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Home , Cecil Rhodes, First Boer War, Jameson Raid, Leander Starr Jameson, Paul Kruger, Second Boer War

Duplicated Debacles? A comparison of the 1895-96 and the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion

Adam Burns and Gallimore take us on two invasions, one by land and one by sea

ollowing the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and the rise to power of the socialist regime of Fidel Castro, the – ever fearful of growing Communist influence across the world at the height of the Cold War – quickly moved to rid Fthe western hemisphere of Castro’s embryonic regime. As well as plans to assassinate Castro, the CIA hatched a scheme that they felt might give the USA ‘plausible deniability’ and instead look like a homegrown counter-revolution. On 17 April 1961, ‘Operation Zapata’ saw a group of US-backed Cuban exiles journey to the Bay of Pigs in southern Cuba. Within a few short days, the poorly planned and executed invasion, which the US hoped would spark an anti-Castro uprising, had failed absolutely. The American president of the day, John F. Kennedy, was subjected to international condemnation, and ridicule from Soviet Russia. This failure helped to solidify Castro’s grip on power and increase tension in the region immeasurably. Following the of 1880-81, the -speaking of the and Orange were given grudging recognition from the British, who had designs on creating a grand in , which included these fledgling republics. In 1895, after years of growing tension, the prime minister of Britain’s South African , , and his friend Dr , hatched a plot for the latter to embark upon a similar journey, leading a small force into , the capital of the Transvaal, and aiming to spark a revolution among the (non-Boer – mainly British – residents) in the city. Rhodes and his allies hoped that if the unrest proved widespread enough, the British would then have good cause to intervene and absorb the uncontrolled Boer territories. However, the result was a fiasco that served only to embarrass Britain internationally, embolden their great rival , and heighten tensions in Africa and beyond.

Caricature of Leander Starr Jameson. Caption read ‘Dr Jim’. Vanity Fair, 9 April 1896.

‘ makers and breakers’ – Vanity Fair illustration of the House of Commons inquiry into the Jameson Raid, November 1897. Sir William Harcourt (second from right) sought to use the raid to attack the position of Cecil Rhodes (centre).

22 The Historian – Winter 2016/17 Arrest of Jameson after the raid. From Petit Parisien, 1 January 1896.

On the face of it these two quixotic of ‘’, Rhodes and to , Jameson travelled once excursions might seem to have only a his friend Dr Jameson made a tour of more to Johannesburg and reported passing resemblance. Yet, as this article these new possessions. Travelling back back to Rhodes that the tension was illustrates, such similarities seem more separately via the towns of and at fever pitch. A potentially disruptive tangible as one begins to dig deeper. By Johannesburg in the Transvaal, they general election back in Britain saw the exploring the journeys leading up to the reconvened in (the capital expansionist move attempted coups, their execution and of the British Cape Province). On the into the and Rhodes and their aftermath, it becomes clear that a basis of their recent travels the two his supporters soon bent him to their number of interesting parallels exist. men agreed that the Transvaal-based scheme – as long as there was a ‘genuine’ Uitlanders’ resentment at their treatment rebellion which was free from Journeys by the had created an atmosphere evident British influence, Chamberlain The arch-imperialist Cecil Rhodes ripe for rebellion – the sort of rebellion was on board. haboured dreams of extending British that could be steered towards Rhodes’s As the end of the year approached, influence into the Transvaal, not to ultimate goal: the union of the South Jameson set about putting the final mention securing its significant mineral African republics under the British flag. touches to his invasion force. Although wealth. In 1894, buoyed by his recent Rhodes and Jameson then set sail he was able to raise a band to wait success in crushing the Matabele people for , where a number of other on the border for the anticipated and forming the modestly named new pieces of their scheme seemed to fall ‘uprising’ and arrange for arms to be into place. Rhodes was given smuggled into Johannesburg, both permission (in principle) were meagre in number. In addition, by the then Liberal while the plan came closer to fruition, government to extend the the crucial support from businessmen reach of the Cape Colony in Johannesburg was wavering. As (of which he was Prime the long-awaited month of December Minister) all the way north 1895 arrived, a number of messages to Rhodesia, which was weaved their way from the Cape to run by Rhodes’s chartered Johannesburg. The original invasion company. The journey date of 26 December was put back, first appeared to have secured for two days, and then until January. Rhodes’s power and allowed Jameson, frustrated in his camp on the him to encircle the Boer Transvaal border, sent a final message republics. Upon returning on 28 December that he would proceed

