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The “Double V” was for victory: Black soldiers, the black protest, and World War II

Thomas, Joyce, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1993

Copyri^t ®199S by Thomas, Joyce. All rights reserved.

U-M 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

THE "DOUBLE V" WAS FOR VICTORY: BLACK SOLDIERS, THE BLACK PROTEST, AND WORLD WAR II

DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By Joyce Thomas, B.A., M.P.A

*****

The Ohio State University 1993

Dissertation Committee: Approved by Warren Van Tine

Stephanie J. Shaw 'Adviser John C. Burnham Department of History Copyright by Joyce Thomas 1993 VITA

1973...... B.A., History, Muhlenberg College, Allentown, Pennsylvania. 1982...... Masters, Public Administration, Rutgers University, Newark. 1992-Present...... Instructor, African- American History, Cleveland State Universtiy, Cleveland, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History Modern U.S. History Modern European History Black Studies

11 TABLE OF CONTENTS

VITA...... ii

INTRODUCTION...... 1

CHAPTER PAGE I. "UNCLE MOSE ISDEAD": THE "NEW NEGRO/' 1940.. 32 II. BUT WE "KNOW TEE NEGRO": BLACK PROTEST AND WHITE COMPLACENCY...... 103

III. "ISOLATED SKIRMISHES," INSIGNIFICANT "INCIDENTS" AND THE "WAR" FOR DEMOCRACY AT HOME...... 139 IV. THE CONTOURS OF A CIVIL RIGHTSMOVEMENT 191

V. THE PROTEST AGAINST "INSULT"...... 228

VI. THE PROTEST AGAINST RACIAL "SEPARATION."... 258

VII. SO, WHAT DID IT ACCOMPLISH?...... 288

CONCLUSION...... 325

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 335

111 INTRODUCTION

On February 6, 1991, while I was at the National Archives, Leslie Lee's historical play, "Black Eagles," premiered at the Ford Theater not very far up the

street. The subject of the play was the Tuskegee Airmen. Theater critic and staff writer Lloyd Rose,

reviewing the play for the Washington Post, was

evidently disappointed. He found it beneath the

standards of Mr. Lee's other works and "certainly not up to the great subject." The men, the critic

contended, "seemed to just sit around and discuss

their anger at segregation." When two white officers "come to integrate on their own," the Tuskegee Airmen

"let them know that 'Things are Not Right'"and then run offstage to dutifully fly their next mission. He thought the author demonstrated very well "what the men were up against," However, he never gives any sense of their taking control of their own destinies, except for the solitary attempt to desegregate the officers' club. Nor do the characters react with any complexity. The characters in the movie "Glory" were stock, but each had his individual response to military service...Lee's characters seem to react pretty much identically: They want to prove themselves, they want to fight, they want to 2 kill."

Rose noted further that there was a great deal of "irony and ambiguity" in the Tuskegee Airmen's

situation which was not reflected in the play. One of

the ironies is that military service, even in a

segregated armed forces, could be beneficial to blacks. He cited historian Bruce Catton's contention that because blacks had fought in the Union Army during the

Civil War, it became more difficult to disenfranchise

them after the war was over." He noted, however, that

in more recent times, young blacks had manifested a

deep ambivalence toward military service, as was

evident in the response to the Persian Gulf War. Despite the benefits of military service, they

perceived it as "a form of social oppression." In Lee's

play, the Airmen have no misgivings. They seem to want

nothing more, in fact, than "the opportunity to kill for their country.""

The critique of the play, while warranted, was unfair to Leslie Lee. The play accurately reflected the

state of the historical record upon which it was based. The historical record delineates very well what black servicemen "were up against," but that is about where it stops. It rarely "gives any sense of their taking control of their own destinies" or any sense of black 3 servicemen as active participants in the World War II

experience. One would have to agree that Mr. Lee, the playwright, was remiss in not informing the audience that the "'solitary' attempt to integrate the Officer's club" at Selfridge Field resulted in the replacement of General Matthew Ridgeway by an African-American officer, Benjamin Davis, Jr. However, even in the historical scholarship, the incident appears isolated.

Moreover, it provides further evidence of "what they were up against," since three of the officers were court-martialed and the club remained segregated. With dogged perseverance, Lee could have discovered a few similar "incidents" in the published literature. For the most part, however, the image which he brought to the stage at the Ford Theater is the image of black servicemen as they appear in the historical record. The story that the critic obviously expected Lee to tell is not. Historians have written little about the experience of black servicemen in World War II except to emphasize that they were the objects of discriminatory racial policies. That part of the story is indeed familiar. In the years between the wars, discriminatory military policies severely restricted military service for blacks. If they attempted to join 4 the Air Corp or the Marines, they would simply be

turned away. The Navy accepted them, but only in

"menial" capacities, such as mess attendants or

servants for officers. They could get into the regular Army, but only if there were spaces available in the four segregated units reserved for blacks. Even after the war began, and the armed forces were forced to accept blacks in proportion to their numbers in the population, they were restricted to segregated service units and denied "their right to fight." They were forced to endure segregation and discrimination, at the hands of military officials and civilian whites, both

North and South. As black journalists at the time pointed out, even as they sacrificed their lives in the defense of freedom and democracy, they were granted neither at home.

When the historical literature does provide a clue to how they reacted to their treatment, they still do not appear to have reacted "with any complexity." In the scholarship, the dominant theme is one of black selflessness and patriotism during periods of crisis and white denial of civil rights. Beginning with

Crispus Attucks, black Americans have always been ready to die in the defense freedom and democracy despite the fact that both were denied them.* In sum, the 5 playwright's account was hardly at variance with the historical account. It is impossible to see how Mr. Lee could have written a better play.

It was apparent from reading Rose's critique that the playwright had defined black servicemen by

inference. In the absence of scholarship to the contrary, he had ascribed to black servicemen

characteristics based on what others said about them

and on what had been done to them. In this respect, he

merely emulated, rather than distorted, the historical literature. The major defect of the existing

literature is the absence of studies which focus on the attitudes or behaviors, or the responses of black

soldiers to the military experience. The result is a

historical picture in which black servicemen appeared,

as W.E. DuBois described it almost a century ago, to

have "assent[ed] to inferiority, were submissive under oppression and apologetic before insult.

This is not the result of any deliberate effort to

distort the black experience but rather the result of

the fact that, as Richard Kohn contends, "political and policy considerations have...dictated the categories of inquiry."® The net result has been a tendency to

study black servicemen almost exclusively as the object of military policies. Kohn contends that this is the fate of all soldiers in the historical literature, but the result has been a distortion of the literature toward the essentially inert and one-dimensional characterization evident in the play about the Tuskegee Airmen.

It is not surprising, in the case of black servicemen, that political and policy considerations have "dictated the categories of inquiry. " The question of military policy toward black servicemen was such an important issue during the war. For black

Americans, an end to segregation and discrimination in the military was second perhaps only to an end to discrimination in employment as a goal to be attained.

It thus dominated the discourse and the records of both military officials and civilian advocates of civil rights. Consequently, even half a century later, the best available studies still focus on military policies toward blacks. The first of these studies that is relevant to this dissertation is Ulysses Lee's The Employment of Nearo Troops. Completed in 1966, it focused on "the development of Army policies in the use of Negroes in the service and on the problems associated with the execution of these policies at home and abroad."’ It was never intended as "a 7 comprehensive and balanced history" of black servicemen in World War II, because such an undertaking, Lee reasoned correctly, could not be accomplished in one volume. While Lee's study was candid in acknowledging the biases of military officials, it focuses heavily on the defects of olack servicemen. His primary interest was in explaining the difficulties involved in the use of black soldiers in combat. He thus emphasized the high proportion of black illiterates, the low AGCT

(Army General Classification Test) scores, and the lack of technical skills among black servicemen, factors that militated against their use in a combat capacity. He also explained that black combat units tended to have lower "morale," were "less disciplined" and "less efficient" than white troops. Even if one accepts the validity of his conclusions for all combat troops, Lee acknowledged that combat units constituted a tiny proportion of black soldiers in the Army.® Other volumes in the official series were to have focused on other types of units and on other aspects of the servicemen's experience. Those volumes were never com­ pleted. It is primarily from Lee's analysis, which was never intended to be "comprehensive" or "balanced," that later historians characterized black servicemen.

While Lee focused on the development of policy and 8 the problems associated with their implementation, the largest body of literature is concerned with the process and reasons for the change from racial

segregation to integration in the military. Richard Dalfiume's Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces:

Fighting on Two Fronts (1969), Richard Stillman's Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed

Forces(1977). Morris MacGregor's Integration of the

Armed Forces , 1940-1965.(1981), and Bernard Nalty's Strength For the Fight: A History of Black Americans in

the Military (1986) all address the discriminatory

policies and attitudes of military officials and the factors that compelled these policies and attitudes to

change. There are also specialized studies of the process of desegregation in the different branches.

Dennis Nelson's The Integration of the Negro into the U.S. Navy (1948) and Alan Osur's Blacks in the Army Air Forces: The Problem of Race Relations (1977) are

examples of this type. We learn from all of these

studies of the reluctance of white officials to accept blacks into military service, of the relegation of blacks to segregated, service occupations within the branches, and eventually, of the interaction of factors that made segregation untenable. There is little indication of the role of black servicemen in the 9 process except as the objects to be affected by the alterations in policy.

There are hints in several of the studies that perhaps blacks were not nearly as passive as the state of the scholarship would lead one to conclude.

MacGregor, for instance, points out that black soldiers

resented southern segregation laws and sometimes responded with violence. Like Lee, however, he

interprets their response as an indication of their

"low morale" and "lack of discipline."® Dalfiume

recognized a degree of racial militancy among black officers. He asserts that "the high educational level

of black officers made them more resentful of and prone to fight segregation." He acknowledges further that

"these acts of defiance" were indeed not uncommon. He fails to explore them in any detail, however, and the main conclusion he draws from the incidents is that

they "added to the stereotype among most white officers

of the black officer as a nuisance, [an] incompetent, and an undesirable. Finally Bernard Nalty, in Strength For the Fight, asserts positively that black

soldiers not only fought segregation and discrimination but that their actions had an impact on military policies. He concluded that segregation in the Army Air Forces began to 10 soften as the war progressed and the changes resulted not from recognition of heroism on the battlefield but represented a reaction to a series of racial outbursts by black servicemen, such as the one which took place at Bamber Bridge, England, in 1943.

He fails to develop this aspect of the experience because his, too, is a primarily "administrative" history. It is essentially a study of the changes in military policies toward blacks from colonial times to the present. The response of blacks to those changes was not his central focus.

The issue of political equality underlies the second broad category of literature, which focuses on the 'contributions' of blacks to America's military conflicts. Jack Foner's Blacks and the Military in

American History-. A New Perspective (1974) and Otto Lindenmeyer's Black and Brave; The Black Soldier in

America (1970) fall into this category. Both are general surveys of black participation in the military from the War for Independence to Vietnam, and both contain discussions of the World War II period. The emphasis in both studies is on the eagerness with which blacks have always responded to the call to duty, the heroic manner in which they performed despite discriminatory policies, and the failure of white society to reward them with racial equality. It is not 11 difficult to imagine why this category of literature is necessary, nor are black Americans the only ethnic group to speak of their "contributions" in laudatory terms, according to historian Richard Kohn.^^

However, the response of Black Americans to military service was always very complex and cannot be encompassed in a simplistic paradigm. Black Americans in World War II, as a whole, were equivocal about the war, so the eagerness of the black draftee therefore must be proven. Moreover, studies to date almost always focus on blacks who served in a combat capacity, and most blacks did not in fact serve in combat, however broadly defined. Thus, these studies do not incorporate the experience of the vast majority of blacks who served in the military.

Information about the attitudes, behavior, and response of soldiers are difficult to come by, no matter what their ethnic identities. The absence of such a body of literature concerning black servicemen is therefore not remarkable. As indicated previously, those who study soldiers in general are interested in them primarily as objects of military policies." This does not mean, however, that studies motivated by a concern for military policies cannot aid us in understanding soldiers. The most valuable studies of 12 soldiers' attitudes resulted, in fact, from the need to implement effective policies. The four-volume series, entitled "Studies in Social Psychology of World War

II," was the result of surveys conducted by Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues who comprised the Research Branch of the Army during the war. They surveyed enlisted men on a wide variety of topics at the request of military officials. The researchers inquired as to which type of ration soldiers preferred, for example, which newspapers or magazines they read, what they thought of their officers, how they felt about the war, whether or not they liked their Army jobs, and what they planned to do after the war. Chapter 10 of Volume

I, discusses the "The Negro Soldier." Stouffer emphasized, however, that the chapter was "a report on the attitudes of and toward Negro soldiers, and in no way "a systematic treatise on the Negro in the Army." Though black soldiers were intentionally excluded from many of the surveys "because of the additional expense involved in surveying them, they were included in enough of the surveys to make the surveys a valuable resource for the historical researcher. Stouffer and his colleagues, on the other hand, asked the soldiers their opinions only on issues that were of interest to military officials. Consequently, the survey results do 13 not constitute a coherent narrative of the black

experience and must still be supplemented with other

sources to construct such a narrative. Some interesting narratives of American soldiers in World War II have emerged in the past few years, but they generally do not incorporate the experience of black servicemen. Lee Kennett's G .I.: The American

Soldier in World War II (1987) and Edwin Hoyt's The

G.I.'s War: The Story of American Soldiers in Europe in World War II (1988) are two very welcome narratives about how enlisted men felt about and responded to

World War II. Both focus, however, on white enlisted men and make only passing reference to black ones.

Kennett, for instance, devotes only a few pages to a discussion of black soldiers and he, too, treats them as the object of military policies. He lets the reader know, for instance, that "hayseeds from places such as

Maine and Texas thought (emphasis added) that Army life was easier because "they let you sleep till 5:30," but his discussion of blacks addresses only how they were treated.Edwin Hoyt's The G.I.'s War: The Story of American Soldiers in Europe in World War II (1988), tells the story of World War II from the point of view of "the 'doughface': the slogging, leather-booted, tin- hatted, dirty-shirted soldier of the line.Hoyt, a 14 corporal in the Army from 1941 to 1943, documents the experience of soldiers like himself who served in

combat units. While it makes fascinating reading, it necessarily slights the experiences of black

servicemen, who were largely restricted to the rear.

There are a few published studies which provide

glimpses into the attitudes and responses of black servicemen in World War II. None, however, represents

a "systematic treatise" on attitudes, behaviors, or responses of blacks to military service. The most

valuable is Mary Penick Motley's, The Invisible Soldier: The Experience of the Black Soldier in World

War II(1975). Motley's work is a collection of

interviews, published with only a brief introduction

and no discernible thesis. The interviews, though

apparently intended for a popular audience, constitute in reality a primary resource for scholars. Phillip McGuire's Taps for a Jim Crow Armv: Letters From Black

Soldiers in World War 11(1983) is also revealing of the

attitudes of black soldiers toward military service. There is, however, an automatic bias in the publication. The letters, extracted from the files of the Civilian Aide to the Secretary, are all from soldiers who had a complaint. The letters provide

insight into the protest within the military, and are. 15 again, a valuable primary resource for the researcher. Finally, Studs Terkel's The Good War; An Oral History

of World War II includes several interviews with black servicemen which are of value for the same reason.

Thus, while existing studies of World War II have not ignored black servicemen, knowledge of their

experience is inadequate and unrepresentative. It has been fairly well established that blacks in World War II were discriminated against. Existing studies, however, fail to explore other aspects of the

experience to any significant extent. This helps to explain why the playwright, Leslie Lee, could not "seem

to get a plot going," why his characters just seemed to "sit around, and jaw and quarrel." At least one historian who studies military policies, Morris

MacGregor, has recognized that there is indeed a gap in the literature. His study of military integration was, he acknowledged, largely "written from the top down," and could not address important aspects of the black experience. It would not encompass "how black seirvicemen responded to discrimination", or "how they viewed their condition" or "how they conveyed their desire for redress." He thought such a study would be

"valuable" but thought it "practically impossible in the absence of sufficient autobiographical accounts and 16 detailed sociological measurements." Actually, his pessimism is unwarranted.^

The purpose of my dissertation is to explore one of the aspects of the black experience that MacGregor believed that he could not examine, namely, how black servicemen responded to discrimination and segregation during World War II. It is part of a larger interest in the status of black soldiers in the military, their attitudes towards militairy life, and the impact of the

World War II experience on those who served. The study will argue that protest or resistance in some form, not complacency, was the more typical response to racist policies and practices. It will begin with an analysis of the pre-service backgrounds of black servicemen and the changes that occurred in Black America during the two decades between the wars. The attitudes black soldiers brought with them into the military in part determined hov; they responded to military life.^® This will be followed by an analysis of the conditions that blacks confronted upon entering military service and an extensive examination of how they responded to discrimination and segregation, both on and off military installations. Finally, the study will address how their actions affected military policies and, in a way, altered their military 17 experience.

My findings contradict the compliant image that has been imputed to black servicemen. A number of studies have already demonstrated that, for a number of reasons, black civilians had become increasingly militant on the issue of racial equality.“ Black soldiers, on the other hand, are largely assumed to have been docile and complaisant. This was not the case. Black soldiers took civilian attitudes with them into the military and, as a result, kept insisting on the same "rights" as any other soldier in uniform. It is true that black soldiers stationed in the South were sometimes the victims of violent attacks by racist whites. This violence, however, has to be understood in light of the refusal of black soldiers, both northern and southern, to conform to "the laws and customs of the South," as Southern whites saw it.^° The more common response to discriminatory practices and policies I shall argue, was resistance, not complacency. Black America had indeed made gains during the inter-war years. Owing in part to the Great Migration and to the New Deal programs, blacks were healthier, better educated, economically better off, and beginning to feel a sense of their political importance. All 18 of these factor contributed to a growing racial militancy which permeated all classes, according to Gunnar Myrdal.^^ Even researchers within the military

recognized the change in blacks who entered military

service at the beginning of World War II compared to those who served in World War I. When they analyzed the

data .on the first set of black selectees, Stouffer and

his colleagues at the Research Branch were amazed at

the improved quality of black soldiers in comparison with their fathers only a generation before. The data

revealed, according to the researchers, "the most remarkable change in educational levels among Negro

troops in a single generation." They also found that the North was supplying a disproportionate share of the black soldiers. The data merely confirmed the anecdotal

evidence that had been coming in from commanders in the field that there was something "different" about black

soldiers, the researchers pointed out. They wanted to warn military officials that "this New Negro might respond differently when faced with patterns of life

that are new to him.

The "patterns of life" to which they referred were, of course, the Jim Crow policies of the southern states in which the vast majority of camps were located. Northern blacks were simply unaccustomed to 19 the blatant form of racial segregation existing in the South. What was really interesting, however, is that even southern blacks who were accustomed to segregation

in civilian life, did not believe that it had any place within the military.^'* Samuel Stouffer and his

colleagues were correct. Soldiers began to protest as soon as they discovered that they really did have to

transfer to the "cattle car" on their way to the camp.

The irony was that for many black servicemen, life in the military was not all that bad. The conditions confronting all soldiers in many of these

camps were often primitive, especially in the initial

stages of mobilization. Conditions were generally worse for blacks than for whites, however, because of racial discrimination. Yet, from the viewpoint of some blacks, even life in a segregated military was an immense

improvement over their civilian circumstances. That was certainly the attitude of ex-hobo Banks, a black veteran interviewed by Studs Terkel for Hard Times. He was glad when the war came. It gave him a job and food and a place to sleep. He "put on the uniform," he recalled, and he "felt safe.

Banks was not alone. Researchers found that black soldiers responded very positively, sometimes more positively than white soldiers, to many aspects of Army 2 0 life. Black soldiers tended to express greater pride in their unit, they were more likely than white soldiers to say their jobs were interesting and they were more inclined to believe that they were making "a valuable contribution to the war effort." Some of the findings perplexed the researchers. After all, these were soldiers serving in segregated units and "relegated" to "menial" occupations.

The researchers found that black servicemen were less likely than white servicemen, however, to want an assignment that took them overseas and into combat. It did not matter how researchers re-worded the questions: black soldiers indicated the least desire to "get into the fight.The surveys merely substantiated the anecdotal evidence coming in from white officers in the field. One commander of a cavalry unit reported that he could not convince black soldiers "that they must and will fight." The feeling among soldiers under his command was that "the United States was a white man's country" and that "it would be no less so after the war was over.The personal narratives of black veterans and military intelligence records support the surveys and the commander's report. Though ex-hobo Louis Banks, was proud of his five battle stars, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that black servicemen were 21 ambivalent about the war. The evidence indeed tends to belie the myth that black servicemen wanted "nothing

less than the opportunity to die for their country."

Their comparative lack of desire to "get into the fight" must be understood in the context of their

hostility toward military racial policies. As Stouffer

and his colleagues found, black soldiers were about as well "adjusted" to Army life as were white soldiers, provided that none of the survey questions were related

to military racial policies. The researchers were shocked by the extent to which black servicemen were

"race conscious," by the extent to which they

"perceived the world in racial terms." Black soldiers

tended to respond not as soldiers, the researchers

found, but "as members of an oppressed minority."^® The recollections of black servicemen support the

survey results. For many of them, there were two wars to be fought: one for "democracy" and "freedom" abroad and another for equality at home. After a black

soldier had served in southern camps for a while, he

got "a little confused as to who the enemy was," recalls Colonel Donovan Queen. For many of them, going into combat was the equivalent of fighting for the protection of discrimination and segregation. If they had to die for something, they reasoned, it simply made 22 more sense to die fighting for equality at home.

Throughout the World War II period, my research

reveals, black soldiers did in fact fight the "war" for equality at home. In some instances, the "war" took on the character of a civil rights "movement," though it

had no manifesto or recognized leader, nor it was it

centered in one place. From the very beginning, black

servicemen kept insisting on their "rights." When

historian Bell Wiley, then an Army Captain, prepared a study of the problems associated with the training of

black troops for combat duty, he cited as one of the difficulties "a concern for racial 'rights' particularly among Northern troops, which often

culminated in riots and other forms of violence.

Military Intelligence records, court-martial records, and other sources reveal that active opposition to segregation and other discriminatory practices was

commonplace among black servicemen. In fact, official

records support black veteran Lacey Wilson's claim that "the black soldier [in World War II] fought back against the military by all possible means. Resistance did not often take the form of

organized, violent rebellion, thus reinforcing the belief among some white officers in the military that black servicemen were not unhappy with their status. 23 As political scientist James Scott and historian Eric Langer found in separate studies of rural resistance to economic change, however, resistance among

subordinate groups seldom takes the form of organized, large-scale rebellion. A powerless group is rarely in a

position to organize and implement mass rebellion.

They both contend that to understand resistance, one must look at "everyday" or "day-to-day" forms of

resistance," the kind of resistance which is generally

indirect and non-confrontational. In the military during World War II, black servicemen engaged in a variety of behaviors that these scholars contend

characterize peasant resistance, such as foot-dragging,

feigned ignorance, false compliance, and desertion. "To understands these commonplace forms of resistance," according to Scott, "is to understand what much of the peasantry does 'between revolts' to defend its interest as best it can.

The protest "movement" within the military went beyond "everyday forms of resistance," however. The inarticulate, as Scott found was the case with peasant resistance, largely employed the "weapons of the weak."

But because so many black servicemen were indeed articulate and educated, they could also employ the direct, sometimes organized methods of protest that 24 Scott finds were largely "the domain of the middle class and intelligentsia."^^ Black servicemen in fact emulated the techniques of their civilian counterparts. They knew they could apply political pressure by repeated petitions to outside agencies. This explains the letters to President Roosevelt, Mrs. Roosevelt,

Congressional representatives, the War Department, the Civilian Aide to the Secretary, and the black newspapers, for example. The records also indicate that black servicemen were often willing, and felt sufficiently emboldened by their successes, to risk outright confrontation with the system. Open defiance of segregation laws, both on and off military bases, and other forms of civil disobedience became commonplace, especially after 1943. In some instances, blacks also resorted to violence. As one ex-serviceman put it, "we'd take so much and that was all.

Conditions for black servicemen had improved by the end of the war, an improvement brought about, in part, by black servicemen themselves. It is true that segregation remained intact, but the soldiers often succeeded in making the military experience more tolerable. As a result of letters written to outside agencies and individuals, sometimes they received better food, better job assignments, improved 25 equipment, or other privileges to which they felt entitled. In some instances, they acquired improved

recreational facilities or facilities where none

existed. On several well documented occasions they got rid of a racist commander, who was sometimes the real

object of the protest. Moreover, segregation did

soften, as Bernard Nalty contends, an improvement that he credits to the violent opposition of black

servicemen themselves. While it is true that

segregation was still intact, perhaps it was beginning to operate, to borrow Eric Hobsbawm's terminology, "to their minimum disadvantage."^®

In summary, examination of the pre-service backgrounds of black servicemen reveals that they were not entities apart from but rather an integral part of the black community, its "favorite sons" in many

instances, or at least, they shared the demographic characteristics as well as the values of the communities from which they came. These values would govern the attitudes, behavior and responses to the varied aspects of military life. They shared the civilians' commitment to social change and the civilians belief that they had waited long enough. They manifested the civilians' strong concern for racial "rights" and kept insisting on the respect due 26 them as soldiers in the United States armed forces.

Resistance to discriminatory policies was thus widespread, a resistance they maintained precisely because it was effective. 27

ENDNOTES

1. The Washington Post. February 7, 1991.

2. He need not have gone back to the Civil War for an example of the benefits of military service. Studies of minority veterans have revealed that, with the exception of those who served in Vietnam, veterans tend to have a higher socio-economic status than non­ veterans. See for example, Harley L. Browning, Sally C. Lopreato, and Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Income and Veteran Status: Variations Among Mexican Americans, Blacks and Anglos." American Sociological Review 38 (February 1973): 74-85.

3. The Washington Post, February 7, 1991.

4. Otto Lindenmeyer's Black and Brave : The Black Soldier in America (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), 13, expresses precisely such a view. Black soldiers in World War II perpetuated the "myth" in their complaint letters in order to evoke sympathy for their cause. See Phillip McGuire, Taps for a Jim Crow Army (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio, 1983), xxiii.

5. According to W.E.B. DuBois and the originators of the Niagara movement, this was the false impression of blacks that had been given by Booker T. Washington. Quoted in Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal For Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 12. See the "Niagara Movement Declaration of Principles," in Thomas R. Frazier, Afro-American History: Primary Documents (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1988), 211. It was still the impression held by most whites in the 1940's, as will be demonstrated later.

6. Richard Kohn, "The Social History' of the American Soldier: A Perspective and Prospectus for Research," American Historical Review 86 (1981): 562-3. 28 7. Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops. United States Army in World War II, Special Studies. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), ix.

8. Ibid., 592.

9. Morris J. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces (Washington, B.C.: Center for Military History, U.S. Army, 1981), 39.

10. Richard Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts. 1939-1953 (Columbia. Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1969), 69.

11. Bernard Nalty, Strength For the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 156.

12. Kohn, "The Social History of the American Soldier," 561-2.

13. Ibid., p. 563.

14. Samuel Stouffer, The American Soldier: Adjust­ ment During Army Life. Studies in Social Psychology in World War I, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 487-8.

15. See Lee Kennett, G .I : The American Soldier in World War II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1981), 6, 11, 39. 16. Edwin P. Hoyt, The G.I's War : The Storv of American Soldiers in Europe in World War II. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1988), xv.

17. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces. ix. Certain sources, such as the Intelligence Reports, had not been declassified when MacGregor published his study in 1981. In addition, more autobiographical 29 accounts have become available since 1981. However, the attitude surveys conducted by the Research Branch have been available since the end of the war. MacGregor, however, is primarily concerned with military policies. The response of black soldiers to the military experience was not his subject.

18. According to historians Peter Karsten and Richard Kohn, one of the defects in the literature has been the failure to explore the pre-service background of all soldiers. The result has been to credit changes in their behavior to military participation when in reality the behavior pattern could have been the result of values brought into the military. See Peter Karsten, "The 'New' American Military History: A Map of the Territory, Explored and Unexplored," in American Ouarterlv 36 (1984): 405-7, and Kohn, "The Social History of the American Soldier," 564-565.

19. A number of historical studies have documented the militancy of black civilians during World War II. Notable among them are Neil Wynn, The Afro-American and the Second World War (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975); A. Russell Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II Santa Barbara : ABC Clio, 1977; Phillip McGuire, He Too Sooke for Democracy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1983) ; and Herbert Garfunkel, When Negroes March: The March on Washington Movement in the Organizational Politics for FEPC (New York: Atheneum Books, 1975). None of these authors explored the attitudes and activities of soldiers in sufficient detail because their main focus is on black civilian protest.

20. See James L. Burran, "Racial Violence in the South During World War II " (Ph. D Dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1977), 5-6. Southern whites kept complaining to military officials about the attempt by black soldiers to break down their "laws and customs." See, for example, "Weekly Intelligence SuTcmary, " 19-25 August 1944, Headquarters, Fourth Service Command (Atlanta), "Racial Annex," RG 107, Box 262, National Archives. 21. Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks. 30-32. 22. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma : The Nearo Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 744. 30 23. Research Division, Special Services Branch, "Some New Statistics on the Negro Enlisted Man," Report No. 2, February 17, 1942, RG 330, National Archives. 24. Wilbur Walker, whose experience will be discussed later in the study, recalled that they had never questioned racial separation when he was growing up in Baltimore. Yet, en route to his first military- base in the South, he refused to sit in the rear of the bus. See, Wilbur Walker, We Are Men: Memoirs of World War II and the Korean War (Baltimore: Heritage Press, 1972), 2-3; 14-15.

25. Interview with Louis Banks, Jr., in Studs Terkel, Hard Times.- An Oral History of the Great Depression (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 43.

26. Samuel Stouffer et. al.. The American Soldier. 521-525.

27. Bell Wiley, "The Training of Negro Troops," Study no. 36 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, Historical Section, 1946), 12.

28. Stouffer, The American Soldier, 503.

29. Wiley, "The Training of Negro Troops," iii. Wiley also included a "lack of interest in the war" as one of the problems encountered in training black soldiers for combat.

30. Interview with Lt. Lacey Wilson, 364th Infantry Regiment, in Mary Penick Motley, The Invisible Soldier:The Experience of the Black Soldier. World War II (Detroit: Wayne State University Press), 61.

31. Ulysses Lee, for example, points out that the number of violent rebellions was small in relation to the number of blacks in the Army. MacGregor points to the number of black servicemen who indicated on Research Branch surveys that they thought separate facilities a "good" idea. See Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops. 348; and Morris Macgregor, Integration of the Armed Forces. 1940-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1981), 41-2. 31 32. James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), xvi, 29; and Eric Langer, Economic Change and Rural Resistance in Southern Bolivia. 1880-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 191. 33. Scott, Weapons of the Weak, xv.

34. Interview with Tech. Sgt. Willie Lawton, 369th Infantry Regiment in Motley, The Invisible Soldier. 103.

35. Scott, Weapons of the Weak, xv. CHAPTER I

"UNCLE MOSE IS DEAD": THE "NEW NEGRO," 1940.

It was usually hot in Bizerte (near the Straits of

Italy) when Sergeant Frank Penick and the 46th

Quartermaster Company arrived there from Oran in 1943, so one day Penick, about twenty of the men and their

white Lieutenant "decided to hike to the beach." There

were white soldiers at Bizerte, but the black soldiers had no contact with them because racial segregation was

complete. On the way to the beach, however, they passed by a white artillery unit, and the white soldiers

started "hollering about the 'niggers,'" and

incorporated into their diatribe "every obscenity their minds could come up with." Penick and his men "turned around to mix it up with them" but, at his Lieutenant's

insistence, they walked on. His men "headed for the water as soon as they arrived at the beach" and Penick was about to join them when the Lieutenant told him to

call them back. He asked why and the Lieutenant replied that "the beach was reserved for others." Penick had noticed "a few white men sunbathing on the slope leading down to the beach" [but] "thought

32 33 nothing about it." There was, he recalled, one "lone

occupant" on the beach at that moment. The Lieutenant suggested that they "swim further down" but Penick "reminded him that the rest of the coastline was rocky." The lieutenant was adamant. By then, the other

black soldiers "sensed that something was wrong," and

came out of the water. They gathered around and asked

Penick what they should do and he told them to go ahead and swim because, as he recollected, "I could not

conceive of this whole stretch of beach being reserved

for a handful of men." The "lone occupant" of the beach, overhearing the conversation, "jumped up," and

said that Penick was "insubordinate to an officer" and

should be court-martialed. The stranger then gathered up his men and "took off."

