PRAGMATISM, PHILOSOPHY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:

THE UNESCO COMMITTEE ON THE PHILOSOPHIC PRINCIPLES OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND THE DRAFTING OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

by

ALEXANDER GORDON DANTLOVIC

B. A., The University of British Columbia, 1981 LL. B., The University of British Columbia, 1985

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

(Department of History)

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

Dr. George W./Egerton (Thesis Supervisor)"

•Br. Steven H. Lee

Dr. Joy Dixon/Graduate Advisor)

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

September 2002

© Alexander Gordon Danilovic, 2002 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced

degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it

freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive

copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my

department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or

publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written

permission.

Department

The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada

Date OCX • 8, ZooZ.

DE-6 (2/88) 11

ABSTRACT

In January 1947 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR) held its

First Session, the primary object of which was to draft a Universal Declaration of Human

Rights. However, during the debates at this session the ideological and philosophical differences between the delegates were of such intensity that it appeared that the project would be unable to proceed. What this thesis examines is the role of the Unesco

Committee on the Philosophic Principles of the Rights of Man in resolving the philosophical and ideological impasse faced by the CHR. Specifically, this study examines the Unesco Committee's project to ascertain the philosophic bases of human rights, which was undertaken parallel to the work of the First and Second Sessions of the

CHR, the First Session of the CHR's Drafting Committee and the drafting of the preliminary Declaration by Canadian John Humphrey, the director of the Human Rights

Division (HRD) of the UN Secretariat. This study analyzes the relationship between these various processes, and the motives and objectives of Unesco in undertaking its project. The method of investigation includes an analysis of CHR records and documents, primary Unesco documents, inclusive of personal letters and reports, and the memoirs and writings of key figures in the drafting of the Declaration and Unesco, such as Humphrey and Julian Huxley, the first Director General of Unesco. Based on this review of documents a conclusion was drawn that key actors from the CHR, the HRD and Unesco closely cooperated with the intention of constructing precisely the philosophical and ideological conclusions, and pragmatic human rights structure, required to resolve the CHR's ideological impasse, and provide the necessary philosophical rationalizations to justify Humphrey's preliminary draft and the version of the Declaration ultimately proclaimed. Ul

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract 11

Table of Contents iii

Acknowledgements lv

Introduction 1

Huxley 2

Formulating The Problematic 4

The Unesco Perspective 7

The Role Of Humphrey 8

The First Draft Of The Declaration 10

The Unesco Initiative 12

Humphrey In Paris : 16

The First Session Of The Drafting Committee 18

The Cassin Draft 19

The Unesco Committee 23

A Practical Solution 28

Resolving The Dualities 30

The Unesco Report 34

The CHR's Reception Of The Unesco Report 39

The Influence of the Unesco Report 43

Conclusion 47

Notes 50 iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my father, Dragomir, without whose support, encouragement and wise advice, this project could neither have been begun nor completed.

I would also like to offer my sincerest thanks to Dr. George W. Egerton, who provided the guidance, constructive criticism and sound counsel that allowed me to navigate through a sea of documents toward a small advance in historical discovery. If it had not been for Dr. Egerton to open a door onto the fascinating world of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, this study could not have been undertaken.

I also wish to extend my appreciation to the staff of the Inter-Library Loans department of the Koerner Library at the University of British Columbia without whose assistance the majority of the documents used in this study would not have become available.

Finally, I would like to thank the remaining members of my family, Ljuba, John,

Sasha and Peter, and my friends, whose words of encouragement, unique perspectives and apt advice, also helped make this thesis possible.

And to you "Mama," thank you.

Hvala Tebi Gospode 1

In the early summer of 1942, while in his beloved France the collaborationist government of

Marshall Henri Petain began the brutal process of deporting French Jews into the abyss of the

Nazi apparatus of death,1 Jacques Maritain, the distinguished French philosopher living as an

exile in New York,2 deeply troubled by the tragedy of war that had befallen the world and

reflecting on the prospects for humanity's future, wrote the following:

In contrast to the myth of.. .Nazi...racism...a vaster and greater hope must surge up, a more fearless promise must be made to the human race. The truth of God's image naturally imprinted in us, liberty and fraternity~all these are not dead. If our civilization is in the throes of death, this is neither because it has ventured too much, nor because it has proposed too much to men. It is rather because it has not ventured enough, and because it has not proposed enough. It will revive, a new civilization will come to life, on condition that men hope and love and strive, truly and heroically, for truth, liberty and fraternity.3

Maritain's prophetic thoughts, inclusive of his human rights philosophy, which would prove so

influential in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the contrasting

• ideology of Nazism, each represented a diametrically opposed moral vision in the social i evolution of humanity. In the words of historian Yehuda Bauer, Nazism was only "one logical

I possible outcome of European history,"4 while Maritain's convictions had evolved from its i j moral antithesis.

Ever conscious of this tragic duality, and determined to secure for humanity the other logical i

possible outcome of a more noble and just future, the representatives of forty-four of the World's

| nations met in London from November 1st to 16th, 1945, to create the United Nations

| Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco), to draft its constitution and to

I enshrine within it a humanistic and democratic philosophy.5 The constitution affirmed the

preservation of man's moral conscience in the struggle to attain human rights in the first words

of its preamble: | Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed; .. .the great and terrible war which has now ended was...made possible by the denial of i the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation 1 ... of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races; ... the education of humanity for justice and j liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the ! nations must fulfill.6 2

In consequence of this sacred duty the first and greatest purpose of Unesco was:

To contribute to peace and security by promoting... universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed.. .by the Charter of the United Nations.7

This thesis examines Unesco's first great effort in achieving these aims. Specifically, we will

examine Unesco's assistance to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in its

historic task of formulating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration or UD), and

how Unesco's efforts allowed the CHR to resolve certain critical philosophical issues with which

it was confronted, and which, in January 1947, came close to aborting the project. In particular

this analysis will involve a critical study of the work of the Unesco Committee on the

Philosophic Principles of the Rights of Man (Unesco Committee) and its relationship to the CHR

and the United Nations (UN) Secretariat's Human Rights Division (HRD). Our study will

attempt to show that certain key philosophical concepts advanced by the Unesco Committee bore

a direct relationship on the work of the CHR and the drafting of the Declaration. The method we

will use in conducting our analysis will be to examine the events and records related to the work

of the CHR and the Unesco Committee from January to December 1947, that is during the first

phase in the formulation of the Declaration. These events and documents will be considered in

light of the philosophical issues faced by the CHR, such as the relationship of the individual to

the State and of liberty to equality, and in relation to the writings of Julian Huxley, the first

Director-General of Unesco, and those of the Canadian, John Humphrey, the first Director of the

HRD. On the basis of this analysis it is hoped that certain conclusions may be drawn as to how

and why the Declaration took the form that it did and to what extent Unesco's role was critical to

that process.

Huxley On March 1, 1946, Julian Huxley, the eminent British evolutionary biologist, assumed

the post of Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for Unesco.8 Shortly thereafter Huxley caused to be circulated among the members of the Commission a long essay that he had

authored, entitled Unesco: Its Purpose and Philosophy9 The essential proposition of this

document was that in order to carry out its responsibilities Unesco required a "working

philosophy...concerning human existence."10 In Huxley's view, given Unesco's constitutional

emphasis on the principles of democracy, equality and human dignity, it must adopt a philosophy

that opposed the view that the "State is a higher or more important end than the individual."11 j Consequently he was convinced that Unesco's philosophy must be based on a foundation of

; "world humanism" that endeavors to treat "all peoples and all individuals... as equals in terms of i human dignity."12 This humanism must also be "scientific" and include a fundamental i i 13 understanding of "evolutionary" theory. The resultant philosophy of "Scientific World i | Humanism," as he called it, would endow man with the ability to discern "those trends and

' activities and methods which Unesco should emphasize and facilitate."14 Moreover, Huxley saw i j this philosophy as ultimately providing for the "emergence of a single world culture."15 i Huxley's essay, however, was not well received by the other members of the Preparatory i

' Commission and its Executive Committee, who viewed it as detrimental to the underlying i objective of Unesco's constitution to respect all cultures.16 Consequently the Executive j Committee officially declared that the "essay of the Executive Secretary [is] a statement of his

| personal attitude [and] is in no way an official expression of the views of the Preparatory i Commission."17 Indeed, Huxley himself indicated in his essay that it "represented only his i i

personal views."18 Nevertheless Huxley's paper was widely circulated within Unesco and, even

' though criticized by the diplomatic representatives to the organization, it was further published j and distributed in 1947, which greatly contributed to the assumption that the document was an i official "statement of the Organization," or at least an unofficial, yet authoritative, expression of

\ Unesco policy.19 As we shall see the Unesco Secretariat kept alive the essence of Huxley's

' views, long after they were denied official sanction. 4

Formulating The Problematic When the CHR met for its First Session from January 27 to

February 10, 1947, and began its debates and discussions concerning the prospective

International Bill of Rights, inclusive of a Universal Declaration, the philosophical and

ideological positions of the various delegates were promptly expressed in strongly antagonistic

and uncompromising terms. John Humphrey, who was also serving as Executive Secretary to

the CHR, and thus had a superb vantage point from which to observe the ideological dynamics of

the event, and who himself played a pivotal role in the formulation of the Declaration, recalled

that "it would have been unreal had the great international debate on human rights not reflected

the deep differences that divided nations and groups."20 Indeed, on the 31st of January, Vladislav

Ribnikar, the representative of communist Yugoslavia, opened the debate by making a series of

aggressive Marxist-Leninist assertions about how the Bill should be structured, stating that it

must recognize that the "common interest is more important than the individual interest,"21 and

that "the psychology of individualism.. .has been used by the ruling class to.. to preserve its own

privileges."22 On February 4th Charles Malik, the representative of Lebanon, a noted neo-

; Thomist philosopher and devout Eastern Orthodox Christian, articulated the essential

' liberal democratic reply to Ribnikar's position.23 He began by observing that the "deepest j danger of the age [is] the extinction of the human person.. in his own individuality,"24 and as an j antidote to this threat he proposed 'Four Principles' of personal liberty that in his view must

constitute the basic human rights philosophy of the Commission. First, that "the human person

I is inherently prior to any group to which he may belong;" Second, that "people's minds and

! consciences are the most sacred and inviolable things about them;" Third, "any social pressure,

\ coming from any direction, that automatically determines a person's consent, is wrong;" and I , Fourth, "the group to which a person belongs, whatever it be.. .can be wrong."25

The Soviet delegate, Valentin Tepliakov, replied that Malik's position was erroneous, in that J ; human beings live "as individuals in a community and a society" and have overriding "duties i I 5 and obligations to their community," principles which, in his view, formed the basis of the Soviet constitution, under which its citizens enjoyed full human rights.26 Hansa Mehta, the representative of India, frustrated at the digressive nature of the philosophical discussions, retorted in practical terms that the Commission's purpose was "to uphold the dignity and worth of the human person" and to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights" in accordance with the

UN Charter and not to "decide whether the human person or society comes first," nor to "enter into this maze of ideology."27 For Eleanor Roosevelt, the American representative and the Chair

of the CHR, it was not imperative that the question of whether "government exists for the good

of the individual [or] for the benefit of a group" be answered, but rather the Commission had to

ensure that in drafting a Declaration it "safeguard the fundamental freedoms of the individual."28

On February 5th the British representative, Charles Dukes, attempting to formulate a moderate

social democratic balance between the Marxist left and libertarian right, stated that "there is no

such thing as complete personal freedom," and therefore the Commission must of necessity "find

a position between those two extremes" of ideology, for "no freedom that precludes State

organization, and.. .individual responsibility to State organization will meet present day

requirements."29 France's representative, the eminent legal philosopher and jurist Rene Cassin,

focusing on the essence of the debate, emphasized that Malik and his opponents were articulating

the "two main theories" of social existence confronting humanity: "the fundamental rights of the

individual and the fundamental rights of the group. Which.. has more rights and

responsibilities?"30 He found his answer to this question in the observation that "the individual,

the human being, is above all a social creature whose life, development and progress have been

made possible only because he could lean on his neighbors," and consequently the "social group

[and] State" exists only with the "support of human beings."31 In Cassin's view this tendency,

with its inherent requirement of the balance of rights and interests, compelled, as a matter of

human necessity and political imperative, that humanity "try to solve in a practical way those 6 two aspects of the problem."32 Malik, now replying in less absolute terms, suggested that the only true solution to the tyranny of the State was to implement a formula for human rights which allowed individuals "full social responsibility" and yet balanced this with the "truth" that the

"State in all its functions is for the sake of the free human person."33

Such was the chaotic state of the CHR at the end of its First Session, with hopes for the formulation of a Declaration endangered by the voices of diametrically opposed ideologies and political philosophies. If this philosophical impasse could not be transcended the work of the

CHR would be paralyzed and the moment for the advancement of universal human rights would

pass. In the view of legal historian M.A. Glendon "these exchanges... marked a defining

moment,"34 in consequence of which "the members of the Commission seemed to have been

sobered by the opening of the great divide" between the proponents of liberal individualism and

Marxist collectivism.35 Nevertheless, it was clear from the debates that this ideological division,

leaning predominantly in the direction of liberal democracy, was overlapped by the views of the

ideologically pragmatic and those who articulated a position of philosophical compromise, who

were perhaps in a slight majority and, as Glendon observes, "advocated a balance between the

36

traditional civil and political rights [and] the newer social and economic rights." However,

given the political power of the States holding the more extreme ideological positions, primarily

the USSR, the key for this pragmatic majority was to achieve a balance of rights in such a way as

would take the various positions into appropriate consideration and reasonable inclusion; and if

this were not possible, to discover at least a compromise formula that would allow the work of

the CHR to proceed. What remained was a profound philosophical crisis, expressed in a series

of antinomies which we may summarize as follows: the rights of the individual as against the

rights of the collective, the relationship of liberty to equality, the relationship between the rights

and duties of the individual and the State, and the role of natural law, with its religious

implications, as against positive law in the origins and formulation of human rights. These four 7 fundamental dualities reflected the inherent tension between the two major ideological conceptions of society: Liberalism and Communism.

The Unesco Perspective Present at these unproductive debates which were unable to resolve

any philosophical differences, and discerning the obvious binaries of these positions, was an

official representative of Unesco.37 Unesco's continued, constitutionally mandated, interest in

human rights, and its intention to assist substantively the CHR, was confirmed at the First

Session of the Unesco General Conference, held Nov. 19 to Dec. 1, 1946, where it determined to

establish a conference or committee to investigate the philosophical principles underlying human

rights.38 Indeed, plans for such a deliberative body were being formed in January of 1947,

before the CHR was in session, as if, Glendon notes, "anticipating" the probability that critical

questions of philosophy would inevitably arise.39 Consequently, Huxley sent a special

representative, Archibald MacLeish, American Assistant Secretary of State and a member of the

United States delegation to Unesco, to apprise the Commission of these plans in general terms.40

On January 28, 3 days before the philosophical debate began, but already in an atmosphere of

ideological tension, MacLeish, in his address to the CHR, noted that Unesco was "particularly

interested.. .in the general question of a Declaration of human rights" and "emphasized that

Unesco had only one desire, which was to be as useful as it could, and place itself at the service"

of the Commission. 41

At the beginning of February, as the intensity of the philosophical debate increased, Huxley

himself arrived at UN headquarters and unofficially attended one or two CHR meetings as an

observer.42 Nevertheless, it is clear that Huxley did take part in informal discussions with CHR

members, and, we may infer, with members of the HRD. Huxley specifically spoke to Mrs.

