Representing in the West: A Comparison of the Arab European League (AEL) with the Arab American Institute (AAI)1

Virginie Mamadouh

Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies (AMIDSt), Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 Department of Geography, Planning, and International Development Studies,University of , Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam, The

This paper discusses two attempts to mobilize communauté. Cette étude analyse et compare “Arabs” in a Western context: the Arab European leurs représentations respectives des Arabes, du League (AEL) and the Arab American Institute monde arabe et de l’Occident. Les pratiques des (AAI). The first is a grassroots political move- Arabes en Occident présentent un cas particuliè- ment mobilizing Arab migrants and their descen- rement intéressant d’actions collectives par les dants in Flanders () and the immigrés, car elles énoncent une identité qui Netherlands; the second is a Washington-based n’est pas délimitée par l’appartenance nationale non-profit organization promoting the electoral à un seul pays d’origine et par conséquent vrai- participation of Arab Americans. Both organiza- semblablement plus contestée. En outre, le tions aim at representing and mobilizing Arabs contexte géopolitique et la pertinence mondiale as a single community. The paper analyzes and des conflits dans le monde arabe perturbent les contrasts their representations of the Arabs, the dynamiques locales de migration et d’intégra- Arab world, and the West.The experience of tion. Arabs in the West is a particularly interesting Mots clés : action collective, mobilisation poli- instance of migrant collective action, because it tique, représentations, Arabes, Marocains, articulates an identity that it is not bound to the Libanais, États-Unis, occidentale, citizenship of one country of origin and therefore Belgique, Pays-Bas is likely to be disputed. In addition, the geopolit- ical context and the global significance of the Introduction conflicts in the Arab world interfere with the domestic dynamics of migration and integration. This paper examines collective representa- tions by Arabs in the West. It focuses on a Keywords: collective action, political mobiliza- comparison of two organizations trying to tion, representations, Arabs, Moroccans, Lebanese, USA, Western Europe, Belgium, The mobilize immigrants from theArab world and Netherlands their descendants as Arabs and to improve their political position in their country of resi- Cet article examine deux tentatives de mobilisa- dence: the Arab European League (AEL) and tion des « Arabes » dans un contexte occidental : the Arab American Institute (AAI) (see Box la Ligue arabe européenne (AEL) et l’Institut 1). This comparative approach was chosen in arabe-américain (AAI). La première est un order to explore both diversity within the mouvement politique de base mobilisant des population of Arab descent in the West and immigrés d’origine arabe ainsi que leurs diversity among Western countries. How do descendants en Flandre (Belgique) et aux Pays- they represent the Arab communities and Bas ; le second est une organisation à but non their relations with the West and the Arab lucratif basée à Washington favorisant la participation électorale des Américains arabes. world? What are differences and similarities Ces deux organisations visent à représenter et à between organizations operating in different mobiliser les Arabes en tant qu’unique parts of the West?

The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe Vol 10, No 3-4 (2007) 153–169 © 2007 by AWG Publishing, Toronto, Canada 154 Virginie Mamadouh

After clarifying the terms “representa- articulating by Westerners in the West—for tion,” “Arabs,” and “the West,” the article example travellers, painters, geographers, introduces insights from the literature on the adventurers, and the military. It focuses collective action of migrant communities. instead on the representation of the Arabs Arabs in the West form a particularly inter- who live in the West, that is, migrants from esting migrant group, not a diaspora linked the Arab world and their descendants. Now to a specific state or to a nation claiming that it is clear that our discussion here will statehood but related to a broader cultural focus on representations involving “Arabs in group or a pan-nationalist ideology. This the West,” rather than all Western represen- Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 means that many alternative identities can be tations of Arabs, the three terms within this invoked (and, indeed, are invoked) to mobi- phrase need some clarification. lize the same population, including national, ethnic, religious, and local identities (e.g., Representing …? Moroccan, Amazigh, Muslim, or Rifain identities for the large group of immigrants Representation is conceived here at two to the Netherlands and their descendants levels. The first pertains to representations originating from the North of ). In as narratives, images, discourses, and prac- addition, this group is of special interest to tices that label, classify, and frame actors political geographers because Arabs in the and events, distributing blame, naming West must manoeuvre at the intersection of heroes, and consequently shaping domestic and foreign policy agendas, the constraints and opportunities for action. one relating to the position of immigrants “Representing the Arabs” is used here as a and their descendants in their country of broad umbrella term for the discursive residence and the other concerning the construction of the identity of that social policy of their country of residence toward group in the public domain, especially in the the Arab world. They are an especially inter- media (see, e.g., Hargreaves and Perotti esting migrant group in relation to geopoli- 1993; ter Wal 1996).The second-level mean- tics, national identities, and the connections ing pertains to political representation: in between them. This article discusses repre- other words, it is about giving voice to Arab sentations articulated by two organizations communities in the political arena, either in two different parts of the West, one in the through electoral participation or in specific United States and one in the Low Countries representative institutions (see, e.g., (Flanders and the Netherlands). Moulier-Boutang 1985). Obviously these two levels of represen- Representing Arabs in the West? tations interact. Discursive representations are performed in the process of political “Representing Arabs in the West” is a simple representation. Political entrepreneurs sentence that is easily misread. It first aiming to mobilize and organize a group evokes a long history of Orientalism in according to a certain identity have to deal painting and literature, coupled to a long with pre-existing identities; they can also history of political and cultural imperial- use both ascribed and self-proclaimed iden- ism.2 In human geography, Edward Said’s tities, and they can reproduce these through seminal work Orientalism (1978) has been political representation or shape new identi- influential too, ensuring a sustained atten- ties in the process. tion to the importance of geographical repre- This article examines how two political sentations and imaginations (Gregory organizations that claim to mobilize and 1994). But this article is not so much about represent Arabs in the political arena (i.e., in the representations of Arabs that have been the second meaning of the term “representa-

