budget period. The reduced requirements for operational costs ($13.6 million) were mainly the result of lower-than-budgeted expenditures under air operations and other supplies, services and equipment, owing to reduced requirements for the rental and operational cost of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters and for other freight, as a result of the ability to ship cargo directly to Mogadishu owing to the improved security situation on the Mogadishu coast. The lower-than-budgeted expenditures under those operational classes of expenditure were offset in part by higher expenditures for facilities and infrastructure, marine operations and medical services. 2/36 20-15865 A/75/607 Performance of financial resources (Thousands of United States dollars; budget year is from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020) Variance Category Apportionment Expenditure Amount Percentage Military and police personnel 164 165.1 133 340.6 30 824.5 18.8 Civilian personnel 83 777.5 86 133.6 (2 356.1) (2.8) Operational costs 316 615.5 303 016.0 13 599.5 4.3 Gross requirements 564 558.1 522 490.2 42 067.9 7.5 Staff assessment income 6 919.8 7 764.7 (844.9) (12.2) Net requirements 557 638.3 514 725.5 42 912.8 7.7 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) – – – – Total requirements 564 558.1 522 490.2 42 067.9 7.5 Human resources incumbency performance Actual Vacancy rate Category Approveda Planned (average) (percentage)b United Nations military contingents 70 43 11 74.4 African Union military contingents 19 586 19 586 19 074 2.6 African Union police 240 240 224 6.7 African Union formed police units 800 800 492 38.5 International staff 368 368 336 8.7 National staff National Professional Officers 40 40 29 27.5 General Service 149 149 119 20.1 United Nations Volunteers International 20 20 17 15 Government-provided personnel 6 6 5 16.7 a Represents the highest level of authorized strength. b Based on monthly incumbency and planned monthly strength. The actions to be taken by the General Assembly are set out in section V of the present report. 20-15865 3/36 A/75/607 I. Introduction 1. The proposed budget for the maintenance of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) for the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 was set out in the report of the Secretary-General dated 22 February 2019 (A/73/762) and amounted to $569,506,600 gross ($562,568,600 net). It provided for up to 70 United Nations military contingent personnel, 19,586 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) military contingent personnel, 1,040 AMISOM police personnel (including 800 in formed units), 370 international staff, 189 national staff (including 40 National Professional Officers), 20 United Nations Volunteers and 6 government-provided personnel. 2. In its report dated 24 April 2019, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions recommended that the General Assembly appropriate $569,258,100 gross for the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 (A/73/755/Add.8, para. 51). 3. The General Assembly, in its resolution 73/325 and its decision 73/555, appropriated an amount of $564,558,100 gross ($557,638,300 net) for the maintenance of UNSOS for the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020. The total amount has been assessed on Member States. II. Mandate performance A. Overall 4. The mandate for the support provided to AMISOM was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1863 (2009) and extended in subsequent resolutions of the Council. The mandate for the performance period was provided by the Council in its resolutions 2415 (2018), 2431 (2018), 2472 (2019), 2498 (2019), 2500 (2019), 2516 (2020), 2520 (2020) and 2540 (2020). 5. The United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) was mandated to provide a logistical support package to AMISOM to support the efforts of the Government of Somalia towards the stabilization of the country, to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and to create conditions conducive to long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia. 6. The Security Council, in its resolution 2102 (2013), decided to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), headquartered in Mogadishu, with UNSOA as a part of the integrated mission, and, in its resolution 2093 (2013), mandated UNSOA to provide mission support services to UNSOM. In its resolution 2540 (2020), the Council extended the mandate of UNSOM until 31 August 2021. 7. The Security Council, in its resolution 2124 (2013), requested UNSOA to support the Somali National Army, in joint operations with AMISOM, through the provision of food, water, fuel, transportation, tents and in-theatre medical evacuation on an exceptional basis. The Council also decided that funding for this support would be provided from an appropriate United Nations trust fund. 8. In its resolution 2245 (2015), the Security Council, in view of the expansion of UNSOA since its establishment, decided that UNSOA should bear the name UNSOS and also decided that UNSOS would be responsible for support for AMISOM, UNSOM and the Somali National Army on joint operations with AMISOM, with UNSOS personnel being responsible for ensuring the delivery of the support package to the Somali National Army and its compliance with the human rights due diligence 4/36 20-15865 A/75/607 policy on United Nations support for non-United Nations security forces. In the same resolution, the Council decided to expand the support for AMISOM to include 70 AMISOM civilians and expanded the logistical support package to include reimbursement to troop-contributing countries for various self-sustainment categories. 9. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 2245 (2015), in which
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