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United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

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United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) CASE STUDY DR. ROBERT U. NAGEL, MS. KATE FIN, MS. JULIA MAENZA MAY 2021 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Conflict history armed insurgency, led by the National Organization of Armed conflict in Cyprus began during the latter stag- Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), instigated a parallel Turkish es of British colonial occupation in the 1950’s.1 Greek Cypriot movement for taksim, or partition. Cypriot opposition to British colonialism spurred by a desire to unify with the Greek motherland (“enosis”) in- By 1957, Great Britain, Turkey, and Greece attempted stigated riots and led to a violent insurgency steeped to negotiate a solution. The Zurich and London Agree- in rhetoric of Greek nationalism. The emergence of this ments and a Treaty of Guarantee granted Cyprus in- UNFICYP military and police personnel join calls for an end to violence against women and girls in December 2015. / UNFICYP/Juraj Hladky dependence while forbidding the island to unify with priots, as well as the displacement of a quarter of the another state or be partitioned. Britain, Turkey, and Turkish Cypriot population to a few dozen enclaves.3 Greece would guarantee the terms of the agreements. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Under the new arrangements, Turkish Cypriots were al- (UNFICYP) was deployed in 1964 to quell violence and lotted 30 percent of all government posts and 40 per- support enclaved communities. cent of military posts, despite representing only 18 per- cent of the population. Disputes soon emerged over In 1974, the Greek Cypriot National Guard, backed issues such as the establishment of Greek and Turkish by the mainland Greek junta, led a coup against municipalities in central cities, taxation, and the struc- President Makarios. In response, Turkey launched an ture of the armed forces.2 invasion codenamed ‘Operation Atilla’ in July 1974 under its authority as a security guarantor. Turkey In 1963, Greek Cypriot President Makarios III proposed claimed the northernmost 36 percent of the island, 13 amendments designed to streamline the gridlocked which became the Turkish Republic of Northern Cy- government’s operations. However, the amendments prus (TRNC). The invasion displaced 160,000 Greek scrapped many of the constitutional guarantees af- Cypriots, about one-third of the community’s pop- forded to Turkish Cypriots, who rejected the proposal. ulation.4 It was during this period that the parties in The crisis ushered in a wave of violence that resulted in conflict agreed to a demarcated modern buffer zone, the deaths of 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cy- or “Green Line”. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 2 Figure 1: Chronology of Cyprus Dispute 1957 1974 2002 Cyprus gains A coup led by the Greek Cypriot The Annan Plan seeks to unite independence with military deposes President Cyprus under the Swiss federal Turkey, Greece, and Makarios. In response, Turkish model. It is accepted by Turkish Britain as security forces invade and claim the Cypriots but rejected by Greek guarantors. northern third of the island. Cypriots in a referendum. 1963 1977 2017 Intercommunal violence breaks The parties agree to a four- UN Secretary General proposes out after President Makarios point negotiation framework a six-point framework for proposes constitutional providing for an independent, unification talks. Negotiations amendments which erode non-aligned, bi-communal become deadlocked at a Turkish Cypriot guarantees. federal republic. conference in Switzerland. Despite a series of unsuccessful UN-mediated negotia- UN Security Council Resolution 186 empowered the tions, both communities have agreed to four basic prin- mission to “prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as ciples which continue to guide peace talks. These are: necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and (1) Cyprus will be an independent, nonaligned, bicom- restoration of law and order and a return to normal munal federal republic, (2) each community’s territory conditions.” What “law and order” and “normal con- would be reassessed, (3) freedom of movement, prop- ditions” meant was unclear, as was how the force erty, and settlement issues would be discussed, and would prevent the recurrence of fighting given its lack (4) the powers and functions of the central government of ‘offensive’ capabilities.7 would be capable of safeguarding the country’s unity.5 During this initial phase, the scope of UNFICYP’s op- Two episodes in modern history have brought Cyprus erational tasks was narrow and focused on prevent- close to a solution. A 2002 referendum on reunification ing active fighting, while a UN mediator was respon- garnered Turkish Cypriot support