The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe 10, no 3-4 (2007) Representing Arabs in the West 155 tion”) represent Arabs and the Arab world in colonialism and decolonization, and by their publications (i.e., in the first meaning Islamism as the main alternative transna- of the term). To research the representation tional ideology in the 1990s and 2000s.5 practices of the AAI and the AEL, I looked Arabness is a complex cultural concept, mainly at their activities and their publica- with competing religious, cultural, and tions, both in print and online. Both organi- political connotations. Still, Arabness zations maintain extensive Web sites, though relates primarily to a language community, the AAI has a much wider range of publica- one that shares the use of Arabic. tions and activities than the AEL. In addi- Nevertheless, no easy inter-communicabil- Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 tion, secondary sources were consulted. ity should be expected between people from Both organizations enjoy coverage by different parts of the Arab world, especially conventional media, the AEL much more, between those who are not able to read and but over a shorter period, than the AAI. write in modern Arabic and between those Additional information on the AEL came from the Mashrek and those from the from observation of meetings and lectures. Maghreb, even if these differences between colloquial Arabic variants have recently … Arabs …? been mitigated by audiovisual mass media— the cinema and, later, television (earlier from To clarify the issues at stake in the strategic Egypt, later from and the Gulf use of Arabness in identity politics by (some states) do shape some commonalities of) these immigrants and their descendents, between oral variations of Arabic. some preliminary comments on this The Arab language is also closely geographical category are necessary. connected to the Qu’ran and to the spread of Unlike most names used to label Islam outside the Arab peninsula, so closely specific groups of immigrants and their that “Arab” and “Muslim” are often descendants, the qualifier “Arab” does not perceived and used as synonymous terms. refer to the citizenship of a state of origin.3 It The fundamental association of the Islamic is not a nationality either,4 or not quite. scripture with the Arabic language may Some do speak of “the Arab nation.” This explain why many believe most Muslims to Arab nationalism promoting the formation be Arabs. This, of course, is not correct: the of one Arab state is generally referred to as countries with the largest Muslim popula- “pan-Arabism.” Pan-Arabism has been an tions are India, Indonesia, Pakistan, important ideology in Egypt (Nasserism) Bangladesh, and Nigeria, while the largest and in the Levant, especially in Syria and Arab country, Egypt, ranks sixth, by Muslim , where the nationalist pan-Arab Baath population, just ahead of Iran and Turkey. party (founded in 1947) seized political Even more importantly, not all Arabs power in 1963 in Syria and in 1969 in Iraq are Muslims; traditionally, Jewish and (where it held power until 2003). Political Christian groups were present in Arab coun- initiatives to realize Arab unity include the tries, nor should we forget the importance of short-lived United Arab Republic (1968– both secularism and socialism in certain 1961) and Federation of Arab Republics Arab countries. In addition, all three reli- (1972–1977); the Arab Maghreb Union gions are subdivided in several sub-denomi- (since 1989); and the Arab League (since nations. Finally, there are various 1945). The appeal of pan-Arabism (still configurations of religion and state power, symbolized by the black, green, white, and including secular states (e.g., Algeria, red used on the flags of several Arab states) Tunisia, Syria, Iraq); pluralist states (e.g., has been weakened by (state) nationalism, Lebanon); and countries in which religious by the diverging national experiences of and state institutions are intertwined, as

The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe 10, no 3-4 (2007) 156 Virginie Mamadouh when the king is also a religious leader scope, and categories), different countries of (Saudi Arabia, Morocco). origin, and different socio-cultural and It is most common to define Arabs as socio-economic characteristics. The overall people from countries in the Arab world. But size of their Arab communities is difficult to delimitating the Arab world is also a prob- measure. In Europe, no overall statistics on lem of meta-geography. Sometimes the Arab Arabs are available; census categories world is defined linguistically, as compris- always refer to national (or state) identities, ing those states where Arabic is the main with the noticeable exception of ; sometimes politically, as compris- statistics, which also include data on the Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 ing the member states of the Arab League. foreign-born population and the population This means that some member states are of foreign ancestry (second generation included even though large portions of the only).7 population are not Arabophone (Sudan, The composition of the Arab immigrant Somalia, Djibouti, and the Comoros),6 while population varies from country to country. is excluded despite a sizeable Arabic- Moroccans are present in many European speaking minority—demonstrating again countries.8 They are the largest foreign that Arabness is socially constructed. In any group in Spain (235 000 Moroccan citizens case, many countries of the Arab world in 2001), in Italy (160 000 Moroccans with a feature sizeable non-Arabophone linguistic resident permit in 2001), and in Belgium minorities, such as the Kurds in Iraq and the (122 000 Moroccans and 82 500 Moroccans Imazighen in Morocco and Algeria. So it who had obtained Belgian citizenship as of would be wrong to assume that all immi- 2001). But the largest Moroccan population grants from the Arab world are is found in France, where—with over half a Arabophones. Finally, the lasting influence million persons—they represent the fifth- of colonial languages (French, English, and largest group of foreign citizens, after Italian) should not be neglected. In certain Spaniards, Italians, Portuguese, and states, the language of the formal colonial Algerians. In the Netherlands, there are administration remains important—politi- about 100 000 Moroccan citizens, but Dutch cally, economically, and culturally—espe- statistics on country of origin mention, cially among the elites. registered in 2001, 156 000 first-generation Thus, major sources of diversity among Moroccans (Dutch residents born in immigrants from the Arab world are citizen- Morocco) and 117 000 second-generation ship (of more than 20 states, plus Moroccans (Dutch residents whose parents Palestinians and Israeli Arabs), religion were born in Morocco)—a group three time (many different Islamic and Christian as large as the population of Moroccan denominations), language, and ethnicity nationals only. It is the third-largest immi- (ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Assyrians, grant ethnic group, behind Turks and Berbers, and Copts do not generally define Surinamese. Other sizeable Arab groups in themselves asArabs).This diversity makes it the Netherlands are Iraqis (almost 40 000) especially interesting to consider whether and Egyptians (15 000; CBS 2001, 14). In the two organizations under study do Belgium, other Arab groups are much succeed in articulating a pan-Arab identity, smaller: only 8 000 Algerians and 1 000 which aspects of Arabness are highlighted, Lebanese nationals live in Belgium. and whether alternative identifications (reli- By contrast, ethnic identity is registered gion, ethnicity) are used for mobilization. in the United States as self-reported ancestry The two organizations under scrutiny in the census, and “Arab Americans” is a here operate in countries with very different category used by the U.S. Census Bureau.9 Arab migration histories (in terms of timing, According to the Census Bureau, the five

