DOCSLIB.ORG

Thesis She Encouraged Me to Write My Phd

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) The meaning of resistance: Hezbollah’s media strategies and the articulation of a people el Houri, W. Publication date 2012 Document Version Final published version Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): el Houri, W. (2012). The meaning of resistance: Hezbollah’s media strategies and the articulation of a people. Rozenberg Publishers. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:01 Oct 2021 THE MEANING OF RESISTANCE: Hezbollah’s media strategies and the articulation of a people WALID EL HOURI THE MEANING OF RESISTANCE: HEZBOLLAH’S MEDIA STRATEGIES AND THE ARTICULATION OF A PEOPLE Walid el Houri ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam © Walid el Houri, 2012 All rights reserved. Save exceptions stated by the law, no part of this publication maybe reproduced, stored in a retrieval system of any nature, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, included a complete or partial transcription, without the prior written permission of the authors, application for which should be addressed to author. Cover photo: Various stages of disintegration, 2007 © Nicolien Kegels Rozenberg Publishers Lindengracht 302 d+e 1015 KN Amsterdam The Netherlands (+) 31 (0) 20 625 54 29 [email protected] www.rozenbergps.com ISBN 978 90 361 0286 5 THE MEANING OF RESISTANCE: HEZBOLLAH’S MEDIA STRATEGIES AND THE ARTICULATION OF A PEOPLE ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. dr. D.C. van den Boom ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel op vrijdag 9 maart 2012, te 14:00 uur door Walid el Houri geboren te Beiroet, Libanon Promotiecommissie: Promotor: Prof. dr. P.P.R.W. Pisters Overige leden: Prof. dr. A.C.A.E. Moors Prof. dr. C.P. Lindner Prof. dr. J. Arquembourg Prof. dr. J. Früchtl Dr. J. Alagha Dr. M.M. Leezenberg Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen In memory of my grandfather And to my loving parents, Sana and Marwan TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS |xi NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION | xiii INTRODUCTION | 1 CHAPTER 1: FROM NASSER TO NASRALLAH: A HISTORICAL CONTEXT | 13 1. The rise and fall of Arab nationalism | 15 1.1 Consolidating the Arab nation | 16 1.2 Nationalism, colonialism and Islam | 23 2. “Islam is the solution” | 26 2.1 From Arabism to Islam |28 2.2 Slums and globalization | 30 3. The emergence of Hezbollah | 35 3.1 The Lebanese Shiite experience | 37 3.2 The transformations of Hezbollah | 39 3.3 The articulation of a multidimensional identity |44 CHAPTER 2: RESISTANCE AND HEGEMONY: SPACE, MEANING, AND THE ARTICULATION OF A PEOPLE|49 1. Populism as resistance: the construction of Hezbollah’s populist identity | 50 1.1 Resistance and hegemony |50 1.2 Politics as articulation |53 1.3 From hegemony to populism |55 1.4 Resistance as an empty signifier |57 1.5 From object to Thing |60 2. Strategies of resistance in war and conflict |63 2.1 On resistance as being heard and seen | 63 2.2 The role of popular culture in counter-hegemony |65 2.3 Political Islam, war, and media strategies |67 2.4 ‘War of signs’: war and the field of perception |69 2.5 Identification and jouissance |70 2.6 Resistance and the politics of space |72 CHAPTER 3: NASRALLAH ON THE SCREEN: NAME AND VOICE OF THE RESISTANCE |77 1. Charismatic leadership |80 1.1 Good, evil and empty signifiers |81 vii 1.2 Salvation narratives |83 1.3 Cultural references|84 2. Shiite faith in Hezbollah’s discourse: the religious sermons |85 2.1 A culture of resistance |87 2.2 Martyrdom, sacrifice, and the victory of blood over the sword |88 2.3 Beyond the religious scope: Ashura as a universal narrative of resistance |89 3. Articulating the nation: the public political speech |90 3.1 A narrative of resistance and victory |91 3.2 Hezbollah and the Lebanese state: articulating “you” and “they” |94 3.3 Resistance as a transnational model |97 4. The spectacle of victory: the 2006 war speeches |98 4.1 Two Lebanese publics: mobilization and reassurance |100 4.2 The Arab public: political criticism and the articulation of the nation |102 4.3 The Israeli public: psychological warfare |104 5. Media and war from 1967 to 