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UNIMAGINABLE COMMUNITY: NATIONALISM AND KURDISH NOTABLES IN THE LATE OTTOMAN ERA

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfilment of

the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By

A . Hakan Ozoglu, MLS

********

The Ohio State University 1997

Dissertation Committee: pd b%

Professor, Stephen Dale, Adviser

Associate Professor, Victoria Halbrook Adviser

Associate Professor, Jane Hathaway Department of History UMI Number: 9813328

UMI Microform 9813328 Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, M l 48103 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to thank first my adviser. Professor

Stephen Dale, for his intellectual support and positive encouragement without which completing this dissertation would never have been possible. I have benefited from his advise and experience as an accomplished scholar in every step of this work. I am truly honored to work under his supervision.

I would also extend my appreciation to my other committee members. Professor Jane Hathaway for commenting on my dissertation and correcting my stylistic and intellectual errors, and Professor Victoria Holbrook for providing me with the chance to become a scholar and for her guidance throughout my graduate studies.

I should also express my sincere gratitude to my wife Elizabeth for giving me the emotional support in the long and tiring process of completing my dissertation and for her time in proofreading this work. Needless to say, responsibility for the mistakes and shortcomings of the present study belongs completely to me. VITA

December 17, 1964...... Born - Istanbul, Turkey

1993...... M.L.S. Comparative Studies, Ohio State University

1997-Present...... Lecturer,

University of Chicago

1997 Winter-Summer...... Adjunct Faculty

Ohio Wesleyan University and Franklin University

PUBLICATIONS

1. "State-Tribe Relations: Kurdish Tribalism in the 16th and 17th Century Ottoman Empire," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 23-1 (Summer 1996), p p . 5-22 .

2. "Kurdish National Discourse: Comparing and Contrasting the Shaikh Said and the PKK Revolts," Turkish Studies Association Bulletin. 18-1 (Spring 1994), pp. 90-93. Abstract.

3. "Winds of Change : The Kurdish Workers' Party and Turkish Nationhood," Turkish Studies Association Bulletin. 17-2 (Fall 1993), pp. 111-122.

4. "Turk Basininda Can Pazari," [Crises in the Turkish Press], Gozlem. 18 (Winter 1992), pp. 18-21.

Ill FIELD OF STUDY

Major Field: History

IV TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Acknowledgments...... ii

Vita...... ill

Chapters :

1. Introduction...... 1

1.2. Why Study Kurdish Nationalism ...... 3

1.3. Some Clarifications...... 5

1.4. Boundaries of the Research...... 6

1.5. Sources...... 10

1.4.a. Primary Sources...... 10

I. Archival Documents...... 11

II. Memoirs ...... 13

III. Interviews ...... 14

IV. Other Sources...... 16

1.4.b. Organization...... 18

2. Nationalism: For Granted?...... 22

2.1. On the Evolution of Nationalism...... 23

2.2. Present State of Scholarship...... 25

2.3. Ethnicity and Nationalism...... 32

2.4. More Remarks on Nationalism as Employed in this Study...... 3. History and Kurdistan...... 4 0

3.4. Kurdistan in the Late Ottoman Period...... 57

3.5. Kurdistan in the Ottoman Sources...... 64

3.6. Conclusion...... 71

7. Notables and Kurdish Political Organizations During the World War I Era......

4.8. Kurt Terakki ve Teavun Cemiyeti...... 8 4

4.9. Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti (KTC) of 1918.... 88

10. Kurdish Notables and Their Background...... 96

5.11. The Naksibendi SemdinanFamily of Nehri 102

5.1.a. Seyyit Abdulkadir...... 108

5.2. The Bedirhani Family...... 118

5.2.a. Emin Ali Bedirhan...... 125

5.2.b. Celadet Ali and Kamran Ali Bedirhan... 128

5.2.C. Other Members of the KTC in the Bedirhani Family......

5.3. The Cemil Pasazade Family...... 134

5.3.a. Ekrem Cemil Pasa...... 137

5.3.b. Kadri Cemil Pasa (Zinar Silopi) 139

5.4. Sefik Efendi (Arvasi)...... 142

5.5. Serif Pasa...... 145

5.6. Said Nursi...... 150

5.7. Hizanizade Bitlisli Kemal Fevzi...... 156

5.8. Conclusion...... 150

6. Concluding Remarks...... 166

Appendices...... 17 9

vi Bibliography...... ^84

vil Chapter I

Introduction

It has been often postulated that nationalism is a

movement of the middle class engineered and ushered by

the bourgeoisie. Is this a tenable assertion to espouse

regarding the entire world, or does the composition of the

nationalist leadership in the non-Western world exhibit

distinct characteristics?

Undoubtedly, nationalism proves to be one of the most

effective and competent political ideologies of the modern

world. As it has increasingly attracted scholarly

attention, the concept of nationalism continues to provoke

lively debates among scholars on many theoretical fronts

such as the definition, origin, nature, and function of

it. Among these hotly contested issues concerning nationalism, the present study deals mainly with the above-mentioned questions in the context of the Middle

East and the Kurds and claims that Kurdish nationalism in

its early stage was primarily a movement of the notables. Following the nationalist movements in the Balkans at the end of the 19^^ century, the Muslim subjects of the

Ottoman Empire began making national demands early in the

20^^ century. However, it seems fair to state that nationalist movements in most of the Middle East gained considerable momentum after World War I when the collapse of the Ottoman Empire seemed eminent. As the Young Turk movement became increasingly Turkish nationalist in nature, Arab nationalism, receiving support from the West, came correspondingly to the fore.

Unlike the nationalist leadership in the West, early

Turkish and Arab nationalists did not belong to the middle class. Case studies on the Syrian nationalism, for example, clearly demonstrate that nationalist leaders were in fact local notables, who enjoyed a privileged status as members of the Ottoman elite. The same observations can also be made for most of the Turkish nationalist leaders, who came mainly from the askeri (military) class.

Therefore, it can be asserted in connection with the best known nationalist movements in the Middle East—Turkish and

Arab—that such nationalisms were not middle-class movements. 1.1. Why Study Kurdish Nationalism.

By the same token, Kurdish nationalist leadership, as this study will demonstrate, consisted exclusively of the representatives of notable families. Kurdish nationalism, however, is unique in the Middle East in that it has not yet realized its objective of establishing an independent

(or even autonomous) nation-state, ein ultimate goal of nationalist movements.

While Turkish and Arab nationalisms have attracted scholarly attention, studies on Kurdish nationalism have remained rather peripheral. Kurdish nationalism, however, is a fundamentally important subject, if one wishes to understand nationalism in the Middle Eastern context. I believe that reliable generalizations on Middle Eastern nationalisms cannot be made, if the Kurds, a group of approximately 20-25 million people, are ignored. If this impressionistic figure is accepted, the Kurds constitute the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, and the largest in the world without a state of their own.

Furthermore, the territories in which the Kurdish population live lie in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria--and hence is one of the principal domestic and foreign concerns of these states. Kurdish nationalist organizations and the respective states seem to have

severe ideological and military clashes in the region.

For example, presently in Turkey, a Kurdish organization

(the PKK, or Kurdish Workers' Party) is involved in a

guerrilla war that claims dozens of lives daily.

Internationally world public opinion has become convinced

that the 'Kurdish problem' is one of the very important

issues of international politics particularly after the

Gulf War. However, from its birth in the late Ottoman

period to its development in the Turkish Republican era,

Kurdish nationalism has been one of the least studied

aspects of Middle Eastern history. Although there is a

growing literature on Kurdish nationalism at present,

there have been made a very few scholarly attempts to

include the Kurds as a part of the studies of the region

and of nationalism in general.^

This study has been conducted to contribute to Middle

Eastern history, for it aims at bridging this gap by

producing a study on the Kurds in the late Ottoman period.

It intends to free the study of Kurdish nationalism from

^ See for example Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1992); Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991); Lale Yalçin-Heckmain, Tribe and Kinship Among the Kurds (Frankfurt, Bern, New York and Paris: Peter Lang, 1991) .

4 its narrowly-defined and marginal position by placing it in the larger context of Ottoman history.

1.2. Some Clarifications

The subject of this work, Kurdish nationalism, is not immune to the confusion stemming from the vague nature of the term nationalism. Like other nationalisms, Kurdish nationalism is extremely difficult to define since in everyone's mind, it has a distinct meaning. As hard as it is to offer a satisfactory definition of Kurdish nationalism, for the sake of clarity, I am obliged to define and defend my usage of the term. In accordance with my above discussion, I refer to the term 'Kurdish nationalism' as an intellectual and political movement that is based mainly (though not entirely) upon two premises : a sense of group solidarity and a belief in the existence of a historical homeland. Since the definitions of 'Kurdistan' and 'Kurd' differ from one period to another, and from group to group, this work acknowledges that boundaries of Kurdish society as a distinct group are the result of an imaginary process. This does not refute, however, the existence of a social group that sees itself as culturally distinct on the national level from the rest of society. Once a nation is imagined, group identity

becomes a 'real entity' .

I argue that Kurdish intellectuals, who were mainly

Ottoman bureaucrats and landed notables, functioned as the

main agents of Kurdish nationalism. However, not all

intellectuals were Kurdish nationalists. Hence when I

categorize Kurdish notables as nationalists, I do so based

mainly upon their active involvement in the propagation of

Kurdish identity. In other words, Kurdish nationalists

are those who, in their minds, nurture the idea of such an

ethnic-based unity and of a historical homeland, and who participated in Kurdish political movements. They do not necessarily strive for secession and are not anti-state.

As will be discussed later, not all Kurdish nationalists

in the late Ottoman period were in favor of an independent

Kurdistan.

1.3. Boundaries of the Research

The boundaries of my research fall into three categories: geographical, chronological and methodological. Geographically, my research will focus chiefly on the Kurds who lived in the Ottoman Empire. I further limit my study to the region comprising the present Turkish Republic. I limit my study to Turkey for three reasons: (1) Currently two-thirds of the Kurdish

population live in Turkey; (2) Since the region was the

core of the Ottoman Empire, the continuing intellectual

and political relationship between the old imperial center

and periphery can be observed; and (3) The largest

collection of sources concerning the Kurds is located in

Turkey, and as a native of Turkey, I have greater access

to the necessary data for my research.

Chronologically, I restrict my research to a period

stretching from the late Ottoman to the post World War I

era, although frequent references to earlier periods have

been made. In particular, this research focuses on the

era between the end of World War I in 1918 and the

foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

Methodologically, I have concerned myself mainly with

the social history of Kurdish nationalism, while acknowledging that such other categories as political and economic history indisputably overlap with other areas of concern. The basic questions for which I have sought answers were : What were the social background and kinship connections of Kurdish nationalists? Was there any primordial relation among the leaders of those different periods? By primordial I mean the tribal relation based on fictive or real kinship relations. I avoid using 'family' relation since 'primordial' appears to be more

inclusive. As a result of my research, I have

reconstructed the family trees of some notable families.

These show the kinship relations of some Kurdish

nationalists (see appendix).

Finally, I limit this study to a Kurdish political

organization that was actively involved in defining and promoting Kurdish identity. Political organizations are

clear indicators of growing group identity; hence, they can reveal clues about the intellectual milieu of their periods. Members of these political organizations can be

treated as representatives of political leadership. To represent Kurdish nationalism, I have picked Kurdistan

Teali Cemiyeti (The Society for the Development of

Kurdistan or the KTC).^ Although there existed earlier

Kurdish political organizations, I have selected the KTC to represent the Kurdish nationalism of this era for two main reasons. First, the KTC was the best-organized

Kurdish political group and also published a newspaper to create a united Kurdish identity and to disseminate its ideology. Second, the social composition of the KTC was highly heterogeneous; it consisted of the representatives

The KTC hereafter. of different notable families claiming to represent the

Kurdish intellectual and nationalist class.

The present study will first analyze the evolution of

the perception of the Kurds and Kurdistan in history.

Then, it will focus on the social and tribal dimensions of

Kurdish nationalism in the early twentieth century by

introducing prosopographical data on the Kurdish

nationalists. Based upon both qualitative and quantitative data, this study will analyze the social

origins and kinship relations of Kurdish nationalist

leaders. One of the goals of this study is to ground the

ideological/idealistic discourse of Kurdish nationalism

firmly in the social realities of the Middle East in general and Kurdish society in particular.

This dissertation demonstrates two significant claims. 1) Group identity is closely tied to territory.

Although religion and language are significant contributors to identity formation, this study argues that the role of territory should not be overlooked. This study will show that the perceived political boundaries of

Kurdistan change in time, and in relation to this change, the perception of group identity fluctuates.

Nevertheless, also fundamental to this work is the claim that there has always existed a core area in reference to which social groups, Kurds in this study, define

themselves. 2) The social composition of Kurdish

nationalist leadership in the late 19"^^ and early 20"^^

centuries reveals important clues about the nature of

Kurdish nationalism and its relations to territory. For

example, the majority of Kurdish nationalist leaders

originally belonged to the land-owning nobility. Their

access to land came either through their traditional

status as local notables or through their position as men

of religion, or in some cases these categories overlapped.

1.4. Sources

1.4.a. Primary Sources

This study is distinguished by its reliance on

primary sources. These can be divided into four main

categories: 1) archival documents ; 2) memoirs of Kurdish

intellectuals; 3) interviews with Kurdish family members ;

4) other primary sources.

I . Archival Documents

The majority of the archival documents used in this study come from the Baçbakanlik Osmanlx Arçivi (B.A.) in

Istanbul. Documents concerning the Kurds are scattered

10 among different collections. In this study, I have

primarily used the following collections: the trade

Dahiliye collections, which include communications between

the provincial and central governments. Here, I found a

great many references to Kurdistan, particularly in the

second half of the 19*^^ century. Devlet Salnames, or the

yearbooks of the state, provide information concerning

Kurdistan as an administrative unit in the Ottoman Empire.

Names of the governors who served in Kurdistan and of

other public servants can also be obtained in the Devlet

Salnames. I have used those salnames dating from 1848 to

1867, when Kurdistan was granted eyalet^ status.

Another significant collection is the Mesail-i

Mühimme, which is concerned with significant events in the

Ottoman Empire. There exists a rich collection of

documents in this collection. The second volume of the

catalog includes a section titled 'Kurdistan Meselesi,' or

The Issue of Kurdistan. Documents numbered 1224 onward in

this volume deal specifically with Kurds and Kurdistan.

As will be seen later, an important document indicating

the formation of the Kurdistan province is found in this collection (Doc. 1310).

^ Eyalet can loosely be translated as 'province'. It was the largest provincial unit in the Ottoman administration. II The Sicill-i Ahval collection has proved to be very

useful, albeit incomplete, for the purpose of this study.

I have gathered some of the prosopographical information

from this collection, which contains the personnel records

of Ottoman civil servants. I have used this collection to

determine information regarding the birth-places,

education, family, and appointments of Kurdish notables

who were also Ottoman civil servants.

An entire register or 'defter', Ayniyat 609, is

devoted to a Kurdish notable, Bedirhan Bey, whose revolt

against the central government in the mid-19*^'^ century has

become a central event in the development of nationalist

rhetoric. This defter, consisting of 62 pages, deals with

necessary measures to be taken in Kurdistan after the

revolt.

Some of the other collections in which I found

information on the Kurds are Meclis-i Vükela (M.V.),

Dahiliye Nezareti Siyasi Evrak (Dh.Sys.), Dahiliye

Nazareti idare (Dh. id.), Dahiliye Nazareti Kalemi Mahsusa

(Oh. Kms), and Hariciye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi (Hr.

Mkt.), which deals primarily with the condition of religious minorities in Kurdistan.

I have also used published British Foreign Office documents. Among these, the collection called The Blue 12 Book contains extensive information, particularly about

the period around the turn of the 20^^ century. The

reports to London from the India and the Middle East

Offices give vivid descriptions of the area as well as the

relationship between the Kurdish notables and the British

government.

XI. Memoirs

Memoirs constitute another major primary source for

my research. A limited number of Kurdish intellectuals of

the era under examination left memoirs that shed light on

Kurdish nationalism. The most important memoirs for my

study include the following: Kadri Cemil Paga (Zinar

Silopi), Doza Kurdistan; Nuri Dersimi, Kurdistan Tarihinde

Dersim, and Hatxralarim; Ekrem Cemil Paça, Muhtasar

Hayatim; ihsan Nuri Pa?a, Agri Dagi isyani; Mevlanzade

Rifat, Mevlanzade Rifat'in Anilari; §erif Paça, Sir

Muhalifin Anilari; Said Nursi, îçtimai Reçeteler. The authors were Kurdish leaders of the era under examination and some of them joined the KTC; hence, their memoirs contain very valuable information that was utilized in

this study. Most of these memoirs contain biographical information about the Kurdish nationalists and their intellectual orientations. In the last two decades, these books have been re-published in modern Turkish.

13 Unfortunately, some of the most significant leaders of

this era, such as Seyyid Ubeydullah'*, who was the

president of the KTC, left no written document in the

genre of memoir or otherwise. The absence of Seyyid

Abdulkadir's memoir has deprived researchers of the

opportunity to draw a more vivid picture of the

intellectual milieu of the period, for he was the

president of the Ottoman senate (Ayan Meclisi) and at the

same time, the president of the KTC, a Kurdish nationalist

organization.

XXX. Xntexviews

I have used interviews mainly to collect biographical

information; however, the interviews yielded more

information than I had anticipated. The hardest task was

to find the surviving members of the families and to

convince them to talk with me. After I was able to get in

touch with them, and they were convinced that my questions were not political in nature but geared towards an academic study, they welcomed me and my questions wholeheartedly.

I first talked to Melik Firat, a grandson of the

Kurdish leader Çeyh Said, on whose revolt in 1925 a great

^ His title is also spelled 'Seyit', and sometimes he was

14 deal of literature has been produced. Although my

research excluded this family, I pursued this contact

mainly to extract information about the other families. I

learned from Melik Firat more than I needed, including the

existence of Hizir Geylan, a grandson of the KTC president

Seyyid Abdulkadir.

Although Abdulkadir's name has been mentioned very

frequently in the Ottoman documents, oddly, I did not find

any entry in the 'Sicill-i Ahval' collection about him.^

In the present scholarship, not much has been said about

Abdulkadir's family life. Therefore, to be able to

interview one of his grandsons provided me with an

opportunity to gather information about a personality

significant not only as a Kurdish intellectual, but also

as an Ottoman statesman. At the end of the interview,

Geylan presented and kindly permitted me to copy a hand­

written family tree of his family that demonstrated the

kinship relations in detail.

My interview with Riiksan Güneysu, a granddaughter of

Bedirhan Paça, a very significant figure in Kurdish nationalism was also highly beneficial, for I gathered

referred to as ?eyh Ubeydullah. ^ None of the entries matched with his father's name or his birth place. He might have been listed under a different name; however, none of my sources indicated that this was the case. 15 information about the family life of several members of the Bedirhan family. Güneysu was most helpful in providing a rare book on this family that was published in a very limited quantity in Sweden. This book by

Malmisanij, Cizira Botanli Bedirhaniler ve Bedirhan Ailesi

Derneqinin Tutanaklari, contained very valuable information about the members of the family. I have confirmed the reliability of the presented data with

Güneysu.

My last interview was with a granddaughter of a significant Kurdish personality, Çeyh Çefik Arvasi. My informant, Handan Arvas, provided me with information enabling me to learn more about the family and professional life of Çeyh Çefik, who was a co-founder of the KTC. Equally beneficial was the information that

Handan Arvas delivered on the inter-familial relationships among Kurdish intellectuals and their offspring in

Istanbul.

IV. Other Sources

One of the most useful sources that was used in this study is the collection of Kurdish newspapers published in the late 19^^ and early 20^^ centuries. The first Kurdish

16 newspaper. Kurdistan (1898-1902), published by the

Bedirhani family, is a very significant source in

determining the perception of Kurdish identity at the turn

of the century. This newspaper, however, is limited in

that only one family, the Bedirhanis, was involved in the

publication and editorial process. Hence, one cannot

claim that Kurdistan represents the view of the Kurdish

population at large, but perhaps only a segment of it.

Nevertheless, as the first newspaper published in Kurdish

and Turkish, it reveals clues about the political and

social environment of its era.

Another newspaper, the Jin, was first published in

1918, and served as an unofficial newspaper of a

significant Kurdish organization. Kurdistan Teali

Cemiyeti, or the Society for the Development of Kurdistan

(KTC) . Published in Kurdish and Turkish, the newspaper

included a wide variety of Kurdish intellectuals and hence

represented a large spectrum of Kurdish rhetoric.

Articles in the newspaper provide the researcher with a

rich primary source regarding the Kurdish population and

their intellectual, social, political and economic position in the Ottoman Empire.

The newspapers Kurdistan and Jin were collected,

transliterated, and translated into modern Turkish by

17 Mehmet Emin Bozarslan, a Kurdish scholar. Although his

introduction and conclusions represent the scholar's own

opinion, the newspaper collections are as valuable as they

are unexplored for scholars specializing on the Modern

Middle East. These collections are also utilized in this

study as primary sources.

Concerning the late Ottoman period this study also

employs some other published primary sources such as

Mehmet Bayrak's Açik-Gizli, Resmi-Gayriresmi Kiirdoloji

Belgeleri (Istanbul; Ozge, 1994) and Kurt1er ve Ulusal-

Demokratik Miicadeleleri (Istanbul: Ozge, 1993). These

books contain a number of primary documents, such as the political programs of Kurdish organizations with the lists

of their members. These kinds of sources not only offer

information about the political and migratory life of the

Kurdish intellectuals as nationalist leaders, but also provide very detailed footnotes allowing researchers to

locate other primary sources.

1.5. Organ!zation

The reader will find in the second chapter a discussion of the related theories on nationalism. This chapter aims primarily at providing a theoretical ground

18 for the discussion of the following chapters. It draws readers' attention to 'territory' as a major component in the identity formation process. This is not to deny the importance of other constituents such as language and religion. However, this study focuses primarily on the critical role that territory plays.

The third chapter is a demonstration of the claims made in the first chapter. Examining the primary sources since the 16^^ century, this chapter shows that Kurdish identity is closely tied to territory, namely 'Kurdistan'.

It claims that there does not exist a fixed Kurdistan and

Kurdish identity. Although a 'core region', defined as

Kurdistan, exists and in relation to which the Kurdish identity is formed, the boundaries of perceived Kurdistan are always in flux. Therefore, the perceived identity of the Kurd constantly changes, corresponding to the demands of time and space.

Also claimed in this chapter is that the outsider's view of Kurdistan and the Kurds has always been a significant factor in Kurds' self-identification. In other words, the surrounding states and their definitions of Kurdistan contribute greatly to how the Kurdish intellectuals define Kurdistan. Again, this is not to deny the contribution of indigenous forces. However, it

19 seems that the Kurds were more active in keeping and

nurturing the identity than in creating it.

The fourth chapter provides the reader with

background information on power centers in the Ottoman

Empire and complements the following chapter. In this

chapter, such important political centers as the ayan

(notables) and the tarikat (mystical orders) are defined

and their role in the Ottoman Empire is discussed. Also

introduced in this chapter are the Kurdish social and

political organizations in the early 20^^ century.

Additionally presented in this study is the Kurdistan

Teali Cemiyeti, or the KTC, which was selected to

represent the Kurdish nationalist leadership.

Utilizing a wide range of primary sources including

the Ottoman archives, the fifth chapter is a prosopographical study on the social, religious and tribal background of the Kurdish leadership during the World War

I era. Referring to the importance of territory, this chapter shows that a great majority of the Kurdish nationalists were landowners and hence were conscious of the importance of territory. Examination their background also reveals that Kurdish leaders operated under the

Ottoman system and were employed by the state at the

20 highest ranks. Further implications of the findings are

also discussed in detail in this chapter.

Based on the information I have gathered from the primary sources, I present the reader with family trees of

some Kurdish notables in the appendix. These trees

clearly point out the kinship relations of some KTC members.

This study is titled 'Unimaginable Community' , for it accepts that social identity is the result of an

imagination process, and it claims that it is a very difficult task to define Kurdish identity, even if it is tied to territory. However, it is also a grave mistake to ignore or discount the existence of the Kurdish identity in the late 20^^ century. This dissertation is confined to explaining the origins and evolution of that identity.

Except for common words in English, I have used the modern Turkish transliteration for the Ottoman words in this study.

21 Chapter 2

Nationalism: For Granted?

Nationalism has proven to be one of the most

persistent and consequential ideologies of the 20^^

century. A voluminous amount of literature has been

produced on nationalism, yet, scholars most often take the

definition of nationalism for granted and use the term

without providing a working definition. Consequently,

nationalism provokes different meanings in people's minds.

Nationalism, like most social terms, proves to be very

problematic due to the social nature of its expression.

To date, there is no consensus among scholars as to what

constitutes a nation and what defines nationalism. Hence,

serious scholars--although amazed at the effects of

nationalism on the human imagination--are challenged by

the ambiguous nature of it. This ambiguity, unfortunately, does not allow a universal definition that both provides a scholarly ground for comparison and, at

the same time, complies with indigenous variations.

22 However, conducting a study on nationalism entails an obligation to define what should be understood when the term nationalism is employed in the study.