Roosevelt indicating, "Unesco would endeavor to establish certain principles of human rights."43

It is highly probable that Huxley also had informal discussions regarding Unesco's plans with

such key figures as Cassin and Humphrey. In addition, Huxley's presence was crucial to 8

Unesco's program for it would have been clear to him, as he witnessed the debates in those

critical days, that the CHR had reached an impasse that had to be overcome. Regardless of

Huxley's state of mind, two days after the Four Principles debate, he directed one of Unesco's

representatives to the CHR, Herve Darchambeau, to more specifically inform the CHR of

Unesco's plans.44 On February 6th Darchambeau addressed the CHR, stating that:

The question of human rights was a fundamental one for Unesco. He therefore hoped that collaboration between the Commission... and Unesco would be effective... in a sphere of particular interest to Unesco, namely, the Bill of Human Rights. In regard to the Bill, three meetings of philosophers and experts had been arranged to take place in June, July or September of 1947 in order to clarify the philosophical principles that must be the basis of any Bill of Human Rights [and that] it was desirable that Unesco should communicate the result of its work to the Commission45

Mrs. Roosevelt took "due note" of Darchambeau's remarks, and not a single word of opposition

was voiced by the delegates, from which we may infer that the CHR acquiesced to Unesco's

objectives.46 Unesco's proposal was also confirmed in the CHR's report on the First Session,

drafted by Malik, to its parent body, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).47

The Role Of Humphrey Given the philosophical controversies of the First Session it became

readily apparent that the CHR, on its own, would not be capable of drafting a preliminary

Declaration of human rights for the purpose of further discussion.48 On February 3 the CHR

unanimously approved a joint resolution of France, Lebanon and Yugoslavia, that the Chair,

Mrs. Roosevelt, Vice-Chair, P. C. Chang the representative of China, and the Rapporteur, Malik,

would form a Drafting Committee (DC) and, "with the assistance of the Secretariat" and "in

accordance with the instructions and decisions" of the CHR, prepare a draft of the Declaration

for submission to the Second Session of the CHR for review.49 Nevertheless, this was only

achieved after the resolution of a controversy as to whether the Secretariat could call in the

assistance of outside experts, it being decided that such assistance was not appropriate.50 In

regard to this dispute, Humphrey recalls in his memoirs that "if there was any plot to turn the

drafting over to outsiders, I knew nothing of it: and, in fact, no outside experts were consulted at 9

any stage in the drafting," a comment that will take on a certain ambiguous significance in light

of subsequent events, both in regard to the position of the CHR and the definition of the term

outside experts.5y

The first meeting of the Drafting Committee took place on February 18 at Mrs. Roosevelt's

Washington Square apartment in New York, and was attended by Malik, Chang and

Humphrey.52 As Humphrey recalls "it soon became obvious that this Committee would not draft

the bill," given that "Chang and Malik were too far apart in their philosophical approaches to be

able to work together on a text," even though their positions bore strong liberal democratic

similarities; the contention rested in the fact that Malik was a adamant believer in natural law and

a devout Christian while Chang, with whom Humphrey would form a strong personal and

philosophical friendship, was a pragmatist and, a 'pluralist,' loathe to import natural law

formulations into the Declaration.53 Indeed, personal relationships with members of the CHR

were pivotal to Humphrey's ability to exert a critical, if indirect, influence on the drafting

process. In his memoirs Humphrey stated that some delegates operated with very few

"instructions from their governments," and that these "were not the least useful

representatives,"54 noting that the "Secretariat worked very closely with these delegates, who

were glad to be fed ideas" and that whenever he "had an idea that had any merit [he] could

usually give it expression through some friendly delegate."55 This was, as Humphrey modestly

states, one of the "ways in which we were able to make a substantive contribution,"56 suggesting

that the potential to effectively persuade delegates was considerable.57 For the present, the duty

of drafting the initial Declaration was delegated by the Drafting Committee to Humphrey, whose

task was to bridge the philosophical gulf of the Drafting Committee by drawing together the

antagonistic philosophical positions that were evident in the CHR.

Humphrey's Political Philosophy By the time Humphrey joined the UN Secretariat, in August

of 1946, to become Director of the Human Rights Division, after a successful career as a law 10 professor at McGill University, he considered himself a socialist, a rationalist and anti-clerical.58

His socialism, however, was one that revered fundamental political and civil rights, and as such

his personal political beliefs were based on a philosophical and ideological duality that mirrored

the philosophical debates of the CHR. Indeed, Humphrey's writings of that time exhibit the

same yearning to resolve this duality, as do the pragmatists of the CHR. Previously, in 1932 he

had indicated that "I'm like Leon Blum, to me socialism is a religion"59 yet, he later stated: As

"a liberal (with a small 1).. .the individual is my religion and ultimate value."60 This theme of

philosophical duality and opposition, countered by a theme of balance, compromise and

synthesis, reappears in his early diaries where, contemplating the "conflict between democracy

and equality on the one hand and liberty on the other," he concluded that the "quarrel between

equality and liberty is...in modern terms, the quarrel between socialism and liberalism" and, in

consequence, the "great question is.. .which do you want most" in the balance between liberty

and equality?61 His own answer at the time, 1949, and which we may assume informed his

thoughts in 1947 when he approached the drafting of the Declaration, was "I want some of both,

as much indeed of both as their fundamental incompatible natures permit. That is why I reject

both liberal capitalism and totalitarianism."62 Thus, Humphrey, already infused with an

intellectual tendency to synthesize antagonistic rights, now embarked on an effort to merge the

significant rights ranged in opposition to each other in the uncompromising philosophical

positions of the CHR, by merging those rights most similar to those reflected in his own

philosophy and objectives, and, in strategic and practical terms, those most proximate to one

another.

The First Draft Of The Declaration Humphrey began working on his draft on or about

February 18, 1947, and would continue this work for approximately the next five to six weeks.63

Prior to the beginning of the First Session, the CHR had received about 20 draft Declarations of

human rights from various governments, NGOs and individuals that had been reviewed by the 11

HRD, which had distributed a report on this material to the delegates.64 Humphrey employed these as the primary legal, structural and philosophical models for his draft.65 In Humphrey's

view the best of the documents he utilized in preparing his draft was that submitted by the

American Law Institute, and it was from this draft that he borrowed many of the legal concepts,

formulations and phrases that he included.66 As Humphrey recalls, of the core documents he

consulted, "with two exceptions, all these texts came from English-speaking sources, and all of

them came from the democratic West."67 However, among these sources the draft declaration of

the 'Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States,' which Chile

had submitted to the CHR, along with a Cuban draft and one from the American Federation of

Labor, all of a social democratic nature, were, in human rights scholar Johannes Morsink's view,

the primary sources "from which Humphrey borrowed when he put the social, economic and

cultural rights into his first draft."68

Reviewing Humphrey's draft primarily from the philosophical perspective, we can see that he

crafted a document reflective of his philosophical predispositions, and an inclination to balance

and synthesize, to the greatest extent rationally possible, philosophical opposites. In the result

Humphrey produced a draft Declaration made up of forty-eight articles and four brief

introductory principles, to be placed in a preamble, suggestive of the objectives and purposes of

the Declaration.69 Most of the articles related specifically to civil and political rights; however,

economic, social and cultural rights were present in almost equal measure, with Humphrey

reflecting later that it was "by no means certain that economic and social rights would have been

included in the final text" if he had not included them in his draft,70 implying the powerful

influence Humphrey had in molding the Declaration. In the result Humphrey achieved a

balanced composite of rights and ideology. Briefly summarized, Humphrey's draft included the

following rights, freedoms and duties: 12

There can be no peace unless human rights and freedomsar e respected...Man does not have rights only; he owes duties to society... Man is a citizen of his State and of the World... There can be no human freedom or dignity unless war [is] abolished. Everyone has a duty of loyalty to his State and must make common sacrifices for the common good; each must respect the rights of others; each has the right to life and liberty and against arbitrary arrest; slavery shall be prohibited; there must be liberty of movement and freedom from arbitrary search and seizure and personal interference; each has a right to a legal personality, freedomo f conscience, belief and expression; each has a duty to present information fairly; each has freedomo f assembly and association, to own personal property and to equal opportunity of vocation and profession; each has a right to petition, to resist oppression, to free elections, to take part in the government of one's State and to a nationality. Everyone has a right to medical care, to education, a right and a duty to perform socially useful work and to good working conditions; each shall have a share of national income, public help and social security, to healthy food and housing and a rightt o participate in cultural life, the sciences and the arts; each shall be free from discrimination and be secure as a minority.71

Humphrey's draft, with its balance of rights, represents a reconciliation of the interests of the individual and the collective, of liberty and equality, and of rights and duties, the issues that affected his political consciousness, and had deeply divided the CHR. It was a document that, to the degree it successfully transcended the philosophical dualities and divergent interests of the

CHR, could form the basis of further discussion and permit the CHR to continue the process of formulating the Declaration. Whether this solution would be acceptable to the delegates was a matter to be decided by their collective and individual wisdom. For those who favored this solution, and desired that it form the foundation of a coherent juridical and philosophical whole on which a universal edifice of human rights could be built, the proper intellectual justifications would have to be applied.

The Unesco Initiative Humphrey had completed his draft by approximately the end of March

1947, but while he had been working, Unesco was simultaneously planning and preparing its contribution to the work of the CHR. By the middle of March Unesco had formulated the first stage of its strategy to provide the CHR with the intellectual means for the resolution of the philosophical issues with which it was faced. To achieve this objective, as was indicated to the

CHR, Unesco was to conduct an investigation of the philosophical principles at the core of human rights. Jacques Havet, one of Unesco's permanent delegates to the CHR, and head of the 13

Philosophy Sub-Section of the Philosophy and Humanistic Studies Section of the Unesco

Secretariat, was in overall charge of the project, though Huxley was intimately involved.72 The

CHR had voiced no objections to this project, and consequently Unesco concluded that the CHR

in fact concurred in Unesco contributing to the process of formulating a Declaration. Indeed, in

a document published by Unesco in March of 1947 it was noted that Unesco had "been informed

by the Chairman of the Commission that its views on the principles underlying [a] Declaration

would be welcomed."73

Unesco had initially considered convening a great 'Conference of Philosophers' to engage in

a comprehensive discussion of the question.74 However, Unesco, aware of the acute nature of

the issues to be resolved, and the specific time schedule driving the CHR, concluded that "in

view of the immediacy of the task" it considered it preferable to cancel the Philosopher's

Conference.75 As an alternative Unesco decided to request that various philosophers provide

"contributions in written form" of an analysis of "the problem of human rights and its underlying

principles so as to permit the formulation of a Declaration of Human Rights." 76 On March 27th,

therefore, Unesco sent out approximately 150 invitations to "individual thinkers to submit a

statement on the subject or a particular aspect of it, to serve as suggestions" for the CHR.77 After

receiving the responses Unesco would submit them to the Unesco Committee, that is, a small

group of philosophers and intellectuals appointed by Unesco, with Havet as Executive Secretary,

which would "utilize them as the basis for a single document" to be sent to the CHR.78 The

contributors were asked to submit their replies "as soon as possible," and not later than the end of

June 1947, when the Unesco Committee was scheduled to meet in formal session to discuss

them.79 In addition, Unesco was aware that the Drafting Committee would also be meeting in

June to discuss and prepare its preliminary draft;80 therefore, if Unesco was to complete its work,

and have any influence on the deliberations of the DC and CHR, time was of the essence. 14 The Unesco Memorandum In addition to the invitations to the philosophers, the Philosophy

Sub-Section had attached a comprehensive Memorandum and Questionnaire, drafted by Havet

and his staff, though with Huxley's influence, that set out "the general framework of ideas in which [Unesco] hoped the contributors would treat the problem."81 This memorandum began with a historical review setting out the foundations of the philosophical conflict faced by the

CHR, and thereby formulating the problem to be analyzed. The memorandum acknowledged

that the "classical formulations of human rights" that were so "influential" in the development of

Western culture were "drawn up on the basis of a conception of individual human rights as

absolute and inherent" and articulated as "natural rights."82 The document also credited the

Reformation "with its appeal to the absolute autonomy of the individual conscience" and the

material and social requirements of capitalism "with its emphasis on freedom of individual

enterprise," articulated as Liberalism, as being primarily responsible for preparing the social and

intellectual foundations for the modern conception of individual rights.83

However, individual freedom "by no means guaranteed economic and social freedom" which

was "profoundly modified" through the ascendance of industrial capitalism.84 In time, man's

relationship to the social consequences of capitalism were acutely affected by the "general

acceptance of the theory of evolution, and the rise of Marxism" which produced a "relativistic

frame of reference" for the development of human rights.85 In this context, the advent of

massive unemployment and economic depression, concurrent with efforts at alleviating the

suffering of workers, further threatened "individualist conceptions" of human rights.86 This

crisis was exacerbated by Marxist revolutionary developments in Russia, and the consequent

radical emphasis on economic and social rights, culminating in a fundamental "opposition"

between the "western and the communist usage of the word 'democracy'."87

Given the contradictions between the two opposed ideologies of Liberalism and Marxism, and

their respective views on the relationship between man and society, the memorandum concluded 15 that "the present state of the subject may be regarded as a confrontation of two working

conceptions of human rights," one constituted by the "premise of inherent individual rights" and

a strong "bias against.. government interference," and the other "based upon Marxist principles

and.. one party government, which inevitably restricts certain political freedoms."88 This

conclusion and its phrasing is very close to one articulated by Huxley in his Unesco essay of a

year earlier where he stated that in the contemporary world "two opposing philosophies of life

confront each other," and one "may categorize the two philosophies as.. individualism versus

collectivism; or...as capitalism versus communism,"89 which "differ essentially on one point -

the relation between the individual and the community."90 In consequence of this philosophical

opposition, the memorandum proposed that humanity's task was to "find some measure for the

future development of the two tendencies, or in terms of the Marxist dialectic to affect a

reconciliation of the two opposites in a higher synthesis."91 This statement is nearly identical to

one in Huxley's text, where he argues:

Can this conflict be avoided, these opposites be reconciled, this antithesis be resolved in a higher synthesis? I believe not only that this can happen, but that, through the inexorable dialectic of evolution, it must happen... I am convinced that the task of achieving this synthesis in time to forestall open conflict must be the overriding aim of Unesco.92

Clearly, the drafters of the memorandum were attempting to advance the principles of

Huxley's philosophy and, to that extent, were pre-judging the conclusions of the contributors and

discreetly influencing the substance of their replies. This is underscored in the memorandum's

concluding Huxleyan directive to the philosophers:

The immediate issue is clear. The world of man is at a critical stage in its political, social and economic evolution. If it is to proceed further on the path towards unity, it must develop a common set of ideas and principles. One of those is a common formulation of the rights of man.93

Thus, if humanity is to prevail over its crises it must adhere to Huxley's conception of an

evolutionary philosophy leading to the synthesis of man's philosophies ~ that is, his essay's

universal imperative of "a unified common outlook and a common set of purposes," and the

initial step in this process was to be the universalizing of human rights.94 16

Having introduced the problematic in Huxleyan and Western philosophical terms, and focused on the philosophical issues confronting the CHR, the memorandum now specifically listed the consequent philosophical dualities in the form of a series of pertinent questions it hoped the philosophers would attempt to resolve:

What are the relations between the political, the social and the economic rights of individuals... and of groups? Are the differences between the divergent formulations of ideal human rights and freedoms in different societies accurate indications of... material differences in economic and social conditions? Have the personal relations and group relations... of man been altered... by intellectual and cultural developments? Have traditional human rights... been affected by the industrial revolution and its consequences? What are the relationships between rights and duties for individuals and for groups? What are the relationships of individual freedoms to corporate and social responsibilities!95

The philosophers were then given a list of rights, reminiscent of Humphrey's, on which they

were asked to comment as to their "theoretical grounds" and "practical extent."96 Unesco, and

those who sympathized with its goals, anxiously awaited the philosopher's replies as to whether

they believed, as did Humphrey, that a common formulation of human rights was possible.

Humphrey In Paris Having finished his draft, and set in motion a vast annotation of his work

by the HRD, known as the 'Documented Outline,' Humphrey left for Paris at the beginning of

April to represent the Secretary-General at meetings of the Executive Board of Unesco that were

scheduled from the 10th to 15th that month.97 It is clear from Humphrey's memoirs that while in

Paris he had extensive social and professional contact with Huxley. Though stating he was "a

mere observer," having, officially, "very little to do or say," Humphrey does indicate he

discussed international policy with Huxley, though, curiously, he makes no references to specific

discussion on human rights.98 Nevertheless, Unesco documents clearly reveal that Humphrey

discussed the Unesco human rights project with Huxley, the Executive Board and key members

of the Philosophy Sub-Section in great detail, and thus he was fully aware of Unesco's activities.

For example, Huxley, in a letter to Arthur Compton the US representative to Unesco, dated May

9, 1947, stated that: 17

I discussed the whole question at length with Professor Humphrey... before his departure recently [from Paris], and after he had investigated Unesco's part in this work at length over a period of days. His conclusion was that... we should go ahead as proposed."

However, a question did arise as to possible overlapping activity between the CHR and Unesco, with Humphrey concluding, in Huxley's words, that "the risk of a possible duplication with the

Human Rights Commission.. .being in fact not serious."100

It is highly probable that Humphrey had in his possession, in Paris, all the documents relevant to his discussion on human rights with the Unesco leadership, including his draft Declaration, and that he fully apprised them of his work and that of the Drafting Committee. Given

Humphrey's detailed human rights discussion with Unesco, and his reticence to reveal this in his memoirs, the critical question is whether Humphrey had any influence on the further development of the Unesco project? Had he discussed the possibility of utilizing the project to generate the philosophical rationalizations he required to justify his draft, which itself was a composite synthesis consistent with Unesco's objectives? Indeed, had he earlier influenced the construction of the memorandum, whose list of rights and themes mirrored his own? In my view, the answer is a provisional yes, though the evidence is largely circumstantial.

