DOCSLIB.ORG

Digital Authoritarianism in China and Russia: Common Goals and Diverging Standpoints in the Era of Great-Power Rivalry

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Digital Authoritarianism in China and Russia: Common Goals and Diverging Standpoints in the Era of Great-Power Rivalry FIIA OCTOBER 2020 BRIEFING PAPER I 294 DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA AND RUSSIA COMMON GOALS AND DIVERGING STANDPOINTS IN THE ERA OF GREAT-POWER RIVALRY Elina Sinkkonen Jussi Lassila -◄ FINNISH - INSTITUTE 11 OF INTERNATIONAL - AFFAIRS FIIA BRIEFING PAPER OCTOBER 2020 I 294 DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA AND RUSSIA COMMON GOALS AND DIVERGING STANDPOINTS IN THE ERA OF GREAT-POWER RIVALRY • China and Russia are jointly advancing their shared interests in the international arena and are building up cooperation in the tech sector. • Despite far-reaching plans, the asymmetry of cooperation in favour of China is increasingly at odds with Russia’s national goals in digital technology. • Diferences in resources and standpoints are also refected in the implementation of digital surveillance. China’s surveillance system is sophisticated and extensive whereas Russia’s is largely inconsistent and emerging, as evidenced by the fact that there was virtually no control of the internet in Russia until 2012. • While advanced surveillance in authoritarian countries is worrying, technology in strategic sectors is also a key feld of increasingly disconcerting great-power competition. As a result of strategic competition, the world is faced with the risk of technological decoupling, which would contribute to further fragmentation of the international community and deepening of existing rivalries. ELINA SINKKONEN JUSSI LASSILA Senior Research Fellow Senior Research Fellow Global Security Research Te EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood Programme, FIIA and Russia, FIIA ISBN 978-951-769-661-6 ISSN 1795-8059 Language editing: Lynn Nikkanen Cover photo: Pixabay Arkadiankatu 23 b The Finnish Institute of International Affairs is an independent research institute that produces POB 425 / 00101 Helsinki high-level research to support political decision-making as well as scientific and public debate C Telephone +358 10)9 432 7000 FINNISH both nationally and internationally. INSTITUTE Fax +358 [0)9 432 7799 All manuscripts are reviewed by at least two other experts in the field to ensure the high - OF INTERNATIONAL quality of the publications. In addition, publications undergo professional language checking -II. AFFAIRS www.fiia.fi and editing. The responsibility for the views expressed ultimately rests with the authors. DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA AND RUSSIA COMMON GOALS AND DIVERGING STANDPOINTS IN THE ERA OF GREAT-POWER RIVALRY INTRODUCTION Meanwhile, the Russian National Technology In- itiative from 2014 also builds on ideas of competing China and Russia have become increasingly authoritar- blocs, and more recent plans aim to elevate Russia’s ian in recent years, and the ways in which they can use competence to that of a leading technological power. technology to control their own citizens and to pro- Echoes of great-power rivalry can also be heard in the liferate new surveillance methods to less developed context of internet regulations: Russia and China pro- authoritarian countries have caused concern. In July mote internet sovereignty and oppose the free fow of 2020, the law on mandatory preinstalled applications information. Many experts have speculated that the for smartphones, computers and smart TVs sold in Rus- internet will be divided into two spheres, an authori- sia came into force. Te new regulations were claimed tarian China-led one and a Western version. to give Russian consumers domestic options, but critics Tis Briefng Paper overviews digital surveillance are worried about information security and potential and tech investment strategies in China and Russia in non-consensual information-gathering. China, for its the era of increasing great-power rivalry. Instead of part, passed a new regulation in December 2019 requir- inciting a threat narrative of an authoritarian alliance, ing all new smartphone buyers to scan their face before discussion on technology cooperation between China being able to use the phone. Te regulation was framed and Russia should acknowledge diferences between as a part of larger eforts to ensure cyber safety by mak- the countries and take into account other ancillary ing it harder to access the internet incognito. Tese are threats of which technological decoupling is a real and only some of the recent examples of how authoritarian signifcant part. countries can use technology to monitor their citizens and boost domestic tech companies. Global competition in technology is a tournament DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE IN CHINA AND RUSSIA in which Chinese tech companies in particular take part. Great-power rivalry can be seen in US decisions Advances in technology point to more potent surveil- to ban telecom companies Huawei and ZTE from its lance. Today’s surveillance technologies range from markets, and in pressuring European countries to re- cameras, drones and satellites to surveillance sys- strict Huawei’s market access as well. China has re- tems monitoring communications data. Te essence