To prevent such confusion in this study, this chapter will provide a synopsis of the evolution of the term nation, and move on to discuss the present schools of thoughts on nationalism.

2.1. On the E^volution of the Word Nationalism

The original usage of the word indicates that kinship or more broadly, ethnicity (to be discussed later), was an important factor in the definition of a nation. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word 'nation' originates from the Latin stem of 'nasci', 'to be born', and came to denote :

An extensive aggregate of persons, so closely associated with each other by common descent, language, or history, as to form a distinct race or people, usually organized as a separate political state and occupying a definite territory.®

The word was first used in the 14^^ century to denote a distinct group of people as defined above. However, in

® 'Nation', Oxford English Dictionary, edition on the Internet.

23 the following centuries, the vocabulary has been employed

in different contexts and carried different meanings. For

example, in the Middle Ages nation referred to 'a body of

students belonging to a particular district, country, or

group of countries, who formed a more or less independent

community' within a university.^ In all usages, the term

'nation' came to denote a new configuration of people.

Only in the 19^^ century did the word nation yield

one of its most used derivations—nationalism.

Nationalism, a feeling of supreme loyalty to one's own

nation, emerged after the revolutions of 1848 in Europe

and spread to the world. It is generally accepted that

the French Revolution of 1789 and the Napoleonic Wars

during the first half of the 19^^ century were the

determining factors in the major shift in peoples'

loyalties from their tribes, kings, states or religions to

their nations.

After the 19^^ century, many different forms of

definitions of nation, nationalism and nation-state have

come to be included in the political terminology. An

increase of the different and often contradictory usages

of these terms forced scholars to take into account variations of nationalism. Because nationalism took

^ Ibid. 24 different forms, such as religious, conservative, liberal,

socialist, fascist, cultural, political, civic,

integrationist, and irredentist, studies faced major

obstacles conceptionalizing nationalism in the 20^^

century.

As the forms of nationalism have varied, so has the

scholarship on nationalism. Currently, studies on

nationalism are still far from operating on a common

ground. In the following, I will introduce the present

state of studies on nationalism and provide an operative

definition for this study.

2.2. Present State of Scholarship

The present scholarship on nationalism is still in

the stage of infancy--despite all the existing studies.

However, at the present time, students of nationalism can

largely be distinguished by their adherence to two main

schools of thought: primordialist and constructionist.

The primordialists see nationalism as an ancient and persistent phenomenon. Nations, they believe, have existed since some distant point in history. Yet when they originated is not clear. Believing in the 'essence' of a nation, the primordialists argue that humankind is

'naturally' divided into distinct communities of history

25 and culture called nations and that each nation is unique

in its own nature. Nationalities, the chief agents of

nationalism, distinguish themselves from one another by-

possessing certain objective characteristics such as

common descent, shared culture, language, religion and

territory. This line of thinking found its most ardent

followers among Romantic nationalists. Among the early-

modern scholars, German idealists such as Johann Gottfried

von Herder (1744-1803) and Johann G. Fichte (1762-1814)

can be considered the early proponents of romantic

nationalism. In his Addresses to the German Nation,

Fichte preaches for the unification of Germany, for it

constitutes a distinct whole.®

Similarly, Johann Gottfried von Herder believed in

the 'national soul' of Germany. Herder believed that:

An aggregate of human beings is first differentiated from another by peculiarities of geography and climate; then it develops distinctive historical traditions—an appropriate language, literature, education, manners, and customs; thereby it becomes a full-fledged nationality possessed of a 'folk-character,' a kind of 'national soul,' and a truly national culture.®

® Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, trans. R. Jones and G. Turnbull (Chicago, London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1922).

® Herder is paraphrased by Carlton H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modem Nationalism (New York: Russell, 1968), p, 30.

26 Herder was an ardent believer in the essence of the German nation; hence, his ideas constitute a good example of the essentialist school. Similar views are apparent in the writings of Guiseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), an Italian nationalist and political activist, when he states;

The nation is the God-appointed instrument for the welfare of the human race, and in this alone its moral essence lies.... Fatherlands are but workshops of humanity, [and] nationalism is what God had prescribed to each people in the work of humanity.

In a more recent academic study, Anthony D. Smith, a sociologist, rejects the 'constructed' claims of nation and points out the continuity of nationalism through its agent ethnie, a new term. Smith claims that ethnie does not carry ethnic or racial connotations; it refers only to such dimensions as a common myth of descent, a shared history, a collective name, and a distinctive shared culture. Hence, nationalists are in fact 'political archeologists' trying to construct a nation by rediscovering and reinterpreting the past in order to reconstitute the community as a modern nation. Smith claims :

As quoted in Hayes, p. 155.

27 [The task of nationalists] is indeed selective- they forget as well as remember the past-but to succeed in their task they must meet certain criteria. Their interpretations must be consonant not only with the ideological demands of nationalism, but also scientific evidence, popular resonance and patterning of particular ethnohis tories.

Smith does not see the modern nation existing throughout

history, yet believes that the major ingredients which

paved the way to modern nationalisms were present in

history. In other words, perhaps not the whole essence of

nation was present but essential traits existed. Hence,

the task of nationalists is nothing but to assemble these

fragmentary essences into modern nations. Although Smith

acknowledges the process of modernization and its role in

the emergence of nationalism, placing him into this

category is unavoidable for he finds the origins of

nations in the ethnie, a real entity embedded in history.

On the other hand, the constructionists claim the

opposite. According to them, nationalism is a

construction of recent developments in human history.

Anthony D. Smith, "Gastronomy or Geology?" Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 1 (March 1995), p. 19.

Thomas H. Eriksen, a Norwegian anthropologist, goes so far as to claim that "history is not a product of the past, but a response to requirements of the present," Ethnicity and Nationalism (London; Boulder, Colorado: Pluto Press, 1993), p. 98.

28 Hence, such essentialist claims of nationalism are

completely ahistorical. They argue that the connection

with the past is just an invention. This group can

further be divided into two subgroups: (a) materialists,

who argue that nationalism and nations were created as a

result of the need for capitalism's growth; and (b)

culturalists, who emphasize the non-materialist aspects of

nationalism.

The common point among the materialists is that they

see nationalism as a product of industrialization, Ernest

Gellner argues, for example, that nationalism is a

characteristic of an industrial society, owing its

existence mostly to forces of economy, political power, and bureaucratic government. According to Eric Hobsbawm, a representative of the materialist school, nationalism is an invention of the state to keep up with the needs of capitalism. Hobsbawm further maintains that political systems are moving into the 'post-national' era, which is dictated by globalizing forces of trans-national division of labor.

Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny in their 'Introduction' provide a good summary of the position of these scholars, Becoming National (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 3-39. See also Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780....

29 As one of the earliest proponents of the culturalist school, Ernest Renan, a 19'^^-century French scholar, takes into account cultural and social dimensions of nationalism. Renan, in his well-known lecture "What is a

Nation?" argues against essentialist claims of nationalism stating that common language, shared territory, religion, etc., remain ineffective to define a nation. A nation, maintains Renan, is 'a soul, a spiritual principle,' the outcome of the profound complications of history. The collective act of forgetting the past, according to Renan, is fundamental to the creation of nations. Therefore, one can claim that Renan paved the way to seeing nations as creations of human needs as opposed to fixed entities.

It is this very point that later culturalists, such as Benedict Anderson, the key figure in the intellectual shift from the materialist to the cultural constructionist school of nationalism, picked up and developed into a comprehensive theory. In his book Imagined Communities,

Benedict Anderson suggests that nations are neither natural nor eternal, but modern constructions. Since the members of even the smallest nations cannot have face-to- face contact with their fellow citizens, group solidarity

Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?" in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi Bhabha (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 8- 23 .

30 on a national scale can transpire only in people's minds.

Yet there, people nurture the image of communion.

Therefore, a nation, Anderson maintains, is an 'imagined

community' born in the New World and spread to Europe,

then to the rest of the world. Since a nation is imagined

based on the changing needs of the present, no clear cut

definition of nationalism can be offered, nor any

objective social boundaries be drawn to those communities

which regard themselves as 'nations'.

It is important to note that capitalism, as

materialists suggest, more specifically 'print

capitalism',^: has a central place in Anderson's theory.

However, moving far beyond any simple reduction of

nationalism to the needs of modernization, Anderson

refuses to see nationalism as mere fabrication, hence

'unreal'. Rather he argues that 'imagined' does not

necessarily mean 'unreal'. On the contrary, once

'imagined', nations and nationalism become real. This is

the focal point of the distinction between materialist and

culturalist approaches.

In conclusion, although nationalism has been assigned a variety of definitions by the representatives of the

It is caused by the interaction between capitalism and printing.

31 above-mentioned schools, this study deals primarily with

ethnic nationalism (see below) and fits better into the

cultural-constructionist school. Hence, for pragmatic

reasons, arguing against the essentialist school, I define

nationalism as a political movement of an ethnic group to

obtain recognition either as an autonomous political group

in a larger political structure or as an independent

state. Notably, a movement becomes nationalist in

character only when a group of people, who believe that

they constitute a separate ethnic entity, are politically

organized and struggle for a nation-state or at least

autonomy.

Therefore, it is crucial to note that, in this study,

ethnicity is treated as one of the major agents of

nationalism; in other words, it is deeply embedded in

nationalism and the relationship between the two must be

addressed.

2.3. Ethnicity and Nationalism

Before discussing the interrelation between ethnicity and nationalism, I should define ethnicity. According to

The Oxford English Dictionary, one of the meanings of the word 'ethnic' corresponds closely to 'nation'. 'Ethnic' 32 originates from the Greek word ethnos, which meant heathen

or pagan, and after the mid-19"^^ century, the word

gradually came to refer to racial characteristics. As

Thomas Eriksen, a Norwegian anthropologist, suggests,

'Since the 1960s, ethnic groups and ethnicity have become

household words in Anglophone social anthropology,

although ... few of those who use the terms bothered to

define them. ... [However] ethnicity has something to do

with the classification of people and group relations

[emphasis original].'^’ And, ethnicity classifies human

groups based on kinship. Hence, one can suggest that

ethnicity seems to be the largest kinship (real or

fictive) group after tribe and confederacy.

In an attempt to define ethnicity, Dru C. Gladney

suggets a synthesis between a purely primordial-based and

interest-based ethnic identity and maintains that the answer 'must involve a combination or dialectical

interaction of the two aspects of ethnicity.'^® Gladney

further points out that some ethnic identities are formed and reformed based on the interaction between an ethnic

'Ethnic' in the Oxford English Dictionary, 2”'^ ed. Eriksen, p. 4. Dru C. Gladney, ' Sedentarization, Socioecology, and State Definition: The Ethnogenesis of the Uighur, ' in Rulers From the Steppe, eds. G. Seaman and D. Marks (Los Angeles: Ethnographic Press, 1991), p. 312.

33 group and a state as the controlling power. In other

words, Gladney stresses the role the surrounding or

controlling states (states that have political control

over the group in question) play in the formation of

ethnicity.

This study holds views similar to Gladney's, and

argues that ethnicity requires more than kinship (weather

real or fictive, based on a common ancestor). The present

study will further assert that group identity,

particularly at the level of ethnicity, needs a territory

with which the members identify themselves. Hence, shared

territory becomes a vital component in the process of

identity formation. Ethnic groups identify themselves not

only with a common language, past, and kinship, but

perhaps more importantly with a territory or motherland.

Territoriality is important also in nationalist rhetoric

for the majority of nationalist movements strive for a

territory on which members of a society share the same vision. At this stage a question arises as to the

relationship between ethnicity and nationalism.

Some scholars argue that nationalism and ethnicity can co-exist but are not related. Eric Hobsbawm, for example, ignores the tie between the two, arguing that nationalism and ethnicity are distinct and 'non-

34 comparable' entities.^® Ethnicity might be present in

nationalism, but there does not exist an obligatory

relationship between the two concepts.

Other scholars divide nationalism into two types :

ethnic based and civic-based. In an earlier work Hans

Kohn acknowledges the existence of the two lines of

thinking. Dividing nationalism into two groups, 'eastern'

and 'western', Kohn claims that compared to 'organic'

eastern nationalisms, western nationalism appears to be

'civic'. Western nationalism, according to Kohn, is

rational and based on citizenship, whereas eastern

nationalism is stagnant and based mainly upon kinship

(whether real or fictive).^° Hence, Kohn believes that

ethnicity is only one aspect of nationalism.

This study focuses on the link between nationalism

and ethnicity. Nationalism is the political movement of an ethnic group which, based partly upon common language, religion, kinship and territory, coheres. Acknowledging

that 'civic' or 'religious' nationalisms take central place in the present scholarship and scholars present valid points in re-configuring nationalism, this study

Eric Hobsbawm, 'Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today,' Anthropology Today 8, 1 (1992), p. 4.

Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1945) , pp. 329-31. 35 deals primarily with 'ethnic' nationalism and shows that human groups' relation with a territory is a significant factor in the formation of an 'imagined community' and should be addressed properly.

It should also be mentioned here that different forms of group solidarity should not be confused with nationalism. Labeling every political group as a nation contributes greatly to the confusion revolving around the definition of nationalism and nation-state. A distinction exists between state and nation; the latter requires ethnicity to cohere, however 'imagined' or 'constructed' it may be. Walker Connor confirms this point, stating that :

The interrelationship between national identity and the identity which flows from citizenship in a state merits closer scrutiny since ... the two are often confused. Loyalty to the state and its institutions [should be] properly termed patriotism....

Clearly, membership in a nation comes with the belief that members are ancestrally related, yet individual loyalty to a state brings only patriotism, not nationalism. This is not to deny, however, that the majority of the so-called

21 Walker Connor, 'The Nation and Its Myth, ' in Ethnicity and Nationalism, ed. Anthony D. Smith (Leiden, New York, Koln: E.J. Brill, 1992), p. 53.

36 nation states are ethnically heterogeneous. Nevertheless,

to phrase it anthropologically, it is not what a nation is

but what people perceive it to be that creates group

solidarity. Hence, nationalism emerges when the members

of a given group believe in their ethnic distinctness and

act upon it for independence.

2.4. More Remarks on. Nationalism as Employed in This

Study

As mentioned earlier, nationalism is one of the most

troublesome terms to define; consequently, such difficulty

results in numerous definitions. Corresponding with the

changing needs of the present, nationalism continuously

alters itself; it is, by its very nature, a flexible,

multi-faceted political reality.

However, this flexibility has been the most

noteworthy asset of nationalism, for it provides

nationalism with ideological compatibility. The term's variant meanings demonstrate that nationalism is compatible with even contradicting ideologies such as socialism, religion, secessionism, imperialism, anti­ colonialism, and fascism. Such a high rate of adaptability makes it almost impossible to provide an all-

37 encompassing definition of nationalism, and legitimizes

the high volume of definitions existent in the

scholarship.

In this study, I add another version to the long list

of nationalisms, namely 'pragmatic nationalism' as opposed

to the romantic variety. This study will demonstrate that

nationalism possesses also a pragmatic aspect. Aside from

its romanticized appearance, nationalism provides

politically and economically unsatisfied groups with a

legitimate ideological tool to challenge the status quo.

Nationalist leadership, particularly in the Middle East,

consists of once-privileged notables who saw the nation­

state as the most favorable political formation or as a

bargaining chip to regain their privileged status.

Consistent with the position described above, this

study will also examine the following hypotheses : 1)

Pragmatic nationalism arises during and after great

catastrophes, such as wars; although the idea seems to

have been planted in the late 18^^ century, nationalism

gained considerable momentum after the First World War.

In the case of the Kurds, although there exists some

literature to argue that Kurdish nationalism existed prior

to the modern era, it seems that Kurdish nationalism, whether secessionist or autonomist, emerged as a political

38 movement after World War I. 2) Nationalism proves to be a

significant ideology to challenge the status quo, containing contradictory forces in its nature such as religion and socialism. The present study will demonstrate that nationalism, a particularist ideology, can cooperate with Islam, a universalist belief, to destroy the status quo. 3) Nations and nationalism communicate with the changing needs of a particular time and continuously re-define themselves. 4) Nationalism is a modern phenomenon, engineered on the myths and interpretations of the past. Hence, the perception of the past is significant. 5) Nationalism is a construction, yet, at the same time, it is real. Once imagined, nationalism becomes real. 6) Lastly, nationalism is not necessarily a bourgeois-movement that is inconsistent with feudalism. On the contrary, this study will demonstrate that Kurdish nationalist leadership was monopolized by the nobility.

39 CHAPTER 3

History and Kurdistan

This chapter will examine the evolution of the

perceived boundaries of 'Kurdistan' between the 16^^ and

early 20^^ centuries and claim that the group identity of

the Kurds is closely related to a territory—Kurdistan.

In the light of the available hard data, this chapter

claims that territory plays a major role in the

development of group identity. Introducing the early

theories of the origins of the Kurds, the chapter first

examines the literature produced by the Kurds to exemplify

the perception of Kurdish identity and Kurdistan. Then,

the Ottoman state's contribution to the idea of Kurdistan

in the 19^^ century will be discussed.

It will be argued that there exists a fundamental

contributor to the idea of national identity, namely, the

territory. In addition to religion and language, social groups are defined based on the territory that they or

their ancestors inhabited. Nationalities identify

themselves or are identified with a 'core' territory.

40 Here, the reader should keep in mind that this 'core' can also be 'imagined'. When combined with other significant elements such as religion and language, the definition of the group becomes crisper. Although different religious or perhaps language groups can be considered a part of the society, without the territory component national identity fails to exist. This chapter will demonstrate that a

'core area' exists in Kurdish nationalist rhetoric with which the Kurds are identified. It will also be argued that the boundaries of Kurdistan are in flux; hence, it is problematic to assume that 'Kurds' refer to a fixed group of people, and the boundaries of Kurdistan to an unchanging entity. This chapter will demonstrate that as the boundaries of Kurdistan change, so does the perception of the Kurd.

The early scholarship on the Kurds can readily be defined as essentialist as it endeavored to establish the

'missing link' between the modern Kurdish identity and its origins in history. European scholars were particularly heavily involved in the process of reconstruction of the past. One of the most widely cited works of this genre is an article, 'The Name Kurd and its Philological

Connexions, by an early 20^^ century British scholar, G .

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1923) pp. 393-403.

41 R. Driver. In his article. Driver examines various ancient words and establishes philological connections between those words and the term 'Kurd' as an ethnic label.

Driver suggests that the earliest account of the Kurds comes from a Sumerian clay tablet from the 3 ’^'^ millennium

B.C., on which the land of Kar-da or Qar-da was inscribed.

This land referred to the region south of Lake Van, inhabited by the people of 'Su', who were connected with the Qur-ti-e, a group of mountain dwellers. It is with the name Qur-ti-e that Driver makes his first etymological connection.

According to Driver's second derivation, the word

Kurd is a term taken from Xenophon's epic Anabasis.

Xenophon mentions the people of 'Karduchi' or 'Kardaka', who were recruited from present day Kurdistan and employed as mercenaries. Since 'Karda', the Greek version of an

Armenian word, meant manly and warlike, Driver connects it with the Persian word Gurd, which meant brave. Therefore, concludes Driver, these people 'can hardly be anything else than Kurdish tribesmen who lived partly by brigandage and partly by serving as mercenaries in foreign armies.'

For exact citation see Driver, pp. 393 ff. Ibid. , p. 394.

42 Another group of people who lived around the same

area, the Cyrtii, also provide philological similarities

to the Kurds. Driver maintains that 'Cyrtii' was

mentioned by several classical authors to describe an

Asiatic tribe who were, like the Kardakes or Karduchi,

famous as ' slingers ' .

A widely applied theory suggests that the Medes, who

inhabited the land where currently the Kurds are the

majority, were the forefathers of the modern Kurds. It is

also claimed that the Medes who invaded the region in the

8"^^ century B.C. linguistically resembled the Kurds.

Driver's theories regarding the origin of the Kurds

provide the present essentialist scholarship with valuable

data.^^ Many scholars rely very heavily on these

theories, ignoring their highly speculative nature.

Although these theories represent a possibility and are plausible, the evidence is too inconclusive to rely heavily on them. Martin van Bruinessen, a prominent Dutch

25 Ibid., p. 397.

Basil Nikitin paraphrases Minorsky in Kürtler trans. H. Demirhan, C. Süreyya (Istanbul: Deng, 1991), pp. 31-38. The book was originally published as two volumes but in 1991 the combined version was published.

Undoubtedly, Driver was not alone in the search for Kurdish roots in history. Minorsky, in his seminal article in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, second ed., mentions several other

43 scholar of the 20^^ century, claims that 'Though some

Kurdish intellectuals claim that their people are descended from the Medes, there is not enough evidence to permit such connection across the considerable gap in time between the political dominance of the Medes, and the first attestation of the Kurds.

Vladimir Minorsky, the author of the entry 'Kurds' in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, concurs that it is dangerous to ground scholarly works on such theories as that of

Driver. However, he himself devotes his studies to finding the origin of the Kurds in the ancient history of the Medes' civilization. According to Minorsky, Kurds are the descendants of the Medes, who inhabited the same area as the present time Kurdistan. Since he believes that the origins of the Kurds are buried in ancient times, one can also classify Minorsky as a member of the essentialist school despite his most praiseworthy effort to study the

Kurds on more scientific grounds.

Reliable information regarding the Kurds comes first with the Arab conquest of the area in the 8"^^ century.

Hence, it is no surprise that the modern word 'Kurd' is of names such as Hartmann, Noldeke, and Weissbach; see sv. 'Kurds, Kurdistan'. Nikitin adds another name, Marr, to this list.

44 Arabie origin. Arab sources give systematic information concerning the distribution of the Kurdish tribes.

Minorsky mentions Mas'udi and Istakhri, two 10^^ century

Arab writers, as important sources, for they provide a list of Kurdish tribes.

The term Kurdistan as an administrative unit, on the other hand, was first employed by the Seljuks

(Selçuklular). In the 12^^ century, Sultan Sancar established an administrative region located in the eastern part of the Zagros Mountains near Hamadan and called this province 'Kurdistan'. Here, I should mention that the suffix '-istan' denoting 'the land of' is of

Persian origin. Hence, the earliest use of Kurdistan was a name given by non-Kurds.

Early documents suggest that Arabs did not use the term 'Kurdistan' to denote the land populated by the

Kurds. Instead, they applied such geographical appellations as Jibal ('mountains' in Arabic), Zozan,

Martin van Bruinessen, 'The Ethnic Identity of the Kurds,' in Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, ed. Peter Alford Andrews (Weisbaden: Ludwic Reicherd, 1989), p. 616. For more information see Minorsky, sv. 'Kurds, Kurdistan' El second ed.

45 Azarbaycan, and Armenia.It seems very likely that the

Arabs used the term Kurd to refer to a group of mountain

people with whom they were not familiar. Hence, those who

lived in these mountains and spoke languages that was not

familiar to the Arabs (such as Turkish and Persian) were

called collectively 'Kurd' . This theory seems convincing

when considering that Luristan, a mountainous region in

Iran, was included in Jibal; possibly the Lurs were

regarded as Kurds. After the Mongol invasion Luristan and

Hamadan were separated from Kurdistan. Basil Nikitin, a

Russian scholar of the Kurds, claims that the original

boundaries of Kurdistan shrank after the 15^^ century when

the Safavids came to power.

It is extremely important to note that the terms

'Kurd' and 'Kurdistan' had not been used by the indigenous

people until the 16^^ century. Hassan Arfa, in his book

The Kurds: A Historical and Political Study, suggests that

'The name Kurd dates from the Arab invasion of their

country.... [However] most of the tribes of that time

ignored the name Kurd given to them by the Arabs and

Iranians, and called themselves by their tribal or clan

Ibid. ; see also Driver, 'The Dispersion of the Kurds in Ancient Times,' Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1926), pp. 563-572. Basil Nikitin, Kürtler, p.58. For a detailed discussion on the origins, see pp. 19-87.

46 name of the particular region or valley they were living

[in] , or from the mountain chain along which they were

nomadizing. '

The earliest document that shows the perception of

Kurdistan comes only in 1597-8 from a book,the gerefname,

written by gerefhan Bitlisi, the ruler of the Bitlis

Emirate located around present-day Bitlis. Written in

Persian, gerefname displays a very elaborate perception of

Kurdish identity. Although gerefhan uses the term Kurd

consciously, he does not define it with precision. It

seems that he uses the term to denote a collective

identity associated with a geographical region—Kurdistan— which he defines more objectively:

The boundaries of the Kurdish land begin from the sea of Hürmüz [the Gulf of Basra] and stretch on an even line to the end of Malatya and Mara?. The north of this line includes Pars, Irak-1 Acem [the Khuzistan region of Southwest Iran], Azerbeycan, Little and Great Armenia. To the South, there is Irak-i Arab, Musul, and Diyarbakir....

Growing up in the Safavid palace and possibly having access to the palace libraries, gerefhan may have been

Hassan Arfa, The Kurds... (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 7.

gerefhan Bitlisi, gerefname, trans. M. E. Bozarslan (Istanbul: Hasat, 1990), p. 20.

47 exposed to the Persian literature about the Kurds, which

explains his trans-tribal views of Kurdish society.

Unfortunately, there does not exist any document, besides

the gerefname, indicating the status of collective Kurdish

identity. It is highly unlikely that the indigenous

people called themselves Kurd, but instead preferred

possibly their tribal names.