Penick was summoned before his Captain and the Lieutenant upon arrival at the camp. The lieutenant lectured him on "disobeying an officer" and told him

that he could be court-martialed. Penick told them to

"go ahead" and court-martial him. "I told them, " he recalled, "that I was a civilian, and a northern one at

that, in an Army uniform and that was what I would always be and they could court-martial me if they wished." They lectured him a while longer and then let him go. He heard nothing further about the incident.^ 34 In asserting that he was a "civilian"... and a northern civilian, Penick intended to convey to his

superiors that in order to understand his attitude that

they needed to understand civilians. Some historians who study the military agree. As historian Richard Kohn argued, "understanding...soldiers means grounding them in their communities and the times in which they

lived."2 Historian Peter Karsten agrees. Some studies

have indeed found that soldiers' attitudes were affected by prolonged military service in "a total environment" substantially different from that from which they came.^ However, Karsten's research as well

as that of other scholars, rather than demonstrating

the power of the military experience to alter attitudes and behavior, had in fact "demonstrate[d] tne

importance of personality traits and values acquired prior to military service". Studies designed to show that veterans had been "militarized," had become more

"authoritarian," or more inclined to own weapons as a consequence of military service had been unable to do so, Karsten found. Moreover, studies of radical Vietnam veterans that took their pre-service backgrounds into account had found that, rather than being "radicalized" by the Vietnam experience, "radical" veterans were usually those who opposed the war "before entering the 35 service." In fact it seems that the military

experience, rather than transforming attitudes and

behavior, seems more often to have reinforced already- existing values.*

Failure to "ground" black soldiers in their communities and the times in which they lived," has

indeed led scholars to attribute to the military

experience attitudes and behavior that black soldiers, for the most part, brought with them into the military. Because so many of the leaders of the Civil Rights movement were veterans of World War II, it is commonly believed that they were "radicalized" by the

experience. For example, historian Richard Dalfiume in his seminal study of desegregation in the military,

contended that "the race issue could no longer be

ignored" after the War and one of the reasons was that

"the American Negro came out (emphasis added) of World War II determined to change his status.Moreover, military sociologist Charles Moskos, commenting on the racial militancy of black soldiers in Vietnam observed that "black troopers were no longer as acquiescent or as passive to discriminatory practices as they were in previous times.® There are no studies, however, to support these conclusions.’ It has simply been assumed that the subsequent racial militancy of black 36 veterans was a consequence of the military experience.* Contemporaries would have disagreed. Anyone who studied or observed the black population during the war

and in the decade preceding it came to the same

conclusion: that the mood of the black population was

"different" by 1940.* "It cannot be doubted," Gunnar

Myrdal wrote in the renowned study American Dilemma,

"that the spirit of American Negroes in all classes is different today from what it was a generation ago." If

they had ever been satisfied with their position in society, this was no longer true by 1940. "The protest

against caste," he asserted, was no longer restricted to the small number of "betterment organizations" but

"has become part of the ideology of the entire Negro people to an ever increasing extent. The belief

that there was indeed a "New Negro was widespread, not

just among scholars and other observers, but among the black population itself. It was the "New Negro," they would argue, who went into the military in 1940. Contemporary studies of the black population in a number of locations posited the existence of this "New

Negro." Journalist Roi Ottley, whose sociological study of New York City's black population was published in 1943, found that the new "mood" was prevalent among 37 black New Yorkers. "Listen to the way Negroes are talking these days," Ottley wrote in New World A'Coming.

"Gone are the Negroes of the old banjo and singin' roun' the cabin doors. Old Man Mose is dead! Instead, black men have become noisy, aggressive, and sometimes defiant.

In explaining the racial prejudices of white soldiers and the inability of the Army to alter those

prejudices, sociologist Samuel Stouffer and his

colleagues contended that "it is inevitable that an institution whose membership is temporary and

involuntary would not develop a set of values which

departed radically from the earlier orientation of its members.If the behavior and attitudes of white soldiers in the Army reflected "the earlier

orientation" of the group, the same has to be said of black soldiers.

St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, whose

sociological study of Chicago's Black Belt was published in 1945, concluded not only that the black population was different but that Chicago's black soldiers were different from what they had been in

World War I . They asserted that The Negroes who went to fight in the Second World War, unlike those who fought in the First, were not masses of illiterate cotton- field hands, dragooned into battle never 38 asking "Why?" At least half of the Negro soldiers--and Bronzeville's men fall into this class--were city people who had lived through a Depression in America's Black Ghettoes, and who had been exposed to unions, the Communist movement, and to the moods of "racial radicalism" that occasionally swept American cities. Even the rural southern Negroes were different this time--for the thirty years between the First and Second World Wars has seen a great expansion of school facilities in the South and distribution of newspapers and radios.“

Every other study undertaken during this period sounded similar themes.

That the "New Negro" spirit existed by 1940 was clear to all intelligent observers, but what was less

clear was the causes of the new mood. All the studies agreed, however, that changes resulting from the northward migration, which began in World War I and continued into World War II, were instrumental in forging this new consciousness. The northward migration improved the migrants' standard of living, gave them access to education, gave them, relatively speaking, a taste of "freedom," exposed them to new ideas and influences which abounded in the cities." These factors and others combined to produce the New Negro spirit of the 1940's.

The impact of higher educational levels on the changing mood was generally acknowledged. As a consequence of the northward migration, illiteracy 39 among the black population had declined significantly by 1930. In addition to being a place where "a man was

a man," Chicago's southern migrants had also been told

that the North was a place where their children could obtain a good education. In fact, when the Chicago

Commission on Race Relations asked southern migrants in

1920 what they liked about the North, the availability

of education was included in the majority of the

responses. One respondent liked "the schools for the children, the better wages, and the privileges for colored people,-" another liked "liberty, better

schools. The migrants took advantage of the educational opportunities, as was evident in the increased educational levels. The illiteracy rate, which stood at forty-five percent in 1900, was down to 16 percent by 1930. New York blacks, in fact, had a higher literacy rate than whites in Alabama, Georgia,

Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, or Kentucky.^

The increasing educational levels tended to correlate, all researchers found, with increased racial

"militancy." Researchers everywhere found what Gunnar Myrdal termed "Negro sensitiveness" to be stronger among the "upper classes," a status among blacks synonymous with higher education. The educated tended 40 to feel "the humiliations more intensely," according to

Myrdal, and to "feel overwhelmed by the discrimination and the prejudice."^® Charles S. Johnson, an eminent black sociologist and later president of Fisk

University, found this was the case among blacks even

in the South. Education made them "more aware of political and social thought," he contended; it made

them "more conscious of the dichotomy between their

high educational attainment and their low social position." His research revealed that

...the less educated Negro was apt to regard white domination as part of the order of the universe. The upper class feels themselves entitled to achieve a high social position in the community--a position denied by reason of race alone.

Social scientists and other researchers generally agreed with Myrdal, however, that the "New Negro spirit" was no longer confined to the well educated but had become the "spirit" of the general population by

1940. A major finding of the sociological and anthropological literature was that there was a growing sense of "race consciousness" and racial solidarity among black Americans. Elizabeth Ferguson, a graduate student in sociology at Yale University in 1936, found that while all ethnic groups manifested some kind of "'minority group consciousness,' the sentiment as 41 manifested among Negroes is particularly intense."i*

Arnold Rose, a sociologist at the University of Minnesota in the 1940's, came to a similar conclusion. He found that by 1940, "Negroes had achieved remarkable group identification, that they exhibited a

stronger sense of group identity than that which existed among other minorities during this period.

Ferguson attributed the intensity of the sentiment to "the discrimination under which all Negroes labor

[which] has welded them into a more or less coherent group and developed in them a powerful race

consciousness. Rose agreed. "Negroes have suffered the greatest deprivation," he argued," [and] as a consequence, have reacted more." For this reason, "their group identification is more highly developed."

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, which stressed group self-hate among black Americans, Rose argued that the trend among black Americans from the turn of the century onward had been from "low" to "high morale," a term he defined in terms of "loyalty and solidarity within the group. Sociologist E. Franklin Frazier contended, in fact, that the northward migration "heightened the "consciousness of being a Negro." The migrants, whose perceptions of the North were likely to be unrealistic. 42 found race riots and discrimination in the North. While jobs were plentiful during the War, competition for housing was fierce and white opposition to integrated neighborhoods intense. The friction with whites and the continued discrimination served to produced a kind of racial consciousness from which they had been

"protected" by legal segregation. In addition, news of discrimination against and mistreatment of black soldiers on the war front added to the disillusionment. The result was a new kind of "Negro nationalism, " not unlike, according to Frazier, that of the nationalistic movements in Europe prior to World War

The "New Negro," some scholars argue, was evident as far back as the race riots of 1919. Prior to World War I, Arnold Rose contended, "race riots were little more than the massacre of helpless Negroes by whites."^Tn the riots following the war in the summer of 1919, blacks mobilized and "killed almost as many whites as there were Negroes killed.Moreover, it was the lower class black who fought pitched battles in the streets of Chicago, Drake found. "Civic leaders" privately approved, though. While they publicly decried the violence, in private, they "justified the fighting as self defense and as proof that Negroes would [no longer] supinely suffer mistreatment."^® The 43 latter part of the statement sums up, to a considerable degree, the attitude of the "New Negro" of 1940.

The response to the "racial radicalism" of Marcus Garvey, both Myrdal and Drake contend, provided further evidence of the emergence of the "New Negro.By the

end of World War I, the migrant to northern cities like

Chicago had come up against the limitations of racial

"equality" in the North.Garvey, a Jamaican

immigrant whom DuBois described as "a squat, ugly black man with intelligent eyes and a big head," came along about this time.®® Southern migrants took to the movement "out of the bitterness and frustration

experienced at the end of World War I . "®° Myrdal concluded, and other researchers agreed,

that the mass following that Garvey acquired "testified to the basic unrest in the Negro community.Only a handful of the black elite ever joined Marcus Garvey.

His support was largely confined to the lower classes.

Most noteworthy, however, is that he acquired a mass

following by preaching "blatant racial chauvinism," by "exalting everything black." He exalted black skin, and African culture. He condemned "amalgamation" with whites and urged blacks to "keep the race pure." He preached racial separatism and self-help. Though they took issue with his figures, even his black enemies 44 (notable among them the NAACP) acknowledged that he had obtained a mass following, something they had been unable to do.^^

When Drake and Cayton studied the black community in Chicago in the 1930's, the remnants of the

organization still existed, and Chicagoans still talked

about Marcus Garvey and the "Back to Africa" movement.

They were not duped, as the middle and upper classes were inclined to believe. Blacks in Chicago tended, for example, to "ridicule" the entire notion of returning to Africa. As one Chicagoan opined, "Why should the

colored people go back to Africa? There ain't nothing

for them to do over there." Another expounded "flatly," (from his barber chair) 'There ain't no

boulevards in Africa!" Drake and Cayton found, however,

that while they ridiculed the idea of going back to Africa,

"his emphasis on race pride, and particularly on the 'virtue of blackness' caught on. It put steel in the spine of many Negroes who had previously been ashamed of their color and of the identification with the Negro group. Before this time such things as colored dolls or calendars with colored families and heroes were a rarity. Today they are commonplace...^^ The NAACP and the "betterment organizations" recognized as early as the 1930's that they were out of

step with the racial consciousness of the masses, that 45 the people were demanding a different kind of leadership. The leadership eventually followed them.

During the Depression years, for example, "Negroes discovered the power of mass action," according to Drake and Cayton. Like everyone else, what black

Americans wanted was a job. Unemployed blacks looked into store windows in the black neighborhoods, however, and saw only white store clerks. The result was the "Spend Your Money Where You Can Work Campaign," which began with "a group of ragged pickets...walking in front of Black Belt chain store in the fall of 1929."

It unified Black Chicago as nothing had done since the riots of 1919. A grocery store gave in and "hired three colored girls," and the movement spread. They directed the full-force of the campaign against

Woolworth's, which gave in and "hired twenty-one colored girls, later raising the proportion of colored employees in all stores in the neighborhood to 25 percent."^"* The movement was emboldened. Similar campaigns sprang up under different names in the rest of the country.

The campaigns were not especially successful. The boycotts "did not solve the employment of thousands," according to Drake and Cayton, but

minor victories convinced the Negro community 46 that the boycott was a useful weapon, and many churches and community organizations united to pay pickets, to hire loudspeakers, to provide bail, and occasionally to furnish a detail of members for the picket line.

Roi Ottley came to similar conclusions about the campaign in New York. The gains made were not especially significant, he recalled, but the campaigns served "to dramatize the unemployment problems of

Negroes and served as well to stimulate racial unity.

In fact, the growing "radicalism" of the black population in the 1930's became of increasing concern to liberal whites as well as "respectable Negro leaders." They were especially concerned about the growing influence of the Communist Party. Blacks wanted their leaders to take aggressive action on their behalf, and the Communists did. The Party, which had made no headway among blacks in the prosperous 1920's,

"emerged as leaders" during the depression years of the 1930's. They helped black Chicagoans fight evictions, lead the demonstrations for more adequate relief and lead the legal fight to free the Scottsboro Boys. "When the eviction notice arrived," according to Drake, "it was not unusual for a mother to shout to the children, 'Run and get the Reds.'"^’ The resultant good will was 47 evident throughout Chicago's Black Belt. Even the Chicago Defender saw fit to recognize them in an

editorial entitled "WHY WE CANNOT HATE REDS."^® No

more than a handful of blacks ever joined the party, but they attended the parades and the picnics and

fought side by side with the Communists against the

police and the bailiffs. When one of the demonstrations turned into a riot in Chicago, "conservative and

progressive Negro leaders went into a huddle with city officials, laying the grievances of Black Metropolis before them." They would have to do something to "cut

the ground from under the radicals." It was the Communist's emphasis on racial equality that made the strongest impression on the lower

classes. There is merit to Roy Wilkins' contention

that the black masses, like their white counterpart in the 1930's, were not terribly radical. The Black masses, he asserted, were "only radical with respect to the status of the race. The Communist Party's doctrine of class warfare made little impression on blacks, but their insistence on racial equality did. They put on several public trials of their own members for racial discrimination/"- They ran a black man for

Vice-President. They also defended the Scottsboro boys when the NAACP was reluctant to do so.'*® These actions 48 impressed blacks in Chicago. In 1938, for instance, one of Drake and Cayton's researchers followed the Communist Party's float, which was part of a parade sponsored by the Chicago Defender. He followed it for five miles, mingling with the crowd in order to gauge their response. He reported that a wave of applause greeted the float throughout the parade. On the rare occasion when a spectator was critical, other spectators were quick to defend the Party. "Them's the Communists," a spectator commented. "They don't believe in no differences. All's alike to them. The ordinary black person would most likely have condensed the entire Marxist ideology into the simple statement,

"they don't believe in no differences." It was what mattered the most. As the Depression took hold, the actions on the part of blacks became more strident. Unemployed black laborers beat up white laborers who came into their neighborhoods to repair the streets and railroad tracks. On one occasion, they attacked the white workers and chased them out, then refused to leave the tracks until the Mayor and other government officials arrived and assured them that the neighborhood's unemployed would be given a share of the work. Sporadic acts of violence and other forms of "direct action" 49 became common up to 1931, and, according to the researchers, even "respectable Negroes" thought them justified/" The "accepted leaders" in Chicago realized that they would have to change in order to catch up with their followers and they did. The Urban

League, for instance, "not only sanctioned the "Spend Your Money Where You Can Work" campaigns," it also permitted the movement to use the League's facilities in furtherance of the campaign. Beyond that, however, they were unwilling to go. Their organization could not endorse some of the negotiating tactics of the "racial radicals," which sometimes included tossing a brick through the window of a recalcitrant merchant's establishment.

While the Urban League could not give approval to such coercive techniques, the leaders of the organization realized that its methods were out of step. The Chicago office, in fact, expressed this to the national leadership in a memo as early as October

9, 1930.

The time has come for a more aggressive attitude on the part of Negroes. We, of the Chicago Urban League, realize that fact and our future programs will be far more aggressive than they have been in the past

In fact, Cayton and Drake found that by the end of 50 the 1930's,

"the old style 'safe leader' has virtually disappeared from Bronzeville. Challenged on one hand by the Communists and on the other by the racial radicals, the 'accepted leaders' have had either to accommodate themselves to new techniques or give way to men who could do so. The major community organizations (exclusive of the churches) are now in the hands of people who know how to steal a little of the radical's thunder, and 'when they can't lick'em, to jine 'em.'^®

To hold on to their followers, the 'safe leaders'

were forced to approximate the radicalism of the

radicals. When the 'left-wingers' announced in 1936 that the Negro National Congress (which contained a

large Communist contingent and would later become

Communist controlled) intended to bring all existing

community organizations into one group to "struggle for Negro rights," the 'accepted leadership' responded by

forming the Council of Negro Organizations. By 1938, the Council "was itself organizing demonstrations in the proletarian style," according to Drake and Cayton.

In fact, by 1938, "it had become respectable to support

a demonstration or a boycott in the struggle for Negro rights." When the war began, "many very 'respectable' Negroes" could be found on the picket lines and in the demonstrations.^’ The "respectable" leadership, by

1940, had caught up with its followers. Robert Moton, the successor to Booker T. 51 Washington at Tuskegee, supported Drake and Cayton's contention that "even the southern Negro was different" by 1940. The "New Negro" was evident to him a decade earlier. "Only a few people outside the race actually know what is going on within the race," Moton contended in 1929; "all the while there has been developing a new type of Negro which does not lend itself either to burlesque or to caricature."^® He, too, felt that "to understand the thinking Negro" (emphasis added) it was necessary to recognize the changes which had occurred in the lives of Black Americans."^®

Like Drake and Cayton, he found that the advancement in education among blacks in the South had helped to produce the "new type of Negro." Moton confirmed that although blacks were still largely receiving an inferior education, school facilities for blacks had expanded and attendance by black school children had increased. E. Franklin Frazier, too, painted a distressing portrait of comparative deficiency of the black education. He conceded, however, that by 1940 more black children were attending secondary and elementary schools, and with increased regularity. In the eighteen states that had separate schools, 85.9% of all children were enrolled by 1940. The most noteworthy change he found, however. 52 was that the number attending high school was up to

thirty-five percent. Moreover, the average number of

days attended was on the increase, from 113 in 1935-36, to 126 for the 1939-40 school year. A quarter of all

black pupils were enrolled in high school, and in 1939-

40, there were 30,009 black high school graduates.^

But improvement in education extended beyond the

elementary and secondary levels. Writing in 1929, Moton asserted that "there is scarcely a scholastic degree

attainable by examination to which [Negroes] have not

been admitted." Thousands of blacks had attended the

same higher institutions as whites (both in the United

States and abroad) and he pointed out that eighty-eight had been elected to the Phi Beta Kappa honorary

society.^

Continual progress in education as well as steadily increasing "accumulation of wealth" combined

to produce in southern blacks a strong sense of "race consciousness." To understand this consciousness, he

argued, one had to understand that blacks were making progress. "Anyone who would understand the Negro

today," he wrote in 1930, must take into account the continuous progress of the race...Of the nature and extent of this progress the overwhelming majority of white people in America are, practically speaking, entirely ignorant. This 53 is true of those whose attitudes toward the Negro is sympathetic and friendly as well as those who are avowedly hostile...As a generalization it may be said that this progress has done as much as anything else to produce the greatly heightened race consciousness within the Negro race...which is noticeable on every hand.

To understand the "new type of Negro" Moton told his readers, one had to understand that "advancement" had

"stimulated the thinking of this group on the subject

of the relation to American life in general and their status as American citizens in particular."^ Charles

Johnson, Gunnar Myrdal, and others would document his

contention in the 1930's. Higher educational and income

levels correlated with increased "sensitivity" to racial discrimination, the tendency to view their low

social status, as Johnson pointed out, as entirely the consequence of their race. A disproportionate share of this group of blacks went into the military during

World War II.

W.E.B. DuBois and others also underscored the significance of prolonged segregation and

discrimination in the creation of the "New Negro. In the South, the foirmation of a group identity was

also facilitated by segregated institutions. This was especially true of the schools. Arnold Rose pointed out that most children, even in the North where segregation 54 was illegal, attended black schools, with black school teachers, and principals. The school boards in the

South kept an eye on the curriculum to ensure that they did not teach "'subversion,' that is, "Negro protest- teaching." Outside of that, however, blacks were generally in control, and tended to do a number of

things "which contributed to group identification."®®

In many schools they observed "Negro History Week,"

which stressed the achievements of the race. Moreover,

the normal history curriculum was "race-angled," and gave a different and sometimes more accurate view, in Rose's opinion, from that available in the standard

history text. In addition, teachers

used Negro subjects in art classes and Negro songs, including James Weldon's Johnson's 'Lift Ev'ry Voice and Sing,' which has become the 'Negro National Anthem,' is taught in music classes. Perhaps more important, the schools each the children the American Creed, and the many ways in which the society deviates from it.®®

Elizabeth Ferguson, writing in 1938, noted the

frustration of whites with the "race consciousness" of blacks. She also observed whites did not seem to understand that, if they wanted to prevent blacks from identifying with "the race," all they had to do was not

discriminate. ®’ Drake and Cayton were also correct in their 55 assertion that one reason that "even the southern Negro was different this time" was due to the spread of

newspapers and radios. In the years prior to World War

II, it was generally acknowledged that the institution with the most impact in promoting race-consciousness and militancy was the black press. Most white people in

America," Gunnar Myrdal wrote in American Dilemma, "are entirely unaware

of the bitter and relentless criticism of themselves; of their policies in domestic or international affairs;..their legal and political practices;..their social customs, their opinions, and prejudices; and almost everything in white civilization. Week in and week out these are presented to the Negro people in their own press.®®

In content, as Arnold Rose found, "the Negro newspaper is primarily a reporter of discrimination against

Negroes and achievements of Negroes."®® Both served to promote race-consciousness and racial identification. The black press, which viewed itself as the "spokesmen

for racial rights," indeed made no pretense of being objective. Its foremost concern was "the advancement of the race." As Roi Ottley noted, it was "honest,

faithful, and indeed biased to the Negro cause. Every intelligent observer agreed that, in the interwar years, the black newspapers had became the "most important vehicles for forming and reflecting public 56 opinion. "

Moreover, by 1940, available evidence supports

Arnold Rose's finding that "the Negro newspapers reach[ed] practically all of the Negro people, at least some of the time." There were 155 newspapers in 1940,®^ with a combined weekly circulation of

1,276,000. There were 3,164,000 black families in 1940, indicating that more than 1/3 of all families subscribed to the black newspapers. The circulation increased during the war, to 1,809,000. Moreover, Rose contended justifiably that the audience was even larger than the circulation figures indicated because the contents of the newspapers were circulated by word of mouth. The newspapers were also available in barbershops and sometimes churches, lodges, and pool halls, where they were re-read.®'* Gunnar Myrdal concurred that the newspapers' audience was not just the upper class but reached down into the "upper layers of the lower class." The black newspapers contained little advertising, he pointed out. They were paid for almost entirely by their readers. Myrdal reasoned correctly that "even if practically all persons belonging to the upper classes were to buy the Negro newspapers, this could not sustain them."®®

Research further reveals that, by the 1930's, the 57 press was indeed reaching blacks in the South. A study of the consumer habits of southern urban blacks undertaken in 1929-30 (using a representative sample of families), revealed that they were indeed reading the black newspapers. The study revealed, not surprisingly, that the upper occupational groups read their local white daily and a national black newspaper, a habit similar to that of northern blacks. The more salient finding, however, was that "even among the lower occupational groups almost half the Negro families, except in Birmingham, took one Negro paper or another."®® Readership in urban areas was, as was to be expected, stronger than in rural areas. On the other hand, an unpublished study conducted by Charles

Johnson in 1936 revealed that "even in isolated parts of the South, it is a large northern Negro newspaper that is most frequently read."®’

In addition to bringing bad news of persistent discrimination, the newspapers disseminated the good news too. They let their readers know, for instance, "the race was progressing." Drake and Cayton agree with Moton that race "progress" helped to foster the "New

Negro spirit." They contended that northern blacks, too, were feeling good about themselves by 1930. Their research revealed that "there were a few prophets of 58 doom in the Twenties but generally,

an air of optimism pervaded the Black Belt, as it did the whole city. There were evidences on every hand that the Race was progressing. Here were colored policemen, firemen, aldermen, and precinct captains, state Representatives, doctors, lawyers, and teachers. Colored children were attending the public schools and the city's junior colleges. There were fine churches in the Negro areas, and beautiful boulevards. It seemed reasonable to assume that this development would continue with more and more Negroes getting ahead and becoming educated.®®

Adding to the feeling of "Negroes getting ahead" was the success of the NAACP which, in the years prior to World War II, had already begun to chip away at the legal underpinnings of segregation and discrimination.

The NAACP's Board decided in the mid-1930's, that in lieu of a direct attack on Jim Crow laws, it would

"force 'equal if separate'." It selected higher education because few states had any facilities for blacks at all. It reasoned that the cost of providing separate facilities for the small number of black college students would be so prohibitive as to force the states to admit them on an integrated basis. It lost the first case in 1933, on a technicality, but won the second, the case of Donald Murray in 1934. The

Court ordered the University of Maryland either to provide a law school for blacks or to admit Murray. The 59 most significant achievement was the case of Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada. Registrar of the University.

In 1936, the Supreme Court ruled the state had a duty

to provide education for all its citizens and to do so within the state.®®

The NAACP also instituted a series of cases designed to force school systems to pay black teachers

salaries equal to white teachers. It won the first case against the Anne Arundel County Board of Education in

Maryland in 1938 and the second against the Norfolk Board of Education in 1939. Other counties, fearing lawsuits by their teachers, began to equalize salaries voluntarily.

The courts also began to uphold the civil rights of black Americans in other areas. In 1938 and 1940, the Supreme Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to deny them the right to serve on juries. In 1940, in a very narrow decision, it reversed an Illinois Supreme

Court decision which had upheld racially restrictive covenants. It also struck down debt peonage in a Georgia case and it upheld their due process rights in several cases. As a result of these successes, more black Americans declared themselves willing to challenge Jim Crow laws and customs in the courts. Black Americans, as Harvard Sitkoff concludes 60 correctly, "increasingly had the law on their side in the struggle against discrimination." They no longer had to beg for concessions from white America but were entitled to them by law. By 1940 they began more and more to demand the rights to which they were entitled before the law.’°

As Moton found, "race consciousness" among blacks in the South manifested itself in the constant search for evidence that blacks were progressing, that they were "catching up to white people.In the North by

1930, blacks saw abundant evidence that this was the case. A decade after the Great Migration, blacks in Chicago had gained two aldermen, one state senator, four state representatives, a city judge, and a

Congressman.7: in 1928, they elected a representative to Congress, Oscar De Priest, the first since the end of Reconstruction. Similarly, other blacks won election to local offices in Cleveland, Detroit, New York City, and Philadelphia.^

"The one thing that holds us back more than anything else," a black Chicagoan told one of Drake and Cayton's interviewers, "is our lack of unity. Actually, she was entirely too critical. Every intelligent observer noted the degree of cohesiveness among black Americans by 1940. All noted the strong 61 sense of "race consciousness," of group identification," of "group solidarity." The manifestations were everywhere.

The racial solidarity was evident in their voting behavior in the 1930's. Frederick Douglass used to say, with considerable justification, that "the Republican

Party is the ship. All the rest is open sea."’® Actually, Ottley argued that, in voting Republican, blacks had voted for what was good for "the Race." Ottley contended in 1943,

that the Negro vote is not tied to any party, as the last three national elections have demonstrated...The Negro's political evaluations are realistic and he is voting for persons who...have shown concern about the Negroes' problems long before election day. The yardstick is as exacting for Negro as for white leaders...Today, the social and economic condition of the race is the weather-vane of the Negro vote...The Negro vote goes to the highest bidder in terms of concrete social and economic offers

By the mid-1930's, President Franklin Roosevelt became the highest bidder: he offered them the MPA (Works Progress Administration). The New Deal

Administration included blacks on the relief programs, even though they sometimes did not receive benefits equal to whites. The MPA was so popular among blacks that it was immortalized in a popular blues song from that era: 62 Please, Mr. President, listen to what I have to say: You can take away all of the alphabet, but please leave that WPA. Now I went to the poll and voted, I know I voted the right way-- So I'm asking you, Mr. President, don't take away the WPA!’®

In fact, it was this tendency to vote for the

candidate who offered the most in concrete social and economic terms that was partly responsible for the

defeat of Oscar DePriest in the election of 1934.

DePriest was a racial "radical," and blacks in Chicago liked that. Incensed at the bombing of black homes by white homeowners, he was once quoted as saying--in front of an audience of both black and white people--

"Negroes are going to move anywhere they can pay rent and if the white people don't like it, we'll run them

into the damn lake."’® However, DePriest, a good

Republican, voted against the WPA. He lost his bid for re-election. In 1934, the major concern of the race would have been its "economic conditions". Most black

Americans would have agreed with Drake and Cayton (WPA workers themselves) that "who was looking for brotherhood when you could get a good WPA job?"®°

The voting behavior of blacks in the South reflected those of black in the North, researchers

found. Gunnar Myrdal observed (with obvious 63 disapproval) that the small number of blacks able to

vote traded their votes for "political spoils, favors,

and protection." In exchange for the few hundred votes cast in 1939 in Greenville, South Carolina, for example, blacks received "two fully equipped playgrounds." In Louisville, as a reward for the shift

from the Republican to Democratic Party in 1933, blacks received their own fire company and "a score of minor administrative and clerical jobs." Similarly, blacks in Memphis found that if they voted for the "Crum

Machine," fewer blacks were killed by the police. They voted for the "Crum Machine." Finally, Myrdal reported that he had heard while in New Orleans that

Negroes...were solidly behind Huey Long because he did not discriminate against Negroes in giving free school books, and because he put Negro nurses in the hospitals, Negro servants in the state Capitol and refrained from referring to 'niggers' in his campaign speeches.^

Blacks had indeed "learned the lesson of racial solidarity" and used it to advance the race.^ They increasingly voted as a block, and consequently the black vote, which had long been important in some local contests, became a factor in national elections for the first time. The black vote was beginning to regain something of the importance it had enjoyed during 64 Reconstruction. The major parties competed for it. In some key states, the black vote held the balance of power. As a consequence, blacks were feeling

politically strong, not weak. British historian Neil

Wynn was correct in his conclusion that, while women "had lost the political leadership, sense of purpose

and unity, blacks were just beginning to feel and exercise their economic and political power in the

years before 1941."®^

By 1940, black Americans had achieved not only a surprising degree of group solidarity but also a

surprising degree of unity of purpose. This was demonstrated by the circumstances surrounding the publication of Rayford Logan's What the Nearo Wants in 1944. The University of North Carolina Press asked

Logan, then a professor of history at Howard

University, to "ask a representative group of Negro writers and leaders to write, independently, short essays dictating what they felt to be the Negroes' demands." Logan wrote the introduction himself and

then, in accordance with the publisher's instructions, selected fourteen black leaders and writers from the differing political spectrum. The contributors included Communists, Socialists, Republicans and Democrats. All but three had been born in the South. The degree of 65 similarity among the essays came as a complete shock to

the director of University of North Carolina Press. The press delayed publication of the book for some time and

finally published it with a "Publisher's Introduction," which expressed basic disagreement with the

contributors. Sociologist Charles Johnson, regarded by

his contemporaries as the "dean of black conservatives (italics added)," reviewed the book for the American

Sociological Review. He devoted most of the review to an attack on the "publisher's Introduction." Johnson noted the unanimous agreement among the black leaders not only on the basic question of "What the Negro Wants," but also the near unanimous agreement as to how

to best achieve them. If biographical sketches had not been included in the text, he contended, it would have been impossible to tell that the contributors were from different political spectrum. "Even more striking,"

Johnson noted, "is the fact that the statement by the man farthest to the left and that of the (probably) most conservative southern educator are as alike as two peas in a pod." He asserted that

this unanimity among the authors and the matter-of-factness with which each stated the same desires for full citizenship proved disturbing to the publisher. It prompted the publisher to take the extraordinary step of inserting...a publisher's introduction which took the contributors to task for doing 66 frankly what he requested them to do...This remarkable introduction seems to imply first that Negroes ought not to want what these leaders say they want and second (and still more surprising) that having been asked the question, they should not have answered it. .

It was indeed a common belief among white

Americans that blacks in the 1940's did not want what the leaders said they wanted, that the attitudes of the

intelligentsia and middle class did not reflect the attitude of "the masses," who were blissfully ignorant for the most part and content with their status in society. Contemporary scholars and observers disagreed.

