CASE STUDY

DR. ROBERT U. NAGEL, MS. KATE FIN, MS. JULIA MAENZA MAY 2021

United Nations Force in (UNFICYP)

Conflict history armed insurgency, led by the National Organization of Armed conflict in Cyprus began during the latter stag- Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), instigated a parallel Turkish es of British colonial occupation in the 1950’s.1 Greek Cypriot movement for , or . Cypriot opposition to British spurred by a desire to unify with the Greek motherland (“”) in- By 1957, Great Britain, , and attempted stigated riots and led to a violent insurgency steeped to negotiate a solution. The Zurich and Agree- in rhetoric of Greek . The emergence of this ments and a Treaty of Guarantee granted Cyprus in- UNFICYP military and personnel join calls for an end to violence against women and girls in December 2015. / UNFICYP/Juraj Hladky

dependence while forbidding the to unify with priots, as as the displacement of a quarter of the another state or be partitioned. Britain, Turkey, and Turkish Cypriot population to a few dozen enclaves.3 Greece would guarantee the terms of the agreements. The Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Under the new arrangements, were al- (UNFICYP) was deployed in 1964 to quell violence and lotted 30 percent of all government posts and 40 per- support enclaved communities. cent of military posts, despite representing only 18 per- cent of the population. Disputes soon emerged over In 1974, the Greek Cypriot , backed issues such as the establishment of Greek and Turkish by the , led a coup against municipalities in central cities, taxation, and the struc- President Makarios. In response, Turkey launched an ture of the armed forces.2 codenamed ‘Operation Atilla’ in under its authority as a security guarantor. Turkey In 1963, Greek Cypriot President Makarios III proposed claimed the northernmost 36 percent of the island, 13 amendments designed to streamline the gridlocked which became the Turkish of Northern Cy- government’s operations. However, the amendments prus (TRNC). The invasion displaced 160,000 Greek scrapped many of the constitutional guarantees af- Cypriots, about one-third of the community’s pop- forded to Turkish Cypriots, who rejected the proposal. ulation.4 It was during this period that the parties in The crisis ushered in a wave of violence that resulted in conflict agreed to a demarcated modern , the deaths of 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cy- or “ Line”.

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 2 Figure 1: Chronology of

1957 1974 2002

Cyprus gains A coup led by the Greek Cypriot The seeks to unite independence with military deposes President Cyprus under the Swiss federal Turkey, Greece, and Makarios. In response, Turkish model. It is accepted by Turkish Britain as security forces invade and claim the Cypriots but rejected by Greek guarantors. northern third of the island. Cypriots in a referendum.

1963 1977 2017

Intercommunal violence breaks The parties agree to a four- UN Secretary General proposes out after President Makarios point negotiation framework a six-point framework for proposes constitutional providing for an independent, unification talks. Negotiations amendments which erode non-aligned, bi-communal become deadlocked at a Turkish Cypriot guarantees. federal republic. conference in .

Despite a series of unsuccessful UN-mediated negotia- UN Security Council Resolution 186 empowered the tions, both communities have agreed to four basic prin- mission to “prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as ciples which continue to guide talks. These are: necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and (1) Cyprus will be an independent, nonaligned, bicom- restoration of law and order and a return to normal munal federal republic, (2) each community’s territory conditions.” What “law and order” and “normal con- would be reassessed, (3) freedom of movement, prop- ditions” meant was unclear, as was how the force erty, and settlement issues would be discussed, and would prevent the recurrence of fighting given its lack (4) the powers and functions of the central government of ‘’ capabilities.7 would be capable of safeguarding the country’s unity.5 During this initial phase, the scope of UNFICYP’s op- Two episodes in modern history have brought Cyprus erational tasks was narrow and focused on prevent- close to a solution. A 2002 referendum on reunification ing active fighting, while a UN mediator was respon- garnered Turkish Cypriot support but failed to provide sible for achieving a political resolution.8 Though the sufficient security guarantees for . Like- UN’s rules of engagement permitted the mission to wise, UN-mediated talks came to a halt in 2017 and use force only in cases of self-defense, UNFICYP have not resumed.6 was generally successful at preventing violence during this period. There were only two major out- breaks of violence: in 1964, before the mission was Mission background fully operational, and in 1967, when the Greek Cy- The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus priot military, the National Guard, began patrolling in (UNFICYP) was first deployed on March 27, 1964 in Turkish Cypriots enclaves, instigating violence with response to violence catalyzed by Turkish Cypriot the Turkish Cypriot community.9 UNFICYP also fa- opposition to proposed constitutional amendments. cilitated the elimination of economic restrictions im-

Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security 3 Figure 2: Chronology of UNFICYP

1964 1974 2004

UNFICYP is established After the Turkish invasion, UNFICYP’s political through UNSC Resolution UNFICYP is redeployed and civil affairs section 186 to “prevent a recurrence to occupy the buffer zone. is expanded as military of fighting” and to facilitate a The mission more than personnel are reduced. return to “normal conditions.” doubles in size.

1967 1993

UNFICYP troops do not After nearly two decades intervene in the face of a without major incident, Greek Cypriot offensive UNFICYP is downsized at Kophinou, the largest to three of 350 outbreak of violence in years. personnel.

posed by each community on the other.10 However, dence in 1983, the mission has served as an interme- the mission was criticized for failing to (1) establish diary between the two Cypriot governments. freedom of movement on the island, (2) defortify the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, and (3) preserve the military In 1993, Resolution 831 restructured UNFICYP to a and political ‘status quo.’11 Limited troop strength, a strength of three battalions of 350 personnel civilian mandate, and limited administrative capacity each, the minimum required to maintain the buffer hindered the mission’s ability to meet other objec- zone. The move was prompted by severe financial lim- tives as well, such as restoring the judiciary’s oper- itations, as the mission was funded through voluntary ation, re-opening public utilities, disarming civilians, contributions from member states. Resolution 1217 or reintegrating the Cypriot police.12 (1998) established UNFICYP’s civil affairs branch. Ci- vilian personnel are responsible for liaising with the The mission entered a new phase in 1974, when a government, serving as interlocutors between the two Turkish invasion expelled UNFICYP troops from the sides, and delivering humanitarian assistance to mi- northern third of the island, fundamentally changing nority populations and enclaves. Over time, the bal- the political status quo. UNFICYP transformed from ance of power shifted from being concentrated in uni- an intra-state force to an inter-state force. In response, formed contingents to the civilian affairs section as the the UN more than doubled total deployment to 4,444 chasm between both parties’ stances deepened. from 2,078.13 The UNFICYP mandate also expanded to include maintaining the buffer zone, supervising lines, and performing humanitarian duties. Composition The mission began to monitor electricity, deliver food, As of November 2020, UNFICYP is composed of 984 and investigate abuses and missing per- personnel. Since its establishment, 183 UNFICYP sons.14 Following the TRNC’s declaration of indepen- personnel have died. The mission is led by a civilian

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 4 Sector 4 is 65 km, spanning from Kaimakli village Figure 3: UNFICYP Personnel • to the village of Dherinia on the Eastern Coast. It Composition (November 2020) is staffed by 190 Slovakian troops. One platoon is responsible for monitoring , the only bi-com- munal village in the buffer zone.19 7% Police 6% Civilians UNFICYP has 28 Military Observer Liaison Officers (MOLOs) and Sector Civilian and Military Liaison Of- ficers (SCAMLO).20 In addition to acting as observers, MOLOs facilitate negotiations and liaise between Turk- ish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot forces. SCAMLOs as- sist the Civil Affairs Team for each sector in performing their daily functions, such as humanitarian relief and fa- 87% Military Troops cilitating bi-communal events. Finally, the mission ben- efits from a Mobile Force Reserve of 65 troops which act as a rapid response team at the Force Command- er’s disposal.