Curiously, at this same time in April, Cassin had contacted Unesco to offer his assistance to the philosophy project, which was enthusiastically accepted by Huxley in a personal letter, in which he thanked Cassin "for the suggestions" he made "notably in regard to what we might perform in relation to the Preamble of the Declaration," and instructed Havet to discuss the subject with Cassin "in the near future," though details of cooperation were not specified.101

Simultaneously, Mrs. Roosevelt, who we must assume was fully aware of Unesco's activities, notified the American delegation to Unesco on April 17th that the first session of the Drafting

Committee was scheduled for June 9th and to convey to Unesco that it should submit its contribution by that date; however, she noted that if this were not possible such "contribution could be utilized later."102 In consequence of this message, and, no doubt, of the constructive 18

discussions with Humphrey, Huxley wrote a comprehensive reporting letter to Mrs. Roosevelt on

th

May 12 , confirming Unesco's position as set out at the first session of the CHR and informing

her of the progress of the Unesco project, but regretting "that it will not be possible to • th

provide.. .Unesco's contribution by June 9 /'nevertheless he was confident that Unesco's report,

when submitted, would "be of assistance" in the further deliberations of the Commission.103

The First Session Of The Drafting Committee On June 9, 1947, Humphrey's draft

Declaration and the Documented Outline of the HRD were submitted to the DC, now expanded

to eight members, for review.104 Humphrey's text was to be utilized by the DC as "the basis for

its work" in the further drafting of the Declaration, and the session gave Humphrey, who was

also Executive Secretary of the DC, his first opportunity to exercise the influence necessary to

implement the ideology and philosophy of his text without directly asserting what these

philosophical choices were.105 Indeed, at the first meeting of the DC the issue of philosophy was

re-ignited, when the representative of Australia, William Hodgson, pointedly asked Humphrey

"What was the philosophy behind this paper?"106 In his memoirs Humphrey comments that his

initial reaction was "that any answer I could give to his question would, in that ideologically

divided group, get my draft into hot water"101 Consequently, Humphrey provided an evasive

reply that averted attention from his personal, and the draft's, philosophy and the ideological

strategy behind the drafting of the document, stating ambiguously, that he could not answer "for

the simple reason that [the draft] is based on no philosophy whatsoever. "108 Given the

philosophical foundations of Humphrey's political thinking and the Social and Liberal

Democratic spectrum of ideas from which he chose his composite structure of rights, this

statement was clearly disingenuous. In his memoirs he justified his equivocation by suggesting

that, "essentially my answer was true, because my draft was based on the documents that I had

before me" including "rights recognized by various national constitutions and... suggestions that

had been made for an international bill of rights."109 19

Nevertheless, and we must assume this reflected his state of mind in 1947, Humphrey clearly admits in his memoirs that this purely technical reasoning was a screen for his motives and philosophical positions, stating that "I wasn't going to tell him that insofar as it reflected the views of the author -who had in any event to remain anonymous- the draft attempted to combine humanitarian liberalism with social democracy."110 Humphrey was the single directing mind behind this attempt to combine, which was motivated by his personal philosophical choices, for as he states, "I had myself decided what to put in and what to leave out."111 Therefore, he was clearly aware that by revealing his philosophical and ideological objectives he would jeopardize his ability to influence the outcome of the deliberations in a direction that would secure the type of composite Declaration he desired, observing in his memoirs that "a more expansive reply would have been indiscreet to the point of compromising the work of the Commission."112

I suggest this was a euphemistic description of the possible compromising of Humphrey's own work, which he intimately identified with that of the CHR. It appears that the real purpose behind Humphrey's evasion of the truth was to execute a calculated strategy to convince the majority of the CHR to accept his draft as the only rational solution to the philosophical impasse, while simultaneously convincing them to refrain from interrogating its philosophical origins.

This could only be achieved if some mechanism were found through which philosophical positions could be reasonably and constructively ignored.

The Cassin Draft The Drafting Committee also reached something of a philosophical crisis, as the contents of the draft Declaration remained contentious, though they agreed that

Humphrey's text should be utilized as the basis for further discussion and re-drafting.

Consequently it was decided that a "temporary working group" be appointed, made up of Cassin,

Malik and Geoffrey Wilson of the UK, to "suggest 'a logical re-arrangement' of the articles" in

Humphrey's draft, and how "they should be re-drafted in light of the Committee's discussions."113 When this group met on June 13th, they concluded that any revised document 20 would have "greater unity if drawn up by an individual" and directed Cassin to undertake this responsibility, which he completed over the next three days.114 Previously, at the second

meeting of the DC, Cassin had complimented Humphrey and the Secretariat on the success of their work; however, he suggested that certain "fundamental principles should be incorporated in the outline" which would emphasize the "unity of the human race" and "fraternity among

men."115 Malik added that the draft "did not contain a sufficient reference to the dignity of

man."116 Cassin now proceeded to rectify, in manifestly philosophical terms, what he and Malik

considered to be deficiencies in Humphrey's text.

Cassin's new draft consisted of a preamble, six "introductory" articles of General Principles,

and thirty-six "substantive" articles categorized under eight descriptive headings.117

Nevertheless, as Humphrey notes, Cassin's text was virtually identical to his own, reproducing

"most of its essentials and style," and duplicating some 75% of his articles and phrasing.118

However, in relation to the philosophical issues with which we are concerned, certain articles in

Cassin's text, under the heading of General Principles, which are relatively different to

Humphrey's, are, in summary, as follows:

Art. 1. All men, being members of one family are free, possess equal dignity and rights, and shall regard each other as brothers. Art. 2. The object of society is to enable all men to develop.. .their physical, mental and moral personality. Art. 3. As human beings cannot live and achieve their objects without the help and support of society, each man owes to society fundamental duties... demanded for the common good. Art. 4. The rightso f all persons are limited by the rights of others.119

Primarily by means of these General Principles, the overall affect of Cassin's draft was to

articulate a philosophically explicit improvement over Humphrey's prosaic composite balance of

rights with its tactical reticence to implicate philosophical principles. In Glendon's view, Cassin

achieved this in the dignitarian assertions of his "introductory provisions," which incorporated

the substance of Humphrey's philosophical goals and composite structure, and affirmed "the

equal rights of every member of the human family and embodied concepts.. that were neither

individualist nor collectivist," yet expressed them in the ennobling terms of the Enlightenment.120 21 th The Drafting Committee began its discussion of Cassin's draft on June 17 . Humphrey's reaction, though muted during the deliberations, and no doubt expressed privately, was recalled in his memoirs as one of restrained indignation that, "there were several articles.. .which stated principles that were more philosophical than legal [and] not appropriate for the Declaration."121

In my view, Humphrey clearly meant overtly philosophical, and thus destined to provoke an attack against themes that were identical, though implicit, in is own draft. This is revealed in

Humphrey's comment in his memoirs that his "own draft had carefully avoided any philosophical assertions," as opposed to underlying implications, when, as we have seen, even by

Humphrey's own admission, his philosophical presuppositions were clearly included.122 The key word here is: assertions for appearances and ultimately assent, are pivotal to Humphrey's

strategy. Thus, the apparent conflict between Cassin and Humphrey, given their basic

ideological agreement, was in reality one of strategy and the most effective method of ensuring

acceptance of a philosophically composite draft by the CHR.

The roots of Humphrey's strategy may be found in his earlier theories regarding how

international legal norms are assented to by States. In 1945 Humphrey argued that the ultimate

"fundamental norm" of international law "is simply the precept that international custom shall be

obeyed."123 Humphrey conceded that, with regard to this underlying condition of assent, his

"hypothesis cannot.. .explain the legal character of custom itself;" for "why international custom

should be obeyed," or any law for that matter, "the jurist cannot say," or need say.124 Ultimately,

in all legal contexts, the need to assert a legal norm makes it "necessary to resort at some point to

some fundamental hypothesis or axiom, the validity of which cannot be proven juridically."125

Therefore, the requirement for the validity of any legal order is simply that it be universally

accepted as an "assumed norm," and that "the terms used in the suggested norm must carry with

them their own definitions."126 Humphrey appears to have transposed this theory to the

establishment of a fundamental universal norm of human rights, whose ultimate validity as a 22 legal order, whether present or prospective, cannot and need not be explained juridically, and by implication, philosophically. If his Declaration is to be accepted and implemented as a universal

norm it must be assumed to be valid and binding regardless of metaphysical justifications, which

could neither validate the norm nor explain its ultimate origins. Debate and agreement on

philosophical origins were neither required nor necessary, and could jeopardize the Declaration's

existence as a norm. Thus, for Humphrey, a philosophical principle is only acceptable if it is

assented to as an unquestioned norm; otherwise it is to be avoided.

Regardless of how true Humphrey's theory may have been, an inspirational or practical

impetus was required to initiate the acceptance of the Declaration as a new fundamental norm,

and selected philosophic principles could serve as a method to bring this into being. Cassin

seems to have understood this instinctively; nevertheless he also believed that what was required

was a common sense philosophy without controversy, for Cassin still essentially agreed with

Humphrey regarding his philosophical objectives and the importance of the success of his

composite draft. As Cassin commented later regarding his General Principles, his objective was

to "find a formula that did not require the Commission to take sides on the nature of man and

society, or to become immured in metaphysical controversies," a purpose identical to

Humphrey's.127 However, Cassin, like Humphrey, did in fact take a position, in an ideologically

composite and balanced middle ground, by means of a formula that assimilated social democratic

rights to a liberal democratic nucleus. Cassin's draft, as Glendon observes, "did implicitly take

sides against the extremes of capitalist individualism and socialist collectivism,"128 and

delineated a rights framework built on Humphrey's initial ideological choices. In the result,

Cassin and Humphrey's essentially unified endeavor was an evolution in human rights ideology

that articulated the balanced solution advocated by the liberal and pragmatic voices of the CHR.

It was, as Glendon accurately recognizes, a "synthesis [that] was bringing something new into

the world."129 23

This synthesis, however, even if sympathized with by a majority of the delegates, did not preclude a continuation of the divisive ideological debate on the meaning of rights and the necessity for their inclusion in the Declaration, particularly with regard to economic and social rights.130 By June 25th, the day the Drafting Committee adjourned, it had only partially advanced towards its goal and several proposed amendments to the articles had still not been fully debated.131 Consequently, the Committee's draft Declaration, a slightly altered and incompletely reviewed version of Cassin's, was submitted to the full CHR for consideration at its next session in late November 1947.132 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Drafting Committee had achieved

"substantial agreement in principle" on the majority of rights, and had gone a considerable distance in accepting the substance of Humphrey's core draft.133 However, as Glendon notes, significant dissonance remained on the "precise formulation of each article" and the reconciliation of the various philosophical positions.134 This was a continuing dissonance that

Jacques Havet and other Unesco representatives at the DC, had witnessed. Yet, Unesco was confident that this discord could be transcended by the results of the work of the Unesco

Committee, whose meetings were to begin in Paris a mere day after the adjournment of the

Drafting Committee.

The Unesco Committee The Unesco Committee on the Philosophic Principles of the Rights of Man, which convened in Paris from June 26th to July 2nd, 1947, was made up of a distinguished panel of eight philosophers and intellectuals, chaired by British historian E.H.

Carr,135 and included: American philosopher Richard McKeon, who was also the Committee's

Rapporteur and a member of the Unesco Executive Board;136 French philosopher Etienne Gilson, a member of the French delegation to Unesco;137 French physicist Pierre Auger, who was also vice-president of the Unesco Executive Board; French Philosopher Georges Friedmann;

Harold Laski, the well known British political scientist and socialist;140 Belgian political theorist 24

Luc Sommerhausen;141 and Chung-Shu Lo, a professor of Philosophy from China and a Unesco

Special Consultant.142

As can be seen, French liberal intellectuals were strongly represented on the Committee, and

Carr, McKeon, Sommerhausen, Laski and Lo were also invited to make formal replies to the

memorandum, which they in turn were required to evaluate along with the other philosophers'

contributions, suggesting a certain conflict of interest. Further, many of the members were also

directly involved with Unesco executive bodies and thus had a special interest in the direction

and outcome of the project. Though it is clear fromUnesc o documents that Huxley and the

Philosophy Sub-Section had ostensibly chosen intellectuals from the Western Democracies

because of their proximity to Unesco headquarters in Paris, given that time was of the essence, it

is also clear that they were intentionally chosen on the basis that consistency of philosophy was

required if agreement on a coherent solution to the philosophical problems in issue was to be

achieved expeditiously; as Huxley noted "personally I feel.. if possible all of them [should be]

from Western Europe, as the matter is urgent."143 In addition, given that the memorandum had

framed the potential solutions to these issues in the idiom of Western philosophy, only those with

complementary views could facilitate the required result.

Several key members of the Unesco Secretariat were also present at the meetings and, along

with Havet, took part in the deliberations at the request of the Committee.144 Curiously, none of

the documents I have reviewed clearly indicate that Huxley contributed to the discussions,

though it seems probable that he did.145 What is most interesting, however, is that Cassin, less

than one week after the end of the First Session of the DC, also attended one Committee meeting

and, we may assume, took part in the discussions.146 Havet noted in his official report that

Cassin was "anxious to express the interest he felt for Unesco's undertaking" and he gave the

"delegates his encouragement in a task" which he considered would be "most useful to the

Commission" when it met at its next session.147 It seems highly probable that during Cassin's 25

visit, there would have been a detailed, if unofficial, discussion of the progress achieved by the

Drafting Committee. It is also likely he would have provided the Unesco Committee with the

substance, or copies, of the Humphrey-Cassin and DC drafts, and have clearly explained the

philosophical problems these drafts were designed to resolve, the significance of the composite

rights structure he and Humphrey had advanced, and proposed ways that the Committee could

facilitate the acceptance of the DC draft by the CHR. In any case, within two weeks Unesco

would receive a copy of the DC draft from the UN along with a formal request for Unesco's

comments on the draft.148 What remains a matter of conjecture is the extent to which Cassin

influenced the conclusions, or affirmed the findings, of the Unesco Committee.

The Replies By the beginning of the meetings Unesco had received forty-four replies to the

memorandum and questionnaire and, of these, twelve had been received from the US, nine from

the UK, four from Belgium, three from France, three from India, two from Australia and one

each from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Canada, Denmark, Italy, China, the Netherlands, ,

South Africa and Germany.149 In addition, the Committee considered a paper concerning "The

Rights of Man in the USSR" that had been provided by a Soviet expert engaged by Unesco.150

Prior to and during the meetings the Committee members thoroughly "examined the replies,"151

which "had previously been communicated by letter" to each of them, preliminary to drafting the

Committee's Final Report.152 In describing its conceptual approach to the replies, the

Committee, rather than limiting itself to the objectives of the memorandum and the synthesis of

philosophic extremes, decided that, consistent with the critical needs of the CHR, its task was to:

Explore the philosophic bases of human rights for the purpose of clarifying grounds of possible agreement underlying divergent philosophical approaches and of facilitating the removal of differences due to the variety of philosophic interpretations.153

It is clear from the documents that though all the replies were reviewed, the Committee's final

report was drafted on the basis of only "various contributions to the inquiry,"154 and that the

conclusions of the report udo not represent the opinions of all the scholars who contributed' 26 replies to the memorandum.155 The Committee was well aware that the CHR was faced by

"fundamental problems concerning principles and interpretation"156 and "for this reason" it had

determined to formulate "common grounds of agreement."157 Thus, we may conclude that the

core of the Committee's strategy was to provide the CHR with the intellectual justifications it

required to resolve its philosophical crisis. To this end, in contrast to the memorandum, the

Committee stated that the purpose of its analysis:

Of human rights and of the theoretical differences concerning their nature and interrelations, was intended, not to set up an intellectual structure to reduce them to a single formulation, but rather to discover the intellectual means to secure agreement concerning fundamental rights.158

Only the replies that were consistent with, and contributed to, this goal were assimilated into the

Committee's findings. The first step in this process, which we reconstruct below in relation to

the conclusions of the Committee's Final Report, was to acknowledge the impracticability and

utopianism of Huxley's synthesis of Liberal Capitalism and Marxism-Leninism.

Abandoning The Synthesis Of Extremes The problem that the Committee members were

immediately faced with was the philosophically uncompromising nature of the contribution of

the Soviet expert, Boris Tchechko, whose views were no doubt approved by the Soviet

government.159 Tchechko argued that the Marxist view of human rights was preeminent and the

true "democratic emancipation of man" required the "liberation of... workers from capitalist

slavery" and the "abolition of private ownership of the means of production."160 In his view

Liberal individualism only "serves the ends of the bourgeoisie."161 Indeed, the Soviet citizen has

no wish for such bourgeois liberties and "no desire for liberation from the State," for the

individual may only "regard himself free.. in a socialist society."162 Clearly, given such views,

no synthesis or even basic compromise between the Soviet position and liberalism was possible.