When Hortense Powdermaker interviewed blacks in

Indianola, Mississippi during the 1930's for a

"cultural study of the deep South," she noted the rarity of the stereotype so much assumed by white southerners. Even the older generation did not conform to the "literary stereotype of the ignorant darky, content in his lowly place." Powdermaker cited the example of "Mother B., a woman in her late seventies, who as she sits rocking in her chair, the traditional handkerchief around her kinky hair, talking about the 'good white folks,' might have stepped out of a popular southern novel. She tells how bad she felt when her Missus died...and how the white woman's son, whom she had nursed, came and threw his arms 67 around her and they cried together. It is all true, but it is not all the truth. Still rocking back and forth, she continues about how her father was sold away before she was old enough to remember, adding: 'In those days people were sold like oxen and horses.'Then she tells how when her mother died, 'before surrender,' her brothers and sisters went to the funeral but her mistress made her stay home and work. She has never forgiven this, nor forgotten how bitterly she cried. After surrender, she was 'bonded over' to her mistress, who was supposed to educate her and give her some money when she came of age. She was never educated and she never received any money. 'All I got was work.' Now almost eighty, she is learning to read and write at an (sic) FERA class for adults. She was one of the first to enroll and she proudly displays her copy book and her first, almost illegible scrawls. With equal pride she reads haltingly from a first-grade primer. This same black mammy tells how white folks all call her Mammy and Aunty, though 'I ain't no kin to them at all.' She half resents the terms and certainly is not flattered by them.®®

Mrs. B ., on the whole, still thought that white people were superior, Powdermaker added; the generation that followed tended to deny such claims, she found. A woman of forty who Powdermaker noted "had no schooling at all, who has spent most of her life working in the cotton fields," expressed her denial in religious terms as was often done. In response to Powdermaker's inquiry, the woman retorted, "'Didn't the Lord make us all? The Whites have the power and the advantages now, but they ain't no different from the colored folks...Yes, the Whites think they're better but I 68 don't."®® Powdentiaker's research confirms Elizabeth Ferguson's contention that the most typical response to

racism and discrimination was "outward acceptance but fierce resentment. "®?

Powdermaker found, however, that the "conviction

which the middle-aged Negroes of today conceal from the

whites cannot long remain secret from their children."

She found an "intense and mounting bitterness" among the younger generation, which was "helpless and undirected." The bitterness manifested itself in subtle ways. Unlike their parents, for example, they would not

say, "Howdy, Boss" to white people. They avoided saying anything to them at all.®® The parents were aware of the feelings of their children, Powdermaker found, and they "regret the increased bitterness." They were concerned about what they perceived as the younger generation's refusal to "exercise tact and diplomacy." Most shared the feelings of one father who told Powdermaker that his son "simply won't take from the

Whites what the boy's parents had done all their lives.

He hopes that the son will go North before he gets into trouble down South."®® Charles Johnson's findings support Powdermaker's. He found that "upper class" southern blacks found "migration inconvenient" for themselves but "they pass on their feelings to their 69 children.

It was this generation which formed the core of the black leadership in the South, and it was this generation which seemed to confirm to the stereotype.

From their viewpoint, they were simply using "tact and diplomacy." In Indianola, Mississippi, Powdermaker reported that "every successful colored landowner can tell a long tale of the small subtle diplomacies he practices daily in order to 'get by.' The more successful he is the more tact and flattery he must use to make the white man feel that he is still staying in his place." ®^Gunnar Myrdal found that there "was much bitterness among southern Negro leaders because they are criticized for being 'Uncle Toms, especially by northern Negro intellectuals." As one such leader told Myrdal,

I'm a respectable citizen... [but] when I try to get my rights,I do so in a way that will not be obnoxious, and not in a radical way. I don't believe in no radicalism. We ask for things, but never demand. When I'm in Rome, I burn Roman candles...but I don't "Uncle Tom." 92

Southern leaders felt that it took "little courage" for northern blacks "stay in the safety of the North [and] keep on protesting against Negro suffering in the

South." One such leader, a prominent banker, told Myrdal, 70 They should come down here and feel the fears, uncertainties, and dependence of one of us in their own bones. If they continued their outbursts, we would know that they are crazy and we would have to try to get rid of them as a public danger. But sure they would come along. They would be as cautious and as pussy-footing as we are.

Whatever engendered the racial solidarity and race consciousness among black Americans, it was evident everywhere by 1940. It was manifested in the insistence on the capitalization of the "N" in Negro and of the

"C" in colored.®^ It was manifested in the tendency to enforce group solidarity. "Light" complexion, for instance, had always been "valued" within the black community. It was not uncommon for parents, or schools or cliques to show preferences for children based on relative "whiteness." When Myrdal did his study in the early 1940's, he found however, that "as the Negro community is becoming increasingly 'race conscious' it is no longer proper to display color preferences openly," that in fact, "the light-skinned Negroes have to pledge allegiance to the Negro race."®® "Passing" was declining. In fact, those light complexioned enough to pass took a certain amount of "pleasure in being able to pass and not actually doing so." Professional "passing" was more common, but others in the community knew the individual was passing and treated it as a 71 form of deception of white people.In Chicago, Drake and Cayton also found that "race consciousness bred a demand for 'racial solidarity'." The researchers contended that

everyone knew that no matter how high a Negro gets he's still just a Negro, that as they contemplate their existence as a minority in a white world which spurns them, they see their ultimate hope in presenting some sort of united front against that world. .

Charles Johnson reached a similar conclusion about blacks in the South. When Johnson studied the

"personality development of rural youth in the 1930's, he found a high level of adjustment "to being a Negro."

Of the 2,241 youths responding on the survey, only4% endorsed the statement, "I wish I were white." Thiswas the item on the survey most designed to signify a high degree of "maladjustment to the group." Johnson's research revealed that the Negro community is built around the idea of adjusting to being a Negro, and it rejects escape into the white world...Without much conscious instruction, the child is taught that his first loyalties are to the Negro group. He may criticize Negroes and even dislike them, but he is a Negro and must not even wish to be otherwise. The doctrine is reinforced by stories of the meanness and cruelty of white people. To wish to be white is a sacrifice of pride. It is equivalent to a statement that Negroes are inferior.. Sociologist Arnold Rose made a similar point in his study of "group identification" among blacks. He 72 found among them "attitudes intended to promote self- identification, " very much similar to what is

characterized in the armed forces as "pride in outfit," "loyalty to the nation," and "hatred of the enemy." He found that "there is a regular indoctrination in these

attitudes among Negroes," even though less informal

than those practiced in the armed forces. He cited the

example of novelist Richard Wright, who in 1937

recalled his experiences with the indoctrination process while growing up in Mississippi. Wright recollected that

Having grown taller and older, I now associated with older boys and had to pay for my admittance into their company by subscribing to certain racial sentiments. The touchstone of fraternity was my feeling toward white people, how much hostility I held toward them, what degrees of value and honor I assigned to the race. None of this was premeditated, but sprang spontaneously out the talk of the black boys who met at the crossroads.^ Minority group consciousness, researchers recognized, could be either positive or negative. Arnold Rose contended that, by 1940, "group identification" among black Americans was positive. For Rose, positive group identification involves not only a recognition that because of one's ancestry one is a member of a racial or religious group...it also involves a positive desire to identify oneself as a member of the group and a feeling of pleasure 73 when one does so identify. . In Tamotsu Shibutani's study of the

"demoralization" of a Japanese unit in World War II, he highlights the importance of looking at "primary group identification" in studying the response to the military experience.Johnson was correct in his assertion that the first loyalty of black Americans was to "the Negro group." This attitude is absolutely fundamental to any understanding of how black Americans responded to World War II.

On the eve of World War II, black Americans, for a variety of reasons, were dissatisfied with "things as they are." Drake and Cayton (who were still conducting their study of black life in Chicago for the WPA when the war began) found that "discontent .. widespread in

Bronzeville," It is most articulate, of course, among individuals of higher status groups [but]even a cursory observation of a political rally or a barbershop discussion will convince the most skeptical, however, that these spokesmen are expressing the attitudes and desires of the Negro masses... Many were angry, perhaps angrier, at what the Pittsburgh Courier termed "The War Against

Negroes. Roi Ottley, whose sociological study of blacks in New York was also ongoing when the war began, found a similar discontent. "Six months before the 74 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Ottley recalled, Negro communities in the urban areas were seething with resentment. This was reflected in the outspoken utterances of ordinarily conservative Negro leaders, by the pointed editorialized reporting in the Negro press and, as well, by the inflammatory letters-to- the editor. Harlem's Amsterdam Star-News described the situation in this language: 'Where there was once tolerance and acceptance of a position believed to be gradually changing for the better, now the Negro is showing a democratic upsurge of rebellion, ' bordering on open hostility.

A similar change in attitude was evident to black leaders in the South. A black clergyman. Dr. Nathaniel

Tross, expressed his concern to Gunnar Myrdal. "I am afraid for my people," he told Myrdal. "They are not happy. They no longer laugh. There is a new policy among them--something strange, perhaps terrible.

He implied that he feared they would turn to violence as a solution to their problems.

The response of black Americans to World II was also governed by the memories of World War I. As Walter White, then Executive Secretary of the NAACP pointed out, "Memories of all Negroes, except those of the very young, are bitter-green regarding the last World War." In World War I, they had wanted to participate, they had followed the advice of their leaders to "forget our special grievances and close ranks with our fellow white citizens and the allies [who are] fighting 75 for democracy."^®® Those who had helped to "make the world safe for democracy" returned to find there was

still little of it at home, however. A generation was simply too short a time for the memories to fade.

The belligerency was reinforced by the difficulty black Americans encountered in finding employment in the emerging war industries. Blacks in 1939 still comprised a disproportionate share of the unemployed. when the war began, however, they were virtually excluded from jobs in the booming defense industry. Unlike the situation in World War I, there was a large pool of unemployed white workers when World War II began. Employers would not hire black workers if white workers were available.^®® Employers were explicit about their racial policies. As the president of the North American Aviation company expressed it,

"While we are in complete sympathy with the Negro, it is against company policy to employ them as aircraft workers or mechanics, regardless of their training...There will be some jobs as janitors for Negroes. When the United Stated Employment

Service sent inquiries to selected defense industries concerning the number of positions available and whether they would employ black workers, over half of them indicated categorically that they would not. A 76 survey of ten defense plants in the New York area revealed that of the 29,215 employees, only 142 were black. In Michigan, 22,042 of the 26,904 positions in the defense industry were closed to black applicants.Gunnar Myrdal noted that at the time his study was being written, exclusion of blacks from the war industry was still "the rule practically everywhere.

Given this and other factors, it would have been surprising if black Americans displayed enthusiasm toward the war. They did not. Two weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, sixty prominent black leaders met in New York City in a conference called by the

NAACP and the National Urban League. William Hastie, then Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, introduced a resolution which stated that "the colored people are not wholeheartedly and unreservedly all out in support of the present war." It passed with only five dissenting votes. Walter White, Executive Secretary of the NAACP and a participant in the meeting, "attributed the country wide apathy of Negroes to discrimination in the Army, Navy, and Air Corps and especially in the war industries (emphasis added) . Drake and Cayton and other researchers concluded that the attitudes of the leaders reflected the attitudes of "the Negro masses." 77 "Negroes of all classes," Drake and Cayton asserted, have a habit of 'taking out in talk.' If we examine the random comments, the unprompted conversations of the lower class Negro in Bronzeville, we find that they, no less than the more literate higher status group, are not satisfied with things as they are."^“

They cited, for example, a conversation which took place in the home of one of their "lower class" subjects on the eve of World War II. They had been listening to a report on the radio about the anti- lynching bill which was under debate in Congress. The conversation naturally drifted from lynching to the impending entry of the United States into the war. One of the subjects, identified as "High Pocket," remarked

"Yeah, this time nex' year I guess they'll have us all in the war." "Sandy" had served in World War I, and he naturally began to "tell tales of his experiences." He said, I went to France last time--in the medical section. I useta drive white officers up to Paris so they could raise hell. That was the most beautiful place I ever see. But they'll have to kill me next time. I see plenty to fight for here, but I don't see nuthin' to go over there to fight for.^^"*

Some even shared the view that the war itself constituted vengeance for the injustices of white people everywhere against the "colored races." Drake and Cayton encountered such a viewpoint at a "city wide 78 meeting of lower class preachers" in 1939. One of the ministers, who was an "educated preacher" but still

popular among the "store front preachers," proposed a resolution "calling on President Roosevelt to convene

an international conference to head off [the] war. It was passed in a perfunctory manner without debate."

Toward the end of the meeting, an almost illiterate woman, a missionary recently returned from Africa,

asked permission to speak and was granted three minutes. She proceeded to condemn the preachers for voting for peace.

No, we don't want no peace. God's punishing the white folks by letting 'em kill each other off. Look at ol' Leopol' and his Beljuns now! Look what ol' Mussaleeny did to Ethiopia! My God! Naw, don' vote for peace. God don' want no peace.

Throughout her speech, "she was interrupted by cries of "Amen," and "That's right, sister." The resolution prevailed but the researchers felt that, in their hearts, the preachers shared the woman's view that the war represented divine retribution for the injustices committed by White people.^* A West Indian doctor in New York expressed a similar opinion to Ralph Bunche, who was investigating the "tactics of betterment organizations" for Myrdal's American Dilemma. The physician, the leader of the 79 remnants of the Garvey movement, told the interviewer, Sir, the Negro must leam to keep his business to himself. He must be as wise as a serpent and appear to be as harmless as a dove. He must strike at the right moment. Let the European war start. Some Negroes are crying for peace. Peace, hell! Let them kill each other as long as they want to. The longer they do that, the better off the Negroes will be.^^’

Within a year the United States was drawn into

what blacks routinely termed "the white man's war.

The ambivalence toward the war was intensified by the fact that the United States was fighting another

"colored" nation. When the war began, few blacks in Chicago, according to Cayton and Drake, were aware of

"Japanese militarism and its brutal history." They knew

that "Japan was the one 'colored' nation which was a great power--that it had steamships and large factories," and that it defied the European powers who had previously been dominant in the East. Even those who were aware of Japan's brutal history expressed mixed emotions. One such individual, who the authors noted was of left-wing tendencies but unquestionably loyal to the United States, "made the following confession" of how he responded upon hearing that Pearl

Harbor had been attacked: I was really ashamed of myself the day Pearl Harbor was hit. When I heard the news I 80 jumped up and laughed. 'Well, sir, I said, 'I don't guess the white folks will say colored people can't fly airplanes from now on. They sure slammed [the] hell outa Pearl Harbor.' Then I caught myself. I know the Japanese are a bunch of Fascists; and I've been raisin' money for China relief for years. I know this isn't a race war. I shouldn't have been so pleased at anything the Japs did. But I supposed I just see it this way--we're bound to win this war in the long run and a few tactical defeats like Singapore and Pearl Harbor, in the framework of a strategy for total victory, may help democracy in the long run. They may make the white man wake up to the fact that he can't shove darker people around forever. Of course, we've got to lick the Japs. I'm not for a negotiated peace or anything like that.^^®

The ambivalence black Americans felt was also not helped by the tendency of white Americans, especially

in the early years of the war, to refer to the Japanese by such racial epithets as "yellow bastards." A preliminary report done for American Dilemma revealed

that about one-fifth of black Americans interviewed nationwide "admitted pro-Japanese sentiments."

(emphasis added) Drake and Cayton believed that the

sentiment was considerably more widespread, especially

in the early days of the war.^^° The ambivalent attitudes toward the war extended

even into the South. Walter White related a story he had heard from a teacher at "a well-known Negro college in the South" concerning the attitudes of students toward the war. In one of the class discussions, the 81 teacher reported, one of the students proclaimed, with infinite bitterness, 'I hope Hitler wins.'" The teacher

argued with the student was unable to convince him that his life would be considerably worse under Hitler. The student responded.

Things can't possibly be any worse than they are for Negroes right now. The Army jim- crows u s . The Navy lets us serve only as messmen. The Red Cross refuses our blood. Employers and labor unions shut us out. Lynchings continue. We are disenfranchised, jim-crowed, spat upon. What more could Hitler do than that?"“^

The attitudes were not limited just to college

students. While undertaking research in the South, Gunnar Myrdal found that

it was quite common that Negroes feel a satisfaction in the temporary adversities and want the war to become as serious a thing as possible for the white people in power. There have been reports that poor Negro sharecroppers sometimes indulge in dreams of a Japanese Army marching through the South and killing off a number of 'crackers.' They do not want them to land in the North, though, and they certainly do not want them to stay. But much more common is a glowing ill-conceived satisfaction over the war adversities on various f r o n t s .

A report from an FBI agent, undercover in Norfolk,

Virginia, confirmed that such attitudes still prevailed in 1945. He reported to his superiors that the events which have transpired on the war fronts have been more widely discussed by the general run of Negroes than at any other time...The reactions of the Negroes as 82 expressed have been highly confusing and at times border on sedition. Many times this agent has overheard statements which would seem to indicate that the person uttering them was actually pleased at the setbacks encountered by the American forces in Europe.. .123

In the meantime, black attitudes continued to be

embittered daily by continued injustice. White America gave fair and impartial trials to Nazi spies but they lynched black Americans. Blacks were especially

embittered by the lynching of a mentally retarded youth

named Cleo Wright, "who was burned, his body mutilated, tied to an automobile, and dragged through the streets of Sikeston, Missouri.

Moreover, even before the war started, reports of

the mistreatment of and discrimination against black

soldiers started to filter back to the civilian population.The reports added to the ambivalent attitudes on the part of the black population. A letter to the editor of the Amsterdam Star News probably

reflected the opinion of a large proportion of the black population when it asserted that "it is all right to be loyal if encouraged, but I fail to see where

America is doing anything to encourage the loyalty of black men..."^^® It was in this atmosphere that the

sixty-six black leaders met in New York and approved the resolution which stated that "the colored people 83 are not wholeheartedly and unreservedly in support of the present war effort,

Despite the bitterness over continued discrimination on the home and on the war front, blacks did their share to aid in the war effort. They would out-do each other in their efforts to make "the boys" feel comfortable when they came to Chicago. They purchased millions in war bonds and, in fact, one of the liberty ships was named for Robert Abbott, publisher of the Chicago Defender. T h e undercover FBI agent in Norfolk reported that this was also true of blacks in Norfolk. He reported that

there is no indication of any organized penetration into Negro thinking or any directed activity toward producing mass disloyalty... It should also be noted that the Negro elements have met their assigned quota in bond buying and have continued to support in every way war activities. An outstanding example of this was the volunteering by Negro stevedores to work during the recent holidays. There is an underlying inconsistency in the Negroes' sentiments and overt action on the part of the Negro population and makes predictions relative to the status of the Racial Situation difficult.

There was no underlying inconsistency as far as black Americans were concerned. They were willing to do their share, but not for the "official" reasons. Drake and Cayton found, that "patriotism received its 84 strongest reinforcement from the widespread belief that the war might help to 'advance The Race.'" Selling

bonds and working the docks on holidays activities, were more than patriotic duties, they were also a means of 'advancing The Race. ' Moreover once someone they knew went to war, it took on a more personal meaning. Once someone they knew died, it became easier to visualize Japan as the enemy.

In the meantime, it was agreed that activities on the homefront to advance "the Race" would continue. In contrast to its position in World War I, the black leadership was nearly unanimous that the protest for civil rights would continue during the war. In the first editorial written after the attack on Pearl Harbor, The Crisis declared,

"NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO BE SILENT." We need to say all the things that cry out to be said--not later, but now... We must say that the fight against Hitlerism begins in Washington, B.C., the capital of our nation where black Americans have a status only slightly above that of Jews in Berlin.

This position received widespread popular approval. The popular symbol for the war was a 'V,' symbolizing victory over the enemies of democracy abroad. At the suggestion of a reader, the Pittsburgh Courier adopted a 'Double V,' to symbolize the need to fight for democracy at home and abroad. Opinion polls 85 taken by the Office of War Information and polls taken by the newspapers themselves revealed that there was indeed widespread support for the 'Double V' campaign." As a letter writer to the Amsterdam Star News expressed it, "remember that what you [Negroes] fail to get now you won't get after the war.

This statement reflected the "New Negro" attitude

in 1940- The belief that they were "different" was voiced even among southern blacks by the early 1940's.

Ottley recounts a story which was apparently making the rounds about

a group of rural Negroes living outside Richmond, Virginia, [who] were having a heated argument over the difference between the old and new Negro. 'Well, as I sees it,' drawled an octogenarian finally, "when the old Negro was insulted he shed a tear; today, when these young ones is insulted they sheds blood. '

There was perhaps, Ottley observed, a certain amount of

"wishful thinking" in the old man's assertions, but the belief that there was "New Negro" was voiced in many quarters. It is the "New Negro" who went into the military during World War II.

The consequences were soon evident. Problems between black soldiers and southern civilians had already begun even before the war started, and observers perceived the attitudes of black soldiers as 86 a contributing factor. In August of 1941, a battle

erupted between white military police and black soldiers on a bus in Fayetteville, North Carolina. A black soldier was shot dead and two military police were wounded. Black soldiers, who witnessed the

incident the Pittsburgh Courier reported, were openly proud of the dead soldier, who wounded the white military policemen.Black soldiers, in fact, repeatedly voiced the opinion that if they had to die fighting for "democracy," it might as well be for "democracy" at home. A popular anecdote used to demonstrate this attitude concerned a black soldier on a bus in the South who refused to move to the rear. He was alleged to have taken off his coat and said to the bus driver, "Well, I'm fixing to go off and fight for democracy. I might as well start right now."“ ^

University of Chicago sociologist Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues in the Research Branch of the Army concluded as early as 1942 that black soldiers were "different". The Research Branch began to look at the characteristics of black soldiers in early 1942 in order to assist Army officials with providing recreation, welfare, and educational services for them.

Moreover, as a result of racial disturbances which occurred in several Army camps in the summer of 1942, 87 the Army requested that the Research Branch include

black soldiers in their surveys of soldiers' attitudes toward the War. As a result of the studies, the researchers documented both the change in

characteristics and attitudes of black soldiers in World War II.

Many officers in contact with Negro troops, [Stouffer reported], have observed that the Negro soldier--particularly the selectee-is a different man from the Negro soldier in World War I or even in the peacetime regular Army. The facts, charted from statistics, back up such observations. Indeed, they make it clear that a radical change in the average type of Negro soldier has taken place.

The demographic change alone, which they tabulated from a special run of the 1940 Census acquired from the Census Bureau, astounded the researchers. Stouffer and his colleagues asserted that one of the most striking single facts--one which sometimes was inadequately appreciated by those whose experience with Negro soldiers derived from World War I--was the remarkable change in educational levels in a single generation.

Their analysis revealed that, in World War I, eighty percent of black soldiers came from the South, and only three percent of southern blacks had even attended high school. The North supplied the remaining twenty percent of the soldiers and they too were largely illiterate. Only fourteen percent of Northern blacks 88 had even attended high school because, even among blacks who enlisted from the North, as many as half were recent arrivals from the South. In World War II, largely as a result of the Great Migration, the North was supplying a larger proportion of black soldiers, about one-third, a fact that impacted enormously upon the literacy rate of blacks in the Army. The southern black soldier, the researchers found, "still had little schooling." However, even among them, thirty-three percent had attended high school, eleven times as many as in World War I. "But the most significant change," they contended, "was in the Northern Negroes." Sixty- three percent of black soldiers from the North had attended high school, and twenty-four percent were either college or high school graduates. The vast majority came from the large northern cities, such as New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia where education was compulsory.Stouffer and his colleagues concluded that although the educational level of the black soldier was still far below that of the white soldier (who was also better educated than his father had been in World War I,) "the illiterate plantation hand from the cotton South was no longer the typical black soldier. The researchers suspected that the "New Negro" 89 might "create problems for the Army." Writing in 1942,

they asserted that the 'New Negro' has already created problems in race relations.When they surveyed black soldiers attitudes beginning in 1943, the surveys

confirmed the researchers' apprehensions. Stouffer and his colleagues discovered that black soldiers had a higher educational level than the blacks in the general population. Civilian studies had already revealed that the better educated tended to feel racism more intensely. The researcher also confirmed this. They found this. The more educated a black soldier was, the more likely he was to be a militant on the issue of racial equality. Colonel Donovan Queen, one of a small number of black career Army officers at the beginning of World War II, also recalled that the black draftee was different from the black "regulars," like himself. "The black regular had chosen the Army and had to be pushed pretty hard before he fought back...The black draftee was different. He did not give a damn about a military career. ...He was therefore prone to react swiftly. "1*^ Stouffer and the Research Branch found that the results of their surveys "did not confirm the stereotypes normally associated with Negroes." Stouffer 90 argued that

the concept of the average Negro as a happy, dull, indifferent creature, who was quite contented with his status in the social system as a whole and in the military segment of that social system, finds little support in this study...There was a readiness to protest which was quite inconsistent with the stereotype of happy-go-lucky indifference. On the other hand, the Negroes were not revolutionaries plotting the overthrow of the present social system...It would be absurd...to attribute to all Negro soldiers a consistent or well articulated ideology...But even the uneducated tended to feel and express resentment at treatment which seemed to them unjust. .

It is this "readiness to protest...to feel and express resentment at treatment which seemed to them unjust" which constitutes the subject of this study. 91 ENDNOTES

1. Interview with Sgt. Frank Penick, in Mary Penick Motley, The Invisible Soldier (Detroit : Wayne State University Press, 1975), 50-51.

2. Richard Kohn, "The Social History of the American Soldier: A Prospective and Prospectus for Research, American Historical Review 86 (June 1981): 564.

3. Studies of the revolutionary period found that political positions altered because of military service. For instance, see William Benton, "Pennsylvania Revolutionary Officers and the Federal Constitution," Pennsylvania History 31 (1964): 419-35; and Edwin G. Burrows, "Military Experience and the Origins of Federalism and Anti-federalism," in Jacob Judd and Irwin Polishhook, ed.. Aspects of Early New York Society and Politics (Tarreyton: Sleepy Hollow Restorations, 1974). Barbeau's study of black soldiers in World War I also found that black soldiers became more politically conscious after the war. See Arthur Barbeau, The Unknown Soldiers : Black American Troops in World War I (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974. There are serious doubts, however, as to whether the Army in 1940 qualifies as a "total environment," one "radically different" from the pre-service environment of soldiers in general. As we shall see, most soldiers in World War II were seldom cut off from contact with their civilian environment. Moreover, Barbeau did not investigate the pre-service background or environment out of which black soldiers came, nor did he provide any evidence of the subsequent radicalization.

4. See Peter Karsten's "The 'New' American Military History: A Map of the Territory, Explored and Unexplored, " American Quarterly 36 (1984): 405-7. Nancy Phillips study of War veterans demonstrated that World War II veterans were more inclined to be "hawkish," regardless of whether they had volunteered or had been drafted. However, she studied only World War II vets who were employed in a defense plant. See Nancy Phillips, "Militarism and Grass Roots Involvement 92 in the Military Industrial Complex," Journal of Conflict Resolution. 17 (1973) : 625-55. Studies that were unable to prove that soldiers were more likely to own firearms as a consequence of the military experience include Alan Lizotte and David Bordua, "Childhood Socialization and Vet's Firearm Ownership," Journal of Political and Military Sociology (1980) : 243-56. It found that the military was largely pre- selective, that the soldiers went into the military because they had a fascination with weapons. John Helmer studied Boston working class veterans who later became active in the anti-war movement and found evidence for radicalization. However, he paid little attention to pre-service attitudes. See John Helmer, Bringing the War Home (New York: The Free Press, 1974. 5. Richard Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts. 1939-1953. (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press), 3. 6. Charles Moskos, "Commentary," The Military and Society: Proceedings of the Fifth Military Symposium Held at the United States Air Force Academy October 5- 6. 1982. ed. Major David Maclsaac, USAF (Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF and United States Air Force Academy), 139.

7. There are few studies of the impact of military service, as previously indicated. A quantitative study of the black veterans of World War II found that southern black veterans were more likely than whites to migrate after the war. Analysis of migration statistics from the 1950 census revealed that more than fifty percent of the southern black men in their twenties were living in a region other than the region of their birth, compared to a third of white men. There is nothing in this study to suggest, however, that they had none of these inclinations before the war. See John Modell, Marc Goulden, and Sigurdur Magnusson, "World War II in the Lives of Black Americans : Some Findings and Interpretations," Journal of American History 76 No. 3 (December 1989): 838. A small study undertaken by James Hadley Stiles among veterans in Atlanta in June of 1945 found that most of the veterans he sampled were either "satisfied" with living in the South (24%) or indifferent (33%). Only a minority, 15%, thought it was "No place for [the] Negro. His sample however consisted of a high percentage of college graduates (21%) and they were most likely to be successful there. See James 93 Hadlet Stiles, "The Social Attitudes of Negro Servicemen," (Master's Thesis, Department of Sociology, Atlanta, University, 1945), 13. Another study conducted in 1945 among black veterans enrolled at Virginia State college found that southern blacks expressed more positive attitudes toward whites after the war than they had before the war and that northern blacks expressed the reverse. See Harry W. Roberts, "Prior-Service Attitudes Toward Whites of 219 Negro Veterans," in Journal of Nearo Education. 23 (1946): 32-40 and Harry W. Roberts, "Impact of Military Service Upon the Racial Attitudes of Negro Servicemen in World War II," Social Forces 12 (1948): 132-156. A study of race relations between black and white soldier in the Army in the 1970's failed to prove that contact between the group produced positive racial attitudes. In fact, the study found that "the single most important" factor was "the strong positive effects of pre-service contacts" between the groups. See John Silby Butler and Kenneth L. Wilson, "The American Soldier Revisited: Race Relations in the Military," Social Science Quarterly (59) : 465.

8. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces. 3; and Moskos, "Commentary," Proceedings of the Fifth Military History Symposium. 139. Black soldiers also repeatedly made the assertion that when they got out of the military they would fight for civil rights. They did not recognize that what they were doing constituted protest.

9. There are no existing studies of the attitudes of black soldiers who served in World War I . Arthur Barbeau and Florette Henri's Unknown Soldiers : Black American Troops in World War I is essentially a study of attitudes toward black soldiers. However, there is evidence that they did protest their treatment during World War I. Roi Ottley recounted an incident in which the members of a Harlem unit which had won the Croix de Guerre. "stood in a field near the Metz and silently displayed its resentment against the insincerities of its homeland" by refusing to sing 'My Country 'Tis of Thee.'" See Roi Ottley, The Negro In New York (New York: Public Library, 1967 ), 205. 10. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma : The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1944), 744. 94 11. Ottley, New World A-Corning. (New York: Arno Press, 1968; ), 307.

12. Samuel Stouffer, The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, vol. I, Studies in Social Psychology in World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 486.

13. St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, Black Metropolis: A Study of Necrro Life in a Northern City (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1945), 754. 14. Ibid.. 99.

15. Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal For Blacks; The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue. New York: (Oxford University Press, 1978), 31. 16. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 761.

17. Charles Johnson, Growing Up In theBlack Belt. (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941), 312.

18. Rose, The Negro's Morale: Group Identification and Protest (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), 4; and Elizabeth Ferguson, "Race Consciousness Among Negroes," Journal of Negro Education 6 (1938) : 34.

19. Rose, The Negro's Morale. 54.

20. Ibid.. 110.

21. Ferguson, "Race Consciousness Among Negroes," 35

22. Rose, The Negro's Morale. 9. 23. E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro in the United States (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1949), 531. 24. Actually, this subject requires further study. The race riots in Atlanta ended after blacks mobilized and started to fight back. See Benjamin Brawley, A Social History of the American Negro (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1921; reprint. New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1968), 319-320. 95 25. Rose, The Negro's Morale. 52 26. Drake, Black Metropolis. 66.

27. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 746-7; Rose, The Negro's Morale. 42; and Drake, Black Metropolis. 752-3. 28. Drake, Black Metropolis. 101-128.

29. Ottley, New World A'Coming. 69.

30. E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro in the United States. 531.

31. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 749.

32. Ibid., 749 and 835-6, citing a letter from Walter White, March 15, 1941, and Ralph Bunche, "The Programs, Ideologies, Tactics, and Achievements of Negro Betterment and Interracial Organizations," unpublished manuscript, prepared for the Myrdal study. 33. Drake, Black Metropolis. 751-2 and Ottley, New World A'Coming. 73-75. A journalist and social worker employed by the WPA during the Depression, Ottley witnessed the first UNIA parade in his native Harlem in the 1920's. He recalled that it was a "spectacle almost approaching medieval splendor." He also recalled the adulation for Garvey expressed by the black spectators who lived on the parade route. 34. Drake, Black Metropolis. 85.

