Duplicated Debacles? a Comparison of the 1895-96 Jameson Raid and the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion
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Duplicated Debacles? A comparison of the 1895-96 Jameson Raid and the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion Adam Burns and Robert Gallimore take us on two invasions, one by land and one by sea ollowing the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and the rise to power of the socialist regime of Fidel Castro, the United States – ever fearful of growing Communist influence across the world at the height of the Cold War – quickly moved to rid Fthe western hemisphere of Castro’s embryonic regime. As well as plans to assassinate Castro, the CIA hatched a scheme that they felt might give the USA ‘plausible deniability’ and instead look like a homegrown counter-revolution. On 17 April 1961, ‘Operation Zapata’ saw a group of US-backed Cuban exiles journey to the Bay of Pigs in southern Cuba. Within a few short days, the poorly planned and executed invasion, which the US hoped would spark an anti-Castro uprising, had failed absolutely. The American president of the day, John F. Kennedy, was subjected to international condemnation, and ridicule from Soviet Russia. This failure helped to solidify Castro’s grip on power and increase tension in the region immeasurably. Following the First Boer War of 1880-81, the Afrikaans-speaking Boer Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State were given grudging recognition from the British, who had designs on creating a grand federation in southern Africa, which included these fledgling republics. In 1895, after years of growing tension, the prime minister of Britain’s South African Cape Colony, Cecil Rhodes, and his friend Dr Leander Starr Jameson, hatched a plot for the latter to embark upon a similar journey, leading a small force into Johannesburg, the capital of the Transvaal, and aiming to spark a revolution among the Uitlanders (non-Boer – mainly British – residents) in the city. Rhodes and his allies hoped that if the unrest proved widespread enough, the British would then have good cause to intervene and absorb the uncontrolled Boer territories. However, the result was a fiasco that served only to embarrass Britain internationally, embolden their great rival Germany, and heighten tensions in Africa and beyond. Caricature of Leander Starr Jameson. Caption read ‘Dr Jim’. Vanity Fair, 9 April 1896. ‘Empire makers and breakers’ – Vanity Fair illustration of the House of Commons inquiry into the Jameson Raid, November 1897. Sir William Harcourt (second from right) sought to use the raid to attack the position of Cecil Rhodes (centre). 22 The Historian – Winter 2016/17 Arrest of Jameson after the raid. From Petit Parisien, 1 January 1896. On the face of it these two quixotic protectorate of ‘Rhodesia’, Rhodes and to South Africa, Jameson travelled once excursions might seem to have only a his friend Dr Jameson made a tour of more to Johannesburg and reported passing resemblance. Yet, as this article these new possessions. Travelling back back to Rhodes that the tension was illustrates, such similarities seem more separately via the towns of Pretoria and at fever pitch. A potentially disruptive tangible as one begins to dig deeper. By Johannesburg in the Transvaal, they general election back in Britain saw the exploring the journeys leading up to the reconvened in Cape Town (the capital expansionist Joseph Chamberlain move attempted coups, their execution and of the British Cape Province). On the into the colonial office and Rhodes and their aftermath, it becomes clear that a basis of their recent travels the two his supporters soon bent him to their number of interesting parallels exist. men agreed that the Transvaal-based scheme – as long as there was a ‘genuine’ Uitlanders’ resentment at their treatment Uitlander rebellion which was free from Journeys by the Boers had created an atmosphere evident British influence, Chamberlain The arch-imperialist Cecil Rhodes ripe for rebellion – the sort of rebellion was on board. haboured dreams of extending British that could be steered towards Rhodes’s As the end of the year approached, influence into the Transvaal, not to ultimate goal: the union of the South Jameson set about putting the final mention securing its significant mineral African republics under the British flag. touches to his invasion force. Although wealth. In 1894, buoyed by his recent Rhodes and Jameson then set sail he was able to raise a band to wait success in crushing the Matabele people for London, where a number of other on the border for the anticipated and forming the modestly named new pieces of their scheme seemed to fall ‘uprising’ and arrange for arms to be into place. Rhodes was given smuggled into Johannesburg, both permission (in principle) were meagre in number. In addition, by the then Liberal while the plan came closer to fruition, government to extend the the crucial support from businessmen