Issue 3 (13), 2018 BORDERS

REFORMS ASSOCIATION

CHANGES PRAGUE EAST FORUM

CIVIL SOCIETY WEST DELIVERABLES POLICY STRATEGY RUSSIA DELIVERABLES ASSOCIATION

PESCO CHANGES BORDERS BORDERS

NEIGHBOURHOODPERSPECTIVES FORUM EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

• EASTERN PARTNERSHIP • NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY • EUROPEAN UNION

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (13), 2018 1

BOARD OF ADVISERS

Dr. Dimitar Bechev (Bulgaria, Director of the European Policy Institute) Issue 3 (13), 2018 Dr. Iulian Chifu Analysis and Early Warning Center) (Romania, Director of the Conflict European Neighrborhood Amb., Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky (Ukraine, Director of the Diplomatic Academy under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine)

Editors Dr. Igor Koval (Ukraine, Rector of Odessa National Dr. Hanna Shelest University by I.I. Mechnikov) Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko Amb., Dr. Sergey Minasyan (Armenia, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Armenia to Romania) Publisher: Published by NGO “Promotion of Intercultural (Germany, Director of the Cooperation” (Ukraine), Centre of International Marcel Röthig Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine) of the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Studies (Ukraine), with the financial support Foundation in Ukraine, and the Black Sea Trust. James Nixey (United Kingdom, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, the UA: Ukraine Analytica Royal Institute of International Affairs) analytical journal in English on International is the first Ukrainian Relations, Politics and Economics. The journal Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák (Slovakia, State Secretary, is aimed for experts, diplomats, academics, Ministry of Defence) students interested in the international relations and Ukraine in particular. Amb., Dr. Oleg Shamshur (Ukraine, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Contacts: France) website: http://ukraine-analytica.org/ e-mail: [email protected] Dr. Stephan De Spiegeleire (The Netherlands, Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ Director Defence Transformation at The Hague ukraineanalytica Center for Strategic Studies) Twitter: https://twitter.com/UA_Analytica Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (Ukraine, Vice- The views and opinions expressed in Prime Minister on European and Euroatlantic articles are those of the authors and do not Integration of Ukraine)

Analytica, its editors, Board of Advisors or Dr. Dimitris Triantaphyllou (Greece, Director of necessarily reflect the position of UA: Ukraine donors. the Center for International and European Studies, Kadir Has University (Turkey)) ISSN 2518-7481

500 copies Dr. Asle Toje (Norway, Research Director at the Norwegian Nobel Institute)

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (13), 2018 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE ONLY WAY TO BENEFIT FROM THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT IS TO ENSURE ITS SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION ...... 3 Interview with Amb. Kostiantyn Yelisieiev, Deputy Head of the Administration of the

THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AT THE TURN OF ITS TENTH ANNIVERSARY: WHERE HAVE WE COME SINCE PRAGUE, AND WHERE TO GO NEXT? ...... 7 Pavel Havlicek

TEN-POINT MEMO ON THE REVISED EASTERN PARTNERSHIP MULTILATERAL ARCHITECTURE...... 14 Hennadiy Maksak

EASTERN PARTNERSHIP: WHAT OPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT ARE NEXT FOR UKRAINE?...... 19 Oksana Dobrzhanska

EAP–EU ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: WHAT IS NEXT? ...... 25 Yurii Vdovenko

ADVANCING THE REFORM AGENDA WITHIN THE EU ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MOLDOVA, GEORGIA, AND UKRAINE ON THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ...... 33 Andrei Iovu

THE EU TOWARDS RUSSIA IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD – MISSING THE STRATEGIC VISION...... 41 Loredana Maria Simionov

WHY BELARUS HAS A DISTINCTIVE POSITION IN THE ENP...... 46 Fatih Ekinci

EU-NATO COOPERATION: IS PESCO THE ANSWER TO THE BALANCE OF EU’S REGIONAL PRIORITIES? ...... 55 Alexandru C. Apetroe and Daniel Gheorghe

2 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (13), 2018 THE EU TOWARDS RUSSIA IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD – MISSING THE STRATEGIC VISION

Dr Loredana Maria Simionov Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi

The conflict in and around Ukraine has sparked once more countless debates regarding the EU’s best course of action regarding Russia, as well as regarding Moscow’s actions and behaviour. It is clear that the events that shocked the world in 2014 caught the EU completely unprepared and have undoubtedly left the EU-Russia relations under unprecedented strain. The EU has lacked strategic vision in the Eastern Partnership region and underestimated both the Kremlin’s endgame as well as the reasons behind Russia’s involvement and actions in Crimea.