35. Drake, Black Metropolis. 85.

36. Ottley, New World A' Coming. 113.

37. Ibid.. p. 86.

38. Ottley, New World A' Coming. 243-4, and Drake, Black Metropolis. 87, 735. 39. Drake, Black Metropolis. 87, and Myrdal, American Dilemma. 749.

40. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 834, citing internal memorandum by Roy Wilkins, NAACP, August 11, 1942. 96 41. Ottley, New World A'Coming. 243-4; the Communist impressed black New Yorkers for the same reason. 42. See Dan T. Carter, The Scottsboro Case: A Tragedy of the American South (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1974). 43. Drake, Black Metropolis. 737.

44. Ibid., 87-88.

45. Ibid., 733-34.

46. Ibid., 737. 47. Ibid., 738-9. 48. Robert Moton, What the Nearo Thinks (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1930), 32, 34.

49. Ibid., 33. 50. Frazier, Negro in the United States. 436-7.

51. Moton, What the Negro Thinks. 40.

52. Ibid., 32-33, 45.

53. Ibid., 44. 54. Rose, The Negro's Morale, p. 6-7.

55. Ibid., pp. 96-97.

56. Ibid., 97-98. 57. Ferguson, "Race Consciousness Among Negroes," 35 58. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 908. 59. Rose, The Negro's Morale. 105.

60. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 908. 61. Ottley, New World A'Coming. 270. 97 62. The assessment is found in Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, p. 399, but confirming opinions can be found in E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro in the United States. 513, Myrdal, American Dilemma. 924, and Ottley, New World A' Coming. 270.

63. E. Franklin Frazier found 144 active newspapers in 1943, with a circulation of 1,613,255. See Frazier, The Nearo in the United States. 514.

64. Rose, The Negro's Morale. 104.

65. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 917.

66. Rose, The Necrro's Morale. 104. 67. Ibid., 105. 68. Drake, Black Metropolis. 80.

69. John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Nearo Americans. Fifth Ed. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1980), 403-407.

70. See Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal For Blacks. 216-243, for an extended discussion of the legal developments during this period. 71. Moton, What The Nearo Thinks. 22-23.

72. Drake, Black Metropolis. 109.

73. Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks. 31.

74. Drake, Black Metropolis. 725.

75. Alain Locke and Bernard Sterner used the term "minority group consciousness" and Elizabeth Ferguson, referred to it as "race consciousness." See Ferguson, "Race Consciousness Among American Negroes," 34; and, Alain Locke and Bernhard Stern, When Peoples Meet (New York, Progressive Education Association 1942), 465. 76. Ottley, New World A'Coming. 211.

77. Ibid., 204. 78. Drake, Black Metropolis. 354. 98 79. Ottley, New World A'Corning. 212, and Drake, Black Metropolis. 369 for discussion of Oscar DePriest.

80. Drake, Black Metropolis. 354. Drake and Cayton found that a similar attitude prevailed among blacks in Chicago. They "became astute politicians," the researchers found, "shrewdly demanding for their votes "all that they think the traffic will bear."

81. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 498-9.

82. Ottley, New World A' Coming. 204, 211. 83. Neil A. Wynn, The Afro-American and the Second World War (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975), 19. 84. Rose, The Negro's Morale. 122-24; Johnson's review was contained in The American Sociological Review 11 (April 1946): 244-45. It was at the publishers insistence that "moderates" were these moderates included among the contributors. He expected them to ask for "favors," such as a new university for the South, not for racial equality. The publisher's introduction went so far as to state that the "Negro's condition is produced by inferiority..."

85. Hortense Powdermaker, After Slavery : A Cultural Study of the Deep South (New York: Russel and Russel, 1939), 326-7.

86. Ibid., 328.

87. Ferguson, "Race Consciousness Among Negroes," 35. 88. Powdermaker, After Freedom. 333.

89. Ibid., 333-4.

90. Johnson, Growing Up in the Black Belt. 312 91. Powdermaker, After Freedom. 330. 92. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 773.

93. Ibid.■ 770. 99 94. Ferguson, "Race Consciousness Among Negroes," 33 and Moton, What the Nearo Thinks. 45. 95. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 698.

96. Ferguson, "Race Consciousness Among Negroes," 35-36, Myrdal, American Dilemma. 685 and Rose, The Negro's Morale. 114. There are naturally no statistics available on the extent of passing, according to Rose, but he and other observers contend that it had declined considerably since the "low morale" period from 1890- 1910. 97. Drake, Black Metropolis. 723.

98. Charles Johnson, Growing Up in the Black Belt. p. 301.

99. Richard Wright, Black Bov (New York: Harper and Row, 1945), p. 68. 100. Rose, The Negro's Morale. 3.

101. Tomatsu Shibutani, The Derelicts of Company K: A Sociological Study of Demoralization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 9, 13-14, and 412-17. 102. Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis. 716. 103. Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II. p. 116. Lynching, for example, had increased during the 1930's. It was one reason that the NAACP decided against a frontal attack on "Jim Crow" laws and decided instead to force "equal if separate." They were afraid that a frontal attack would precipitate more violence against blacks. 104. Ottley, New World A'Coming. 289.

105. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 1013.

106. This is an excerpt from the famous "Close Ranks," editorial, which W.E.B. DuBois wrote in The Crisis. January, 1918. Walter White's comments are from his editorial in The Crisis. January, 1942. 100 107. Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, noted that the Negro newspapers even in the 1920's, had "reserved their major thrust for those who denied Negroes equal economic opportunity." Charles Johnson agreed. His research on blacks in the South, as will be discussed in the following chapter, also revealed that "economic suppression" was more deeply resented than was racial segregation. See Johnson, Growing Uo in the Black Belt. 83.

108. Herbert Garfunkel. When Negroes March: The March on Washington Movement in the Organizational Politics of the FEPC (New York: Antheum Books, 1975), 19.

109. PM, May 7, 1941, p. 18; quoted in Herbert Garfunkel, When Negroes March, p. 17. 110. Ottley, New World A' Coming. 290.

111. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 1005.

112. Ottley, New World A' Coming. 314-315. 113. Drake, Black Metropolis. 718; See also James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Evervdav Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), Chapter 7, "Argument as Resistance." Like Drake and Cayton, he went about the village of Sedaka and listened to the conversations of the poor peasants. Scott argues similarly that the conversations the poor had among themselves reflected a denial of the claims of the rich to superior status, a rejection of the categories which the rich sought to impose upon them, and so on. 114. Drake, Black Metropolis. 719.

115. Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis. 720-21. The king of Belgium, the researchers noted, used to have the hands of African natives cut off for refusing to work on the rubber plantations. It created quite a scandal at the time. Old "Race" leaders in Chicago were still talking about this, in the 1930's! 116. Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis. 720.

117. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 813. 101 118. Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis. 721. 119. Ibid., 745.

120. See Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis. 745. The study he cites is contained in Myrdal, American Dilemma. 1400. Drake and Cayton also noted that the OWI (Office of War Information) had conducted a similar study but it was naturally not available. They believed, however, that the number of black who were sympathetic to the Japanese was much higher, especially in the early years of the war.

121. "What the Negro Thinks of the Army," Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Sciences 223, (September, 1942): 67-71. Walter White told the story to an audience of students in the midwest, and to his dismay, the audience applauded the students. He had meant the story to "illustrate the short-sighted thinking which Negro Americans have to guard zealously against." It took him a while to quiet the applause, he recalled, and though he "offered a detailed explanation of the fallacy of such thinking," he left the meeting with "a deep feeling of depression born of the conviction" that some in his audience remained unconvinced that "Hitlerism could and would be worse." 122. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 1007.

123. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C., Subject: "Racial Situation in the Hampton Roads Area: General Summary of Prevailing Attitudes," Hampton, Virginia, 5 January, 1945, in RG 319, (Military Intelligence) Box 444, National Archives, Suitland, MD. 124. Ottley, New World A'Coming. 308.

125. Ibid., 310. 126. Ibid., 311. 127. Ibid., 314-15.

128. Drake, Black Metropolis. 751. 102 129. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), "Racial Situation in the Hampton Roads Area," Hampton, Virginia, 5 January, 1945, in RG 319, Box 444, National Archives, Suitland, Md.

130. Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis. 748. 131. The Crisis. January, 1942, 7. 132. Ottley, New World A' Coming. 314.

133. Ibid.. 309.

134. P. L. Pratis, "The Morale of Negroes in the Armed Forces of the United States," Journal of Nearo Education. 12 (1943): 355.

135. Sterling A. Brown, "Out of Their Mouths," Survey Graphic (November, 1942): 482.

136. Research Division, Special Services Branch, "Some New Statistics on the Negro Enlisted Man." February 17, 1942, Report No. 2, Record Group 330, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 137. Stouffer, The American Soldier. 489.

138. Research Division, "Some New Statistics on the Negro Enlisted Man," 2.

139. Stouffer, The American Soldier. 489-90. Stouffer and his colleagues noted further that even if one took into account the fact that blacks especially in the South had received an inferior education, it did not detract from their achievement.

140. Stouffer, "Some New Statistics on the Negro Enlisted Man," 11. 141. Stouffer, American Soldier. 569. 142. Inteirview with Colonel Donovan Queen, in Motley, The Invisible Soldier. 40. 143. Stouffer, The American Soldier. 596. Chapter II

BUT WE "KNOW THE NEGRO:" BLACK PROTEST AND WHITE COMPLACENCY.

Black servicemen entered the Armed Forces in World

War II with a predisposition toward protest. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the population in

the 1940's was becoming increasingly more assertive on the issue of racial equality, an assertiveness that disturbed the Office of War Information as early as

1942.1 In contrast to its position in the previous conflict, the black leadership agreed that there would be no moratorium on protest in World War II. ^ It should come as no surprise, therefore, that some black servicemen took the assertiveness of the black population with them. The result, as Stouffer and the researchers found, was "a tendency to protest which was quite inconsistent with the stereotype of happy-go- lucky indifference."!

Army officers tended to disregard the findings of the Research Branch as well as the body of civilian literature on black attitudes. Most officers were southern whites and they had been in fact selected to

103 104 command black soldiers based on the Army's belief that southern whites understood blacks. There was a strong belief among these officers that black soldiers were

"satisfied with things as they are, that most

"incidents" were the result of northern "agitation" or "the low level of intelligence" among black servicemen.s

Southern blacks were aware of the southern whites' claim to complete knowledge of "the Negro," a claim that southern blacks found somewhat amusing. Writing in 1930, Moton contended that

Perhaps no single phrase has been more frequently used in discussing the race problem...than the familiar declaration, "I know the Negro...Negroes have always met this remark with a faint, knowing smile. Their common experience has taught them that...there are vast reaches of Negro life and thought of which white people know nothing whatever, even after long contact with them, sometimes on the most intimate terms. ®

There was, he acknowledged, an element of truth in the southerners' claim. There were some whites who had acquired some knowledge of blacks, either from having them as playmates, or servants, or from working with them in industries and so on. He took issue with their conviction of the "essential correctness of their own impression." He concluded that not only did whites not 105 "know the Negro," it is "what he doesn't know about the Negro that produces the race problem. When the Research Branch surveyed soldiers, the investigators found an "underlying theme of Negro protest against and white complacency toward the racial

status...in almost every aspect of Negro-white

relationship."* This belief mirrored the findings of

civilian researchers. White satisfaction with the

racial status quo was revealed by opinion surveys. The white population generally assumed that the black population was also satisfied.

There was indeed, in the 1940's, a widespread belief among the white majority in the passivity, tractability, and complacency of the black population. This presumption was, of course, grounded in conclusions about the nature of peoples of African descent and the slave experience. Moton wrote in 1930 that "today, Negroes young and old, resent the assertion that they were contented as slaves, which is primae facie evidence, they would say, that the person so declaring does not know them."* Sociologist Charles Johnson found that the sentiment still prevailed among whites in the 1930's. Southern whites believed, Johnson wrote, that "Negroes were innately docile as a race and [had been] content with 106 slavery."^® The evidence for the innate docility and contentment was the small number of violent rebellions among the slave population in North America. The historical scholarship, of course, refutes the conclusion that black slaves were satisfied with their status during slavery.^ In the 1940's however, the belief in the complacency of blacks was widespread.

Gunnar Myrdal recalled, as he travelled through the South conducting research for American Dilemma, that he was often told, sometimes by the most educated people that

there is 'no Negro problem' in America and that, if there ever was one, it is solved and settled to the satisfaction of both parties...We think the Negroes are all right in their place; and they do not want things changed, in fact, they are the happiest lot on earth. Just look at them: how they laugh and enjoy themselves,- how they sing and praise the Lord. (Italics added)

An Office of War Infoirmation survey conducted in

1943 among a representative sample of blacks and whites in Birmingham, Raleigh, Oklahoma City, Chicago and

Detroit quantified Myrdal's assertion. The researchers found that though the "Negroes expressed many grievances and dissatisfactions... the majority of whites think Negroes are generally satisfied." Seventy-eight (78)percent of whites surveyed believed that blacks were "satisfied with things as they 107 are.A survey conducted by Stouffer and his colleagues at the Research Branch of the Army revealed

a corresponding belief among white soldiers. Only fourteen percent of Northern white servicemen and ten percent of Southern white servicemen believed that the majority of blacks were unhappy with their status. The

overwhelming majority were of the opinion that "most Negroes... are pretty well satisfied.

Official beliefs about the character and disposition of black soldiers mirrored those of white civilians and white soldiers. In the years following

World War I, military analysts undertook a series of studies as a basis for determining, among other things, policies toward blacks soldiers in future conflicts. They also used the studies to train officers, including some who would actually command black soldiers in World

War II. In one of the studies, student officers at the Army War College were asked to summarize the character of the soldiers as the basis for understanding how to handle them. The student officers assessed the character and disposition of black soldiers as follows: As an individual, the negro is docile, tractable, lighthearted, carefree, and good- natured. If unjustly treated, he is likely to become surly and stubborn, though this is usually a temporary phase... On the other hand, the negro is cheerful, loyal, and usually uncomplaining if reasonably well 108 fed..

For the most part, they shared the belief of white

soldiers and white civilians that blacks soldiers were "pretty well satisfied."

The results of attitudinal surveys conducted among black servicemen appeared to support them. Beginning in 1943, at the request of the Army, Stouffer and his colleagues undertook extensive surveys of the attitudes

of black soldiers toward the war effort and their participation in it.^® Some of the questions on one of the surveys were designed to discern their

"attitudes...toward racial segregation in the Army." The researchers, avoiding the term 'segregation'

"because of the emotional response it tended to evoke," instead asked the soldiers how they felt about using

'separate' facilities and about serving in 'separate' units. The survey results revealed that black servicemen were fairly divided. Forty percent (40) of those surveyed in March of 1943 thought separate Post

Exchanges (PX) "a good idea," while forty seven (47)percent considered them "a poor idea." Forty-seven percent(47) responded it was "a good idea" to have separate service clubs, while thirty-nine (39) percent thought it was not. On the third question, designed to test their attitudes toward service in integrated (they 109 used the term "mixed") units thirty six (36) percent agreed that separate units were " a good idea" and thirty-seven (37) percent disagreed.^’

The researchers cautioned military officials not to interpret the results as evidence of "satisfaction"

with the status quo since, "the field work and

subsequent analysis of the data revealed a number of ambiguities in the responses." Some black soldiers, for example, had no facilities and thought any kind of facility "a good idea.Even those soldiers who

thought separate facilities or units "a good idea" did

so for reasons unrelated to acceptance of racial inferiority. Some black soldiers commented that

So long as there are so many prejudiced white people, it would be unpleasant. We want to be treated like men, not like dogs.

Whites would get all the best privileges if we were together.

By being in separate outfits, we can show that the Negroes can do as well as the whites. It is about time the white people learned the truth about this 'superiority' business. I had rather be with my own color. Then I know where I stand. Military officials ignored the researchers' admonitions and interpreted the survey results as evidence that racial segregation was satisfactory to black soldiers 110 and that they were "generally satisfied" with military racial policies.

They in fact ignored the finding that protest

against or condemnation of racial inequality was somehow revealed in all the survey results. His central

finding was that black soldiers "viewed situations in

racial terms... a point of view [which] is sometimes

difficult for those who are not Negroes to appreciate."2° Black soldiers, the surveys revealed,

tended to "react not just as a person but as a member

of an oppressed minority." This tendency became clear to the researchers when they studied the free responses to one of the questions on the March, 1943 survey. They asked the soldiers, "If you could talk to the President of the United States, what are the three most important questions you would ask him about the war and your part in it?" Four out of five black soldiers wrote at least one question, about the same proportion as white soldiers who were surveyed at the same time. At least half of the black soldiers "wrote explicit questions or protests about racial discrimination." Many of the remaining questions were worded in such a way as to imply a racial emphasis, though the researchers were unable to categorize them as such on the basis of the question itself. The researchers had deliberately Ill designed the question to focus attention on the war. They had deliberately omitted any reference to race. The vast majority of soldiers, however, managed to get "race" into their responses. Questions they wanted to ask the President included:

Will I as a Negro share in this so called democracy after the war?

I would like to ask him about Jim Crow in the South.

If it is not going to benefit my race, why should we be called to shed our blood?

Why is there discrimination even in the Army?

I would like to know what we have got to fight for?

The white soldiers surveyed at the same time were

asked "do you think that most Negroes in this country are pretty well satisfied or do you think most of them

are dissatisfied?" As indicated earlier, most thought

they were satisfied. The researchers disagreed. The

sentiments expressed in the free comments, they concluded, "are hardly consonant with the view that most Negroes are satisfied with the status of their group in American society." Like their civilian

counterparts, most white soldiers did not "know the Negro." This was actually the overwhelming conclusion of 112 all the sociological and anthropological studies of the 1930's and 1940's. Moton argued in 1930 that "Negroes feel that any person outside the race is simply

deceiving himself when he professes to know them, for

the reason that... circumstances operate effectively to prevent such knowledge.The most important

circumstance that prevented such knowledge was the

tendency of blacks to conceal their feelings from whites. It had been necessary during the days of

slavery, and "in spite of emancipation," he contended,

"Negroes still feel it is necessary to conceal their thoughts from white people.

The Research Branch confirmed that blacks indeed tended to "conceal their personalities from whites."

As the researchers prepared for the surveys to be

undertaken in March of 1943, they conducted extensive

pretests to ascertain the problems they would encounter

in obtaining information from black soldiers. The pretest revealed that all soldiers except those with

less than a fourth grade education could comprehend the written survey, thus only those with less than a fourth grade education had to be interviewed. They conducted a

second pretest in which a sample of black enlisted men was interviewed by white enlisted men and a matched sample was interviewed by black enlisted men. The 113 researchers discovered that they obtained significantly different answers depending on whether they used black

or white interviewers. The researchers found that

"Negro interviewers tended more than white interviewers to elicit responses reflecting racial protest,

unfavorable attitudes toward the war, or unfavorable

reports on the Army." Despite their repeated assurances of anonymity, black soldiers would not reveal their

true feelings about the Army to white interviewers.^^

The tendency to conceal their true feelings from whites was not confined to the South but extended to

blacks in the North as well. In 1942, the Office of War

information polled black New Yorkers on their attitudes toward the war effort. The questions included one

designed to ascertain the level of support for the "Double V" campaign. Forty-eight percent of New Yorkers

thought it was actually more important to fight for

democracy at home rather than democracy abroad. The

figure declined to thirty-five percent when the

interviewer was white. The tendency toward concealment was equally strong in the black community in Chicago. Drake and Cayton, while conducting research for Black Metropolis, noted

that they sometimes met with "expressions of scorn and contempt for people who tell all their business to 114 white folks." A woman said to Drake, "I don't have much education but I know I have a mind of my own. I know

that we need the help of the good white man, but at the

same time we should be very careful just what we let him know about us." Another WPA researcher was condemned by "a lower class woman" whom he was

interviewing. "You let the white folks use you," she

told the researcher. "White folks are doing everything they can to find out how the colored people are thinking. If God keeps His spirit in me. I'll keep that knowledge out of their heads." (Italics in the original)

The Research Branch's findings are consistent with sociological research in the 1930's and 40's that revealed that blacks adopted "a different face" when interacting with white people. The southern black practiced the art of deception. Gunnar Myrdal found that blacks tended to adopt "a cynical, even explosive attitude" toward white people's pretenses of superiority," for instance. Lower class parents, in Washington, B.C., for instance, taught their children

"techniques for 'getting by,' techniques which "included 'acting like a monkey,' 'jibbering,' 'flattery,' and just plain lying. Myrdal's research revealed in fact that "a dual 115 Standard of behavior is not unnatural for the southern

Negro." This was especially true of the black leader, who was expected "to play two roles, to wear two fronts." Myrdal interviewed the President of the NAACP, in "a small capital city" in the Deep South. The leader was distinguished and elderly, a postal clerk for many years. Since his position as a federal employee provided him economic independence, he had been leading a "cautious" battle for the rights of blacks in his community. Myrdal asked him if there were other organizations in the city, and the question prompted the following conversation:

A. Yes, there is the League for Civic Improvement. Q. Why do you bother to have two organizations with the same purpose of trying to improve the position of Negroes? A. Sir, that is easily explainable. The NAACP stands firm on its principles and demands our rights as American citizens. But it accomplishes little or nothing and it arouses a good deal of anger in the whites. On the other hand, the League for Civic Improvement is humble and 'pussy-footing.' It begs for many favors from the whites, and succeeds quite often. The NAACP cannot be compromised in all the tricks Negroes have to perform down here. But we pay our dues to keep it up as an organization. The League for Civic Improvement does all the dirty work. Q. Would you please tell me who is president of this League for Civic Improvement. I would like to meet him. A. I am. We are all the same people in both organizations.

Southern blacks expected their leaders to be 116 "accommodating," Myrdal found that the "Negro community gets revenge ...out of whites being deceived, that they "got satisfaction," when the leaders succeeded in "'pulling the wool' over the eyes of trusting whites."

They enjoyed watching the leaders "spreading the flattery thick when approaching the whites." Myrdal regarded this as the "the most concealed, almost perverted, form of the Negro protest." The leaders, on the other hand, experienced considerable satisfaction from their performance, and each one "feels pride in his skill at flattering, beguiling, and outwitting the white man." This type of leader actually assumed legendary status in the South and was embedded in the folklore.^®

John Bollard's findings support Myrdal's. When Bollard studied the southern caste system in the

1930's, he found that "the value of accommodation is actively propagandized within the Negro group."

Southern blacks took pleasure in describing their "Br.

Jekyll and Mr. Hyde' personalities" and he noted that he had indeed had the opportunity to observe what he labelled their 'white folks manner,' in operation with reference to him.®® There is little evidence that most blacks internalized these characteristics. As one of Myrdal's subjects, just a boy, expressed it, "I hate 117 myself, every time I say 'boss' or 'cocktail' a peckerwood.Southern blacks indeed came to an

accommodation with the South, but it was an "accommodation under protest".

As Moton found was the case in the 1930s, no matter how deep the resentment, "it was part of the

wisdom" that such anger and resentment toward white

people could not be openly expressed or acted upon. A

host of other researchers agreed. Myrdal found that

though "there is no wholehearted acceptance of the present situation," the protest in the South of

necessity had to be concealed. Myrdal contended that

deep down in the most dependent and destitute classes of Negroes in the rural South, the individual Negro of the masses ordinarily keeps a recess in his mind where he harbors the Negro protest...In the lower classes...it is usually framed in the ideals of Christian brotherhood. 'The high and mighty white people are the possessors of this unrighteous world. Sometime, somehow, the wrongs will be corrected and last shall be first and the first shall be last...' This is the Negro protest in its most concealed form.^^

Dollard came to a similar conclusion in his study of

the caste system in the South. Blacks in the south, he

reminded the reader, "had been deprived of the normal outlets of aggression for a minority group which desired to change its economic or social status." They could not organize politically or otherwise, nor could 118 they openly protest against the status. The "result is to drive the protest underground."

Because open hostility was suicidal, Dollard and

other researchers found that blacks had to resort to "indirect, circuitous, and symbolic methods of conflict with whites."34 He found among southern blacks a

variety of methods of expressing hostility, which he

analyzed from the most direct to the most concealed. Black men were indeed known, on occasion, to murder a

white man and sometimes a black man would openly take a stand after he had reached the stage where he no longer cared what happened to him. For the most part, though,

such direct expressions were the exception. The "wisdom" was for blacks to employ clandestine,

indirect, or symbolic means of expressing hostility. He

cites numerous examples, including "shooting from the bush," sabotage, withdrawal of trade from businesses where they are treated disrespectfully, "sick-outs" by domestic servants, neglecting to call whites "Mr." and

"Mrs.," quitting their jobs without giving notice, slandering southerners to northern whites, withdrawal

of interest and attention from whites, secretiveness

about their affairs (whites perceived this as "clannishness"), and migrating.The concealed nature

of the protest served to delude whites into the belief 119 that it did not exist.

An informant told Dollard, however, that the forms of indirect protest were becoming increasingly more difficult, that southern blacks "were becoming restless under the constant pressure from...whites." The informant cited an example of an incident recently in which a black man had been hunted down and shot by whites for some unstated offense. He asserted that blacks in the town were very angry but did not let it show it in their faces or in their behavior. "If they got a chance," though, "they were ready to fight back. "3G

The changing attitude seems to be reflected among young people in the South in the 1930's and 40's. Davis and Dollard's research on the impact of the caste system on the personality of the southern children revealed such a change. The father of one of the subjects told the researchers that the young people were developing a different attitude toward white people. The father stated that when you is on these WPA jobs you is always liable to git in a lotta trouble wid these white folks. They is always ready to start somethin' an' these young niggers ain't lak us ol' folks, they ain't gonna stan' back an' let 'em kick an' 'buse 'em lak we ol' folks...^

What the father did not say was that the parents were 120 partially responsible for the changing attitudes and behavior of the children. When the researchers interviewed the seven-year-old son, they noted that Judy(sic) "talks back to white adults and fights white children." The parents, it seems, had instructed the children that they were to avoid conflict with white children if possible, but that they were "to hit back if attacked." Charles Johnson's study of "growing up in the black belt" offers similar evidence. One of his subject, a young boy named George Carter, told Johnson that "papa told me not to start no fight with them

[whites], but if they start fighting for me to fight back." Johnson found that this was precisely what the children did. He found that "Negro youth in the rural

South tried to avoid overt conflicts with whites. They seldom initiated the fights but fought back as a last resort.

Dollard and Johnson's research lends support to Charles Evers' recollections. He recalled that the Klan was in its heyday when he was growing up in

Mississippi, but they did not come to his neighborhood. His father was regarded as one of "those crazy niggers." He "stood up to white people" and he taught Charles and younger brother Medgar to do likewise. They could not always do it openly, however. Their attitudes 121 were also affected by events going on around them. Even rural Mississippi was, by 1940, connected to the outside world. Charles Evers recalled, for instance,

that he heard about the Mau Mau uprising on the radio and he and Medgar secretly fantasized about replicating it in Mississippi. Their father overheard one

conversation and took the bullets for their hunting

rifles away.

What is significant for our purposes is that it was the young people, such as Charles and Medgar Evers and George Carter who served in World War II. Charles

Evers enlisted in the Army in 1940, and Medgar shortly

thereafter. They took this hostility with them into the military

The belief that blacks were "generally satisfied" was abetted by racial segregation, both in the North and South. There was a large proportion of blacks in

the South with whom whites had no contact, whatsoever, who "move in a sphere confined almost entirely to his

own people. The same can be said of blacks in the North, where de facto segregation circumscribed blacks to communities comprised almost entirely of their own

race. Gunnar Myrdal noted the "mutual ignorance" in the North as he travelled the country undertaking research for American Dilemma.'^ There was indeed little 122 opportunity to get to "know the Negro."

Because military authorities believed that blacks were "generally satisfied" with their status, military

officials and, consequently, military historians often misunderstood the resistance and protests. Ulysses Lee, for example, simply wrote off most forms of protest other than "serious, generalized outbreaks."^ He acknowledged that there were "hundreds of cases of physical racial friction", anything from "minor brawls to serious outbreaks," but they seldom involved large numbers of troops or became widespread, at least not until the Summer of 1 9 4 3 . He did not explore these

"skirmishes and incidents" which he acknowledges had become "a common occurrence" at some installations.These represented, for him, mostly evidence of "low morale" or "lack of discipline." The only form of protest he deemed worthy of examination were the violent mutinies, and he maintains, with justification, that in comparison to the number of black soldiers in the Army, the number of these were quite small. Because scholars failed to explore these "isolated skirmishes," "incidents," and "cases of...racial friction," Lee and others overlooked and minimized the soldiers' resistance and protest against their status. 123 As studies on the nature of peasant resistance reveals, one will not appreciate the true dimension of

resistance or protest if one focuses solely on large- scale, violent rebellions. As political scientist James Scott found in his anthropological study of peasant

resistance to economic change in Malaysia, most of the

time resistance did not take the form of "outright

collective defiance." Instead, peasant resistance

generally took the form of "everyday forms of

resistance," protest which seeks to avoid "open confrontation with authorities."^® Eric Langer reaches

almost identical conclusions as a result of his

examination of resistance to economic change among peasant agricultural workers and tribal peoples in southern Bolivia in the 19th and 20th century. The results of Scott and hanger's research are

consistent with what Johnson and Dollard and Davis

discovered about the nature of black protest in the

1930's and also consistent with the finding of those who study the nature of slave resistance in the antebellum period. The black protest within the military was

facilitated, to a considerable degree, by Army policies. Blacks did not constitute a social or economic class, or an indigenous people or regional 124 group. They constituted instead a group set apart and separate from all others in the society. Anyone possessing the most minute quantity of "Negro blood," was designated a Negro, Myrdal pointed out, and assigned to a lower caste, beneath all whites.^® They were assigned this status "not because they are poor or uneducated," he argued, but simply "because they are

Negroes." The caste lines, moreover, were "absolutely rigid. "■*’

The laws and customs did not acknowledge that not all blacks belonged to the same economic or social class, that there was indeed a class structure within the "caste." It was ideologically more comfortable for whites to perceive the class structure as flat, because it made it easier to justify treating all blacks alike.

The black American who ascended to wealth or status was still imprisoned by his "caste" because Jim Crow laws made no distinction between the classes within the black community.

Neither did the "Jim Crow" policies of the United States Armed Forces. The primary criterion for acceptance to or classification within the military was race. The primary criterion for classification of other groups in the early years of the war may have been skill as officials claimed, but in the case of blacks 125 it was always race. Staff Sgt. Chester Jones, who drove

the Redball Express with the 3418th Trucking Company, recalled that he was inducted from Wyoming with a childhood friend, who was white. They actually stayed together through basic training at Ft. Carson,

Colorado. When they reached Aberdeen, Maryland, however, they were separated and assigned to segregated groups for training. "We might as well have been on the other side of the World," he recalled, "for Aberdeen was two separate worlds, one black and the other white.By mid-1945, three-fourths of all blacks were assigned to segregated units within the service branches.** The caste system was replicated, and according to black soldiers, expanded in the Armed

Forces. Thus, the black graduate of the best northern institution of higher learning was imprisoned behind the same caste walls as the illiterate farmhand from the backwoods of Mississippi.

The net result was to enhance the protest. In the previous chapter, reference was made to Dubois' observation about the impact of continued segregation and discrimination on the development of a black identity in the South. Segregation and discrimination in the military had a similar result. The tendency to isolate black servicemen in segregated units fostered 126 "race consciousness" and facilitated the struggle against discriminatory policies.

Military officials, at least the more astute ones, recognized this. Admiral Chester Nimitz, U.S. Navy, was one of them. Walter White recalls an interview he conducted with Admiral Nimitz during his tour of the

Pacific in 1944 to investigate conditions among black servicemen. The Admiral asked the ships' officers, who had been invited to the interview, how the non­ segregation experiment which the Navy had recently initiated was proceeding. The captains responded that "the men shared the same sleeping quarters" but at present they thought it would be best "to assign all the Negro crew members to the hammocks at the end of the room." Admiral Nimitz advised them that the arrangement was not at all satisfactory to him and that "the Navy wanted integration." He explained to the captains that

if you put all the Negroes together, they'11 have a chance to share grievances and to plot among themselves...If they are distributed among other mevEÜDers of the crew, there will be less chance of trouble.^

Lt. Walter Green's experience supported Chester

Nimitz's assessment. Green recalled that he "was one of the bad boys...the rebellious lieutenants of the 25th 127 Infantry." The unit was stationed on Hollandia, New Guinea from 1943 onward and the black officers were "continually in hot water and being punished for our protests that showed itself in one form or another."

They got a new Commanding General (he did not indicate when), who was "apprised of the situation" immediately upon his arrival. He decided to create "what he called the "'bad boys school '[and] brought all us so-called obstreperous black 2nd lieutenants from all the other units together." The major problem with them, according to the General, was their lack of sufficient training.