2006 |107 5.1 Victory and defeat in the Arab context |108 5.2 Hassan Nasrallah: the emergence of a charismatic narrator |110 IMAGE ANNEX | 115 CHAPTER 4: SPECTACULAR VIOLENCE: FILMING HEZBOLLAH’S MILITARY OPERATIONS |123 1. Videotaping Hezbollah’s military operations |125 1.1 The Dabsheh tank, October 29, 1994 |126 1.2 Storming the Ahmadyeh outpost, June 29, 1996 |126 1.3 The Tallouseh operation, January 15, 1993 |127 1.4 From home movies to military videos |127 2. Same videos, different message |130 2.1 The videos as events |131 2.2 Framing the videos |131 2.3 The dual audience of the media war |132 3. On the strategy of showing violence |134 3.1 Showing is doing |134 3.2 Exhibiting power: hegemony and the promise of order |138 3.3 Playing the military operations |139 3.4 Perception and emotions: framing victory and showing martyrdom |141 4. The videos as archives |143 4.1 From the event to the archive |143 4.2 The political function of images |144 4.3 Re-articulating the archive |146 viii CHAPTER 5: THE MUSIC VIDEOS: FROM THE SECT TO THE NATION |149 1. Resistance in sounds and images |150 1.1 A genealogy: from MTV to Al Manar |150 1.2 The grammar of music videos |152 1.3 Music and war |153 1.4 The changing context of a practice |155 2. The changing boundaries of a multidimensional people |156 2.1 A religious call to duty |156 2.2 Articulating victory: the Hezbollah anthem |159 2.3 The emergence of a national narrative |161 2.4 Re-articulating the Arab nation |163 2.5 "The victory of the Arabs": from Lebanon to the Arab nation |166 CHAPTER 6: THE POLITICS OF INHABITATION: MAKING SPACE SPEAK |173 1. Land and identity: Lebanese politics and the Ashura campaigns |174 1.1 Occupation and resistance |174 1.2 Lebanese politics and sectarian (im)balance |176 1.3 Black turns yellow: colour politics and the changing face of the resistance |178 2. The faces of resistance: martyrdom and the de-politicization of politics |180 2.1 Politics and advertisement |180 2.2 Politics and emotional frames |183 2.3 Mobilization, commodities, and the faces of martyrs |185 3. Re-appropriating space: everyday spatial practices of liberation and hegemony|189 3.1 Power and deterrence |189 3.2 Displays of order and military trophies |192 3.3 Transgression and the meaning of space: the re-appropriation of Khiam |193 CONCLUSION |199 BIBLIOGRAPHY |207 SUMMARY |219 SAMENVATTING |223 ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would first like to thank the members of my committee for their interest, time and surely their patience in reading my project. I would also like to thank the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis and the University of Amsterdam for providing me with an open and inclusive atmosphere to develop my academic interests with seminars and events that shaped both my academic and intellectual work. My gratitude then goes to my supervisor, Patricia Pisters, who has been involved in my academic career and supportive of me ever since I arrived at the University of Amsterdam to do my MA in Film Studies in 2005. After supervising my MA thesis she encouraged me to write my PhD. Her comments, support, and constant encouragement throughout the long process of research and writing were invaluable and without her inconspicuous ways of getting me to organize my time this project would have remained a work in progress. I would also like to thank Eloe Kingma and Marc van Steekelenburg for all their help and for answering my many questions in dealing with the bureaucratic complications that come with being a non-EU national in the Netherlands. Throughout the last five years, a number of people were there to share and help manage (most of the time successfully) the complicated emotions that came with the process of writing a PhD. I would like to thank these people who made my life in Amsterdam and Beirut a great experience filled with challenging and insightful (late-night) conversations lasting countless hours, drinks and topics. These people have become my extended family scattered around the world but always present in my heart and life. Each of them has had an impact on me in a unique and immutable way and for that I am grateful.
Recommended publications
  • Muhammad Umar Memon Bibliographic News