The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe 10, no 3-4 (2007) Representing Arabs in the West 157 ancestries most commonly reported in 2000 are less educated, have lower incomes, and were German (42.8 million Americans) and are more often unemployed than the average Irish (30.5 million), followed by African Belgian or Dutch person. These are charac- American (24.9 million), English (24.5 teristics that those attempting to mobilize million), and American (20.2 million; each of these populations as Arabs must take Brittingham and de la Cruz 2004, 3). into account. “Arab Americans” is a category compiled by the Census Bureau based on the … the West? following self-reported ancestries: general Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 Arab ancestry categories (Arab or Arabic, The West is also a vague geographical Middle Eastern, North African) or specific notion, with different geopolitical and Arab ancestry categories (Lebanese, Syrian, cultural components. While it was a coher- Egyptian, Palestinian, etc.) (De la Cruz & ent geopolitical bloc during the Cold War— Brittingham 2003: 3).10 Most of these the bloc of market economies and liberal specific ancestries are linked to an existing democracies opposing a bloc of communist state, with the exception of Kurdish (almost regimes in the East—the West has been rede- 10 000 persons), Berber (1 300), fined in cultural terms in the post–Cold War Alhuceman, Bedouin, and Rio de Oro (less period, as in earlier periods of history. It is than 1 000 each; de la Cruz and Brittingham thus opposed to a cultural East, located alter- 2003, 3; Brittingham and de la Cruz 2005, natively in the Middle East, South Asia, or 3). Persons of Chaldeans or Assyrian ances- East Asia, or even in these three places at the try, and other Christian minorities from Iraq, same time, as in the much-disputed “clash of are not included in this category. Sudanese, civilizations” envisioned by Samuel Somalis, and Mauritanians are not included Huntington, which would oppose a Sino- either, although their homeland states are Islamic alliance against the West members of the Arab League; Comorians (Huntington 1993, 1996). and Djiboutians are. When it comes to the position of Arabs Taken together, the Arab population in in the West, one must account for major the United States was 1 189 731 in 2000. The differences between Europe and the United Lebanese were by far the largest group at States with respect to both their different over 440 000, followed by Arabs, Syrians, experiences of immigration and integration and Egyptians (each with more than 100 000 and their different engagements with the persons). According to the census data, the Middle East and the Arab world. Both these population of Arab ancestry represents factors are likely to influence the opportuni- 0.4 % of the U.S. population. According to ties for migrants from the Arab world, and the AAI,11 Arab ancestry is under-reported. their descendants, to mobilize and organize Based on polls, the AAI estimates the popu- themselves, as well as their representation of lation of Arab Americans—that is, their own position in the West. First, key Americans with ancestors from the Arabic differences pertain to the migration regime; speaking world—at 3.5 million.12 access to citizenship, civic rights, and politi- Arab migration has a longer history in cal rights; and the general orientation toward the United States, and the Arab population is the integration of migrants and the forma- more diverse in terms of national and reli- tion of ethnically based organizations. gious background, than in Belgium and the Second, they pertain to the nature of the Netherlands. American Arabs are better encounter with the Arab world. While the educated and have higher incomes than the European–Arab interface is a long history of average American, while Moroccans and fruitful cultural encounters (in philosophy, other Arabs in Belgium and the Netherlands mathematics, medicine, science, etc.) and

The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe 10, no 3-4 (2007) 158 Virginie Mamadouh dramatic violent clashes (the Umayyad invasion of Iraq. Such differences may affect conquest of south-western Europe, the how immigrant communities perceive “the Crusades, the Reconquista, modern colo- West” in general and their country of resi- nialism), the United States is a more recent dence in particular. player in the region. There is also a major The two organizations under scrutiny difference between the American and operate in countries with no formal colonial European experiences with terrorist attacks past in the Arab world, where dominant originating from the Arab world, and narratives of the Arabs and the Arab world between the targeting of Europeans and of are therefore primarily shaped by present- Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 Americans in the Arab world, that could day immigration and by international rela- influence both foreign policy and public tions (especially the Israeli–Palestinian opinion. Finally, anti-immigrant discourses conflict and the war on and occupation of are more likely to target Arabs (and Iraq). The Dutch government supported the Muslims) in Europe (see Fekete 2004; Bat invasion of Iraq and has voiced over time a Ye’or 2005; Carr 2006) than in the United pro-Israel policy, while the Belgian govern- States. ment has taken a more critical stance in both As a result of these past experiences, but instances, siding with French and German also because of the different origins of the opposition to the war on Iraq in 2003 and, in various Arab communities, the terms “Arab” 2001, allowing a lawsuit to be filed against and “Arabic” have different connotations Ariel Sharon (then prime minister of Israel) and are associated with different stereotypes under the Belgian genocide law for his in different European languages. In the responsibility in the September 1982 Sabra United Kingdom, for example, the term and Chatila massacre in Beirut. The AEL “Arab” is associated primarily with the was actively involved in that lawsuit.13 Middle East of Lawrence of Arabia, with the upper classes of the Gulf states spending Collective Action and Identity Formation their petrodollars in London, and with Al in Immigrant Communities Qaeda; in France, it is more likely to be asso- ciated with North Africa, the Algerian war of The political mobilization of migrants and independence, and the Front Islamique du their descendants has been a topical issue in Salut (FIS) and the Groupe Islamique Armé Western countries for a long time. Generally, (GIA). These connotations may affect the observers contrast two possible orientations attractiveness of the Arab identity to migrant of collective action: toward the homeland communities when this identity is invoked and toward the host society (Layton-Henry by political leaders to mobilize these popula- 1990). In this process, mobilization by tions. nationality of origin is taken for granted, Finally, the geopolitical context differs while pan-nationalist mobilizations aiming in the different Western countries. During at groups from different states are over- the Cold War, and in the post–Cold War looked. This may explain why, despite the period, European states have not always relatively large numbers of Arabs in the West followed the lead of the United States: think and the vehement articulation of fears of and of the difficult decolonization of British and objections to their presence, Arab communi- French colonies, especially Algeria; the ties and identities are rarely studied by Suez crisis; the Palestinian–Israeli conflict; academics.14 the 1973 oil crisis; and, most recently, the rift More generally, diasporan identities are between the United States and several major often essentialized (Sökefeld 2006). But European states—especially France, identities should not be taken for granted: Germany, and Belgium—over the 2003 they are strategically shaped and employed