"The whole idea," Green claims,

was to break us. But he made a foolish mistake. General Johnson had gathered all us vocal rebels in one spot, so we had each other for moral support. Separately we had been dubbed trouble, now we could become double trouble.

Together they were able to "frustrate [Army] discipline." The Commanding General finally gave up after the black lieutenants went on strike. One of the lieutenants, who was illegally perusing the records, discovered that they were not assigned to the school. Instead they were still carried on the records as physically assigned to their individual units. They reasoned that since the Army did not know they were there, they did not have to do anything. Nothing they 128 did at the school would appear on their records. They

also reasoned that the General would not court-martial them because he might not want his superiors to know

that he had created the school without their approval.

The lieutenants were correct. Instead of court- martials, the General decided to reclassify them all. Reclassifying them, they also reasoned, would take a

considerable amount of time, and it did. In the meantime, they could have a nice, long holiday. The reclassification were eventually completed and Green was assigned to battalion headquarters, an assignment designed he claims to enable his superiors to keep an eye on him.®^

Admiral Nimitz was not alone in his assessment that putting black soldiers together was not good for the Army. Bernard Nalty notes that Colonel Noel Parrish, the white Commanding Officer at Tuskegee Air

Base echoed a similar viewpoint in disputing the contention prevalent in the Air Forces that segregation contributed to military "efficiency." Colonel Parrish argued, instead, that People handled in groups rather than as individuals come to react as a group rather than as individuals. Pushed together... in groups, even against their individual will, they will think and act as groups... inevitably developing "group feeling and group spirit which is often contrary to the National feeling and National spirit. 129 Stouffer and his colleagues at the Research Branch would have agreed. They found that there was a tendency among all soldiers, including blacks, to "conform to group norms" and that these norms were not always consistent with Army norms.” Some of their officers, especially those in the field, agreed. They were often frustrated by the "clannishness" of black soldiers, by their tendency to do what was good for "the race" rather than the Army.^'* Though black servicemen were treated as members of a racial group first and individuals second, officers still expected them to behave as individuals first and everything else second.

Many black servicemen could not. They behaved, first and foremost, as members of "an oppressed minority." As one ex-soldier put it, "my motivation [for fighting] was not 'God and Country' but 'me and my people.'"”

Just as segregation served to intensify the soldiers' protest, it also broadened the range of options available within the units. As was the case with Scott's peasants, the "illiterate plantation hand from the cotton South" was rarely willing to risk open confrontation with civilian and military authorities.

More often, he leaned toward indirect forms of protest, such as footdragging, false compliance, dissimulation and desertion. 130 As Scott points out, if one looks for formal, organized protest, one will not find it among the peasantry because such activity was generally "the

preserve of the middle class and intelligentsia." By 1943, however, the black intelligentsia (at least its younger sons) was actually in the military, and

subject to the same discriminatory policies as the less fortunate members of the caste. The most intelligent

soldiers were the first, in fact, to be selected for military service. By 1943, the Selective Service becomes less "selective," but it always took the best of the available pool. That was the case with the black draftees. As a consequence, black servicemen, as mentioned earlier, had an even higher educational level than the general Negro population.

The educated black soldiers tended toward direct

forms of protest. This was entirely consistent with their pre-service backgrounds. As Gunnar Mrydal found,

"in the upper strata, and generally in the North, the

Negro protest [was]...more clearly thought out and overtly expressed in social, economic and political terms."®® It should have come as no surprise that black servicemen transferred the same behavior patterns

into the military. As has already been suggested, segregation en- 131 hanced the caste protest in another way. It facilitated communication and the exchange of information. Educated black servicemen knew their "rights." It was not uncommon for them to pass this knowledge on to their

less educated counterparts. For instance, the

Intelligence officer at the Eighth Service Command,

headquartered at Dallas, Texas, reported on December

20, 1944, that "a colored soldier had objected to the seating arrangement at Theatre #l...and quoted his

Chaplain to the effect that he could sit anywhere."^’ The Chaplain had obviously advised him of the text of the War Department's Order of July, 1944, which technically made segregation on military facilities and on military-operated transportation facilities illegal. It was not unusual for information to be disseminated by educated blacks within the units. This might explain why, for example, inspectors found that "southern blacks of relatively long service turned out to be the chief complainants in investigations of discriminations conducted during the second half of the war." Moreover, the Research Branch surveys revealed that the longer the southern black stayed in the Army, the less he was inclined to agree that racial "separation" was "a good idea."®® It seems that the longer the southern and northern black soldiers associated with each other. 132 the more their viewpoints tended to converge.

Black servicemen were, for the most part, not prepared to do their duty meekly and wait until the war was over to struggle for their "'rights'" That strategy had not worked for their fathers in World War I. They thus entered the military with a tendency toward assertiveness, not passivity. The belief that black soldiers were docile and complacent persisted largely because it fit into the assumptions of others about the black population in general, not because it represented reality. 133 ENDNOTES

1. James L. Burran, "Racial Violence in the South During World War II" (Ph. D Dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1977), 58.

2. Neil Wynn, The Afro-American and the Second World War (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975), 20.

3. Samuel Stouffer and others. The American Soldier: Adjustment During Armv Life. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II Series (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 596. See also U.S. Army Service Forces, Information and Education Division (The Research Branch), "What the Soldier Thinks," No.2, Report No. 58, August, 1943, 58.

4. This statement is a re-wording of one of the questions on a Research Branch survey of white soldiers, which asked if they thought "most Negroes were satisfied with things as they are." As we shall see, most soldiers, like most white civilians, answered in the affirmative.

5. See Ulysses Lee, Employment of Nearo Troops. United States Army in World War II, Special Studies. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), 361-2. 6. Robert Moton, What the Nearo Thinks (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1929), 1.

7. Ibid., 8.

8. Stouffer, The American Soldier. 507. 9. Moton, What the Nearo Thinks. 9.

10. See Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Nearo Problem and American Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 736-7; and Charles Johnson, Growing Up in the Black Belt (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941), 243. 11. A good example of the literature exploring resistance to enslavement is Gerald W. Mullin. Flight and Rebellion: Slave Resistance in Eighteenth Century Virginia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972) . 134 12. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 30.

13. Survey Division, Bureau of Special Services, Office of War Information, "The Negroes' Role in the War: A Study of White and Colored Opinions," July 8, 1943. Located in Box 441, Record Group #165, National Archives, Suitland, Md.

14. Stouffer, et.al.. The American Soldier. 506.

15. Ulysses Lee, Employment of Nearo Troops. 45.

16. The Research Branch had already asked white servicemen about their attitudes toward racial separation in April and May of 1942. The survey results published in "What the Soldier Thinks," August, 1942, revealed that most white soldiers thought some sort of racial separation was necessary. When they surveyed blacks, they again took a matched sample of whites for comparison. Both surveys, labelled AMS32N and AMS32W (American Soldier #32, Negro and White) are on the data tape available from the National Archives. 17. Stouffer, The American Soldier. 568. Percentages do not add up to 100 because in each category, the remaining participants indicated that they were "undecided, " meaning sometimes they did not care or it did not or "should not" matter.

18. Ibid., 571.

19. Ibid., 574; see pages 566-76 for a detailed explanation of the results of the questions related to segregation of facilities.

20. Ibid., 502. 21. Moton, What the Nearo Thinks. 2-5, 8. Even if they knew some blacks, he contended, they did not know all nor were they knowledgeable of all aspects of the lives of the ones they did know. Moreover, as a result of racial separation, there were large number of blacks with whom whites had no contact at all. 22. Ibid., 12.

23. Samuel Stouffer, et al.. Measurements and Prediction. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 720. 135 24. Herbert Garfunkel, When Negroes March: The March on Washington Movement in the Organizational Politics for FEPC. New York: Atheneum Books, 1975), 21.

25. St. Clair Drake, and Horace R. Cayton. Black Metropolis: A Study of Nearo Life in a Northern City. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1945), 728. 26. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 762; see also, E. Franklin Frazier, Negro Youth at the Crossroads: Their Personality Development in the Middle States(Washington. D.C.: American Council on Education, 1940), 49-51.

27. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 777. Even in the 1960's, this was still true. The Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth, who was one of the leaders of the Montgomery Bus Boycott and one of the organizers of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, explained in an interview how the organization got his name. He told Aldon Morris "since the NAACP was like waving a red flag in front of some southern whites, we decided that we needed an organization that would do the same thing and yet be called a Christian organization...we said Southern Christian Leadership Conference so that they would say, well, that's Baptist preachers so they didn't fear us...they didn't bother us..." See Aldon Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement :Black Communities Organizing for Change (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 86. 28. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 773.

29.Dollard, Caste and Class. 258-9.

30. "Cocktail" was a slang term for "flatter" and "peckerwood" was a lower class white man. See Myrdal, American Dilemma. 762, 1395.

31. Myrdal, American Dilemma, p. 760. (Italics in the original)

32. Ibid., 757. For similar expressions of the same idea, see Moton, What the Negro Thinks : Hortense Powdermaker, After Slavery: Arnold Rose, The Negroes' Morale : and Charles Johnson, Growing Up in the Black Belt. 136 33. John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (New York: Donbleday, 1937), 287.

34. Dollard, 289. 35. Ibid., 289-314.

36. Ibid., 292.

37. Allison Davis and John Dollard, Children of Bondage: Personality Development of Nearo Youth in the Urban South (Washington, D.C: American Council on Education, 1940), 299.

38. Johnson, Growing Up in the Black Belt. 296. 39. Charles Evers, Evers (New York: World Publishing Co., 1971), 66-67.

40. Moton, What the Negro Thinks. 2.

41. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 762.

42. Ulysses Lee, Employment of Negro Troops. 348. 43. See Lee's discussion of a series of violent racial incidents, mostly in the summer of 1942 and spring of 1943, in Lee, Employment of Negro Troops. Chapter 12, "The Harvest of Disorder." 44. Ibid., 355.

45. See James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New York: Yale University Press, 1985) , 29 and Eric Langer, Economic Change and Rural Resistance in Southern Bolivia. 1880- 1930 (Stanford University Press, 1989), 6 and 191. Among these he includes "footdragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, feigned ignorance, sabotage and so on." Langer, too, argued that "excessive emphasis on revolution or at the very least violent rebellions...has meant that other perhaps more subtle methods of resistance have not been adequately taken into consideration. Perhaps one needs to understand 'day-to-day' forms of protest, which are usually more common and perhaps more effective. 137 46. Army regulations required all registrants to be classified by race. It appeared there were only two classifications--white and colored (or Negro). Several American Indians, went to court in 1941 to resist being inducted into the Army as "colored." As a consequence, draft boards in Virginia did not accept Indians at all for a while and then began passing Indians through to the Army with no race determination. The Army instructed the draft boards that they had to make a "determination as to race or color." Instructions to the director of Selective Service from the Adjutant General stated that "a man is considered colored if he has any ascertainable negro blood," and that "trainees of all other races other than Negro will be assigned the same as white trainees." As Myrdal concluded, the caste system was absolutely rigid. See Memorandum, August 28, 1943, from the Adjutant General, Washington, D.C., to theDirector of the Selective Service, in RG 407 (Records of the Adjutant General), Box 1511, National Archives. 47. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 669. Myrdal argued that caste relations, i.e, relations between blacks and whites, could improve but that the caste lines remained rigid. A black person could escape the caste system only by "passing."

48. Motley, Invisible Soldier. 185.

49. Stouffer, The American Soldier. 492. 50. Walter White, A Man Called White (New York; Arno Press and the New York Times. 1969), 272-3.

51. Interview with 2nd Lieutenant Walter Green in Motley, The Invisible Soldier. 93-4. 52. Letter, Col. Noel Parrish to Brigadier General William E. Hall, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, Headquarters, U.S. Army Air Forces, August 5, 1945. Item #19 in the Basic Documents quoted in Bernard Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 213. 53. Stouffer, The American Soldier. 525. 138 54.Intelligence and Security Division, New Orleans P.G.E., "Technical Intelligence Report," 28 April 1945, in Box 265, RG 107, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 55. Motley, The Invisible Soldiers. 151. 56. Myrdal, American Dilemma, 357.

57. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Eighth Service Command, Dallas, 23 December 1944, Box 262, RG 107.

58. Lee, Employment of Negro Troops. 306.

59. "U. S. Army Service Forces, Information and Education Division (Formerly the Research Branch) "What the Soldier Thinks" (August, 1943), 58. CHAPTER III "ISOLATED SKIRMISHES," INSIGNIFICANT "INCIDENTS," AND THE WAR FOR DEMOCRACY AT HOME.

"Black soldiers of World War II showed more courage just surviving as well as fighting back by all

means possible...than young people today can ever

imagine," Lt. Lacey Wilson told Mary Penick Motley in

1972. "Hell, we fought the 'man,' the system, and the Axis powers."1 Navy Steward Ray Carter, a Detroiter who enlisted in the Navy the day after Pearl Harbor,

echoed a similar theme. As he told Motley, We black servicemen of World War II can sit down and talk and laugh about the war but we know deep down inside the war struck at our manhood...Some of our men were broken by the racism in the United States Armed Forces. There were always a small number of real Uncle Toms. However, the majority of the black men...fought back in innumerable ways... Speaking for myself, I knew I went through hell... but I came out a better man than those who were wielding the power. I survived everything the 'man' could throw at me and I fought back in every way I could think of...^

The assertion that they fought back is a persistent

theme in the recollections of former servicemen. The actor, Ossie Davis, interviewed recently on National Public Radio, had served in a medical unit in Liberia.

139 140 In response to the reporter's inquiry concerning his

experience in combat, he answered, "Oh, I didn't do any fighting in Liberia. I did all of my fighting down South. "3

What is noteworthy here is not just the ex-

servicemen's assertion that black soldiers fought back but that, as Steward Ray Carter recalled, "the majority...fought back in innumerable ways." Though he mentions the number of open rebellions/* "he also

indicates that he and others fought back in every way he could think of. Official records support his

impression. The evidence clearly reveals that while

some black soldiers fought the war for "freedom" and

"democracy" abroad, others fought the war for "freedom" and "democracy" at home. This chapter examines the war for "democracy" at home in its least confrontational

form. The struggle was often manifested in the

"isolated skirmishes," the insignificant "incidents" and the "hundreds of cases of physical racial friction" which Ulysses Lee did not explore.® These incidents,

in reality, comprise a significant part of the struggle for victory over the enemy at home. By examining these occurrences, to paraphrase political scientist James Scott, one can understand what black servicemen did between mutinies to fight back as best they could.® 141 Military historian Morris Macgregor notes correctly that "racial troubles were developing by the end of the first year of the war."’ The vast majority

of bases, for practical and political reasons, were

built in the South.® Many black veterans contend that this was their first experience with racism and discrimination. Most northern black soldiers seemed

genuinely unprepared for the rigidity and harshness of southern "laws and customs." Writer Bill Downey, one of the first black marines, recalled thinking after he was forced into the "cattle car," that "this was a

different America" than the one he had known in Iowa or Chicago.® Sammy Davis, Jr., contended that he too

encountered racism for the first time in the Army. When he got to the barracks to which he had been assigned, he was shocked and hurt to find that the white soldiers had moved their beds away.^° Lieutenant Albert Evans

recalled he was "surprised by the school children yelling racial epithets as we disembarked in Texas.

As they reflected upon it, though, they realized that it was not a different America. Colonel Donovan Queen recalled that "Ft. Dix and the white civilians of

New Jersey were no better than those in the deep South." “Tuskegee Airman Robert Decatur agreed that the North was not much different. "Columbus, Ohio was 142 no different from Columbus, Georgia, he asserted". I couldn't get a hotel room in Columbus, Ohio, either.Sammy Davis realized, upon reflection, that his father and uncle had protected him from racism, that it had "been there all the time." The hotels at which they stayed, he remembered, "were almost always colored hotels and rooming houses, but I had never thought of them like that. I simply thought they were 'our rooming houses.Bill Downey also realized that he had forgotten about the swimming pool back in Ottumwa, Iowa, at the YMCA. If blacks in Ottumwa wanted to swim, "we had to wait for Friday night...before they changed the water for the week. "

Even soldiers accustomed to segregation and discrimination in civilian life, as Wilbur Walker had been while growing up in Baltimore, were unprepared to find such practices in the military. Walker recalled that Baltimore in 1942 was as segregated as anywhere in the deep South and although they did not accept it, "there was little questioning of separation; the cry was for equality of opportunity." Though accustomed to segregation and discrimination, he refused to move to the rear of the bus on the way to Whiting Field in Florida.^

As sociologist Charles Johnson pointed out with 143 respect to southern blacks in the 1930's, "there would have been no race problem if the Negro group had uniformly accepted the status that was assumed for it."^’ A major reason for the development of the

"racial troubles" which MacGregor notes developed early in the war was black soldiers' insistence on being given the respect that went with the uniform.

General Benjamin Davis, Sr., in his capacity as Inspector General, reported on the attitudes of black soldiers at Ft. Clark, Texas, in 1943. He found that the enforcement of segregation laws by bus drivers and railroad officials was "a source of irritation to the colored soldiers, especially those coming from localities where Jim Crow laws did not prevail." He reported that

even the colored soldiers from the Southern States resent the enforcement of these laws and practices. Colored soldiers feel that their uniforms should guarantee them protection and the same freedom as other soldiers, wherever they are serving.

It is in this context that many of the "infractions" of southern segregation laws must be understood. They were not as "inevitable" as MacGregor seem to think. There would have been no "infractions" if black soldiers had simply accepted the status assigned to them.

That black soldiers did not accept the status 144 assigned to them was becoming increasingly apparent and frustrating to many white southerners as the war progressed. Southern whites saw the growing assertiveness of black soldiers as "a threat to racial harmony," to the "color line.Historian Richard

Dalfiume recalled, from his experience growing up in a small Louisiana town, that

a Negro in uniform evoked hostility, fear, suspicion on the part of many southern whites. It was felt that a Negro in the Army had been 'spoiled,' had forgotten his 'place,' and had become 'uppity.

Military records support the assertions that whites were responding to the growing assertiveness of blacks.

Intelligence reports from Atlanta in 1944 carried undercurrents of frustration and irritation at the "increasing number of incidents involving Negro soldiers" and at the fact that "Negroes are continuing their attempt to break down Jim Crow laws and customs in this area." These reports were especially frequent after July of 1944, when the Army issued its order which technically outlawed racial segregation in facilities on all military installations. Black soldiers used this as the basis for advocating non­ discrimination practices off the base as well as on.^^

Intelligence officers in Virginia in February, 1945, likewise reported on the "growing awareness and 145 discussion of racial issues by the average white person and by the white press." They foresaw "a more militant attitude by whites" as a result of the "belligerent attitudes of some Negroes and widespread publicity on agitation for Negro 'rights.

Racial problems developed early on, however, and as the events which transpired at Camp Gibbons

(Wilmington, North Carolina) revealed, so did black soldiers' resistance. On the evening of September 7, 1941, a black soldier wrote an anonymous letter to

Walter White at the NAACP. He claimed that another black soldier had been "seriously wounded" near the camp the evening before, that nothing had been done about it, and that it is being referred to by high ranking officers as being trivial. To belie the statement [however] 200 white guards were put around camp to guard the soldiers from going out to vindicate the cruel treatment the colored soldiers have been receiving ever since we have been in this camp...If something is not done in the not too distant future there is liable to be an explosion that will cause repercussions thout (sic) the South. "24

Since the letter was anonymous, the NAACP asked Raleigh attorney Curtiss Todd to travel to Wilmington to investigate because they would "rather transmit the letter to the War Department over the signature of a reputable person. 146 Curtiss Todd ascertained soon after his arrival that indeed a soldier, Private James Mickles, had been

shot the evening before. The circumstances surrounding the shooting were provided by special military

policeman Matthews, a white Texan assigned to the 54th Coast Artillery, and another white military policeman

named Seader. Around midnight on September 7th, four

white civilian and military police entered Herbert "Lunnie" Cowan's place and took a black soldier outside. He "submitted reluctantly...all the while

asking why" he was under arrest. He pulled away from

them and they hit him. He ran back into Cowan's place,

"hollering, 'don't let them hit me.'" Matthews took the soldier outside to find out what had happened but he never had an opportunity because other soldiers crowded around Matthews and enabled him to escape. In a few minutes, additional white civilian and white military police drove up looking for the soldier. They tried to disperse the crowd and it was slow to move. A white city policeman named Phales shot at their feet shouting "dance, you niggers, dance." The crowd scattered. Private Samuel Mickles had been part of the crowd.

Mickles "made some remarks and ran" and a policeman ran after him. Shots could be heard. Mickles was in good health at that time because, shortly thereafter, he was 147 back inside "Lunnie" Cowan's place "talking and

laughing with a girl." The same white policeman

confronted him and want to know "what he was talking and laughing about." Mickles retorted "that he had a right to laugh if he wanted to" and the policeman

struck him and placed him under arrest. His lieutenant arrived about that time, however, and had Mickles

released. Mickles left with the lieutenant in the

lieutenant's car. He turned up at camp about forty-five minutes after the disturbance, however, "with a wound

through the fleshy part of his arm." Sergeant Seader was positive that Mickles had been shot, under as yet undetermined circumstances, by the white city policeman, Phales. As word of the shooting spread, black soldiers returned back to camp where "they were furnished rifles by a colored supply sergeant." Todd verified that they were indeed prevented from returning to town by two hundred (200) white guards from nearby Camp Davis, who "patrolled the camp until order was restored." In response to Todd's inquiries about relations between blacks and the military and civilian police,

Matthews contended that "the actions of the white civilian and military police caused a great deal of the problem." He asserted that "a great deal of the 148 friction is caused by the attitudes of white military [and civilian] police toward Negro soldiers." When

there was a problem, for example, neither paid any attention to the black military police. They simply

"barged in and took over." The black military police agreed with Matthews.^®

After his conversations with Matthews and Seader, Curtiss Todd proceeded to the Chief of police in

Wilmington, Chief Casteen. Casteen denied that Phales

shot Mickles because "Mickles was shot with a thirty-

eight and Phales carries a 32-20." Chief Casteen

naturally offered a different interpretation of the cause of the shooting. He contended that "it was the very poor attitude of the colored soldier" that was to blame for incidents such as the shooting of private

Mickles anyway. He claimed that the "colored soldiers had an idea that as long as they wear the uniform, they are immune from civil authority." Whenever one of his officers attempted to make an arrest, "the colored

soldiers gang up on him or them." He claimed not to have the same problem when white soldiers were involved. Curtiss Todd reported that he also talked to about

"one hundred or so" of the 450 black soldiers who were at Camp Gibbons. The soldiers, he noted, were "largely 149 from above the Mason-Dixon line" and that they wanted to be "any place but where they are now." Todd, a southern black, added that he had "concluded from

observation that quite a number of the colored soldiers do go around with a chip on their shoulders."

Todd then interviewed several prominent black

citizens in Wilmington. As General Davis found later at

Camp Stewart, Todd discovered that the discriminatory transportation system was one of the primary causes of difficulties between black soldiers and authorities.

Dr. Rosamond, a dentist in Wilmington, reported that civilians and white soldiers are permitted to board the bus at any stop. The colored soldiers must go to the bus station. At the station the white military police permit the white soldiers to board first...leaving the colored soldiers waiting for the next bus. The next bus, the same thing happens. The colored soldiers tire of this and proceed to get on anyway causing a general disturbance.

Dr. Foster Burdett, a physician in Wilmington, added that "places of amusement for black soldiers were limited," and was a cause for some of the problems.

"The white soldier," Dr. Burdett stated, "could go to Carolina Beach or Wrightsville Beach near by. The

colored soldiers had no places nearby to go." As a result they tended to congregate around "juke joints." Chief Casteen surprisingly agreed. He acknowledged that 150 black soldiers indeed had few places to go for amusement. It is for that reason that he had not "closed any of the 'juke joints'" where they generally

congregated. Dr. Burdett added that "colored people in

Wilmington owned beach property" which they had offered

to sell to state and federal authorities about a month earlier "to be developed as a recreational beach for colored soldiers." Thus far, they had no response.

Curtiss Todd found that there were no recreational facilities on base for black soldiers either. He spoke to Carrie Hargreaves, the senior hostess and Hortense

Young, the librarian at nearby Camp Davis. He learned that there was "still no service club nor library there for colored soldiers (now under construction).

Miss Hargreaves added that black soldiers were seldom satisfied with the type of work assigned to them, that she was in fact surprised that there had been so few problems at the base. Her observation supports the anonymous letter writer's complaint about the perceived discriminatory nature of the work assignments. They were "made to work at the warehouses late into the evening" and were not fed when they returned. He also claimed that they did all the work while "white soldiers of the same rank are put over us like Simon Degree." 151 The situation at Camp Gibbons in 1941 illustrates the problems confronting black soldiers throughout the

war. If the problems manifested themselves early in the

war, so did the resistance and protests. Their behavior encapsulates much of the range of protest and resistance forms (moving along a spectrum from the

least to the most confrontational) which will be

discussed throughout the study. They had complained--a form of petition--to their white officers, the letter

writer said, "about the poor attitudes of the white

military and civilian cops in the city." Their officers, he claimed, had done nothing for them. He

claimed that they were told " 'you know where you are now;'" and he asserted that their officers were "in

cahoots with the lowly whites of the community." They had also protested to the Inspector General. Benjamin

Davis, Sr., had visited the camp in his capacity as

Inspector General, and they were told that they "may

speak to the General on any problems we might have."

After they did so, however, "all of the non­ commissioned [officers] of the 87th Quartermaster Co.(RHD)^® were confined to camp and were reduced in

grade. Curtiss Todd's report revealed they were already engaging in forms of "resistance.Black soldiers 152 helped each other to escape from or evade arrest by- civilian and military police, for example. They gathered around Matthews because they thought he was arresting the original soldier who, by the way, was being arrested for throwing a bottle through a store window. The soldier escaped. That was no accident. There is actually some validity to Chief Casteen's contention that they would "gang up" on white civilian police when they tried to make an arrest. They felt justified because, as the anonymous letter writer explained, "a soldier is convicted before he even gets to court."

Evidence therefore shows that even in 1941 black soldiers had already begun to fight back. They generally attempted to cooperate with Jim Crow policies, as the Army counseled them to do, as long as the system operated, to borrow Eric Hobsbawm's terminology, "to their minimum disadvantage."^^ The transportation system at Wilmington did not. It was entirely understandable that they would tire of waiting for each subsequent bus and simply get on the next one, regardless of the consequences. Finally, when they had felt that they had exhausted all other forms of protest, they were willing to risk violent confrontation with authorities. The shooting of Private 153 Mickles occasioned such a response. As word of the shooting spread, it must be remembered, they reported back to camp where "a colored supply sergeant" provided

them with rifles. As the letter writer indicated, they had concluded after the shooting of Mickles, that

"there [was] no win for Negroes." Sometimes, as Colonel Queen recollected, black soldiers "felt that dying stateside was just as good.

The range of protest and resistance began with "the war of words." Part of the struggle between the rich and the poor in Sedaka, the peasant village James

Scott studied, took the form of "argument" for and against the combine harvester. Scott sees in the arguments of the poor "a rejection of the world view of the rich" as well as the assertion of a world view of their own. Much human wisdom shows that the individual who is argumentative is resisting.

The protest against southern "laws and customs" in

1941 began, then, as it did in Sedaka, with the "war of words." Throughout World War II, black soldiers fought "attempts to relegate them to a permanently inferior... status," they "rejected the characterization which whites sought to impose upon them, [and] loudly asserted their citizenship rights.The "war of words" is evident in the encounter between Mickles and 154 the white city policeman. Mickles got into trouble with the white city policeman because he was being argumentative. He "made some remarks" and ran, and the white city policeman ran after him. When the white policeman again confronted Mickles back at Lunnie

Cowan's place and wanted to know what Mickles was laughing about, Mickles retorted that he had a "right to laugh if he wanted to."

Throughout the war, black soldiers' resistance was manifested in the assertion of a different world view, indeed a kind of psychological resistance which white officers found frustrating. Stouffer and his colleagues discovered that black soldiers "interpreted situations in racial terms to an extent which whites failed to appreciate."^® This is illustrated by a report from

Camp Plauche, Louisiana, to the Headquarters of the Eighth Service Command in Dallas. "A group of Negro enlisted personnel," the report indicated, "had interjected 'racial' comments in the orientation talk" given by a white veteran who had been interned in a Japanese prison camp. The veteran, had been attempting to explain the part colored enlisted men were playing in combat and how important their training...would be. When [he] described seeing six American colored prisoners of war shot by the Japanese, immediately the agitators asked, 'Did they shoot only the colored 155 men?'...Another question was: 'Did the Japanese put the colored and white men together in the concentration camp?' When the question was answered in the affirmative, a murmur went through the crowd..

The rejection of the world view which the white

veteran sought to convey is evident in this exchange as is the assertion of a different world view by the black

soldiers. If the Japanese did not segregate the black

soldiers and if they shot all prisoners equally, they could not be all bad.

Black soldiers tended to reject, as evidenced by the repeated arguments, the interpretation which white

officers gave to their actions. White officers claimed repeatedly that black soldiers interpreted normal military discipline and work assignments as racially biased. A white Lieutenant, a southerner, said in his report that whenever any white officer made a correction or a reprimand of the [enlisted] men, they openly accused the officers of racial discrimination...and if a white officer ordered them to do something, they would go to the colored officer and complain that the white officers were prejudiced. This made it almost impossible for white officers to maintain control over the men. .

The "war of words" over the "fairness" of military racial policies was also fought between white and black officers. For example, a black chaplain who had served in Europe stated that he had a difficult time disputing 156 the contention of other black officers in his unit that Army promotion policies were discriminatory. He cited the case of "a hardworking officer" in his unit who was not promoted while less qualified white lieutenants were. "Lieutenant Mitchell," he felt, "was an excellent officer, unlike other colored officers who were constantly arguing with white officers about racial discrimination."39 Had black officers and enlisted men acquiesced to their inferior status, there would have been no argument.

Sometimes the "war of words" took the form of open expression of hatred for whites. When John Bollard, studied southern blacks in the 1930's, he found that

"Negroes have become quite adept at concealing their feelings in dealing with white people," that "it is part of the wisdom for the Negro to suppress his resentment.Black soldiers were not nearly so restrained during military service. Intelligence officers at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, reported in September, 1944, that a "colored enlisted man, alleged to be prejudiced against white men, made statements that it was his greatest desire to kill a white man," and that he "also told his C.O. he would kill him if he had a gun. Another soldier, according to a report from Atlanta, sat down beside a 157 white man on the bus, and most likely in response to

the white man's objection, said that "he would like to get all white people on a rock pile and mow them down with a tommy gun.Military intelligence officers at

Atlanta reported a similar occurrence a year later, this time involving a black officer. Officials at Ft. McClellan, Alabama, reported that they were requesting punitive action against a "Negro Second Lieutenant assigned to the IRTC" who

became antagonistic when told by the driver of a civilian bus that he would have to go to the rear...The officer was questioned by the Provost Marshal and stated that he did not like the United States and would leave it if possible when the war is over; that he would gladly have killed any white man shortly after returning from overseas; that he did not like the interviewers' face because it was white; and he did not mind dying a martyr to change conditions for the race...^"

Finally, Lt. Leon Paul, a white security officer interviewed on his return from the Pacific, reported a conversation he overheard between his "colored driver" and the driver's "companion" as they drove him around on official business. Lt. Paul recalled that

They passed the wreck of a 2 1/2 [ton] truck on a one way pontoon bridge. The driver remarked to the other soldier, 'I hope it was a white boy.' No more was said because they remembered that he was in the back seat. The protest sometimes took the form of simply 158 denying to whites, both civilian and military personnel, the deference to which they had become

accustomed and to which they felt by nature entitled.

Bollard found in his study that southern blacks were "practiced in saying 'yes, sir' and 'no, sir'" and

that, in the South, "nothing is more immediately sensed as hostile as the withdrawal of deference forms and prestige acknowledgements to white people.Soldiers rather intentionally withdrew the deference, a fact that was the subject of frequent altercations with white civilians who worked at the bases. Such was the case at Camp Gordon when a black soldier working next to a white civilian addressed him "without calling him

'mister.'" The white civilian reportedly told the

Sergeant to "put a handle on that name when you are talking to me, nigger." The sergeant protested the use of the term "nigger," and an argument followed. The argument was terminated without violence when the soldier's commanding officer appeared.^® In another incident, a soldier at Drew Field, Florida, was court- martialed for refusing to salute a white officer. He reportedly stated that he simply "would not salute a white man and 'no goddam MP' could make him.