    Muhammad Umar Memon Bibliographic News

    muhammad umar memon Bibliographic News Note: (R) indicates that the book is reviewed elsewhere in this issue. Abbas, Azra. ìYouíre Where Youíve Always Been.î Translated by Muhammad Umar Memon. Words Without Borders [WWB] (November 2010). [http://wordswithoutborders.org/article/youre-where-youve-alwaysbeen/] Abbas, Sayyid Nasim. ìKarbala as Court Case.î Translated by Richard McGill Murphy. WWB (July 2004). [http://wordswithoutborders.org/article/karbala-as-court-case/] Alam, Siddiq. ìTwo Old Kippers.î Translated by Muhammad Umar Memon. WWB (September 2010). [http://wordswithoutborders.org/article/two-old-kippers/] Alvi, Mohammad. The Wind Knocks and Other Poems. Introduction by Gopi Chand Narang. Selected by Baidar Bakht. Translated from Urdu by Baidar Bakht and Marie-Anne Erki. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 2007. 197 pp. Rs. 150. isbn 978-81-260-2523-7. Amir Khusrau. In the Bazaar of Love: The Selected Poetry of Amir Khusrau. Translated by Paul Losensky and Sunil Sharma. New Delhi: Penguin India, 2011. 224 pp. Rs. 450. isbn 9780670082360. Amjad, Amjad Islam. Shifting Sands: Poems of Love and Other Verses. Translated by Baidar Bakht and Marie Anne Erki. Lahore: Packages Limited, 2011. 603 pp. Rs. 750. isbn 9789695732274. Bedi, Rajinder Singh. ìMethun.î Translated by Muhammad Umar Memon. WWB (September 2010). [http://wordswithoutborders.org/article/methun/] Chughtai, Ismat. Masooma, A Novel. Translated by Tahira Naqvi. New Delhi: Women Unlimited, 2011. 152 pp. Rs. 250. isbn 978-81-88965-66-3. óó. ìOf Fists and Rubs.î Translated by Muhammad Umar Memon. WWB (Sep- tember 2010). [http://wordswithoutborders.org/article/of-fists-and-rubs/] Granta. 112 (September 2010).
  • Hezbollah's Syrian Quagmire

    Hezbollah's Syrian Quagmire

    Hezbollah’s Syrian Quagmire BY MATTHEW LEVITT ezbollah – Lebanon’s Party of God – is many things. It is one of the dominant political parties in Lebanon, as well as a social and religious movement catering first and fore- Hmost (though not exclusively) to Lebanon’s Shi’a community. Hezbollah is also Lebanon’s largest militia, the only one to maintain its weapons and rebrand its armed elements as an “Islamic resistance” in response to the terms of the Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon’s civil war and called for all militias to disarm.1 While the various wings of the group are intended to complement one another, the reality is often messier. In part, that has to do with compartmen- talization of the group’s covert activities. But it is also a factor of the group’s multiple identities – Lebanese, pan-Shi’a, pro-Iranian – and the group’s multiple and sometimes competing goals tied to these different identities. Hezbollah insists that it is Lebanese first, but in fact, it is an organization that always acts out of its self-interests above its purported Lebanese interests. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Hezbollah also has an “expansive global network” that “is sending money and operatives to carry out terrorist attacks around the world.”2 Over the past few years, a series of events has exposed some of Hezbollah’s covert and militant enterprises in the region and around the world, challenging the group’s standing at home and abroad. Hezbollah operatives have been indicted for the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri by the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in The Hague,3 arrested on charges of plotting attacks in Nigeria,4 and convicted on similar charges in Thailand and Cyprus.5 Hezbollah’s criminal enterprises, including drug running and money laundering from South America to Africa to the Middle East, have been targeted by law enforcement and regulatory agen- cies.
  • Iran, Hezbollah, and the Shi'ite Population in Europe