Introduction membership perspective for the EaP

Over the past decade, the European progress of Europeanisation in the region discourse about its Eastern Neighbourhood cannotpartners, only etc.), be blamed the conflicton Russia, and but slowalso states has been centred on the concepts on the EU’s lack of commitment, long-term of Europeanisation, integration, and reforms, since it remains within the EU’s most important interests to have stable didvision, not yield and any specific positive end-result outcomes. for As thesesuch, and prosperous countries at its borders. thecountries. EU’s approach The ‘go before with the 2014 flow’ determined approach Despite the union’s efforts to assist these that ruling elites of some EaP states were countries in developing their economic balancing their politics between Russia and and political environments, the outcome the European Union, and were implementing of the ENP has been rather disappointing, a ‘bridge’ policy between the West and the especially in the spheres of democracy and East. However, such a strategy failed because the rule of law. Furthermore, the events these countries did not have the resources in and around Ukraine have shaped what to balance for a long time, and big actors could be considered as the most serious have been insisting on them picking a side crisis in the EU-Russia relations and has in the end (particularly relevant for Ukraine, profoundly affected not only Ukraine, where the population was politically but also the welfare and security of the divided between a pro-Western and pro- extended Europe. Russian vision, a notion actively used and exaggerated by the parliamentary and Despite several inconsistencies, which presidential campaigns). Ukraine represents have been widely analysed in literature a tragic failure of the EU’s actorness in the (lack of incentives, limited resources, region, as it did not anticipate nor prepare EU members’ divergent interests, no for a crisis that could go to such a scale.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (13), 2018 41 The Russian Factor in the Shared than usual. At the same time, a content Neighbourhood analysis detected some notions of doubt. The speech is dynamic (most used words are Without a doubt, the most sensitive verbs). Such discourse shows an emotional and problematic area in the Eastern attachment to the Ukraine issue, not only from the president’s side, but also from the resolution process. It is quite clear that citizens who posed the questions revolving Neighbourhood regards the conflict around Ukraine. resolution at its Eastern borders, where therethe EU are was several not able long-simmering to deal with conflict and For a comprehensive analysis, Ukraine’s and the EU’s interests and personal choices where the union’s engagement has been should be taken into account on the same sporadicpotentially at best destabilising so far . This region conflicts, has been and level as Russian ones described above; however, this paper is solely based on a brief Russian-Georgian war showed, could break critical analysis of the EU’s shortcomings outa hot at spotany givenof frozen time. conflicts, which, as the in understanding the deeper issues and structural causes of Russia’s reactions, The EU underestimated and did not consider which could have helped in making Russia the importance of Ukraine for Russia – it has more predictable and in anticipating some failed to see the emotional attachment and of the events that followed. the importance it has for Russians’ identity and collective mind-set. For Russians and for Although, the EU got involved and has Putin, Ukraine is much more than a territory invested in resolving the Ukraine crisis, as or pride; it represents an integral part of their identity, deeply rooted in ‘russkiy it merely reacted to events, without having mir’ concept, stretching all the way back awell clear as strategyother conflicts or political in the determination. area, quite often If to Kievan Rus. As such, the EU has terribly the EU had paid more attention to Russia’s underestimated the extent to which Russia emotional stance on Ukraine, it could have would go to defend its interests in the region built a proper strategy towards Russia and when it felt threatened with losing its grip Ukraine. Unfortunately, so far, the EU has on Ukraine. based its actions on improvisation and reactions to Russia. Therefore, how does the For instance, in the televised annual EU currently cope with these challenges? show Direct Line with Putin, in 2014, the most frequently used word in the entire The EU’s Lack of Vision and transcript is ‘Ukraine’. Although the show Political Imagination in the Eastern was supposed to touch upon more internal Neighbourhood affairs, from a wide spectre of spheres, Ukraine was mentioned overall 322 times The fact that the concept of ‘Common throughout the three hours and 40 minutes Strategies’ introduced by the Treaty of the TV show. However, it should be taken of Amsterdam (1997) has practically into account that this ‘direct line’ happened disappeared from the EU’s external agenda, just after the illegal annexation of Crimea, so it generally makes the EU even less effective the level of attention to Ukraine was higher