The Historian – Winter 2016/17 23 Cuban cigar: Bay of Pigs invasion blows up in JFK’s face. Cartoon by Leslie Gilbert. the bud. The most important part was that the United States government must be able to keep its role firmly in the shadows. The CIA, the instigators of this plan, having initially begun training the Cuban exiles in the USA, decided to ship the exiles off to Guatemala, the scene only years before of their great ‘regime change’ success. As 1960 progressed, the plan developed into an amphibious invasion, an alteration given the go-ahead by the experienced military veteran Eisenhower and on which Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kennedy was duly briefed. By the start of 1961 the operation was picking up speed and further Cuban exiles journeyed from Florida to the CIA training camp in Central America. Despite a change of occupant in the White House in January that year, CIA officials won Kennedy over to the existing operation. The brigade, led by Cuban exile officer Pepe San Roman, was armed, trained and determined to defeat Castro. They were wholly convinced by the CIA that they had the full backing of the United States in achieving this aim. Three sites for the invasion were considered for the landing, but the somewhat late final choice was settled on as the Bay of Pigs, around 100 miles south of the capital, Havana. On 16 April US planes – that were painted to appear as if they were Cuban – left Guatemala on a mission to take out Cuban airforce facilities, but a second airstrike that aimed to finish the job was cancelled by an anxious Kennedy. The invasion force of 1,400 exiles, named Brigade with the plan unless he heard to the was plotting his downfall. In early 1960 2506 (after the membership number of contrary. Despite a last-ditch attempt President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave the a colleague killed in a training accident), to dissuade him from proceeding, the go-ahead to the raising of a US-trained left Guatemala for the remote and swampy enclave on Cuba’s southern doctor was now determined to proceed. group of Cuban exiles who would travel On 29 December Jameson and his men to Cuba and land a fatal blow to Castro. coast and landed there on 17 April 1961 set off from their camp and that night The CIA – buoyed by recent success in with dreams of toppling Castro’s still met up with supporting soldiers from overthrowing a left-wing government nascent regime. Mafeking. In total, 511 men rode to in Guatemala in 1954 – indicated to the Johannesburg in the hope of crushing president that there were clear signs of Execution: the adolescent republic.1 rebelliousness in the air and the United lack of surprise Fidel Castro had not even been in States was in a good position to help One important factor regarding the power for a year before the United States nip the socialist revolution of Castro in potential success of the Bay of Pigs

24 The Historian – Winter 2016/17 A group of captured US-backed Cuban exiles, known as Brigade 2506, being lined up by Fidel Castro’s soldiers at the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs), Cuba, following an unsuccessful invasion of the island, April 1961. Getty images