A group of Western Socialists also drafted replies that were somewhat similar to Tchechko's,

such as British philosopher John Lewis, who held that "human rights cannot be fulfilled without 27 the final defeat of liberalism [and the] rights of Capital,"163 Luc Sommerhausen,164 and Harold

Laski who nevertheless felt that a compromise with liberalism was still possible.165

The Impossibility Of The Synthesis A number of liberal democratic and social democratic philosophers also suggested that the synthesis posited by the memorandum, and the view that a mutually agreeable philosophical justification of rights could be established, were logical impossibilities. In Lewis's view the way the question was framed created an "irreconcilable contradiction."166 While the memorandum attempted to suggest the two extreme philosophies were complementary, a "confusion exists between the conception of'natural rights' as the inalienable possession of man, as absolute principles" and "rights as goals... arising... historically as different classes rise to importance and power."167 In Lewis's view, given this dissonance in the origin of rights as both inherent and deterministic, if "absolute rights.. .are to be maintained there is no reconciliation possible, only a hopeless conflict [and] a permanent antagonism of interests."168 The eminent Italian liberal philosopher Benedetto Croce,169 American legal philosopher F.C.S. Northrop,170 Spanish philosopher D.S. de Madariaga,171 and McKeon172 all came to similar conclusions, while Canadian, Frank Scott, a McGill law professor and friend of

Humphrey's, and Canada's preeminent civil libertarian, observed that "there are several currents of thought and belief... which are neither Marxist nor individualist and... are equally asserting a faith in human liberties," such as "democratic socialism," an opinion identical to Humphrey's.173

Jacques Maritain was also one of the philosophers who had been invited to express his views on human rights.174 After returning from exile, Maritain was now France's ambassador to the

Holy See as well as one of its representatives to Unesco.175 Primarily as a result of his highly acclaimed book The Rights of Man and Natural Law, published in 1942, Maritain, a devout

Roman Catholic Christian and an internationally renowned neo-Thomist natural law philosopher, had achieved a great reputation as an important theorist on the issue of human rights.176

Maritan's reply set forth the most significant and influential criticism of the synthesis and the 28

purported need for a unitary philosophical justification of human rights.177 In Maritain's view if

Unesco's objective were to achieve "a reconciliation of theories and an ideological synthesis"

then such a process would require a "vast philosophical.. .investigation," the result of which

would nevertheless "remain one doctrine among many" and "could not claim to establish [a]

universal ascendancy over men's minds."178 He concluded that, any attempt to achieve

"theoretical agreement" with regard to human rights was "impossible" and it "would be quite

hopeless to look for a common rational justification" of human rights.179

A Practical Solution It is clear that in consequence of the forceful arguments of this

influential group of philosophers, some of whom were on the Committee itself, the Committee

accepted that the synthesis demanded by Huxley, and philosophical agreement on rights, was

impossible, and, given the intransigence of the communist position, quite impractical. The

question now was: What conceptual alternatives remained which would allow them to arrive at

some formula whereby the philosophical impasse of the CHR could be resolved? The solution

the Committee favored arose from the suggestions advanced by a key group of philosophers,

whose conclusions were surprisingly consistent, and who provided the precise method for

escaping the philosophical dilemma with which they were faced. The primary proponent of this

solution, though it required, to some degree, the principled suppression of his Christian

convictions, was Jacques Maritain.180 In Maritain's view even if philosophical agreement on the

foundation of human rights in a Declaration was not possible, "practical agreement in regard to

such a Declaration is possible."181 He suggested that throughout the "historical development of

mankind," men have "become conscious... of a number of practical truths.. .upon which they can

182

agree." Nevertheless, these truths "derive from...extremely different, or even fundamentally

opposed, theoretical conceptions."183 In Maritain's opinion it was only possible "to establish a

common formulation of these practical conclusions" and the "different rights recognized"

therein.184 For Maritain, the formulation of a Declaration may only succeed if it concentrates on 29 a "more pragmatic than theoretical approach," and must, of necessity, "leave on one side [any] pre-occupation with theoretical justification," a conclusion very similar to Humphrey's position.185 By means of this process a consensus on rights could be formulated which would

• • 186 give rise to a Declaration "acceptable to all as embodying a practical convergence of views."

Maritain's pivotal intellectual discovery, a formula brilliant in its simplicity, in fact dominated the conclusions of the Committee and formed the foundational concept for its final report. The formula not only allowed the Committee's work to proceed, it provided the CHR with the means it required to transcend its philosophical difficulties. Further, once the practical solution was applied to the primary philosophical conflict in question this rendered the four subsidiary issues of philosophy tractable. Indeed, the practical formula permitted the Committee to draw conclusions precisely consistent with those of the Humphrey-Cassin Draft.

What is interesting is that Huxley not only anticipated the probable difficulties of achieving his grand synthesis but he also anticipated Maritain's solution. In the conclusion of his Unesco book Huxley suggested that the problem of the synthesis of Liberalism and Communism, is not only, or ultimately, "one of metaphysics or dogma, but essentially practical."1*1 Huxley concluded that his proposed reconciliation: can be approached from two directions. It can be approached from above and outside, as an intellectual problem, a question of agreement in principle: and it can also be approached from below and from within, as a practical problem, a question of agreement through action.188

Indeed by November of 1947, in his report to the Second Session of the General Conference of

Unesco, where Maritain gave an influential speech on his practical formula, Huxley reversed his position on the synthesis.189 Though their positions were independently arrived at, it seems probable that Huxley and Maritain conferred on the construction of this formula, with the intention of influencing, with the help of sympathetic thinkers on the Committee, the conclusions of the final report. Indeed, Committee member McKeon,190 Danish philosopher Peter Skov,191 and de Madariaga,192 all held views comparable to Maritain's. 30

Having adopted Maritain's practical formula as the solution to the philosophical impasse of the CHR, the Committee could now proceed to construct, on a pragmatic basis, a composite list

of rights as reflected in the two antagonistic philosophies, and apply this formula to the

resolution of the four philosophical dualities related thereto. This process would be based on their analysis of the philosophers' replies, the inclusion of whose views would be contingent on

their consonance with the prevailing objectives of the Committee, and additionally with the

practical formula.193

Resolving the Dualities: The Individual Versus The Collective French evolutionary theorist,

Jesuit priest, philosopher and Christian mystic, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin argued in his reply

that any perceived "conflict... between the human," who is "ever more conscious of his

individual value, and his social ties.. .is only apparent," for a human being is "not self

sufficient."194 Consequently, in Teilhard's view, it is not in the "self isolation" of liberalism but

rather "by proper association.. .that the individual can hope to achieve full development."195

Therefore, "collectivization and individuation [are] not in fact two contradictory movements" but

are, rather, complementary.196 American biologist R.W. Gerard also articulated this view

observing that while "each man.. .is a complete whole, dedicated to self survival" he is

nevertheless "a component unit of a larger whole, the society, and dedicated to group survival by

basic cooperation."197 Consequently, a Declaration must carefully reflect this principle, for "any

doctrine which regards man as only an individual or only as a unit in a group, is necessarily

false."198 This principle, of the balance of the rights and interests of the individual and the group,

was similarly advanced by American legal philosopher Quincy Wright,199 American political

scientist Harold Lien,200 American physicist Arthur Compton 201 and de Madariaga who

observed, "Man is a synthesis" which may be "described as an individual-in-society."202 Some

socialist intellectuals such as Lewis,203 Belgian philosopher Jean Haesaert,204 and Laski, 205 while

attempting to mitigate the influence of individualism, advocated a similar formula. 31

The fundamental theme of these contributors was that a Declaration must articulate a practical and equitable balance of the rights and interests of the individual and the State. This was the only means by which the duality between the two could be transcended. Moreover, it was also a formula previously advanced by Huxley in his essay on Unesco's philosophy, arguing that:

A well-developed human individual is the highest product of evolution to date. This provides external and scientific support for the democratic principle of the dignity of men... It also constitutes a complete disproof of all theses... which maintain that the State is... higher than the individual, and that the individual exists only or primarily for the State. On the other hand ... evolution... is ... manifesting itself primarily in the development of societies. This... makes it equally obvious that...unrestricted individualism is equally erroneous. The human individual ... only acquires significance in relation to some form of society.206

Here we find the articulation of a rational solution to Humphrey's internal philosophical

dilemma, and the secular elevation of the dignity of man without the use of religious or natural

law referents, a position they no doubt discussed in April. It is probable that the Committee was

influenced by Huxley's conclusion in determining the resolution of this philosophical issue, and

clearly accepted this compromise formula as its own in the its Final Report. Further, this

practical and balanced compromise, which underlies the views of the philosophers' noted, is

precisely reflective of the philosophy and objectives of Humphrey's draft, and was the principle

that the Committee would apply to the resolution of the remaining philosophical issues.

Liberty Versus Equality In Lien's view, society must provide a right of opportunity that is

"share[d] equally" and "made as extensive as the diversity of talents" will allow, and with the

concurrent assurance that "freedoms [are] available equally to all."207 However, "equality and

.. .liberty" must "supplement and give substance to each other," that is, the individual must

temper this liberty with a "sense of responsibility.. .to himself and.. .to the society in which he

* 208 * 209 210

lives." Laski, and McKeon argued similar positions. Here again we see the promotion of

a balance of rights strongly reminiscent of the previous section, Huxley's views, and the

principles underlying the Humphrey-Cassin draft. 32

Rights Versus Duties Continuing with his earlier position on equality, Lien asserted that all

rights must be complemented by correlative social "burdens and responsibilities" which in the

interest of justice and necessity "must be distributed equally."211 Consequently, a Declaration of

rights must be "balanced with a corresponding list of duties."212 The Chairman, Carr, articulated

an identical formula,213 while Lewis,214 Haesaerts,215 and Gerard216 also expressed consistent

views. Non-European voices, such as Chinese philosopher CS. Lo,217 a Committee member,

and M. K. Gandhi,218 also advanced arguments that affirmed the necessity of a balance of rights

and duties in a Declaration. Taken collectively, the views of these philosophers articulated a

practical and reciprocal integration of rights and duties. This principle was regarded as the only

reasonable resolution of their social relationship and as such closely corresponded to the

conclusions of the Humphrey-Cassin draft. The Committee, with the aid of the philosophers,

would now attempt to apply the concept of pragmatic compromise to the most contentious issue.

Natural Law Versus Positive Law The solution that the Committee adopted was one advocated

by a group of philosophers who conceived of these two philosophical currents as reflecting

identical underlying purposes if both were viewed as techniques of governance whose objectives

are to establish social norms for the benefit of humanity. Lewis argued that "the conception of

absolute, inherent.. .rights, based on man's origins and nature.. .is [a] myth," for rights are "based

upon human needs" and the necessity of creating conditions that will "fulfill.. .common ends."219

Needs are expressed as "social justice," which in turn are advanced as rights by a social class that

"finds its needs circumscribed."220 The dominant class of the modern era, the bourgeiosie, in an

effort to secure its demand for rights, has historically "reinforced" its claims "by appealing to the

authority of nature" and to a "certain natural right inherent in man."221 Nevertheless, the

advancement of these rights in the religious idiom of natural law retained the "practical aim of

widening the freedoms" of this class, whose "practical needs.. are the real origin of the rights

claimed, and their only validity."222 Thus, practical needs are the essential source of rights 33 regardless of how they may be articulated philosophically, which is solely a technique of legitimization. Therefore if human requirements are seen as the source of natural law then this transcends any theoretical conflict between the two positions.

McKeon offered a similar conclusion, observing that in the classical Declarations a consensus to include "the conception of natural rights, sacred and inherent in man" was achieved "not because men had agreed on a philosophy but because they had agreed, despite philosophic differences, on the formulation of a solution to a series of moral and political problems."223 In

McKeon's view, what was acknowledged in the 18th century, and should also in the 20th, is that with regard to the practical necessity of protecting rights "the problem may be solved by recognizing that certain rights are inherent in the very nature of man"224 If the conflict between natural and positive law is placed in this context then they become reconciled at the level of functionality. Maritain added qualified support to this position. In his view history has revealed to us an understanding of "how natural law requires supplementing in accordance with variations of circumstances and time" by means of what he calls "the contingent provisions of human law."225 This process is reflective of the means by which humanity's "knowledge.. .of the duties and rights involved in natural law...develops" and constitutes a complementary positive law deduced through the Reason of natural law.226

In his earlier writings Humphrey also viewed natural law as a technique for legitimizing positivist legal norms, suggesting that "as long as men.. .believed that its precepts governed" their conduct it was "immaterial [that] natural law might have no real existence," for, in terms of the validation of law, "the important thing was that men believed that it did exist."227 For

Humphrey, to legitimate a legal norm all that is required is agreement on precepts; unanimity on philosophical origins among those who advocate a natural law right is, strictly speaking, irrelevant, but may be instrumental to achieving such agreement. Though, as noted above,

Humphrey later concluded that the mere assent to a norm was sufficient for its legitimacy, it 34

seems probable that Humphrey was conscious of this natural law position in the formulation of his draft, where he included natural law rights devoid of their philosophical roots. In the result, the philosophers who argued that natural law could be conceived of as a legitimizing device, which allowed for the reconciliation of the theoretical conflict between natural and positive law, together with the arguments advanced for the resolution of the three previous philosophical

issues, provided the Committee with the precise answers it required to formulate its final report.

Drafting The Report Having carefully discussed and analyzed the philosophers' contributions

and become acquainted with any proposed solutions that corresponded to the its stated

objectives, the Committee now came to definitive conclusions and, with the completion of the

meetings on July 2, began the process of drafting its final report, which was to be completed in

the month of July and submitted to the CHR.228 On July 31st Unesco and the Committee released

its results in a document entitled "The Grounds of an International Declaration of Human

Rights."229 In an introductory note to the report McKeon, as Rapporteur, and drafter, indicated

that, "while the Committee approved the report, as a general statement of its agreement, it does

not necessarily represent in detail the individual opinions of all the members of the Committee"

nor of all the contributors.230 Indeed, the Committee's conclusions were representative of the

views of a minority of the philosophers, and, in essence, the views of the intellectual leadership

of Unesco and the Committee. Nevertheless, the Committee, as McKeon notes, "was able,

without avoiding the basic difficulties with which the problem is surrounded, to reach a broad

and positive agreement."231

The Unesco Report What is most striking about the Final Report is that much of the

memorandum, notably the Huxleyan synthesis, had been completely abandoned, and replaced by

a structure of human rights reflecting Maritain's practical agreement and the formulae, set out

above, relating to the resolution of the core philosophical opposites. The report began by stating

that the Unesco Committee was "convinced" that the members of the UN universally "share 35 common convictions on which human rights depend" regardless of the fact that these beliefs are

"stated in terms of different philosophical principles,"232 and that it is this "common understanding" which will make the Declaration "feasible and... practicable,"233 precisely adopting Maritains's position on the universal nature of moral truths. Further, the Committee

stated that, even while building on this practical common understanding, the UN must formulate the Declaration so as to "record its faith in freedom and democracy, and its determination to

safeguard their power to expand."234 Here, the Committee was clearly placing itself on the side

of liberal democracy and assimilating to it the concept of the practical agreement. Then, in

phrases echoing Cassin's preamble, the report underlined that these democratic objectives are

"founded on the faith in the inherent dignity of men" clearly a natural law formulation but

consistent with its use as a legitimizing technique.235

Having thus established its ideology, and its core belief that humanity has "certain great

principles in common,"236 the report nevertheless conceded, in Maritain's voice, that

philosophies "have led to varied even opposed interpretations of fundamental rights."237 The

report then argues that the source of these seeming philosophical conflicts between rights is that

with the advent of social rights the "meanings" of political and economic rights have "undergone

modification and the two have... been thought to be in conflict."238 This is the primary cause of

the antagonism between "social responsibilities" and "civil and political rights," and is the

"source of the complexities in the interpretation of liberty and equality.. .as well as of apparent

contradictions" among human rights.239 Having stated the issues with which a Declaration is

faced, the Committee suggested that the solution to "the problem of the implementation of

human rights... depends on the tacit or explicit resolution of basic philosophical problems," the

pragmatic means for which the Committee had discovered.240

The Committee then stated that it would be formulating its conclusions within a framework of

working definitions of the terms right, liberty and democracy that was clearly consistent with 36 liberal democracy and the philosophical solutions that the Committee adopted.241 Consequently:

Right is "a condition of living, without which... men cannot give the best of themselves as active members of a community;" Liberty is "the positive organization of the social and economic conditions within which men can participate...at the highest level permitted by the material development of society;" and Democracy is "liberty set in that context of equality which makes it an opportunity for all men."242

These definitions precisely reflect the balanced solutions to the philosophical opposition between

rights and duties, liberty and equality, and the individual and the collective, that we discussed

above. With these underlying principles and philosophical choices affirmed, the Committee then

formulated the primary principle upon which the entire report would be based and its

recommendations derived:

The Committee is convinced that the philosophical problem in a Declaration of human rights is not to achieve doctrinal consensus but rather to achieve agreement concerning rights, and also concerning action in the realization and defense of rights, which may be justified on highly divergent doctrinal grounds.243

The Committee thereby confirmed the validity of Maritain's pragmatic formula, but, given its

definition of terms, did so after already arriving at an internal consensus about the meaning of

rights, liberty and democracy, and having pre-determined their inclusion as the basic ideological

material upon which the practical formula would act.