acted to this by increasing its budget for the Made in of modern surveillance used for communications data China 2025 programme and China Standards 2035 is that programs are difcult to detect and easy to use initiative, and in trying to reduce reliance on US tech remotely. suppliers. China is also considering measures against Authoritarian regimes that rely on digital surveil- Nokia and Ericsson, two European leaders in telecom lance and repression are identified as being among networks, in case the European Union member states the most durable. During the last twenty years, the ban Huawei from taking part in building 5G networks challenge of popular protests has become more con- in Europe. On October 20, 2020 Sweden announced sequential for numerous authoritarian regimes around that it will not allow Huawei or ZTE gear to be used the world. Tis has increased the need to monitor and by frms taking part in its 5G spectrum auction. Te suppress opposition via digital means to secure regime Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed its disapprov- survival. Furthermore, the adoption of digital repres- al of Sweden’s decision and urged Sweden to “cor- sion has not diminished the use of physical measures, rect its mistake ---to avoid negative impact on the as these new tools are used to identify and control op- Swedish businesses operating in China”.1 At the time position members more efectively.2 of writing there is no information on any concrete China is, perhaps, a prime example in many respects. countermeasures. Te Chinese Communist Party has always taken social 1 PRC Foreign Ministry, ‘Regular Press Conference on October 21, 2020’, https:// 2 Kendall-Taylor, A., Frantz, E. and Wright, J. (2020), ‘Te digital dictators: how www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1825675.shtml. technology strengthens autocracy’, Foreign Afairs 99(2): 103–115. FIIA BRI EFING PAPER OCTOBER 2020 I 3 unrest issues seriously. Consequently, China has applied However, regardless of well-established founda- censorship of some sort ever since the internet became tions for the state's mass surveillance, SORM has faced commercially available in the country in the mid-1990s. fnancial and technological difculties. In the absence Internet surveillance is now one among many forms of of a single, state-controlled telecom operator, most surveillance and control in a society that is permeat- independent operators have managed to “shirk” the ed by digitalization and, increasingly, artifcial intelli- requirements while appearing to be following them gence (AI). Digitalized visual surveillance is one such formally almost to the letter. As one specialist pointed form. China has invested heavily in CCTV cameras with out: “It’s like a kind of Italian strike, where documents automated facial recognition programs. In Xinjiang, get passed back and forth for years but no one actually monitoring includes obligatory DNA sampling used for does anything.”4 A common technological challenge ethnic profling.3 Xi Jinping’s regime has also built the stems from the fact that networks built in the past are capacity to forecast large-scale popular protests and has simply incompatible with the hardware that the au- adapted its political indoctrination to the era of big data thorities would like to use. by using AI in surveillance and censorship. A partial indication of these difculties is that there In addition, China aims to resolve diferent soci- are no signs of the Kremlin's extensive capacity to etal and economic problems with an emerging “social control the information space, regardless of numer- credit system”, driven by information technology. By ous shutdowns of allegedly harmful websites and acts collecting data from diferent sources, the social credit of pressuring their authors. Indeed, the importance of system can monitor, assess and change the behaviour the internet has grown at the expense of traditional of both citizens and companies. As state actors could state-controlled media (above all TV), regardless of not manage big data collection endeavours on their ever-tightening internet legislation. Russian citizens own, China’s social credit system includes a wide vari- are fully aware of protests, forest fres and ecological ety of commercial actors. Te system was supposed to disasters around the country through the internet. In be ready in 2020, but as there are data-sharing prob- short, the state’s increasing investments in developing lems between diferent parts of the system and sanc- mass surveillance have not resolved the fundamental tioning mechanisms remain underdeveloped, the 2020 problem of the free fow of information. In this regard, deadline will not be met. However, many parts of the the Kremlin’s main strength in controlling citizens is system are already operational. based on the deterrence provided by punishment and In post-Soviet Russia, the legal (or illegal) founda- physical control over the ofine space rather than on tions of the state's surveillance practices were formed comprehensive digital surveillance.5 in the 1990s when the “System for Operative Inves- Although China has been viewed as an important tigative Activities” (Sistema operativno-razysknikh partner by the Kremlin since the early 2000s, a major meropriyatiy, SORM) was introduced.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Russia's Silence Factory