It is also noteworthy that gerefhan includes the Lurs

as one of the Kurdish groups and places Luristan within

the map of Kurdistan. According to him, Kurdish tribes

can be divided into four groups based on tradition,

language and social condition: Kurmanç, Lur, Kelhur, and

Goran. gerefhan claims that a group of 400 Kurdish

families migrated to Luristan from 'Sxmak', a mountainous region in the province of Damascus, in the 12^^ century and became part of the confederacy of Muhammed Hurçid.

Soon after, the Kurdish tribes took control of the confederacy; they also controlled Luristan.gerefhan's account is vague in dealing with the Lurs. However, it seems clear that gerefhan includes Luristan as part of

Kurdistan and sees the Lurs as Kurdish groups.

Ibid., p. 20. Ibid., pp. 35-36.

48 As indicated above, gerefhan attaches Kurdish

identity to the territory he calles Kurdistan. Therefore,

since Luristan was located within the perceived boundaries

of Kurdistan, gerefhan possibly saw the Lurs as a Kurdish

sub-group. This argument that Luristan was a part of

Kurdistan becomes significant when in the 20^^ century

Luristan is detached from the maps of Kurdistan.^®

gerefhan's understanding of the Kurdish identity

concurs with those of Arab and Persian sources, for he

seems to rely on such literature in his book. For

example, using Firdevsi's classical epic the gahname,

gerefhan concludes that Rustem bin Zal, one of the heroes

in the epic, was of Kurdish origin. It is important to

note that gerefhan seems to manipulate the language since

gahname uses the adjective 'gurd' (brave) for Rustem

(Rustem-i Gurd). Similarly, he claims that another hero

in the Persian literature, Ferhat, the passionate lover of

Çirin, was a Kurd from the Kelhur tribe, which seems to

reside in an area that gerefhan calls Kurdistan.

' I should note that some 20^^ century writers refer to the Lurs as Kurds. See M. Emin Zeki, Kurdistan Tarihi (Istanbul: Bebun, 1992), p. 24. Zeki comes to this conclusion based on linguistic similarities. gerefhan, p. 23.

49 It seems convincing to suppose that gerefhan

appropriated the etic (outsider's) view of Kurdish

identity. This is not unique to the Kurds; in the process of identity formation, many indigenous categories make use of outsiders' labeling. For example, the word 'Turk', denoting a group of people, was employed by the Chinese and Byzantine records long before it appeared in the Orhon

inscriptions near Lake Baykal in the 8"^*^ century G.E.

Similarly, Dru C. Gladney convincingly argues that Uygur

(Uighur) identity is a result of the interaction of the

local people primarily with China and Russia, who have responsibility for the development of Uygur identity.^®

Undoubtedly, language and religion are major determinants in national identity formation; however, outside sources, as indicated above, use territorial classifications that in turn are adopted by the indigenous people for defining their identity. Hence, one can claim that the etic view of the boundaries of a socio-political group contributes to identity formation.

A hundred years after Çerefhan, Ahmede Hani, a 17^^ century Kurdish man of religion and a poet, demonstrated a clear consciousness of separating the Kurds from Arabs,

Gladney, 'Sedentarization, Socioecology, and State Definition: Ethnogenesis of the Uighur' in Rulers from the

50 Turks, and Iranians. In a section titled 'Derde Me' ('our ills') in his well-known epic Mem-u Zin, Hani writes :

If only there were harmony among us. If we were to obey a single one of us. He would reduce to vassalage Turks, Arabs and Persians, all of them We would perfect our religion, our state, and would educate ourselves in learning and wisdom..."'*

Look, from the Arabs to the Georgians, The Kurds have become like towers. The Turks and Persians are surrounded by them. The Kurds are on all four corners. Both sides have made the Kurdish people Targets for the arrows of fate. They are said to be keys to the borders. Each tribe forming a formidable bulwark. Whenever the Ottoman Sea [Ottomans] and Tajik Sea [Persians] Flow out and agitate. The Kurds get soaked in blood Separating them [the Turks and Persians] like an isthmus. 4°

This work, which was written in Kurdish, is regarded as the 'national epic of the Kurds' by present-day Kurds, for it clearly qualifies the Kurds as a separate group and more importantly seeks self-rule. By using Kurdish, Hani clearly targets his fellow Kurdish speakers. It is unclear, however, whether any of Hani's contemporary Kurds shared the same distinctive feelings. From the quantity

Steppe, ed. G. Seaman and D. Marks (Los Angeles: Ethnographies Press, 1991), pp. 308-341. Translated by van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State..., p. 267 Translated by Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language, p. 53

51 of the surviving copies, one can conclude that Mem-u Zin

was read widely in Kurdistan and manuscripts were copied

mainly by local religious leaders (imams and molias) and

particularly by Sufi tarikats.^"

Ahmede Hani clearly illustrates that in the 17^^

century, Kurdish consciousness existed, although possibly

among very few Kurds. However, it is an error to assume

that such a scattered consciousness led to a unified

Kurdish 'national' solidarity, or generated a political

movement in this period. It was only after the

penetration of the western concept of nationalism into the

Middle East in the 19^^ century that Mem-u Zin became

nationalist literature for the Kurds and mobilized them politically. Hence, it is not the epic itself but the political and the intellectual environment of a later era

that qualifies the literature as nationalist. Therefore, one can theorize that identity communicates with the needs of its time to define and re-define itself. In the case of Ahmede Hani, it is safe only to state that Mem-u Zin demonstrates the awareness of Kurdish identity by some

Kurds in the 17^^ century. There is a lack of hard evidence for a widespread Kurdish consciousness in this

Bruinessen, p. 267. The author conducted field work in the region in the early 1970s. His observations are of great value.

52 century and, therefore, no basis for claiming the

existence of nationalist identity can be substantiated.

Unfortunately, Mem-u Zin does not give us more

concrete clues about the definition of the Kurds in the

17^^ century. What Ahmede Hani means by 'Kurd' remains

very obscure since he does not define Kurdistan. Clearly

however, Hani sees Kurdish identity as separate from that

of other groups, such as Arabs, Turks, or Persians.

Hence, one can claim that Hani defines the Kurds by

exclusion. More concretely, the Kurds are those who are

not Arabs, Turks, Georgians, or Persians.

The earliest Kurdish literature concerning the

distinct Kurdish identity appeared in the 16^^ and 17^^

centuries. One might ask, why did the Kurds wait so long

to produce such literature? I believe the answer lies in

the political history of the region in the 16^^ and 17^^

centuries. As is known, the Ottomans took control of the

region after their defeat of the Safavids at the Battle of

Çaldiran in 1514 and organized the scattered Kurdish

This is one of the points that John Armstrong, a student of nationalism, presents as a characteristic of nationalism. In his book Nations Before Nationalism, he talks about 'identity by exclusion', which is later referred to as 'negative nationalism' . Kurdish identity in the 16"^^ and 17^^ centuries can be a good example for Armstrong's claim that a nation can define itself by way of exclusion from other identities. Territory, religion and language were major determinants in this process of identity formation.

53 tribes under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. The

16'" and 17^^ centuries were times of uncertainty and

bloodshed for the region. Kurdistan was caught in the

middle of a very destructive war between the Safavid and

the Ottoman Empires in which both sides tried very hard to

gain the loyalty of the Kurdish tribes. Unlike the

earlier centuries, when the Kurds were subject to one

empire or another, in these centuries Kurdish tribes were

recognized as political units and were empowered by the

state.Particularly, the Ottoman Empire granted special

administrative privileges that were rarely given to any

other members of the Muslim umma or the Islamic

community.

Experiencing the destruction of war between the

Safavids and the Ottomans, Çerefhan and Ahmede Hani were

aware of the unique circumstances of the Kurds. They were

aware that neither empire treated them as one of its own.

Particularly, Çerefhan, through his childhood access to

the Persian palace and later service to the Ottoman court,

acutely observed his surroundings. Therefore, one can

For more information on Ottoman administrative policies in these centuries, see Hakan Ozo^lu, 'State-Tribe Relations: Kurdish Tribalism in the 16'*'- and 17'*' -century Ottoman Empire', British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 23:1 (May, 1996), pp. 5-29.

Definitely, this does not mean that such special privileges were non-existent elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire.

54 claim that: in times of confusion and disorder, people tend

to re-examine their social identities. The 16"^^ and the

17*^^ centuries were not only times of disorder for the

Kurds; they were also periods in which some Kurdish

notables, such as §erefhan, enjoyed access to the Persian

and Ottoman palaces. In this way, he possibly read

official documents and books concerning how the Ottomans

and Safavids saw Kurdish identity and Kurdistan.

After the Treaty of Kasr-r §irin in 163 9 between the

Ottomans and the Safavids, some Kurdish confederacies

enjoyed relative autonomy. In the 18"^^ century, the

Safavid Empire collapsed and the Ottoman Empire became very administratively decentralized. It was in the 18"^^ century that many Kurdish confederacies reached their political peak and appeared like proto-states. The most

important among these was the Botan dynasty, which, after the legendary ruler Bedirhan in the 19*^^ century, became known as the Bedirhans. One can also mention the Hakkari and Baban emirates. These Kurdish emirates, ruled by aristocratic Kurdish dynasties were in appearance operating under the established political systems.

However, paying only lip service to the Ottoman Empire, to which they were subject, the Kurdish confederacies enjoyed the highest degree of autonomy.

55 Among the past four centuries, the 18"^^ century seems

to be relatively the most peaceful century in Kurdistan.

However, interestingly, no Kurdish literature of the

magnitude of gerefname or Mem-u Zin was produced.

Although awareness of Kurdish identity developed,

historians rely on European or Ottoman sources to study

this century. Hence, this study is unable to examine the

meaning of Kurd and Kurdistan for the indigenous

population or for particular indigenous Kurdish figures

and compare it to the earlier centuries.

It was after the Ottoman Sultan Selim Ill's (17 89-

1807) re-centralization policies, and particularly during

and after the reign of Abdulhamid II (187 6-1909), that new

Kurdish literature appeared. To generate necessary income

for the state to compete with technologically superior

Europe, the Ottoman Empire in the 19*^^ century introduced

a series of centralizing policies. Such a challenging

task included the destruction of the autonomy of local

rulers. In particular, the Kurdish emirates required a

significant effort since the Kurdish notables who were

ruling the local population resisted the central

government to maintain their power. It was only with military expeditions that the Ottoman state restored the direct authority of the central government. As will be

56 discussed later, the most fierce resistance came from the

Botan Emirate in 1846, ruled by the famous Bedirhan Bey.

Despite Bedirhan Bey's initial success against the Ottoman

forces, he saw no way out in the end but to surrender.

Consequently, the Ottoman authorities replaced Bedirhan with his nephew, Yezdanx?er. Later, the Ottoman state

removed Yezdanxçer from power and integrated the Botan

emirate completely into the Ottoman central system.

Bedirhan Bey's future after the revolt is a prime

example of how the Ottoman state dealt with potential dangers to the government. Bedirhan Bey and his family were sent to Istanbul. He was not imprisoned but became a civil servant for the state. He was granted the title

'pa?a' and appointed to Girit (Crete) as a representative of the state. Most of Bedirhan's children served in the

Ottoman bureaucracy, becoming a significant part of the

Kurdish intellectual class in Istanbul and abroad.

3.1. Kurdistan in the Late Ottoman Period

The iieign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) was an era in which the Kurds began producing literature on the condition of the Kurds in Istanbul. The Bedirhan family was very actively involved in newspaper publishing.

57 Kurdistan, the first Kurdish newspaper, was published in

this era by the Bedirhans. This Kurdish

(Kurmanci)/Turkish newspaper (1898-1902) aimed at drawing the attention of the sultan to the Kurds. In several articles, Mikdat Mithad Bedirhan, the founder and editor of the newspaper, published 'open letters' to Sultan

Abdulhamid II. These letters indicated that Kurdish identity was well-established among the Kurdish elite in the late 19'^^ century. However, one should be cautious about arbitrarily labeling this newspaper as nationalist.

Since nationalism is defined here as a political movement for independence or at least autonomy, this newspaper cannot be labeled as nationalist literature, for it demands only that more attention be paid to Kurdistan.

For example, one letter requests the sultan's attention to the mistreatment of the Kurds in Kurdistan:

My Sultan, as you might Icnow, as a result of the tyranny of the Ottoman officials in Kurdistan, veiry many Kurds left their homeland and migrated to Iran ... and they kindly request your help.''®

Such an honorable exile to a remote area was a typical Ottoman strategy.

Abdurrahman Bedirhan, 'To Sultan Abdulhamid II,' Kurdistan (April 2, 1899), p. 1, in Kurdistan, vol. 1, ed. M.E. Bozarslan, p. 273.

58 In another article, the editor clearly declares his

intention in publishing this newspaper:

I, as one of the distinguished members of the Kurdish notables, because of the Prophet's order saying 'you all are shepherds and responsible for your flock,' to fulfill my obligation publish this newspaper in Kurdish with the hope of educating the Kurds in arts and science and raising their consciousness to the modern level.

Although this newspaper cannot be seen as nationalist

literature. Kurdistan gives us clues about the perception

of Kurdish identity in this period. For example, an

article claims that the Kurds were one of the most

distinguished people in the Ottoman Empire and that they were proud of being members of Ottoman society.

Articles in the newspaper present Kurds both as a separate group and at the same time as part of Ottoman society.

Unfortunately, although the word 'Kurd' is used

frequently in the newspaper, its meaning is never made clear. There are indications, however, that Kurdish identity was connected closely to territory. Addressing the Kurds, Abdurrahman Bedirhan writes:

47 Ibid., p . 154 ,

59 Humans live necessarily in groups. Hence, the well-being of an individual depends heavily upon the society with which he has ties. ... The endurance of a society depends on the land on which the members gather. ... So that, the true person [insan-i hakiki] protects this land on which he grew up and by which he was able to feed himself, with his life

Abdurrahman Bedirhan implicitly states the important role

of territory, which creates solidarity among the sharers

of a land.Hence, judging from such implicit

statements, the claim can be made that Kurdish identity in

the late 19^^ and early 20*^^ centuries was initially based

on the existence of a territory called Kurdistan. Unlike

the Serefname, the articles in Kurdistan do not define the

boundaries of the Kurdish land. Hence, I am unable to compare the meaning of the words Kurd and Kurdistan in the

19"^^ century to their meaning in the 16"^^ century.

After World War I, one can see that discussions on

Kurdish identity gained momentum and gave way to nationalist claims. One of the significant sources of

Ibid., p. 146: 'devlet-i ebedmüddet-i Osmaniyelerini te?kil eden akvaioin en gü2idelerinden„.0smanli tabiiyetiyle müftehir bulunduklari.... '

49 Abdurrahman Bedirhan, 'Kürtlere' [To the Kurds] , Kurdistan, vol. 27 (13 March, 1901), p. 5, in Kiirdistan, p. 475.

This is not to say, however, that territory is the only indicator of identity. Abdurrahman, for example, separates Armenians, who share the same land with Kurds.

60 Kurdish consciousness in this era was a newspaper called

Jin, a publication of the Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti (see

next chapter). Articles from Jin indicate that Kurdish

identity was developing separately from Ottoman identity,

in contrast to the previous era, in which Kurdish identity

was perceived as a part of Ottoman identity. An article

in Jin, for example, draws clear boundaries for Kurdistan.

According to this article, written in 1919 by Kamran All

Bedirhan, 'Kurdistan of Turkey consists of Van, Elazig

(Memaretulaziz), Diyarbakir, Bitlis and Erzurum'.

Kamran Ali Bedirhan, a grandson of Bedirhan Pa?a, uses the

term 'Kurdistan of Turkey' for the first time in the

newspaper. One possibility is that Kamran Ali makes the

distinction since he can draw more conclusive boundaries

for Turkish Kurdistan. In another newspaper, the same

author presents the very same region as just

' Kurdistan' .

It is interesting to see that Kamran Ali Bedirhan

uses the term 'Turkish Kurdistan'. It indicates that the

Kurdish leadership adopted the division imposed mainly by

Britain. In the British sources, Kurdistan was divided

51 'Kurdistan ve Kürtler,' Jin, p. 447.

Kamran Ali Bedirhan, 'Kurdistan'in Hazaini Tabiiyesi' in ictihad (1918), vol. 15, p. 2846 as quoted in T a n k Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952 (Istanbul: 1952) p. 431 ff. 61 into two parts: Turkish and Iranian Kurdistan. A report by the British Political Department of the India Office describes Kurdistan as follows:

Kurdistan (i.e., the Kurdish portion of Asiatic Turkey: there is also a Persian Kurdistan) as defined in the Foreign Office Memorandum ... covers parts of the Vilayets of Bitlis, Van and Mosul, but does not include the town of Mosul...

After World War I, the Western colonial powers divided the Ottoman Empire into smaller pieces. As the dominant political power, Britain insisted on imposing a fixed western boundary of Iran, thus dividing areas formerly under Ottoman jurisdiction. Hence, Kurdistan became divided into two parts, and the perception of

Kurdistan among the Kurds seemed to change. Having close contact with the British, some Kurdish notables sought to establish international contacts, and hence they altered, consciously or not, their perception of Kurdistan. For example, since Britain was in favor of dividing Kurdistan into Turkish and Persian spheres. It is very likely that

Kamran Ali Bedirhan complied with the British demands to keep Persia intact and adopted the British terminology

'Turkish Kurdistan'.

62 A note given to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 by

Çerif Pa?a (see chapter 4), who represented the Kurdistan

Teali Cemiyeti (Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan) on behalf of the Kurds, drew the boundaries of Turkish

Kurdistan as follows :

The borders of Turkish Kurdistan include in the north Circassia; in the west Erzurum, Erzincan, Kemah, Arapkir, Behismi, and Divrik; in the south Harran, Sincar mountains, Tel Af?ar, Erbil, Kerkük, Süleymaniye, Ak-el-man, Sinna; in the east Revanduz, Baçkale, Vezir Kale until mount Ararat.

Here, the borders of Kurdistan are wider than those defined by Kamran Ali Bedirhan. In contrast to the gerefname, 20"^^ century documents, like the one above, do not include Luristan.This non-uniform perception of the boundaries of Kurdistan clearly demonstrates that

'Kurdistan' did not refer to a fixed region and that its boundaries were in constant flux. However, it also shows

(I. 5546/18) B. 303, December 14'^*’, 1918, 'Kurdistan', in Great Britarin, British Policy in Asia: India Office Memoranda, Vol. 1, Mid-East 1856-1947, part 3 (London: Mansell, 1980).

gerif Pa?a, 'Note on the request of the Kurdish People,' presented on March 22, 1919, in Mehmet Bayrak, Kürdoloji Belgeleri (Ankara; Ozge, 1994), p.20. There are some Kurdish scholars, such as Mehmet Emin Zeki, who insist on including Luristan in Kurdistan based on linguistic similarities, see Kurdistan Tarihi (Istanbul: Bebun, 1992) .

63 thac there existed a core area with which the Kurds

associated themselves.

Further such documents show that Kurds were aware of

their surrounding states and of the literature produced

about them. It seems very likely that the Kurds were

influenced by these external perceptions of them and their

homeland. In the following, I will discuss how Ottoman writers and the Ottoman state perceived Kurds and

Kurdistan.

3.2. Kurdistan in the Ottoman Sources

If one moves from Kurdish sources to the Ottoman sources, one finds that 'the outsider' had a very elaborate perception of Kurdistan. For example, Çemseddin

Sami, in his famous encyclopedia Kamus-ul-Alem, defines

Kurdistan as follows:

Kurdistan is a large land in western Asia. Most of it remains in the Ottoman Empire but some belongs to Iran. It is called Kurdistan for the majority of its inhabitants are Kurds. However, this name [Kurdistan] does not have political or administrative connotations at the present time. In the past the name Kurdistan was given to a territory where the Ottoman Empire in the past and Iran in the present established 'the province of Kurdistan' . ... It is notoriously hard to define the exact boundaries of Kurdistan, but approximately we can say that it starts from the

64 shores of the lakes Urumiye and Van [stretching down towards] the rivers Diyale and Dicle (Tigris) to where Karasu mounts Firat (Euphrates) and from there north towards the line that separates Aras from the basin of the Dicle and Firat. Hence, it includes in the Ottoman Empire a part of Mosul which is the territory lying on the left side of Dicle and Van, Bitlis, and parts of Diyarbakir province and Memaret ul Aziz [present-day Elazig] and Dersim. In Iran Kurdistan covers half of Azerbaijan and the province known as Kurdistan. In this way, Kurdistan remains in a territory neigboring Azerbeycan in the northeast, Irak-i Acem in the east, Luristan and Irak-i Arab in the south, Cizre in the southeast, and Anatolia in the northwest. It resembles an upside down pear that is located within the latitudes of 34-39 degrees and the longitudes of 37-46 degrees.

5emseddin Sami (1850-1904) was one of the well-lcnown

Ottoman writers of the late 19*^^ century. Although the source of his knowledge is unlcnown, his precision regarding the boundaries of Kurdistan is noteworthy. As an example of 19^^-century Ottoman literature by a non-

Kurd, this entry also indicates that the Kurds were seen as a sub-group by the educated Ottoman elite, with their own distinctions. In other words, at the turn of the century, t^e Ottoman writers did not have a problem in calling a social group 'Kurd'. This is important to note since in the later periods, this social group intended to

§emseddin Sami, Kamus-u Alem, vol. 5 (Istanbul; Mihran Matbaasi, 1889), p. 3840.

65 be a separate political group. It was then that Kurdish identity was dismissed and denied.

Compared to §erefhan's perception of Kurdistan in the

16-^ century, Sami seems to exclude certain areas from

Kurdistan, most notably Luristan. Sami, acknowledging close kinship [karabet-i cinsiye] between the Lurs and the

Kurds, claims that 'there exists dislike [münaferet] between the two groups, and the Lurs do not consider themselves as Kurds.Consequently, Sami excludes

Luristan from the map of Kurdistan. This is important to note since Luristan was mainly excluded from Kurdistan by the Kurds in the early 20^^ century.

As an additional point, Çemseddin Sami asserts that the Ottoman Empire formed an administrative unit called

'Kurdistan Eyaleti' or the province of Kurdistan. An irade of 1846 (imperial order) indicates that the Ottoman

Empire established an administrative unit and called it

Kurdistan. However, this administrative re-structuring was aimed solely at establishing direct central rule.

This irade contains a letter dated May 6, 1846, from the office of the Grand Vizier (Sadaret Arizasx), which reads:

... The commander of the Anatolian Army, illustrious Müçir Pa?a, had some observations

- Ibid.

66 regarding the future of the Kurdistan region which was saved—perhaps re-conquered—from brigands (eçkiya). To present the requirement to, and to request permission from the Sultan, two days ago their excellencies Serasker Pa?a, Fethi Pa?a, the above-mentioned Mü?ir Paça, Nazir Efendi, and the undersecretary met in the Grand Vizier's Residence (Bab-i Ali). Müçir Pa?a firstly stated that the village of Harput, ... although it is a suitable place to station the Army, is peripheral to the headquarters of the Army. On the other hand, Ahlat— which is located on the other shore of Lake Van, and has suitable weather and fertile soil, and is located at the center of the Imperial Army (Ordu-yu Hümayun)—is, unlike Harput, closer to the Iranian and Russian borders. Ahlat provides better transportation and logistical support and is located in the heart of Kurdistan, where the Kurds can be better controlled with the iron fist (pençe-i satvet), which proves to be necessary. Therefore, it is suggested to the exalted Sultan that Ahlat should become the headquarters of the Anatolian Army. The appropriate action should be taken pending the Sultan's approval. ...

Müçir Paça/s second point was related to the administrative structure of Kurdistan. According to the Paça, the Kurdistan region was conquered to provide security and order to the region. Diyarbekir province (eyalet) and Van, Mu?, and Hakkari districts (sancak) and Cizre, Botan and Mardin sub-districts (kaza) should be united under the name of Kurdistan Eyaleti [emphasis mine] which should be granted a special status and autonomy (idare-i mahsusa ve miistakil tahtina konulmasi). Authority should be granted to a shrewd and knowledgeable person....^®

In response to this request the Sultan stated his approval: 'It is approved that for the welfare of the

B.A., Mesail-i Mtihimme, 1310.

67 local people and to protect the public order and security, the suggested region should be united under a new province and shall be called 'Kurdistan Eyaleti

This document is significant for several reasons.

First of all, it documents that the Ottoman Empire established an administrative unit and called it

'Kurdistan Eyaleti', a term that became extinct in the early Republican period. Hence, Kurdistan, for the first time in Ottoman history, became a province with political borders rather than a mere 'geographical expression,' as was Italy before unification in the 19^^ century.

Kurdistan Eyaleti was unique in that it was granted special status and autonomy. Unfortunately, the document does not specify what kind of autonomy it was given. It seems that bureaucrats and governors were picked from the most experienced civil servants and enjoyed higher salaries than other civil servants. For example, the latter part of the same document (not quoted here) deals with administrative arrangements and appointments to this newly created province. This section suggests that 'based on its large size (cesamet) and its importance to the offical duty (memuriyet) Kurdistan should receive 80, 000

Ibid.