The report then provided a brief historical survey of the evolution of economic and political

rights in the West, exclusively, concluding that civil and political rights have been "imperfectly

secured," given that they were not "supplemented by [economic and social] rights which are

essential to their realization."244 Consequently, in the Committee's view, the progressive

recognition of this fact has resulted in the "translation into political instrumentalities" of a

number of inter-related, but seemingly contradictory principles, beginning with the "close

interdependence of rights and duties."245 For the Committee it was imperative that a Declaration

acknowledged that, "the enjoyment of rights involves.. .the acceptance by the individual of

corresponding obligations to society," expressing a principle of social and ideological balance,

articulated by the philosophers' reviewed and by the Humphrey-Cassin draft.246 Given its belief 37 in the fundamental nature of this principle, and hopes for improvement of the material conditions

of humanity, the Committee concluded that, notwithstanding the importance of political rights,

economic and social rights "have assumed priority over and have affected the conception" of

classical rights and made them "universally practicable."247 Consequently, inspired by a vision

that it is imperative, practically feasible and philosophically justifiable to constitute a

fundamental integration of economic and social rights with political and civil rights, the

Committee concluded it was now "possible to draw a list of fundamental rights on which

the.. .Committee is convinced all men are agreed."248

The Principal Rights The Committee began by asserting a core philosophical position that its

catalogue of fundamental rights "may be seen to be implicit in man's nature as an individual and

as a member of society," asserting a principle of natural law and also the convergence of the

interests of the individual and the collective.249 The Committee then proclaimed its first axiom,

the: "fundamental right to live" which is the "condition and.. foundation of all other rights,"

confirming the views of several of the contributors and Humphrey's art.3, and Cassin's art.7.250

Then, in an ambiguous synthesis of natural and positive law, the Committee constructed a

composite formula of philosophical origins by stating that "all rights derive.. from the nature of

man as such and.. the stage of development achieved by social and political groups in which he

participates," again confirming the concept of natural law as technique, and therefore acceptable

to all, and repeating the memorandum's conceptual contradictions as noted in Lewis's

analysis.251 Further, the Committee asserted that man must be able to exercise all rights

"connected with.. .means for subsistence" either "through his own effort or.. .through the

resources of society," affirming the principle of 'balance' that the individual can only fulfill his

objectives and liberties when integrated with the collective.252

Having stated these preliminary principles the Committee then enumerated the first part of its

core list of rights: 38

The right to the protection of health; the right to work, to a fair wage, to adequate leisure; the right of workers to participate in collective action, and non-discrimination in access to work; the right to maintenance in time of social need, unemployment, infancy, old age, sickness or incapacity; and, the right to personal property.253

Then, in accordance with the philosophical position that more than mere existence is required for the fulfillment of the individual, the Committee asserted that "bare living... is not sufficient" for

man, and he must be allowed to exercise rights that will provide him with the "intellectual

foundation for living well," and with "opportunities for self-development and the advancement of

the common good" again confirming the necessity of the integration of the interests of the

individual and the collective.254 The report stated these rights to be:

The right to education at the elementary level, and to higher education on the basis of merit; the right to information; freedom of thought; and, the right to self-expression.255

In the Committee's view, having secured these rights and their effective implementation, man is

thereby assured the fullest exercise of rights that guarantee his "participation in society and his

protection from social and political injustice:"256

The right to equal justice, to be protected by law from illegal arrest, brutality, torture and double- jeopardy; the right to an expeditious trial by due process of law; the right of inviolability of domicile and correspondence; the right to political action, to vote, to participate in public affairs and to form political associations; freedom of speech, assembly, association, worship and the press; the right to citizenship; the right to rebellion or revolution; and, the right to share in progress.257

In this brief list of rights and freedoms the Committee essentially affirmed the same rights as

were enumerated in the Humphrey and Cassin drafts, and constructed its list in accordance with

the same composite philosophical strategy that balanced proximate and related liberal and social

democratic rights. Indeed, Unesco had constructed precisely the report Humphrey and his

supporters required to justify the substance of the preliminary Draft. The reality of international

politics, however, would generate an unexpectedly problematic reception to the document.

The CHR's Reception Of The Unesco Report Unesco formally submitted the Report to the

CHR on August 1st 1947, through Henri Laugier, Under-Secretary for Social Affairs, and

Humphrey's superior, who received the document, and fifty copies, enthusiastically and assured 39

Unesco that the report would be distributed to the members of the Commission, and asked for

more copies to be sent, though fifty additional copies of the report had also been sent directly to

Humphrey.258 Unesco then began the process of disseminating its findings by publishing, at the

UN's request, the replies of a dozen of the philosophers, including Maritain, in the United

Nations Weekly Bulletin (UNWB), in the fall of 1947.259 Unesco also featured the report at the

Second Session of the General Conference of Unesco, held in November of 1947, where

Maritain gave a widely reported speech detailing the Committee's work.260 To this point, the

response to the report was as expected.

However, at the fourth meeting of the Second Session of the CHR, held in closed session on

December 3, 1947, the Commission took up the question of the Unesco Committee's report and,

ironically, given Unesco's sincere desire to assist the CHR, gave it a very hostile reception.261

Though the meeting was initially to discuss human rights petitions to the CHR, the delegates

took advantage of the cloak of confidentiality to freely discuss and criticize Unesco and the

report.262 Malik and Chang, however, were not present, which was highly disadvantageous for

Unesco given that it considered Malik, Cassin, and to some degree Mrs. Roosevelt, the most

favorable to their project, though we may assume, and events would show, that Chang was also

sympathetic to Unesco.263

The opening remarks were made by the Belgian representative Fernand Dehousse, who

stated, indignantly, that he "had been very sorry to find that Unesco.. .had just published a

report" on the philosophical bases of human rights, which "the Unesco Committee had sent to

the... Commission."264 He then questioned Humphrey on the issue, inquiring "whether Unesco

had been asked by the Secretariat to draw up that report or whether the Secretariat had been

consulted as to its opportuneness."265 Dehousse expressed bewilderment that excerpts from the

Unesco report, and the replies of key philosophical contributors had been published in the

UNWB, and had attracted much attention, implying attention had been diverted from the CHR, 40 and diminished its exclusive authority to formulate the Declaration.266 One may speculate that

Dehousse's criticism, in part, turned on the fact that, though Unesco had provided the

philosophical answers the CHR required, the politically sensitive members of the CHR did not

want it to appear as if they were being directed by an outside agency as to how to conduct the

drafting process. Reflecting a form of political amnesia, given Macleish and Darchambeau's

submissions to the CHR, and Huxley's informal visit and consultations at the First Session,

Dehousse then insisted that he wished to "know on whose initiative the report had been drawn

up" adding that "it would be regrettable if [it] had been taken by Unesco alone."267

Humphrey replied that "the Secretary General had not asked Unesco to prepare either a Bill

of Human Rights or documentation for such a Bill" and that "he had the impression that Unesco

had acted on its own initiative."268 Clearly, Humphrey's statement was completely contrary to

the facts and documentary record, as he himself knew them to be, including his own informal

discussions with Unesco in April 1947, Cassin's embassy to the Unesco Committee in July of

1947, the CHR's acquiescence to Unesco's representations at the First Session, and the

Secretariat's invitation to Unesco to comment on the preliminary Draft. Given that Unesco had

directly informed the CHR of its activities and results, and the fact that between August and

December these were widely publicized, it astonishes that at this moment Humphrey and

Dehousse should feign ignorance. Incredibly, Humphrey suggested that "nothing in the

resolutions of the Commission or of [ECOSOC] could have decided Unesco to draw up that

report;"269 however, this comment seems perplexing when compared with Malik's official report

of the First Session confirming Unesco's involvement. When we consider Humphrey's

philosophical sympathy and close collaboration with the Unesco project, it is difficult to discern

what his motive was in taking this negative position, unless it was intended to placate the

delegates in their opposition to alleged outside interference, and at the same time implement 41

Unesco's solutions, which had already been anticipated by and assimilated into the Humphrey-

Cassin draft, by other indirect means.

At this point Mrs. Roosevelt interjected that she did recall that at the First Session Huxley

"had been present at one or two meetings" and had "told her in private conversation that Unesco would endeavor to establish certain principles of human rights,"270 adding that her "opinion had

not been asked" though she did not divulge what her reply may have been.271 Given that the

response of the CHR at the time had been essentially positive, Huxley would have been justified

in assuming there were no objections to the project. Again, we must assume that her motive in

claiming ignorance was to protect the political jurisdiction of the CHR, a strategy perhaps

arrived at in concert with other delegates.272

Humphrey, despite his seeming reluctance to overtly support the Unesco report, now argued

on its behalf, noting that it was officially a "report submitted by the Unesco Committee" to the

CHR, and in his legal opinion the Commission was obliged, and indeed "Unesco had asked him,

[to] distribute it to members of the Commission" and to reproduce and distribute it to UN

member States, and that despite the concerns raised by the delegates "he intended to have it

distributed."273 Mrs. Roosevelt, now revealing a residual sympathy for the substance of the

report, if not its political effects, attempted to follow Humphrey's lead and added her support by

suggesting that regarding the duplication of the report "the Commission might leave it to the

Secretariat to solve the difficulty or take up the principles which might be useful in drawing up

the Declaration and decide later whether to publish the.. report or not."274

The Soviet representative, A. Y. Bogomolov, in recognition of the fact that neither the USSR

nor several other Soviet bloc members of the CHR were members of Unesco, and no doubt

because the Unesco report had essentially ignored the communist position, declared that the

Commission ought to disregard the report completely and "not devote any more time to

the.. document."275 However, an official decision on whether to publish and distribute the 42

Unesco report to UN and CHR members had to be made, which would directly impact on its official consideration by the CHR, and Mrs. Roosevelt invited the delegates to closely consider the issue before taking a definitive vote on how to proceed.276 Dehousse moved that the report be distributed to CHR delegates only and not distributed to all UN members, and was supported by M. Amado of Panama and Hodgson of Australia.277 Hodgson added that he had read the report and "did not approve of the majority of the ideas" it contained, and thus saw no reason why the CHR should support its public distribution; which seems to indicate that for some of the delegates the jurisdictional argument masked ideological differences.278 Mrs. Roosevelt supported the report's distribution, and now also belatedly recalled Darchambeau's earlier submissions, stating that from that point forward she had "heard no more on the matter," when in fact she had corresponded with Huxley in great detail on the issue as recently as May.279

At this juncture, Cassin, who could fully attest to the intimate cooperation between Unesco and members of the CHR and the Secretariat, and who personally took part in the very deliberations that formulated the Unesco document before them, made his only enigmatic comments of the debate, stating, in response to Mrs. Roosevelt's motion that he "supported this

280 proposal." This was all that, officially, came from the mouth of the man who in Paris six months before had sung the praises of the Unesco project; yet all he could pronounce on this critical day were three, brief, uninspired words. In consequence of this debate, the Commission decided, by a vote to 8 to 4 with 1 abstention, "not to reproduce the Unesco report for distribution to all the members of the United Nations," though it would be distributed internally to the CHR delegates.281

Unesco's Reaction Though the above noted meeting was held in camera, and without a

Unesco representative present, Unesco did have a delegation at the session, headed by Havet.282

Once Unesco was informed of the negative response of the CHR it reacted with incredulity at this inexplicable turn of events.283 The only option left open to Unesco was to salvage what it 43 could of its project by attempting to convince the CHR that it should treat the report with an open mind, and, if possible, re-consider its conclusions in relation to any residual philosophical

conflicts that might arise.284 To this end, Havet sent an official letter to Mrs. Roosevelt on

th

December 13 indicating the intentions and objectives of Unesco in pursuing its project, and

setting out a detailed chronology of Unesco's cooperation with the CHR beginning with

Darchambeau and MacLeish's submissions.285 He also pointedly reminded Mrs. Roosevelt of

her frequent correspondence with Huxley on the subject and, most importantly, that from

January 1947 "liaison between the Secretariat of Unesco and the Human Rights Division has

been continuous." that is, Humphrey and his staff were at all material times in intimate contact

with Unesco. Further, Havet made it clear that Unesco's overriding objective was to assist the

CHR in resolving the "fundamental difficulties, which... sprang from the clash of opposing

ideological viewpoints," with which it was faced.287 It was the "conviction" of Unesco that its

report, which constituted a "clarification of opposing ideologies" and a "constructive synthesis"

would be able to assist "the delegates to reach an agreement."288 Nevertheless, Havet noted that

it was never Unesco's intention that the CHR be "bound.. .in any way" by the report's

conclusions,289 though it was hoped that they might prove to be of continuing usefulness.

The Influence Of The Unesco Report Given the tenor of the above debate, it is clear that the

consensus of the majority of the delegates was not to give the report any official endorsement.

Consequently, it became clear to Humphrey, Cassin and their allies that it would now be

necessary to adjust their initial strategy and implement the philosophical and practical solutions

of Unesco by other, implicit, means. This would entail utilizing the report obliquely, often

without overt reference to it, through sympathetic CHR delegates, engaged in the ongoing

debates and drafting of the Declaration. Here we may recall our earlier discussion of the

importance of personal relationships in Humphrey's ability to influence the drafting process and

may presume their probable significance in the application of the Unesco report. Under these 44 circumstances, the official aversion to the report had no practical effect; and if in fact this strategy were already in place at the time of the debate it would perhaps explain why Humphrey and Cassin remained so reticent to speak tmthfully during the discussion.

In his latter writings, however, Cassin was highly complimentary of Maritain and the Unesco

Report, asserting that both were very influential on the development of the Declaration, though immediately after the CHR decision to marginalize the report he and Humphrey made no public comments in its favor.290 Humphrey, in contrast, remained absolutely silent regarding the report in his subsequent writings.291 These profound silences by the Unesco project's greatest initial proponents remain puzzling, but may possibly be explained by a desire not to reveal, at the time or for posterity, the extent of the cooperation between Unesco the HRD and sympathetic CHR members in the process of covertly utilizing Unesco's conclusions in the face of a hostile

Commission. Indeed, there is considerable circumstantial evidence to corroborate the hypothesis that the Unesco report, primarily the practical agreement, was indirectly implemented in the drafting process and continued to exert an important influence on the formulation of the

Declaration up to its final proclamation in December of 1948. What follows are some representative samples of this evidence.

One of the most important instances relates to what Humphrey considered the most controversial philosophical issue that arose in the drafting of the Declaration: Whether draft art.

1, "that human beings.. .are endowed by nature with reason and conscience," should contain a reference to God.292 The crisis over art. 1 took place in the General Assembly's Third Committee debates and was precipitated by the Brazilian delegation which proposed that the words

'endowed by nature' be deleted, and "created in the image and likeness of God" be substituted, on the basis that, as their delegate B. A. de Athayade stated, human rights exist "because of an abstract [divine] force and not as a result of any materialist concept [of nature]."293 Carton de

Wiart, the representative of Belgium "fearing" as Humphrey recalls, this would provoke "an 45 endless philosophical debate," proposed that the words "by nature" be deleted, before formal debate on the Brazilian motion began.294 Chang strongly supported Wiart's motion, pointing out that although China had a rich and ancient philosophical tradition rivaling that of the West, he had refrained from "proposing that mention" of these philosophical principles "should be made

in the Declaration."295 Accordingly, he thought it appropriate "that his colleagues would show

equal consideration and withdraw.. amendments to art. 1 which raised metaphysical

problems,"296 and suggested, by way of compromise so reminiscent of Maritain's formula, and

the use of natural law as technique, that if this were done:

Those who believed in God could still find in the strong opening assertion [that all human beings are bom free and equal and endowed with reason and conscience] the idea of God and at the same time others with a different concept [of human nature] would be able to accept the text.297

The French delegate, Salomon Grumbach, Cassin's alternate and, no doubt, at his direction,

now came to the support of Chang and Wiart's position, by eloquently reminding the Committee

of "Jacques Maritain's conclusion.. .that the nations should and could reach practical agreement

on basic principles of human rights without achieving a consensus on their foundations."298 In

consequence of this collective exposition on the constructive affects of the practical agreement

on philosophical issues, by Humphrey's close friend Chang and his political allies in the French

delegation, Wiart's motion was adopted by a vote of 26 to 4 with 9 abstentions, while Brazil

yielded to the logic of a pragmatism and withdrew its amendment, allowing all views to be

satisfied and still permitting the substance of article 1 to be retained.299

Another example of the application of the Unesco report and the practical agreement, took

place during a debate in the Third Session of the CHR dealing with a draft recital of the

Declaration's preamble, authored by Malik, which stated that "whereas this pledge [to take

action toward the achievement of the respect of human rights] can be fulfilled only through a

common understanding of the nature of these rights and freedoms."300 On this occasion an

unlikely advocate took up the principles of the Unesco report. The Soviet delegate, Alexei 46

Pavlov, attacked the recital on the grounds that it "seemed to require a unity of thought and ideas which were impossible to achieve."301 In his view, the Commission's discussions to that point:

Had clearly shown the divergences which existed... in the fields of philosophy and ideology; that difference of ideas had not prevented fruitful cooperation, because even though there had been disagreement on the nature of the rights, the Commission has, nevertheless come to a satisfactory agreement as to their practicable application202

Pavlov's commentary was, in essence, a restatement of Maritain's practical formula, though no

doubt from altogether different political motives.