invasion was that it was something of were the only people under the illusion Secretary Joseph Chamberlain did an ‘open secret,’ at least so far as those that the defeat of this somewhat obscure was breathtaking – despite the severe involved in the formation of foreign chief was the intended culmination of breakdown of communication in policy were concerned. For example, their endeavours. the immediate run up to the raid. Castro had long awaited a US attack; Chamberlain famously wrote to the there were almost certainly double Elite complicity Prime Minister Lord Salisbury upon agents in Brigade 2506, and there is even From day one, Kennedy was keen to the eve of the raid that, ‘if the rising evidence to suggest that Soviet Premier keep US involvement in the Bay of Pigs is successful it ought to turn to our Nikita Khrushchev knew the exact plan secret, and the aim became to create advantage’.4 Chamberlain got away with date of the planned invasion.2 To make a scenario where – if unsuccessful – the it because Britain’s shame, humiliation matters worse, American involvement United States could claim ‘plausible and the relatively small amount of in the planned invasion became steadily deniability’. Eisenhower had given remuneration were sufficient for the more obvious as the invasion drew official approval to a number of efforts Boers. What is more surprising is closer. The pre-raid airstrikes, aimed to topple the regime, including the that he was forgiven. Chamberlain at eliminating Castro’s air capabilities, invasion by exiles: Kennedy continued was pardoned due to the degrees of ended up revealing to the American to support these plans. Complicity and separation that existed between himself, press that the poorly disguised planes approval from the very highest levels Cape Colony PM, Cecil Rhodes, the used were actually US B26 bombers. In was undeniable, even if Kennedy was British South Africa Company, and many ways, the most surprising aspect of perhaps not directly responsible for events at the border. What is undeniable the Bay of Pigs invasion is that, despite every single decision made. Historian is that the raiders were armed by all of this, the US actually went ahead Peter Kornbluh points very firmly to Britain, many held commissions in the with the operation. the influence of Richard Bissell, the and that Rhodes knew the In the Transvaal, there was little CIA man in of such covert of the Transvaal under the attempt to disguise the two camps from operations.3 Nevertheless, Kennedy auspices of ‘moral intervention’ would which Jameson planned to launch his knew of the plan in its broadest sense. no doubt please Chamberlain. raid. They would have been in plain sight Plausible deniability was not only very to any Boer outrider on the border and unlikely to be achieved, as the CIA Wishful thinking the only element of concealment they knew, but even before the raid took Perhaps one of the biggest mistakes that had was by dint of their distance from place, American fingerprints on the led to the fiasco that was Operation Johannesburg and the less-travelled pre-raid bombings had put an end to any Zapata was that the success of the raid nature of that particular frontier. There semblance of deniability – plausible or relied on a flawed assumption. To be was however some effort made to implausible. a success, the raid by a tiny force of obfuscate the intent of this peculiar The link between the metropolitan only recently trained exiles, without little force; their purpose was purported elite who directed events on the US air support (unbeknownst to the to be the defeat of the Bechuana chief periphery of empire was less ambiguous raiders themselves), could only succeed Linchwe. The effectiveness of this ruse of in 1895 that it had been even ten years with a popular uprising in Cuba that war did not extend beyond the raiding earlier and so to deny complicity rallied in support of the invading exiles. force themselves, members of which as barefacedly as British Colonial Only days before the invasion, Castro