    Iran, Hezbollah, and the Shi'ite Population in Europe

    Radicalization in the Service of the Revolution: Iran, Hezbollah, and the Shi’ite population in Europe Danny Citrinowicz Report n.19, December 2020 Radicalization in the Service of the Revolution: Iran, Hezbollah, and the Shi’ite population in Europe Danny Citrinowicz, senior research fellow at the Abba Eban Institute for International Diplomacy in Israel European Eye on Radicalization Background Recently, following Islamist terrorist attacks in France and Austria, the discourse in Europe has increasingly turned to what can be done to monitor and curb those inciting such attacks by laying down the ideological basis for them.1 Naturally, since these attacks have come from the Islamic State (ISIS), most of the focus has been on those Sunni religious centers and mosques that have, directly or indirectly, assisted the terrorists. However, the discussion currently taking place across the European Continent misses a key facet of the Islamist challenge by focusing exclusively on its Sunni component, and ignoring the institutions created by the Iranian revolutionary government across Europe, which allows them deep purchase within Shi’ite Muslim populations on the Continent, as well as inroads with disaffected Sunnis and even European non-Muslims drawn to the language and posture of anti-Western radicalism. It is important to note that the criminal activities of the Iranian theocracy and its Hezbollah branch throughout Europe are not new. Some of this is ordinary criminality, from trafficking in contraband like weapons and drugs.2 Others are acts of terrorism, whether assassinations of dissidents or bombings, such as that in Burgas, Bulgaria, in 2012.3 Intelligence experts maintain that Hezbollah operatives are located in dozens of European states, including Belgium, Bosnia, Britain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine.4 The Iranian radicalization infrastructure in Europe has been built assiduously over many decades.
  • The Iran-Iraqwar Volume I

    The Iran-Iraqwar Volume I

    FMFRP 3-203 Lessons Learned: The Iran-IraqWar Volume I U.S. Marine Corps PCN iJOU332U3UUU DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited DEPARTMENT OF TIlE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20380—0001 10December 1990 FOREWORD 1. PURPOSE FleetMarine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 3—203, Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraci War, Vol. I, provides useful information to the reader about the Iran-Iraq War, particularly the lessons that can be drawn from it. 2. SCOPE This manual starts with an overview of the Iran—Iraq War. Then it discusses the strategy followed by both sides and the tactics which evolved as the war unfolded. 3. BACKGROUND This manual was written by Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere and LTC Douglas V. Johnson II of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Originally, this version was intended as a draft. Because the information in this manual is particularly significant to forces participating in or preparing for Operation Desert Shield, this manual has been published in its present form. 4. RECOMMENDATIONS This manual will not be revised. However, comments on it are important because they will be used to improve other manuals. Submit comments to —— CommandingGeneral Marine Corps Combat Development Command (WF12) Quantico, VA 22134—5001 i 5. CERTIFICATION Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS - M.P. CAULFt'ELD Major General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commander for Warfighting Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia DISTRIBUTION: i4UU3(J3QO J.i FIgure 1. Map ofIraq.
  • ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives (CHI): Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq1

    ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives (CHI): Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq1

    ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives (CHI): Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq1 S-JO-100-18-CA-004 Weekly Report 209-212 — October 1–31, 2018 Michael D. Danti, Marina Gabriel, Susan Penacho, Darren Ashby, Kyra Kaercher, Gwendolyn Kristy Table of Contents: Other Key Points 2 Military and Political Context 3 Incident Reports: Syria 5 Heritage Timeline 72 1 This report is based on research conducted by the “Cultural Preservation Initiative: Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq.” Weekly reports reflect reporting from a variety of sources and may contain unverified material. As such, they should be treated as preliminary and subject to change. 1 Other Key Points ● Aleppo Governorate ○ Cleaning efforts have begun at the National Museum of Aleppo in Aleppo, Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Heritage Response Report SHI 18-0130 ○ Illegal excavations were reported at Shash Hamdan, a Roman tomb in Manbij, Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0124 ○ Illegal excavation continues at the archaeological site of Cyrrhus in Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0090 UPDATE ● Deir ez-Zor Governorate ○ Artillery bombardment damaged al-Sayyidat Aisha Mosque in Hajin, Deir ez-Zor Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0118 ○ Artillery bombardment damaged al-Sultan Mosque in Hajin, Deir ez-Zor Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0119 ○ A US-led Coalition airstrike destroyed Ammar bin Yasser Mosque in Albu-Badran Neighborhood, al-Susah, Deir ez-Zor Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0121 ○ A US-led Coalition airstrike damaged al-Aziz Mosque in al-Susah, Deir ez-Zor Governorate.
  • Armed Conflicts Report - Israel

    Armed Conflicts Report - Israel

    Armed Conflicts Report - Israel Armed Conflicts Report Israel-Palestine (1948 - first combat deaths) Update: February 2009 Summary Type of Conflict Parties to the Conflict Status of the Fighting Number of Deaths Political Developments Background Arms Sources Economic Factors Summary: 2008 The situation in the Gaza strip escalated throughout 2008 to reflect an increasing humanitarian crisis. The death toll reached approximately 1800 deaths by the end of January 2009, with increased conflict taking place after December 19th. The first six months of 2008 saw increased fighting between Israeli forces and Hamas rebels. A six month ceasefire was agreed upon in June of 2008, and the summer months saw increased factional violence between opposing Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah. Israel shut down the border crossings between the Gaza strip and Israel and shut off fuel to the power plant mid-January 2008. The fuel was eventually turned on although blackouts occurred sporadically throughout the year. The blockade was opened periodically throughout the year to allow a minimum amount of humanitarian aid to pass through. However, for the majority of the year, the 1.5 million Gaza Strip inhabitants, including those needing medical aid, were trapped with few resources. At the end of January 2009, Israel agreed to the principles of a ceasefire proposal, but it is unknown whether or not both sides can come to agreeable terms and create long lasting peace in 2009. 2007 A November 2006 ceasefire was broken when opposing Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah renewed fighting in April and May of 2007. In June, Hamas led a coup on the Gaza headquarters of Fatah giving them control of the Gaza Strip.
  • Report Resumes Ed 012 361 the Structure of the Arabic Language