After hearing much rancorous argument on the point, the French delegate, Pierre Ordonneau,

sensing that the CHR was on the verge of descending into another ideological and philosophical

morass, proffered a practical solution expressed in terms of Unesco's report. Ordonneau argued

that it was evident in the constructive work achieved to date that "the Commission agreed that, in

spite of the difference in philosophical and political systems, it was still possible to find grounds

for common action," a formulation substantially Maritain's, and "that it was on that conviction

that the work it had just completed was founded" implying that the work of the CHR had been

founded on this pre-eminent principle of Unesco's report.303 In his view the essence of the

problem of the recital was "more in the wording than in the substance."304 By this interpretation

Ordonneau was attempting to affect a practical compromise, if appropriate wording were found,

"which would make it clear that the Commission had tried to find a common understanding and

had succeeded in doing so," but an understanding as to the enumeration of acceptable rights and

not as to their nature or philosophical origins.305

Consequently the CHR appointed a drafting sub-committee which arrived at the following

compromise formulation: "that a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the

greatest importance to the full recognition of this pledge," a sentence ambiguous enough to mean

both that a common understanding of rights, at a practical level, had been achieved, and that a

common understanding at a philosophical level is an objective for the future; yet it did not 47 preclude the interpretation that an understanding as to philosophical origins may already have taken place.306 In the result, the CHR adopted this new recital by a vote of 13 to 1 with one

abstention, enshrining a text that would survive every subsequent vote in the evolution of the

Declaration, and which owed its existence to the persistent application of the principles of the

Unesco report by its supporters.307

Conclusion A short time after the proclamation of the Universal Declaration, Malik wrote a

thoughtful analysis on the philosophical issues that had confronted the CHR and how these

issues had been resolved in the final document. He concluded that:

The resulting Declaration is a composite synthesis, the like of which has never before occurred in history... While fully allowing for man's material requirements and for his duties to society, the balance in the present synthesis is decidedly in favor of man's inner freedom, and his natural and inalienable rights.308

The Universal Declaration was, in effect, a reflection of the ideological equilibrium of

Humphrey's foundational draft, which specifically implemented a rights structure that redressed

the balance of power in favour of the individual. What this study has attempted to show, and

Malik's assessment implicitly reveals, is that the guiding minds of the CHR, the UN Secretariat

and Unesco, in an effort to resolve an ideological crisis, conceived of a solution, in the form of a

composite formulation of human rights, that reflected a practical synthesis of principles from

within a narrow spectrum of philosophical and ideological positions. This was the convergent

ground between Humphrey's humanitarian liberalism and social democracy, and constituted a

precise and balanced assimilation of the rights of the collective to the preeminent rights of the

individual. The result was a new universal pragmatic and pluralist ideology of human rights.

Having designed this structure it then became imperative for this group to discover the

intellectual and philosophical justifications necessary to assist them in implicitly guiding the

world's political elite into accepting this composite synthesis as the only rational and just

solution— a task for which Unesco was required, and in all probability solicited, and for which it 48 had simultaneously intuited the necessity of undertaking. Indeed, Unesco discharged its

obligation admirably.

This endeavor required fundamental coordination, albeit informal and politically sensitive,

amongst a collegium of leading intellectual and political figures of sympathetic views, from within the Unesco and UN Secretariat, together with supportive delegates from the CHR. The

success of the enterprise was contingent upon the resolution of the four core philosophical issues

we have enumerated. The Unesco Committee achieved a resolution of these issues, and the

overall philosophical impasse, on a pragmatic and pluralist, if essentially liberal democratic

basis. In the result Unesco's solutions precisely corresponded to, and rationally justified, the

Humphrey-Cassin draft. Further, Unesco's practical formula provided the means for a

constructive agreement on rights by allowing for the evasion of overt philosophical controversy.

A synthesis of rights was thereby constructed by means of a pragmatic, yet subtly philosophical,

compromise, which was substantially preserved in the final Universal Declaration. Indeed, the

concept of the practical agreement was the most significant, if implicit, contribution of the

Unesco Committee to the formulation of the Declaration, and of decisive importance to its

successful completion.

By means of the Universal Declaration, Unesco, the UN Secretariat and the CHR fulfilled

their responsibilities to proclaim the preservation of human rights mandated by the UN Charter

and Unesco's Constitution, and in the result elevated the individual to a level coequal with the

State. The Declaration was the articulation of a concept of universal human rights that Unesco

hoped would mature in the "minds of men" and advance a vision of justice that would be the

antithesis of Nazism. When the antidote to this counter-moral conception was articulated by

Maritain a mere five years before, it was still uncertain whether the victory of the principle of the

inherent dignity of man over the morally subversive power of the authoritarian State, was

assured or even possible. In 1947 when the CHR began the work of forging a universal moral 49 instrument to secure human rights it was clear from the themes of the debates and the contributions of the Unesco philosophers, that among those who sincerely advocated human rights two moral streams, secular and intellectual, spiritual and transcendent, were converging, to construct a more virtuous other outcome for the world. It was a successful convergence that ultimately required the gracious concession of the spiritual to the pragmatism of the temporal.

This principled compromise was preserved in the diplomatic and philosophical efforts of Huxley,

Humphrey, Cassin, Malik, Maritain and others who attempted, from their contrasting perspectives, to advance secular or spiritual ideals in a unified form by translating the values of each into the Declaration. Indeed, it is an irony of history that few individuals did more to ensure the success of the anti-clerical Humphrey's Draft than the devoutly Christian, Maritain.

Regardless of the motives our protagonists may have had for enshrining human rights in the

Declaration, each accepted the essential virtue of preserving the dignity of man. On this one simple, universally profound idea, they all, at the practical level, could agree, and on this foundation they idealistically believed they could construct a new universal peace. Huxley viewed this striving for human rights as an evolutionary journey where each new synthesis permits the gradual perfect-ability of man. Huxley, Humphrey and their ideological brethren believed that in this evolution the Universal Declaration, and the ideology of human rights that is its essence, would play a pivotal and meta-historical role. Regrettably, during the interregnum of the Cold War, the greater part of their hopes lay fallow. However, in the next stage of mans struggle of moral anti-theses, should those Of The Declaration again be victorious, will there arise a more highly evolved composite synthesis that moves a definitive step closer to a more perfect union between the rights of the individual and the collective, between liberty and equality? Whether this can come about as a result of the constructive intervention of human reason in the social evolution of man, as Huxley would have it, or, as in 1947, as a reaction to universal human tragedy, is a question for the future. 50

Notes

1 Saul Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich: A Documentation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 110- 117 passim.

2 For an account of Maritain's time as a political refugee see: George Egerton, "Entering the Age of Human Rights: Religion, Politics, and Canadian Liberalism, 1945-1950," © George Egerton, University of British Columbia, Spring 2002, and 10 August, 2002 (unpublished draft), 18 n.25, 5, 10-11, passim. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Egerton for providing me with a copy of this paper and granting his permission for citation.

3 Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, trans. Doris C. Anson, QMew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), 48-49, hereinafter: Maritain, Rights. It appears that Maritain's book was being written after April 1942, 114. See also Jacques Maritain, Les Droits de L'Homme et la Loi Naturelle (New York: Editions de la Maison Francaise, 1942), and Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, trans. Doris C. Anson, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943).

4 Peter Haidu, "The Dialectics of Unspeakability: Language, Silence, and the Narratives of Desubjectification," Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the Final Solution, ed. Saul Friedlander (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard University Press, 1992), 292.

5 Walter H. C. Laves, and Charles A. Thomson, Unesco: Purpose. Progress. Prospects QBloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), 3 and 442, hereinafter: Laves. Laves, who was Deputy Director General of Unesco in 1947, makes frequent reference to the liberal democratic philosophy that animated Unesco at that time. See Laves, 50, XVIII and XX passim. Note: This paper will not be utilizing a capitalized version of the abbreviation UNESCO, but rather 'Unesco' with a capital U and small case letters, as this was the prevalent custom in Unesco's own documents of the period.

6 Laves, 415. See also Charles S. Ascher, Program-Making in Unesco. 1946-1951: A Study in the Processes of International Administration (Chicago: Public Administration Clearing House, 1951), 15 n.l. The original author of the "minds of men" phrase was Clement Attlee, who, while British Prime Minister, used it in a moving speech to the London conference. Ascher, 15 n.l.

7 Laves, 416.

8 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, A Chronology of Unesco. 1945-1985 Q^aris: Unesco, 1985), 6, hereinafter: Unesco, Chronology. Huxley was elected Director-General on December 6, 1946, at the First Session of the General Conference of Unesco, 6.

9 Ascher, 10, and 10 n.36. See also Document: Unesco/C/6, Julian Huxley, "Unesco, Its Purpose and Its Philosophy," September 15, 1946.

10 Julian Huxley, Unesco: Its Purpose and its Philosophy (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1947), 6, hereinafter: Huxley.

"Ibid., 7.

12 Ibid., 7.

13 Ibid., 7.

14 Ibid., 8.

15 Ibid., 61.

16 Laves, 49-50. See also Ascher, 10 n.36. 51

17 Ascher, 10. See also Unesco, Chronology, 6; and Laves, 49-50. This quotation is from a note inserted by the Executive Committee in Huxley's paper prior to its circulation at the First Session of the Unesco General Conference of November 19 to December 10, 1946. See also Huxley, I. At the First Session Huxley's views were also found to be unacceptable by the State representatives to the General Conference on essentially the same ground as expressed by the Preparatory Commission. See Ascher, 10; and Laves, 49-50.

18 Huxley, 41.

19 Ascher, 10 n.36.

20 John P. Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1984), 25, hereinafter: Humphrey, Adventure. See also Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), 43.

21 Richard McKeon, "The Philosophic Bases and Material Circumstances of the Rights of Man," hereinafter: McKeon, in: Unesco, ed., Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations (London and New York: Alan Wingate, 1949), 38, hereinafter: Unesco, Human Rights. Also published as: Unesco, ed., Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949). See also Glendon, 39; and, UN [United Nations], ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council], Document: E [ECOSOC]/ CN.4 [Commission on Human Rights]/ SR. [Summary Record] 8, 4.

22 Glendon, 39. See also E/CN.4/SR. 8, 4.

23 Paul G. Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 220-221. See also Humphrey, Adventure. 23, 25 passim; and Glendon, 39.

24 Habib C. Malik, The Challenge of Human Rights: Charles Malik and the Universal Declaration (Oxford: Charles Malik Foundation and The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), 28. See also E/CN.4/SR.9, 3.

25 Malik, 29. See also Humphrey, Adventure. 25; and Glendon, 39, 40.

26 Malik, 30. See also E/CN.4/SR. 14, 4. The four communist bloc countries/state-entities represented on the CHR were: Yugoslavia, the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR. The remaining CHR members were: the Philippines, the United Kingdom, India, Chile, Panama, Uruguay, Iran, Australia, Belgium, Egypt, China, Lebanon, France and the United States.

27 Malik, 31. See also Glendon, 40.

Malik, 31.

29 Ibid. 32, 33

30 Ibid. 35.

31 Ibid. 35-36.

32 Ibid. 36.

33 Ibid. 39.

Glendon, 42.

Ibid., 42 (first quotation), 43 (second quotation).

Ibid., 43. 52

37 Unesco, Chronology, 7. See also E/CN.4/SR.26, 13, 14, 15, 16, passim, hereinafter: SR. 26. I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. A. J. Hobbins for kindly providing me with a copy of the SR. 26 document. Unesco's position in the CHR was established by UN/ECOSOC directives that confirmed Unesco's participatory, and observer, status at all open CHR meetings as a UN specialized agency. Unesco's status at the CHR was also determined in accordance with the agreement establishing the relationship and cooperation between Unesco, as a UN specialized agency, and the UN and its subsidiary organs, signed on December 14, 1946. See Unesco, Chronology, 7.

38 Document: Unesco/Phil./l/1947, "Memorandum on Human Rights," March 27, 1947, 1, hereinafter: Phil./l.

39 Glendon, 51.

40 Ibid., 51.

41 E/CN.4/SR.4, 9. See also Glendon, 51.

42 SR.26, 12. Huxley was at UN headquarters at Lake Success, New York, to attend a meeting of the Coordinating Committee of the UN and its Specialized Agencies, beginning on Tuesday, February 4, 1947. See Unesco, Chronology, 8.

43 SR.26, 12.

44E/CN.4/SR.18, 3, hereinafter: SR. 18.

45 Ibid.,4.

46 Ibid., 4.

47 E/CN.4/SR.19, 7, hereinafter: SR. 19. The CHR's affirmation of the Unesco project was further confirmed in March of 1947, in Malik's speech, as Rapporteur of the CHR, to ECOSOC, wherein he praised Unesco for its constructive participation in the deliberations of the CHR and in particular noted that Unesco expressed that it was "deeply interested in human rights" and had "called conferences of experts" for 1947 "on the philosophical principles of human rights, and would... report... their conclusions." Malik, 56.

48 Glendon, 45. See also E/CN.4/SR.12, 5, hereinafter: SR. 12; and Humphrey, Adventure. 27

49 Glendon, 45 (first quotation); and Humphrey, Adventure. 27 (second quotation). See also SR. 12, 5.

50 Humphrey, Adventure. 27.

51 Ibid., 27.

52 Glendon, 47. See also Humphrey, Adventure. 29, and R. St. Macdonald, "Leadership in Law: John P. Humphrey and the Development of the International Law of Human Rights," The Canadian Yearbook of International Law Vol. XXLX (1991), 3-91, 49; and A. J. Hobbins, "Rene Cassin and the Daughter of Time: The First Draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," Fontanus 2 (1989), 7-26, 10, hereinafter: Hobbins, Daughter.

53 Humphrey, Adventure, 29 (quotations), 23 (re Chang and Malik). See also Hobbins, Daughter. 10; and Glendon, 47. Humphrey developed an intimate intellectual relationship with Chang, and came "to appreciate his great human qualities," and they soon became close friends and philosophical allies in the formulation of the UD. Humphrey admired Chang's ideological position as a "pragmatist," and in this regard Humphrey recalls that Chang "was a master of the art of compromise... and would often provide the formula which made it possible for the Commission to escape from some impasse." See Humphrey, Adventure, 23. With regard to Malik, Humphrey recalls that though their personal relations were good their "philosophical assumptions were too far apart," as Malik's near uncompromising adherence to natural law theory "was apt to carry him to rigid conclusions." Humphrey, Adventure. 23. 53

Humphrey, Adventure. 17. Humphrey notes that Malik was one such delegate, though regarding him as one of the most independent delegates, and dedicated to the idea of human rights. Humphrey, Adventure, 17, 18, 23 passim. When we combine Humphrey's admissions with Malik's later comments that he, Cassin, Chang, Roosevelt and [Chilean delegate] Santa Cruz "soon achieved a fairly close identity of views on aims and objectives. We worked more or less as a team," we arrive at better idea of the significance of personal relationships in the implementation of strategies in the drafting of the Declaration, and the influence Humphrey could apply through his friendships. See Glendon, 134.

55 Humphrey, Adventure. 17 (first quotation), 71 (second quotation).

56 Humphrey, Adventure. 18. In his memoirs Humphrey recalls these relationships as so close that, in my view, it appears that the Secretariat often, de facto, replaced the delegate, given that, as he states, "texts and resolutions were sometimes drafted in my office or by my colleagues and later given to a delegation for which we sometimes even prepared a speech in support of the proposal." Humphrey, Adventure. 18.

57 Human rights scholar Johannes Morsink observed that Humphrey "could work the delegates over lunches and outings" and by this means indirectly influence the drafting process. Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 30.

58 Macdonald, 12, 24. See also Morsink, 30, 133, 157 passim; and Humphrey, Adventure. 2. See also Humphrey's diary, A. J. Hobbins, ed., On the Edge of Greatness, Volume 1, 1948-1949 (Montreal: McGill University Libraries, 1994), hereinafter: Hobbins, Edge. Vol. 1. wherein he stated that what the world needs is "something like the Christian morality but without the tommyrot," 39.

59 Macdonald, 33, n.94.

60 Ibid., 68.

61 Hobbins, Edge. Vol. 1. 240.

62 Ibid., 240.

63 Glendon, 47. See also Humphrey, Adventure, 29; and Hobbins, Daughter. 10. During this 5 to 6 week period Humphrey produced a handwritten manuscript, 5 typed drafts, and a mimeographed draft dated March 15, 1947, indicating that at least one draft, and probably also his final draft, was reproduced in large numbers and consequently ready for distribution to whomever Humphrey chose. See Hobbins, Daughter, 10. Emile Giraud of the Human Rights Division assisted Humphrey in the drafting process. Humphrey, Adventure. 31; Glendon, 57; and Hobbins, Daughter, 12.