What needs to be emphasized about the above examples of protest or resistance forms is that they were largely 159 individual and were often indirect. These features define and characterize "day to day" resistance as identified by Scott. Protest or resistance was seldom organized or coordinated, though widespread.

A salient feature of the black soldiers' protests was indeed that so much of it represented a form of "individual self-help."'*® Letter-writing, which will be discussed in a subsequent chapter, was the most commonly employed form of "self-help." In some instances, the protest took the form of "withdrawal," as was evident in Private Jack Morris's decision not to go to school. When Morris failed to attend aircraft mechanic school on April 14, 1945, officials at

Amarillo Field, Texas asked for an explanation. Private Morris, adopted a "belligerent attitude" and contended that he did not want to go to school because black soldiers who completed the course were not given assignments within a reasonable time. The reason, he noted, was "a lack of suitable assignment" and the lack of suitable assignment was "due to racial discrimination." Private Morris, according to the report, indicated that "he had no special complaint about the treatment he received in the school, but he had seen evidence of racial discrimination every place he had been stationed."'*® The absence constituted his 160 own individual and also indirect form of protest.®® Rather than confront discrimination directly, Morris decided to "withdraw" from school.

Actually, Morris's behavior serves to highlight another salient feature of the black soldiers'

resistance, namely, that in many instances they engaged

in forms of protest which sought to avoid, as Private Morris did, "open confrontation with authorities."®^

As Private James Williams contended, "only the most

radical or drunk soldiers" risked open confrontation with authorities. The penalties could be draconian.®^ Thus protest, even when coordinated, was sometimes

indirect and concealed. This is illustrated by the case of Technician 5th Class Clarence E. Adams who wrote to the Baltimore Afro-American from Camp Breckenridge, Kentucky on July 8, 1944, regarding an "incident" with his white officer. He was serving with the 4259th

Quartermaster Gasoline Supply Company and worked as a dispatcher in the motor pool. He had borrowed a book of poems from the Service Club Library to read. The book was entitled Negro Poets and Their Poems. He had just completed his work and was preparing to leave when the Company Executive Officer walked into his office, saw his "paraphernalia...lying on the desk, including the book," and started going through it. "He came to the 161 poem 'Mulatto' by Langston Hughes," Adams stated, "and started to curse and use all kinds of vile language

about the author." He instructed Adams to "take that damn book back where you got it and I don't want to ever see anything like that around the company.'" Adams argued with the officer that the men in his unit would not object to the book, that they "were very- intelligent " and quite a few read "Negro works" in their leisure time. The officer responded that he did not care, that the book "might cause trouble" because "the wrong person might get hold of it." Adams finally acquiesced and said "Yes, sir," implying that he would return the book.

He did not return the book as ordered because, as he told Carl Murphy of the Afro-American. "I had not finished reading it." On Sunday, however, he was called into his Commanding Executive's office and asked if he had returned the book. When he responded that, "No,

Sir," he had not, he "was given a direct order to take the book back." He obeyed. However, he told the other men in his unit about the incident and "as soon as I checked the book in...another member of my organization drew it out again."”

Adams was furious, he wrote to the Afro-American. that "Negro soldiers fighting for democracy should be 162 told not to read a book by one of their own race." Moreover, this kind of "censorship" was a violation of military regulations. Yet, Adams pushed the issue up to a point, and then stopped. This kind of "cautious resistance" characterized much of the soldiers' protest. Adams avoided open confrontation with his officer who, though he was in the wrong, could surely have had Adams court-martialed for failure to obey a direct order.

A similar pattern is evident in the behavior of the 1521st Engineers Construction Group in Saipan. It had been part of a group which had mutinied on Hawaii.

Fifty seven members were court-martialed and sentenced from five to thirty years in prison.The unit was reorganized and stationed in Saipan. They frustrated their officers, for example, with deliberate malingering and "feigned compliance." A white officer who served with the unit. Major Wilbur Koontz, reported that "the greatest trouble with [them] during his experience...was their tendency toward indirect insubordination." As a typical example, the officer explained that the unit was engaged in road-building and as part of the process drivers hauled dirt and fill from a coral pit about three or four miles away. Instead of going to the Coral Pit, however, three or 163 four drivers could repeatedly be found parked along the road with empty trucks. When an officer discovered them sitting there, drivers would pretend they were "out of gas, having motor trouble, having tire trouble,[or] had just gotten it fixed when the officer drove up." On other occasions they would actually go to the Coral Pit but, if the officer in charge was not immediately visible, they would simply sit there. They made no attempt to ascertain his whereabouts.

The officer also reported that "poor workmanship," to an extent he had not encountered elsewhere, characterized their performance on construction projects. He stated that

if they do the work, it will inevitably be a poor job. For example, when constructing with wood, they will cut joints irregularly so that the joints do not fit; they will cut boards too short or too long or when constructing pipe sections, they will cut pipe lengths too short. Similarly when working in concrete, they always manage to make rough finishes.

He could not determine, he reported, if the poor workmanship was "just lack of ability or if it was intentional. Actually, Koontz reported another incident which reinforces the conclusion that these men engaged in subterfuge. He reported that no matter what precautions they took, "ammunition always managed to find its way 164 to some of the men." One evening he was engaged in

conversation "with the Colonel in the Colonel's tent" when they heard the sound of gunfire. "The noise," he reported,

was loud enough to wake up the whole island. He and the colonel ran over to the group of men from which the firing had come. By the time of their arrival, not a single man in the unit, including noncoms--a group of about 25 or 30 men--could remember having seen or even having heard a shot go off.®®

The deliberate malingering, the poor workmanship, and

the feigned ignorance about the gunfire support the

conclusion that their behavior represented perhaps a

less confrontational form of protest against racism.

The report noted that the rumor had spread throughout

the island that the Commanding General "did not want any more Negro troops there," and the officer implied

that the soldiers were aware of the Commanding

General's attitude. The Commanding General, the report indicated further, had a "big job" to be done and he was having considerable trouble accomplishing it. White

officers repeatedly "cracked under the strain" and had to be relieved. While there was indeed real ignorance among black soldiers, there was quite a bit of pretended ignorance too.

The behavior of the 1512th illustrates another passive form of protest employed by black soldiers. 165 namely, "not giving their all" to the war effort. There

were repeated reports from a variety of sources--black and white--that as a consequence of their

dissatisfaction with discrimination, black soldiers were "not doing as much as they could," to aid in the war. This was the opinion of a black soldier

interviewed by intelligence officers of the First

Service Command in Boston in 1945 after his service in

Europe. The soldier's report, which they indicated was being "received with some reservations," was that

Negro soldiers on the whole did not contribute to the best of their ability in this war but they were obsessed with the belief that they were being forever victimized as objects of discrimination and prejudice...He was of the opinion that 'Negro troops carried too much of a chip on their shoulders. ' The observation, they indicated, "came from a mature Negro soldier from the North." The report was

"being received with some reservations because it is set in the context of the same soldier's opinion that participation in the war would not benefit their cause materially in the United States."^® Intelligence officers at the NYPE (New York Port of Embarkation) interviewed a black sergeant from Chicago who had served with the 69th Ordnance Company during operations in Italy. He declared, according to 166 the report, that

the attitude of the Negro soldier overseas is difficult to understand...Many of them had been taken from homes where they struggled for existence, but show no appreciation for the opportunities offered to them when they become part of the United States Army. Their general attitude is one of complete resignation, with the individual making no attempt to participate actively in any phase of their work...Most of them are irresponsible, inefficient and definitely color conscious. They apparently feel that the war is being fought entirely for the benefit of the white race, and they can not see any reason why they should be forced to rectify world unrest which they feel is entirely the white man's fault. Words like "white man's war" and others of stronger significance were common among the Negroes in Source ' s unit.

Lt. Joseph Weiser (white) reported a similar

attitude among the soldiers in the 3 62nd Port Company which he commanded during operations in Ireland, England and France from December, 1944, to January,

1945. One should be aware that though he denied any racial bias, he was obviously resentful that he had been assigned to command a black unit. He acknowledged, however, that "colored troops were hard workers and good producers when they were treated fairly and given the proper consideration." He reported that there were

"about 20 men in his outfit who were 'lazy, arrogant agitators'" and if he could have disposed of them, he

"would have an efficient unit." What was really 167 noteworthy was his comments on the attitudes of the enlisted men in his unit toward the war. He reported that

It is common belief among colored troops, that they were fighting this war for nothing...[that] they were certain that their position in the United States would not be bettered because of their service in the Army, and...that when they are returned to this country they would find discrimination still existing."®®

Major James W. Smith, a white Texan, made a similar report after his service with the 6401st Motor

Vehicle Assembly Company at Oran (North Africa) and the

22th Ordnance Company at Naples. Despite his obvious animosity toward black soldiers, he felt that they

should be integrated with white soldiers because "when Negroes are called upon to act as a group, they deliberately shirk their responsibility and act as if this was not their war." He claimed that punishing them had no impact. They "were not afraid of court-martials or prison sentences," he reported.^ This is also consistent with Bell Wiley's finding that one of the difficulties confronting commanders in preparing black troops for combat was a "lack of interest in the war. "®2

Actually, Major Smith was quite mistaken in his generalization that black soldiers who worked in 168 segregated units "shirked their responsibilities." Black soldiers did work. Ulysses Lee acknowledged that the sheer magnitude of the work performed by Negro units, often operating on round the clock schedules, was tremendous, and that a detailed narrative of their contributions would require a separate volume.®^

Lee's findings are supported by many white officers who commanded black soldiers. Weiser, prejudiced though he may have been, was correct in his observation that

"they were hard workers and good producers when they were treated fairly." William Blackford commanded the

U.S.S. Mason. one of the first ships with an all-black crew. Writing to his parents in 1944, he seemed genuinely bemused by all the "bunk about Negro crews."

He could not "see that they are any different from others if treated the same." He thought, in fact, that they were "anxious to make a name for themselves and actually work harder."®^

Both sets of opinions reflected reality. Some black soldiers indeed felt that "they were fighting the war for nothing," that it was "not their war," that

"the war was being fought for the benefit of the white race," and " [it] would not benefit their cause materially in the United States." Under those conditions, they saw no reason to "give it their all. "65 pqj- others, though, the war provided an 169 opportunity to serve with distinction and, in so doing, buttress their moral claim for racial equality. This

difference in attitude and behavior was merely a

reflection of the attitudes among black civilians, and

black soldiers were, after all, merely civilians in uniform.

Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues from the

Research Branch indeed documented the "ambivalence" of black soldiers toward the war effort when they surveyed

them in 1943 and 1945. First, the surveys revealed that most blacks soldiers did take an interest in the war.

Two-thirds of all blacks surveyed in March, 1943, at

least believed that "the war is as much my business as anyone else's."®® The surveys also revealed that black soldiers were also very bitter about "the treatment

[they] were receiving at the hands of whites, both within and without the military." Consequently, they identified less with the war than did white soldiers and tended to be rather cynical about the idealistic claims made for it. He found no reason to question their patriotism, though. They were no more disloyal than whites, he contended, nor did they evade the draft in disproportionate numbers. Stouffer found, in fact, that white soldiers also lacked interest in the

"ideological formulations" or "a deep personal 170 commitment: to the war."®’ He stressed, however, that despite the lack of personal conviction, both black and white servicemen did what "they were called upon to do." They may have done it without enthusiasm, but they did it nonetheless.

Though many black soldiers lacked belief in the idealistic claims made for the war, some were still willing to fight. White soldiers, John Blum concluded, fought not for anything so esoteric as freeing the world from totalitarianism but for "home: where the good things were." ®®In a sense, one could also say that black soldiers fought for "home" as well. Black soldiers' commitment to the war effort, the researchers discovered, was contingent upon their belief that the status of the group, and thus their own, would be improved as a result of the wartime sacrifices. The researchers concluded, in fact, that

most Negroes were patriotic and knew that a United Nations victory was preferable to an Axis victory but the emotional support tended to be fully rallied only by hope of positive racial gain...While the war received compliance from Negroes in any case, it tended to receive enthusiastic support only from those who identified the interest of the group with the war.®® The researchers found, however, that black soldiers almost evenly divided on whether they would benefit from the war. In the March, 1943, survey, for 171 example, forty-three percent of the black soldiers felt that they would "have more rights and privileges" than

[they] had before the war," while thirty-eight percent thought that their position would not be altered. Thirteen percent were not certain and the remaining six

percent actually believed they would have "less rights

and privileges.’® It should come as no surprise that

some of them did not "give their all" to the war effort while others did.

Another manifestation of the resistance among black servicemen is evident in what the researchers

found was their "greater reluctance to go overseas or to fight in actual combat." This follows, actually, from a previous conclusion that some black soldiers were not inclined to "give their all" to the war effort. Though the results run contrary to what is now accepted dogma about the attitudes of black soldiers toward combat duty, as Noted earlier, the majority of black soldiers surveyed in 1943 indicated little desire to "get into the fight." Actually, white soldiers did not reveal any overwhelming desire to "get into the fight" either, but black soldiers exhibited the least enthusiasm of all. When questioned, the vast majority of black soldiers indicated a preference for a unit that would stay in the United States, or, if it went 172 overseas, they desired some other type of duty besides combat. When asked "if it was up to you, what kind of

outfit would you rather be in?" Seventy-three percent wanted to be "in an outfit that will stay in the United

States," and another eleven percent wanted to be "in a non-combat outfit overseas." Only sixteen percent preferred to be "in a combat outfit overseas." The researchers next inquired of them, "if your unit went overseas, would you rather have an actual fighting job or have some other job?" Fifty-four percent of the black soldiers indicated that they "would rather have some other job," while another eighteen percent were undecided. Only 28 percent indicated that they "would rather have an actual fighting job." However, even here some clarification is necessary because only fifteen percent of these actually wanted to go overseas and into combat. The remaining thirteen percent would have preferred not to go overseas at all. If they had to go, they indicated to the researchers, they might as well fight.Stouffer was convinced that the "greater reluctance" was a reflection of their "greater resentment" of civilian and military racial policies. Anecdotal evidence supports the survey results.

Staff Sgt. Chester Jones, was driving the Redball Express with the 3418th Quartermaster Truck Company in 173 December of 1944 when General Dwight D. Eisenhower issued the memorandum asking black soldiers to

volunteer for infantry duty. They would be permitted to serve on an integrated basis. Jones recalled that

combat officers came to his unit "asking the truckers to volunteer for infantry duty." He did not volunteer

because "they said I didn't have sense enough to be a soldier stateside."^ When Captain Richard Middleton,

a chaplain with the 548th Quartermaster was interviewed upon discharge, he commented on the cynicism among

members of his unit when they were finally given the

opportunity to qualify for combat duty in December of 1944, "during the dark days of the German breakthrough." He reported that

the troops had been agitating for months for combat duty, but when the opportunity presented itself, ninety percent of the men who formerly desired combat duty refused to volunteer stating, 'well, now that the white man cannot stand to see any more of his own dying, he wants us to die in his place.

Most likely a sizeable contingent of black soldiers probably responded with the ambivalence of Master Sergeant Eddie Floyd. He did volunteer, in a way. He was with the 578th Field Artillery attached to Patton's Fifth Army. The unit was a comfortable distance from

the front in December of 1944. They heard the reports 174 of the ferocity of the battle over the radio, and they also heard General Dwight D. Eisenhower's appeal for volunteers. He felt he had a duty to go. "A couple of buddies and I got drunk," he recalled,

and under the influence got carried away and volunteered for the infantry. We went to our commanding officer and...he told us to go to hell. He wanted to know if we were out of our minds; three of his best men. Afterwards when sobriety returned I knew I must have been out of my tree..."’'*

Much has been said of the eagerness with which over five thousand black soldiers volunteered to "trade the safety of the rear" and their segregated service units for combat duty in December of 1944. Perhaps it did say a lot about their sense of "patriotism," but it is entirely possible that it says more about their sense of racial consciousness.’^ White officers opposed to military integration, seeking to belittle this experiment, pointed out with some justification that the volunteers were unrepresentative of black soldiers in the Army. The volunteers did, in fact, consist of a higher proportion of men who had scored in the top three categories of the Army General Classification Test than was the case for all blacks in the Army. This is significant because the researchers found that the more educated a black soldier was, the more he tended to be "militant" on the issue of racial 175 equality. Even more important, when the researchers analyzed the data on attitudes toward combat duty, they discovered that "the men most motivated to get into the

action came disproportionately from the ranks of the

racially militant." The well educated and militant black soldier, whether northerner or southerner,

regarded his assignment to a segregated service unit as a deliberate attempt to deny black soldiers the

opportunity to prove that they were the equal of white

men. Their solution, Stouffer found, was not to resist

combat duty, however, but to "press harder for the

opportunity to demonstrate their abilities and to win for their group a valid claim for greater rights and

privileges.

Finally, there were times when black soldiers,

like so many others before them, demonstrated their opposition to their status by leaving. Rural peasants

and agricultural laborers in Bolivia, peasants in Sedaka, southern blacks during World War I, and

antebellum slaves all employed "flight" as a form of protest. Desertion, the military version of "flight," was the least confrontational and most passive form of protest, and also the most difficult to document. In the case of black soldiers, however, military

intelligence records documented cases in which the 176 protest motive was overtly expressed. Such was the case with Sgt. John B. Smith, a

returnee from overseas who, on December 28, 1944, according to military officials at the AAF (Army Air Forces) Redistribution Center in Atlantic City,

"protested his impending shipment to a new base in the state of Georgia." Pleading his case with the 1st sergeant of his unit, he reportedly stated that "I don't mind going overseas but I do mind having to go to

Georgia and fight the bus drivers." Unmoved by his appeal, the sergeant ordered him to prepare for the trip the following morning. Smith failed, however, to appear at the appointed time and had to be apprehended.

He was shipped the following day, obviously under guard.”

In another case, the People's Voice, a black newspaper, reported that "an AWOL soldier it had persuaded to return voluntarily," had been sentenced to six months imprisonment and forfeiture of $14 monthly in pay. The soldier had apparently told them he had "left his station in protest of 'the Jim Cro setup of the Army.'" They reported that they had succeeded in convincing him that " 'running away' was no the way to fight discrimination."’®

The best documented example came from military 177

officials at Ft. Bliss, Texas, who reported that, on January 15, 1945, the United States Border Patrol had

apprehended Private James Albert Williams, "a deserter from Ft. Meade, Maryland, since 15 July, 1944." Private Williams revealed upon questioning that his intended destination was Africa. Officials said that when asked why he had deserted, he told them "he had been mistreated and denied medical aid for a crippled leg." He further declared, according to the report, that the Army did not live up to its creed of equality and justice. I took the oath of allegiance with the understanding that I was fighting for freedom and democracy. When I got into the Army, I found out that there was no democracy....! feel there is no future for me here in America. There is no opportunity for becoming a man and living like a human being. There is no reason why I should fight; there is nothing for me to fight for.’’

There are other cases of desertion which involve groups of soldiers and in which the protest motive was not as clearly expressed. How prevalent desertion was as a form of protest is difficult to say. As stated earlier, researchers found that it was the uneducated soldier, who was more likely to "vote with his feet."®° Black soldiers generally did not try to avoid military service. Most black soldiers would have agreed that "'running away' was no way to fight 178 discrimination." They were more likely to remain and try to force the military to "live up to its creed of equality and justice."

In conclusion, while black servicemen fought the war for "freedom" and "democracy" abroad, the war that really concerned them most was the war for "democracy" at home. The struggle for victory over the enemy at home took a wide variety of forms, and this chapter has examined the struggle in its most individual, indirect, and least confrontational manifestations, what Scott terms "everyday forms of resistance." Day-to-day resistance began with the "war of words," the

"ideological struggle," which Scott contends correctly is indeed necessary to any further protest. The various indirect and individual forms in which the protest manifested itself especially included the kind that sought to avoid direct confrontation with authorities. While indirect forms of protest were well suited to the characteristics and circumstances of some black soldiers, the tendency to confront discrimination directly increased as the war worn on. Black soldiers came out of a population that was becoming increasing more militant on the issue of race. Like their civilian counterpart, black soldiers exhibited a tendency to confront racism head on as the war progressed. They 179 would have agreed that "running away was not the way to fight discrimination." 180 ENDNOTES

1. Interview with Lt. Lacey Wilson, 364th Infantry Division, in Mary Penick Motley, The Invisible Soldier; The Experience of The Black Soldier. World War II (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), 61, 2. Interview with Ray Carter in Motley, The Invisible Soldier. 110-111. He credits the militancy of the generation of the 1960's and 70's to the fact that they are the children of the blacks who served in World War II.

3. Interview with Ossie Davis, National Public Radio, May 24, 1993.

4. Colonel Donovan Queen, the Commanding Officer of the 366th Massachusetts, and a regular, agrees with him about the unacknowledged number of violent rebellions. Queen was interviewed in Motley, The Invisible Soldier. 39.

5. See Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops. United States Army in World War II, Special Studies (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), 356. 6. James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1985) , 29 and Eric Langer, Economic Change and Rural Resistance in Southern Bolivia. 1880-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 66 and 191, for discussion of the nature of resistance among subordinate groups. Both maintain that organized, violent revolts were usually the last and most desperate form of resistance among the subordinate groups they studied. They exercised every other option available before resorting to violence.

7. I find no evidence to support MacGregor's conclusion that "segregation devastated [their] morale" and "deepened their sense of inferiority." He cited only Ulysses Lee, but Lee does not document his assertion, either. See Morris J. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces. 1940-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, U.S. Army, 1981), 34. 181 First, the term "morale" is generally employed with such irritating imprecision that it should never be used without definition. Tamotsu Shibutani, The Derelicts of Company K: A Sociological Study of Demoralization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 3-5, contains a good summary of the literature, as does Arnold Rose, The Negro's Morale. 3- 4. Rose acknowledged that there are various definitions of "morale," and that many are unrelated to each other. The term sometimes denoted "self-confidence," or "personal adjustment and happiness." He indicated that he was using the term "in the sense of loyalty and solidarity within the group." Under his definition of the term, in fact, black soldiers during World War II actually had very high morale, not low. Shibutani's likewise acknowledged that definitions of morale were vague. The definition he employed was the "degree of effectiveness with which the recognized goals of joint enterprise are pursued." He was also "concerned with persistence in the pursuit of goals--the capacity of a group to maintain its integrity and steadfastness of purpose until the objective is obtained." He found Company K to be demoralized, using this definition because it was unable to perform its Army function. However, he did recognize that Company K, though "demoralized," was able to act with remarkable cohesion in carrying out acts against its commanders. Acutally, Company K, like some black units, had its own goals and exhibited "high morale" in pursuing them. More recently, the Army has defined "morale" in terms of "job satisfaction." See Stephen D. Westbrook, "Morale, Proficiency, and Discipline," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 8 (Spring, 1980) : 43-54. Second, none of the Army's own research surveys supports the conclusion that black soldiers suffered from a sense of inferiority. Their insistence on the basic equality of the races actually belies this conclusion.

8. Most military installations, for political as well as logistical reasons, were located in the South. See James L. Burran, "Racial Violence in the South During World War II ( Ph.D Dissertation, University of Tennessee 1977), 43. 9. Bill Downey, Uncle Sam Must Be Losing the War: Black Marines of the 51st (San Francisco: Strawberry Hill Press, 1982), 9. Downey referred to the segregated coach as the "cattle car." 182 10. Sammy Davis, Jr. Yes I Can: The Story of Sammy Davis. Jr.(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1965), p. 52. Davis was in an integrated unit through basic training at Ft. Warren, Wyoming. Machinist-Mate Edward Oldham said that he served with white soldiers as part of a water purification unit throughout the War. He has no idea why he was selected, but he learned the work and served with the unit without incident. See Motley, Invisible Soldier. 116.

11. Interview with Albert Evans, in Motley, Invisible Soldier. 97.

12. Interview with Colonel Donovan Queen, Commanding Officer, 366th Infantry, U.S. Army in Motley, The Invisible Soldier. 39-40.

13. Interview with Robert Decatur, WCPN, Cleveland, Ohio, February 10, 1993.

14. Sammy Davis, Jr., Yes I can. 54-55.

15. Almost all the Northern blacks who have written autobiographies insist that they encountered racism for the first time when they joined the Army. It did not make sense. After all, racism existed in the North as well. Sammy Davis's realization that his father and uncle had protected him provides at least a partial explanation. Some parents protected the children from the harsh realities of racism, as was the case among upper-class black parents in Washington, D.C. See E. Franklin Frazier, Negro Youth at the Crossroads. p. 63. Moreover, in the North there were fewer racial signs. In the South, they understood because they saw the signs which said clearly "White" and "Colored." 16. Wilbur Walker, We Are Men: Memoirs of World War II and the Korean War. (Baltimore: Heritage Press, 1972; Reprinted 1980), 10. 17. Charles Johnson, Growing Up in the Black Belt. (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941), 276.

18. Burran, "Racial Violence in the South During World War II," 6-7. 183 19. War Department, Office of the Inspector General, Washington, B.C., Memorandum for the Inspector General, from Benjamin 0. Davis, Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Subject: "Survey Relative Conditions Affecting Racial Attitudes at Ft. Clark, Texas," in RG 107, Box 205, National Archives. Italics added. 20. Richard Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts. 1939-1953 (Columbia. Mo*. University of Missouri Press, 1969) , 69. See also Samuel Stouffer, The American Soldier: Adjustment During Armv Life. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II Series (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 558.

21. Ibid., 72-3.

22. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, 19-25 August, 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives.

23. Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Third Service Command, (Va), 1-23 February, 1945, in Box 262, RG 107.

24. Anonymous to Walter White, NAACP, Washington, B.C., Undated (8 September, 1941), in Record Group 107, Box 185, "Camp Gibbons."

25. Todd's report is contained in his letter dated September 17, 1941, from Curtiss Todd to Walter White, in RG 107, Box 185, "Camp Gibbons," National Archives. It is from his letter that the details of the events that transpired on the evening of September 7th as well the factors leading up to it were derived. Hastie's response to the NAACP is also in the file, dated 23 September. 26. Ibid. 27. In all fairness to the Army, this was still the early stages of mobilization, and Camp Gibbons was temporary, as Hastie, then Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, pointed out. Some of the problems, such as lack of facilities, were problems encountered by all soldiers during the early stages of mobilization. See William Hastie to Walter White, September 25, 1941 in RG 107, "Camp Gibbons," Box 185, National Archives. The problems were compounded. 184 however, by racial segregation because the military had to maintain separate facilities for blacks. Facilities were allocated on the basis of numbers. There were fewer blacks, and so they almost always had inferior facilities or none at all.

28. "RHD" means this particular quartermaster unit was being trained as a 'railhead' unit. Railhead units were responsible for unloading and distribution of supplies at docks.

29. Anonymous (Camp Gibbons) to Walter White, 8 September, 1941, Box 185, RG 107, National Archives.

30. For a discussion of confrontational types of protests in the 1940's, see August Meier, CORE : A Study of the Civil Rights Movement. 1942-1968 (New York : Oxford University Press), 1973.

31. E.J. Hobsbawm, "Peasants and Politics," Journal of Peasant Studies. 1 (1973), 13. Also cited in James Scott, Weapons of the Weak, xv.

32. Motley, Invisible Soldier. 39.

33. Scott, Weapons of the Weak. 233-6, 240.

34. See also Erik K. Erikson, "The Concept of Identity in Race Relations: Quotes and Notes," Daedalus 95 (Winter, 1966), 147. "Resistance," he indicates, is "a technical problem met with in the therapeutic attempt to induce an individual to recognize the nature of his illness...and to accept interpretations given to him. Blacks retained a sense of identity, tended not to accept the definitions of who and what they were. This constitutes resistance."

35. These are all features of "the war of words," which characterized peasant resistance in the village of Sedaka. See Scott, Weapons of the Weak. Chapter 7. 36. Stouffer, American Soldier, 502-3.

37. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Eighth Service Command, Dallas, 21 to 28 October, 1944, in Box 262, RG 107. 185 38. Army Service Forces, Technical Intelligence Report, Subject: "Criticism of Mixed Officers in Colored Units," 28 May 1945, RG 107, Box 265.

39. Army Service Forces...Technical Intelligence Reports, From NYPE, Subject: "Morale and Discrimination Against Negro Soldiers," 25 July, 1945, Theatre of Operation, ETO, in Box 265, RG 107 National Archives. The report noted that the chaplain was born in Mississippi and was sometimes mistaken for white. 40. John Bollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1937), 258, 287.

41. Weekly Intelligence Summary, no. 134, Headquarters, III Service Command, 8-15 December, 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives, Washington, D.C. They referred him to the psychiatrist for evaluation.

42. Memorandum of Colonel Roamer, "Summary of the Racial Situation," 7 October 1944, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, Ga. in Box 261, RG 107. (Civil Authorities refused to release the soldier to military authorities and he was tried, and fined $75, and sentenced to 90 days in the workhouse. He was also held over for the grand jury for violating Jim Crow seating laws.

43. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Fourth Service Command, 11-18 August, 1945, in Box 263, RG 107. 44. Technical Intelligence Report, From: Intelligence and Security Division, New Orleans, Port of Embarkation, 28 April, 1945, in Box 265, RG 107, National Archives.

45. Bollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town. 259, 302. 46. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, 16 September, 1944, Box 262, RG 107. 47. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, 11-18 August, 1945, in RG 107, Box 263, National Archives. 186 48. Scott, Weapons of the Weak. 29.

49. Army Service Forces, Headquarters, Eight Service Command, Dallas Texas, Weekly Intelligence Summary, 14-21 April, 1945, in Box 263, RG 107.

50. Gerald Mullin might characterize Morris's protest as "self-indulgent because he did not attack discrimination directly. Scott disagrees with Mullin. Scott argues that these passive forms are a pre­ requisite to other forms of resistance. Morris's case demonstrates this, in a way. He reportedly stated that "others...were keeping quiet but I am going sqwak to everyone." See Mullin, Flight and Rebellion; Slave Resistance in Eighteenth Centurv Virginia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 34-38; and Scott, Weapons of the Weak. Chapter 7, "The War of Words."

51. Scott found that this characterized peasant resistance in Sedaka and all of the studies of the black protest in the 1930's support this view. See Scott, Weapons of the Weak. Chapter 7.

52. Confidential, War Department, Headquarters, First Service Command, Field Office, Security and Intelligence Division, Providence, R.I., Subject: Williams, James N. Pvt., Colored...Ft. Lewis, Washington, in Box 261, RG 107, National Archives. The comments were made in a letter from Williams to an unnamed correspondent. It was apart of a censorship report from the Intelligence Field Office at Providence to Headquarters in Washington. 53. Letter from T/5 Clarence Adams, 4259th QM Supply Co, Camp Breckenridge, Kentucky, July 4, 1944 to Mr. Carl Murphy, The Baltimore Afro-American, in RG 107, National Archives. A portion of the letter is also reproduced in Phillip McGuire, Tans for a Jim Crow Army: Letters from Black Soldiers in World War II (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio, 1983), 90. 54. Walter White was sent to the Pacific in fact to investigate conditions among soldiers as a result of this mutiny. See Walter White, A Man Called White (New York: Viking Press, 1948; repr.. New York: Arno Press, 1969), 271-273. 187 55. See Technical Intelligence Report, 12 July, 1945, From 9th Service Command, Report No. 2754, Subject : "Comments on Negro Troops in Saipan, Source: Wilbur K. Koontz, Major, Executive Officer. It is not unusual for subordinate groups to protest their status by doing their work lackadaisically, especially if they envisioned no improvement in their status as a result of hard work. Slaves in antebellum Virginia foresaw no hope of improving their status and, consequently, tended to do "lazy, wasteful and indifferent work." Langdon Carter's description of his slaves revealed that they were persistently uncooperative. "My people seem to be quite dead hearted," he complained, "and either cannot or will not work." Scott pointed out that indentured servants in India adopted similar behavior patterns as a protest against their caste status. Mullin, Flight and Rebellion. 53-54 and See Scott, Weapons of the Weak. 32-3.

56. See Technical Intelligence Report, From: Headquarters, 9th Service Command, 12 July, 1945 , Subject: "Comments on Negro Troops in Saipan." in RG 107, Box 265, National Archives.

57. First Service Command, Boston, Weekly Intelligence Summary, 25 August to 1 September, 1945, in Box 265, RG 107, National Archives. 58. Ibid.