The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe 10, no 3-4 (2007) Representing Arabs in the West 159 both by political leaders or entrepreneurs Finally, migrants’ organizations need not and by the members of the community they restrain their working area to a single coun- aim to represent (Somers 1994; Mavroudi try of residence; they can be transnational in 2007). In addition to national or pan- the sense that they mobilize migrants across national identities, class, race, and ethnicity state borders in different countries of resi- can be used—possibly more successfully— dence, for example, in a supranational to mobilize the same constituency. region such as the European Union, Europe, In diaspora studies, the orientation North America, or the West. toward the country of origin is often Based on these insights into collective Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 conceived as an intervention in homeland action among immigrant communities, two politics, ranging from the extreme case of a organizations claiming to represent Arabs in government in exile to that of ethnic minori- the West are analyzed below. Following a ties who have escaped persecution and lobby short introduction to the two organizations to obtain collective rights in their home- and their action repertoires, their representa- lands. The diaspora can support certain tion of their constituencies are compared. parties or factions in homeland politics. But Which identity label(s) do they use? Which this orientation toward the country of origin dimensions of group identity do they stress? need not be so direct. It may be mainly about How do they represent their constituency, influencing the foreign policy of the country embedded in theArab world and in the West? of residence toward the country of origin How do they engage with the Arab world? (see, e.g., Carter 2005 for the involvement of the Croatian diaspora in the United States in The Two Organizations and Their Action the Balkans conflicts in the 1990s). Repertoires16 During the past decade, the label “transnationalism” has become a fashion- The Arab European League (AEL) was able term in migration studies, used in addi- created in 2000 in Brussels as Al Rabita by tion to or instead of “diaspora.”15 More , a naturalized Lebanese attention is thus drawn to the transnational refugee, and some friends. It then moved to space created by social interaction between , in Flanders, where it achieved country of residence and country of origin. public visibility by mobilizing young These approaches focus on economic and Belgians of Moroccan background in street cultural ties, particularly the importance of demonstrations. remittances and networks of mutual aid and In 2003 a branch was created in the exchange, and tend to neglect political Netherlands, and the AEL repeatedly publi- mobilization across state borders. With cized its ambition to expand its activities in transnationalism, the locus and the target of Wallonia (the French-speaking region of political action can be both the country of Belgium) and other EU countries, especially residence and the country of origin. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Still, “transnationalism” implies more The AEL aimed to lead a social and political diverse cross-border relations than those movement for the emancipation and political between the country of residence and coun- participation of Europeans of Arab ancestry try of origin. Indeed, pan-Arab organiza- (see box 1). It is a rather loosely organized tions are transnational in the sense that they group, with European, Dutch, and Flemish connect people from different (Arab) branches. It runs different Web sites in states—at least symbolically, in their ideol- English (for the European branch), in Dutch ogy of a pan-Arab nation, and possibly mate- (one for the Dutch and one for the Flemish rially, if they foster collective activism from branch), and in French (for the Walloon persons living in different (Arab) countries. branch) with a common portal site,17 but the

The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe 10, no 3-4 (2007) 160 Virginie Mamadouh content of these Web sites is not amended American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Com- very often. Abou Jahjah has published two mittee (ADC).The new organization built on books on his work for the AEL that give the work of the Association of Arab- additional insight into the goals, activities, American University Graduates (AAUG), and action repertoires of the organization established in 1967;19 the National (Abou Jahjah 2003, 2007). Association of Arab Americans (NAAA), The AEL is an oppositional movement. founded in 1972; and the ADC, created in It clashed several time with police forces. 1980. The AAI is based in Washington, D.C., Some politicians, both in Belgium and in the and is aimed at the emancipation and politi- Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 Netherlands, have called for the police to cal participation of Arab Americans. Its investigate it for illegal activities; others main activities include publicizing informa- have wanted to withdraw its leaders’Belgian tion about Arab Americans and lobbying for citizenship. Nevertheless, the AEL’s action civil rights; electoral participation and repertoire is not limited to street demonstra- monitoring; census and polling activities; tions. The organization also ran for elections and raising awareness of problems in the in Flanders (together with the small leftist Middle East (see Box 1). Among other party Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) in 2003, publications, it runs an extensive and active and alone as the Muslim Democratic Party Web site. The AAI’s action repertoire (MDP) in 2004) and had plans to present its includes lobbying, public relations, news own list in Dutch elections but never real- releases, newsletters, talk shows, polling, ized them.. After a period of high media visi- and the analysis of census results related to bility in 2002–3 generated by more negative Arab Americans. After 11 September 2001, than positive publicity (Van der Welle 2004; the AAI produced an educational packet Jacobs 2005), the organization had diffi- with information about Arab Americans, the culty in organizing itself in a formal way. Middle East, and Islam, available online20. Abou Jahjah effectively ran all branches. Following the 2006 war in South Lebanon, Representations he finally decided to go back to his country of birth, and the organization has since In this section, the representations of the reached a more stable, if low-profile, phase. AEL and the AAI are compared on three The AEL’saction repertoire includes demon- dimensions: the use of Arab symbols (labels strations, (online) publications, and lectures, and colours), the representation of the Arab especially at universities and polytechnics in community, and the representation of the the Netherlands. Arab world. By contrast, the Arab American Institute (AAI) is a formally organized insti- Arab Labels and Colours tute, with a board of directors and a founda- tion, theArabAmerican Institute Foundation Both organizations’ names combine an Arab (AAIF) that issues grants for educational and a Western dimension (whether projects. It also has a formal relationship American or European). They could be with the American authorities: the AAIF has framed as a bridge between the Arab world been designated by the U.S. Census Bureau and the West, but a more adequate reading of “as the only Census Information Center the terms “Arab American” and “Arab dedicated to analyzing data on Arab European” is here embedded to the host Americans.”18 society. These labels represent hyphenated The AAI was established in 1985 by identities. There is however a major differ- James Zogby, an American of Lebanese ence between the United States and Western origin who was already active in the Europe: in Belgium and the Netherlands, the