    Russia’s Silence Factory: The Kremlin’s Crackdown on Free Speech and Democracy in the Run-up to the 2021 Parliamentary Elections August 2021 Contact information: International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) Rue Belliard 205, 1040 Brussels, Belgium [email protected] Contents I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 II. INTRODUCTION 6 A. AUTHORS 6 B. OBJECTIVES 6 C. SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND METHODOLOGY 6 III. THE KREMLIN’S CRACKDOWN ON FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 7 A. THE LEGAL TOOLKIT USED BY THE KREMLIN 7 B. 2021 TIMELINE OF THE CRACKDOWN ON FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 9 C. KEY TARGETS IN THE CRACKDOWN ON FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 12 i) Alexei Navalny 12 ii) Organisations and Individuals associated with Alexei Navalny 13 iii) Human Rights Lawyers 20 iv) Independent Media 22 v) Opposition politicians and pro-democracy activists 24 IV. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TRIGGERED BY THE CRACKDOWN 27 A. FREEDOMS OF ASSOCIATION, OPINION AND EXPRESSION 27 B. FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS 29 C. ARBITRARY DETENTION 30 D. POLITICAL PERSECUTION AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY 31 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 37 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY “An overdose of freedom is lethal to a state.” Vladislav Surkov, former adviser to President Putin and architect of Russia’s “managed democracy”.1 Russia is due to hold Parliamentary elections in September 2021. The ruling United Russia party is polling at 28% and is projected to lose its constitutional majority (the number of seats required to amend the Constitution).2 In a bid to silence its critics and retain control of the legislature, the Kremlin has unleashed an unprecedented crackdown on the pro-democracy movement, independent media, and anti-corruption activists.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's 'Dictatorship-Of-The-Law' Approach to Internet Policy Julien Nocetti Institut Français Des Relations Internationales, Paris, France
    INTERNET POLICY REVIEW Journal on internet regulation Volume 4 | Issue 4 Russia's 'dictatorship-of-the-law' approach to internet policy Julien Nocetti Institut français des relations internationales, Paris, France Published on 10 Nov 2015 | DOI: 10.14763/2015.4.380 Abstract: As international politics' developments heavily weigh on Russia's domestic politics, the internet is placed on top of the list of "threats" that the government must tackle, through an avalanche of legislations aiming at gradually isolating the Russian internet from the global infrastructure. The growth of the Russian internet market during the last couple of years is likely to remain secondary to the "sovereignisation" of Russia's internet. This article aims at understanding these contradictory trends, in an international context in which internet governance is at a crossroads, and major internet firms come under greater regulatory scrutiny from governments. The Russian 'dictatorship-of-the-law' paradigm is all but over: it is deploying online, with potentially harmful consequences for Russia's attempts to attract foreign investments in the internet sector, and for users' rights online. Keywords: Internet governance, Russia, RuNet Article information Received: 10 Jul 2015 Reviewed: 03 Sep 2015 Published: 10 Nov 2015 Licence: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Germany Competing interests: The author has declared that no competing interests exist that have influenced the text. URL: http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/russias-dictatorship-law-approach-internet-policy
    [Show full text]
  • Russia and the World: the View from Moscow
    International Journal of Security Studies Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 1 2020 Russia and the World: The View from Moscow Daniel S. Papp Retired, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/ijoss Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons Recommended Citation Papp, Daniel S. (2020) "Russia and the World: The View from Moscow," International Journal of Security Studies: Vol. 2 : Iss. 1 , Article 1. Available at: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/ijoss/vol2/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Journal of Security Studies by an authorized editor of Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository. Russia and the World: The View from Moscow Cover Page Footnote None This article is available in International Journal of Security Studies: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/ijoss/ vol2/iss1/1 Introduction In 1939, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously observed that Russia was “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” Less remembered but equally significant is what Churchill said next: “Perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest."1 Much has changed in Russia and the world since 1939, but in many ways, Churchill’s observation is as valid today as it was then. What is Russia’s national interest? How do Russia’s leaders, especially Russian President Vladimir Putin, view their country’s national interest? And how can their viewpoints be determined? This is a challenging but not impossible task.