Source: UN Peacekeeping Open Data Portal The mission’s UNPOL personnel are primarily engaged in preserving order in the buffer zone by sanctioning il- legal , farming, and construction projects. They also accompany humanitarian convoys. They do not diplomat who serves both as the Special Representa- have the powers of arrest and detention.21 CIVPOL has tive of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Head of distinct responsibilities, as well. They operate UN po- Mission. Its primary responsibility is to guard the 180 lice spots in high-risk locations, conduct missing per- km-long buffer zone and its ‘civil use areas,’ where son investigations, investigate incidents of violence, around 10,000 people live and/or work.15 According to and liaise between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot UNFICYP, “approximately 1,000 incidents occur within police forces.22 Civil scholar Nicholas Sambanis the buffer zone each year, ranging from name-calling credits CIVPOL with contributing substantially to the to unauthorized use of firearms.”16 The buffer zone is Cyprus through highly effective perfor- divided into four sectors: mance of these and other sensitive duties. By meeting with enclaved persons and investigating inter-commu- Sector 1 is a 90 km-long sector staffed by 226 nal crime, CIVPOL personnel have reduced community • troops primarily from , as well as from tensions and built grassroots support for resolution.23 Chile, Paraguay, and . The contingent con- ducts mobile patrols from San Martin to Roca Though UNFICYP operates under a policy of strict neu- camps and controls four permanent patrol bases.17 trality, the mission is perceived differently by Cypriots in the north and south. A 2007 poll revealed that Greek Sector 2 is 30 km long, spanning from the villages Cypriots generally rely more heavily on the mission for • of to Kaimakli. 163 troops operate it from protection, with 66 percent of Greek Cypriots respon- the UK and .18 dents reporting that the UN’s presence in Cyprus is “absolutely necessary,” compared to only 51 percent Sector 3, now defunct, was the under the con- of Turkish Cypriots. The poll also showed that Turkish • trol of the Canadian contingent before their with- Cypriots felt substantially more secure than Greek Cy- drawal in 1994.

Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security 5 Figure 4: UNFICYP Deployment (February 2021)

Source: UN Geospatial Network

priots, likely because of the presence of Turkish troops Gjerde as Force Commander. These appointments on the island.24 This dynamic persists to this day. represent rapid progress, considering that in 2010, women had not held any senior management posi- tions (D-1 and above).25 Additionally, women made Women, Peace and Security 9.9 percent of UNFICYP troops and 38.2 percent UNFICYP benefits from a substantial number of of police personnel in November 2020.26 Meanwhile, women in key leadership positions and uniformed women constituted 41 percent of UNFICYP’s civilian roles. It became the first mission to have all-female workforce as of August 2020.27 The table below pro- leadership in 2019, consisting of Mission Head vides a breakdown of women personnel by role and and SRSG Elizabeth Spehar, Senior Police Advisor contributing country. Ann-Kristen Kvilekval, and Force Commander Cheryl Pearce. The current team consists of Spehar, Fang Cyprus performs relatively well on gendered criteria, Li as Senior Police Advisor, and Major General Ingrid ranking 31 of 167 countries in the 2019 Women, Peace

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 6 Figure 5: Proportion of Female Troops and Police

