Presidential Directives Declassified in Full

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Presidential Directives Declassified in Full TAB C: PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Overview These Presidential Directives have been declassified in full. This list only refers to the actual directive (through the page with the signature of the President or the National Security Advisor). It does not include appendices or attachments. There is one exception: Early policy documents—the Truman administration through the first year of the Eisenhower administration—often included a financial appendix and/or enclosures with the pagination continuing from the policy document. In these instances, the appendix and/or enclosures ARE considered part of the Presidential directive and do not need to be referred to the NSC if they are listed on this document. The page count from these documents is included on the list below. The attached lists include the following series of numbered Presidential Directives that have been declassified in full by the National Security Council staff. New additions in red. Presidential Policy Titles By Administration NSC: National Security Council Policy, Truman–Eisenhower Administrations, 1947– 61; (pp. 5–50). NSCIDs: National Security Council Intelligence Directives, Truman–Ford Administrations, 1947–77; (pp. 50–53). NSAMs: National Security Action Memorandums, Kennedy–Johnson Administrations, 1961–69; (pp. 53–77). NSDMs: National Security Decision Memorandums, Nixon–Ford Administrations, 1969– 77; (pp. 77–99). NSSMs: National Security Study Memorandums, Nixon–Ford Administrations, 1969–77; (pp. 99–115). PDs: Presidential Directives, Carter Administration, 1977–81; (pp. 115–118). PRMs: Presidential Review Memorandums, Carter Administration, 1977–81; (pp. 119– 122). NSDDs: National Security Decision Directives, Reagan Administration, 1981–89; (pp. 123–138). NSSDs: National Security Study Directives, Reagan Administration, 1981–1989; (pp. 138–142). 4 NSDs: National Security Directives, Bush 41 Administration, 1989–1993; (pp. 142–145). NSRs: National Security Reviews, Bush 41 Administration, 1989–1993; (pp. 145–146). PDDs: Presidential Decision Directives, Clinton Administration, 1993–2001; (pp. 146–148). PRDs: Presidential Review Directives, Clinton Administration, 1993–2001; (pp. 148– 152). NSPDs: National Security Presidential Directive, Bush 43 Administration, 2001–2009; (pp. 152–153). PPDs: Presidential Policy Directives, Obama Administration, 2009–2017; (p. 153-154). PSDs: Presidential Study Directives, Obama Administration, 2009–2017; (p. 154). NSPM: National Security Presidential Memorandum, Trump Administration 2017–2021; (p. 154). NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL POLICY NSC 1 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO ITALY (8 pp.) 15 OCT 47 NSC 1/1 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO ITALY (7 pp.) 14 NOV 47 NSC 1/2 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO ITALY (10 pp.) 10 FEB 48 NSC 1/3 POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO ITALY IN THE LIGHT 08 MAR 48 OF THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT BY LEGAL MEANS (10 pp.) NSC 2 BASE RIGHTS IN GREENLAND, ICELAND AND THE AZORES (6 pp.) 10 NOV 47 NSC 2/1 BASE RIGHTS IN GREENLAND ICELAND AND THE AZORES (7 pp.) 25 NOV 47 NSC 3 U.S. POLICY TOWARD SPAIN (2 pp.) 05 DEC 47 NSC 4 COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES (4 pp.) 09 DEC 47 5 NSC 4A PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (5 pp.) 09 DEC 47 NSC 5 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO GREECE (13 pp.) 06 JAN 48 NSC 5/1 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO GREECE (8 pp.) 02 FEB 48 NSC 5/2 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO GREECE (9 pp.) 12 FEB 48 NSC 5/3 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF U.S. 25 MAY 48 MILITARY POWER IN GREECE (15 pp.) NSC 5/4 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF U.S. 03 JUN 48 MILITARY POWER IN GREECE (17 pp.) NSC 6 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. REGARDING SHORT-TERM 26 MAR 48 ASSISTANCE TO CHINA (10 pp.) NSC 7 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET- DIRECTED 30 MAR 48 WORLD COMMUNISM (9 pp.) NSC 8 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO KOREA (15 pp.) 02 APR 48 NSC 8/1 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO KOREA (20 pp.) 16 MAR 49 NSC 8/2 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO KOREA (20 pp.) 22 MAR 49 NSC 9 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO SUPPORT FOR 13 APR 48 WESTERN UNION AND OTHER RELATED FREE COUNTRIES (7 pp.) NSC 9/1 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO SUPPORT FOR 23 APR 48 WESTERN UNION AND