64 Humphrey, Adventure. 31-32. See also Malik, 27, 41;and Glendon, 49-50. By late January 1947 the HRD had received about 20 draft Declarations from various sources. Humphrey indicates that he worked only from this group of documents and that he did not have access to the vast amount of constitutional material that the HRD gathered between March and June of 1947 for the a 408 page report entitled the 'Documented Outline' that was produced as detailed support for each of the articles of his draft. Humphrey, Adventure. 32; Morsink, 7.

65 Glendon, 47. See also Hobbins, Daughter. 10; Humphrey, Adventure. 29, 31-32; and Macdonald, 51.

66 Humphrey, Adventure. 32. See also Glendon, 57.

67 Humphrey, Adventure. 32.

68 Morsink, 130 (quotation), 131. Humphrey states that at the time, he was acutely conscious of the necessity of including such rights, for "human rights without economic and social rights have little meaning for most people, particularly on empty bellies." Humphrey, Adventure, 2 (quotation) and 32.

Humphrey, Adventure. 32. 54

Humphrey, Adventure, 32. Humphrey recalls that he was later told by a delegate that "once the Secretariat had included something in its draft, it was very difficult to object to its being there." Humphrey, Adventure, 32.

71 Glendon, 271-274 passim.

72 Phil./l, 1, 2. See also Document: Unesco/Phil./8/1947, "Report of the First Meeting of the Committee of Experts Convened by Unesco on the Philosophical Principles of the Rights of Man," 31 July 1947, 2, hereinafter: Phil./8. Unesco used the terms: 'Philosophic' and 'Philosophical' interchangeably in its documents.

73 Phil./l, 1.

74 Ibid., 1.

75 Phil./l, 1.

75 Phil./l, 1.

77 Phil./l, 1. See also Lauren, 223; Morsink, 301; E/CN.4/78, 2; and Unesco: Report of the Director General on the Activities of the Organization in 1947 (Paris: Unesco, 1947), 59, hereinafter: DG's Report; also noted as: Document: Unesco 2C/4, 20 September 1947.

78 Phil./l, 1. It was decided at this time that the Committee would also act as an Editorial Committee "with a view to publishing a comprehensive selection of the contributions received in book form," which became the later volume "Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations" (see n. 21, supra, as Unesco, Human Rights). Given that this book was put into final form 1-2 years after the final report of the Unesco Committee was drafted, and included contributions received after July 31, 1947, with edited versions of earlier replies, it has only been selectively utilized in this study. See Phil./l, 1.

79 Phil./l, 2.

80 Unesco was also attempting to have the DC meeting delayed through informal requests to Mrs. Roosevelt. See "Arthur A. Compton, unpublished letter of March 31, 1947 to Julian Huxley," Unesco Central Registry Official File: Committee for the Philosophic Principles of the Rights of Man - Comite sur les Principes Philosophiques des Droits de L'Homme, 1947 Part I, Reference (UDC): 342.7 (100): 1 A 02, at 69, Electronic file Ref.: AG08SF00007M, [As of May 15, 2002], hereinafter: UCRO File, Part I. See also "Julian Huxley, unpublished letter of April 30, 1947 to Richard McKeon," Unesco Central Registry Official File: Committee for the Philosophic Principles of the Rights of Man - Comite sur les Principes Philosophiques des Droits de L'Homme, 1947-1952 Part II, Reference (UDC): 342.7 (100): 1 A 02, at 16, Electronic file Ref.: AG08SF00008M, [As of May 15, 2002], hereinafter: UCRO File, Part II.

81 Phil./l, 2 (quotation). Unesco hoped that replies would be between 2000 and 4000 words. See also Document: Unesco/Phil./9/1947, "Report of the Meeting of the Unesco Committee on the Philosophic Principles of the Rights of Man, Paris, June 26-July 2," 31 July, 1947, 1, hereinafter: Phil./9; and Unesco, Human Rights, 258, 262. The document was also called the "Memorandum and Questionnaire Circulated by Unesco on the Theoretical Bases of the Rights of Man." See Unesco, Human Rights. 251.

82 Phil /l, 3. Unesco, Human Rights, 251.

83 Phil /I, 3 Unesco, Human Rights. 251.

84 Phil II, 3 Unesco, Human Rights, 251. 252.

85 Phil /l, 3-4. Unesco, Human Rights. 252.

86 Phil /I, 4 Unesco, Human Rights, 253.

87 Phil /I, 4 Unesco, Human Rights, 253. 55

88 Phil./l, 5. Unesco, Human Rights, 254.

89 Huxley, 61.

90 Ibid., 61, 62.

91 Phil./l, 5. Unesco, Human Rights. 254.

92 Huxley, 61.

93 Phil./l, 6. Unesco, Human Rights. 255.

94 Huxley, 17.

95 Phil./l, 6-7. Unesco, Human Rights. 255-266.

96 Phil./1, 7. Unesco, Human Rights. 256. The rights were: Freedom of conscience and worship, assembly, association, movement and communication; political freedom: equality, the right to political parties and to vote; freedom of expression; equality and freedom of economic, social and educational opportunity; freedom to pursue the good life; freedom of teaching and of scientific and philosophic inquiry; a right to work and leisure; a right to the equality of access to the means of subsistence; freedom from fear; freedom from want, including economic rights and economic security; social rights, including freedom from exploitation and oppression; a right to justice; a right to health; a right to property; the rights and freedoms of minorities; the right to self-determination; the rights of politically dependent peoples; and the rights of women, children, the disabled and of the aged. Phil./l, 7-8. Unesco, Human Rights. 256-257.

97 Humphrey, Adventure. 33. See also Unesco, Chronology, 9. See n. 64 supra; Humphrey, Adventure, 32; and Morsink, 7, re: Documented Outline.

98 Humphrey, Adventure. 33.

99 "Julian Huxley, unpublished letter of May 9, 1947 to Arthur A. Compton," UCRO File, Part I, 214. Further evidence of Humphrey's detailed discussions is provided in a letter from Huxley's Executive Assistant, C. M. Berkeley, to F. R. Cowell, of the British Ministry of Education, where Berkeley states, that "John Humphrey...attended our Executive Board Session in April, and the whole thing was threshed out with him." See "C. M. Berkeley, unpublished letter of June 19, 1947 to F. R. Cowell," UCRO File, Part II, 46.

100 UCRO File, Part I, 214. Berkeley's letter also makes reference to this issue where he notes that Humphrey was "reasonably satisfied that what we were doing was not duplicating his own activities" or those of the CHR. UCRO File, Part II, 46.

101 "Julian Huxley, unpublished letter of April 2, 1947 to Rene Cassin," UCRO File, Part II, 74.

102 "Julian Huxley, unpublished letter of May 12, 1947 to Eleanor Roosevelt," UCRO File, Part II, 241.

103 Ibid., 241-242. Huxley's letter was also a reply to a letter Mrs. Roosevelt had sent him on February 10, 1947. Huxley also attached a copy of the memorandum and questionnaire.

104 See Humphrey, Adventure. 37 and 29, regarding the expansion of the DC, on the basis that it was not sufficiently inclusive politically with only three members. See also Macdonald, 50; and Hobbins, Daughter, 10.

105 Humphrey, Adventure. 37. See also Hobbins, Daughter. 10; and Lauren, 321.

106 Glendon, 58 and 258, n.12, quotation taken from the Verbatim Record, June 12, 1947, Drafting Committee Meeting. See also Humphrey, Adventure. 39.

107 Humphrey, Adventure. 39. 56

108 Glendon, 58 and 258, n.12. See also Humphrey, Adventure, 39.

109 Humphrey, Adventure, 40 (first quotation), 39 (second quotation).

1,0 Ibid., 39-40.

111 Ibid., 40.

112 Ibid., 40.

113 Humphrey, Adventure, 42. See also Hobbins. Daughter, 12; Glendon, 60; and: E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.6, 1-2. 'AC is an abbreviation for 'Ad Hoc Committee', in this case referring to the CHR's Drafting Committee.

114 Hobbins, Daughter. 12 (quotation). See also Macdonald, 53; Humphrey, Adventure, 42; Glendon, 61; and E/CN.4/21, 3-4 (a CHR report). Like Humphrey, Cassin was assisted by Emile Giraud of the HRD. See Humphrey, Adventure, 42; Hobbins, Daughter, 12; and Glendon, 63.

115 E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2, 2. Glendon, 67.

,16E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2, 4.

117 Glendon, 63. See also E/CN.4/21, 4.

118 Humphrey, Adventure. 43. See also Glendon, 63; and Hobbins, Daughter. 13. The figure of 75% was calculated by Morsink. Morsink, 8.

119 Glendon, 276.

120 Glendon, 64. See also 217

121 Humphrey, Adventure, 43-44.

122 Humphrey, Adventure, 44. See also Glendon, 63; and Macdonald, 64.

123 John P. Humphrey, "On the Foundations of International Law," American Journal of International Law 39 (1945), 231-243, 242, hereinafter: Humphrey, Foundations.

124 Ibid., 242.

125 Ibid., 237.

126 Ibid., 242.

127 Glendon, 68. See also Rene Cassin, La Pensee etL'Action (Paris: Editions F. Lalou, 1972), 108.

128 Glendon, 68.

129 Ibid., 70.

130 Ibid., 69-70, 253 n.49. See also Humphrey Adventure, 44-45.

131 Glendon, 70. In the result, the Committee concluded that the fairest procedure was to permit the amendments to be placed in the draft document as alternative proposals. Glendon, 70.

132 Ibid., 70. 57

133 Glendon, 72.

134 Glendon, 72.

135 Phil./8, 2. Carr was at the time professor of international politics at the University College of Wales and later at Cambridge University. See Phil./8, 2; Unesco, Human Rights. 281; and Glendon, 51. The Committee was also referred to as the 'Unesco Committee of Experts... on the Philosophical Principles of the Rights of Man.' Phil./8, 1.

136 Phil./8, 2. See also Glendon, 51. McKeon was at the time Dean of the Department of Humanistic Studies at the University of Chicago, and an active political and diplomatic participant in Unesco's administrative and policy affairs as a member of the US delegation to Unesco. See Unesco, Human Rights. 286; and Ascher, 26-27.

137 Phil./8, 2. Gilson could not attend all the meetings of the Committee and is therefore sometimes excluded from the list of participants. See UCRO File Part II, 108 and 136; and Unesco, Human Rights. 272. Gilson was a professor at the Colleges de France, a Counsellor of the Republic, and a member of the French delegation to Unesco. See also Laves, 29.

138 Phil./8, 2. Auger was professor of physical sciences at the University of Paris and Director of Higher Education at the French Ministry of Education; a member of the French Delegation to the Second Session of the Unesco General Conference and, later, Director of the Natural Sciences Department of Unesco. Unesco, Human Rights, 281.

139 Phil./8, 2. Friedmann was at the time a professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers. Unesco, Human Rights, 282

140 Phil./8, 2. At the time Laski was a professor of political science at the London School of Economics and on the Executive Committee of the British Labour Party. Unesco, Human Rights, 284.

141 Phil./8, 2. Sommerhausen was Head of the Secretariat of the Belgian Senate. Unesco, Human Rights, 288.

,42Phil./8, 2. Unesco, Human Rights. 285-286.

143 "Julian Huxley, unpublished memorandum of March 3, 1947 to Jacques Havet," UCRO File, Part I, 51. Huxley also noted that the Committee's deliberations must be held "in the closest possible relation with the members of the [Unesco] Secretariat" so that they may "exercise... supervision," 51. When these comments are considered in relation to Havet's view that the final report was only an "account of the points of agreement" among Committee members, and that only a few "contributions [were] in agreement with the final statement of the Committee," we arrive at a clearer idea as to what the pre-determined ideological and philosophical intentions of Unesco were in the formulation of the Committee and its report. "Jacques Havet, unpublished letter of October 20, 1947 to Quincy Wright," UCRO File, Part II, 258.

144 Phil./8, 2. Among other members of the Unesco Secretariat who took part in the discussions were: M. Mayoux, Head of the Philosophy and Humanistic Studies Section (Havet's immediate superior) and Rene Maheu, Head of the Press Sub-Section of the Information Section.

145 Phil./8, 2. However, see UCRO File, Part I, 35, where a Unesco memorandum lists Huxley as a potential participant.

146Phil./8, 3.

147 Ibid., 3. Cassin's enthusiasm was also confirmed by Huxley, who in a letter to Humphrey's superior, Henri Laugier, noted that, "Cassin visited the Unesco Committee while it was working, and expressed approval of its work." "Julian Huxley, unpublished letter of August 1, 1947 to Henri Laugier," UCRO File, Part II, 146.

148 E/CN.4/78, 4: "Jan Stanczyk (Acting Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Social Affairs), unpublished letter of July 14, 1947 to Julian Huxley." Stanczyk's invitation and delivery of DC draft documents in themselves allowed sufficient time to assimilate concepts from the DC draft into the final report. In any case Havet also kept 58

Unesco apprised of DC activities. For example Huxley commented in a letter to Henri Laugier that the "Unesco Committee was kept closely informed of the work of the.. .Drafting Committee by M, Havet." See n.147 supra, UCRO File, Part II 146-147.

149 Phil./8, 1-2. Unesco ultimately received 60 or 70 replies. See Morsink, 301; United Nations Weekly Bulletin, vol. Ill, no. 17 (October 21, 1947), 520; and E/CN.4/78, 2.

150 Phil./8, 2. This was necessary because the USSR was not a member of Unesco at that time and thus did not receive an official invitation to take part in the project. By June 1947 there were 30 member States of Unesco and participation in the project was contingent upon membership or invitation. Phil./l, 1; Laves, 437-439; and Unesco, Chronology, 40-43.

151 Phil./9, 1. See also Phil./8, 1-2.

152Phil./8, 1.

153 PW1./9, 1

154 Unesco, Human Rights, 258, n.l.

155 Document: Unesco/Phil./10/1947/Rev., "The Grounds of an International Declaration of Human Rights (Report of the Unesco Committee on the Philosophic Principles of the Rights of Man to the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations)," 31 July 1947, 4, hereinafter: Phil./lO. Unesco, Human Rights, 262.

,56Phil./10,l. Unesco, Human Rights, 258.

157 Phil./lO, 1. Unesco, Human Rights, 258.

158 Phil./lO, 5. Unesco, Human Rights. 263.

159 Phil./8, 2. Unesco, Human Rights, 288.

160 Boris Tchechko, "The Conception of the Rights of Man in the U.S.S.R. Based on Official Documents," Unesco, Human Rights. 159-160. In the last two phrases Tchechko is quoting Stalin and M. Chvernik.

161 Ibid., 169.

162 Ibid., 169-170. Tchechko's position was supported by the reply of the Czechoslovakian philosopher Arnost Blaha, a communist, whose conclusions and phrases were virtually identical to Tchechko's. Document: Unesco/Phil./4/1947, Arnost Blaha, "Reply to the Questionnaire on the Rights of Man," 13 June 1947.

163 John Lewis, "On Human Rights," Unesco, Human Rights. 68, hereinafter: Lewis. Lewis was a Marxist theorist and former theologian, and at the time was a lecturer in philosophy at the Universities of Oxford and London, 285.

164 In Sommerhausen's view human rights could only become a reality when society made "it possible for man to protect himself against exploitation" which required a "direct curtailment of the right to own property." Luc Sommerhausen, "Human Rights in the World Today," Unesco, Human Rights, 32-33, hereinafter: Sommerhausen.

165 Harold Laski, "Towards a Universal Declaration of Human Rights," Unesco, Human Rights. 88, hereinafter: Laski. In Laski's view such a compromise must consider the position that "private ownership of...the...means of production makes it increasingly impossible to maintain... freedom or democracy." Unesco, Human Rights. 88.

166 Lewis, 58.

167 Ibid., 58-59. 59

168 Ibid., 59.

169 Unesco, Human Rights, 281-282. Croce commented on the "futility and the impossibility" of attempting to synthesize the two philosophical extremes. Benedetto Croce, "The Rights of Man and the Present Historical Situation," Unesco, Human Rights, 94, hereinafter: Croce.

170 F. S. C. Northrop, "Towards a Bill of Rights for the United Nations," Unesco, Human Rights, 183, hereinafter: Northrop. Northrop concluded that the memorandum's desired synthesis between liberalism and communism was an impossibility, for it is not "merely that they differ" but that they "contradict one another," 183. At the time Northrop was a professor of philosophy and law at Yale University, 287.

171 Don Salvador de Madariaga, "Rights of Man or Human Relations?" Unesco, Human Rights. 48, hereinafter: Madariaga. De Madariaga argued that each philosophy would "provide a different answer" to the question of human rights and "this fact" will "render illusory any hope of agreement" if we "insist on a thoroughgoing definition of our criteria and a rigid formulation of their consequences," 48. De Madariaga was a philosopher, historian, and former Spanish diplomat, who at the time was living in exile in England, 286.

172 McKeon observed that the differences in the basic philosophic definitions of meanings regarding human rights were so severe that they would "render nugatory any agreement" regarding their enumeration. Mckeon, 35.