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% Military Troops Police

UNFICYP UN Peacekeeping

Source: UN Peacekeeping Open Data Portal

and Security Index.28 However, both Greek Cypriot and We conducted 31 semi-structured interviews with Turkish Cypriot women continue to face several chal- uniformed and civilian UNFICYP personnel and civil lenges and vulnerabilities. First, according to civil soci- society actors to examine the gendered impacts on ety actors , both for forced labor and the mission’s operational effectiveness. Interviews prostitution, is a pervasive issue on the island. Though revealed contradictory viewpoints about the value amendments to anti-trafficking legislation have sought and impact of UNFICYP’s women leadership and to increase penalties and criminalize the purchase of women peacekeepers. Many mission representa- sexual services from trafficked people, little appears to tives and civil society leaders evinced that SRSG have changed in practice.29 Second, women are per- Elizabeth Spehar and Major General Cheryl Pearce sistently underrepresented in peace negotiations and have had a direct and positive impact on women’s processes, which have failed to integrate a gender agen- inclusion and empowerment both within the mission da.30 Women’s inclusion and applying a gender lens to and in Cypriot society. UNFICYP’s relatively numer- strategies are key goals that women ous women personnel were also frequently credited activists in Cyprus are pursuing. Finally, civil society in with improved community relations. Stakeholders both communities is considered weak and underdevel- expressed that: oped. Women’s organizations are often underfunded and understaffed.31 UNFICYP has worked with numer- Women’s high- leadership makes the mission ous representatives from Cypriot civil society to over- • more welcoming to women, thus potentially boost- come these and other gendered issues. Mission-perpe- ing gender diversity; trated sexual exploitation and abuse do not appear to be a problem. Though rates are difficult to measure due Women’s leadership helps to challenge stereo- to underreporting, only one allegation against UNFICYP • types of who leaders—especially military leaders— personnel has been reported to the UN since 2015.32 can be;

Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security 7 However, not all stakeholders saw ‘added value’ from Figure 6: Women’s Representation the mission’s women personnel or did not attribute in UNFICYP women’s contributions to their gender. Interviewees also expressed that: Contributing Number of Women’s Roles Country Women Argentina 21 19 Troops • Women are not inherently better soldiers or police, 2 Officers as they too can and do adopt patriarchal values 1 1 Staff Officer and behaviors; Bosnia 5 5 Individual Police Women are not inherently better equipped to deal 1 1 Staff Officer • with local populations or women; it is a matter of 1 1 Staff Officer training; 3 3 Staff Officers 2 2 Individual Police Improvements in the mission’s relations with local Ireland 2 2 Individual Police • women’s civil society groups were the result of work 2 2 Individual Police by gender experts, not merely women personnel; 1 1 Individual Police 1 1 Individual Police • Gender diversity is a necessary but insufficient 2 2 Staff Officers element of mission effectiveness, as diversity of Paraguay 2 2 Troops background, education, training, and thought are 3 3 Individual Police equally important. 6 2 Staff Officers 4 Individual Police Challenges 27 23 Troops UNFICYP faces a series of unique challenges un- 3 Individual Police der Cyprus’ political and conflict conditions. Since 1 Staff Officer 2017, when talks between the Republic of Cyprus 1 1 Individual Police and TRNC stalled most recently, UNFICYP has ex- 1 1 Individual Police perienced escalating assaults on its authority, pri- UK 24 22 Troops marily from the north. The Turkish Cypriot govern- 2 Staff Officers ment and have challenged the demarcation of decades-long ceasefire lines through repeated construction violations and increased mil- itary and police presence along the line since 2018. This has led to “levels of political tension not seen in Women uniformed personnel are ‘role models’ for Cyprus in years.”33 The TRNC’s decision in October • the local population; to reopen the beach town of Varosha, which had re- mained shuttered since the Turkish invasion in 1974, Women personnel can more effectively communi- is emblematic of this rising belligerence. Despite • cate with local communities, thereby improving the condemnation from the international community, mission’s overall relations with the local population; the Republic of Cyprus, and UNFICYP34 Varosha re- mains open. The TRNC’s November 2020 presiden- Women personnel can more readily uncover and tial run-offs, in which -backed hard-liner Ersin • respond to women’s unique concerns. Tatar beat moderate incumbent Mustafa Akinci, only