The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe 10, no 3-4 (2007) Representing Arabs in the West 161

vote are engaged in treason to the American Box 1:Mission statements of Republic. (Roosevelt 1915; see also “Roosevelt theAAI and theAEL Bars the Hyphenated” 1915; and Lang 2005, 2)

The Arab American Institute (AAI) repre- A few years later, President Woodrow sents the policy and community interests of Wilson is reported to have said that Arab Americans throughout the United States and strives to promote Arab Any man who carries a hyphen about with him carries a dagger that he is ready to plunge into American participation in the U.S. elec- Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 toral system. AAI focuses on two areas: the vitals of this Republics whenever he gets campaigns and elections and policy forma- ready. (Wilson 1919) tion and research. The Institute strives to serve as a central resource to government Obviously the aversion to hyphenated identi- officials, the media, political leaders and ties was related to the Great War in Europe community groups and a variety of public and the fear that loyalties to countries of policy issues that concern Arab Americans origin would profoundly divide Americans. and U.S.–Arab relations. (AAI, Mission)21 Indeed, when the United States finally entered the Great War in 1917, it put German The Arab European League (AEL) is a Americans—the largest group of hyphen- political and social movement that stands ated Americans—in a difficult position. In for the Rights of the Arab and Moslem that year and the next, the German language communities in Europe and the Arab almost disappeared from classrooms and causes in general. The AEL stands also for church services. solidarity with all Muslim peoples and One century later, hyphenated identities communities and all the oppressed peoples are acknowledged in the United States and of the world. (Vision of the AEL)22 are generally proudly claimed as a way to make visible cultural heritages other than expression “Arab European” is a neologism, that of white Anglo-Saxon Protestant while “Arab American” is a common term in (WASP) Americans. One of the largest the U.S. context. It has been used before by hyphenated identity groups at present is that other organizations (see above), and hyphen- of African Americans, whose roots are ated identities are commonly used in among the deepest in the United States apart American society. from those of Native Americans. Most Still, at the beginning of the 20th hyphenated American identities refer to a century, the term “hyphenated American” country of origin (Irish Americans, Italian gained currency as a negative phrase. Americans), although some refer to race President Theodore Roosevelt markedly (Afro-Americans and, since the 1980s, opposed it, declaring in a famous 1915 African Americans; Asian Americans; and speech that the less common Caucasian Americans) or a religious-based ethnicity (Jewish There is no room in this country for hyphenated Americans). The Gale Encyclopedia of Americanism. […] A hyphenated American is Multicultural America lists no less than 130 not an American at all. […]There is no such groups of hyphenated Americans (qtd. in thing as a hyphenated American who is a good Lang 2005, 3). The specificities of the Arab- 23 American. The only man who is a good American experience have recently been American is the man who is an American and discussed with respect to both changes in nothing else. […] status over time (Cainkar 2006) and the … those hyphenated Americans who terrorize American politicians by threats of the foreign importance of political activism (David 2007).

The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe 10, no 3-4 (2007) 162 Virginie Mamadouh

Arabness is equally expressed in words the Arab People and that they have by both organizations, but their use of visual contribute to our nation through a common symbols differs. The AEL has definitively history.”25 The AEL also states that it chosen Arab symbolism through the use of acknowledges the oppression of the the colours of the Arab flag (green, white, Imazighen and other minorities under Arab red, and black) and of Muslim symbols (the totalitarian regimes and calls for the recov- dome of the Al Aqsa mosque in Al ery of threatened languages. The AEL artic- Quds/Jerusalem; the colour green as back- ulates an inclusive conception of the Arab ground colour on the English-language Web nation that would include these ethnic Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 site). By contrast, the AAI has stuck to U.S. groups in a civic community, talking in this symbols—the colours red, white, and blue context of hyphenated identities: Aramaic- and a star—in its logo. Arabs, Assyrian-Arabs, and Amazigh- Arabs. Representing Residents of Arab Ancestry For example, point 10 of the “Vision of the AEL” states that Both organizations represent hyphenated Arab identities even in their names. Aramaic-Arabs, Assyrian-Arabs and Amazigh- However, while the AAI talk about Arab Arabs especially are to be recognized as Americans when talking about its grass- protected components of our nation. Rif, Sous roots, the AEL never uses the term “Arab and Kabilya can become each a federated Arab province enjoying internal autonomy while Europeans” to label (groups of) people; being parts of the Arab federal state. The AEL rather, it aims to mobilize and represent also recognizes the disastrous assimilation and Arab and Muslim communities in Europe. oppression policies that Arab minorities were The AEL also uses the term constituencies facing on the hand of the dictatorships; for “Arab Shatat (diaspora)” in all three of its example the Rif and the Assyrians. Therefore the working languages. AEL calls for the restoration of all threaten[ed] Both organizations articulate inclusive languages like Rif and Assyrian languages notion of Arabness, and both are criticized alongside the National Arabic language. Having for this, but the critique came from different said that[,] the Aramaic, Assyrian and Amazigh- ethnic groups, as a result of the different Arabs are not separate peoples but have demographic makeup in each context: contributed largely to the formation of the Arab nation, which makes them an integral part of the Assyrians and Maronites form a large group Arab people. Any racist separatist tendency in the US, Imazighen in Western Europe. claiming the supremacy and exclusivity of a The AEL does not provide an account of certain race or ethnicity from any side should be the main characteristics of the community it fought.26 represents. It does not give details on the national origin of immigrants and their On the AEL’sWeb sites, featured news items descendants, instead speaking generally of pertain either to news about the AEL itself the Arab or the Muslim communities and of (including opposition critiques and lawsuits Muslims. Nevertheless, the AEL has against the AEL) or to general news about frequently been accused—both by migrants the position of migrants in Flanders, on the who prefer to define themselves as Flemish Web site, or in the Netherlands, on Berbers24 and by Belgian and Dutch crit- the Dutch Web site. The AEL sites monitor ics—of Arab imperialism and of wanting to anti-Muslim statements and activism. impose Arabic on a population of immi- Sometimes they feature some information grants that is mainly Berber-speaking. In about the situation in other European coun- response, the AEL has stated that the tries, especially France and the United Imazighen are a “recognised component of Kingdom, particularly if a specific topic has