    [Show full text]
  • Extending Russia Competing from Advantageous Ground
    Extending Russia Competing from Advantageous Ground James Dobbins, Raphael S. Cohen, Nathan Chandler, Bryan Frederick, Edward Geist, Paul DeLuca, Forrest E. Morgan, Howard J. Shatz, Brent Williams C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR3063 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0021-5 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: Pete Soriano/Adobe Stock Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of the RAND Corporation research project Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground, sponsored by the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8, Headquarters, Department of the Army.
    [Show full text]
  • 2016 Freedom of Expression Trends in Russia and Kazakhstan
    Freedom of Expression Trends in Russia and Kazakhstan 2016 Jurisprudence in Review Bakhtiyor Avezdjanov 6/1/2017 Bach Avezdjanov – Columbia Global Freedom of Expression Contents Kazakhstan .................................................................................................................................................... 2 Overview ................................................................................................................................................... 2 Incitement to Ethnic Hatred ..................................................................................................................... 3 The Case of Max Kebenuly Bokaev and Talgat Tulepkalievich Ayanov, No. 1-501/2016, November 28, 2016 ................................................................................................................................................ 3 The Case of Ruslan Gansanovich Ginatullin, No. 1141, December 14, 2016 ........................................ 4 Russia ............................................................................................................................................................ 8 Overview ................................................................................................................................................... 8 Select Cases - Anti-Extremism ................................................................................................................. 10 The Case of Ayupov R.N., No 2-1756/2016, February 16, 2016 .........................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Technological Collaboration in a Closing World
    Technological Collaboration in a Closing World About The Guardian Project While smartphones have been heralded as the coming of the next generation of communication and collaboration, they are a step backwards when it comes to personal security, anonymity and privacy. Guardian Project creates easy to use secure apps, open-source software libraries, and customized mobile devices that can be used around the world by any person looking to protect their communications and personal data from unjust intrusion, interception and monitoring. The Guardian Project's core application suite (Orbot, Orweb/Orfox, ChatSecure, FDroid, etc) provide a baseline set of privacy and security capabilities to the common activities of browsing, messaging and getting apps on an Android smartphone. They have shipped multiple releases over the past 4 years, utilizing best practices for free software projects, community driven development, and support for tested technologies and open standards, such as Tor, OTR, XMPP, and Firefox. In addition, they have acted as a catalyst to do the initial development work on ports to Android for technologies like SQLCipher, GnuPG, Tor, Privoxy, and even Debian. About the Author Seamus Tuohy is the principal consultant at Prudent Innovation LLC. Prudent Innovation provides technical and security guidance, development, research, and programmatic support to organizations working in complex or hostile environments. Mr. Tuohy has worked with donors, Human Rights defenders, Civil Society, and International NGOs around the globe to to assess, address, and adaptively manage risks in their work. He is also one of the chief architects of "The Security Auditing Framework and Evaluation Template for Advocacy Groups" (SAFETAG), which adapts traditional risk assessment methodologies to be relevant to low-resourced non-profit organizations based or operating in the developing world.