68 kuru? (piasters) and Mosul 67, 500 kuru$ from the central government.' Considering that Mosul, a very significant province, was receiving only 67, 500 kuru? from the government, it becomes obvious that Kurdistan enjoyed special privileges and was a large province.

This irade also demonstrates that the Ottoman state created 'Kurdistan province' mainly for reasons concerning the positioning of the military against Russia and Persia.

Having a strategic base at the corner of the Persian and

Russian empires must have seemed to be a very compelling reason for the Ottomans to create the Kurdistan Province.

Moreover, to counter any future Kurdish insurgency and to control the region directly—away from the influence of the local rulers—seemed to be another noteworthy reason for the establishment of Kurdistan.

The Devlet Salnames (State Yearbooks) between 1848 and 1867 testify that Eyalet-i Kurdistan was indeed established and ruled directly by the central government.

Ottoman irades also contain very rich material regarding the interaction between the state and the province.

Primary documents suggest that the Kurdistan province ceased to exist in 1867. In the Devlet Salname of 1867, the name Kurdistan was crossed out and replaced by

Ibid. 69 Diyarbakir. After 1867 Kurdistan was not referred to as

an eyalet but was used as a geographical expression again.

I was not able to locate the corresponding irade

concerning the elimination of the Kurdistan Eyaleti; it is

highly likely that this document has not yet been

catalogued. Hence, the information about the reasons for

such an action remain open to speculation. After 1867

Diyarbakxr Eyaleti went through restructuring; however,

crossing out the name Kurdistan in 1867 suggests that the

initial purpose was more of a name change than re­

structuring. In other words, the Ottoman state felt a

need to remove the name Kurdistan Eyaleti from its

official records. Any attempt to speculate at this time would be premature, as it would be groundless and possibly misleading.

Kurdistan Eyaleti lasted two decades, a time span

long enough to have further implications. For example, as was discussed earlier, the Kurdish nationalist leadership after World War I defined the political boundaries of

Kurdistan.along lines similar to the Kurdistan Province of sixty years earlier. It is possible that the creation of a Kurdistan Province by the Ottoman Empire inspired the

Kurdish leadership of the early 2 0^^ century to draw its

Devlet Salnamesi, 1284 (1867), p. 93.

70 political lines. After all, the Ottoman Empire already provided an administrative infrastructure for the region.

This experiment might have inspired the Kurds to envision that an autonomous (if not independent) Kurdistan could exist. Such an arrangement would return the Kurdish notables to their glory days as rulers.

3.3. Conclusion

After the Arab invasion of the region in the 8®^^ century, the terms Kurds and Kurdistan took their place in

Middle Eastern literature. Kurdistan became a geographical expression, referring to a region where the

Kurds lived. However, it was the outsiders, most noticeably the Arabs and Persians, who created and used this terminology.

It was not until the 16^^ century that the Kurds themselves used this term. Çerefhan Bitlisi, a ruler of the Bitlis Emirate, was the first to use the term 'Kurd' as a designation of collective identity. Nevertheless, it seems very.unlikely that the term was popular among the

Kurds at large, who instead preferred their tribal names to identify themselves.

Although after World War I Kurdish identity and the historical Kurdish homeland became increasingly the focus

71 of intellectual and political discussions, primary documents do not offer any clear definition as to the socio-political or ethnic boundaries of the Kurds. It seems that the term 'Kurd' was used arbitrarily to distinguish a group of people from the other territorial, religious and linguistic groups in the Middle East.

This chapter has demonstrated that territory is a principal component in the process of identity formation.

Throughout centuries Kurds were associated with a territory. Those who lived in or originated from this

'core' area were partly qualified to be called Kurd in general terms. In other words, anyone who called himself a Kurd was believed to come from this core region. This, however, is not to deny that there exist other social groups in this region who defined themselves as non-Kurds, such as Armenians and Turcomans. In such cases religion and language come into the picture for further elaboration of group identities. Nevertheless, the existence of non-

Kurdish groups in the region does not refute the claim that one qf the prerequisites of being a Kurd is to have a belief that one originated in Kurdistan.

On the other hand, this study also claims that it is highly problematic to accept the existence of a fixed

Kurdistan and Kurdish identity. Depending on the shifting

72 boundaries of Kurdistan, Kurdish identity alters. The

boundaries of Kurdistan as they were perceived by the

Kurds shrank considerably as a result of the political

restructuring of the Middle East. The existence of

Iranian Kurdistan was acknowledged by some; however, some

Kurds wanted to obtain autonomy in a larger Kurdistan.

Clearly, there was not an agreement among Kurdish

activists regarding the boundaries of Kurdistan in the

post World War I period.

The most noticeable distinction between Kurdistan of

the 16^^ century and that of the early 20^^ century was

that Luristan was dropped from the map of Kurdistan and

the Lurs were regarded as a separate group, mainly because

Kurdistan excluded Luristan. Another article in Jin shows

that Luristan was not a part of Kurdistan. According to

this article, which cites The Encyclopedia Britannica in a

footnote, the southernmost border of Kurdistan was the

Sincar mountain, which lies north of Luristan. Defining

Kurdistan by the definitions of foreign sources indicates

that 'outsiders' were still influential in shaping

Kurdistan; it was not only an indigenous attempt.

In the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire created a

super-sized province and called it Kurdistan Eyaleti. It covered Diyarbakxr, Van, Mu?, Hakkari, Cizre, Botan, and

73 Mardin. Similarly, Kurdish intellectuals made a

distinction between Turkish and Persian Kurdistan. For

example, Kamran Ali Bedirhan defined a Kurdistan in a

manner similar to that of the Ottoman Empire and included

Van, Elazig, Diyarbakir, Bitlis, and Erzurum. On the

other hand, Kurdish delegates presented the Paris Peace

Conference of 1919 with a map that requested that a larger

area be acknowledged as Kurdistan.

I believe that primary documents conclusively prove

that Kurdistan has never referred to a fixed region.

Despite a perceived core, the boundaries that defined

Kurdistan and the limits of Kurdish identity have always

been in flux. By the same token, the term 'Kurd' was

never clearly defined, although it was used increasingly

after World War I. Judging from the fact that present-day

maps of Kurdistan exclude Luristan and Lurs as part of

Kurdistan and the Kurdish community, contrary to what

Çerefhan asserted, one can claim that Kurdish identity,

too, is flexible.. Therefore, this section concludes that

any essent^ialist claims to define an ethnic group are

ineffective when examined on scholarly grounds. It is

important to clarify that this section does not intend to deny the fact that Kurds and Kurdistan exist today;

rather, it argues that the present perceptions of

74 Kurdistan and the Kurds are a modern constructions and cannot be traced to ancient history.

75 Chapter 4

Notables euid Kurdish Political Organizations During the

World War Z Era.

After the 16^^ century the West emerged as a superior region that produced empires that had the ability to control most of the world. The unstoppable rise of the

West after this century has become a major question that has generated heated debates among world historians.®^

Particularly after the French Revolution, the West began exporting new ideologies to the rest of the world. When the 19^^ century arrived, the pressure from the West became a major force in the policies of the non-western states, determining not only their place internationally, but also their internal politics and policies.

The Ottoman Empire in the 19^^ century, for example, was under such heavy military, economic, and intellectual pressure from the West. This pressure was apparent not only in the Sublime Porte but more importantly in the

See, for example, William McNeill, The Rise of the West (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 76 traditional power centers throughout the Empire. After

the 17^^ century the Empire began losing its highly

centralized structure, and was favoring more de­

centralized policies. In the 18^^ century, Ottoman

provincial administrations seemed more and more autonomous

and local rulers enjoyed a high level of flexibility. The

timar (military fief) system, for the most part, was

replaced by iltizam (tax farming), which gave the grant

holders hereditary rights to control (though technically

not own) lands. By encouraging tax farming, the central

administration planned to reduce the cost of collecting

taxes.

A century later, when the Ottoman Empire became more

susceptible to Western economic and military superiority,

a general view of the Empire attests that the power

structure of the Empire was in a state of change.

Traditionally, Ottoman society consisted of two status groups: askeri (military) and reaya (simply the rest of

the society). The military class included not only military personnel but also civil servants and religious professionals. This class was free from any tax obligation. It was the reaya class that mainly generated the tax income for the state. The government successfully controlled local power centers by incorporating them into the Ottoman bureaucracy and by recognizing and legalizing

77 their power status. However, it was clear that competing

against international pressure, the Empire was losing its

grip on these notables, who exercised considerable

autonomy in their domestic as well as foreign affairs. In

this chapter, I will talk about an important power center,

namely the ayan (notables) which also included sufis, for

this topic is directly related to the Kurds and their

political movements. Then I will discuss the emergence of

early Kurdish political organizations formed by Kurdish

notables.

The ayan^^ became a significant political force

particularly during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 when the Ottoman state requested the service of local

notables. 'The Porte resorted [to ayan] in order to raise

funds and recruits for the army; and in due course they were accorded official recognition as the chosen representatives of the people vis-a-vis the government.'""

In return, the notables were recognized and put on the payroll (ayaniyye) of provincial governments. In 1779, the right _of appointing notables to the local ayan chamber was transferred from the provincial governors (Vali) to the Grand Vizier because of allegations that the former

I will use the tern ayan and notable interchangeably from here on.

78 abused this right. Early in the 19^^ century, the local notables seemed highly autonomous, 'often defying the

Porte for long periods and managing districts over which they had extended their control in virtual independence, although often providing contingents for the Ottoman army in time of war.'°^ In 1808 the notables pressured the sultan for a formal recognition of their rights and prerogatives, stipulated under a document known as the

'Senedi ittifak'. Bernard Lewis goes further to label the

Anatolian notables as 'derebeys', a term that can be best translated as feudal lords.®® Lewis claims that early in the 19^^ century 'the ayan had become more than a provincial gentry and magistracy. ...In Anatolia the derebeys had become a kind of feudal vassal-princes ruling over autonomous, hereditary principalities.'®^ This is best illustrated in the case of the Kurdso as will be discussed later. Clearly, the notables of the Ottoman

Empire in this period constituted a power center and enjoyed the benefits of Ottoman de-centralization. At

H. Bowen-r , sv. 'Ayan, ' El second edition.

65 Ibid.

The readers should be reminded that there exists a controversy about comparing Ottoman notables to European feudalism. Derebey is the term used in modern Turkish to denote European feudals. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), p. 447.

79 this point, for the sake of connecting the subject to the

Kurds, one should necessarily address to the question of

who the notables were.

The definition of the notable in the Ottoman context

has mainly been approached from the functionalist point of

view. For example notables, according to Albert Hourani,

were intermediaries between the government and the people.

Hourani divides notables into three main categories :

ulama, representing the religious group; local military

leaders; and secular traditional notables whose power

depended mainly on primordial relations with the local

population.^

Hourani's categorization of notables, which is

primarily oriented towards the Arab provinces, requires

modification in the Kurdish case. For example, his

definition of a notable seems to draw clear-cut lines

between local notables and notables at the center. This

study demonstrates that the local notables were also

members of the Ottoman bureaucracy and hence of the

center. Therefore, I divide Kurdish notables into two

overlapping categories: (1) the traditional Kurdish socio­ political elite who, similar to Hourani's secular

80 notables, derived its power from traditional patriarchal tribal authority, (2) Sufi (mainly Nakgibendi) ?eyhs, whose authority originated from Kurdish society's profound attachment to popular religion.®® As this study will demonstrate, these groups were an important part of the

Ottoman elite.

To explain the significance of the Nakçibendi order in Kurdish political life, it is necessary to discuss the

Nakgibendi branch of sufism in the Ottoman Empire. Sufism and the tarikats, or sufi orders, played a significant role throughout the Ottoman period.Bernard Lewis claims that by the century, the tarikats had established themselves in almost every village and town in the Empire.

'Through their close links with the guilds and corporations, they were able to dominate the professional and social, as well as the religious life of the artisan and much of the merchant classes.'^' Moreover, tarikats were very influential among the lay people of the rural areas as well as among even the high-ranking ruling elite.

The Nakçibendi order is definitely one of the tarikats in

Hourani, 'Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,' in The Emergence of the Modem Middle East, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 36-65. Here I use the term "popular Islam" to denote an alternative interpretation of Islam, namely sufism.

Lewis, p. 407. the Ottoman Empire which found ardent followers among all

walks of life in Ottoman society and produced effective

political leaders. Here, the reader should be warned that

particularly in the urban setting, the sufi and ulema

distinction becomes problematic since members of the ulema

class might have close sufi ties.

Established in 13'^^-century Central Asia, the

Nak?ibendi order was re-organized by Bahaaddin Nak?ibend

(1318-1389) of Bukhara. In the following centuries this sufi order gradually spread to China, the Caucasus,

Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. In

India, through Ahmed Faruk Sirhindi, a Nak$ibendi ?eyh and

the founder of the Mujaddidi (Müceddidi) branch, the order became more militant and conservative.^ Several very effective resistance movements in the 19^^ and 20^^ century

Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East benefited from the discipline, hierarchy and militant tendencies of the Nakçibendi order. Two of the well-known examples in the Caucasus and Anatolia are the ?eyh Çamil movement against Russia in the 19th century, and the §eyh

Ubeydullah and Çeyh Said movements against the Ottoman

Empire and Turkey, respectively.

"■ An opposing view to this 'neo-sufism' paradigm is presented by R.S. O'Fahey and Bernd Radtke, 'Neo-Sufism Reconsidered,' Per Islam 70,1 (1993), pp. 52-87.

82 The Nakçibendi order was initially introduced to the

Ottoman Empire early in the 15^^ century by Molla ilahi

(d. 1409), who came to Anatolia in an earlier period.'

However, the reformed order, with its non-conformist and militaristic tendencies, introduced itself in the early

19^^ century, through the service of Mevlana Halid, a Kurd of the Jaf tribe. Receiving the icazet (spiritual license) to transmit the Nak?ibendi order from Abdullah

Dehlevi of India, Halid lived in Baghdad and Süleymaniye and produced very many halifes (representatives) in the

Middle East and particularly in Anatolia. Those halifes, in turn, became very influential religious figures and political leaders.

This fact is particularly indisputable in the Kurdish areas of the Ottoman Empire. The Nakçibendi order has produced many significant leaders who assumed leadership positions in the Kurdish movements, as the following chapter will demonstrate.

I have placed the Nak?ibendi elite and Kurdish tribal leaders into the category of notables. Kurdish notables were very instrumental in Kurdish nationalism, which manifested itself very clearly in the early 20^^ century.

Yagar Nuri Ôztürk, The Eye of the Heart (Istanbul: Redhouse, 1988), p. 107.

33 with the liberal atmosphere created by the Young Turks in the Second Constitutional era, influential Kurdish notable families found an opportunity to be politically organized beyond the traditional limits of their tribes or tarikats .

These notables, residing mainly in the capital, Istanbul, established several political societies and parties. In the following I will discuss these Kurdish political organizations.

4.1. Kürt Terakki ve Teavün Cemiyeti

With the Young Turk revolution of 1908, Istanbul became the center of many liberal intellectual, cultural, and political organizations. Along with Turks and Arabs,

Kurds became heavily involved in establishing societies that in turn constituted political opposition to the government. The KTTC, one of the earliest Kurdish nationalist organizations, was established in the same year as the Young Turk revolution. The organization gathered several rival Kurdish notable families under its roof. In particular, the two families Çemdinan and

Bedirhan provided the society with a backbone although they were rivals.The KTTC elected Seyyid Abdulkadir of

For more information on this rivalry see the next chapter. Tank Zafer Tunaya, a Turkish scholar, also mentions the family competition, Tiirkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, vol. 1

84 Çemdinan as its president for life and published a newspaper sharing the same name with the organization.

In its first article of the constitution, the KTTC declared the purpose of the society as follows:

There has been established a beneficial society [cemiyet-i hayriye] by the name of Kurdistan Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti to consolidate the Kurdish ties [revabrt] with [the Ottoman state] while protecting the Constitution [Megrutiyet] as the only way for progress and explaining to those Kurds who are not aware of the virtues of the Constitution [Kanun-u Esasi], which is responsible for the happiness of the people and also suitable to the great rules of Islam. [It shall] protect the high esteem [mübeccele] of being an Ottoman and strengthen the relations with the Armenian, Nasturi^'* and other citizens of the Ottoman Empire. [It shall also seek] solutions to the problems amongst the tribes and confederacies [kabail ve açair] by uniting them [and it shall] encourage commerce, agriculture and education.^"

Clearly, the regulation was very carefully worded to reiterate the position of the Kurds as an inseparable part of the Ottoman Empire; hence, the Kurds did not pursue secessionist policies. However, this passage may also

Nasturi or Nestorians were a Christian population living mainly in Anatolia and Syria who refused to accept the Orthodox Church's condemnation of Nestorius. Their Church is usually referred to as the Assyrian or Nestorian Church.

^ KTTC Nizamnamesi (Dersaadet: Kasbar Matbaasi, 1906), article I, 'Maksad-i Tesis'. The document was published in Tunaya, pp. 409-413. There should be a mistake in the publication date,

85 indicate that by desiring unification of the Kurdish tribes, the KTTC wanted to represent Kurds at Large in

Istanbul; hence, it wished to obtaine more political leverage from the government. Good will towards the

Armenian and Nasturi Christians could be a result of the liberal atmosphere of the era.

The volume of news in Takvim-i Vakayi and Tanin, daily newspapers, concerning the KTTC indicates that the society became very active in 1 9 0 9 . The KTTC was very vocal in drawing the government's attention to the problems in Kurdistan, such as the land dispute between

Armenian and Kurdish parties.^ In addition, in the

Meclis-i Viikela (assemble of the elected members) , Kurdish representatives were complaining about the unequal treatment of the Kurdish provinces. For example, Mithad

Bey, a representative from Van, pointed out that his province came to be known as Siberia (meaning the exile place) of the Ottoman Empire. The Dersim representative complained of the region's underdevelopment and low

for the Society was established in 1908 (hicri 1327), not 1906 (1324) .

■5 Ibid., pp. 405-409. 77 Tunaya cites Tanin, 23 Teçrin-i ewel 1324, pp. 3-4. The land dispute between Armenian and Kurdish landowners is also reflected in Ottoman documents, particularly in the Meclis-i Vukela, Dahiliye collection of 1909.

86 literacy rate. Only one in 10,000 of Kurdistan's overall

population was literate.’®

Although the KTTC sought government help to address

the problems of Kurdistan, for the most part, it

functioned as a social club for Kurdish notables residing

in Istanbul. Interestingly, some of the conditions of

being a member to the KTTC were to reside in Istanbul, ®

and to be able to read and write in Turkish and Kurdish.

If one did not speak Kurdish, then one should replace

Kurdish with another language. The stipulation that

required Turkish, not Kurdish, might suggest that the

nationalist tendency of the society was not conclusive and

that the society wished to function within the Ottoman

system. Speaking at least two languages and residing in

Istanbul limited the membership to notables, who came mostly from the urban population. Therefore, apparently

the participation in the society was very limited to notables who were already a part of the Ottoman system.

Although the KTTC was exclusively a Kurdish organization, the organization should not be labeled as

No sufficient information is available about the accuracy of this number except for the statement by MUnip and Mehmet Hamza, representatives of Hakkari. For the full citation of the sources, see Tunaya, p. 407. ’ 'Istanbul'da mukim olmak...' the KTTC Nizamnamesi, ibid.

87 nationalist for it did not demand special political rights for the Kurds. In fact, none of the later Kurdish organizations that were established before 1918 demanded independence or autonomy. After the KTTC, there were established several Kurdish organizations, such as the

Kürt Hevi Talebe Cemiyeti (Kurdish Hope Student

Organization) of 19’12; however, none was as well organized and effective as the Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti or Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan.

4.2. Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti (KTC) of 1918

Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti or the Society for the

Development of Kurdistan (the KTC) was established during the final year of the First World War, when the defeat of the Ottoman Empire looked imminent. The Mudros Treaty, signed on October 30^^, 1918, between the Ottoman Empire and the victorious Allied Powers, was a death sentence for the Ottoman Empire. The elite group in the Committee of

Union and Progress, or the CUP, escaped from the Empire, and secondary members of the party were arrested and exiled to Malta. The empire was in complete disarray.

The society was also known as Kurt Ligi (Kurdish League), Kürt Teali Cemiyeti(Society for Kurdish Advancement). Silopi makes a distinction between the two, stating that Kürt Teali Cemiyeti was established independently in Diyarbakir under the leadership of the Cemilpagazade family and later became a part of Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti of Istanbul; Doza Kürdistan (Ankara: Ozge, 1991), p. 54.

88 Meanwhile, the American president Wilson declared his

'Fourteen Points' which recommended autonomy or independence for all ethnic minorities.

It is against this background that the KTC was established on December 17, 1918, approximately one and a half months after the Mudros Treaty. The founders of the

KTC were the same Kurdish notables prominent in the preceding Kurdish organizations. Kadri Cemil (Zinar

Silopi) in his memoirs provides a list of the executive committee of the KTC:

The President: Seyyid Abdulkadir of Çemdinan

Vice Presidents: Emin Ali Bedirhani and Fuad Pa?a

Secretary General: Hamdi Pa?a

Accountant: Seyyid Abdullah of $emdinan

Founding members : Halil Bey, Mehmet Ali Bedirhani, Mehmet Emin, Ali Efendi, ?eyh Çefik, Çükrü Babanzade, Fuat Babanzade, Fetullah Efendi, Dr. Çükrü Mehmet Sekban®^

T a n k Zafer Tunaya adds several more names, such as

Hikmet Babanzade, Aziz Bey, Kamran Ali Bedirhan, Necmettin

Htiseyin, and Re?it Aga.®^ Ismail Go Ida? provides the most

31 Silopi, pp. 56-57.

T a n k Zafer Tunaya, Tiirkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, vol.2, pp. 186-187. 89 comprehensive list of members, which amounts to 167. This

list also includes Said Nursi, who later became the

founder of the Nurcu movement in Turkey. There does not

seem to exist any official document listing the members;

however, from the memoirs of prominent Kurds one can

conclude that the leadership of the KTC was divided into

two influential families: the Bedirhanis and Çemdinans who

were very active in the organization. As the next chapter

will show, these two families were also rivals for Kurdish

leadership and constituted two poles or factions in the

KTC.

The constitution of the KTC ambiguously states that

the purpose of the society is to ensure the general well­

being of the Kurds (Article 1)®“*. Contrary to the KTTC ' s

constitution, the political position of the KTC in the

Ottoman Empire is left unclear; however, the society

clearly aimed at creating a united Kurdish consciousness.

The internal regulations of the KTC (Article 4), for example, state that the responsibility of the administration (heyet-i istiçare) is to work towards the

” Ismail Gôldaç, Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti (Istanbul: Doz, 1991), pp. 39-45 The regulation of the KTC is published in Tunaya, p. 203

90 advancement: of Kurdistan and the Kurdish people (Kurt

kavmi) .

If- its constitution does not identify that the KTC

was a Kurdish nationalist organization, its activities and

publications would definitely attest to this fact. The

best support for this claim comes from a newspaper, Jin, a

publication of the KTC. This newspaper published many

articles that are well qualified to be called nationalist propaganda. For example, in an article in Jin, Siverekli

Hilmi addresses the Kurdish youth:

The time passed by to follow others. ... Work only for your own people. Do not forget that we have a language of our own, however neglected, and a rich history. Here you have a formula for independence: action and initiative.®®

In addition, the political activities of the KTC members, as discussed in the following chapter, confirm that the KTC sought international assistance for its nationalist designs'. For example, on August 4, 1919, the executive committee of the KTC visited the American,

French and British representatives in Istanbul to

’ One can also translate Kurt Kavmi as Kurdish nation. Tunaya, pp. 208-209.

Siverekli Hilmi, 'To Kurdish Youth,' Jin, vol. 8, p.9, published in Jin, ed. M. Emin Bozarslan, vol. 2 (Uppsala: Deng, 1985), p. 401. 91 introduce the Kurdish nationalist aspirations in the

Empire. Zxnar Silopi states that:

The KTC leaders visited American, British and French representatives in Istanbul and argued for the national rights of the Kurdish people. In a meeting with the American representative, Seyyid Abdulkadir, Emin Ali Bedirhan, Said Nursi and Doctor Mehmet Bey pointed out the boundaries of Kurdistan on the map and asked for alliance on the sea. Upon the reply of the American representative indicating the US intention to create an independent Armenia at the expense of land called Kurdistan, Said Nursi responded 'If Kurdistan had a shore to sea, you would destroy it with your naval power; but you cannot enforce such a decision in the mountains of Kurdistan. '

The KTC was evidently asking for international assistance for the cause of Kurdistan. The threat of an independent

Armenian state in Kurdistan seemed to legitimize the KTC activities in the eyes of the Ottoman government.

However, the Damat Ferit Pa?a government was also very suspicious about the nationalist propaganda of the KTC.