59. Army Service Forces, Office of the Commanding General, Technical Intelligence Report, Sources: William Taylor, Ordnance, Supt. of Storage with the 69th Ordnance Co, in RG 107, Box 265, National Archives. 60. Army Service Forces, Office of the Commanding General Washington, D.C. Technical Intelligence Report, Subject: "Racial Problems in the European Theatre." From: Security and Intelligence, 5th Service Command, 18 June, 1945, In Box 265, RG 107. 61. Technical Intelligence Report, Eighth Service Command, 14 April, 1945, Subject : "Unsatisfactory Performance of Negro Troops," Box 265, RG 107, National Archives. This topic will be discussed in Chapter 7. 188 62. Wiley, "The Training of Negro Troops," Study no. 36 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, Historical Section, 1946), 9.

63. Lee, The Employment of Nearo Trooos. 593.

64. To "Mom and Dad," May 23, 1944, from "Bill," (Commander) William Blackford, U.S.S. Mason. Fleet P.O. New York, N.Y. in author's possession. Commander Blackford wrote also to his parents in his letter of Jan 14, 1944 that he "was delighted with the colored men who are here now. They know what they are doing and can really put out the work."

65. Stouffer, American Soldier. 574. This is a paraphrase of one of the "free comments" from the survey of their attitudes. The researchers asked them if "you are giving your all to the war effort." Most were honest and admitted that sometimes they did, and sometimes they did not.

66. Ibid., 508.

67. Ibid., 509. The researchers were actually surprised by the mostly positive attitudes of black soldiers toward army life. Given their resentment of military racial policies, the researchers had expected their attitudes toward military life would have been much worse.

68. John Morton Blum, V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), 67. 69. Stouffer, American Soldiers. 520.

70. Ibid., 514. Black soldiers as well as white soldiers tended to exaggerate the part their group was playing in the war, the researchers found. 71. Stouffer, American Soldier. 521-4. Only forty- five percent of white soldiers, less than half, wanted "an actual fighting job."

72. Interview with Chester Jones, in Motley, The Invisible Soldier. 190. 189 73. Technical Intelligence Report, Subject: "Morale and Discrimination Among Negro Troops," from NYPE...26 July, 1945, in Box 263, RG 107, National Archives. This was the same unit in which the chaplain reported that black officers were constantly arguing with the white officers about racial discrimination. 74. Interview with Eddie Floyd, in Motley, The Invisible Soldier. 182.

75. See MacGregor, Integration of the United States Armed Forces. 55.

76. Stouffer, American Soldier. 526-7.This is actually the reverse of the situation in Vietnam, where Charles Moskos found a strong sense of racial militancy "coming from below." In World War II, researchers found the strongest sense of racial militancy coming from above. See Charles Moskos, "Commentary," The Military and Society: Proceedings of the Fifth Military Symposium Held at the United States Air Force Academy October 5-6. 1982. ed. Major David Maclsaac, USAF (Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF and United States Air Force Academy), 139.

77. Second Service Command, Summary of Intelligence Information, 7-13 January, 1945, in RG 107, Box 262, National Archives. In completing the report the Intelligence Officer stated further that "the majority of colored troops at the AAF Distribution Center objected strenuously to having to be shipped to southern camps for assignment."

78. Intelligence Officers read the local black newspapers and reported stories the newspapers carried about the military. The intelligence officers did not indicate if they had verified them or not, but they were obsessed with the black press which they claimed reported false stories and was biased against the Army. The intelligence officer in Drew Field, Florida reported this one. See Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, 7-14 October, 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives.

79. Weekly Intelligence Summary, 20 January, 1945, Headquarters Eighth Service Command, Dallas, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives. 190 80. Special Services, "What the Soldier Thinks," No. 2, August, 1943, 35. CHAPTER IV

THE CONTOURS A CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

To counteract criticism about the Army's reluctance to use blacks in combat, historian Bell

Wiley, then a Major in the Army, was assigned to

prepare a study about the difficulties which the Army

had encountered in preparing blacks for combat duty.

When he interviewed commanding officers, one of the

complaints frequently logged against black soldiers was that they exhibited "a concern for racial 'rights' which often culminated in riots and other forms of violence.To document servicemen's "concern for "racial 'rights,'"Wiley related an encounter between "a well-educated colored lieutenant" and an Inspector

General officer who had asked the Lieutenant "about the desirability of postponing agitations of racial rights until the end of the war." The Lieutenant, who had been a successful businessman in civilian life, responded that to retard the war effort is a serious thing. However, I feel that it is asking too much of me as a colored man... to enter wholeheartedly into that struggle when I am not accorded the treatment to which my conduct entitles m e ... I

191 192 do believe that if the Army requires me to be a member of it, it ought to accord me the same protection which my status entitles me. If it doesn't do that I cannot have the right attitude towards it...I believe that a man should be treated as a man, whatever his complexion or color may be. That is not asking too much of the Army..

His conviction that asking for the same rights as other soldiers was "not asking too much" and that it was indeed asking too much of black soldiers to put aside the "agitation" for equal rights until the war was over reflected the view of a significant proportion of blacks, civilian and military. His statement is, in fact, a reassertion of the "Double V," and the Research

Branch surveys found significant support among black soldiers for the "Double V." When asked on the March,

1943 survey, "Which of these things do you think

Negroes back home in civilian life should try hardest to do first," twenty-seven percent endorsed the statement that they should "try hardest to make things better for the Negro," while thirty-seven percent thought they "should try to do both at the same time."

Less than a third, thirty percent, thought they should "try hardest to win the war first." Even among the third who thought they should concentrate on winning the war first, the free comment revealed a desire to do so for racial gain. They commented that "things will be 193 better," or "Negroes can demonstrate (or earn) their right to better treatment," or "there will be more time (or a better chance) to improve conditions for the

Negro after the war." The salient point is that a total of sixty-four percent preferred to fight the war for

democracy at home entirely or fight it simultaneously indicating that support for the "agitation for racial

rights" was substantial.^ As noted in Chapter 1, the Crisis editorial after the attack on Pearl Harbor had

told black Americans, "Now is not the time to be

silent. "■* A significant number of black soldiers obviously agreed.

The tendency of black soldiers to "agitate" over

racial "rights" while in the military is documented in a variety of sources.® As Stouffer pointed out, however, it would erroneous to "attribute to all

Negroes a well-thought out or consistent philosophy."® While it might thus be an overstatement to speak of a civil rights movement within the military, it is apparent that the protest among black soldiers did at times take on the appearance of a civil rights movement.’ This is the subject of this chapter. The most frequently used form of protest or "agitation" for "racial rights" among the articulate was letter-writing. A survey conducted by the Research 194 Branch of the Army revealed that the vast majority of soldiers spent their leisure time writing letters.® Black soldiers were no exception. It should be pointed

out at the beginning that there was nothing unusual about soldiers complaining about the Army, either. White soldiers did not think too highly of the

institution and they too wrote home and complained.

They also wrote to the President and complained.® The black soldiers' concern with racial issues, however, was documented repeatedly by the Research Branch.

Benjamin Quarles is correct in his contention, more­ over, that their higher educational levels made them more aware that "words were weapons" in the struggle for racial advancement.^® The political aims of black letter writers were evident in much of the correspondence. A frequent recipient of their letters were the black newspapers, including the Pittsburgh Courier, which had launched the "Double V" campaign, and the Baltimore Afro-

American. Like the civilian advocates of civil rights, a major aim of the letter was to generate publicity for the cause. One letter writer told the Courier that he "would appreciate it if you would make this the headline in your next edition." Another letter to the Afro-American asked that it "kindly expose this 195 statement in any issue of your paper and reveal same to the NAACP." The influence of the 'Double V' campaign was evident in a letter from the men at Ft. Leonard

Wood whose letter closed with the statement, "Yours for a Double V."“

That their personal difficulties took on a political meaning was evident in the letter which

Private Iva Bluford wrote from Camp Davis, Wilmington

North Carolina to his mother in July of 1941. It was a general complaint about the poor quality of the food, that they were "treated like dogs," and that they had not been paid. These were indeed common complaints among white soldiers.He revealed, however, that other members of his unit (Battery D, 54th Coast

Artillery) "had written letters to their congressmen and to different newspapers telling them of the situation here." He also asked his mother to "try and get some big official" to quietly investigate the camp and suggested she contact the NAACP. He requested that she not use his name, however, because the officers were "already searching for the boy who wrote an article about the camp for the Detroit Chronicle. Black soldiers were well informed of the activities of contemporary black leaders and civil rights organizations. That is why Private Elwood Smith 196 wrote to the NAACP from Dale Mabry Field on 10

September 1944, to complain about the kind of work they were "forced to do," such as "working in the officers'

mess and cutting grass, " about the attitudes of the

officers and also that disabled black soldiers were forced to work. He asked the NAACP if they "could

contact the Adjutant General and request an

inspection." He was asking for their assistance, he

stated, because "my mother, father and sister are members of the NAACP." Moreover, he continued, "I

realize your power for the Negro...! realize that you will do all that is possible to see that they get some of what is due them."“

Private Alfred Cobb, on the other hand, asked for their assistance because he was a member of the NAACP. He wrote to them from the guardhouse at Ft. Dix, New

Jersey in 1942. He had been on a bus going to Ft. Dix, he told them, when "a gang of white soldiers started

calling me nigger and other vile names." So did the military policeman who was on the bus. He contended that "when I had no choice, either get beat up or probably killed, I cut the MP and landed in the guardhouse." No one else was arrested. He was inquiring of the NAACP if they could investigate his case because "I am a member of the organization stationed at Ft. 197 Dix. "IS

The soldiers in fact, kept contact with the

civilian world, a fact that intensified the protest within the military. The intelligence officer for the 97th engineers reported in January of 1945 that two

privates had written letters indicating their "violent hatred for the Army and the U.S. based on their

resentment of 'alleged discrimination against

Negroes.'" They interviewed the first soldier and the officer noted that he had been "aroused by a piece of

news received from home. They had a discussion with him

and found that he was of "sound mind and unquestionably

loyal." The matter was considered closed. They

interviewed the second soldier, however, and sent him to the hospital for being "unsound mentally." The

interview with him had only brought a "sullen and

violently prejudicial response." They sent him for

"extended treatment in an effort to rehabilitate him. "

Black soldiers were not beyond employing subterfuge in their letter-writing if it served to

advance the cause. In February of 1943, the Office of the Inspector General conducted an investigation of an

"alleged attack upon a Negro soldier at Scooba, Mississippi." The investigation had been triggered by a 198 letter printed in the Pittsburgh Courier. The writer claimed to be a "white man born and raised in

Mississippi," who had could no longer be silent about the way black soldiers were treated. He said he had witnessed a vicious attack upon a black soldier by

white civilian police in a place called Catfish Alley.

He thought the soldiers was dead since he had seen "the

soldier (sic) blood run on the street." He said that he wanted this injustice brought to the attention of

President Roosevelt. He claimed that he "didn't have much learning" and asked if the editors could "fix the

letter and send it to the White House." The publication

of the letter triggered an investigation. The waitress

who had been the cause of the incident and her husband, both black, testified before the Inspector General.

They backed up the military police's assertion that

they had used no more force than was necessary to get

the soldier under control. The investigation also concluded that the writer was not a white person at

all. It was the consensus of those who were contacted during the investigation and those who read the letter

that the writer was black. The Commanding officer of the 65th Aviation Squadron, a black unit, was one of

those who testified. He was positive, the investigators reported, that "one of the members of his unit wrote 199 the letter and took it to Scooba, Mississippi to mail it."

It was not unusual for soldiers to bypass military censors by smuggling their letters of complaint out of camps. Intelligence officials at the Indiantown Gap Military Reservation in Pennsylvania reported that they had interviewed a black enlisted man, a prisoner in the post stockade, who had apparently "admitted having mailed a letter illegally through outside sources." The letter had apparently been sent to the Adjutant

General's office in Washington, who returned it to them. The letter, according to the report, "set forth alleged mistreatment" he had received at the base.

During the interview, the enlisted man allegedly

"admitted that all the facts set forth in the letter were fabrications." He also acknowledged having mailed another letter to one of the black newspapers in St.

Louis.

The president of the Boston Chapter of the NAACP,

Julian Steele, acknowledged that they had been receiving a considerable number of complaints from soldiers, and that some of them were of dubious merit. Steele stated that they were receiving a constant stream of complaints from Negro soldiers for alleged discrimination and that the organization had adopted the policy that 200 if these men have done wrong they should be punished and can expect no help. Many soldiers will do wrong and hide behind the fact of their color.“

If the NAACP received "a steady stream of

complaints" from black soldiers, with or without merit, evidence reveals that it also received financial

support from the soldiers as well. The intelligence Officer at Tuskegee Army Air Force base reported in May

of 1945, that "an NAACP recruiting campaign has been

launched among the military and civilian personnel at

this base." The soldiers also "maintained a bulletin board on which they posted newspaper clippings concerning the activities of the NAACP." In addition, three soldiers had collected $166 for the organization.

When questioned, the soldiers stated that they had been asked by two civilian instructors to aid in the efforts.2° Similarly, the intelligence officer at the

Seventh Service Command in St. Louis reported that it had reliable information that the local branch of their

NAACP had received contributions amounting to $160 "from a Negro sergeant stationed in Burma to carry on the campaign against segregation and discrimination in St. Louis." The sergeant included a list of the contributors and it "contained names of nineteen soldiers from twelve states.Similarly, 201 Intelligence officers at the Louisville district reported that a private of the 619th Bombardment Squadron had made a collection for the NAACP in the

Orderly Room on the 30th of April, immediately after

the men had received their monthly pay. The

contributions were reported to have totalled somewhere between $100 to $200.2=

Information in the black press support the intelligence reports. According to a report from the Second Service command in New York,

Almost every week the Negro press reports receiving contribution from Negro troops stationed in all parts of the world. It is indicated that a steady stream of contributions are received from Negro servicemen who are regularly receiving literature and newspapers describing the campaign against Jim Crowism and racial discrimination. This week's reports of contributions assert that large amounts have been received from soldiers stationed in Europe and in Dutch New Guinea and from marines stationed somewhere in the Pacific. . .22

Intelligence officers in Oklahoma found similar accounts in the black newspapers in their area. The front page of the Oklahoma, for instance. Black Dispatch carried a story that a Negro soldier who was inducted from Oklahoma City and is now assigned to the 3907th Truck Company in Germany has forward $825 to the local branch of the NAACP....This represented money collected as a result of NAACP membership drive conducted by personnel 202 of his organization.^'*

Black soldiers thus supported activities by-

civilian organizations both spiritually and financially and indeed considered themselves a part of the struggle for racial equality.

They maintained links to the outside community. For example, the Intelligence officer at Tuskegee

reported in July of 1945 that there was a voter registration drive going on at the post. He reported that

sometime prior to July 1, a handbill was distributed on this post [which] explained voter registration requirements for Macon County and gave registration dates for new registrants. On 14 July, a mimeographed letter was discovered posted over the time- clock in the supply building which claimed discrimination in registering Negro voters and announcing a mass meeting on 15 July The voter registration drive, "sponsored by 18 local

Negro organizations," was being coordinated by "One of

the Negro instructors at Tuskegee who was also "president of the Tuskegee Civic Association."^®

For black soldiers, however, an even more

important link to the outside world came to camps everywhere: the black newspapers. The "agitation" for

"racial rights" among soldiers was partially fueled, as the report from the Second Service Command indicated, by the fact that soldiers were "regularly receiving 203 literature and newspapers describing the campaign

against Jim Crowism" as well as the persistence of racial discrimination. A military intelligence survey,

undertaken in February of 1943 as a reaction to

publication of information related to the demotion of Samuel Reed, revealed that the black newspapers reached

almost all black soldiers, most of the time. In an

investigation conducted by the military, intelligence officers surveyed 486 black soldiers about which

newspapers they read. Seventy-six percent (76%) said they read the Afro-American. fifty-six percent (56%) that they read the Pittsburgh Courier, twenty-eight percent indicated that they read the Norfolk Journal and Guide and another 1% indicated that they read the

Chicago Defender. Only 22 of the 486 soldiers, (.4% of

those surveyed) indicated that they read none of the black newspapers. This finding is in accord with

Arnold Rose's conclusions that the black newspapers

"reached practically all the Negro people, at least some of the time."2®

White commanding officers were convinced that it was the black newspapers that were responsible for the "agitation" for racial rights within the military.

Officers repeatedly reported that stories of discrimination on the home front and in the military 204 were a major source of the "agitation" among black soldiers. Such was the case with the 97th engineers, stationed in the Pacific in 1945. Their intelligence

officer reported in January of 1945 that "clippings

from colored newspapers sent in letters to soldiers entirely overemphasize the ...supposed mistreatment of the colored personnel." Most of them were "mentally advanced enough to take a rational view of the situation," but many were "swayed by the reports and have the idea that the colored soldiers have nothing to fight for." He indicated that newspaper articles were "publicly discussed and difficult to abate because of the freedom of the p r e s s . H e wanted the newspapers banned.

When white commanding officers banned black newspapers from the camps, black soldiers succeeded in having them restored. Such was the case at Camp Forrest, Tennessee in 1943. An enlisted man. Sergeant Malcolm Smith, occasionally contributed a column for the Pittsburgh Courier and the Chicago Defender. One day he was stopped by two white military policemen and asked what newspapers he had in his possession. He acknowledged that he had copies of the Defender and the Courier. They informed him that he was in violation of military policy and that the publications were 205 prohibited by a "Secret War Department Order." The story was apparent leaked to the black press because an

somewhat incredulous Truman Gibson^® wrote to his friend, Bryon Minor, asking if Minor could verify the

report. He indicated that he had read in the Courier. Lt. Minor indeed verified that it was true. He had a

copy of the memo, he told Gibson, but could not send it

to him because that would be a violation of the military regulations. Gibson, in his capacity as

Civilian Aide, had no difficulty obtaining the

information from military intelligence.

Headquarters at Camp Forrest verified that indeed

"it had been informed by the Director of Military Intelligence division for their region that

the following newspapers are not approved for Service Clubs, Day Rooms, or Camp Libraries*. a. Pittsburgh Courier b . Chicago Defender c. People's Voice d. Afro-American Journal e. Boston Chronicle

The Intelligence Officer verified he had to authority to approve reading materials for clubs and Post Exchanges and that his "office recommends a newspaper for colored personnel." They could submit a list for approval, provided that none of those listed above were included. Truman Gibson had the newspapers restored, 206 and Lt. Minor thanked him for "helping make them a little more aware that Negroes have some power

somewhere. Similar bans at other camps met with

similar results. Black soldiers also got around the bans by subscribing or getting them through relatives at home.

Consequently, the protest within the military bore an uncanny resemblance to the protest outside. This was especially true, as will become evident, with respect to protest by educated black soldiers. As Myrdal found, while among "the destitute classes in the imral South," the protest was most often expressed in concealed forms, among the "upper strata," and generally in the

North, "the protest is more clearly thought out and overtly expressed in social, economic and political terms.Because the draft was selective, as indicated previously, educated blacks were disproportionately represented among draftees in World

War II. Sixty-three percent of them had attended high school, or beyond. In the general population, the figure was about 53%. The Research Branch was especially impressed with the statistics which revealed that twenty-four percent "were either college men or high school graduates. The more educated leaned toward the organized, formal, and open protests 207 associated with civilian advocates of racial equality. This is demonstrated by the case of Samuel Reed. In November of 1942, Carl Murphy, publisher of the

Baltimore Afro-American forwarded to William Hastie a

copy of a letter concerning Camp Lee which had been sent to him anonymously.^^ The letter was in reference

to the demotion of Samuel Reed and eleven other non­ commissioned officers at the Camp. The NAACP launched an investigation at the request of Reed's mother who

saw the story in the newspapers. Reconstruction of the circumstances surrounding the demotion of Reed and the other non-commissioned officers involved analyses of the anonymous letter to the Afro-American, the office of the Inspector General's report, and Samuel Reed's letter to Roy Wilkins at the NAACP.

As he told Wilkins, "by the way of background,"

Reed had acquired something of a reputation as an "'agitator' in civilian life, and "military intelligence being what it is, [it] automatically became part of my military record." Reed, a college graduate from St. Paul, Minnesota, stated to the Intelligence Officer who questioned him at Ft. Dix that he "had for some years been affiliated with the

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. He was under surveillance, he claimed, from 208 the day he arrived at the Camp.^® It did not help either that Reed possessed what he termed "an irrepressible tendency to speak my mind." Such a tendency would "not prove an asset in the Army." This tendency to speak his mind, or not to if he so desired, caused the initial confrontation with his white Commanding Officer at Camp Lee. The first confrontation took place, according to Reed, when

General Benjamin Davis was sent by the Office of the

Inspector General to inspect the Camp. Samuel Reed "led a group of men" who went to General Davis and

"protested conditions in and around the Camp." After the General's departure, Reed stated that he "had a very sharp exchange with Colonel Henry," the commander of the 9th Regiment. Reed was called into Colonel

Henry's office and "given a severe dressing down for 'betraying my loyalty to him by complaining about conditions at Camp Lee.'" He wanted to know what Reed had said to General Davis. "Despite his threats and repeated efforts," Reed refused to divulged the nature of the conversation, a conversation that he felt was

"confidential." The Colonel questioned Reed at length "about my civilian background, the people I knew, their political complexion, my activities in the Army and my ideas on [issues] involving white and Negro relations." 209 Reed was courteous, but uncommunicative. The Colonel terminated the conversation by indicating how little use he had for "smart niggers."^®

Sometime after his encounter with Colonel Henry, the 11th Quartermaster Regiment was organized at Camp Lee. The new commanding officer of the 11th (also white) whom Reed described as a friend, requested that

Reed be transferred to the new unit. The Colonel, who Reed alleged "never forgave me for my disloyalty," was only too happy to oblige. Reed was "literally kicked upstairs and out of the 9th," and made Regimental Sergeant Major of the new unit.

Reed saw his transfer to the 11th Quartermaster as an opportunity "for the development of some of my ideas..and I lost no time getting to work." As

Regimental Sergeant Major, Reed requested permission to organize a "social club" for the non-commissioned officers. His white officers, who "hardly anticipated the purpose of the organization at the time, " readily agreed to its creation. When it became apparent that the purpose of the club was not entertainment, "official attitudes changed from paternalistic interest to open hostility." High ranking officers held meetings "to determine an effective way to crush the organization." They sent spies to the meetings to 210 report on the discussions. Reed and the others worked

furiously to complete a list of "recommendations ...before the organization was crushed and all our efforts and all our efforts frustrated."

The contents of the petition, constructed from the anonymous letter to the newspaper and the Inspector

General's report, included the following:

1) That Negro soldiers be permitted to board busses at all designated stops between Camp Lee and Petersburg. At present, they have to board the bus below 19th St., even though colored troops are located as far up as 17th.

2) That Negro military police be assigned or attached to Camp Lee to protect them, [black soldiers] 3) That ten Negro officers be assigned to each of the 9th and 11th Regiment.

4) That no Jim Crow laws be enforced on the military reservations; for example, [we] ask for the right to go to all shows on the post instead of the small and inadequate Theatre No. 3 which is for the sole use of colored troops. 39

Reed, a college graduate from Minnesota, knew military procedures and took care to act in accordance with them. Reed and a committee presented the petition to their immediate superior, the Commanding General of the 11th Regiment, who accordingly forwarded it to the Commander of the Quartermaster Replacement Center. The Commanding General of the Replacement Center granted an interview to the committee chairman, Sgt. Reed. The 211 Commanding General promised to take care of Section C of the letter, which requested more black officers. He

also suggested some amendments to the petition, which Reed accepted. As was required, Reed then requested permission to speak to the Commanding General of the

Post to whom the petition was addressed. General Rowe

(Commanding General of the Quatermaster Replacement

Center) stated he would ask the General's permission for an interview.'*®

While they waited for a response from the base

commanding officer, a piece of correspondence related to the application of a candidate for Officer Candidate

School disappeared while technically in Reed's possession. It had apparently been placed in Samuel Reed's IN basket. Reed was reprimanded for the loss and he readily accepted the reprimand because, as he indicated, " I was responsible for it, whatever became of it." He thought the matter was closed because, in his opinion, the item which had been lost could be easily replaced. On November 6, however, he was placed under arrest by the Acting Regimental Commander. The orders had come from Colonel Henry, the Commanding General of the base. When his regimental commander returned, orders for his reduction in rank and immediate removal from Camp Lee had already been 212 approved by higher headquarters. His regimental commander, who indicated that the situation would not

have gone as far as it did if he had been present, had no alternative but to obey orders. Samuel Reed was

reduced in rank and transferred to Fort Dix on November 13, 1942.

The Inspector General's report on the events at Camp Lee denied any connection between Reed's demotion

and the petition. The base commander claimed that Reed had destroyed the papers because the candidate was not

to Reed's liking. He implied that the candidate was also black but was someone who did not share Reed's views on racial matters. Wilkins told the NAACP that he knew Reed's father, and Reed, Jr., though apparently not as well as the father. He implied that Reed was

somewhat "radical" but not a liar. Wilkins believed

that the demotion was a direct result of the petition. Demotions of other members of the unit responsible

for the petition drive soon followed. Samuel Reed was relieved of his duties on November 6, a week after the petition was forwarded to the Camp commander. On

November 7th, 1st Sergeant Clifford Clemens, also a member of the Committee, was reduced to the grade of private. On Wednesday, November 8, Colonel Henry held a meeting with the non-commissioned officers in which he 213 was alleged to have told them to "TAKE VIRGINIA JIM CROW LAWS AND LIKE IT OR BE BUSTED AND SENT TO ACTIVE

D U T Y . T h e anonymous letter claimed that the quote was "verbatim and approximately 400 non-coms can back this up." He said that the Colonel had stated that

"Camp Lee was the most liberal Camp of them all and he asked us to play ball with these laws." The writer also

claimed that the Colonel acknowledged that "several high ranking non-coms have been 'busted' because they

dared to come to the front (sic) and deliver a set of resolutions.

The Inspector general's report claimed otherwise.

He said Clemens was demoted for harsh punishment of a new recruit. He was alleged to have beat him. No

explanation was offered for the other nine demotions.

He acknowledged, however, that the presentation of a petition was indeed sufficient to warrant the

demotions. A soldier has no right to petition the

United States Army.

Samuel Reed accepted his demotion and transfer to Ft. Dix without complaint. He "was convinced," as he told Roy Wilkins, that "the reductions were the direct

repercussion of our activity but...it is impossible for me to prove it." He also reminded Wilkins "of the inclusiveness and extent of the punitive Articles of 214 War," that military laws punished acts which in civilian life would not be considered a crime. Reed

implied that he did not consider himself particularly

victimized, which is why he did not ask the NAACP to intervene on his behalf. He was inclined to regard the punishment "as a stroke of bad luck."

It was evident that Reed and the non-commissioned officers regarded their struggle for equal treatment within the military as an extension of the struggle

outside the military. Though Reed did not ask the NAACP

to intervene on his behalf, before he left Camp Lee he

"asked that a copy of our recommendations be sent to you so that you might know something of what we tried to do here." The anonymous letter writer sounded a corresponding theme. He claimed that their commanding officer had "made... a point about our acting on something that we could not accomplish [now] but 'which would work in the future,..and we should (italics in original)leave such work to "the civilians outside."

The writer disagreed. "We will continue to fight and object (if necessary)," he asserted. "It is for this reason that I am writing to you.

Reed, an self-described "agitator" in civilian life had, in fact, brought the agitation for "racial rights" into the military with him. He acknowledged 215 this commitment in his response to Wilkins. The Commanding Officer had contended that Camp was one of the most liberal in the South and Samuel Reedagreed.

"In all fairness," Reed explained to Wilkins,

Camp Lee is no hell-hole; conversely, it is no bed of roses. It is better on the average than most camps in the South. We took this position, despite conditions, and maintain it still: as long as we suffer discrimination, segregation, and limitations solely because we are Negroes we must perforce protest and contest and fight. To our minds the degree of persecution is of little consequences. As long as persecution exists, we feel it a threat to our progress and a barrier to our freedom. Ours was an attempt at total destruction of every last vestige of it at Camp Lee.'*^

Samuel Reed probably expressed the feeling of the articulate black soldier when he wrote that "as long we suffer limitation solely because we are Negroes, we must perforce protest and contest and fight." The anonymous writer to the Afro-American certainly agreed. They would not, as the Commanding officer advised,

"leave such work to 'the civilians outside.'" Second Lieutenant Coleman Young would have agreed. The Intelligence Officer at Midland Army Air Field, Midland, Texas reported that on September 24, 1944, a letter, signed by twenty (20) black officers had been sent to the Office of the Inspector General in Washington, B.C. The letter "was delivered direct (sic) 216 to the Post Sergeant Major for mailing by an unidentified colored officer," and in it the officers "complain [ed] of racial discrimination and other violations of War Department policies at Midland field." The report stated further that

Among the signatures appearing on the letter was the name of Coleman A. Young,...2nd Lieutenant, Infantry, Colored...Young arrived at Midland Army Air Field on 4 July 1944 and since that date has been the organizer of a colored 'equality movement' at the station. He has called upon the Commanding officer on three occasions entering complaints of not having the liberties and concessions that were afforded white military personnel. He visited one colored WAC officer and stated that he had called all colored officers together at meetings on several occasions for the good of the colored race...He has also engaged in an altercation with a white cashier and a white sergeant as to where he would sit in the Post Cafeteria. Upon his departure, he remarked that 'he would have to start some action, if his race was ever to be accorded equality.'^®

Coleman Young's attempt to organize a "colored equality movement" while in the military highlights the importance of looking at the pre-service background of black soldiers as Karsten and Kohn suggest. Coleman Young, the officer reported, had been under investigation since his arrival at Midland Field "for engaging in Communistic activities prior to his induction into the Armed Forces."®’ Young worked for the Ford Motor Company in Detroit and, prior to his 217 induction, had been an organizer for the United Auto Workers (UAW) , Affiliated with the Federation of

Negro Labor (which played a important role in

organizing the postal union) as far back as high

school, Coleman Young became an organizer for the UAW

in 1937. A black trade unionists in the 1930's was

considered a "radical" even among militant blacks. In organizing a "colored equality movement" at Midland Field, Coleman Young's behavior represented a

continuing of, not a departure from, his activities in civilian life.

Further evidence of the tendency of the struggle

inside the military to resemble the struggle outside was supplied by the Intelligence Officer at San Angelo

Air Field in San Angelo, Texas. In December of 1944, he reported that on 13 December

the colored flight leader of class 45-lOB, the more advanced of the two colored bombardier student classes at San Angelo Army Air Field, voluntarily reported to his tactical officer and submitted a copy of a letter of complaint signed by every colored aviation cadet at the station, the original of which he stated had been mailed directly to the Inspector General, Washington, D.C. The letter charged administrative authorities at the field with racial discrimination and violation of War Department policies; specifically, that the cadets were compelled to use segregated sections of the post exchange and mess hall. The letter requested steps to taken to correct the reported situation and that the cadets 'be accorded 218 the privileges required by decency and Army regulations, or that we be transferred to a field at which this is possible. Should this not be possible, we ask that we be allowed to resign from service with the Army of the United States.'^

Evidence also indicated that black soldiers attempted to coordinate efforts and share information with other black soldiers on neighboring military installation in furthering the cause of racial equality. Several events involving black soldiers at Tuskegee and Ft. Banning where black officers were trained provide support for this conclusion. In a memorandum dated July 8, 1944, the War Department prohibited racial segregation in facilities on military installations. The War Department memo had been received at Ft. Banning but had not been published.

Much to the chagrin of post authorities, however, they found that the memo was "very much discussed among them" [the black officers] and that "many of the officers had in their possession copies of the directive before its distribution by Post authorities." The copies, according to Ft. Banning's Intelligence Officer, had obtained from black soldiers at Tuskegee Air Field. Their investigation revealed that a clerk at

Tuskegee "had access to the directive and made a copy which was mimeographed and distributed." The black 219 soldiers believed that the memo had been withheld deliberately "in order to prevent knowledge of its contents." Consequently, they circulated it not only to black soldiers at Tuskegee but sent copies to Ft. Benning as well.®°

A week later, an Intelligence officer from

Tuskegee came to Ft. Benning to report that three officers from Ft. Benning had come to Tuskegee to visit

Captain Willard Hansen. Hanson was "alleged to be the spokesman for the officers who demanded the right to eat in the white cafeteria at Tuskegee." The

Intelligence officer became aware of the meeting because on the way back the officers from Benning were arrested for possession of alcohol. Hanson wrote a check to help defray the cost of bailing them out and the check bounced. Ambler, the Intelligence officer from Benning, had not been privy to the officer's conversation but "he was convinced that it undoubtedly had something to do with the racial situation at Ft.