The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe 10, no 3-4 (2007) Representing Arabs in the West 163 been addressed in the Dutch or the Flemish More generally, Arab-American activism press. The West, unlike Europe and the emerged in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab– European Union, is not a significant Israeli War (David 2007). Still, 9/11 was a geographical notion for the AEL. particularly difficult experience, and many The AAI, by contrast, circulates a great reports deal with the Arab American experi- deal of information about Arab Americans. ences and activities after 9/11, particularly A whole section of the organization’s Web the report Healing the Nation: The Arab site is dedicated to Arab Americans, with American Experience after September 11 subsections titled “About Arab Americans,” (AAI 2002). In addition, the AAI also publi- Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 “Arab Americans On the Move,” cizes teaching materials created by the “Demographics,” and “Famous Arab AADC to help combat discrimination and Americans.” This information includes prejudice. national and local statistics but also lists of Nationally defined subgroups are visi- famous Arab Americans. These famous, and ble through country of origin in census less famous, American politicians, athletes, statistics, and the AAI pays more attention to businessmen, entertainers, authors, artists, two national categories in its publications: and so on with an Arab background are seen Lebanese Americans and Palestinian as ambassadors of the community (see Americans. Kasem 2006) and possibly also as role Like the AEL, the AAI has been criti- models for young Arab Americans. The AAI cized for its inclusive use of the label “Arab” also publishes a yearly Roster of Arab and accused of making unjustified claims on Americans in Public Service and Political certain sections of the population from the Life that includes a wide array of elected and Arab world. Organizations of Assyrians appointed federal and state officials (e.g., (mainly from Iraq), Maronites (from AAI 2007a) and a congressional scoreboard Lebanon), and Copts (from Egypt) contend rating the voting behaviour on important that incorporating these groups, with their policy issues (e.g. AAI 2007b). Another notably different ethnicity (language, reli- category of information pertains to the gion) and their own organizations in the dissemination of census and polls results27 United States, allows the AAI to boost its about Arab Americans, including data for numbers of Arab Americans and its list of the states and cities where most Arab Arab-American achievers. After 9/11, the Americans live (notably California, Coalition of American Assyrians and Michigan, and NewYork).Last but not least, Maronites (consisting of the Assyrian the AAI closely monitors electoral processes American National Federation, the Assyrian at the national and local levels,28 reports on Universal Alliance, the Assyrian Chaldean the role of Arab Americans, and supports Syriac Alliance, the Assyrian Chaldean Arab American candidates from both Syriac Union, the American Maronite Union, parties. It also publishes resources for Arab the World Maronite Union, and the World Americans interested in lobbying or in Lebanese Organisation) formally requested organizing political meetings and the AAI, in an open letter, to stop referring to campaigns. Assyrians and Maronites as Arabs and to stop The situation was difficult for Arab speaking on their behalf (CAAM 2001). Even Americans long before the events of 11 the name of the Kahlil Gibran Spirit of September 2001. The AAI published articles HumanityAwards—awards theAAIF gives to with titles like “Are Arab Americans People honour “individuals, corporations, institu- Like Us?” (Zogby 2000) and “Not Quite tions, and communities for their work in White: Race Classification and the Arab promoting greater understanding and appre- American Experience” (Samhan 1997). ciation of diversity and inclusion”—is

The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe 10, no 3-4 (2007) 164 Virginie Mamadouh contested (AINA 2001). This point was made We reject the Zionist project in Palestine and we again in 2007 when the Assyrian call for the dismantling of the Zionist entity and International News Agency protested against the establishing of a united Palestinian demo- the AAI’s interpreting an attack on an cratic state in all historical Palestine. A state Assyrian Church in Detroit as an anti-Arab where Arabs and Jews can coexist peacefully enjoying equal rights without any discrimina- attack. For the Assyrian organization, tion. This includes the return of all Palestinian refugees to their original homes with compensa- The practical ramifications of the AAI’s desire to tion. Until such a solution is put to practice we usurp Assyrian identity are by no means trivial. Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 will support resistance against the Zionist occu- By counting Assyrians and other Middle Eastern pation of Palestine Christian groups as Arabs, AAI attempts to enhance its demographic and, by extension, We are opposed to all non-democratic regimes or political clout in the U.S. This enhanced Arab all other regimes that do not guarantee the full political clout may then be used to further an scope of human rights as mentioned in the agenda that is at best alien and sometimes universal declaration of human rights. We outright hostile to Assyrian self-awareness and believe that freedom can not be fragmented. It is aspirations. Arab American demographic claims the freedom of society from foreign occupation illegitimately bolstered by Assyrian numbers and colonization. But it is also the freedom of may also be used to vie for grants, financial the individual from every other kind of oppres- assistance, and services otherwise destined for sion. We will not trade one for the other, nor put the Assyrian community to instead further Arab one on hold for the other. cultural, linguistic, social welfare, and national- ist goals. (AINA 2007) We believe that the Unity of the Arab people in one democratic federal state is a necessary transla- Finally, the AAI limits its work to one coun- tion of the actual objective Unity of the Arab try of residence—the United States—and in people that is a result of century’s old shared this sense is not transnational. The West is history.29 not a relevant geographical notion, and even News items, articles, and statements on the North America is hardly relevant. AEL Web sites cover interactions between countries of residence and the Arab world Representing the Arab World (e.g., when a representative of the Netherlands visits the Arab League) but also The AEL explicitly extends its activism to deal with conflicts in the Middle East, espe- the Arab world; its aims involve struggling cially Israel/Palestine, the 2006 war in for democracy and for a pan-Arab federal Lebanon, and the war in Iraq. There is plenty state in the region. The AEL’s scope and its of attention to the situation in Gaza, the role ambitions for the Arab world are best of the United States, and Al Qaeda. It is demonstrated by quoting the relevant goals remarkable, however, that there are very few from the English version of the AEL vision items about Morocco, the main country of statement: origin of the AEL’s constituency. We are part of the stream of the Arab National The AAI’s objectives related to the Arab Movement that is working towards the goals of world are much more modest: freedom, Social justice and Unity in the Arab homeland. The Institute strives to serve as a central resource to government officials, the media, We are an anti-colonial and anti Zionist organi- political leaders and community groups and a zation. Therefore we reject colonization and variety of public policy issues that concern Arab occupation of any Arab territory by any foreign Americans and U.S.–Arab relations.30 power.

