Clarifying the Long- and Short-Term Causes of World War II

Robert Boyce, Joseph A. Maiolo, eds.. The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. vii + 397 pp. $33.95, paper, ISBN 978-0-333-94539-1. Reviewed by David J. Ulbrich Published on H-War (April, 2004) Clarifying the Long- and Short-Term Causes of plan for domination of Western Europe; his plan World War II succeeded until 1941 because of his shrewd diplo‐ In The Origins of World War Two: The Debate macy and other nations' errors. Mussolini, for his Continues, Robert Boyce and Joseph A. Maiolo part, exercised a remarkable level of fexibility as bring together distinguished scholars to discuss he maneuvered to extract the best position for the causes of the Second World War. The editors Italy in European affairs. Both nations, however, believe that it is too simple to blame the entry of suffered from serious internal weaknesses which the United States into the conflict merely on the hurt their warmaking capabilities once the con‐ Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor or to argue that flict started. appeasement of Adolf Hitler was a sufficient Japan is expertly discussed by Antony Best. cause for war in Europe. The reality was much He brings the historiographical debate about the more complex. This anthology draws the historio‐ origins of the Second World War in Asia up to graphical map using two approaches: national date. No more can Japan's high-ranking militarist studies and thematic studies. clique be solely blamed for starting the war. Nor The chapters in part 1 of this book focus on can the attack on Pearl Harbor be treated as re‐ the major and minor powers that became in‐ sulting from American and Japanese competition. volved in the Second World War. Best seeks to place Japan into technological and geographical contexts. He believes that many The chapters on Germany and Italy reject pre‐ problems were caused because Japan had been vious interpretations holding that these powers "wrestling with the effects of late industrialization reacted to developments in the international are‐ and the tensions created by the modernization na. Instead, Christian Leitz and John Gooch re‐ process" (p. 53). Expansion in Asia occurred be‐ spectively show that Hitler and Mussolini long cause of a thirst for raw materials and because of possessed ambitious plans for territorial expan‐ opportunities in those regions. After completing sion. Hitler added a diabolical racist twist to his H-Net Reviews their conquests, the Japanese wished to recast According to Warren F. Kimball in his chap‐ their nation as an autarky. Its leaders expected ter, the United States remained locked in a Wilso‐ that a short war with China in the late 1930s nian mindset throughout the interwar period. The would yield that nation's resources with little cost. mindset embodied by the Treaty of Versailles and Chinese communism also needed to be contained. the League of Nations contained two fatal expec‐ However, according to Best, "Japan found itself tations: a single global system, and equality trapped in a conflagration from which it could not among nations. If the problems caused by the escape" (p. 66). Likewise, the Japanese hoped to Great Depression are added into the mix, the iso‐ move into Southeast Asia with little trouble be‐ lationism of the United States can be understood. cause of declining European influence in that re‐ For Kimball American isolationism needs clarifi‐ gion. Instead, Japan increasingly aroused the ire cation; it aimed to avoid entangling alliances but of the United States which in turn led to embar‐ still strongly affect global politics and economics. goes and eventually the attack on Pearl Harbor. He also denies the common historical argument Jonathan G. Haslam addresses the enigmatic that American isolationism played a major role in Soviet Union and the problematic Spanish Civil starting the Second World War; he puts the re‐ War in his chapter. Insuring the survival of the sponsibility on German and Japanese aggression Soviet Union stood as a major goal for Josef Stalin combined with French and British timidity. Nev‐ in the late 1920s and 1930s. Towards that goal, ertheless, Kimball points out, Franklin D. Roo‐ Stalin worked to increase Soviet industrial and sevelt certainly did recognize the increasing dan‐ military capabilities. His ideology doubtlessly gers to peace in Europe and Asia. He wanted to helped to shape his attitudes of fear and hatred protect democracy, "the code word for American for Nazism and thus made him participate in the political liberty and economic opportunity" (p. Spanish Civil War. Yet, the same Stalin would later 139). Roosevelt cleverly modified American neu‐ shrewdly join with Hitler in the Nazi-Soviet Non- trality to allow expanded assistance to Britain, Aggression Pact because the English and French most critically after the fall of France in 1940. He were too slow to oppose Germany. hoped to keep the United States out of the Euro‐ pean conflict while preventing Germany