The Historian – Winter 2016/17 25 rounded up a number of suspected hour late. There is good reason why this this was yet further proof that Britain rebels (as if he knew the invasion was operation is frequently labeled a fiasco. had no intention of allowing the two coming).5 This, coupled with the massive Jameson’s underestimation of independent Boer republics to exist in underestimation of Castro’s popularity, the Boers’ fighting capabilities was the long term. , the leader particularly in this region of Cuba, remarkable. Jameson’s men came of the Transvaal, treated his prisoners meant that the exiles were alone when equipped with field and Maxim with clemency, denying the British a they landed and were destined to remain guns to fight a lightweight, highly right to intervene in any way. The raid so. The exiles, meanwhile, were unaware mobile force of sharp shooters who had solidified Kruger’s credibility; he of the execrable US intelligence. On quickly dwindled the raiding force with was absolutely correct in his mistrust every level, this support was unrealistic withering fire. If anything was going to of the British. As a result, Kruger and historians are unusually united in deter the Uitlanders from rising up, it rapidly moved toward closer relations condemning the intelligence – verging would have been the sight of Jameson’s with Britain’s arch-rivals Germany. on the delusional – that led so many men slipping from their saddles as a Kaiser Wilhelm himself sent a telegram people to ‘believe’ such an uprising consequence of dehydration and lack of congratulations to Kruger for would occur. The expectation of a of sleep as they dragged behind them successfully seeing off the British in their popular uprising was – among many mounts that stumbled under the burden ill-advised raid. The Boers also increased chinks in the rusty of Operation of their dead and wounded. their gun purchases from the Germans Zapata – the starkly unprotected in readiness for the next move in the Achilles’ heel. Aftermath: game. Jameson was not necessarily guilty of the blame game wishful thinking so much as delusional The Bay of Pigs fiasco was undoubtedly Increased tension and optimism. He knew that the compliance a disaster for Kennedy – with US hollow victories of the Uitlanders in Johannesburg involvement an internationally known The final, and best-known consequence would not be readily forthcoming and fact, he could hardly deny having been of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, is that it led that there would be no fifth column to involved. Obviously the CIA were to a marked escalation in the Cold greet him. Yet he still went ahead.6 He going to be the main scapegoat for the War. Khrushchev, initially viewed as a might well have felt this reluctance to administration – and rightly so – and moderate compared to Stalin, grew more openly support his raid stemmed from they were subject to internal changes confident, seeing Kennedy as weak and a reluctance to believe that he and his and investigations, even if these were incompetent. In the months following heroic riders would arrive in enough kept secret for many decades afterwards. Operation Zapata, the Soviets started to force to warrant the inherent risk of The shame and complicity of the move missiles to Cuba, leading to what showing their true colours. Jameson, British government was plain for all to became known as the Cuban Missile however, felt that when the Uitlanders see and there was an attempt to shift Crisis the following year. Just as the saw his raiders storming in they would blame firmly onto the maverick men- Bay of Pigs fiasco made Khrushchev indeed rise up against the oppressing on-the-spot in the shape of Rhodes bullish, it made Kennedy want revenge Boers. and Jameson. Both men did their duty, for the humiliation that Cuba had dealt Rhodes by resigning and Jameson by him – his hard line on Cuba and his Poor intelligence marching into captivity (rather than suspicion of intelligence and military The poor planning of the CIA-run fighting to the last) and not betraying officers in the USA both had roots in operation is infamous. In addition to anyone else’s involvement in the process. the failure of Operation Zapata. What the above issues, such as the lack of an this all led to was the most dangerous element of surprise and wishful thinking Alienating the enemy moment of the Cold War – a perilous on the part of the US, Operation further game of brinkmanship crafted by the Zapata itself was also littered with other The most significant outcome of failure of the previous year and which mistakes. The site of the operation in Operation Zapata was exactly the led – thankfully – to a public victory the swampy Bay of Pigs (a late change of opposite from what the USA had for Kennedy (his concessions to the destination) may have made it difficult intended. It proved Castro’s rhetoric Soviets remaining secret for many years for Cuban troops to attack the exiles’ about Yankee to be true. It to come). Overall, Kennedy followed beachhead, but it also made it difficult proved that Kennedy was not different up Operation Zapata with a victory of for the exiles to escape to the interior from the rest; the USA had not changed. sorts, but in the long term the victor mountains, or for any internal Cuban Castro was the hero of the hour. As was Castro – whose regime, under his rebels to join them (if indeed there were Fidel’s co-revolutionary, Ernesto ‘Che’ brother Raul, still holds power today. any). So out-of-date was CIA intelligence Guevara, told one US official afterwards: The United States may have lost the regarding the site that they were ‘Thanks for Playa Giron…Before the first battle and won the second, but it seemingly unaware that this coastal area invasion, the revolution was weak. certainly lost the war. around Playa Giron had recently become Now it’s stronger than ever’.7 From this The Jameson Raid was one of a a fashionable Cuban resort, and much time onwards, Castro’s Cuba became number of events that led in relatively money had been pumped into the area inextricably drawn towards the Soviet short order to the outbreak of the by Castro – creating better transport sphere, adopting a more Soviet style of in 1899. With the raid links and a pro-Castro feeling in the government and economics. The Soviets having moved the Boers to the defensive, locality. The failure to destroy all of were also more than happy to take on as well as a closer relationship with Castro’s planes in the pre-raid strikes saw the roles formerly held by the USA in Germany, Britain became increasingly the exiles’ key ammunition ship sunk Batista’s time: purchasing Cuban sugar, fearful of the potential for their dream of during the raid. Finally, an even more investing heavily in the Cuban economy a South African federation (and control last minute U-turn by Kennedy to allow and effectively keeping Castro in power. of Transvaal ) slipping away from very limited air support was stymied To the Boers, already aware of them. The Second Boer War (1899-1902) because they forgot to take into account British designs upon their territory proved a dangerous and controversial the time difference, and turned up an from the First Boer War of 1880-81, conflict – the British infamously