    Report Resumes Ed 012 361 the Structure of the Arabic Language

    REPORT RESUMES ED 012 361 THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARABIC LANGUAGE. BY- YUSHMANOV; N.V. CENTER FOR APPLIED LINGUISTICS, WASHINGTON,D.C. REPORT NUMBER NDEA-VI-128 PUB DATE EDRS PRICE MF-$0.50 HC-$3.76 94F. DESCRIPTORS- *ARABIC, *GRAMMAR: TRANSLATION,*PHONOLOGY, *LINGUISTICS, *STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS, DISTRICTOF COLUMBIA THE PRESENT STUDY IS A TRANSLATIONOF THE WORK "STROI ARABSK0G0 YAZYKA" BY THE EMINENT RUSSIANLINGUIST AND SEMITICS SCHOLAR, N.Y. YUSHMANOV. IT DEALSCONCISELY WITH THE POSITION OF ARABIC AMONG THE SEMITICLANGUAGES AND THE RELATION OF THE LITERARY (CLASSICAL)LANGUAGE TO THE VARIOUS MODERN SPOKEN DIALECTS, AND PRESENTS ACONDENSED BUT COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY OF ARABIC PHONOLOGY ANDGRAMMAR. PAGES FROM SAMPLE TEXTS ARE INCLUDED. THIS REPORTIS AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY MOSHE PERLMANN. (IC) w4ur;,e .F:,%ay.47A,. :; -4t N. V. Yushmanov The Structure of the Arabic Language Trar Mated from the Russian by Moshe Perlmann enter for Applied Linguistics of theModern Language Association of America /ashington D.C. 1961 N. V. Yushmanov The Structure of the Arabic Language. Translated from the Russian by Moshe Perlmann Center for Applied Linguistics of the Modern Language Association of America Washington D.C. 1961 It is the policy of the Center for Applied Linguistics to publish translations of linguistic studies and other materials directly related to language problems when such works are relatively inaccessible because of the language in which they are written and are, in the opinion of the Center, of sufficient merit to deserve publication. The publication of such a work by the Center does not necessarily mean that the Center endorses all the opinions presented in it or even the complete correctness of the descriptions of facts included.
  • Party Formation and Political Legitimacy

    Party Formation and Political Legitimacy

    THE EVOLUTION OF HEZBOLLAH: PARTY FORMATION AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at George Mason University, and the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Malta By Anastasia Franjie Bachelor of Arts George Mason University, 2011 Director: Lourdes Pullicino, Lecturer Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies Fall Semester 2013 George Mason University Fairfax, VA This work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noderivs 3.0 unported license. ii DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to several individuals whom were of great help and positive influence in my life. To my parents, Serge and Anna Maria whom were advocates of my pursuing higher education, and gave me the ability to experience and be part of a unique cultural upbringing, To my siblings Alexander, Grace, Olivia, Kristel, and our princess Mia, showing them that continuous success requires hard work, To my Maltese family whom stood by me through this process and pushed me to be over the average, Finally and most importantly to my Lebanon and every oppressed around the world with hopes of achieving peace, security and justice. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS During the course of pursuing my dual master degree from the University of Malta and George Mason University in Valletta, Malta, I had the strongest support from my family whom were overseas. This experience not only taught me about conflict analysis and resolution and Mediterranean security but it also taught me about responsibility, and life. Therefore, I would like to thank the many friends, relatives, and supporters who have made this happen.
  • Saudi Arabia, Iran and De-Escalation in the Persian Gulf

    Saudi Arabia, Iran and De-Escalation in the Persian Gulf

    Saudi Arabia, Iran and De-Escalation in the Persian Gulf Contents Acknowledgements About the authors Introduction 1. Simon Mabon and Edward Wastnidge, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Resilient Rivalries and Pragmatic Possibilities 2. Cinzia Bianco, KSA-Iran rivalry: an analysis of Saudi strategic calculus 3. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Iran-Hizbullah ‘Proxy’ Relations 4. Lawrence Rubin, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United States 5. Clive Jones, A Chimera of Rapprochement: Iran and the Gulf Monarchies: The View from Israel 6. Banafsheh Keynoush, Prospects for Talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia 7. Robert Mason, Towards Peace Building in Saudi-Iranian Relations 8. Sukru Cildir, OPEC as a Site of De-Escalation? 9. Ibrahim Fraihat, Reconciliation: Saudi Arabia and Iran 10. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Diplomacy and de-escalation in the Persian Gulf 11. Eyad Al Refai and Samira Nasirzadeh, Saudi Arabia and Iran: How our two countries could make peace and bring stability to the Middle East. Concluding Remarks Acknowledgements SEPAD has been generously funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York. We would like to extend thanks to Hillary Weisner and Nehal Amer for their continuous support in all ways imaginable. We would also like to thank all those who contributed pieces to this report. This was undertaken during the formative stages of the COVID19 pandemic and we are grateful that authors were able to offer contributions on this important topic at a time when they were facing myriad other pressures and demands on their time; thank you. We would also like to thank Elias Ghazal for his editorial and technological support. About the Authors Shahram Akbarzadeh is Research Professor of Middle East and Central Asian Politics at Deakin University.
  • Hezbollah's Growing Threat Against U.S. National Security Interests in the Middle East