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AAI news releases and stories cover U.S.– cases, irrelevant as a (metaphorical) place of Arabs relations and specific conflicts in the residence. The national context (the US, Middle East, especially Israel/Palestine and Belgium or the Netherlands) is for both Lebanon; to a lesser extent, Iraq; and, more organizations important, while the European recently, Darfur. But a significant portion of Union is potentially an important arena for the AAI’s constituency, unlike that of the the AEL. AEL, actually does originate from Lebanon, The AAI is pan-Arab to the extent that it Palestine, or Iraq. aims to unite Americans of diverse Arab Neither the AEL nor the AAI is a dias- origins, but it does not endorse the pan-Arab Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 pora organization that tries to interfere in rhetoric of the AEL or its call for a federal domestic politics in Arab countries. Instead, Arab state. In Belgium and the Netherlands, both intervene in their host countries’ domes- the full-fledged pan-Arabism of the AEL’s tic public debates about conflicts in the Arab Lebanese leadership is not echoed by the world. The AEL does so by protesting and movement’s Moroccan constituency. The demonstrating support for the Palestinians, AEL’s difficulties in expanding beyond the Iraqis, and the Lebanese in an effort to Flanders and the Netherlands and in consoli- influence public opinion in Belgium and the dating its organization in these two countries Netherlands. The AAI does so through lobby- as a quadratically transnational movement ing and advocacy activities targeting foreign (i.e., involving both different countries of policy makers in Washington, D.C. origin and different countries of residence) A final major difference between the two also reveal the limitations of its transnational organizations is that the AEL opposes U.S. ambitions. Even in the European Union, policies in theArab world, while theAAI goes national political opportunity structures seem to great lengths to demonstrate its American to largely constrain the shape of collective patriotism (especially since 9/11). action (see also Imig and Tarrow 2001). The preliminary findings reported here Conclusion show the diversity of Arab representations in the West. Further work is needed to compare As I have shown in this paper, the similarities these representations with those of organiza- between the AEL and the AAI are superficial. tions that do not carry the label “Arab” but Both label themselves using a hyphenated aim at mobilizing (parts of) the same Western Arab identity, but their representa- constituency and to explain why the collective tions of the Arabs in their part respective of actions of theArab communities in the United the West—Western Europe versus the United States and in Europe are so different from States—are quite different. Whereas the each other in terms of organization, action Arab-American identity of the AAI is firmly repertoires, framing, and achievements. grounded and institutionalized in the American context, partly thanks to the AAI’s own activities with respect to census data, the Notes Arab-European identity of the AEL is virtual. 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented While the AAI emphasizes the religious at the 2006 AWG conference, The Euro-Arab diversity of the Arab-American community, Encounter: Geographical Linkages and the AEL uses “Muslims” and “Arabs” as Cross-Cultural Research Agendas, held in synonyms. Finally, while the AEL gives voice December 2006 at the Lebanese American University, Beirut. to anti-Americanism in its critiques of U.S. 2 For a recent research note, see Gökmen and foreign policy in the Arab world, the AAI Haas (2007). combines pride in its Arab heritage with 3 As one of the AWG referees rightly pointed American patriotism. The West is, in both out to me, this is also the case for a major

The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe 10, no 3-4 (2007) 166 Virginie Mamadouh