in defining clear strategic visions for its

1 A. Huff, The Role of EU Defence Policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood, Institute for Security Studies, EU, Occasional Papers, No. 19, 2011, p. 5, [http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/the-role-of-eu-defence-policy-in-

the-eastern-neighbourhood accessed in February 2013]. 42 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (13), 2018 external political relations2. When it comes term vision regarding relations with Russia. to its biggest and most important neighbour, Russia, the lack of strategic vision has been of long-term vision as “the main factor thatMoreover, prevents the Moscow report identifiedand the from lack since the Common Strategy towards Russia3 overcoming the ambiguity and the crisis of wasidentified launched and in emphasised1999. As such, long over ago, a decade ever ago Haukkala and Medvedev4 brought to light a detailed critique of the EU’s lack of Nearlyconfidence two in theirdecades mutual have relations.” passed since strategic vision in the EU’s Common Strategy. the Common Strategy was launched and Although many events and years that have the EU has still not elaborated a coherent passed since then, the critique still stands document dedicated exclusively to shaping today. Per se, the conclusions of the strategy a long-term vision/strategy on Russia. The analysis outline three general setbacks: • the fact that the European Union is indeed Russia consists of a one-page subchapter titledlatest official“European form Securityof the EU’s Order” ‘strategy’ that onis 7 Russia, which the authors call “a strategy incorporated into the EU’s Global Strategy ofsuffering non-strategy from a on strategic Russia”, deficit vis-à-vis presented in 2016. Although this ‘chapter’ is quite detailed in terms of ‘principles’, it does • the fact that member states are more interested in protecting their own that the EU should take to further engage interests vis-à-vis Russia rather than ornot mendadd up things to any with specific Russia. actions The or chosenmeans in developing an operationally strong formula for dealing with Russia is built upon strategy document, • as well as that rather than having a full- interests overlap’, which suggests a short- sighted‘selective vision engagement’ based on […] improvising ‘if and when rather our than planning. The only long-term mention evolvingfledged andevents coherent in Russia, strategy, the European which of the text is the declarative statement of Unionwould allowhas forinstead a flexible been response forced tointo the strengthening cooperation with civil society reaction, improvisation, and a reliance on through “deeper societal ties through ad hoc arrangements.5 facilitated travel for students, civil society and business”. However, it only mentioned Following Haukkala and Medvedev’s the ‘what’ and not the ‘how’. relevant and up-to-date critique, the report “Assessment of the Cooperation between Similar to policy towards Russia, in terms of the EU and Russia”6, published in 2006, lacking a long-term vision, is the European also emphasised the dire need of a long- Neighbourhood Policy (2004), which was

2 Assessment of the Cooperation between the EU and Russia, Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB),

3 Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia: Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, 04 June 1999. 28 March 2006, [http://aei.pitt.edu/9092/1/Russia-EU.pdf]. 4 H. Haukkala, S. Medvedev, The EU Common Strategy on Russia: Learning the Grammar of the CFSP, Ulkopoliittinen instituutti/The Finnish Institute of International Affairs: Helsinki 2001. 5 H. Haukkala, S. Medvedev, The EU Common Strategy on Russia: Learning the Grammar of the CFSP, Ulkopoliittinen instituutti/The Finnish Institute of International Affairs: Helsinki 2001, pp. 65-67. 6 Assessment of the Cooperation between the EU and Russia, Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB),

7 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – The European Security Order, EU Global Strategy, 2016, 28 March 2006, [http://aei.pitt.edu/9092/1/Russia-EU.pdf].