    [Show full text]
  • The Command and Control Nexus of Putin's Russia
    The Presidential Administration: The Command and Control Nexus of Putin’s Russia By Mark Galeotti Executive Summary • The Russian political system is a diffuse and informal one, but the closest thing to a true command-and-control nexus for President Vladimir Putin, including non-military interference abroad, is the Presidential Executive Office of Russia, also known as the Presidential Administration (AP, Administratsiya Prezidenta). • The office performs crucial roles as the main gatekeeper to Putin, his primary source of information, and the president’s voice in terms of not only public discourse and presentation but also the setting of goals and the establishment of limits within the executive. • This is a secretive institution, so it is hard to be certain of its organizational code and culture. However, while it appears fully committed to Putin’s current geopolitical campaign and convinced that Russia faces an existential political and cultural challenge from the West, it is able (and required) to see the big picture and, as a result, is more risk- averse than the Russian intelligence community and perhaps even the military. One of the key challenges when seeking to understand Russian policy—and thus to predict it—is identifying where power truly lies in this system. There is a formal structure that looks strikingly similar to most Western ones, with a separation of powers among the judicial, executive, and legislative branches; a cabinet of ministers; and a clear constitutional basis for power. Of course, in practice, little of this truly matters. This is a hyper-presidential regime, in which the law offers few constraints to the executive, parliament is largely a rubber-stamp body packed with selected yes-people, and the cabinet is essentially a structure devoted to the execution of policy rather than its formulation.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress
    Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress November 24, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46616 SUMMARY R46616 Russian Military Intelligence: Background and November 24, 2020 Issues for Congress Andrew S. Bowen Following Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and invasion of eastern Ukraine in Analyst in Russian and 2014, many observers have linked Russia to additional malicious acts abroad. U.S. and European European Affairs officials and analysts have accused Russia of, among other things, interfering in U.S. elections in 2016; attempting a coup in Montenegro in 2016; conducting cyberattacks against the World Anti- Doping Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in 2016 and 2018, respectively; attempting to assassinate Russian intelligence defector Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom in 2018; and offering “bounties” to Taliban-linked fighters to attack U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. Implicated in all these activities is Russia’s military intelligence agency, the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GU), also known as the GRU. The United States has indicted GRU officers and designated the GRU for sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, cybercrimes, and election interference. The Department of Justice has indicted GRU officers for cyber-related offenses against the World Anti-Doping Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, NotPetya malware attacks in 2017, various cyberattacks against the 2018 Olympics, and interference in the 2016 U.S. elections. The GRU as an agency has been designated for sanctions under Executive Order 13694, as amended, and Section 224 of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L.
    [Show full text]
  • How the Biden Administration Should Approach Belarus Alexis Mrachek
    ISSUE BRIEF No. 6070 | MARCH 22, 2021 DOUGLAS AND SARAH ALLISON CENTER FOR FOREIGN POLICY How the Biden Administration Should Approach Belarus Alexis Mrachek elarus has been rocked by political turmoil KEY TAKEAWAYS since the fraudulent presidential election last Belarus has been rocked by politi- BAugust. Belarusian citizens today continue to cal turmoil since fraudulent elections protest the election result on the streets, and author- in 2020, and authorities continue to ities continue to hold political prisoners and commit hold political prisoners and commit human rights abuses against the protestors. So far, human rights abuses. approximately 30,000 citizens1 have been arrested for protesting, supporting the opposition, defending The Biden Administration must human rights, or journalistically covering events ensure that U.S. solidarity with the pro-democracy movement and sup- related to the crackdown. port for opposition leader Sviatlana President Joe Biden must now develop a clear strat- Tsikhanouskaya are unwavering. egy toward Belarus. To support Belarusians’ pursuit of democracy, the United States should host Belaru- The Administration should host sian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya at Tsikhanouskaya at the White House, show the White House, pass new and relevant legislation solidarity with the Belarusian people, to formalize U.S. assistance to the pro-democracy and voice support for Belarus’s terri- torial integrity. movement, support Belarusian civil society, call for This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/ib6070 The Heritage Foundation | 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE | Washington, DC 20002 | (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