173 Frank R. Scott, "The Rights of Man," United Nations Weekly Bulletin. Vol. Ill, no. 25 (December 16, 1947), 813, at 813, hereinafter: Scott. See also Phil./8, 1. Scott was a professor of Civil Law at McGill University at the time, and had been a colleague and friend of Humphrey's when both were teaching law at McGill. They also shared a common social democratic ideology. Given these connections, and their friendship, they no doubt had ample reason and opportunity to discuss the relationship between the Unesco and CHR human rights projects. See Scott, 813; and Macdonald, 10-38 passim.

174 Phil./8, 1.

175 Maritain was also head of the French Delegation to the Second Session of the General Conference of Unesco in November of 1947. See Unesco, Human Rights. 286-287; n.2 supra; and United Nations Weekly Bulletin [UNWB] Vol. Ill, no. 21 (November, 18, 1947), 673, hereinafter: UNWB, 111/21.

176 See n. 3 supra, Maritain, Rights.

177 Maritain's official reply is: Document: Unesco/Phil./5/1947, Jacques Maritain, "Communication With Regard to the Draft World Declaration on the Rights of Man," 18 June 1947, hereinafter: Phil./5, (also reproduced in UNWB, HI/21, 672-674). A revised version of Phil./5 is at Unesco, Human Rights, 72. Maritain also wrote the introduction to Unesco's edited collection of the philosophers' replies published in 1949, at Unesco, Human Rights, 9, which elaborates on his Phil./5 article and adds new material. The Committee received Phil./5 in June of 1947 and is the document it considered in the formulation of its report, and, therefore, is the Maritain document primarily utilized in this study. Maritain also expressed his views in a speech to the Second Session of the General Conference of Unesco, given on November 6, 1947, in which he discussed the points set out in Phil./5, and the issue of Huxley's philosophy for Unesco, (see Unesco, Human Rights, 10-12, and the above noted UNWB at 658). Since the 'second article', the 'introduction' and the 'speech' could not have been considered by the Committee prior to drafting its report they will only be relied on for the purpose of further clarifying Maritain's views.

178Phil/5, 2.

179 Ibid, 1.

180 With regard to the philosophical origins of human rights Maritain noted: "And God forbid that I should say it does not matter to know which...is right! It matters essentially;" nevertheless, with regard to the "practical expression" of rights, there can be "agreement and... common principles of action." Unesco, Human Rights, 11.

181 Phil/5, 1. 60

82 Ibid., 1.

83 Ibid., 1.

84 Ibid., 1.

85 Ibid., 2.

86 Ibid., 2.

87 Huxley, 62.

88 Ibid., 62.

189 With regard to the issues of a universal convergence of philosophies and a synthetic philosophy of human rights, in Huxley's official report to the Session he conceded, in terms identical to Maritain's, that "efforts to draw up such theoretical principles... might be actively harmful, for attempts at precise formulations would almost certainly provoke exacerbating conflicts of ideology." See Asher, 10, n.37; and DCs Report, 11. With regard to Maritain's widely publicized speech elaborating the practical formula, See Unesco, Human Rights. 10-12 and UNWB, 111/21, 658.

190 McKeon suggested that "agreement concerning actions to be taken" regarding human rights "need not pre• suppose philosophic agreement," (McKeon, 35) for "philosophic differences are unimportant in the resolution of practical problems," 37.

191 Peter Skov, "The Rights of Man," United Nations Weekly Bulletin Vol. Ill, no. 25 (December 16, 1947), 811- 812, 812, hereinafter: Skov. Skov was a high-ranking member of the Danish Foreign Service, 812. In his reply, Skov observed that if a Declaration is to succeed "our political principles must be founded on practical considerations," 811.

192 Madariaga, 48. With regard to the CHR's philosophical impasse, de Madariaga was of the view that the drafters "need not decide the point," and if this principle were accepted "the door remains open for some kind of compromise or common ground of all doctrines," 48-49.

193 The discussion of the four philosophical dualities will only include representative samples of the most significant and relevant of the philosophers' replies that, in my view, the Committee adopted.

194 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "Some Reflections on the Rights of Man," Unesco, Human Rights. 105, hereinafter: Teilhard. Teilhard was a renowned Paleontologist and philosopher of science, who attempted to merge Christian theology and evolutionary theory, 288.

195 Ibid., 105.

196 Ibid., 105.

197 R. W. Gerard, "The Rights of Man: A Biological Approach," Unesco, Human Rights. 205-206, hereinafter: Gerard. At the time Gerard was professor of physiology at the University of Chicago, 283.

198 Ibid., 208.

199 Quincy Wright, "The Relationship Between Different Categories of Human Rights," Unesco, Human Rights. 146, hereinafter: Wright. Wright was professor of law at the University of Chicago, 288. In his paper Wright suggested that every progressive State must recognize "the need of compromise of individual interests and social interests," 147.

200 Lien noted that the interests of the individual and the collective are only attainable in concert, with "self- interest" remaining the "force of gravity which binds individuals together." Arnold J. Lien, "A Fragment of 61

Thoughts Concerning the Nature and Fulfillment of Human Rights," Unesco, Human Rights, 29, hereinafter: Lien. At the time Lien was professor of political science at Washington University, 285.

201 Compton suggested that, given the greater benefits of collective life, pragmatic "self-interest," would reflect a balanced desire for "complete freedom for self development as a unit of... society." Arthur H. Compton, "The Rights of Man," United Nations Weekly Bulletin Vol. Ill, no. 18 (October 28, 1947), 555-556, 555, hereinafter: Compton. Compton was Chancellor of Washington University, a Nobel Laureate and a philosopher of science, as well as a US representative to Unesco, 555; and Ascher, 27.

202 Madariaga, 47.

203 Lewis argued that it is only when men "pursue a common good to be shared," that individual needs are fulfilled. Lewis, 56.

204 Jean Haesaerts, "Reflections on Some Declarations of the Rights of Man," Unesco, Human Rights. 101, hereinafter: Haesaerts. Haesaerts was a sociologist and political scientist at the University of Ghent, 283. He argued that man must pursue self-development in a manner "compatible with the essential needs.. of collective life," 101.

205 Laski noted that a Declaration formulated in "individualist terms" only "would separate, and not.. .unify... towards common purposes." Laski, 82-83.

206 Huxley, 16.

207 Lien, 27-28.

208 Ibid., 28.

209 Laski suggested that liberty "cannot... exist... in the absence of economic security." Laski, 89.

210 McKeon, 43. McKeon argued that in the conflict between equality and liberty "the control essential to the former" must be balanced against how far this may "impinge on... freedoms... defensible under the latter," 44.

211 Lien, 27.

2,2 Ibid. 28.

213 Carr stated that a Declaration of rights must be balanced by a "declaration of obligations." E. H. Carr, "The Rights of Man," Unesco, Human Rights. 21, hereinafter: Carr.

214 Lewis observed that, "rights.. .are only made effective through the acceptance of social duty." Lewis, 56.

215 Haesaerts argued "there can only be rights when they are accompanied by corresponding duties." Haesaerts, 100.

216 Gerard, 205. In Gerard's view the "rights of man involves rights of the individual... as against other individuals ... or the whole society... which implies duties of them to him" and it follows that the "rights of the whole... as against the individual... implies duties of him to it," 209.

217 Lo expressed the view that logic will dictate that rights and duties require balance, if we remain conscious of the "basic ethical concept" of Confucianism that the "fulfillment of the duty to one's neighbor" is paramount. Chung-Shu Lo, "Human Rights in the Chinese Tradition," Unesco, Human Rights. 187.

218 Gandhi suggested that the "right to live accrues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship," and on this basis we may "define the duties of man.. .and correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be performed." M. K. Gandhi, "A Letter Addressed to the Director General of Unesco," Unesco, Human Rights. 18.

219 Lewis, 54. 62

220Ibid. , 54.

221 Ibid., 54.

222 Ibid., 54.

223 McKeon, 37.

224 Ibid., 42.

225 Phil./5, 3.

226 Ibid., 3.

227 Humphrey, Foundations. 232. Humphrey was writing in the context of the relationship between natural law, positive law and international law. Humphrey drew similar conclusions with regard to socialism, which he viewed as a "technique." Hobbins, Edge. Vol.1. 39. He also argued that all societies require "devices of government," such as federalism, which he also termed a "technique." See John P. Humphrey, "The Parent of Anarchy," International Journal Vol. I, no. 1 (January 1946), 11-21, 12 and 19 passim.

228 Phil./8, 1.

229 Phil./9, 1. The report was an eleven page single spaced document.

230 Ibid., 1.

231 Ibid., 2.

232 Phil./lO, 1. Unesco, Human Rights. 258.

233 Phil./lO, 1. Unesco, Human Rights. 258.

234 Phil./lO, 2. Unesco, Human Rights. 259.

235 Phil./lO, 2. Unesco, Human Rights. 259.

236 Phil./lO, 2. Unesco, Human Rights. 259.

237 Phil./lO, 3. Unesco, Human Rights. 261.

238 Phil./lO, 3. Unesco. Human Rights. 261.

239 Phil./lO, 3. Unesco, Human Rights. 261. See also Huxley, 16, for a similar phrase.

240 Phil./lO, 3. Unesco, Human Rights. 261.

241 Phil./lO, 4. Unesco, Human Rights. 262.

242 Phil./lO, 4. Unesco, Human Rights. 262-263.

243 Phil./lO, 4-5. Unesco, Human Rights. 262.

244 Phil./lO, 7. Unesco, Human Rights. 266.

245 Phil./lO, 7. Unesco, Human Rights. 267. 63

246 Phil./lO, 7. Unesco, Human Rights. 267.

247 Phil./lO, 7. Unesco, Human Rights. 267.

248 Phil./lO, 7-8. Unesco, Human Rights. 267-268.

249 Phil./lO, 8. Unesco, Human Rights. 268.

250 Phil./lO, 8. Unesco. Human Rights. 268.

251 Phil./lO, 8. Unesco, Human Rights. 268.

252 Phil./lO, 8. Unesco, Human Rights. 268.

253 Phil./lO, 8-9. Unesco, Human Rights. 268-269. These rights were also in the Humphrey-Cassin draft and the DC draft. Note Humphrey's art. 37, Cassin's arts. 35 and 37, and the DC draft's arts. 29 and 30. The Committee also added, under the right to work, that "work cannot be considered a commodity, its moral and social value is an essential right" which is virtually identical to art. 37 of Cassin's draft and a principle set out by Martian in his book on human rights. Maritain, Rights. 94. The position that only personal property is a right is consistent with art. 22 of Humphrey's draft.

254 Phil./lO, 9. Unesco, Human Rights. 269.

255 Phil./lO, 9. Unesco, Human Rights. 269-270. These rights are also in the Humphrey, Cassin and DC drafts.

256 Phil./lO, 10. Unesco, Human Rights. 270.

257 Phil./lO, 10-11. Unesco, Human Rights. 270-271. These rights are also in the Humphrey, Cassin and DC drafts.

Huxley's covering letter for the submission of the report, which in part was a reply to Stanczyk's letter (see n.148 supra) is at: UCRO File, Part II, 146-147. See n.147 supra. Huxley's letter was also carbon copied to Humphrey. Laugier's reply and his request for additional copies of the report is at: "Henri Laugier, unpublished letter of August 19, 1947 to Julian Huxley," UCRO File, Part II, 145. See also Lauren, 341, n.61.

259 Lauren, 341 n. 58. The request for publication was made by the UN Department of Public information. See E/CN.4/78, 2. The UNWB issues containing philosophers' replies are Vol. Ill, no. 17 (October 21, 1947), 520, to Vol. Ill, no. 25 (December 16, 1947), 811.

260 Unesco, Human Rights. 10-12. UNWB, HI/21, 658.

261 SR.26, title page.

262 Ibid., 11.

263 In Havet's view "the delegates who are most favourable to Unesco.. .are Mr. Malik.. .Mr. Cassin [and] Mrs. Mehta.. .Mrs. Roosevelt is favourable to Unesco, but eager to act only as Chairman, in her official capacity," which indicates how badly Unesco had, and continued, to misjudge the public support of the State actors involved. See "Jacques Havet, unpublished draft letter circa March 1948 to Solomon Arnaldo," UCRO File, Part II, 276. As for Mrs. Mehta, she remained, unfortunately for Unesco, absolutely silent during the entire debate.

264 SR.26, 11.

265 Ibid., 11.

266 Ibid., 11. See also Lauren, 341 n.61; and Glendon, 84, re protection of CHR authority. 64

267 SR.26, 11. Dehousse was representing Belgium for the first time at the CHR, but we may assume he was fully informed of CHR activities by the previous delegate, Roland Lebeau. See Humphrey, Adventure, 48-49.

268 Ibid., 11.

269 Ibid., 11.

270 SR. 26, 12.

271 Ibid., 12.

272 Dehousse reinforced his concern by noting that "political, diplomatic and literary circles in Brussels had been wondering.. .whether it was this Bill drawn up by Unesco that was going to be discussed" by the Commission. Ibid., 12.

273 Ibid., 13 (quotations) and 16. In Humphrey's view Unesco had the legal "right to request the distribution of such documents" in accordance with "paragraph 6, article 3 of the agreement concluded between Unesco and the UN, which authorized such distribution," 13.

274 Ibid., 14.

275 Ibid., 14.

276 Ibid., 16.

277 Ibid., 16-17.

278 Ibid., 17.

279 Ibid., 17. See UCRO File, Part II, 241-242, n. 102 supra, re: correspondence between Huxley and Mrs. Roosevelt. See also UCRO File, Part II, 46-47, n.99 supra, re: correspondence between Berkeley and Cowell where he indicates that Unesco "had assurances from Roosevelt and others [no doubt Humphrey, Cassin, Laugier, etc.] that our contribution will be welcome," 46.

280 SR. 26, 17.

281 Ibid., 17.

282 Morsink, 301.

283 Ibid., 301.

284 Ibid., 301. See also E/CN.4/78, 1

285 E/CN.4/78, 2. The title of this document is; "Communication Addressed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights," 16 December, 1947. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Johannes Morsink for providing me with a copy of this document.

286 Ibid., 2.

287 Ibid., 1.

288 Ibid., 1.

289 Ibid., 1. 65

290 Lauren, 341, n.60. See also Cassin, "La Declaration Universalle Des Droit De l'Homme," Recueil De Cours De L'Acadamie De Droit International 79 (1951 II), 239-367, 272. Cassin noted that "Une place exceptionnelle doit etre reservee au livrc.publie en aout 1948 par l'U.N.E.S.C.O avec une introduction de J. Maritain, qui est le resultat d'une 'enquete sur les droits de l'homme, aupres de sociologues, de juges, de juristes et de philosophes'," 272. He also added "C'est le philosophe Maritain.. .a vu juste en disant qu'il ne fallait pas chercher une conciliation theorique ou une synthese proprement philosophique, mais trouver une convergence pratique d'ideologies et de principes d'action fondamentaux," 286. See also Macdonald, 53.

291 See generally: Humphrey, Adventure (Though Humphrey does briefly note in his memoirs that he had a "long tete-a-tete about human rights" with Huxley in, or about, July, 1948, at 61); Hobbins, Edge. Vol. I; A. J. Hobbins, ed., On the Edge of Greatness. Volume 2. 1950-1951 (Montreal: McGill University Libraries, 1996); —, On the Edge of Greatness. Volume 3. 1952-1957 (Montreal: McGill University Libraries, 1998); —, On the Edge of Greatness. Volume 4, 1958-1966 (Montreal: McGill University Libraries, 2000); and John Humphrey, No Distant Millennium: The International Law of Human Rights (Paris: Unesco, 1989).

292 Humphrey, Adventure. 67. See also Glendon, 295; and Morsink, 284. In his diary Humphrey noted that, "the two special interests that have tried hardest to influence the Declaration are the Catholic Church and the Communist Party - the former with considerably more success that the latter!" Hobbins, Edge. Vol. 1. 83. See also Humphrey, Adventure. 66.

293 Morsink, 285-286.

294 Humphrey, Adventure. 67. See also Morsink, 286-287.

295 Morsink, 286 (quotation). See also Humphrey, Adventure, 67; and Glendon, 146.

296 Morsink, 286 (quotation). See also Humphrey, Adventure, 67 and Glendon, 146.

297 Morsink, 287 (quotation). See also Glendon, 146 and 261, n.10, transcript of the debates of the Third Committee, Ninety-Eighth Meeting, October 9, 1948, 114.

298 Glendon, 147 (quotation), and 261, n. 12. Glendon is paraphrasing Grumbach's remarks from a transcript of the debates of the Third Committee, One Hundredth Meeting, October 12, 1948, 127.

299 Glendon, 147. See also Morsink, 287.

300 Morsink, 316. See also Glendon, 118.

301 Ibid., 317.

302 Ibid., 317.

303 Ibid., 317.

304 Ibid., 317.

305 Ibid., 317, 318.

306 Ibid., 318. The drafting Sub-committee was made up of China, France, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, and the USSR, 318. See also Glendon, 294.

307 Morsink, 318.

308 Malik, 132. See also Glendon, 164. S.D.G.