    Hezbollah's Growing Threat Against U.S. National Security Interests in the Middle East

    1 Hezbollah's Growing Threat against U.S. National Security Interests in the Middle East Dr. Matthew Levitt Fromer-Wexler Fellow and Director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Author of Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Georgetown University Press). Testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa March 22, 2016 Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran, which is only growing strong in the wake of the nuclear deal with Iran. Barely ten days after the JCPOA was signed in Vienna, Hezbollah General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah stated that, “Iran's relationship with its allies is based on ideological grounds and come before the political interests.” 1 In April 2015, Nasrallah noted that even under sanctions Iran funded its allies, and anticipated that a now "rich and powerful Iran, which will be open to the world" would be able to do even more: "I say that in the next phase Iran will be able to stand by its allies, friends, the people in the region, and especially the resistance in Palestine and the Palestinian people more than any time in the past, and this is what the others are afraid of."2 Hezbollah officials are comfortable and confident that Iran will not abandon the group. As one Hezbollah official told al Monitor: “‘Hezbollah is more than just an ally for Iran.’ The relationship is similar to ‘that between father and son’… Hezbollah’s importance as an ally for Iran in the region has also become quite clear … The group has played a pivotal role in preserving the leadership of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Iran’s No.
  • 1 Khomeinism Executive Summary: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

    1 Khomeinism Executive Summary: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

    Khomeinism Executive Summary: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the country’s first supreme leader, is one of the most influential shapers of radical Islamic thought in the modern era. Khomeini’s Islamist, populist agenda—dubbed “Khomeinism” by scholar Ervand Abrahamian—has radicalized and guided Shiite Islamists both inside and outside Iran. Khomeini’s legacy has directly spawned or influenced major violent extremist organizations, including Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as Lebanese-based terrorist organization and political party Hezbollah, and the more recently formed Iraqi-based Shiite militias, many of which stand accused of carrying out gross human rights violations. (Sources: BBC News, Atlantic, Reuters, Washington Post, Human Rights Watch, Constitution.com) Khomeini’s defining ideology focuses on a variety of themes, including absolute religious authority in government and the rejection of Western interference and influence. Khomeini popularized the Shiite Islamic concept of vilayat-e faqih—which translates to “guardianship of the Islamic jurist”— in order to place all of Iran’s religious and state institutions under the control of a single cleric. Khomeini’s successor, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, relies on Khomeinist ideals to continue his authoritarian domestic policies and support for terrorism abroad. (Sources: Al-Islam, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic, Ervand Abrahamian, pp. 15-25, Islamic Parliament Research Center, New York Times) More than 25 years after his death, Khomeini’s philosophies and teachings continue to influence all levels of Iran’s political system, including Iran’s legislative and presidential elections. In an interview with Iran’s Press TV, London-based professor of Islamic studies Mohammad Saeid Bahmanpoor said that Khomeini “has become a concept.
  • Darwich2015.Pdf

    Darwich2015.Pdf

    This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use: This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author. When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. Ideational and Material Forces in Threat Perception Saudi and Syrian Choices in Middle East Wars May Darwich PhD The University of Edinburgh 2015 1 2 Declaration I declare that this thesis is of my own composition with acknowledgement of other sources, and that it has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification. May Darwich 3 4 Abstract How do states perceive threats? Why are material forces sometimes more prominent in shaping threat perception, whereas ideational ones are key in other instances? This study aims to move beyond the task of determining whether material or ideational factors offer a more plausible explanation by arguing that threat perception is a function of the interplay between material factors and state identity, the influence of which can run both ways.