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 8 further complicated the prospect of peace. Tatar has Effectiveness publicly insisted upon a two-state solution in oppo- UNFICYP operates in a frozen but fragile conflict context. sition to the negotiation principles which have guid- Its primary responsibility involves monitoring the buffer ed peace talks for decades. zone, including regulating increasingly invasive civilian activity such as farming. A 2017 UN Strategic Review The COVID-19 outbreak and accompanying restric- of the mission found that while UNFICYP’s operating tions have also worsened tensions. In July/August environment was characterized by “contained” military 2020, the TRNC barred UNFICYP from accessing ter- incidents, most stakeholders in Cyprus “attributed the ritory in the north, allegedly as a public health mea- of military incidents to the preventive and sure. Additionally, six crossing points along the buffer deterrent role of UNFICYP.”35 The authors recommend- zone were closed. In response, the mission called for ed only minor reductions to , conclud- both sides to desist from violating the military status ing that a significant drawdown would constitute an quo, resume free movement of UNFICYP personnel, unreasonable risk to peace and security. More recently, and increase efforts at diplomacy and cooperation. stagnation on the political front has fostered growing frustration on both sides. “The absence of a resolution Interviews with UNFICYP personnel and leaders uncov- of the Cyprus problem,” a report of the Secretary Gener- ered the most significant challenges facing the mission. al concludes, “is increasingly unsustainable.”36 Among the most commonly-cited challenges were: Stakeholder consultations revealed a diversity of opin- • A lack of resources, especially as it pertains to gen- ions on the value and effectiveness of the mission, of- der programming, COVID-19 response, and sup- ten split along identity lines. Among the most important port to civil society; findings were that: • The growing belligerence of both parties, including Many stakeholders, especially Turkish Cypriots, their unwillingness to communicate with each oth- • see the force as useless and impotent; er and/or cooperate with the mission; Many stakeholders, especially Greek Cypriots, see Constant, six-month mandate renewals, which ex- • the force as a vital security guarantor; • acerbate anxieties amongst Greek Cypriots in par- ticular; The mission contributes to the island’s al- • ready-acute militarization, thereby sometimes con- • The prevalence of human trafficking on the island; tributing to feelings of insecurity; • Mission fractionalization in the form of a lack of co- The mission’s role in relaying and rephrasing mes- operation and distrust between the civilian, police, • sages between the two parties is vital; and military elements of UNFICYP; There is widespread frustration at the lack of prog- In particular, military personnel felt that civil af- • ress on the political front; • fairs discriminated against and/or condescend- ed to the mission’s uniformed components; The force’s support for Cypriot civil society is im- • pactful, if not robust. Limited opportunities to interact with local popu- • lations as a result of the mandate, which concen- trates troop strength in the buffer zone.

Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security 9 Endnotes

1 Ker-Lindsay, James. The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone 16 Ibid. Needs to Know. Oxford University Press, 2011, 13. 17 UNFICYP. “Sector 1.” UN Department of Peace Opera- 2 Ibid, 20. tions (August 2020), accessed on January 7, 2021. https:// 3 Oberling, Pierre (1982). The road to : The Turkish unficyp.unmissions.org/sector-1. Cypriot to . p. 120. 18 UNFICYP. “Sector 2.” UN Department of Peace Opera- 4 Ker-Lindsay, James, “The Cyprus Problem” in “Frozen tions (August 2020), accessed on January 7, 2021. https:// Conflicts” in , ed. Anton Bebler (: Verlag Barbara unficyp.unmissions.org/sector-2. Budrich, 2015), 21. 19 UNFICYP. “Sector 4.” UN Department of Peace Opera- 5 U.S. , Congressional Research Ser- tions (August 2020), accessed on January 7, 2021. https:// vice, Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Is- unficyp.unmissions.org/sector-4. sues, by Carol Migdalovitz. RL33497 (2007), 3. 20 UNFICYP. “Other Key Units.” UN Department of Peace 6 Following a three-day summit in late 2021, the UN Operations (August 2020), accessed on January 7, 2021. said there was not enough to common ground to resume ne- https://unficyp.unmissions.org/other-key-units. gotiations to break the impasse. “Cyprus settle- 21 Soydemir, Abdullah, 2018. The Role and Effectiveness of ment talks found little common ground: UN chief” accessed United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Cyprus Island. May 5, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/29/cy- Security Strategies Journal, 14(27), 169. prus-settlement-talks-found-little-common-ground-un-chief. 22 Asmussen, J., United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cy- 7 Aksu, Esref. “The UN in the Cyprus conflict: UNFICYP” in prus (UNFICYP). In The Oxford Handbook of United Nations The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative Peacekeeping Operations. change. (Manchester University Press, 2003), 130-154. 23 Nicholas Sambanis. “The United nations Operation in Cy- 8 Ibid, 142. prus: A new look at the peacekeeping‐peacemaking relation- 9 Evriviades, Marios, and Dmitris Bourantonis. “Peacekeep- ship.” International Peacekeeping 6, no 1, (1999): 79-108. ing and peacemaking: Some lessons from Cyprus.” Interna- 24 UNFICYP. “The UN in Cyprus: An Inter-communal Survey tional Peacekeeping 1, no. 4 (1994): 394-412. of Public Opinion by UNFICYP.” (2007), accessed on Jan- 10 Ibid, 400. uary 7, 2021. https://unficyp.unmissions.org/sites/default/ files/2007_04_april.pdf. 11 Nicholas Sambanis. “The United nations Operation in Cy- 25 prus: A new look at the peacekeeping‐peacemaking relation- Bertolazzi, Francesco. Women with a blue helmet: the in- ship.” International Peacekeeping 6, no 1, (1999): 79-108. tegration of women and gender issues in UN peacekeeping missions. United Nations International Research and Train- 12 Ibid, 91. ing Institute for the Advancement of Women, 2010. 13 United Nations. Department of Public Information. The 26 Bertolazzi, Francesco. Women with a blue helmet: the in- blue helmets: A review of United Nations peace-keeping. tegration of women and gender issues in UN peacekeeping United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1997. missions. United Nations International Research and Train- 14 Nicholas Sambanis. “The United nations Operation in Cy- ing Institute for the Advancement of Women, 2010. \h https:// prus: A new look at the peacekeeping‐peacemaking relation- peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/07_gender_report_ ship.” International Peacekeeping 6, no 1, (1999): 102. november_2020_32.pdf. 15 “About the Buffer Zone.” UNFICYP. Last modified 21, 27 Information Management Unit. August 2020. “UNFICYP 2019. https://unficyp.unmissions.org/about-buffer-zone. Mission Fact Sheet,” accessed on January 7, 2021. https:// peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/unficyp_aug20.pdf.

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 10 28 Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and 32 UN Department of Management Strategy, Policy, and Peace Research Institute Oslo. 2019. Women, Peace and Compliance. “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse : Table of Alle- Security Index 2019/20: Tracking sustainable peace through gations” (2021). Accessed April 2, 2021. https://conduct.un- inclusion, justice, and security for women. Washington, DC: missions.org/table-of-allegations. GIWPS and PRIO. 33 UN Security Council, United Nations operation in Cyprus 29 . “GRETA Publishes Its Third Evaluation Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/682 (10 July 2020), Report on Cyprus.” Against Trafficking in Human Be- accessed on January 7, 2021. https://undocs.org/S/2020/682. ings. (June 10, 2020), accessed on January 7, 2021. https:// 34 UN Security Council, 8766th Mtg., UN Doc. SC/14322 www.coe.int/en/web/anti-human-trafficking/-/greta-publish- (October 9, 2020), accessed on January 7, 2021. https:// es-its-third-evaluation-report-on-cyprus. www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14322.doc.htm. 30 Demetriou, Olga (2019) Gender in the Cyprus Negotia- 35 UN Security Council. Strategic review of the United Na- tions, PRIO Cyprus Centre Report, 3. : PRIO Cyprus tions Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus: Report of the Secre- Centre. tary-General, S/2017/1008 (28 November 2017), accessed 31 Vasilara, Marina, and Gotelenne Piaton. “The role of civil on January 7, 2021. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ society in Cyprus.” The Cyprus Review 19, no. 2 (2007): 107- files/resources/N1740064.pdf, 11. 121. 36 Ibid, §60.

Cover photo: UNFICYP bids farewell to Force Commander. / Photo by: Ľuboš Podhorsky

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United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 12