    [Show full text]
  • Moscow´S Digital Offensive: Building Sovereignty in Cyberspace
    TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY POLICY Moscow's Digital Offensive – Building Sovereignty in Cyberspace Carolina Vendil Pallin and Mattias Hjelm Summary • Russia is pursuing a long-term policy that aims to build its cyber sovereignty. • The law on a “sovereign internet” appeared in 2019, but the concrete plans were evident in 2014 and present among the security services as long-term aspirations even further back. • The goals are strategic – to escape what Russia sees as U.S. dominance in the cyber sphere and to increase control over information flows within the “Russian segment of the internet”. • Russia has built up a capability to perform cyber operations over at least two decades, from relying on “mercenary” hackers and crude distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) to employing its own specialists and utilising advanced malware. • Russia’s current bid for an international treaty on information security goes back to the late 1990s. • Moscow aims to achieve a high degree of coordination for this policy across different government ministries, agencies and s­­­ervices as well as with parliament and the leading Russian internet companies. Building sovereignty in cyberspace 1 What the West perceives as a Russian digital offensive left for Russian authorities was always to hammer out so- stems to a considerable degree from a deep-seated sense mething approaching a territorially defined information of insecurity in Moscow – both of being under attack and space and claim Russian sovereignty. Russia has also deve- of lagging behind technologically. Russia’s intelligence and loped its capability to conduct cyber operations and step security community, moreover, has been keenly aware of by step built a coalition of likeminded countries around how the global internet infrastructure setup affects the its bid on how to frame international information security.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Private Military Contractors in Sub-Saharan Africa Strengths, Limitations and Implications
    Notes de l’Ifri Russie.Nei.Visions 120 Russian Private Military Contractors in Sub-Saharan Africa Strengths, Limitations and Implications Sergey SUKHANKIN September 2020 Russia/NIS Center The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. This text is published with the support of DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy, Ministry of the Armed Forces), under “Russia, Caucasus and Eastern Europe Observatory”. ISBN: 979-10-373-0222-9 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2020 Cover: © Getmilitaryphotos/shutterstock.com How to quote this document: Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian Private Military Contractors in Sub-Saharan Africa: Strengths, Limitations and Implications”, Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 120, Ifri, September 2020 Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15—FRANCE Tel.: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00—Fax: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Russie.Nei.Visions Russie.Nei.Visions is an online collection dedicated to Russia and the other new independent states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). Written by leading experts, these policy-oriented papers deal with strategic, political and economic issues.
    [Show full text]
  • The GRU, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Russia's Wagner Group
    The GRU, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Russia’s Wagner Group: Malign Russian Actors and Possible U.S. Responses Kimberly Marten Professor and Chair, Political Science Department Barnard College, Columbia University Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment United States House of Representatives Hearing on Exposing and Demanding Accountability for Kremlin Crimes Abroad Prepared for presentation on July 7, 2020 Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify, and to share my research and analysis with you concerning the Russian military intelligence agency (the Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU), Yevgeny Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group “private” military company. This testimony first summarizes the recent malign activities of the GRU. It then explains how Russia’s political system works today and the role of President Vladimir Putin’s personal friends and cronies within it. Then, relying on an exhaustive review of high-quality, primarily Russian- language and local investigative journalism,1 it explains who Prigozhin is, what the Wagner Group is, and what is known about the Wagner Group’s recent activities, including how it appears to be connected to the GRU and how its actions have threatened U.S. values and interests. It concludes by explaining why U.S. sanctions so far seem to have had limited impact on Russia’s malign behavior, and suggests additional options that may be available to the United States and our allies in responding to the Wagner Group and Prigozhin. The GRU The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Ministry of Defense was never reformed after the Soviet collapse.
    [Show full text]