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The ASC History Newsletter Volume VII, Issue 12 15 September 2017 The ASC History Newsletter 100th Anniversary of World War I: Battle of Jutland This MONTH in military history … 1776: The Battle of Harlem Heights 1779: The Siege of Savannah 1812: Seminole Indians ambush Marines in Florida 1846: US troops capture Monter- rey The Battle of Jutland was the larg- the Germans got the better of it. its base. With darkness, the Germans est naval battle of World War I and Three British battle cruisers 1862: The Battle slipped away. one of the most important sea fights (Indefatigable, Queen Mary and In- of Antietam in military history. The British Grand vincible) were sunk and Beatty’s The British did suffer higher losses than the Germans: 14 vessels (3 bat- 1918: Meuse- Fleet deployed 151 ships: 28 dread- flagship was hit in one of its turrets. noughts, 9 battle cruisers, 34 cruisers, The flagship stayed afloat by flood- tle cruisers, 2 cruisers, and 8 destroy- Argonne Offen- and 80 destroyers. The German High ing its magazine before it exploded. ers) to only 11 German ships (1 battle sive launched Seas Fleet numbered 101 ships: 16 It is at this point that Beatty turns to cruiser, 1 pre-dreadnought battleship, 4 cruisers, and 5 destroyers). The 1944: Octagon dreadnoughts, 6 pre-dreadnoughts, 5 one of his officers and says in typical battle cruisers, 11 cruisers, and 63 British fashion, “there seems to be disparity in tonnage losses was even Conference destroyers. The British hoped the something wrong with our bloody greater. 111,980 for the British and 62,233 for the Germans. Casualties 1944: Operation engagement would be another Trafal- ships today.” gar. The Germans hoped to gain totaled 6,094 for the British and Market Garden world naval supremacy. Both sides At this point, Vice Admiral Beatty 3,058 for the Germans. were to be disappointed. turned his formation north to link up 1950: US 8th Ar- with the main British fleet and lure The Battle of Jutland demonstrated my breaks out of The battle took place from May 31- the Germans into Jellicoe’s trap. The the German superiority of optics and the Pusan Perime- June 1, 1916, seventy miles west of Germans obliged. At about 1830 hrs., night-fighting tactics as well as gun- Denmark’s Jutland Peninsula. Admi- nery. The most detailed study of the ter the Germans finally realized the error ral John Jellicoe commanded the of their ways when on the horizon the gunnery in the battle concluded that 1950: 5th Marine British Grand Fleet, with Vice Admi- main British fleet appeared. the Germans fired every 20 seconds Regiment seizes ral David Beatty commanding the and the British every 30 seconds. British battle cruiser squadron. Ad- The British had pulled off the best Granted both sides were not very ac- Kimpo Airfield miral Reinhard Scheer commanded possible formation for a naval fight. curate with the British scoring hits 1968: Special the German High Seas Fleet, with They were able to “Cross the T”. only 2.75% of the time and the Ger- Forces camp at Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper lead- This meant that the German stream- mans only marginally better at Thuong Duc at- ing the German battle cruiser squad- ing north in line were met by the 3.39%. ron. Both sides wanted to lure the British fleet sailing perpendicular in tacked opposing fleet into a trap. The British front of them. This enabled most of After the battle, German admiral Scheer claimed Jutland was a great 1980: Iran/Iraq and Germans hoped to use their battle the British ships to fire a broadside cruisers to make initial contact, re- attack from about 9 miles, whereas, German victory, however, this did War began treat towards their main body and the Germans could only return fire not mirror reality. The long term ef- fects favored the British. Their block- 1982: Peacekeep- then spring the trap. The Germans from their forward turrets. ade of Germany continued as before, ing troops arrived added submarines and Zeppelins to further degrade the British fleet. At a disadvantage, the Germans and the Germans never again risked in Lebanon However, these would not play a role succeeded in extracting themselves their capital ships in a showdown by having their destroyers lay down a battle. It was a German tactical vic- 2001: Attacks on in the battle. smoke screen and cover their with- tory, but a crushing strategic win for In the years after the battle, military the WTC, Penta- drawal with a torpedo attack. This the British. gon and United historians have broken down the en- phase of the battle was characterized Airlines Flight 93 gagement into four distinct phases. by moves and countermoves. The Increasingly, the German capital May 31 1430-1700 hrs. British and Germans trying to get themselves ships lay idle in port as their crews 2006: Operation German Battle Cruisers open engage- into better position to engage the and junior officers were siphoned off Mountain Fury in ment; May 31 1700-1800 hrs. British British, failing that, making it back to for the U-boat war. For the German Afghanistan cruisers turn north to lure Germans; their base at Wilhelmshaven. The High Sea Fleet, the culmination of May 31 1800-2100 hrs. Main fleet British continued to try and tempt the Jutland would mark a decline in their 2014: Airstrikes battle; May 31 2100-June 1 1200 hrs. Germans into a general engagement. power, leading eventually to mutiny begin against ISIS Night Action and German evasion. Once this was deemed impossible, and the scuttling of the fleet at the During the initial engagement be- the main British fleet tried to position end of the war. tween both battle cruiser formations, itself between the German fleet and ASC Poster 870-1 Brought to you by your friendly ASC History Office. For more copies or any history related needs call Jason Morin or George Eaton or stop by for a visit at Building 390 BSMT SW. .
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