reach of the Cape Colony in Johannesburg was wavering. As (of which he was Prime the long-awaited month of December Minister) all the way north 1895 arrived, a number of messages to Rhodesia, which was weaved their way from the Cape to run by Rhodes’s chartered Johannesburg. The original invasion company. The journey date of 26 December was put back, first appeared to have secured for two days, and then until January. Rhodes’s power and allowed Jameson, frustrated in his camp on the him to encircle the Boer Transvaal border, sent a final message republics. Upon returning on 28 December that he would proceed The Historian – Winter 2016/17 23 Cuban cigar: Bay of Pigs invasion blows up in JFK’s face. Cartoon by Leslie Gilbert. the bud. The most important part was that the United States government must be able to keep its role firmly in the shadows. The CIA, the instigators of this plan, having initially begun training the Cuban exiles in the USA, decided to ship the exiles off to Guatemala, the scene only years before of their great ‘regime change’ success. As 1960 progressed, the plan developed into an amphibious invasion, an alteration given the go-ahead by the experienced military veteran Eisenhower and on which Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kennedy was duly briefed. By the start of 1961 the operation was picking up speed and further Cuban exiles journeyed from Florida to the CIA training camp in Central America. Despite a change of occupant in the White House in January that year, CIA officials won Kennedy over to the existing operation. The brigade, led by Cuban exile officer Pepe San Roman, was armed, trained and determined to defeat Castro. They were wholly convinced by the CIA that they had the full backing of the United States in achieving this aim. Three sites for the invasion were considered for the landing, but the somewhat late final choice was settled on as the Bay of Pigs, around 100 miles south of the capital, Havana. On 16 April US planes – that were painted to appear as if they were Cuban – left Guatemala on a mission to take out Cuban airforce facilities, but a second airstrike that aimed to finish the job was cancelled by an anxious Kennedy. The invasion force of 1,400 exiles, named Brigade with the plan unless he heard to the was plotting his downfall. In early 1960 2506 (after the membership number of contrary. Despite a last-ditch attempt President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave the a colleague killed in a training accident), to dissuade him from proceeding, the go-ahead to the raising of a US-trained left Guatemala for the remote and swampy enclave on Cuba’s southern doctor was now determined to proceed. group of Cuban exiles who would travel On 29 December Jameson and his men to Cuba and land a fatal blow to Castro. coast and landed there on 17 April 1961 set off from their camp and that night The CIA – buoyed by recent success in with dreams of toppling Castro’s still met up with supporting soldiers from overthrowing a left-wing government nascent regime. Mafeking. In total, 511 men rode to in Guatemala in 1954 – indicated to the Johannesburg in the hope of crushing president that there were clear signs of Execution: the adolescent republic.1 rebelliousness in the air and the United lack of surprise Fidel Castro had not even been in States was in a good position to help One important factor regarding the power for a year before the United States nip the socialist revolution of Castro in potential success of the Bay of Pigs 24 The Historian – Winter 2016/17 A group of captured US-backed Cuban exiles, known as Brigade 2506, being lined up by Fidel Castro’s soldiers at the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs), Cuba, following an unsuccessful invasion of the island, April 1961. Getty images invasion was that it was something of were the only people under the illusion Secretary Joseph Chamberlain did an ‘open secret,’ at least so far as those that the defeat of this somewhat obscure was breathtaking – despite the severe involved in the formation of foreign chief was the intended culmination of breakdown of communication in policy were concerned. For example, their endeavours. the immediate run up to the raid. Castro had long awaited a US attack; Chamberlain famously wrote to the there were almost certainly double Elite complicity Prime Minister Lord Salisbury upon agents in Brigade 2506, and there is even From day one, Kennedy was keen to the eve of the raid that, ‘if the rising evidence to suggest that Soviet Premier keep US involvement in the Bay of Pigs is successful it ought to turn to our Nikita Khrushchev knew the exact plan secret, and the aim became to create advantage’.4 Chamberlain got away with date of the planned invasion.2 To make a scenario where – if unsuccessful – the it because Britain’s shame, humiliation matters worse, American involvement United States could claim ‘plausible and the relatively small amount of in the planned invasion became steadily deniability’.