26 The Historian – Winter 2016/17 resorting to the use of concentration camps and a scorched these events to explore the other, and help in some small way to earth policy to defeat the guerilla forces of the Transvaal. further the cause of comparative history. Ultimately, Britain won out but at great expense in both international goodwill and pounds sterling. Having said that, Further Reading at least until 1994, it was the Boers () who were the Burleigh, Michael (2013) Small Wars, Far Away Places: the real victors, as in the years after South African federation and genesis of the modern world, 1945-65, London: Macmillan. independence in 1910, they came to dominate the government Judd, Denis & Surridge, Keith (2013 edn) The Boer War: a of the new republic. history, London: IB Tauris. Conclusion Kornbluh, Peter, ed. (1998) Bay of Pigs Declassified: the secret Now, over 50 years on from the Bay of Pigs fiasco and more CIA report on the invasion of Cuba, New York: New Press. than a century since the Jameson Raid, key figures from Pakenham, Thomas (1991 edn) The Boer War, London: Abacus. those eras still resonate in our political culture. It was not until the final two years of the Obama presidency that the REFERENCES United States and Cuba began to resolve the great divisions 1 For a detailed narrative of the days and months leading up to the attack see the classic: Eric A. Walker (1940) ‘The Jameson Raid’ in Cambridge Historical that have existed between them ever since the botched raid. Journal, 6, 03, pp. 283-306. In 2015 the two nations restored diplomatic relations, which 2 Bay of Pigs Declassified (2000) produced by David M. Frank. The History had been suspended since 1961, and Obama flew to Havana Channel. 3 Ibid. to meet President Raul Castro, who could well remember the 4 Cited in Harry Browne (1974) Joseph Chamberlain, Radical and Imperialist, US-backed invasion that his brother had foiled. Even Cecil Harlow, Essex: Longman, p. 61. 5 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (1998 edn) The CIA & American Democracy, New Rhodes has appeared with some regularity in newspapers of Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 123. late, following the foundation in Cape Town – and afterwards 6 Pakenham, Thomas (1991 edn) The Boer War, London: Abacus, p. 8 in – of campaigns to fell statues of the noted imperialist 7 Cited in Burleigh,Michael (2013) Small Wars, Far Away Places: the genesis of as part of an effort to ‘decolonise’ university campuses. Though the modern world 1945-65, London: Macmillan, p. 448. Rhodes’s imperialist ventures are long past and the Bay of Pigs invasion has been a staple of GCSE history for many years now, Dr Adam Burns is the Head of History and Politics at the tremors that these events created are certainly still felt all Queen Elizabeth’s Hospital in Bristol. He is currently across the world to this day. studying for an EdD at the University of Leicester exploring As ever, when drawing parallels such as those above, how students learn about British imperial history and has there are a number of instances that space does not allow authored a number of articles on both History and History one to discuss: both further similarities, as well as some Education. His first book, American Imperialism, 1783-2013, evident differences. This article does not seek to present an is scheduled for release by University Press in incontestable set of resemblances, but to bring to the fore what February this year. Robert Gallimore teaches History at is – at the very least – a set of comparisons that help us to look Taunton School in Somerset. Prior to his turn to teaching again at instances we might have thought we already knew. after leaving the army, he was a decorated major in the Both the Jameson Raid and the Bay of Pigs invasion have been Welsh Guards. He served for almost 17 years across the written about by a number of excellent scholars, and perhaps globe including time in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Iraq and this piece will help encourage those only familiar with one of . New podcasts from the HA

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