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John Ehrlichman

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John Ehrlichman TABLE OF CONTENTS Ehrlichman’s Tapes and Taping Capability 2. May 1969: Ehrlichman Hiring of Ulasewicz 1969-71: Awareness of Intelligence Activities: IEC, Huston Plan, Plumbers, Sandwedge, Enemies List 4. June. 1969: Kraft Wiretap Ehrlichman’s Receipt of National Security Wiretaps 6. June-July 1971: Brookings. Firebombing 7. November 1971: Liddy’s Employment at CRP 8. June 17-19: How Ehrlichman First. Learned of the Break-in June 19: First Contacts with Dean, Knowledge of Liddy’s Involvement i0. June 20: First Meeting of all the Actors, Ehrlic~man and.Haldeman Then Meet the President ii. June 17-20: Ehrlichman’s Responsibility for Making an Investigation, and His Contacts With the Justice Department IIA. Dean’s Access to FBI Reports 12. June. 19: Meeting on Hunt’s Safe, 4 p.m. 13. June 20 On: Dean and Ehrlichman Discuss the Contents of Hunt’s Safe 14. June 28: Dean and Ehrlichman Give Gray HuntSafe Materials 15. June 21-22: Knowledge of Mexican Checks: Other Meetings 15A. June 23, 1972 Ehrlichman-Sloan Meeting 16. June 23: CIA Meeting 17. June 26-28: Knowledge of Dean-Walters Meetings July 6: Follow-up Discussions Between Ehrlichman 18. and the President on CIA Involvement July 1972: Ehrlichman’s Awareness of the "White House Horrors," and Motivation for Concealing the Ellsberg Break-in June 28 On: Ehrlichman’s Knowledge of Payments to the Defendants, Summer 1972, and Contacts with Kalmbach Ehrlichman’s Control Over Kalmbach Funds, 21. Knowledge of the White House $350,000 22. June-July 1973: Ehrlichman’s Knowledge of Perjury 23. July 21: Ehrlichman Interviewed by the FBI 24. July 31: Ehrlichman Meeting with Kleindienst, Dean July 1972: Disclosure with the President about 25. Clemency Contacts with MacGregor, 26. July, August 1972: Getting the Watergate Story Out Ehrlichman Intercedes to. Prevent 27. Late July 1972: Stans from being Called before the Grand Jury October 1972: Segretti Story Breaks in the Press November 12: Dean Plays Segretti Tape for Ehrlichman and Haldeman. in Florida November 15: Dean Plays The Hunt-Colson Tape at 30. Camp David December 5-13: Decision is Made Not to Make Public 31. Report 32. December 15: Meeting with Helms and Colby 33o January 3-5: Ehrlichman’s Role in Approving Clemency for Hunt, Through Colson 34. January 4: Meeting with Dean, Kleindienst to Discuss Clemency 35. January 6-10: Ehrlichman’s Attempts to Have Cushman Write a Memo That Does Not Name Him as the Person Who Requested Aid for Hunt January and Feburary Meetings with Dean January 1973: Ehrlichman Tells Dean to Retrieve CIA Materials from Justice 38. February i0-ii: LaCosta Meetings: Discussion of Money 39. Meetings in February and March 40. March 20: Dean Tells Ehrlichman of Hunt’s Threat 41. March 21: Meetings with Haldeman, Dean, the President 42. March 22: Meeting with Mitchell, Dean and Haldeman 42A. March 22: Afternoon Meeting with the President 43. March 23: McCord Letter 44. March 27: Meeting with Young 45. March 27 & 28, 1973: Ehrlichman’s Meeting with the President and Phone Call (Taped) to Kleindienst April 5 and 7: Meetings with Judge Byrne March 30 on: Ehrlichman investigates for the President and makes a report April-14 48. M~rch 30 on: Ehrlichman’s interviews with various people 49. April 14: Ehrlichman’s phone call to Kleindienst 50. April 15: Ehrlichman’s call to Gray about Hunt’ssafe 51. April 30: Meetings with Young and Krogh ~- EHRLICHMAN’S TAPES AND TAPING CAPABILITY Ehrlichman had a button on his dictaphone that permitted him to tape phone conversations surreptitiously. On April 30 he possessed about 30 tapes of conversations recorded since 1969. Some of those which were relevant to Watergate he turned over to the Grand Jury on his third appearance, after being evasive in his second appearance as to whether he had been instructed to produce them, and whether he had given them to his attorneys. There are other Ehrllchman tapes "relevantto the case" that are now in the President’s files. It appears they were sent there between his first and third Grand Jury appearance. Ehrlichman has never been asked if he had an independentcapability to tape conversations in his office, despite the fact that he taped office meetings with Magruder and Mitchell. Jack Anderson has reported that whenMelvln Laird moved into Ehrlichman’s office, Laird found and had removed an extensive tape mechanism built into Ehrlichman’s desk. On September 2, 1973, Jack Anderson reported that Ehrlichman had taped his April 14, 1973 conversation with Kleindienst. Ehrlichman apparently possesses a tape of a conversation with Clark MacGregor that has never been turned over to us, but was turned over to the Senate. What follows is an account of his Grand Jury testimony relating to taping and his possession of tapes. 