On July 10, 1919, the representatives of the Ottoman government, Avni Paça, Minister of Marine; Haydar Efendi, a former geyh-ül-îslam ; and Ahmet Abuk Pa?a, a former minister of war, met with the KTC members Seyyid

Abdulkadir, Emin Ali Bedirhan, Mevlanzade Rifat, Captain

Emin and Colonel Avni Bey. When asked to explain the

92 KTC's meeting with the British without the permission of

the government, Mevlanzade Rifat stated that:

... [Ajccording to the Wilsonian principles every nationality had the right to work for their own welfare and ... the Kurds were convinced that the only Power which could assure them freedom and security was Great Britain. They had therefore considered it desirable to approach the British Authorities. [Mevlanzade Rifat] asked how it could be possible for the Turkish Government to grant any form of autonomy to the Kurds seeing that the Turks themselves were not sure of their own position.®®

The above citation from a British report demonstrates

that, encouraged by the Wilsonian Principles, the KTC,

after the Ottoman defeat, was pushing hard for

independence or at least autonomy. Therefore, unlike the

previous Kurdish organizations, it is only fair to

describe the KTC as a 'nationalist' organization.

Noticeably, this document hints that the Istanbul

government possibly entertained the idea of granting

autonomy to the Kurds.

The KTC, for the purpose of organizing the Kurdish

segments of Ottoman society, established two more Kurdish

37 silopi, p. 57.

Great Britain. Foreign Office, [112773/3050/44A] , 'Letter from Mr. Hohler (Constantinople) to Sir F. Tilley,' July 21, 1919, in Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), p. 696. 93 societies: Kürt Tamim-i Maarif ve Ne?riyat Cemiyeti (The

Society for the Spread of Kurdish Education and

Publications) and Kürt Kadxnlari Teali Cemiyeti (The

Society for the Advancement of Kurdish Women) . Both societies were established in 1919 by the members of the

KTC and their wives. To judge from their organizational structure and internal regulations, these organizations, like the other political organizations of the Young Turk era, were modeled after their European political counterparts. However, their aristocratic composition prevented them from successfully reaching large Kurdish groups whose tribal loyalties outweighed nationalist loyalties.

It is evident that the Kurdish leadership had no intention of dissolving the tribal loyalties; instead it tried to incorporate tribalism into nationalism. In its early stages Kurdish nationalism was tribal in character.

To use an architectural analogy, Kurdish nationalism was not built with individual bricks, but with large concrete blocks for"it seemed less costly. However, these large blocks were not measured correctly and failed to fit together to build a strong building. Consequently,

Kurdish nationalism became very susceptible to disharmony

94 at the leadership level, and vulnerable to pre-existing tribal feuds.

Such disharmony became visible when a split occurred in the KTC in 1920. Polarized under the leadership of the rival Çemdinans and Bedirhans, the KTC broke up. The

Bedirhanis, teaming up with the Cemil Paçazades and the

Babans, established another Kurdish organization,

Te?kilat-x ictimaiye Cemiyeti or the Society of Social

Organization. In addition to their declared secessionist brand of nationalism, the leadership of this break-away organization was united by their opposition to the influence of the Çemdinan family over their respective territories. After the destruction of the Kurdish principalities by the centralizing Ottoman reforms in the early 19^^ century, the Nakçibendi $emdinan family exercised a great authority over the partial territories of the Baban and Bedirhan families. As will be discussed later, I believe this preexisting enmity determined the understanding and manifestation of Kurdish nationalism.

The following chapter examines the family backgrounds of the Kurdish notables and discusses how tribal ties affected Kurdish nationalism in its early stages.

95 CHAPTER 5

Kurdish Notables emd Their Background

The composition of the Kurdish leadership reveals clues about the nature of Kurdish nationalism in its earliest stage. This chapter deals with the social background and political attitudes of the Kurdish leadership. To represent the Kurdish nationalist leadership, I selected the Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti (The

Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan), or the KTC.

This society was by far the best organized, most active and, in regard to participation, most heterogeneous

Kurdish organization in the late Ottoman period. I examined the social and family lives of the KTC members, searching-for specific information concerning the following: place of birth, education, knowledge of foreign languages, kinship relations with the other members of the

KTC, religious affiliations, marriage patterns, and level of intellectual and political participation in the KTC.

96 The data is not perfect but it is sufficient to draw important conclusions.

As the following analysis shows, there are several patterns in the social and intellectual lives of the

Kurdish nationalist leadership. Before presenting the information I collected on the members of the KTC, I would like to highlight several characteristics of the composition of the Kurdish leadership. I will reserve the implications of such a social fabric to a general study of nationalism for the conclusion.

The first and perhaps the most noticeable trait is the fact that a great majority of the active nationalist population belonged to the landed notable class. They possessed a sense of territoriality which, I believe, was a significant ingredient in their perception of nationalism. Therefore, almost all of these notables, whether tribal or not, were settled Kurds (though not necessarily urban based). Conceivably some may have controlled nomadic groups as their satellites; however, the leaders of the nomadic Kurds were not primarily involved in nationalist movements. Many of the members came from leading families of large and well-established tribal confederacies.

97 Secondly, the Nakçibendi tarikat contributed to the

KTC at the highest levels. Those members who were not tribal nobility were the elite of the Nakçibendi order.

The president of the KTC, Seyyid Abdulkadir, was a respected ?eyh of the Nakçibendi order. Although many members lived in Istanbul (away from Kurdistan) and belonged to the Ottoman ayan, their family names still assured these bureaucrats and military officers the utmost respect among the Kurdish people in the rural areas. More often than not, these categories overlapped. Hence, one could see a sufi geyh assuming also tribal (or trans- tribal) leadership.

The third pattern is that the leadership was mainly

Sunni in origin. With the exception of a few Alevi Kurds such as Ali?er of the Koçgiri confederacy, the majority of the Kurds in the KTC followed the Sunni branch of Islam.

Although Yezidism®®, the pre-Islamic religion of the

Kurds, still existed and was practiced by some Kurds, none participated in—or perhaps were allowed to be part of--the activities" of the KTC. Ali?er®° of the Alevi Koçgiri

Yezidis were often mistakenly called 'Devil worshippers'. Because of their non-Islamic belief, Yezidis, who are Kurmanji speakers, have been subject to persecution by even Sunni Kurds. Due to lack of information, I did not discuss Aliçer in this chapter; but his social background is similar to those of other KTC members. He is a grandson of Aliçan Pa?a, who controlled a large tract of land as his iltizam. 98 tribe became a member of the mainly Sunni KTC

organization; however, that did not mean that Alevi and

Sunni Kurds came to terms with their sectarian differences

in nationalist organizations. For example, the Koçgiri

rebellion of 1920-21 did not receive support from the

Sunni Kurds; nor did the Sunni §eyh Said rebellion of 1925

enjoy help from the Alevi Kurds. Hence, it is evident

that sectarian differences played a significant role in

the development of Kurdish nationalism. In other words,

nationalism failed to transcend the sectarian boundaries

of the Kurdish society.

Another noteworthy characteristic of the nationalist

leaders is their status in the Ottoman government. A great majority of these leaders were Ottoman bureaucrats, occupying mainly very high posts in the Empire. Their activities took part within the social and political

sphere of the Empire until the collapse of the state.

While engaging in nationalist activities, these leaders

still occupied their posts in the state. Many of the KTC members carried the title 'pa?a' and were part of the

Ottoman elite.

Fourth, most of the Kurdish nationalists came from

the educated class, who were multi-lingual. In addition

to Kurdish (mainly the Kurmanci or Sorani dialect) ,

99 Kurdish nationalists spoke Arabic, Persian, Russian and/or

French. Some traveled to or were educated in Europe

(mainly in France and Switzerland) , and hence, they experienced European nationalism.^^ Some were exposed to nationalist ideology in Cairo, Mecca or Medina through their religious and intellectual connections. They were possibly in close contact with Arab nationalists. The

Balkan Wars were another occasion in which some Kurdish officers came in contact with nationalism; moreover, they had the opportunity to share the intellectual atmosphere of Istanbul with Turkish and Arab nationalists.

Fifth, available information suggests that a considerable number of the KTC members married non-Kurdish wives. Circassians, Turks and Arabs were major choices for marriage. I found no connection, however, to suggest that offspring from inter-marriages were less nationalistic than those who kept their 'pure' Kurdish blood. This should not be a surprise since the Kurds exhibited all traits of a patriarchal society; thus it was typical for offspring to identify with their father's ethnic identity. However, it does indicate that in the case of polygamy, exogamy (external marriage) was preferred over endogamy (internal marriage). In other

See the sections on the Cemilpaçazade and Bedirhan families

100 words, one of the wives came from outside of Kurdish

society.

A final critical point is that most members of the

KTC were related to one another through the ties of

kinship or through the Nakçibendi order or both. This is

important to note since the preexisting ties and conflicts

played determining roles in the emerging Kurdish

nationalism. For example, as the Nakçibendi members

gathered around the demands of autonomy, traditional

Kurdish notables, as will be discussed in this chapter,

formed the secessionist camp.

The following discusses in detail the social, tribal and intellectual backgrounds of the Kurdish families whose members were actively involved in Kurdish nationalism

through the KTC. In this chapter, I have included prosopographical information of the KTC members. I have endeavored to search the family genealogy of the Kurdish leaders and to create their family trees (included in the appendix) By doing so, I was able not only to discuss the KTC members who came out of these families, but also to examine inter-familial relations in the earlier period.

Such hard data, I believe, provides the reader with a better context to understand the different perception of below.

101 Kurdish nationalism in the post-World War I era. As will

be demonstrated, early interactions between the families

have ramifications in their future political behavior.

Also, I have included information regarding the political

and intellectual behavior of each member under

examination. The KTC members about whom only very limited

information is available come in the latter part of the

chapter. I have insisted on including them for they

clearly demonstrate some of the points outlined above.

5.1. The Nakçibendi Çemdinzm Family of Nehri

The $emdinan family proved to be one of the most

influential and politically active Kurdish families in Che

late 19^^ and early 20^^ centuries. This family had

enjoyed high prestige, particularly in the Hakkari region,

from the earlier periods. Connected to the silsila

(spiritual chain) of the Halidiye (Khalidiyya) branch of

the Nakgibendi tarikat, the family traces its origin back

to Abdulkadir Geylani, a 12^^ century Baghdadi mystic and

the founder of the Kadiri (Qadiri) order. Interestingly,

the family line reaches to the Prophet through his daughter Fatima, not Ali, his cousin and son-in-law.

Although ardently Sunni in orientation, most of the

102 Nakçibendi families do not see a contradiction in

including Fatima in their geneology, although Fatima is

seen as a major figure in Shii Islam.

As a shaykhly family, the Çemdinans emerged as political and military leaders of the Kurds after the centralizing policies of the Ottoman state in the first half of the 19^^ century. Desperate for income to compete with the European powers, Mahmud II (1808-183 9) initiated a centralization policy to collect taxes directly from the areas which had been controlled by local rulers. In

Kurdistan, the Kurdish leadership consisted mainly of tribal leaders who ruled over vast areas by paying only lip service to Istanbul. The most notable of these tribal confederacies were the Botan, Baban, and Hakkari, which were in competition with one another.

After a series of military expeditions, the Ottoman state crushed the authority of these powerful tribes in the first half of the 19^^ century. The last emirate, the

Botan headed by the Bedirhan family, was removed from power in 1847. A decade later, the state introduced the

Land Reform of 1858 aimed at settling the nomadic tribes

Bruinessen, p. 217, traces the Kadiri origin back to Muhammad through Ali; however, the family tree of the Çemdinan family uses Fatima as the link to the Prophet. See the family tree of the family in the appendix.

103 so that it could generate tax income. Another aim was to remove the land from the control of the notable families and to divide it into smaller units.

It is a result of the Ottoman Land Reform of 1858 that shaykhly families emerged as landowners. Combined with their trans-tribal influence, these families inherited the political leadership of their respective regions. The brutal conditions of this period, stemming from the Turco-Russian wars of 1877-78, provided the Sufi

(mainly Nakçibendi) ?eyhs with an opportunity to assume the leadership of the Kurds.

The Semdinan family, as one of the most respected heads of the Nakçibendi branch, benefited from this unstable political era, and emerged as the unchallenged authority of the second half of the 19^^ century. Seen in this light, it should not be a surprise that ?eyh

Ubeydullah of the Çemdinan family led an uprising against the Ottoman and Persian states in 1880. However, the revolt was readily suppressed by these states. By this time, Çeyh Ubeydullah had usurped the authority over most of the land formerly controlled by the Botan, Bahdinan,

104 Hakkari and Ardalan confederacies.^^ Studies on this

revolt tend to present it as the first nationalist movement, since the çeyh demanded a Kurdish state

(independent or autonomous) governed by himself.Arsak

Safrastian extracts a letter written by British Vice-

Counsel Clayton in Baçkale. In this letter, Clayton quotes Ubeydullah who wrote :

The Kurdish nation is a people apart. Their religion is different [from that of others], and their laws and customs distinct. ... We want our affairs to be in our hand. ... Otherwise the whole of Kurdistan will take the matter into their own hands....

Many scholars rely on this letter, as quoted from

Safrastian, to demonstrate the nationalistic fervor of

Ubeydullah. Furthermore, British documents seem to attest that Ubeydullah, from time to time, entertained the idea of separation from the Ottoman and Persian Empires. In a

Wadie Ja^aideh, 'The Kurdish Nationalist Movement; Its Origin and Development,' Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University, 1960, p. 214.

See Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism...

The letter was mentioned in Vice-Counsel Clayton's report from Baçkale (July 11^\, 1880), p. 7. It was published in Arsak Safrastian, Kurds and Kurdistan (London: Arwell, 1948), pp. 62- 63. Unfortunately, however, I was not able to locate Ubeydullah's letter in the cited source nor in any other British correspondence published in the Blue Book.

105 letter to Earl Granville, Ronald Thomson, a British

officer in Tehran states:

The Sheikh ... states that he and all the Kurdish Chiefs are now agreed as to necessity of establishing a united Kurdistan [emphasis is mine] in order that they may be in a position to manage their own affairs without the interference of either Turkish or Persian authorities.... There seems to be no doubt from ... the proclamations and correspondence which [Ubeydullah] has lately sent to various Kurdish Chiefs along the lines of the Persian border that his design is to detach the entire Kurdish population from their allegiance to Turkey and Persia and to establish under his own authority a separate autonomous Principality....

Researchers such as Arsak Safrastian and Wadie

Jawaideh seem to be convinced that Seyyid Ubeydullah

sought independence.®^ However, primary sources contain

confusing, if not contradictory, evidence about the nature

of Ubeydullah's aim. A good exeimple to show this

confusion comes from a piece of British correspondence

written by Major Trotter:

A letter to Earl Granville from Ronald Thomson, Tehran, October 31th, 1881, Blue Book (Turkey, No. 5, 1881), p. 45.

’^Jawaideh, pp. 226-233. In fact, using the British reports and memoirs of American missionaries, Jawaideh argues sufficiently that Ubeydullah wanted an independent Kurdish state. Hence, Robert Olson places the Ubeydullah Revolt as the first stage in the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. See also for example a transcript of Seyyid Ubeydullah's sermon to his fellow Nak^ibendi halifes and çeyhs, published in Mehmet Bayrak, Kürtler ve Ulusal Demokratik Miicadeleleri (Ankara: Ozge, 1993), pp. 125-126. Bayrak cites a book written by a Russian captain, Avriyanov, as his source but fails to give complete citations.

106 I use advisedly the term 'Ottoman officials' rather than that of the Sultan's authority, as I believe the Sheikh to be more or less personally loyal to the Sultan; and he would be ready to submit to his authority and pay him tribute as long as he could get rid of the Ottoman officials, and be looked at ^ lege as well as ^ facto the ruling Chief of Kurdistan.®®

As demonstrated in this excerpt, primary sources do not faithfully testify that Ubeydullah's movement was a secessionist one. What is certain is that Ubeydullah entertained the idea of a semi-independent Kurdish state, but he was ready to settle for the recognition of his authority in Kurdistan. In any case, Ubeydullah's movement can be labeled 'nationalist' , for it demanded at least autonomy. It provided the Kurds in the 20^^ century with a symbol for nationalist demands.

In the following period, this family contributed greatly to the Kurdish nationalist movement. For example,

Ubeydullah's son Abdulkadir becsime the president of the

KTC and represented the autonomist camp against the secessionist Bedirhanis.

Trotter, Ibid.

107 5.1.a. Seyyid Abdulkadir®® (1851-1925)

Abdulkadir was born in the district of §emdinan in

Hakkari. He was educated in Nakçibendi tradition in his

hometown under his father's supervision. There does not

exist any entry for his career in the Ottoman Sicill-i

Ahval records, even though Abdulkadir served the Ottoman

state at the highest levels. However, from his education

as an elite in the Nakçibendi order, it is conceivable

that he spoke, in addition to Kurdish, Turkish, Arabic and

Persian. Although he was in contact with European

embassies in Istanbul, I have not found any document to

suggest that he spoke any European languages.

After the suppression of his father Ubeydullah's revolt by the Ottoman state, Abdulkadir was sent into exile with his father to Medina. In 1905, Abdulkadir moved to Beirut. After the Young Turk revolution of 1908,

Enver Paça asked for Abdulkadir's service in convincing the Kurdish tribes to accept the authority of the CUP

(Committee of Union and Progress, or ittihat ve Terakki

108 Cemiyeti) regime. Meeting with Enver Pa?a, Abdulkadir agreed to send telegrams to the Kurdish tribes, persuading them to recognize the CUP. It was in this period that

Abdulkadir became a member of the CUP and was allowed to come to Istanbul. Abdulkadir later ser-ved in the Hamidiye

Light Cavalry as a second lieutenant. Hence the process in which Abdulkadir was integrated into the Ottoman state began.

As for his marriage pattern, Seyyid Abdulkadir exercised polygamy and was married to two women. His first wife was a Kurd and bore Mehmetand Abdullah.

Abdulkadir's other wife was of Turkish origin and was a concubine (cariye) in the Ottoman Palace. Perhaps the marriage to a Turkish woman of the Ottoman Palace might have provided him with better access to the Sublime Porte.

Seyyid Abdulkadir, upon his arrival in Istanbul, became one of the founders of the Kurdistan Teavun ve

Teralcki Cemiyeti (the Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and

Unless otherwise indicated, the information presented here was gathered from an interview with Abdulkadir's grandson, Hizir, in Istanbul, Suadiye, November 19^**, 1996. Hizir Geylan did not give me a specific year for this claim; possibly it was during early rule of the CUP period, when the Hamidiye regiments were revitalized and employed particularly in the Balkan Wars.

In some sources, he was referred to as Muhammad, the Arabic spelling. He was the father of my informant, Hizir.

109 Progress) on October 2"'^, 1908. Influenced by the liberal

atmosphere following the Young Turk revolution, Abdulkadir

and such other Kurdish notable families as the Babans, and

the Bedirhans formed this urban-based cultural society.

However, as paternalistic as it was, the society did not

intend to reach the rural areas nor the common Kurds in

Istanbul. It functioned for the most part as a cultural club for the Kurdish nobility of Istanbul.

The Kurdish population of Istanbul did not consist

solely of the noteibles and their children as students.

The workers, particularly porters (hamal) were brought to

Istanbul to replace the Armenian porter population.

With his religious pedigree Abdulkadir exercised great authority over these migrant laborers in Istanbul. In his hometown Çemdinan (or Çemdinli in the modern period),

Abdulkadir's cousin Seyyid Taha II consolidated his power and inherited his family's appeal. Seyyid Taha II later became a member of the KTC, but this did not terminate the dispute between him and Abdulkadir over the leadership of

the family.Away from the area, Abdulkadir was

For a better examination, see Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908 (New York: New York University Press, 1983). Seyyid Taha II was not a very active member of the KTC; however, he was involved very actively in the international politics of the region. In 1922 he collciborated with the British against the Turks. Ironically, he was invited to be a 110 certainly in a disadvantageous position. However, in

Istanbul, his name commanded the foremost respect among the Kurdish porters, who saw him as an important religious figure.

Seyyid Abdulkadir was a significant member of the

Ottoman elite. In the Ferit Paça cabinet of 1919, he became a member of the Ayan Council and the chair of the

Ottoman Senate (Çura-i Deviet or Daniçtay Reisi), a very prestigious position in the Ottoman bureaucracy. During and after the formation of the KTC, Abdulkadir held his position in the Ottoman system.

After his position as the president of the Kurdistan

Terakki ve Teavun Cemiyeti of 1908, Abdulkadir assumed the presidency of the KTC. During the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, which resulted in the Treaty of Sevres, he tried to influence international opinion over the Kurdish question. Kadri Cemil in his memoirs claims that

Abdulkadir and his friends visited the representatives of member of Parliament from the Hakkari region in the Kemalist government. But he refused. See Bruinessen, p. 330, n. 5 ; Bayrak, Kürtler— , p. 651. In the Ottoman archives, a document indicates that Taha asked for forgiveness from the Ottoman government, B.A. Dahiliye Nezareti ?ifre Kalemi (DH-§FR) 43/218/18, Ramazan 1332 (1913). Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, Gôrüp tgittiklerim, 2"'^ ed. (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Yay., 1951), p. 195. See also Golda?, p. 16. Gokta?, p. 19; Kadri Cemil Pa§a, p. 57.

Ill the American, French and British governments in Istanbul in support of the Kurdish cause. However, since particularly the American policy favored an independent

Armenia at the expense of Kurdistan, the KTC did not find a sympathetic hearing. Only the British promised

Abdulkadir the recognition of Kurdish national rights.

The British attitude to Seyyid Abdulkadir can be followed in a memorandum by Mr. Ryan, the British High Commissioner in Istanbul. The commissioner indicated that Abdulkadir had asked for British support to install him as ruler and maintained:

Abdul Kadir Effendi was offering... the collaboration of Kurds who claimed to be very distinct from the Turks.... [However] the religious motive weighs a great deal with him, and I think it is for that reason that he now favors autonomy under the Turkish flag, as he is probably faithful at heart to the Caliphate, though disloyal to the Sultanate.

The excerpt is important, for it indicates how the British saw Abdulkadir and points out his autonomist tendency.

Kadri Cemil Paça, ibid. The Ottoman government was aware of Abdulkadir's relations with the British. A thick file is devoted to Seyyid Abdulkadir and the British; see B.A., Dahiliye Nezareti, Kalem-i Mahsusa (DH-KMS) 4403/28, Recep 1338 (1920). Doc. 160 [E 1776/11/44], February 24, 1920, printed in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, part II, series B, 'Turkey, Iran and the Middle East: 1918-1939', pp. 281-282.

112 More importantly the same report reveals that the British

did not favor Kurdish independence. Mr. Ryan maintains;

In a previous memorandum, I have suggested that His Majesty's Government should study the advisability of a new policy in the country on the basis of open opposition to the extremists of national movement, collaboration with a bloc of moderate elements, the maintenance of a relatively large Turkey and effective, though veiled, foreign control (mainly Anglo-French) over the whole of that Turkey. If this policy were adopted, it should be possible to fit men like Seid Abdul Kadir and the Bedrhans into the scheme by assuring to them a considerable though carefully controlled role in the administration of the regions in which their hereditary and religious influence counts. I cannot but think that this would produce better results than formal separation of Kurdistan from Turkey, followed by a formal partition into English and French protectorates.

Clearly, the British did not want a separate Kurdish

state, but to use the influence of Abdulkadir

clandestinely to control the region. There does not exist any hard data to indicate that Britain physically

supported the Kurds.

The Treaty of Sevres of 1920 stipulated that the

Turks should recognize the national rights of the Kurds; and if the Kurds proved to the League of Nations that they were capable of self government, Turkey would recognize them as sovereign (Articles 62, 64 in particular).

113 However, Sevres was replaced by the Treaty of Laussanne in

1923 which ended the hope of an 'independent Kurdistan'.

During this time a split occurred in the KTC between

the secessionists and autonomists. Seyyid Abdulkadir,

pressured by the other members of the Ottoman senate, gave

an interview to the newspaper ikdam on February 21^^,

1920.^°® In the interview, he denied the accusations that

he wanted to secede from the Ottoman Empire and to

establish an independent Kurdistan. Evidently, the

Ottoman senate did not forget his father Ubeydullah's

aspiration for an independent Kurdish state. In his

interrogation in the Independence Tribunals five years

later, Abdulkadir stated that he wanted to counter the

Armenian threat and for this reason he took part in the

Damat Ferit Pa$a cabinet. He never desired separation from

the Hükümet-i Osmaniye, or the Ottoman government, but

wanted autonomy for Kurdistan.

138 Ryan, ibid.

Siycimend Othman claims that the interview was printed Tasvir-i Efkar and reprinted in The New York Times, 9 March 1920. See "Kurdish Nationalism: Instigators and Historical Influences," Armeniain Review (Spring 1989), vol. 42:1/155, p. 53 . The Diyarbakir Independence Tribunal session took place on May 13'^‘*, 1925; excerpts from the transcript were published in Vakit by Na§id Hakki. See Bayrak, pp.145-145.

114 Such a bold statement against independence triggered

the Bedirhan.i faction to take a position against the

autonomists as they identified themselves as

secessionists. As will be discussed in the following

section on the Bedirhani family, the secessionists

consisted mainly of notable Kurds and the autonomists

included notables of Nakçibendi origin. Thus, the

question remains as to why this split occurred. Kadri

Cemil points out the family feud between the Bedirhanis

and the Çemdinans without elaborating on the nature of it.