[https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/ eugs_review_web.pdf].

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (13), 2018 43 platform and cannot simply be transferred and applied elsewhere8. The long-term dimension is missing both from strategy EU economic sanctions had less political «(having a long-term objective – effect against Russia than expected and to transform the region, but missing the ‘how’) and in assessing the agenda. Although there is an ongoing debate consequences of Russia’s actions have failed, so far, to influence the Kremlin’s matter the outcome, in our opinion, they are notregarding a long-term the efficiency solution. of theIn assessingsanctions, the no basically built on the EU’s enlargement real outcome of the EU’s actions, long-term policy. Initially, Russia was invited to take consequences must be taken into account. part in this policy and when it refused, it was As such, in judging the sanctions, the EU harshly criticised by decision-makers and should not only look at short-term goals of analysts alike. Its attitude was associated harming Russia’s economy. There are side with pride and imperialism, rather than effects in the long run that might be opposite technical details of how to deal with such to the West’s overall interests – Russia’s different countries through the same isolationism and the ‘fortress’ concept will instruments. For instance, was it realistic be a dangerous slope that will most likely not to have Moldova and Russia under the same lead to Russia’s transformation. An isolated framework of cooperation? The ENP offered Russia can become a more aggressive Russia the same package and means to countries and a more nationalistic Russia. that had completely different structures and needs. That is why it did not work so Conclusions well. Such policies should be custom-made according to the partner’s needs in order There is no clear strategy on how to deal to be effective. In our opinion, you cannot with or engage Russia and the Shared deal in the same way, with the same means Neighbourhood. Very often the EU’s actions with Russia (the EU’s main gas supplier) are merely a response to Russia’s actions as you do with Moldova (a country 100% in the region. The long-term dimension is dependent on energy supplies, with high- missing both from strategy (having a long- level poverty and emigration). Not only term objective – to transform the region, does the size of the two countries differ, but missing the ‘how’) and in assessing but so do their agendas, capabilities, and the consequences of Russia’s actions (for resources. instance, in the case of sanctions, the EU

In general, there is no common recipe for the Russian economy, which is an immediate success in dealing with external partners, effect,judges withouttheir efficiency considering in terms the ofchallenges harming as none of the EU’s current cooperation that entail an isolated, ‘fortress’ Russia). frameworks (EU-US, ‘New Neighbourhood’, ‘Swiss’ or ‘Norwegian’ model, etc.) can be In our opinion, the EU has taken more than fully applied to the case of Russia. Each of it could handle, both internally (considering these frameworks is built upon a unique economies that were not prepared, such historical, economic, political, and cultural as Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, etc.) and

8 Assessment of the Cooperation between the EU and Russia, Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB),

28 March 2006, [http://aei.pitt.edu/9092/1/Russia-EU.pdf].

44 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (13), 2018 externally (it misled neighbours and of making Russia want to transform on its promised them prosperity and protection own, which, of course, is a very complex and when in reality it could not deliver them). long-term process. One of the ways to do it is There are other means to appease Russia and by targeting the civil society and supporting hold it accountable for its actions that might liberals inside Russia. work better than sanctions – for example, excluding it from several international organisations. Loredana Simionov, PhD, is a researcher at the Centre for European Studies within Alexandru Ioan Cuza The EU will not be able to overcome this University of Iasi. She has a PhD in Economics and deadlock and bring coherence to its approach International Affairs, having as main research interests towards Russia unless it goes beyond the the post-Soviet space, particularly Russian politics and current state of affairs “to develop a clearer society, the EU’s relations with Russia and the Eastern vision of the political order that it seeks to European neighbours. Furthermore, she has been uphold on the contested fringes of its own post-modern space”9. Instead of focusing involved in over 10 national and international research on changing Russia on our terms as a main projects, both as a team member and as a coordinator. objective, we should set intermediate goals

9 I. Krastev, M. Leonard, The New European Disorder, European Council for Foreign Relations, 2014, p. 6,

[http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_new_european_disorder322].

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ISSN 2518-7481 Issue 3 (13), 2018

64 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (13), 2018