OTHER RELATED FREE COUNTRIES (6 pp.) NSC 9/2 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO SUPPORT FOR 11 MAY 48 WESTERN UNION AND OTHER RELATED FREE COUNTRIES (6 pp.) NSC 9/3 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO SUPPORT FOR 28 JUN 48 WESTERN UNION AND OTHER RELATED FREE COUNTRIES (6 pp.) 6 NSC 9/4 GUIDANCE FOR U.S. MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES FOR LONDON 20 JUL 48 MILITARY TALKS ON THE WESTERN UNION OF NATIONS (9 pp.) NSC 9/5 DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO WESTERN UNION (6 pp.) 08 NOV 48 NSC 9/6 DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO WESTERN UNION (6 pp.) 29 NOV 48 NSC 9/7 DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO WESTERN UNION (4 pp.) 03 MAY 49 NSC 10 DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL STUDIES (7 pp.) 12 MAY 48 NSC 10/1 OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS (6 pp.) 15 JUN 48 NSC 10/2 OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS (4 pp.) 18 JUN 48 NSC 10/3 COVERT OPERATIONS AND CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE 09 JAN 51 ACTIVITIES (6 pp.) NSC 10/4 RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIA (OPC) WITH RESPECT TO GUERRILLA 16 JAN 51 WARFARE (9 pp.) NSC 10/5 SCOPE AND PACE OF COVERT OPERATIONS (4 pp.) 23 OCT 51 NSC 11 ACTION BY U.S. FORCES AT TSINGTAO IN DEFENSE OF U.S. LIVES 24 MAY 48 AND PROPERTY (10 pp.) NSC 11/1 U.S. ARMED FORCES AT TSINGTAO (5 pp.) 19 OCT 48 NSC 11/2 U.S. ARMED FORCES AT TSINGTAO (6 pp.) 15 DEC 48 NSC 11/3 U.S. ARMED FORCES AT TSINGTAO (3 pp.) 23 DEC 48 NSC 12 FRENCH NORTH AFRICA (13 pp.) 28 MAY 48 NSC 13 RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD 7 02 JUN 48 JAPAN (7 pp.) NSC 13/1 RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD 24 SEP 48 JAPAN (5 pp.) NSC 13/2 RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD 07 OCT 48 JAPAN (8 pp.) NSC 13/3 RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD 06 MAY 49 JAPAN (9 pp.) NSC 14 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO PROVIDING 14 JUN 48 MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NATIONS OF THE NON-SOVIET WORLD (8 pp.) NSC 14/1 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO PROVIDING 01 JUL 48 MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NATIONS OF THE NON-SOVIET WORLD (7 pp.) NSC 15 U.S. CIVIL AVIATION POLICY TOWARD THE U.S.S.R. AND 15 JUN 48 ITS SATELLITES (6 pp.) NSC 15/1 U.S. CIVIL AVIATION POLICY TOWARD THE U.S.S.R. AND 12 JUL 48 ITS SATELLITES (7 pp.) NSC 15/2 U.S. CIVIL AVIATION POLICY TOWARD THE U.S.S.R. AND 28 DEC 49 ITS SATELLITES (17 pp.) NSC 15/3 U.S. CIVIL AVIATION POLICY TOWARD THE U.S.S.R. AND 05 JAN 50 ITS SATELLITES (15 pp.) NSC 16 U.S. POLICY REGARDING ANTI-COMMUNIST MEASURES WHICH 28 JUN 48 COULD BE PLANNED AND CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE INTER- AMERICAN SYSTEM (10 pp.) NSC 17 THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE U.S. (38 pp.) 28 JUN 48 NSC 17/1 THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE U.S. (3 pp.) 06 AUG 48 NSC 17/2 THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE U.S. (7 pp.) 13 AUG 48 NSC 17/3 THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE U.S. (34 pp.) 8 16 NOV 48 NSC 17/5 THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE U.S. (8 pp.) 15 JUN 49 NSC 17/6 THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE U.S. (11 pp.) 18 JUL 49 NSC 18 THE ATTITUDE OF THIS GOVERNMENT TOWARD EVENTS IN 06 JUL 48 YUGOSLAVIA (5 pp.) NSC 18/1 ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND YUGOSLAVIA 15 FEB 49 (11 pp.) NSC 18/2 ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND YUGOSLAVIA (9 pp.) 17 FEB 49 NSC 18/3 U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE USSR AND 10 NOV 49 YUGOSLAVIA (20 pp.) NSC 18/4 U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE USSR AND 17 NOV 49 YUGOSLAVIA (21 pp.) NSC 18/5 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO YUGOSLAVIA (6 pp.) 27 FEB 51 NSC 18/6 THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO YUGOSLAVIA (17 pp.) 07 MAR 51 NSC 19 DISPOSITION OF THE FORMER ITALIAN COLONIES IN AFRICA (12 pp.) 09 JUL 48 NSC 19/1 DISPOSITION OF THE FORMER ITALIAN COLONIES IN AFRICA (13 pp.) 21 JUL 48 NSC 19/2 DISPOSITION OF THE FORMER ITALIAN COLONIES IN AFRICA (5 pp.) 04 AUG 48 NSC 19/3 DISPOSITION OF THE FORMER ITALIAN COLONIES IN AFRICA (5 pp.) 09AUG 48 NSC 19/4 U.S. POSITION ON THE DISPOSITION OF THE FORMER ITALIAN 26 JUL 49 COLONIES (15 pp.) NSC 19/5 U.S. POSITION ON THE DISPOSITION OF THE FORMER ITALIAN 04 AUG 49 COLONIES (16 pp.) 9 NSC 20 APPRAISAL OF THE DEGREE AND CHARACTER OF MILITARY 12 JUL 48 PREPAREDNESS REQUIRED BY THE WORLD SITUATION (6 pp.) NSC 20/1 U.S.
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