This, according to Kadri Cemil, was the reason for the

split.It seems very likely that this feud was one of

the main causes for Abdulkadir's position against

autonomy. The very same point is observed by Ismail

Golda? when he states that the 'existing hostility of the

families ... reflected itself, willingly or not, in their contradictory political behavior.... They were not able to go beyond this feudal conflict and to establish a democratically based Kurdish national consciousness

It seems very likely that the family feud between the

Bedirhani and the Çemdinan families originated in the second half of the 19"^^ century, when Ubeydullah extended

""Kadri Cemil, p. 29.

Golda?, p.204.

115 his influence over the areas formerly controlled by the

Bedirhanis. Melik Firat, a grandson of the famous

Nakçibendi ?eyh Said, confirmed that Ubeydullah owned a

great amount of land and exercised authority over the

Botan emirate. This may be a reason for the conflict

between these families. It is clear from Kadri Cemil

Paça's memoir that Celadet Bedirhan was entertaining the

idea of being the king of an independent Kurdistan. Kadri

Cemil states that 'Celadet Bedirhan had a desire to

restore the Botan emirate and himself as the ruler; he

even wished to be the King of Kurdistan. '

After the ?eyh Said Revolt in 1925, the new Turkish

Republic tried Seyyid Abdulkadir for his alleged

connection to the revolt, which constituted a great danger

for the regime. Abdulkadir, along with his son Mehmet,

was found guilty of treason and condemned to death by the

Independence Tribunals in 1925. The other son, Abdullah,

managed to escape to Iran.

The Çemdinan family provided the KTC with four members. In addition to Abdulkadir and his two sons,

Mehmet and Abdullah, his nephew Seyyid Taha II

Personal interview with Melik Firat, Fall 1996, in his residence in Yalova.

Kadri Cemil Paga, p. 150

116 participated in the Society. Seyyid Taha was a son of

Abdulkadir's brother Mehmet Siddik, who, after

Ubeydullah's and Abdulkadir's exile to Medina, remained in

Çemdinan and headed the family. Primary documents portray

Seyyid Taha II as a passive participant in the KTC.

Therefore, I will not elaborate any further on his life.

None of the surviving members of the family took part

in the Kurdish nationalist organizations in the following period in Turkey. Melik Firat, in my interview with him, stated that Hizir Geylan, a University of North Carolina- educated engineer and a grandson of Seyyid Abdulkadir, refrains from participating in any Kurdish events. It was also my observation of Hizir Geylan when I interviewed him that he does not have any desire to stress his Kurdish- more importantly, notable-genealogy. Hizir Geylan married to a Turk and stated in our interview that none of his children speaks Kurdish.

As can be seen, the Çemdinan family represented the autonomist branch of Kurdish nationalism. Deriving his authority mainly from his Nakgibendi pedigree, Seyyid

Abdulkadir exhibits the characteristics of a Kurdish notable in Istanbul. He received a traditional religious education, and was active in Kurdish nationalist

117 organizations but, at the same time, was a member of the

Ottoman elite.

5.2. The Bedirhani Family

The major rival of the Çemdinan family for Kurdish leadership was the Bedirhanis. The family traces its origin back to the Umayyad general Halid ibn Velid.^^^

Çerefhan, in his book Çerefname, claims that the forefathers of the Bedirhani family practiced the Yezidi religion before Islam,The family belongs to the

'Azizan' or 'Azizi' branch of the Botan emirate in Cezire and was highly regarded by Çerefhan, who himself belonged to this family.

Without a doubt, the most important member of the family was Bedirhan Pa?a (1802/3-1869/70), who controlled the strong Botan emirate in the first half of the 19^^ century, ^edirhan Pa?a earned a unique place in Ottoman

Mehmed Siireyya, 'Bedirhan Pa§a', Sicill-i Osmani (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi yay. 1996), p. 360.

Çerefhan, gerefname: Kurt Tarihi, trans. M. Emin Bozarslan (Istanbul: Hasat Yay., 1990), p.135.

Ibid., p. 139. 118 history, for his revolt against the Ottoman Empire became

a main concern of the Ottoman state in the mid-19'^^

century. Until his capture in 1846, he defeated the

Ottoman forces several times, a noticeable success for a

local ruler. This revolt, caused by the centralization

policies of the state, caused so much chaos in the Ottoman

government that upon its suppression, a new medal, the

Medal of Kurdistan, was issued to those who fought against

Bedirhan.The Ottoman archives provide rich but

heretofore unexplored documents regarding this revolt. It

is interesting to note that one defter (Ayniyat 609), is

completely devoted to this revolt. This defter, a

collection of correspondence between the central government and the Kurdish provinces regarding the aftermath of the revolt, indicates how much attention the

Ottoman government paid to this revolt.'-^®

The significance of Bedirhan and his revolt, however, comes from a claim that it was a nationalist movement.

B.A., îj^de Dahiliye, 1265/10866, is a thank you letter from the Governor of Kurdistan upon his acceptance of the Kurdistan Medal. See also Malmisanij, Cizira Botanli Bedirhaniler ve Bedirhan Ailesi Derne^inin Tutanaklari (Sweden: APEC, 1994), p. 68. See B.A., Ayniyat 609. The defter is even titled 'On the Revolt of Bedirhcin Bey' .

For example, Malmisanj, a Kurdish researcher, believes that the Bedirhan Revolt was a nationalist movement; see Cizira Botanli Bedirhaniler..., p. 11; Mehmet Emin Zeki, Kurdistan 119 However, an argument can be made that Bedirhan revolt may

not be seen as a 'nationalist' movement. This is an

important argument to place Kurdish nationalism in the

correct time-frame. Nazmi Sevgen, in a study on the

Bedirhan family, uncovers several documents to demonstrate

that this revolt was not nationalist in orientation. The

Ottoman archives indicate that Bedirhan's primary reason

for revolting did not stem from a nationalistic purpose in

any sense of the term, but from a new administrative

system enforced by the Ottomans and aimed at dividing

Bedirhan's land. According to the new system, as Botan, a

district in the emirate, remained in Diyarbakir province,

Cizre, another district, was attached to Mosul, whose

governor, Mehmed Paça, was at odds with Bedirhan. A

letter from the governor of Diyarbakir, Vecihi Paça, to

Bedirhan demonstrates this arrangement:

We have heard that there exists disharmony and quarrelsomeness between you and the governor of Mosul, Mehmet Pa?a, stemming from the attachment of Cizre district to Mosul, and that you are in anxiety [vesvese] .... As long as you serve and stay loya^ to the Ottoman state, Mehmet Pa?a cannot do you harm. The matter was written to Istanbul and

Tarihi (Ankara: Beybun, 1992), p. 124. See also 'Bedirhan Bey', Kurdistan, 7 April 1897, p. 1. This is the first Kurdish newspaper, and it was published by the Bedirahni family. In 1991 M. Emin Bozarslan re-published the whole collection with its modern Turkish translation, Kurdistan (Uppsala: Deng, 1991), 2 vols.

120 to the governor of Mosul, Mehmet Pa?a. Hence, you should refrain from such anxiety.

As this document indicates, Bedirhan was agitated at the attempt to divide his emirate administratively. The

Ottoman archives do not corroborate the claim that nationalist feelings caused Bedirhan's revolt in 1846.*'“

Furthermore, another source suggests that the Ottoman

Empire was in fact responsible for installing Bedirhan in power. Two American missionaries, Wright and Breath, spent four weeks at the court of Bedirhan and observed that :

[Bedirhan] told us that eight years ago, when he was weak and Turkey strong, he entered into an engagement with the latter; and that now, though the power changed hands, he did not violate his w o r d .... He is a n uncommon man. Eight years ago he was poor, without power, and little known. The Turkish government then took him by the hand; and now his wealth is incalculable.

B.A., Mesail-i Miihiirane, 1225; this document was printed in Nazmi Sevgen, Do#u ve Giineydcdu Anadolu'da Turk Beylikleri (Ankara: TAKE, 1982), appendix, doc. No. XXXI. For Sevgen's transliteration, see pp. 72-73.

Sevgen presents several ocher documents in his chapter on the Bedirhans, pp. 61-134. Wright and Breath, 'Visit of Messrs. Wright and Breath to Bader Khan Bey,' The Missionary Herald, vol. 42 (November, 1846), p. 381.

121 This document of 1846 suggests that Bedirhan was not anti-

Ottoman. Clearly, there is not sufficient hard data to support the idea that Bedirhan was a Kurdish nationalist; rather, he was a notable who wished to protect his own interests against the expanding Ottoman centralization.

Furthermore, this document asserts that Bedirhan received aid from the Ottoman state to come to power, which might indicate that the Ottoman Empire was involved in the internal politics of the emirate in the early 19^^ century. Therefore, it should not be very surprising that even after his revolt was suppressed, Bedirhan was not condemned to death, but awarded the rank of 'paga' and placed on the Ottoman payroll.He served the state even after his revolt as a statesman.

After the revolt was suppressed, Bedirhan was sent to

Istanbul and then Girit (Crete) with his 3 4 wives and 9 6 children. When he died in 1869-70 (hicri 1269), he had 21 daughters and 21 sons.^^^

Ottoman documents indicating this point are published in Sevgen, pp. 61-134. An Ottoman document confirms this number and reveals the names of his children; see B.A. Irade Dahiliye, 1286/41717. The document is a letter written by the children of Bedirhan to Istanbul (Makam-i Mualla-i Sedaret-i Uzmaya), requesting an increase in their salaries. In this document the number of family members is indicated as 63 (altmiçüç neferden ibaret bulunan evlad ve iyal ve ahfadini...) .

122 Although Bedirhan Pa?a, as argued above, should not

be seen as a nationalist figure in Kurdish history, some

of his children and grandchildren played very significant

roles in the development of Kurdish nationalism. In the

second half of the 19^^ century, the first Kurdish/Turkish

newspaper, Kurdistan, was published by the Bedirhani

family.

Most of Bedirhan's sons were employed by the state

and seven of them carried the title pa?a. Some of his

sons became governors of Ottoman sancaks (mutasarrif) , public prosecutors and judges.The family at the turn

of the century carried all traits of the Ottoman elite and was involved in new political formations in the Empire.

Some family members, for example, were sympathetic to the

Young Turk movement. A son of Bedirhan, Abdurrahman, attended The Young Turk Liberal Congress held in Paris in

1902 .

This newspaper, published between 1898-1902, was collected and re-published by M. Emin Bozarslan; see Kurdistan, 2 vols.(Uppsala: Deng, 1991).

:27 See the family tree at the end, and Lütfi, Emir Bedirhan (Istanbul ?: Matbaa-i tctihad). This book, published in Ottoman Turkish, does not have a date or location on it; however, since the author was referred to as 'on behalf of the Kurdish Society, Lütfi' (Kürtler Cemiyeti Nanuna LUtfi) it is most likely that it was published around or after the First World War. Ictihad Matbaasi was in Istanbul. Jawaideh, p. 293.

123 After the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the family participated in the formation of several Kurdish cultural societies, such as the Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and

Progress of 1908 (Kurt Teavun ve Terakki Cemiyeti) and

Kurdish Hope of 1912 (Hevi). These Kurdish societies operated legally and promoted Kurdish identity among the

Kurdish student population of Istanbul. Kadri Cemil Pa?a, an active nationalist of that era, however, argues that the formation of these societies stemmed from personal and factional interests:

During the time of chaos that the Ottoman Empire was facing [in the early 20^^ century]— when the Ottoman state was not able to sustain them properly, Kurdish pa$as and notables [ümera] who belonged to and were paid by the Ottoman system- panicked, and saw the promotion of Kurdish nationalism as the only remedy. These people, who carried with them their personal conflicts, formed the Kurt Teavun ve Terakki in 1908. Unfortunately, this organization did not last long for its members had personal enmities.^*

This account, written by a Kurdish notable, is interesting for it seems to trivialize the Kurdish activities of the era. However, in the general context it appears that

Kadri Cemil was criticizing the family feuds that hindered a strong Kurdish nationalism. Since these organizations did not have a political agenda, I do not classify them as

124 'nationalist', yet, one should keep in mind that these

organizations laid the foundations of the future Kurdish movements.

5.2.a. Emin All Bedirhan (1851-1926)

Emin Ali Bedirhan, a son of Bedirhan Pa?a, and his

sons were doubtless the most devoted and well-known exponents of Kurdish nationalism. Emin Ali (a.k.a. Mehmet

Emin) was one of 21 sons of Bedirhan Pa?a; he served the

Ottoman state as public prosecutor and judicial inspector

in Ankara and Konya. He was sent into exile in 1906 by

the Ottoman government when his cousin Abdürrezzak and his brother Ali Çamil became involved in the killing of Rxdvan

Pa?a, one of the bureaucrats in Istanbul who seemed to have close contact with the Palace. Nazmi Sevgen, based on research in the Ottoman archives, states that Sultan

Abdiilhamid II paid very careful attention to the killing of Ridvan Pa?a, suspecting that this would be a sign for a plot against him. Perhaps for this reason the

Kadri Cemil Pa?a, p. 28. Lütfi, p. 55.

Sevgen, pp. 119-123. Sevgen, publishing the correspondence regarding the matter in the Ottoman archives, fails to support his claim and states 125 Bedirhans, including Emin Ali, received much attention

from the Ottoman throne. Emin Ali, after his exiles to

Isparta and Akka, returned to his work as a government

official. It was probably during this time that he began

to search for an alternative to his Ottoman bureaucratic

identity.

In 1908, Emin Ali became a founding member of what

may have been the first Kurdish organization, the Kurdish

Society for Mutual Aid and Progress. In 1918, he joined

Seyyid Abdulkadir in forming the KTC and became the vice-

president of the society. However, as discussed earlier,

when Abdulkadir identified himself as an autonomist, Emin

Ali formed another organization, the Kurt Te?kilat-i

içtimaiye in 1920 (Society for the Kurdish Social

Organization).In contrast to Abdulkadir's position,

this society adhered to complete independence. It is clear

from primary sources that the members of both families

wished to be rulers of Kurdistan.Hence, it seems that

that this conspiracy is beyond the scope of his work; see pp. 124-134.

The Society was announced in Vakit, June 7, 1920; for the excerpt see Malmisanij, Cizira.... , p. 127. Kadri Cemil states that 'Celadet Bedirhan'da [a son of Emin Ali] had a desire to become the ruler of the Botan emirate, even to become the King of Kurdistan', p. 150. A British document demonstrates a similar desire for Seyyid Abdulkadir, 'He [Abdulkadir] repeated what he often said, namely, that he was himself alone the one man who could command the adhesion of all Kurdistan... . Abdulkadir does not reject the idea of Turkish 126 Emin All's position as secessionist stems arguably from a

pre-existing power struggle with Abdulkadir of the

§emdinan family.

However, it is a mistake to think that Emin Ali

operated outside of the Ottoman system. On the contrary,

he maintained his position in the state. For example,

Emin Ali became a member of an Ottoman political party,

the Hiirriyet ve îtilaf Firkasi (the Freedom and Harmony

Party), which was known for its fierce opposition to the

CUP.^^^

In his diary. Major Noel, a British officer who

worked in Kurdistan, mentions Emin Ali with high

respect :

suzerainty, but he want guaranteed autonomy, and he wants himself to rule the roost'. Doc. 160 [E 1776/11/44] in British Documents on Foreign Affairs.», pp. 281-282. 135 Malmisanij, Cizira Botanli Bedirhaniler, p. 121. There has been much controversy about the nature of Noel's assignment in Kurdistan. Turkish sources claim that Noel was sent to organize a Kurdish uprising; U§ur Mumcu, Kurt Islam AyaklanmasL1919-1925 (Ankara: Tekin, 1992), p. 19; Mumcu refers to Noel as 'Kurdish Lawrance' . The same term was employed by Hohler, a political officer of the British High Commission in Istanbul. Complaining about the 'fanatically' pro-Kurdish views of Noel, Hohler writes to Tilley, an Assistant Secretary in the Foreign Office, ' I am afraid Noel may turn out a Kurdish Col: 'Lawrence' July 21, 1919. [112773/3050/44A] in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919- 1939, vol. IV (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), p. 693. Noel mentions that his objective was to counter pan- Islamism and anti British sentiments in Kurdistan; Noel, Diary of Major Noel, p. 1.

127 [Emine Ali is] a fine old man of good presence. He bears a high reputation and possesses qualities of leadership, and is the type of man who would carry influence and go down well with the Kurdish tribesmen.

Noel was convinced that Emin Ali Bedirhan, although born

and living outside of Kurdistan, still commanded respect

from the Kurdish tribesmen. Clearly, Emin Ali had a close

contact with the British government.

Until the end of his life, Emin Ali was very actively

involved in Kurdish affairs. When he died in Egypt in

1925, his children, particularly, Süreyya, Celadet and

Kamran, became very prominent spokespersons for Kurdish nationalism. Süreyya spent most of his time in Syria and

Cairo after World War I, published newspapers and became heavily involved in Kurdish nationalist activities; however, primary sources do not mention his name as a member of the KTC.

5.2.b. Celadet Ali and Kamran Ali Bedirhan

The other two sons of Emin Ali became involved in KTC activities with their father. They were both educated

137 Noel, ibid. Their names are mentioned in a list that Golda? provides, p. 44.

128 in Europe. Celadet was born in Kayseri, and lived most of his life in France, Germany and Syria. He held a master's degree in Law from Istanbul University and completed his studies in Munich.His wife, Ruçen (Rewçen), was a

Bedirhani h e r s e l f . Ruçen took part in Kurdish nationalist activities mainly during the Turkish

Republican period in Syria. Celadet and Ru?en had two children. Gem?it and Sinemhan.

Prior to his activities as a Kurdish nationalist,

Celadet fought in the First World War in the Ottoman army.

However, after the war, he turned against the Turkish state. In a letter to Earl Curzon, Sir H. Rumbold documents this shift of loyalty. The letter indicates that Celadet and his father Emin Ali had contacted the

Greek representatives.

...I have the honour to state that on the 25^^ instant Emin Ali Bey, the head of the Bedrhan family, called on Mr. Ryan, accompanied by his son Jeladet Bey, who is one of the more active promoters of Kurdish national movement. Emin Ali Bey said that, in view of the present situation, he ax^ his friends had come into touch with the Greek representative here, who had listened favourably to the suggestion of a Kurdish movement

B. Nikitin, 'Badrkhani, Thurayya and Djaladat' EI2. , p. 871.

She was a daughter of Salih Avni, who was not one of the sons of Bedirhan Pa?a; so he must be a nephew of him.

For more information see, Malmisanij, Cizira Botanli Bedirhani 1er..., pp. 190-206.

129 against the Kemalists, which, without any formal co-operation, would promote the interests of both Greece and Kurdish nationalists....*'*^

As this British document indicates, in 1921, Celadet was seen as a Kurdish nationalist. Interestingly, it also reveals that the Bedirhanis contacted Greece, an adversary of the Ottoman state, for a mutual action.

In 1927, Celadet became the first elected president of the Hoybun, a Kurdish nationalist organization that was formed in Syria. The Hoybun actively supported the

Kurdish revolts in T u r k e y .*•'*'* Celadet spoke, at least,

Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish, German and French and published a journal, the Hawar, in Kurdish and French, in addition to Rohani and Roja Nu. He also produced Latin characters for the Kurmanci dialect of Kurdish. Celadet died in a traffic accident in 1951 in Syria.

Kamran Ali, another son of Emin Ali, was perhaps the most recognized member of the Bedirhani family in Europe.

Doc. 194 [E 6215/43/93], May 25, 1921, in British Documents on Foreign Affairs-, vol. 2, p. 300.

W.G. Elphinston, 'The Emir Jeladet Aali Bedr Khan: The Passing of a Kurdish Prince,' Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol. 39 (1952), pp. 91-94. Most notably the A§ri Da$i Revolt of 1930; see Kadri Cemil, pp. 104-122.

130 He was an active member of the KTC until he left for Paris in the 1940s. Kamran Ali received his degree in law from

Istanbul University; he lived in Germany and later France.

After the revolt of the Iraqi Kurds in the 1960s, Kamran became the spokesperson for the Iraqi Kurdish movement in

Europe. He presented the Kurdish movement to the United

Nations. Kamran became a faculty member in the Institute of Oriental Languages (INELCO) in Paris. After Kamran's death in 1978, the Kurdish Institute of Paris recorded his name as the honorary founder. From Paris, Kamran was also involved in the Kurdish movements in Turkey and sponsored several Kurdish students in France.He was married to a princess from Poland and had no children.

5.2. c . Other Members of the KTC in the Bedirhani Family147

The Bedirhani family provided the KTC with several other members. Bedirhani Murat Remzi (d. 1941), who later took Çinar as his last name, was a member of the KTC. He was the youngest son of Bedirhan Pa?a; his mother was a

Yezidi Kurd in Bedirhan's harem. In the Ottoman period,

Murat Remzi worked as a police officer and later a

145 Mumcu, p. 190.

Musa Anter, Hatiralarm, vol 1. (Istanbul: Doz, 1990), pp. 114-115.

Information is gathered from an interview with Rüksan Güneysu, Kiziltoprak-Istcinbul, November 17, 1996. 131 j u d g e . Rüksan Güneysu, a granddaughter of Murat Remzi, indicated that 'he was a very strict and aristocratic gentlemen; he did not speak Kurdish with us at home. My grandmother was a Circassian. ' Like most of the other

Bedirhanis, Murat Remzi preferred exogamy. When he died, he left three children, Rahime, Aziz and Ahmet.

Asaf Bedirhan was a grandson of Bedirhan Paça. He was a French teacher at the Galatasaray Lycee, a well-known high school in Istanbul. Bedirhan Ali, another grandson of Bedirhan Pa?a, was an officer in the Ottoman army. He was sent to exile with his other family members in 1906.

Available lists on the KTC members also include Mikdad

Midhat, a son of Bedirhan, who was one of the publishers of the first Kurdish newspaper, Kurdistan. Mehmet Ali

Bedirhan, a son of Bedirhan, was another military officer in the Ottoman army. Contrary to the general tendency towards independence in the Bedirhani family, Malmisanij points out that Mehmet Ali had reservations about fulfilling this goal.

Clearly, a great number of Bedirhanis participated in the KTC. Most of Bedirhan's sons and grandsons operated

Malmisanij, ibid., p. 185.

Personal interview with Rüksan Güneysu. Malmisanij, ibid., p. 179.

132 in the Ottoman system. Some of them went as high as to

carry Che title pa?a, one of the highest ranks in the

Ottoman state. As indicated earlier, some of them were

exiled in 1905 from Istanbul to other parts of the Empire

but still served the state as administrators. None of the

second- or third-generation Bedirhanis was b o m in

Kurdistan, nor was any of them allowed to go to

Kurdistan by the Ottoman state. This is significant to

note, for the most ardent Kurdish nationalists belonged to

this family. It is also significant because it indicates

that nationalist feelings among exile or diaspora

communities tend to be very strong. The Bedirhanis,

representing the traditional landed notable class, assumed

leadership in the secessionist branch of Kurdish

nationalism. It should be added here that most of the

Bedirhanis received non-religious professional educations

and studied abroad.

On the other hand, particularly from the third

generation on, most Bedirhanis were integrated into the

Turkish Republic and served the new state on different

Emin. Ali was the oldest son of Bedirhan who participated in the KTC. He was b o m in 1851, six years after his father's exile to Crete. He must have been b o m either in Crete or Istanbul. Given the fact that the Bedirhans were not allowed to go to Kurdistan, I can claim that none of the Bedirhans who were KTC members was b o m in Kurdistan.

133 levels. Those who continued their nationalist

activities in the Turkish Republican period, mainly the

Emin Ali line, left Turkey, for they were condemned to

death. This indicates that the Turkish Republic was not

as tolerant as the Ottoman state to the Kurdish demands.

5.3. The Cemil Paçazade Family

This family has produced two of the most active members of the KTC who later became fervent Kurdish nationalists. According to the Sicill-i Ahval collections

in the Ottoman Archives, Ahmed Cemil Paça was born in 1837 or 1838 (Hicri 1253) in Diyarbakir. His father, Hafiz

Mustafa Efendi, was of the Haci Abdullah Efendi family.

No information is available about the ancestors of Cemil

Pa?a, and hence I am unable to present any data about the authority of the fcimily in the region prior to Cemil Pa?a.

Coming from an ambiguous background, Cemil Pa?a establish^ himself in Diyarbakir as an Ottoman bureaucrat and a member of the local ayan. The Ottoman sources show

For example. Professor Emre GOnensay, a great-grandson of Bedirhan, became an advisor to Suleyman Demirel, the President of Turkey, in 1994. Vasif Çinar, another great-grandson of Bedirhan, served the Turkish state as a Minister of Education in 1924 and 1929.

B.A., Sic. Ahv., 4/106 134 that he learned Arabic and Persian not in school but from private tutors, which might suggest that his family enjoyed a higher status.Throughout his civil service, he served in different levels of the Ottoman bureaucracy in eastern Anatolia and Istanbul (Der Saadet) . On attaining the rank of Pa?a, Ahmed Cemil became the governor of Diyarbakir, where he was given a large has

(the highest amount of fief or timar). Most interestingly, in 1860 he was appointed to the provincial senate as a member (meclis-i kebir-i eyalet azaligi),^'® and was commissioned to stop the 'oppression' provoked by the Bedirhan family. This is a significant finding since, as indicated earlier, two of Cemil Pa$a's grandsons in the following era collaborated with the Bedirhan family in the K T C . This can be an indication that the Bedirhan revolt of 1846 may not be seen as a movement creating nationalistic consciousness among most Kurdish notables.