5/3 GJ 78-85: Ehrlichman sometimes taped conversations, but doesn’t know whether he taped those with Clawson,Colson, and Kehrli relating to the June 19 meeting. He has turned about 6-8 tapes, in total, over to his attorneys. He will check to see whether these are among them. He recalls that the 6-8 tapes include conversations with Gray and MacGregor. He turned the 6-8 tapes over to his attorney the Monday after Easter, April 23, 1973. " ~. Ehrlichman Was instructed to produce all those tapes to the Grand Jury. CONTINUED (i) 5/3 GJ 115: Ehrlichman turned over all his "investigational notes" to be xeroxed, keeping originals for the President’s -file. These are a complete set of notes from his investigation. 5/9 GJ 3-6 and 13-16: Ehrlichman admits to having 25-30 tapes of conversations from the, past 3-4 years. (15-20 actual belts) Confusion about who has the 6-8 tapes previously referred to. Ehrlichman denies recalling a conversation after the last Grand Jury appearance in which his attorneys say they never received any tapes from Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman says he "misunderstood" that he was supposed to bring them with him. Ehrlichman denies consulting with his attorneys in the mean- time and finding out. they don’t have the tapes. Ehrllchman is instructed in no uncertain terms to bring them in. .... 5/14 GJ 4-7, ...... 42-44: CONTINUED (i) QUESTIONS: i, What other conversations r@levant to the case did he tape? If. he can’t recall, does he have access to the inventory of his old papers so that he could tell us? 2. When did those other tapes "go over" to the Presi- dent’s-~e? Was it between May 3 and May 14? [Almost undoubtedly, since Ehrlichman wasn’t out til Mayl, and on May 4 didn’t seem to know what he had and what he didn’t have.] 3. Who turned those tapes over to the Presidential files? Did Ehrlichman listen to any of them? Have them transcribed? 4. Did he have a taping facility in his desk, or any device other than the phone device, for taping meetings? What did he use to tape the April 14 meetings? Did Laird remove a unit from Ehrlichman’s desk? Did he tape any other meetings? Which ones? 2.. MAY 1969: EHRLIC~/.L~N HIRING OF ULASEWICZ Ehrlichman approved the hiring of Ulasewicz to work for Caulfield after a meeting at LaGuardia Airport in May 1969,set up by Caulfield. Ehrlichman denied in the Grand Jury that there was any such "meeting," but agreed he once met a man named "Tony" in a "chance encounter" at "some airport", and that he had a vague idea later on that Kalmbach had something to do with paying Ulasewicz, who was one of Caulfield’s "sources." In the Senate, after.hearing the testimony of Caulfield and Ulasewicz, Ehrlichman acknowledged that he hired Ulasewicz for "information gathering" and arranged with Kalmbach for~Ulasewicz to be paid. ULASEWICZ’S VERSION: Caulfield approached Ulasewicz in April or May 1969 about working for Caulfield. After discussions, Caulfield arranged a meeting between Ulasewicz and Ehrlichman at LaGuardia.. Caulfield asked Ulasewicz to come from his home in Queens, and Ulasewicz arranged for the three of them to use the VIP lounge of American Airlines. Ulasewicz believes Ehrlichman and Caulfield were coming up from Washington.by plane and were on their way to New York City..The three met in the VIP lounge. Ehrllchman explained that he wanted someone to seek information on political figures who would not be connected with the White House. Ehrlichman mentioned that Ulasewicz would be paid through Kalmbach’s law firm. Ulasewicz wanted a year contract, but Ehrlichman pressed for a six-month "trial period," Ulasewicz thought the purpose of the meeting was for Ehrlichman to"look him over." Subsequently, Caulfield told him Ehrllchman had agreed to a one year arrangement~ at $22,000 per year, and to Ulasewicz’s desire that only Caulfield would know what he was doing, to protect his cover ~ro~ be~n~.b~own. Caulfield then put Ulasewicz in ~ouch wlth Kalmbach, in Washington. (SC Tr. 4426; GJ; WI) .CAULFIELD’S VERSION: CONTINUED (2) EHRLICHMAN’S VERSIONS: Grand Jury: Ehrlichman met one of Caulfield’s sources, a man named "Tony." He believes it was at some airport. The man was a New York City policeman. "It was a very brief ’how do you do’, and that was all." It was not a meeting but a "chance encounter." Ehrlichman was introduced, Caulfield said that Ulasewicz was one of his sources. The only thing that took place at this chance encounter was that the two were introduced. (5/3 GJ 38-39) Ehrlichman believes that when Ulasewicz did something for Caulfield, he was paid.
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