category in the American context: that of Belgium to protect its military against possi- Latinos. In that case, a similar competition ble lawsuits. exists between the labels “Latino” or 14 A noticeable exception in geography is the “Hispanic” and other labels referring to the work of Caroline Nagel (Nagel 2001, 2002; countries of origin (see Norris 2007). Nagel and Staeheli 2004; Staeheli and Nagel 4 In many languages “nationality” and “citizen- 2006, Staeheli et al 2002). ship” are used as synonyms, but the first 15 See Vertovec (1999); Vertovec and Cohen generally denotes belonging to a cultural (1999); Pries (1999); Faist (2000a, 2000b); entity—the nation—while the second gener- van Amersfoort (2001); Kivisto (2001); and ally denotes belonging to a political entity— many more since. Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 the state. Because many states are 16 “Action repertoires” is a term from the litera- nation-states (or, at least, conceive of them- ture on collective action to characterise the selves as such), nationality and citizenship strategies used by social movement organisa- are equivalent. Nevertheless, in some coun- tions. Typologies of strategies generally tries there is a clear distinction between the distinguish between inside strategies (admin- uses of the two terms, and this difference is istrative, parliamentary and court-related sometimes formally institutionalized—in strategies) and public-related strategies speech, for example, when in Britain one (media attention, informing the public, mobi- speak of the “Scottish nationality,” or in legal lizing public), between legal and illegal terms, as in the former Soviet Union a action forms, between violent and non- national affiliation (such as “Russian” or violent action forms (see for example Kriesi “Georgian”) was inscribed on passports along et al 2008 and Duyvendak et al 1992). with Soviet citizenship. 17 The portal can be accessed at 5 For a review of the competition between the http://www.arabeuropean.org/. The portal two ideologies in the Arab world see Dawisha also includes a link to anArabic version of the (2000). For a discussion of Arab nationalism site, but the link has not worked since at least (Kramer 1993) and for a review of American 2006. views on pan-arabism see Coury 2005. 18 AAI Web site, http://www.aaiusa.org/ 6 Such states are often more recent member foundation/31/about-aaif. states. The same applies to observer Eritrea, 19 For an extensive account of the evolution of while the other two states with observer the AAUG see Suleiman (2007) and the rest status—India and Venezuela—have no rela- of the special issue of Arab Studies Quarterly tion to Arabic at all. devoted to the AAUG (volume 29, number 7 Data from the Central Statistical Office of the 3/4). See also Strum 2006 for a collection of Netherlands are available at chapters on the political participation of Arab http://www.cbs.nl. Americans, especially Suleiman 2006. 8 National statistics cited in this paragraph, 20 http://www.aaiusa.org/foundation/832/ unless otherwise noted, are compiled in educational-packet. It includes among other Fondation Hassan II (2003). things AAI 2002, Zogby 2000, Samhan 1997, 9 Some European states do have a regular Kasem 2006. census, but many prohibit questions about 21 AAI Web site, http://www.aaiusa.org/ ethnic identity. about/14/our-mission . 10 See also Dallo et al 2008 for a discussion of 22 AEL Web site, http://www.arabeuropean.org/ mixed ancestries. vision.php?PHPSESSID=a5d1493da26d2ad 11 The formal links between the AAI and the ad1a18c19bc8e30e6. Census Information Center are detailed later 23 Note the sexist bias—nothing spectacular, of in the article. course, for the beginning of the 20th century. 12 http://www.aaiusa.org/arab-americans/22/ 24 For example the team running the Dutch web demographics. site Amazigh.nl organized in December 2002 13 The suit was dismissed in September 2003 a petition against the AEL and its Arabism after the law was amended in response to a (http://www.amazigh.nl/acties/petitie_ael.php) U.S. threat to move NATO headquarter out of It was discussed on the blogs of the main other

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web sites, such as Maroc.nl and Marokko.nl ———. 2007. Dagboek Beiroet Brussel. (Mamadouh 2001, 2003). Antwerp: Meulenhoff/Manteau. 25 See FAQ file on the two Dutch-language AEL van Amersfoort, H. 2001. Transnationalisme, Web sites, accessible through moderne diaspora’s en sociale cohesie. http://www.arabeuropean.org/. Amsterdam: IMES. 26 English version of the “Vision of the AEL,” Bat Ye’or [Littman, Gisèle]. 2005. Eurabia: The available at http://www.arabeuropean.org/ Euro-Arab axis. Madison, New Jersey: vision.php?PHPSESSID=3338249ec83d1e2 Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. 1e1a4cdd42e7e115c Brittingham, A., and De la Cruz, G. P.2004. 27 Polls are conducted by Zogby International, a Census 2000 brief: Ancestry: 2000. Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/10/3-4/153/1446260/arwg_10_3-4_yv5237g70q374101.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 major U.S. pollster based in Utica, NewYork. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau. Its president is John Zogby, brother of James ———. 2005. We the people of Arab ancestry in Zogby, the president of the AAI, who also the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. works at Zogby International. Census Bureau. 28 For an account of changing Arab-American Cainkar, L. 2006. The social construction of voter mobilization after 9/11, see Gimpel difference and the Arab American experi- Tam Cho, and Wu (2007). ence. Journal of American Ethnic History 29 Vision of the AEL (English version), 25:244–78. http://www.arabeuropean.org/vision.php?PH Carr, M. 2006. You are now entering Eurabia. PSESSID=3338249ec83d1e21e1a4cdd42e7 Race and Class 48(1):1–22. e115c. The vision statement is one of the few Carter, S. 2005. The geopolitics of diaspora. documents that are identical on all three Area 37:54–63. versions of the AEL Web site. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek [CBS]. 2001. 30 AAI mission statement, http://www. Allochtonen in Nederland 2001. The aaiusa.org/ about/14/mission. Hague: CBS. Coalition of American Assyrians and Maronites References [CAAM]. 2001.Coalition of American Arab American Institute [AAI]. 2007a. Roster of Assyrians and Maronites rebukes Arab Arab Americans in public service & politi- American Institute. News release, 27 cal life 2007. Washington, D.C.: AAI. October 2001. http://www.aina.org/ http://www.aaiusa.org/page/- releases/caamletter.htm /Roster/2007Roster_web_.pdf Coury, R. M. 2005. The demonisation of pan- ———. 2007b. 2007 Congressional scorecard: Arab nationalism. Race and Class 46(4): 110th US Congress. Washington, D.C.: 1–19. AAI. http://aai.3cdn.net/ Dallo, F. J., Ajrouch, K. J. and Al-Snih, S., 2008: cfbd9c5e73de050d71_yam6269fu.pdf The ancestry question and ethnic hetero- Assyrian International News Agency [AINA]. geneity: The case of Arab Americans, 2001. Arabization policy follows Assyrians International Migration Review 42(2): 505- into the West. 2001. Assyrian International 517. News Agency, 5 October 2001. David, G. C. 2007. The creation of “Arab http://aina.org/releases/2001/arabization.htm American”: Political activism and ethnic ———. 2007. Arab American Institute still (dis)unity. Critical Sociology 33:833–62. deliberately claiming Assyrians. Assyrian Dawisha, A. 2000. Arab nationalism and International News Agency, 16 April 2007. Islamism: Competitive past, uncertain http://www.aina.org/releases/20070416140 future. International Studies Review 021.htm 2 :3 79–90. Abou Jahjah, D. 2003. Tussen twee werelden: de de la Cruz, G. P., and Brittingham, A. 2003. roots van een vrijheidsstrijd. Antwerp: Census 2000 brief: The Arab population: Meulenhoff/Manteau. 2000. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau.

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