154 Ibid., '..Jiuallim-i mahsusadan Arabi ve Farsi okumu?tur. Ibid. _

Sicill-i Ahval does not mention what eyalet it was. Since Diyarbakir was not an eyalet in 1860, the only possibility remains that it was the eyalet of Kurdistan. Diyarbakir became an eyalet again in 1867; see Devlet Salnamesi, 1284/93. ...yetmis yedi senesinde bila maa? meclis-i kebir-i eyalet azaligina nakil ile o halde agair eslahasinca zuhur iden fesadin tahkiki ve Bedirhan Pa?a müteallikatinin ikag eyledikleri mezallim ve teadiyatin men'i memuriyeti [ne] (...) tahvil olun[mu?tur], Sic. Ahv., 4/106

135 Ostensibly, some Kurdish leaders, such as Cemil Pa?a, opposed the revolt.

From the memoir of Cemil Paça's grandson, Ekrem Cemil

Pa?a, it is clear that the family was in control of a large estate. Ekrem Cemil's memoir contains a vivid description of the luxurious life of a local notable.

The Cemil Pa?a family owned at least twenty villages with their revenues; the revenues that provided support for the family's aristocratic life.

...Twenty villages were the private property (mü lk) of Cemil Pa?a. In these villages were raised cows, sheep, and horses, as well as cotton, rice, wheat, and barley. The daily luxurious expenses of the Cemil Paça household, (...) and of his children studying in Istanbul and Europe (...) were funded from the income generated from these villages.*’®^

Raised in such a prosperous household, Ekrem Cemil and Kadri Cemil, two grandsons of Cemil Paça, later became active supporters of Kurdish nationalism and members of the KTC. Here, one can see that the Cemil Paçazade family was of landed-notable background. They enjoyed the high status of belonging to the Ottoman high bureaucracy. This

Ekrem Cemil, Muhtasar Hayatim (Ankara; Bebun, 1992) , particularly pp. 11-16. Ibid. , p . 14 .

136 would tend to substantiate the claim that Kurdish

nationalist leaders came from upper class and were part of

the Ottoman elite.

5.3 .a. Ekrem Cemil Paça

Ekrem Cemil Paça (1891-1973), like all male members

of his family, received an education in Istanbul and

Europe. After graduating from a local military school in

Diyarbakir, Ekrem Cemil was sent to Istanbul, where he

graduated from the Istanbul Sultanisi (Galatasaray

Lycee) . Successful in science, he was sent by his

father Kasim Bey to Switzerland to study mathematics.^®^

With the beginning of the First World War, Ekrem Cemil,

along with other students from the Ottoman Empire, was called back to Istanbul and fought in the war.

His compliance with the call of the Istanbul government to return to the Empire indicates that Ekrem

Cemil and his family members who were studying abroad still saw the Ottoman state as legitimate and fought to preserve it in World War I. It is important to determine

This was possibly the Sultani Mektebi, which was Galatasaray Lycee, one of the French schools in Istanbul.

137 when the family took the position against the Ottoman

status quo, since it demonstrates the pragmatic and modern

nature of Kurdish nationalism. Ekrem Cemil Pa?a held a

secessionist opinion after the Ottoman Empire lost the

war. Until that time, Kurdish intellectuals, who belonged

mostly to the land-owning class, formed organizations for

intellectual and cultural purposes. Ekrem Cemil, for

example, was one of the founding members of the Hevi

('hope' in Kurdish)organization, which organized cultural

activities and was allowed to function by the Ottoman

state.After the defeat of the Ottoman state, diverse

ethnic and religious groups needed a structure to identify

themselves with. Ekrem Cemil's effort to form a Kurdish

nation was a search to find an alternative political

structure in which the Kurds benefited the most.

Ekrem Cemil also belonged to the Ottoman bureaucracy and carried the title paja. He spoke French, Turkish,

Arabic, and possibly Persian. His mother was of

Circassian origin, and he married a wife of the same origin. This clearly indicates that external marriage was

Ibid., p. 11. On page 22, however, he claims that he went to an engineering school for a year in Lousanne and to G and (Ghent ?) in Belgium.

See B.A. Dahiliye Nezareti, idari Kisim (ID. DH), 57/126/43, 16 Muharrem 1331 (1912). The document confirms the legal formation of the Hevi.

138 practiced in the family and that this practice did not

violate the belief in the blood-based Kurdish identity.

No sufficient information is available as to whether his

mother and his wife spoke Kurdish, but the children were

fluent in Kurdish (possibly in Kurmanci dialect).

Ekrem Cemil died in Damascus in 1973; until his death

he was actively involved in numerous Kurdish nationalist

organizations and movements. After Cemil, however, there

does not exist enough evidence to suggest that his only

son and four daughters were actively involved in Kurdish political organizations.’’®^

5.3.b. Kadri Cemil Paça (Zinar Silopi) 164

Kadri Cemil, another active nationalist of this era, belonged to the Cemil Paça family. His father, Fuad Bey, was in charge of administering his father's land along with Ekrem Cemil's father Kasim Bey. Like his cousin

Ekrem Cemil, he studied in Istanbul and Europe. After graduating from the Numune-i Terakki Mektebi (the school

One of his daughters, Hayriye, died in Damascus in 1953, before him.

Unless otherwise indicated, the infromation is gathered for this section from the memoirs of Ekrem Cemil, Muhtasar Hayatim, and Kadri Cemil Pa§a (Zinar Silopi), Doza Kurdistan, ed. Mehmet Bayrak (Istanbul: Ozge, 1991). 139 for model advancement) in 1911, Kadri Cemil enrolled in

the Halkali Yükselc Ziraat Mektebi (Agricultural College of

Halkali). Two years later, he was sent to Lausanne

Switzerland, where he established, with his cousin Ekrem

Cemil, the European branch of the Hevi organization.

Kadri Cemil Pa?a married his cousin Cavide Hamm, a sister of Ekrem Cemil. His marriage preference contradicts that of his cousin Ekrem Cemil, who married an

'outsider'. Since not enough information is available, I am unable to comment further on Kadri Cemil's family life except to indicate that he was one of the few notables who preferred internal marriage (endogamy).

With the outbreak of World War I, Kadri Cemil returned to the Ottoman Empire and was appointed to one of the famous Hamidiye Regiments in the squadron of the

Hasenan and Cibran tribes. Modeled after Russian Cossack forces, the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments were established by Sultan Abdiilhamid II to fight primarily against Armenian nationalism and Russian expansionism.

Advised occasionally by Turkish officers, the Hamidiye

Regiments were formed and led by the Sunni Kurds and tribal leaders. Another significant reason for these regular military establishments was to ensure the loyalty of the Kurdish nobility to the Ottoman state. The Hasenan

140 and Cibran tribes were two of the strongest among the

tribes and were pro-Ottoman.

It is interesting to note that Kadri Cemil was

commissioned and served in these units. This clearly

indicates that Kadri Cemil was not anti-Ottoman during

World War I. Like many of the other Kurdish notables,

Kadri Cemil lost his faith in the Ottoman state after

World War I--more precisely, after the declaration of

Wilsonian principles, which gave hope to those notables

who lost their privileges as local rulers.

Kadri Cemil Pa?a belonged to a family of landed

notables. He was well-educated and spoke at least one

European language, French. His familiarity with

nationalist ideas came from his education both in Istanbul where he was among Turkish, Kurdish and Arab

intellectuals, and in Europe, where he had the opportunity

to be exposed to the Western idea of nationalism. It is

conceivable that Kadri Cemil had the opportunity to be a part of the debates concerning the idea of nationalism in pre-war Europe. There exists abundant evidence from the memoirs of Ekrem Cemil and Kadri Cemil Pa?a that the idea was carried to the countryside and propagated by agents

141 such as the members of the European educated Kurdish elite.

This family provides a good example for the portrait of Kurdish nationalists before and during World War I. As in the case of the other families discussed above, the findings here show that members of the KTC from this family enjoyed a privileged background and definitely belonged to the Kurdish notable class. The family controlled a large estate and thus, family members were very conscious of the opportunities that control of land can provide.

5.4. Çeyh $efik Efendl (Arvasi) 166

As one of the members of the KTC, $efik Efendi was born in the village of Arvas of Ba?kale, Van. The fcunily claims descent from King Faisal, the Hashemite ruler of

Iraq, installed by the British after World War I. The

See Ekrem Cemil, particularly the section titled 'Diyarbakir'da ki Hayatim, ' pp. 27-60.

Unies otherwise indicated, the information in this section comes from my interview with Handan Arvas on November 16, 1996, Suadiye, Istanbul.

My informant did not make it clear whether the King Faisal was the son of §erif Hiiseyin (Sharif Husayn) of the Hashemite clan or of the Saudi clan. In any case the collective memory of the family traces its origin to the Arabs.

142 Arvasi family has branches in Mecca and Medina. Zinar

Silopi in Doza Kurdistan refers to him as a medrese teacher; however, at the same time, §efik was an influential Nakçibendi $eyh in the region.^®® Handan

Arvas, a granddaughter of Çefik's brother, indicates that

§efik Efendi was a close friend of Said Nursi, but the

Arvasi family as an important branch of the Nakçibendi order had a very close relationship with the Çemdinan family of Hakkari, the most influential representatives of the Nak?ibendi order in the region.

As for the marriage pattern of the family, I was not able to collect information about $eyh Çefik's wife; however, one can see that with the migration to Istanbul the second generation intermarried with the Turks. One of

?eyh Çefik's sons, Rifat^^°, married Belkis, a woman of

Turkish origin. After the second generation intermarriages are very common.

Çefik Efendi owned a great deal of land in the region. This is important, for it provides an example of

Silopi, p. 57. See the appendix in Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State.

170 A medical doctor who died in a traffic accident.

One of the granddaughters of Çeyh Çefik, Didar, married a son of Yusuf Bozkurt Ozal, a brother of the late Turkish president Turgut Ozal. 143 Che landowning religious leadership. After the Çeyh Said

Rebellion of 1925, Çeyh Çefik was exiled to Istanbul,

where he died in the 1960s. Upon his arrival in Istanbul,

Çeyh Çefik established a Nakçibendi tekke in the district

of Eyiip, and prior to his death he was appointed as the

head imam of the Sultan Ahmet mosque, a prestigious

position in an important religious center.

Obviously, Çeyh Çefik Efendi was not seen as a major

threat to the newly formed Republican state, nor was I

able to find any evidence to suggest that he was involved

in Kurdish nationalist organizations in the Republican

period. In fact, one of his nephews, Abdulhakim Arvasi,

father of Handan Arvasi—my interviewee- - served as a member

in the Republican parliament.

Not much has been written about Çeyh Çefik Arvasi.

Neither primary nor secondary sources contain sufficient

information about him and his activities in the KTC. It

is known, however, that he wrote several articles in the newspaper Kurdistan in the early 1920s. Therefore, I am unable to speculate further on the intellectual contributions of Çeyh Çefik to the KTC.

As an indication of the strength of the Nak?ibendi network, I must add that the close relationship between the Çemdinan and Arvasi families remained after their 144 settlement in Istanbul. Handan Arvasi states that the two

families kept close contact and their children grew up

together. The two families also have kinship relations

through intermarriages in the following period.

It seems evident that this fcimily was integrated into

the Republican state, although $eyh Çefik Arvasi was a

founding member of the KTC, a society which aimed at

creating a Kurdish national consciousness. He, like many

of the other participants, belonged to the land-owning

class deriving his authority from the Nakçibendi sufi

order. He was, in fact, a local notable when he was a

member of the KTC.

5.5. Çerif Paça

Zinar Silopi, in Doza Kurdistan, indicates that Çerif

Pa?a was a son of Kurd Said Pa?a of the influential Handan

family. This family originates from the city of

Süleymcini^ in present-day Iraq, the city that was built by the Baban dynasty. Çerif was mistakenly identified as

• • Handan Arvas, ibid.

Silopi, p. 58.

145 a member of the Baban family.However, I found no evidence to substantiate this claim. The Sicill-i Ahval does not refers to him as a member of the Baban dynasty.*'

The Sicill-i Ahval collection tells us that Mehmet

Çerif Paça was born in 1865 in Istanbul. His father.

Said Pa?a, was a former Foreign Minister in the Ottoman government. He graduated from the "Mekteb-i Sultani"*'® and Saint Cyr Military Academy of France. $erif Paça was the military attaché to Berlin and Paris.

Not much information can be found about the family life of Serif Paça. However, it was recorded that his wife was from a local notable family of Egypt.It is, however, a mistake to see Çerif Paça as a local notable for no evidence can be obtained that he kept contact with

Bruinessen, p. 275.

Members of the Baban dynasty were clearly recorded as such. 176 BA., Sic. Ahv., 1/602,

Serif Paça, Sir Muhalifin Anilari ( Istanbul : Nehir yay., 1990), p. 9_; however, in BA., Sicill-i Ahval, Said Paça was recorded as the ambassador to Berlin; "Berlin Sefir-i kebiri..., ibid. The Galatasaray Lycee in Istanbul. The curriculum was in French.

179 Said Paça, p. 9.

Mevlanzade Rifat in his memoirs refers to Serif Paça's wife as 'princess'. Mevlanzade Rifat'in Anilari (Istanbul : Arma, 1992), p. 70.

146 Süleymaniye, the city in which his ancestors enjoyed their

notable status.

During his civil service, §erif Pa?a received several

medals, including one from the Pope and one from the

government of Romania. Evidently, he was the most

internationally known Kurd of his time in the Ottoman

state for he was an Ottoman diplomat in Europe. This is

significant, for it demonstrates that he belonged to the

Ottoman high bureaucracy and he had close contact with

Europe. Obviously he was influenced by the intellectual

developments in Europe and possibly transmitted his

knowledge of European nationalism back to the Ottoman

Empire through, at least, personal correspondence.

§erif's record in the Ottoman archives indicates that

he was bilingual in Turkish and French, and makes no

reference to his ability to speak Kurdish.Hence the possibility remains that he did not speak Kurdish. This was no surprise since Çerif Pa?a was born in Istanbul and

lived his life in Europe.

Coming from a family that served in the highest

levels of the Ottoman bureaucracy, Çerif Paça climbed the

Sic. Ahv., 1/602. Ibid., "Türkçe ve Fransizca tekellüm ve kitabet ider."

147 ladders of the Ottoman government. Earlier accounts of his life attest that he was an Ottoman bureaucrat more than he was a Kurd. His membership in the KTC seems to originate from his dissatisfaction with the central authority on mainly personal grounds. When the KTC was established on December 17^^, 1918, the Tevfik Paça government was in power and $erif Paça, a member of the

Ayan Meclisi, was not given any appointment; nor was he given any position in the second Tevfik Paça government which took power on January 13, 1919.^®^

After his brief service, $erif Paça disputed the

Young Turk government, whose main organ was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) on the grounds that its members had become despotic rulers, not allowing freedom for opposing views. Çerif Paça also accused the CUP of misusing government offices for monetary gain.^®"* In his letter of resignation, he states that one of his reasons for resignation is the involvement of the military in politics and claims that this had proven to be rather dangerous-in the past. It is important to note that

Serif Paça's opposition to the CUP was not motivated by

Gôktaç, p. 16.

Serif Paça, p. 27. Ibid., p. 34. His resignation letter was also published in ikdam, 10 March 1909.

148 his Kurdish consciousness.^®® His memoir is a testament to

his 'Ottomanist' identity. Throughout his text, he refers

to the Ottoman Empire as 'homeland' and the people of the

empire as 'my people'.

In his memoirs, I did not find any line indicating

his nationalist aspirations. Instead, like the other

Ottoman intellectuals of his time, he seems to busy himself with finding solutions for the decline of the

Ottoman state. It was after the end of the First World

War that Çerif Paça left hints in the primary documents regarding his Kurdish identity.

At the 1919 Paris peace talks, Çerif Paça represented the Kurdish delegation and put his Kurdish background to the forefront. For a person who had never paid attention to his Kurdish identity throughout his life, and who was exiled--in fact condemned to death twice--by the CUP, it seems quite naive to think that he was motivated by his

Kurdish consciousness. True, he always sympathized with the de-centralization of power, or 'Adem-i

Merkeziyetcilik', formulated by Prince Sabahattin. I

In this respect, there are striking similarities between Çerif Paça's Kurdish nationalism and Çerif Hiiseyin's Arab nationalism. They both developed as a result of an opposition to the CUP'S policies that diminished their position in the Ottoman state. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism (Urbana, Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press, 1973).

149 believe the developments in Kurdish consciousness after

the World War I and the foundation of the KTC provided

§erif Paça with an opportunity to challenge the CUP.'®^

Çerif Paça, like many of his fellow KTC members, was

a member of the Ottoman bureaucracy; hence his existence

depended upon the state. With the state on its death-bed,

however, Çerif Paça needed a new identity to survive.

Therefore, it should be no surprise that Çerif Paça's

activities for a Kurdish state coincide with the

bankruptcy of 'Ottomanism'. More than his notable

background, his respected position in international

diplomacy provided him with a membership in the KTC.

5.6. Said Nursi (1876-1960)

Said Nursi was born in the village of Nurs in Bitlis,

He was born into a clerical family. His father was an

impoverished village mo11a owning a small holding of land

with seven children. Çerif Mardin claims:

[That] there was some drive for status in the family appears from the title 'mirza', which was used by his father and which could be an

For further discussion and primary documents on Çerif Paça's activities in the Paris Peace Talks after 1918, see ittihat Teraki ve Kürtler (Ankara: Bebun, 1992), Mehmet Bayrak, Kürtler ve Ulusal-Demokratic MUcadeleleri (Ankara: Ozge, 1993).

150 attribute of noble descent. His grandmother is stated to have been a relative of Ali?an Pa?a, a regional notable, and Said traced her ancestry to the family of the Prophet.

Said Nursi, however, refers to his father as a

porter. In îçtimai Reçeteler, addressing Kurdish porters

in Istanbul, he states that 'I have been working for the

spread of education in Kurdistan for one and a half years...

I who am the son of a porter.It is possible that

Nursi used the term 'porter' metaphorically to present

himself as a man of humble background.In his

application for a civil servant position in the Ottoman

Empire, Nursi stated that he was not from a notable family

(Sülale-i Ma'rufe). Nursi received religious education

from Nakçibendi tekkes in the Van and Hakkari region and

was fluent in Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic and Persian.

Although he studied theology in mainly Nakçibendi

tekkes, he did not identify himself as a member of the

Mardin, jp. 65. In this account Mardin relies on Çahiner, who points out his father's and great grandfather's name 'mirza' (prince, son of a lord) as an indicator of nobility.

"Bir buçuk senedir burda Kurdistan'in ne?r-i maarif için çali§iyorum, ben ki bir hamaiin ogluyuitu., " Nursi, p. 52.

Nursi's account of his father definitely portrays him as a poor villager, (see Çahiner, p. 45); but this does not refute the claim that he was of a noble origin and from time to time he utilized his noble origin traced back to Muhammed.

151 NaJc?ibendi Carikat; yet he was very close to Nakçibendis,

such as the Çemdinan and Arvasi families. Nursi derived

his main authority from a religious background. In his

early education, he studied under respected Nakçibendi

çeyhs of Nurçin village of Bitlis as well as in the medreses of Mukus and Arvas of Van. It is important to

note that in the KTC Said Nursi worked together and was

friends with other Kurdish intellectuals and religious

scholars of these regions.

Said Nursi, also known as Bediüzzaman Said-i Nursi,

is another significant character in the political and spiritual lives of the Kurds as well as the Turks. As the

founder of the 'Nurcu Movement' Said Nursi commanded great respect from the Islamic population of the late Ottoman and early Republican eras. He is considered one of the most influential Islamic thinkers of his time by his followers. Like the doctrines of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, his teachings centered around the idea that Islam and modernization were compatible, and in fact the only way to compete with the West.^®^ His philosophy

191 Document published in Çahiner, p. 162. Çahiner, pp. 24, 28. Said Nursi calls Abduh and Afghani 'seleflerim' or my predecessors; îçtimai Reçeteler (Istanbul: Tenvir, 1990), p. 48 .

152 has been widely publicized in Turkey and has found a large audience.

Said Nursi became heavily involved in the political life of his time. In the Ottoman period, he joined the

Committee of Union and Progress and took part in the

'Te?kilat-i Mahsusa', or The Special Organization, which was formed by Enver Paça in 1914 and played an active role

'in the suppression of separatist movements, especially in the Arab provinces...It seems contradictory that Said

Nursi was a member of the KTC—a Kurdish 'nationalist' organization—at the same time that he worked against separatism in the Ottoman Empire. This contradiction can constitute a prime example of the diverse perceptions of

Kurdish nationalism among the members of the KTC. Said

Nursi was a Kurdish nationalist since he believed that

Kurds constituted a separate ethnic group and fought for

One of the best account of Nursi in English is §erif Mardin, Religion sind Social Chance in Modem Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989). In Turkish books were written in a great quantity; see particularly Necmeddin Çahiner, Bilinmeyen Taraflariyla Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Istanbul: Yeni Asya, 1974); the Risale-i Nur collection consists of 130 books including memoirs and teachings written by Nursi himself over his lifetime, and it provides the most authoritative account of his life. Erik Zürcher, Turkey : A Modem History (London and New York: I.E. Tauris, 1993), p. 114. Also see 'Said-i Nursi' in Yeni Türk Ansiklopedisi, p. 3346; Cemal Kutay, Ça^imizda Bir Asr-i Saadet Müslümani: Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Istanbul: Ozal, 1980), pp. 82-84.

153 Cheir rights, yet he was an Ottomanist believing in the

unity of the Ottoman state.

Not much has been written about Said Nursi's political activities in the Kurdish organizations.

Although his Turkish followers try to downplay his Kurdish

identity, particularly in his early career, Nursi paid careful attention to his Kurdishness. He went out to

Istanbul, for example, to ask the Sultan's help in opening schools and promoting the Kurdish language as the medium of education in Kurdistan.

Prior to his membership to the KTC, Said Nursi's articles were published in Kurt Teaviin ve Terakki

Gazetesi, published by the Kurt Teavün ve Teraki Cemiyeti

(Society for Kurdish Mutual Aid and Progress) founded in

1908. According to T a n k Zafer Tunaya, Said Nursi was a member of Kurt Negri Maarif Cemiyeti (Society for the

Spread of Kurdish Education) founded in 1919.^®^ Malmisanij points out that Tunaya did not include Nursi's name as a founding member of the KTC."^® However, evidence is convincing from the memoir of Silopi and an article

Çahiner, p. 58-60. Çahiner replaced the word Kurdistan with Dogu Anadolu (Eastern Anatolia) .

137 Tunaya, Turkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, p. 215 Tunaya relies on an interview with another member of the KTC, Çükrü Baban. 154 published in the Vakit newspaper (15 May 1925) that Said

Nursi, perhaps briefly, was active in the KTC.

Said Nursi never married and none of his brothers was

involved in the KTC or any other political organizations.

Nursi's involvement in the KTC did not last long and there

are conflicting accounts on the state of his Kurdish

national consciousness. Although he was imprisoned many

times in the Ottoman period, the fact that he was not

charged in the istiklal Mahkemeleri (Independence

Tribunals) of 1925 indicates that the new Turkish

government did not see him as a potential threat to the

new regime and/or that he commanded respect among a

considerable number of Turkish politicians.

It seems that Said Nursi came from the humblest

background compared to the other members of the KTC.

Primary documents indicate that he was involved in

nationalist activities, particularly around 1918-1919.

However, although earlier he sympathized with autonomy,

later he put great emphasis on the unity of Muslims. One

can suggests that since he was not from the landed- notable class and was a believer in the unity of the

For futher information, see Malmisanij, Said-i Nursi ve Kurt Sorunu (Istanbul: Doz, 1991), pp. 29-30.

200 See Malmisanij, Said-i Nursi ve Kurt Sorunu.

155 Islamic community, his nationalist aspirations were not as strong.

5.7. Hizanizade Bltlisli Kemal Fevzi (1891/1892-1925)

Kemal Fevzi was born in Bitlis in 1891 or 1892.^°^

His father Re?it Efendi was a respected prosecutor in

Bitlis; however, there is not enough information available about his mother, Hüsniye Hanira. Kemal Fevzi had a sister, Çefika Hamm, and two brothers, Kadri, a teacher and Ziya, a doctor. Kemal Fevzi graduated from Erzincan

Military School, becoming an Ottoman officer.

A newspaper article of 1918 help us to speculate that

Kemal Fevzi's family belonged to a notable family in

Bitlis. In an article published in Jin, the Hizanizade

family was regarded as responsible for opening a private school in Bitlis to teach Turkish.I believe that only a family of high status could open a private school in

There are several accounts of Fevzi's year of birth. Naci Kutlay, based on an interview with Fevzi's nephew, estimates it at around 1883 or 1884, p. 289; yet according to court records of his trial in 1925, Fevzi was b o m in 1307 miladi (1891- 1892); Malmisanij, Bitlisli Kemal Fevzi (Istanbul: Firat, 1993), p. 11. Kurdiye Bitlisi, 'Kürdistanda ki Çehirler Senekesi Turk müdür?' Jin (13 December 1918), p. 3 in Bozaraslan, p. 338.