but failed to provide sible for achieving a political resolution.8 Though the sufficient security guarantees for Greek Cypriots. Like- UN’s rules of engagement permitted the mission to wise, UN-mediated talks came to a halt in 2017 and use force only in cases of self-defense, UNFICYP have not resumed.6 was generally successful at preventing violence during this period. There were only two major out- breaks of violence: in 1964, before the mission was Mission background fully operational, and in 1967, when the Greek Cy- The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus priot military, the National Guard, began patrolling in (UNFICYP) was first deployed on March 27, 1964 in Turkish Cypriots enclaves, instigating violence with response to violence catalyzed by Turkish Cypriot the Turkish Cypriot community.9 UNFICYP also fa- opposition to proposed constitutional amendments. cilitated the elimination of economic restrictions im- Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security 3 Figure 2: Chronology of UNFICYP 1964 1974 2004 UNFICYP is established After the Turkish invasion, UNFICYP’s political through UNSC Resolution UNFICYP is redeployed and civil affairs section 186 to “prevent a recurrence to occupy the buffer zone. is expanded as military of fighting” and to facilitate a The mission more than personnel are reduced. return to “normal conditions.” doubles in size. 1967 1993 UNFICYP troops do not After nearly two decades intervene in the face of a without major incident, Greek Cypriot offensive UNFICYP is downsized at Kophinou, the largest to three battalions of 350 outbreak of violence in years. personnel. posed by each community on the other.10 However, dence in 1983, the mission has served as an interme- the mission was criticized for failing to (1) establish diary between the two Cypriot governments. freedom of movement on the island, (2) defortify the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, and (3) preserve the military In 1993, Resolution 831 restructured UNFICYP to a and political ‘status quo.’11 Limited troop strength, a strength of three infantry battalions of 350 personnel civilian mandate, and limited administrative capacity each, the minimum required to maintain the buffer hindered the mission’s ability to meet other objec- zone. The move was prompted by severe financial lim- tives as well, such as restoring the judiciary’s oper- itations, as the mission was funded through voluntary ation, re-opening public utilities, disarming civilians, contributions from member states. Resolution 1217 or reintegrating the Cypriot police.12 (1998) established UNFICYP’s civil affairs branch. Ci- vilian personnel are responsible for liaising with the The mission entered a new phase in 1974, when a government, serving as interlocutors between the two Turkish invasion expelled UNFICYP troops from the sides, and delivering humanitarian assistance to mi- northern third of the island, fundamentally changing nority populations and enclaves. Over time, the bal- the political status quo. UNFICYP transformed from ance of power shifted from being concentrated in uni- an intra-state force to an inter-state force. In response, formed contingents to the civilian affairs section as the the UN more than doubled total deployment to 4,444 chasm between both parties’ stances deepened. from 2,078.13 The UNFICYP mandate also expanded to include maintaining the buffer zone, supervising ceasefire lines, and performing humanitarian duties. Composition The mission began to monitor electricity, deliver food, As of November 2020, UNFICYP is composed of 984 and investigate human rights abuses and missing per- personnel. Since its establishment, 183 UNFICYP sons.14 Following the TRNC’s declaration of indepen- personnel have died. The mission is led by a civilian United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 4 Sector 4 is 65 km, spanning from Kaimakli village Figure 3: UNFICYP Personnel • to the village of Dherinia on the Eastern Coast. It Composition (November 2020) is staffed by 190 Slovakian troops. One platoon is responsible for monitoring Pyla, the only bi-com- munal village in the buffer zone.19 7% Police 6% Civilians UNFICYP has 28 Military Observer Liaison Officers (MOLOs) and Sector Civilian and Military Liaison Of- ficers (SCAMLO).20 In addition to acting as observers, MOLOs facilitate negotiations and liaise between Turk- ish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot forces. SCAMLOs as- sist the Civil Affairs Team for each sector in performing their daily functions, such as humanitarian relief and fa- 87% Military Troops cilitating bi-communal events. Finally, the mission ben- efits from a Mobile Force Reserve of 65 troops which act as a rapid response team at the Force Command- er’s disposal. Source: UN Peacekeeping Open Data Portal The mission’s UNPOL personnel are primarily engaged in preserving order in the buffer zone by sanctioning il-
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