from Peter Jackson and Williamson Murray exam‐ winning that war. Simultaneously, he tried to de‐ ine France and Britain in their respective chap‐ ter Japanese expansion in Asia, based on the as‐ ters. These two so-called status quo powers sumption that they would not wish to fght the su‐ worked to maintain peace and stability in Europe. perior United States. This assumption about Japan The leaders of both nations desired to use multi‐ turned out to be disastrously incorrect. lateralism rather than realpolitik to avoid future conflicts. Yet, those same leaders were limited by The chapters on the small powers share sev‐ particular assumptions, ideas, and perceptions. eral similarities. Poland, Czechoslovakia, China, Both nations retained horrific images of trench and various neutral nations exerted more agency warfare in their public memories. Such a world and independence of action than is often present‐ view meant that neither France nor Britain direct‐ ed in histories. None were helpless victims who ly challenged Hitler's Germany until it was too lacked foresight and succumbed to overbearing late. As much as anything else, Jackson and Mur‐ neighbors. For example, Poland, in Anita J. Praz‐ ray show that Edouard Daladier and Neville mowska's chapter, possessed a complex foreign Chamberlain lacked the distance or objectivity policy which was driven by a need to fnd allies. with which to interpret actions by Germany, Italy, France and Britain waited until 1939, when it was or Japan. too late, to offer concrete support to the Poles. For Igor Lukes, Czechoslovakia maintained a sizable 2 H-Net Reviews military force yet failed to reach out to other na‐ lyze personality, perception, and beliefs of the na‐ tions in Europe. In fact, during the 1920s and ear‐ tional leaders. Ultimately, Jervis admits that politi‐ ly 1930s, Czechoslovakians feared Austria and cal science offers no single explanation about why Hungary more than Germany. Having allowed it‐ the Second World War started. He does, however, self to become isolated, Czechoslovakia made an believe the model and perspectives can be useful easy mark for Hitler. According to John W. Garver, in analyzing the historical record. a weak and divided China contributed to Japa‐ In a chapter on "Peace Movements," P. M. H. nese-American conflict. Chinese leaders attempt‐ Bell focuses on anti-war tendencies in Britain and ed to play the great powers off against one anoth‐ France between the world wars. People in both er, and they tried to organize a coalition against nations became disillusioned by war following Japan. All these schemes failed by 1937, but the the slaughter of 1914-1918. Too many British and Chinese nonetheless showed amazing tenacity in French men had fallen. Reactions took two forms: resisting Japanese invaders; indeed, as Garver a pacifism in which all wars were seen as im‐ concludes, Japan became "bogged down in an moral, and a peace-minded internationalism in open-ended, costly and essentially unwinnable which wars were seen as catastrophes to be war" in China (p. 194). Other neutral nations such avoided. While minorities in France and Britain as Belgium also possessed agency, despite being embraced pacifism, most tried to avoid war by targets of the great powers. Yet, as Neville Wylie finding alternatives to it. Britain's Neville Cham‐ reveals, the neutrals remained on shaky ground. berlain, for example, tried to appease Germany's The First World War had ruined the concept of Adolf Hitler in hopes of satisfying him. Bell traces neutrality because Germany had invaded Belgium the development of peace movements until 1939 in 1914. Likewise, collective security as espoused when the conflict started. Many anti-war elements in the Treaty of Versailles also undermined neu‐ in France and Britain then rallied around their trality as an option because no nation could re‐ flags in nationalistic fervor. main truly aloof in a war of aggression. Philip M. Taylor's chapter on propaganda illu‐ In part 2 of the book, titled "Themes," the con‐ minates an interesting topic. In a matter-of-fact tributors explore how various topics factored into tone, he reveals that both dictatorships and starting the Second World War. democracies employed propaganda to their re‐ Robert Jervis employs methodologies from in‐ spective advantages. Soviet, German, and Italian ternational relations and political science to help regimes usurped control of media and embarked illuminate the years before the Second World on a calculated campaign to ensure domestic sup‐ War. As a political scientist, he is concerned with port or international sympathy. British and finding a model that accurately represents inter‐ French regimes also utilized propaganda, albeit in national behavior and then applying the 1930s to a more benign way, to persuade their citizens to that model. He tracks the ways in which those support government policies and to fear other na‐ pre-war years might ft into the international sys‐ tions.

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