156 Bitlis at that time. Therefore, it is safe to say that

Kemal Fevzi was definitely not a commoner.

Kemal Fevzi, after graduating from the military

school, served in the Ottoman army until he was shot and crippled in the Balkan Wars. Upon retirement, Kemal Fevzi became a journalist and a poet. Interestingly enough, until the end of World War I, his poetry exhibits

Turkish/Ottoman nationalist traits. For example, in one of his poem titled 'Under the Flag', Kemal Fevzi writes:

I am a son of a Turk, and a persistent slave of this flag.

I carry the revenge of Oguz Han in my heart like a thunderbolt

and the religion of Muhammed in my soul like a sun.

I am the honorable slave of my fatherland. 203

It is not surprising to see a person educated in a military school write such passionate verses of Turkish nationalism; what is surprising is that in a year the very same person used his verses in the service of Kurdish nationalism. The ideological shift in Kemal Fevzi's writings coincides with the end of World War I.

In Malmisanij, p. 20. The same book has a list of all of Kemal Fevzi's publications as well.

157 In 1918 Kemal Fevzi joined the KTC and began writing

for Jin, the semi-official newspaper of the organization.

In an article on the autonomy of Kurdistan, Kemal Fevzi wrote that according to the 62"^ article of the Paris

Treaty of 1920, autonomy should be granted in regions where the Kurds are a majority^®**; 'If this is the case,

since the majority of the population living in Bitlis, Van

and Erzurum are Kurdish, in those three provinces Kurdish

sovereignty should be granted.

Evidently, Kemal Fevzi in the post World War I era acquired a Kurdish identity and became an ardent Kurdish nationalist. His prose and poetry in Jin are clear

indications of his growing Kurdish consciousness. It is not coincidental, however, that a shift occurred in Kemal

Fevzi's group identity from Ottomanism to Kurdism after

World War I. This war had an enormous impact on every aspect of people's lives, including group solidarity.

Catastrophic enough to destroy the political status quo of the world, the Great War not only allowed but pushed peoples tô“re-configure their group loyalties. This is

For the full text, see Devlet-i Aliye lie Sulh Sara'iti (Istanbul, Matbaa-i Amire), p. 20.

Kemal Fevzi, "Kurdish Autonomy, ' in Jin, number 36 (June 21, 1920), p. 1, quoted in Malmisanij, Kemal Fevzi.... Since the original Jin ended after the 25^^ issue, the 36*^“ issue must have been published by the secessionist group of the KTC. This indicates that Kemal Fevzi was in the secessionist camp.

158 not to say that in the pre World War I era peoples, the

Kurds in my study, did not identify themselves as Kurds.

However, territorial claims for independent states for the

newly configured identities reached their peaks in this

era.

It was in this era that a split occurred between

those who were loyal to the status quo and those who saw

the power vacuum as a grand opportunity for secession.

After the split in the KTC between the secessionists and

autonomists, Kemal Fevzi sided with the seccessionists. He

later joined the Kurt istiklal (Azadi) Cemiyeti (Kurdish

Freedom Society), and challenged the territorial integrity

of the new Turkish Republic after 1923 .

After the ?eyh Said Revolt of 1925, which was

allegedly supported by the Kurdish Freedom Society,

Kemal Fevzi was arrested and condemned to death by the

Independence Tribunals in 1925.^°^

See Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism: 1880-1925 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991)p. 26-52. There have been controversial accounts of Kemal Fevzi's active participation in the ?eyh Said Revolt. Malmisanij devotes a chapter to the revolt and Kemal Fevzi based on the several newspaper articles published in Vakit (April-June, 1925), pp. 51-87. The best source for the court records are indeed the newspaper articles, particularly Vakit. These articles were also published in Murat Bayrak, Kürtler ve Ulusal Demokratik MUcadeleleri.

159 Kemal Fevzi never married. Although his brothers

admired him greatly, there is no record to indicate that

any of his family members was an active participant in

Kurdish nationalism. Hence, one can argue that the

Hizanizade family was represented in the KTC only by Kemal

Fevzi, rare in the general fabric of the society.

Although Kemal Fevzi was born in a Kurdish (Kurmanci)

speaking city, Bitlis, he used Turkish rather than

Kurmanci in his articles and poetry published in Jin, a multi-lingual journal. Not educated in Europe, Fevzi possibly first came in contact with the western ideology of nationalism in the Balkan Wars in which he was wounded.

His political and intellectual contributions to Kurdish nationalism developed to such a level that the Kemalists saw him as a clear danger to the territorial integrity of the new-born Turkish state and executed him.

5.8. Conclusion:

Undoubtedly, Kurdish consciousness had existed prior to the Great War. However, this study argues that the war was the major propellant of Kurdish nationalism, manifested as special political demands. These demands

160 focused on the recognition of Kurdish identity in the form

of either separation or autonomy.

To understand the nature of Kurdish nationalism in

this era, I studied the Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti, or the

KTC, a political organization that took precedence over

otherKurdish nationalist movements in the post-World War I

era. In the present chapter, I examined the family

background of certain members to discover potential patterns and to draw parallels between the perception of

nationalism by the Kurds and the composition of the

Kurdish nationalist leadership.

Those leaders I examined came overwhelmingly from the

landed notable class. In a majority of cases, they owned

large estates. Hence, the Kurdish leaders possessed a sense of territoriality, a sentiment that is vital for the

idea of nationalism to grow. Territoriality, I argue, is one of the main ingredients of the materialized form of nationalism. Nationalist consciousness requires territory to define a group identity. In other words, group identity had an organic link with territory, as the Kurds defined themselves as those who originated from Kurdistan, the homeland of the Kurds. Therefore, it is significant to note that Kurdish leaders had ties with the land, and my findings demonstrate clearly the interaction between

161 territory and nationalism. Ironically, most of the

Kurdish nationalist leaders lived outside of Kurdistan,

indicating that nationalist feeling was very strong in diaspora communities.

Tribalism is another aspect of Kurdish nationalism.

The supreme Kurdish leadership in the post-World War I era consisted mainly of the Kurds of tribal or Nakçibendi origin. Great families, such as the Bedirhan and Cemil

Pa?azade, provided Kurdish nationalism with influential members. In addition, families of Nak?ibendi origin emerged as an alternative to the tribal leaders, as the

Nakçibendi connection proved to be very instrumental in

Kurdish nationalism of the following era. Kurdish leaders coming from tribal and/or Nakçibendi backgrounds became the founders and most active members of political organizations. However, the remnants of existing tribal conflicts reflected themselves in the political attitudes of Kurdish leaders. For example, it seems very likely that pre-existing tension between the Bedirhan and the

$emdinan families was a major contributing factor to the decision of Seyyid Abdulkadir of the Çemdinan family to declare himself an autonomist. On the other hand, the

Bedirhani family took the opposing position and favored secession from the Ottoman Empire, contrary to

162 Abdulkadir's position. The two camps were joined by the members of the KTC who had kinship or Nakçibendi links to

their families. For example, the Nak$ibendi Çemdinan

family allied with another Nakçibendi, Çeyh Çefik of the

Arvasi family. Said Nursi had close spiritual ties with

the Çemdinan and the Arvasi families.

The KTC leadership, despite conflicts among them, operated within the context of the Ottoman state. A great majority of them were on the payroll of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Their well-being, financial or otherwise, depended heavily on the state. Therefore, it was only after the Ottoman collapse seemed inevitable that secessionist movements among the Kurds became more attractive to a larger group. Unlike Arab nationalism,

Kurdish nationalism was not favored, to the extent of independence, by the European powers (particularly Britain and France) as the Christian population were at odds with the Kurds in the region. Hence, I believe that, although

Arab nationalists were led by the Arab notables of the

Ottoman Eiflpire and, like the Kurds, belonged to the

Ottoman bureaucracy, they received generous external aid.

On the other hand, the Kurds, exposed to the idea of nationalism, were left no option but to be assimilated into the succeeding political formations in the region.

163 Wilsonian principles also strengthened the irredentist

claims of the Kurdish leadership as the Ottoman

bureaucracy ceased to exist.

This study also indicates that Kurdish nationalism

remained exclusively a Sunni movement. Although Yezidi

and Alevi Kurds co-existed with the Christian population

in the region, the overwhelming majority belonged to the

Safi (Shafi'i) rite of Sunni Islam. Except for a very few

influential Alevi members, all KTC leadership belonged to

the Sunni branch of Islam. The Christian population in

the region, despite cultural and linguistic similarities,

were not regarded as Kurds. None of the Yezidi Kurds

participated in or was allowed to be part of the KTC

activities. Thus, Kurdish nationalism failed to cut

across religious or even sectarian boundaries.

The marriage patterns of the Kurds indicate that

exogamy was very common; Circassians, Turks and Arabs were

the primary choices for marriage. In the case of polygamy, one of the wives came typically from outside of

Kurdish society. My research indicates that Persian or

Christian (Nestorian) women were not preferred by the

Kurds. The practice of exogamy suggests that blood-based

Kurdish identity was not a decisive factor, or that in a patriarchal society women's blood ties were ignored in

164 children's upbringing. In either case, the essentialist

approach to defining Kurdish society, as my research

argues, loses ground. Offspring from these intermarriages

may or may not have defined themselves as Kurds. One can

also conclude that, although tribal in political

organization, the Kurdish society at the turn of the

century was still an open society. No evidence is

available to suggest that the autonomists and

secessionists were intermarried; if it is not a

coincidence, this might indicate that polarization between

the families was strong.

Finally, most Kurdish leaders came from the same

group of families and hence were connected to one another

by primordial ties (see appendix). This research clearly

demonstrates that most members of the KTC were related to

each other by family ties or by the membership in the

Nakçibendi network. Hence, one can argue that pre­

existing loyalties and rivalries played an important role

in shaping Kurdish nationalism. Kurdish nationalism at

this stage”was embraced by the nobility and failed to reach a larger audience. Unlike Western European nationalism, nationalism in the Kurdish context combined with tribalism and manifested itself as a legitimate way of protesting the status quo.

165 Chapter 6

Concluding Remarks

The present study has explained the basic social and geographical factors in Kurdish nationalism. It has dealt exclusively with the social background of the Kurdish nationalist leadership in the late Ottoman era and with the evolution of Kurdish identity in relation to

Kurdistan. Several significant points argued in this study can be delineated as follows. First, in this study

I have argued that Kurdish nationalism was influenced heavily by kinship relations and the sufi connections of the nationalist leaders. Although it seems that Kurdish leaders were united by a clear objective and motivated by the idea of nationalism, I have shown that these leaders were connected to one another through preexisting kinship ties or through sufi, particularly Nakçibendi, networks, or both. This is a significant claim, for it argues that nationalism, contrary to a popular view, does not

166 terminate preexisting ties or loyalties but, in fact,

draws on them.

This study shows that the Kurdish nationalist

leadership during World War I era was dominated by several

notable families and by the Nakçibendi elite. As clearly

demonstrated in their family genealogies (see appendix),

most of the Kurdish nationalists were either brothers or

first cousins who came from very respected notable

families. In other words, the Kurdish nationalist

leadership consisted partly of the members of the

traditional Kurdish nobility who, due to the centralizing

policies of the Ottoman Empire in the 19^^ century, lost

their direct control in the region.

The other group that assumed Kurdish leadership was

the elite of the Nakçibendi order in Kurdistan. The

Nakçibendi order after the 18^^ century became very dominant in the region. After the destruction of the power structures of the local emirates, the Ottoman Empire

failed to fill the power vacuum in Kurdistan. Following the catastrophic wars between the Ottoman and Russian

Empires in the 19^^ century, the Nakçibendi çeyhs emerged as new leaders, replacing the authority of the former traditional tribal leaders. Through their trans-tribal influences, these Nak?ibendi çeyhs became charismatic

167 political leaders. ?eyh Ubeydullah of Çemdinan, whose son

Seyyid Abdulkadir became the president of the KTC,

provides a good example of this kind of leadership.

Although the Çemdinan family was one of the most

distinguished Nakçibendi families, many others existed and

operated in Kurdistan. The leaders or çeyhs of these

orders provided the Kurds not only with religious but more

importantly with political leadership; and they were

connected to one another through the Nakçibendi network.

When they assumed leadership in the nationalist

organizations, the Nakçibendi elite, playing on their

religious charisma, were strong enough to form political

alliances against the traditional leaders. Such was the

structure of Kurdish nationalist leadership in the area

under examination.

These preexisting ties and loyalties also brought

together preexisting feuds and factionalism in Kurdish

nationalist rhetoric. This factionalism played a

significant role in the perception and manifestation of

Kurdish nationalism. An examination of the inner-familial

structure of the Kurds shows that members of the same

families remained in the same ideological alliances, and

that inter-familial rivalries caused polarization in the manifestation of Kurdish nationalism. For example, in the

168 1920s, an ideological split occurred among the members of the KTC. Some members, headed by Emin Ali Bedirhan, advocated complete independence; whereas the other group, led by Seyyid Abdulkadir of Semdinan, who was an influential Nakçibendi §eyh, favored autonomy. Not surprisingly, the Abdulkadir faction consisted mainly of the members of the Nakgibendi order, such as ?eyh Çefik; the Emin Ali faction, on the other hand, included mostly the members of his own feunily (his brothers and children) , the members of the Cemil Pa?azade family, who, most probably, were threatened by the trans-tribal influence of the sufi ?eyhs and some intellectuals of the lesser nobility. Primary sources indicate that there existed a rivalry between Seyyid Abdulkadir and Emin Ali for Kurdish leadership. I have speculated in the text that this enmity originated from the era when Seyyid Ubeydullah, father of Abdulkadir, controlled a vast region that also included the former Bedirhani lands (parts of the Botan emirate) and hence, the Bedirhanis were not strongly attached to Abdulkadir's leadership of the KTC.

Therefore, I argue that pre-existing family feuds contributed greatly to the perception and the direction of Kurdish nationalism.

169 This example also demonstrates that a power struggle existed between the traditional notables, who were mainly the children of tribal leaders, and the religious leadership, embodied in the Nak?ibendi order.

Understandably, these two groups were the products of different education systems; while the latter received a traditional religious education, the former were educated in the non-religious professional schools, and most of them studied abroad. It should not be a surprise to the reader that the Nak$ibendi faction was against complete autonomy, for they believed in the unity of the Islamic umma and saw the sultan as the legitimate caliph. In contrast, the secessionists, when the collapse of the

Empire became eminent, did not have any remaining loyalty to the Ottoman administration, which was then controlled by the Young Turk government.

There are several unifying points among the members of the KTC. First of all, a great majority of the Kurdish leaders were high-ranking Ottoman officials. Seyyid

Abdulkadifor example, was the president of the Ottoman

Senate; Çerif Paça served as an Ottoman diplomat in

Europe; and a great majority of the Bedirhanis carried the title pa?a and served as public prosecutors, local administrators (outside Kurdistan), military officers and

170 judges. In other words, they were on the payroll of the

Ottoman Empire. Integrating the nobility into the Ottoman

bureaucracy and connecting their interests to that of the

state constitute a very common Ottoman strategy for

controlling the people of the peripheries.

The second similarity in the background of the Kurds

is that most of the nationalist leaders were children of

the landowning nobility in the Ottoman Empire. They were

bitter since most landowners lost their control of land to

the state due to the centralization policies adopted by

the Ottoman Empire in the 19^^ century, and had mandatory

residence outside Kurdistan. Hence, the Kurdish leaders

were very conscious of the importance of territory. It is

not a coincidence that the Kurdish nationalist leadership

consisted predominantly of the traditional landed and

religious elite.

At this point I can present another significant point

argued in this study, namely, that Kurdish nationalism is

territorially based. Territory played a very significant

role in Kurdish identity formation, which in turn paved

the way for Kurdish nationalism. Examining primary sources regarding the Kurds has enabled me to state that

In an article, I have studied the Kurdish elite and its relations with the center in the earlier period. See Hakan

171 Kurdish identity is tied very closely to a territory that

was called 'Kurdistan,' in relation to which the Kurds

defined themselves. The findings of this research point

out that Kurdish identity revolves around a 'core area'

that has been referred to as Kurdistan. In other words,

there exists a common region of reference in the primary

sources. I argue that this region constitutes the core of

Kurdish identity, without which any definition of a Kurd becomes very difficult to provide. The primary sources

seem to be more concerned with defining Kurdistan than with defining the Kurds, who appear to be the dwellers in

Kurdistan. Strictly in this respect, religion and

language play a secondary role to territory. That is to say, perceived historical ties to this core area precede other commonalities such as a shared religion and language, which were used principally to exclude the

Christians and Turcomans and the other dwellers in

Kurdistan.

By stressing the role of territory in forming a social identity, I do not claim, by any means, that

Kurdish identity is fixed. On the contrary, pointing out the shifting boundaries of Kurdistan since the 16'^ century, I claim that Kurdish identity is always in flux,

Ozoglu. 'State Tribe Relations....'

172 corresponding Co the changing borders of Kurdistan and the

changing political climate. Such a change in the

perceived borders results from political developments

external to Kurdish society. For example, in his book.

gerefname, gerefhan includes Luristan in Kurdistan and

sees the Lurs as a Kurdish subgroup. On the contrary, a

majority of the 20'^^-century maps drawn by the Kurds

themselves detach the Luristan region from Kurdistan. I

believe this change occurred as a result of the political

restructuring of the Middle East. Until the end of World

War I, political boundaries in the region were constantly

changing. Particularly after the 18^^ century, European

sources, which were widely used by the Kurdish

intellectuals in the 20^^ century, defined Luristan as a

separate administrative unit in Iran. For example, there

exist many articles in Jin, a newspaper published by the

KTC, that relied on The Encyclopedia Britannica (see

chapter 3.3). It seems plausible that Kurdish rhetoric was influenced by these accounts, and as Luristan is

regarded as a separate region, the Lurs acquired a distinct identity. In other words, since the perceived boundaries of Kurdistan excluded Luristan, the Lur

identity became separated from that of the Kurds.

173 This study also contributes to the discussions of the

time-table of Kurdish nationalism. It is argued here that

Kurdish nationalism, like most of the other nationalisms

in the world, is a product of a time of turmoil and

uncertainty. This research provides ample examples to

demonstrate this point. I argue that Kurdish nationalism

became articulate when the collapse of the Ottoman Empire

became eminent at the end of World War I. An ideological

shift can be best followed in the constitutions of Kurdish

political organizations formed before and after the Great

War. A comparison between the constitution of the Kurt

Terrakki ve Teavun Cemiyeti (KTTC) of 1908 and that of the

Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti (KTC) of 1918 shows that the KTTC

saw the Kurds as loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire and

wished to operate within the Ottoman system. The KTTC

constitution further stated its desire to protect the

Ottoman Constitutional system (Me?rutiyet). On the

contrary, the KTC constitution focused more on the

distinction of Kurdishness. Articles published in Jin, a publication of the KTC, demonstrate plainly a high level of nationalist consciousness, and, as stated earlier, in

the 1920s, the Kurdish leadership defined itself along the

lines of either secession or autonomy.

174 The writings of Hizanizade Kemal Fevzi illustrate the

same point more convincingly. In his poetry prior to

1918, Kemal Fevzi states, ' I am a son of a Turk, and a

persistent slave of this flag....' In an article in Jin in

1920, the same Kemal Fevzi demands sovereignty for the

Kurdish provinces. These examples uniformly point out

that Kurdish nationalism as a political movement emerged

after the Great War which had a fundamental impact on

every aspect of people's lives. This war not only allowed

but also pushed the peoples of the world to re-consider

their political loyalties. Therefore, I believe that

Kurdish nationalism, in the modern sense of the word,

emerged after World War I.

Finally, the reader should be warned that this study

has a limited scope; it primarily examines the social

backgrounds of Kurdish leaders, their inter- and intra-

familial structures, and the evolution of Kurdish

identity. I must admit that there remain many issues to

be addressed, such as the examination of the sources of

Kurdish nationalist thought, the role of European

education and of the international contacts of the Kurds,

the intellectual evolution and ideological aspects of

Kurdish nationalism and a further examination of the

Nakçibendi order in Kurdistan. However, I hope that this

175 study provides a solid piece of scholarship on the basis of which comparisons about the nationalist leadership in the Middle East can be made in future studies. I believe that comparisons to Arab and Turkish nationalisms will bring forward striking similarities as well as differences.

I also believe that Kurdish nationalism can be better understood when studied in a larger context. In this study I attempted to place it in the context of Ottoman history; however, through the methodologies of comparative history, it can be placed into even larger contexts such as Middle Eastern and world history.

For example, the role of notables in nationalist movements has been a subject of scholarly attention.

Concerned mainly with Arab nationalism, Albert Hourani provided the field with a paradigm that presented local notables as intermediaries between the people and the state. According to Hourani, the local notables possessed considerable political power, so much so that they could challenge the authority of the state by allying themselves with the Western powers. It was the connection of the

West and, more significantly, the centralizing tendencies of the Ottoman reforms that paved the way for Arab nationalism (see chapter 4).

176 Hourani's paradigm of local notables and their

political power was applied as a framework by Philip

Khoury in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire (mainly

Syria). Khoury found out that urban notables were indeed

responsible for the development of Arab nationalism and

that Arab nationalism was a response to the Young Turks'

Turkif ication and centralization policies.

The present study bears striking similarities to

Hourani's paradigm and Khoury's application of that

paradigm. For example, the Young Turk policies seem to be

a major factor in the development of both Kurdish and Arab

nationalism. By the same token, the nationalist

leadership consisted mainly of notable families, and the

end of the Great War provided a suitable political

atmosphere for nationalism to articulate itself in both

the Arab and the Kurdish cases. Notwithstanding,, this

study has demonstrated that Hourani's term 'local

notables' is problematic. It implies that these notables were extraneous to the Ottoman state. This study shows

that notables were also part of the Ottoman elite and hence, a part of the Ottoman bureaucracy. In other words,

it is a mistake to see notables as purely 'local'.

Philip S. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism (Cambridge, London , New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) .

177 In conclusion, placed into the context of Middle

Eastern historry, this study supports the conclusion that nationalism in the Middle East was a political movement imposed from above. Careful comparisons in future studies between Kurdish nationalism and other nationalist movements, I believe, will result in more fruitful findings about the nature of nationalism in the context of world history. It is undeniable that the events of the world are interconnected; hence, to understand the dynamics of nationalism, and to discover possible patterns, one should not ignore 'the big picture.'

178 APPENDICES

Geneologies

The following are the genealogies of some Kurdish notable families. Names in bold indicate the members of the KTC; thus the kinship ties among them are clearly- demonstrated. As is shown, most of these genealogies include high-level Ottoman bureaucrats indicating a widespread Ottoman practice of absorbing local notables into the Ottoman system by granting them positions in the government.

179 The Bedirheui Family Emir Çerefhan [—♦•Emir Muhammed —*• Emir §erefhan II ----- ♦ Mansur Han------► Ismail Han —Han

Mustafa Han i Abdullah Han

Saiih Bedirhan Pa§a

Telli Hamid Esad Tahir Muhiis (Chief Judge of the Alleppo Higher Coun) -♦Kamuran Mehmet Emin All - "(Inspector of Court) -♦Silreyya

•Osman Nuri Pa$a ------► Celadet ■ ■ Ahmet Hulusi ■Riza Bahri Pa^a — ' ■ Ahmet Bedri Pa?a •Mustafa Ali Pa§a Mehmet Necip Paça (Horns Mutasamfi) Bedirhan Ali

•Yusuf Kamil (Hayfa Kaymakami)

•Hasan Nuri Halil Rami "(Malatya Mutasamfi) Asaf Bedirhan

■Mikdat Midhat Esved HQseyin Kenan Paça "(Kirsehir Mutasamfi) Mehmet Ali

•Halit Cevdet

•Ali Çamil Paça (Üskudar Military Base Second Commander ) •Sadullah Zübeyr Avam

Abdurrahman — — Murat Ream

180 The Çemdinan Family Muhammed I Fatma

Huseyin.„ I

Abdulkadir Geylani

Seyyid Taha

Seyyid Mahmud Seyyid Alaaddin

Seyyid Ubeydullah

Sevvid Alaaddin Seyyid Reçid Seyyid Mehmed Sadik

Seyyid Abdulkadir (President of the Ottoman Senate

Seyyid Taha Seyyid Mehmed/ X II Seyyid Abdullah

Seyyid Musa Seyyid Htzir

Mehmed Levend

181 The Genealogy of Said Nursi Ali?an Pa?a # # Mirza

KumralI * # #

I # Mirza ■ ■ ■ Nuriye

Mehmed Alime Hamm DUriye

Abdullah Said i Nursi Mercan Abdülmecid

182 The Cemilpaçazade Family Cemil Paça

FCadri $emseddin Cevdet Mustafa Ibrahim Kemal Ekrem Kasim Omer Fuad

Ekrem Cemil Pa^a Kadri Cemil Pa^a (Zinar Sllopi)

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