Benning. "

Though one must hesitate to call the protest within the military a "movement," it is apparent that it sometimes took on the characteristics of the movement outside. There were instances where it was overt, coordinated, and used tactics similar to those 220 of civilian advocates of civil rights. It was also led by the same class by which it was led outside the military, namely the black middle class and intelligentsia, or at least its younger sons. Moreover, those who pressed for rightts within the military considered their activities as an extension of and and adjunct to the activities of civilian advocates outside. It was all part of same, "movement," an extension of the Double V campaign, a part of the "war" for democracy at home. 221

ENDNOTES

1. Bell Wiley, "The Training of Negro Troops" study no. 36 (Washington, B.C.: U.S. Army, Historical Division, 1946), iii.

2. Ibid., 31.

3. Computed from Research Branch, Survey #AMS- 032N, "Attitudes of Negroes," March 1943. The data tape was obtained, in machine readable form, from the National Archives, Washington, B.C. RG 330 (Records of the Research Branch).

4. Russell Buchanan, Black Americans in the Second World War (Santa Barbara : Clio Books, 1977), 113.

5. Marvin Fletcher, The Black Soldier and Officer in the United States Army, 1891-1917 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1974), 25. Fletcher would argue that this tendency to protest was not new among black soldiers. His research revealed that black soldiers on the frontier "resented" the manner in which they were treated and, as one of their commanding officers recalled, "were determined to defend themselves on 'questions of the rights of their race.'" 6. Samuel Stouffer, et. al. The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 596. 7. See Bernard Nalty, Strength For the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986) , 157, for a discussion of the protest against the segregated service club at Selfridge Field. This represented the struggle for racial rights in its most organized and coordinated form.

8. U.S. Army Service Forces, Information and Education Division (The Research Branch), "What the Soldier Thinks," Report No. 58 (August, 1943), 2, 9. 222 9. Benjamin Quarles,' "Forward" in Phillip McGuire, Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters From Black Soldiers in World War II (Santa Barbara : ABC-Clio, 1983), XV.

10. Ibid., xviii.

11. Ibid., xviii-xix. These examples are representative of those published in McGuire, Taps for a Jim Crow Army.

12. Ibid., xviii-xix; Lee Kennett, G .I .: The American Soldier in World War II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1981), 72; Also, The Research Branch, "What the Soldier Thinks," No. 2, 25; and Stouffer, The American Soldier. 503.

13. Letter from "Iva (Bluford)," Battery D, Camp Davis,- North Carolina to Mrs. Mary Bluford, Jersey City, New Jersey In RG 107 Box 185, "Camp Davis," the National Archives.

14. Letter dated 10 September, 1944 from Pvt. Elwood Smith, 335th Base unit. Squadron C, Dale Mabry Field, to NAACP headquarters, in RG 107, National Archives. He continued that "some of us are governed by too much pride to work in these places...But there are others of our race that will come along and destroy what we have built...because they do not know that it is not compulsory and they are threaten (sic)." The Officer's mess was officially a private club, not part of the military. Army personnel could not be assigned to it. Soldiers who worked there had to do so voluntarily. Many blacks did because they made an additional $15 per month and which brought their pay up to that of a sergeant. Some soldiers were assigned there and not paid, which was a violation of military regulations. See "Memorandum to the Commanding General, Second Air Force, Colorado Springs, from Headquarters, Second Air Force, Office of the Air Inspector and Inspector General, 5 July, 1944, Subject: Investigation of Alleged Discrimination Against Negro Troops, Davis Monthan Field," in RG 407 (Records of the Adjutant General), Box 1509, National Archives. The racial militant among black soldiers regarded working in the officer's mess as menial, paid or not. Ellwood Smith is apparently one of them. The blacks who testified at this hearing and who worked in the 223 officer's mess expressed basic contentment with the work. The ones who were unhappy were the ones assigned to permanent KP, which was an assignment to the regular mess hall, for which there was no additional compensation. In fact, a basic finding of the Research Branch was that black soldiers exhibited a higher degree of job satisfaction than did white soldiers. This is an area which requires further exploration. 15. Letter, n.d., (rec'd June 14, 1942) from Private Alfred Cobb, Ft. Dix, New Jersey, to NAACP headquarters, in Box 206, RG 107, "Ft. Dix," National Archives, Washington, D.C.

16. 97th Engineers, General Service Regiment, Intelligence Report, 26 January 1945 in RG 407 (Records of the Adjutant General), National Archives, Washington, D.C. Officers tended to classify people who exhibited high level of racial militancy as "neurotic." There are repeated instances in which militant black soldiers who were sent for psychiatric care. It was simply not considered normal to hate people who hated you.

17. Report AG 291.21; 2-22-43, Subject: Report of Investigation on Alleged Attack Upon a Negro Soldier at Scooba, Mississippi, in Box 1513, RG 107, National Archives.

18. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Third Service Command, 1-8 December 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives. 19. Weekly Intelligence Report, 30 June-7 July, 1945, First Service Command, Boston, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives.

20. See Weekly Intelligence Summary, Army Service Forces, Fourth Service Command Headquarters, Atlanta, 12 May to 19 May, 1945. 21. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Seventh Service Command, 25 August to 1 September, 1945, in RG 107, Box 264, National Archives. 22.Weekly Intelligence Summary, 5th Service Command, 5-12 May, 1945, Box 265, RG 107. 224 23. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Second Service Command New York, 12-18 August, 1945, Box 264, RG 107, National Archives.

24. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Eight Service Command, Dallas, Tx, 28 July to 4 August, 1945 in Box 264, RG 107, National Archives.

25. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, 21 to 28 July, 1945 in Box 263, RG 107, National Archives.

26. Ibid.

27. Memorandum "291.2 Negroes," (2-1-43) War Department, M.I.D (Military Intelligence Division), Subject: "Afro-American Company," in Box 148, RG 407 (Records of the Adjutant General), National Archives. 28. Arnold Rose, The Negro's Morale: Group Identification and Protest (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), 103. 29. 97th Engineers, Monthly Intelligence Report, 25 January, 1945, in RG 407, National Archives, Suitland, Md.

30. Truman Gibson had replaced William Hastie as Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War.

31. Letter from Byron Minor to Truman Gibson, November 21, 1943; Letter from Truman Gibson to Byron Minor, 30 October 1943; Memorandum, from Lt. Clifford R. Moore, 931st Field Artillery Battalion, Camp Forrest, Tenn, 25 October 1943; and Memorandum, 26 October, 1943 from Buel A. Williamson, Captain, Military Intelligence, Camp Intelligence Officer to Lt. Clifford Moore, 931st FA Bn., Camp Forrest, Tenn., in RG 107, Box 185, "Camp Forrest," National Archives. 32. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Nearo Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 757.

33. Research Division, "Some New Statistics on the Negro Enlisted Man," Report No. 2, February, 1942, in RG 330, National Archives, Washington, D.C. See also, Stouffer, et. al. The American Soldier. 570. 225 34. Carl Murphy to William Hastie, November 25, 1942, in Box 185, "Camp Lee", RG 107, National Archives. They had apparently received others because he indicated that this was "another letter concerning the situation at Camp Lee."

35. To: Director, Intelligence Division, Headquarters, Second Service Command, SOS, Governor's Island, New York, From: Headquarters Fort Dix, Office of the Post Intelligence officer, December 29, 1942, Subject: Private Samuel A. Reed...Headquarters Detachment, 379th Quartermaster Battalion (Port), Fort Dix, New Jersey, in RG 407, Box 148, 291.2 [Race] (3-31-42 to 12-31-42,) National Archives, Washington, D.C. The Post Intelligence Officer at Ft. Dix interviewed Reed, at the request of Intelligence Headquarters, after Reed's demotion and transfer to Ft. Dix.

36. Samuel Reed to Roy Wilkins, 10 December, 1942. Reed does not say how he knew he was under surveillance, but he was not paranoid. The Army did keep former "agitators" under surveillance, as it did in the case of Coleman Young. Moreover, the Intelligence Officer at Ft. Dix reported to Intelligence headquarters that Reed was being kept under surveillance. He stated that "Reed is definitely intelligent and appears to be quite educated. He is a first class agitator and takes a defiant attitude... Subject is now under surveillance, and in the event his organization is made a task force and is ordered to on overseas duty, subject will be removed from the organization..." See, Memorandum, Office of the Post Intelligence Officer, Ft. Dix, to Director, Intelligence Division, 29 December, 1942. 37. See "Memorandum, October 7, 1941, from the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War to the Adjutant General, in Box 185, "Camp Lee," RG 107, National Archives. Correspondence in the Civilian Aide's files revealed that they had received a number of complaints from soldiers at Camp Lee and that General Benjamin Davis, Sr. had been scheduled to conduct an investigation of the camp October of 1941. 38.Samuel Reed to Roy Wilkins, 10 December, 1942. 39. Lt. Colonel William Slater, who investigated and reported back to Hastie, worded the demands differently. He reported that 226 A petition was circulated requesting three things : a) establishment of an MP Company fully armed. b) that Negro troops not be required to obey the laws of Virginia as to common carriers. c) Rescinding of regulations which allot recreational facilities so as to achieve segregation. See Slater to Hastie, December 10, 1942, in RG 107, Box 185, National Archives.

40. From "Just A Soldier who believes in Right Not MIGHT," Camp Lee, to Carl Murphy, President, the Baltimore Afro-American, n.d.' ca. November 25, 1942, in RG 107, "Camp Lee," National Archives.

41. This seems uncharacteristic a statement for Colonel Henry. He was more inclined toward paternalism. The second half of the statement, in which he asked them to "play ball" seems more in keeping with his character. Note also the threat to send black soldiers to active duty. A common "remedial measure" taken against black soldiers who were "agitators" was to ship them overseas and into combat if possible. Many black units were thus shipped overseas with insufficient training in order to get them out of the South.

42. From "A Soldier Who Believes in Right Not MIGHT," to Carl Murphy, ca.. November 25, 1942. Samuel Reed could not have been a participant in the meeting because he had already been placed under arrest but his version of the Colonel's comments seem very consistent with the Colonel's character. At the meeting, the Colonel was alleged to have informed the non-coms that "he had found it necessary to reduce some high ranking noncommissioned officers in the brigade because they had taken it upon themselves to dictate to the high command. He stated that these men had so much time on their hands and so little work to perform that they let little, unimportant problems force them into taking action which resulted in their demotion. He further stated that if any other men took it upon themselves in the future to voice the grievances of those under their command they could expect to suffer the same fate as the reduced men." 43. "Anonymous" to Carl Murphy, ca. November 10, 1942, "Camp Lee," RG 107, National Archives. 227 44. Samuel Reed to Roy Wilkins, December 10, 1942, in RG 107, "Camp Lee," National Archives.

45. Memorandum dated 19 October, 1944, War Department, MID (Military Intelligence Division), Eighth Service Command, Dallas, Texas. Subject: "Coleman Young...2nd Lt. Infantry (Colored) Midland, Army Air Base, Texas, in RG 107, Box 261, National Archives.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid. 48. Wilbur C. Rich, Coleman Young and Detroit Politics. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 63.

49. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Eight Service Command, (Dallas), 16-23 December, 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives. 50. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, September 2-8, 1944 in Box 262, Record Group 107, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 51. Memorandum, War Department, Security and Intelligence Division, Ft. Benning, Ga., 16 September 1944, Subject: "Visit of Negro Officers to Tuskegee, Alabama, Regarding Racial Situation," in Box 261, RG 107, National Archives. CHAPTER V

THE PROTEST AGAINST "INSULT"

Black soldiers in World War II were very

"sensitive," to racial insult, either against them as individuals or insults against "the race." This

sensitivity was really not new. Marvin Fletcher found

that black soldiers in the regular Army prior to World War I were reflecting the growing militancy of the black population as larger numbers of blacks grew disenchanted with the philosophy of Booker T.

Washington. One of the manifestations was a sensitivity to and protest against racial insult. General

Christopher Auger, who commanded one of the four regular units on the frontier in the 1890's, remembered that his men "were easily excited and thoroughly united on any question of insult to their race." Fletcher's research also revealed that black NCO's (non­ commissioned officers) in the Philippines, for example, had "objected to minstrel shows as degrading" and that black soldiers stationed in Hawaii had prevented the base theater on more than one occasion from showing "racially insulting" movies, once by pelting the

228 229 theater with rocks.An increased "sensitivity" was evident among black soldiers who served in World War II.

In fact, social scientists who studied southern blacks in the 1930's found this same "sensitivity" to racial insults, especially among southern youths.

Gunnar Myrdal's research revealed that "even the lower class Negro in the rural South feels insulted when he is called "nigger" by a white man.Sociologist

Charles Johnson agreed. He found, among youths in the rural South, a marked sensitivity to "being called 'bad names.'" The following excerpt, taken from an interview with one of his subjects, exemplified the feelings of southern rural youths toward racial slurs:

Most white people I don't like. Some is nice. I used to play with white children when I was small and I liked them then, since I grew up I don't bother with white people. Somebody might call me a name and I'd sure fight 'em. It makes me mad if white children call me 'nigger.'I did fight a white girl once. I was about 15. She called me 'black nigger' and I called her 'peckerwood.Then she got mad and slapped me. I pulled her hair and slapped her face. Ain't nobody done nothing about it...She didn't have no right to start meddling with me.* Another youth recalled how angry he was the first time he was called a "nigger." He was "about eight or nine" and he got into a fight with some white children. He had not noticed any difference between himself and 230 white children, that is, until one of them called him a "nigger." What really made him angry was that was not what they had been fighting about. The fight had

started "because they tried to sic the dogs on me and I jumped on 'em.Allison Davis and John Bollard's

research among urban youths in the South revealed a similar sensitivity. They found that

the great majority of upper and middle class adolescents reported that they 'did nothing' when they were called 'nigger' or threatened by white people, but insisted at the same time that they 'felt mad' or 'saw red'...Lower caste Negro children, however, were usually more aggressive in similar caste situations..

Johnson argues in fact that, among southern rural black youths, racial insult was more deeply resented than was racial segregation. Johnson concluded, based on responses to questionnaires, that

Segregation is not resented as vigorously as are economic suppression and insults from whites. While the youths are aware of the restrictions imposed by the racial mores, most of them have adjusted to these restrictions. Unlike the injustices of white employers and insults from white children, segregation does not seem to generate active resentment. Most youth feel that segregation imposes only minor deprivations. In most cases, the youths expressed themselves as preferring not to associate with whites, and viewed their segregation with indifference.’

Johnson realized that "cause and effect" may have been

confused here, that the adolescents may have indeed 231 avoided whites because of segregation. However, on his

surveys they tended to endorse statements which censured whites for "not paying Negroes fair wages" or

for calling them "bad names" more than they tended to

endorse statements which censured them for racial segregation. As one young respondent said of white people, "I don't like 'em and I don't hate 'em. I just

stays out of their way."® Johnson's findings are

supported by Bollard's research which revealed that the

"lower caste Negro [in the urban south] did not look upon the 'Jim Crow' car as a humiliation," that protest against segregated transportation came more often from "mulattoes. What is important for the moment is that, for the lower class southern blacks, segregation was fine if it enabled them to avoid the insults that resulted from interacting with white people.

The behavior of his lower class subjects suggested to Johnson "considerable concern about preserving their own self-respect against behavior interpreted as attempts to humiliate."^® Sociologist Arnold Rose found that "behavior regarded as insulting was manifold--reflecting the complications of the caste system in the South--and the unlearned white who does not wish to offend has to almost travel with Bedeker's guide when he goes among Negroes." He found, for 232 instance, that southern blacks were offended by the terms "darky," "uncle," or "doctor"(if the person is

not a doctor) or that they were insulted by "any sort

of reference" to blacks "as being different in any of

the stereotyped ways, such as being musically inclined, happy go lucky or addicted to eating watermelons or

chicken.They bring these attitudes with them into the military.

Northern blacks, as would be expected, shared his

southern brethren's sensitivity to racial insult, though personal insult seemed to be less of a problem.

Northern blacks exhibited marked sensitivity to any variation on the term "Negro" which they perceived as insults to "the race." The following letter to Time magazine from Girard Bryant, a Pullman porter for the

Union Pacific Railroad, deplored the terms the magazine had been using to describe blacks in 1941. Apparently this was his third letter to them on "the same theme...within the past 15 months. First," he noted,

it was your constant use of the abortive term Negress ; your far fetched designation of pickaninnies in a Chicago department store...now its your use of "darky-driven" trucks....Damn! What is wrong with Time's policy toward the American Negro in the last year and a half? It's getting so I can't read an article about the race without being insulted1“ Black soldiers agreed that racial insults were the 233 source of a considerable amount of the "physical racial friction" which Lee found was a "daily occurrence at many posts." "Just the word 'nigger,'" Sgt. Willie

Lawton recalled, "provoked a whole mess of trouble.

Military officials agreed. Following a minor distur­ bance at the staging area in Ft. Lewis, Washington in 1945, for example, the Provost Marshall interviewed a number of officers in order to ascertain the cause of the disturbance. One of the reasons for the disturbances, they discovered, as that the current group of soldiers at the base consisted of a large number of "southern white soldiers who persisted in referring to the colored soldiers as "niggers."

Similarly, a white officer, speaking on behalf of one of his black soldiers who was about to be court- martialed after an altercation with a bus driver in

Shreveport, Louisiana in December of 1944, argued that his men were very "disciplined" but, among other things, "the southern practice of calling Negroes 'nigger' and 'boys' infuriated [them]."^'* Judy Tolliver's father was correct in his assertion that the "young niggers" were not like "us ol' folks," that they would not call white people "boss" and "cap'n" and

"take their abuse." Major Pernell Shelton, who served with the 369th Infantry, agreed. As he remembered it. 234 black soldiers in World War II "weren't taking any racial guff off of anyone.

In November of 1942, Gunnar Myrdal recalled in

American Dilemma. "Irving Berlin wrote a patriotic song in which he used the term "darky." The result was a avalanche of protest from insulted blacks. Berlin quickly changed the term to "Negro" and apologized,

stating that "he had not meant to offend anyone."

Black soldiers were simply following their civilian inclination when they protested racial slurs by speakers and entertainers. It was common, as Gunnar

Myrdal found, for southern whites to refer to black as

"niggers" in their presence. They did not think that the "deprecation of the Negro is...taken as an insult."^’ But, as both Johnson and Dollard found, southern black indeed took them as insults and so did black soldiers. Like the middle class urban youths in the South whom Dollard studied, black soldiers got

"mad" and "saw red" when insulted by whites. Unlike the urban youth, however, black soldiers were inclined to do something about it. The Intelligence officer at the Topeka, Kansas Air

Base reported to Intelligence headquarters that on

February 13, 1945 black soldiers and guests had walked out of the evening performance of the USO Camp Show 235 "Present Arms." They took offense when the Master of Ceremonies made a remark about "nigger gin" and, according to the intelligence report, "said in

substance, 'you know what that does to you.'" They did

nothing at first, though. They sat quietly until he

began his performance and, as he was singing his

opening song, almost every black person in the

audience,(comprising approximately 20% of those in attendance) "walked out without causing a commotion.

Similarly black soldiers at Camp Wheeler in

December of 1944 took offense at a speaker's remark and walked out. This time the offending term was "darkie."

Officers at the Army Quartermaster school had invited a

civilian from the Camp Wheeler Quartermaster office to

speak to its weekly orientation class about the Quartermaster Corp. The civilian began his presentation with a joke about "a white doctor in the horse and buggy days" in which he made reference to "an old darkie." The black soldiers "took offense" and, according to the report,

started shuffling their feet and clearing their throats and a Negro sergeant left the room. The officer in charge thought the Negro was going to the rest room. At intervals of about 30 seconds, another Negro soldier would walk out until about seven or eight had left, or were leaving the room. The officer in 236 charge announced that the meeting was not finished and told them to return. Most...did and the meeting was continued.“

The substitution of the word "nigger" for the word

"darkie" during a performance caused a similar

response, this time at Vancouver Barracks in the state of Washington on 13 December 1944. Troops from the

Special Services Branch, who were in the staging area awaiting shipment overseas, had put on a performance

for other troops in the staging area. The audience of 1200 soldiers included about 400 or 500 blacks

soldiers. "The show was progressing satisfactorily," the Intelligence and Security Division reported,

until a white lieutenant, who was singing a song entitled 'Old Man River,' substituted the word 'nigger' for the word 'darkie' where it appeared in the song. Two colored soldiers stood up in the audience and one of them said, 'that is enough of that shit, lieutenant,' or words to that effect. The lieutenant apologized and said he had not intended to offend them. The colored men present refused to accept his apology and all but three of them walked out and formed in groups of about 30 to 50 outside the building. There was considerable grumbling among them at what they termed 'an insult to their race.'There was no threats made and no violence...It was, however, evident that they were all very angry because of the insult and the situation was tense. This time, they stayed out, and their officers did not ask them to return. When Security and Intelligence notified the post commander, he ordered them back into 237 the barracks for an "inspection of their clothing." Actually, he really just wanted to get them back inside

"and under the control of their officers." They complied and "there was no further trouble.

Black enlisted men, patients at the Fletcher

Hospital in Cambridge, Ohio likewise became infuriated when the local minister used the word "nigger" in a monologue during intermission at a USO dance. "Forty

Negro girls from Cambridge and sixty white girls from Barnesville" had been invited as dance partners for the soldier/patients at the hospital. The minister and his wife accompanied the white girls from Barnesville. During the intermission, the minister did a monologue in which he used the word "nigger." and "the approximately forty black Negro patients," present at the time, "started an uproar by booing the minister."

The minister apologized. They were not satisfied with the apology, however, and some of them returned to their ward "to get additional 'buddies' with the alleged intent of throwing out the speaker." Their officers succeeded in getting the minister, his wife, and the 100 girls "to their automobiles without further outbreaks." They also succeeded in returning the white and black enlisted men to their wards without further trouble but the racial climate at the hospital remained 238 tense.

Black enlisted men at Camp Pickett, Virginia, also patients at the general hospital, became similarly-

outraged at the use of the term "nigger" and created a

disturbance while attending a musical presentation at the American Red Cross Hall in October, 1945. During

the presentation, a performer used the word 'nigger' in

the song "Shortening Bread," and the black soldiers

took offense. They contended that they had heard the

song over the radio and the word "nigger" had not been used in that version, and they regarded "its use as a deliberate attempt to insult [them]." Some of the black

enlisted men walked out in protest during the performance and on their way out "tore down a piece of

fire-fighting equipment and sprayed the rear floor of

the hall with the contents." At the time of the report, officers had failed to identify the culprits.

Black soldiers brought with them not only their

civilians' sensitivity toward racially insulting terms, but also their civilian sensitivity toward what they perceived as "behavior intended to humiliate." Such was

the case at New Orleans Army Air Base in July of 1945 when, "Negro soldiers and their guests took offense at one of the skits presented by a USO troupe in the Post

Gymnasium. The show," the Intelligence Officer 239 reported,

consisted of six dancing girls in evening dresses who, during the course of the act, raised their dresses and were so costumed to give the effect of a colored chorus. As a group [the soldiers and guests] walked out of the show during the presentation. Some of these colored soldiers later booed the troupe as they left the building and reportedly stated that if an attempt was made to put on another show at the Air Base, they would "put dynamite under it and blow it up." To further voice their displeasure, two colored soldiers who had been detailed to load the equipment left without doing so.

Base officials were rather perplexed at the response and insisted that the troupe had given the same

performance to "mixed audiences" at Camp Planche and at the Jackson Barracks without incident.^

Members of the Intelligence and Security Division, which was present at the time of the incident in

Vancouver barracks made some salient observations about the characteristics of the protest which are noteworthy

for purposes of this study. First of all, they noted, "there did not appear to be any leader." It was, in

fact, spontaneous and uncoordinated, a feature which characterized much of the protest which will be

discussed throughout the study. Second, the reaction was nearly unanimous. General Christopher Augur's

statement that the black soldiers he commanded on the frontier were easily excited and thoroughly united on 240 any question of insult to their race applied equally to black soldiers in World War II. Only three of the 400

or 500 black soldiers remained at the performance. This

is indeed a reflection of the growing sense of militancy among the black population in general. Third,

as will be the case in other incidents, the protest was

usually cautious. In effect, they protested up to a point and then stopped. They had to, really, because

these acts of protests were carried out in what Scott

terms "an atmosphere of routine repression." If at all possible, it was best to avoid "open confrontation with authorities." Though punishment of military offenses varied from installation to installation, the prevailing tendency was to view racial militancy as detrimental to the war effort and thus something to be extinguished. Officials at Camp Wheeler noted in their report that they had identified and were planning to take punitive action against those soldiers who had not returned when ordered to do so by the commanding officer.

When Major Shelton said that his unit "weren't taking any racial guff off of anyone," that included white officers. They had to be handled prudently, though. "You could not deck a white officer for his racial slurs," according to Staff Sgt. Bill Stevens who 241 served with the 48th Quartermaster Corp. The protest consequently tended to fall short of open

confrontation. Sometimes protest against racial slurs

had to be concealed or indirect, as was the case at Venice Army Air Field in Florida in 1945. The

Commanding officers of the 995th Engineers, Squadron C,

a black unit, had made remarks which were perceived as

"derogatory to the Negro race." The remarks were being circulated, in writing it appears, by "unknown persons

within the unit. The white officer claimed that he

had not made the remarks and that someone was

deliberately seeking to create racial strife.

Military officials, wary of criticism from the black press, were very concerned that racial insults by white officers should become known to the media. This helps to explain the somewhat panicked response of the Domestic and Counterintelligence Branch at Holabird

Signal Station to an incident which transpired on

February 2, 1945. A white officer had gone into the orderly room in one of the black units at the base and he "got into a verbal clash with one of the colored

soldiers." In the process, he called him a "damn nigger." The soldier reported it to "the colored chaplain," who reportedly stated that he would "take it up with the Afro-American." The Intelligence officer 242 wanted headquarters to know that the officer "had been in trouble before with the colored personnel" and also

that "there may be some adverse publicity appearing in the Afro-American and the press." One could not deck a white officer, but sometimes it was not necessary.

It must be pointed out that the black soldier, to paraphrase Eric Langer, was not entirely a "hapless victim with no recourse whatsoever." As early as 1941, William Hastie, then Civilian Aide to the Secretary of

War, had received repeated complaints from soldiers about the use of the word "nigger" by officers at military installations. For once. Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Hastie agreed on something. At

Hastie's suggestion, Stimson issued a memorandum which advised commanders of the importance of treating their enlisted personnel in such a way as "to preserve their self-respect" and especially advising them that the

"use of any epithet deemed insulting to any racial group should be carefully avoided.When the Army published the training manual for officers entitled. The Command of Negro Troops in 1944, it again stressed that black soldiers were very sensitive to racial insults and that racial epithets were to be avoided, especially in their presence.^

When an officer's behavior violated a military 243 directive, a soldier was within his rights in filing a complaint. Black soldiers at Boca Raton Army Air Field exercised this option when they filed a formal complaint with the Air Inspector General against a white officer who insulted their club. The officer had entered their club to make a phone call and they overheard him say, obviously in response to an inquiry about his whereabouts, that he was "in the nigger service club." They reported it to the Air Inspector

General. The officer denied their allegation but was nonetheless advised that, in the future, he should refer to the club as Service Club #2.^’

White officers claimed that black soldiers sometimes took offense when none was intended, as appeared to be the case of a white officer at Bergstom

Field, in Texas who unwittingly insulted the orderlies who worked in the Bachelor Officer's Quarters. In an attempt to prevent theft of property from the Officer's Quarters he had posters made with the pictures of the orderlies working in the Bachelor's Quarters posted thereon. The caption above the photographs read "Wanted." Beneath the photographs was a statement requesting that staff officers report to the Provost

Marshall's office any orderlies seen going into or coming out of the Bachelor's officer's quarters, other 244 than those who photographs appeared on the poster. The orderlies saw the posters and also "saw red." They

"became highly incensed," intelligence officials

reported, "and demanded that the pictures be removed

immediately." The photographs were removed and "the

officer responsible for the incident was reprimanded for his utter lack of discretion in the matter."Z*

Black soldiers came closest to hitting a white

officer over a racial slur when the insult was direct and intentional. Such was the case during a basketball game at Deming Air Field in New Mexico. The altercation, according to military intelligence officials at Deming, "developed during a basketball game between a team composed of Negro enlisted men and a team of...white officers for the post championship."

One of the white officers, who was "unintentionally fouled" by the black enlisted man, "sarcastically remarked..., 'nice going, black boy.'" The soldier

"took exception to being called 'black boy.'" A fight almost erupted but both of the combatants were restrained by members of their respective teams and by the referees.^®

In fact, the white officer used two terms that some black soldiers in World War II found offensive: "black" and "boy." The soldiers referred to themselves 245 as "Negro" or "colored." The first time Lacey Wilson heard the term "black" was when they were working with

the Australians defending an island. The Australians would come to have tea with them and referred to them as black. Sgt. Wilson "was offended" until he learned

that the Australians could not "think of the words

colored or Negro." The Australians continued to call them black and it was acceptable because they knew that "the intent was not to malign." None of the white soldiers dared to use the term, however, because, as

Sgt. Wilson put it, "they would have gotten a fat lip if they had."^°

Black soldiers agree that the use of racial slurs by white enlisted men was the cause of many of the

"isolated skirmishes" and "physical racial friction" which Lee acknowledged became commonplace at many posts. Staff Sgt. Bill Stevens, formerly of the 48th

Quartermaster Corp, recalled that "you could not deck a white officer for his racial slurs," but you could a white enlisted man, "which is why there was so much fighting. Lester Simmons, who served with the 94th Engineers, remembered not only the riots, but the

"almost daily name-calling and fistcuffs between black and white soldiers. Major Shelton recalled the "innumerable fights between the Marines (white) and the 246 enlisted personnel of the 369th" when they were stationed next to each other in Hawaii. "There were no overall outbreaks," he added, "but individual and small

group battles were a daily occurrence." Military records support their recollections.^

Sergeant Willie Lawton was correct in his

assertion that "just the word 'nigger' produced a whole mess of trouble." In October, 1944, for instance, the

Intelligence Officer at Aberdeen Proving Ground

reported that two black enlisted men and two white

sailors from the Naval Training Center at Bainbridge, Maryland had been involved in a fight. The reason for the fight was "alleged to have been the sailor's comment, 'there goes a nigger.A report from the Ninth service command at Ft. Douglass, Utah indicated that the "use of the term 'nigger'" had also been the cause of a fight between two black soldiers and a white Marine at Sacramento on 4 February 1945. The black soldier, angered at the insult, attacked the white

Marine "with a piece of garden hose and the Marine retaliated with his garrison belt." The altercation resulted in minor injuries to all three men who were alleged to be "under the influence of intoxicants."^®

The use of the words "nigger soldiers," according to the Intelligence Officers at the same base two weeks 247 later, precipitated another fight, "between two white sailors and five or six Negro soldiers at San

Bernardino." The sailors were slightly injured in the altercation and "several store windows were broken during the fight.Similarly, officers at Camp

Gordon Johnson, Florida, reported that on June 30, 1945 three black soldiers had "accosted" three white soldiers whom they claimed "had referred to them as

'niggers' earlier in the evening. A fight ensued. All had been drinking. The military police arrested all of them, and after questioning, released them to their commanding o f f i c e r s .Finally, authorities from Camp San Luis Obispo reported that

three white soldiers assigned to the 413th Infantry had been beaten and kicked by approximately seven Negro soldiers outside Sisters Inn near the Camp. The white soldiers, identified only as Pfc. William and Pvts. Grady and Davis [were] reported to have entered the Inn and, upon observing many Negroes, remarked,'I guess we are in a Nigger joint.'Corporal Robert Johnson, Negro, 440th Base Unit, Santa Maria Army Air Base, took exception to Land's remarks and invited him outside. Johnson and approximately six other Negro soldiers...beat and kicked the white soldiers. The fight was stopped by military police who took the participants into custody.^®

Some of the name-calling arose out of the "Jim Crow" policies of the southern transportation system, which was "very much resented," as Benjamin Davis 248 found, even by black soldiers of southern origin. Black soldiers, as will be discussed in the next chapter,

increasingly violated southern segregation laws by

taking a seat anywhere. Some white soldiers resented it. The result would be "name-calling and daily

fistcuffs." On January 19, 1945, for instance, a fight broke out between black and white soldiers on a public bus from Miami to Opa Locka field. The fight began when "one of the white sailors told a Negro sailor to go to the back of the bus, calling him a 'nigger.'" The MP's arrested the black soldiers, but later turned them over to the Naval Base.^®

In a related incident, reported from Santa Ana

Army Air Base, a black soldier became indignant when a white soldiers on a bus referred to him as "boy." Both were returnees from overseas and were en route to the Redistribution center at the Air Base. An argument started "after Sgt. Bara Grey (white) said to Private

Walter McCleod, 'Boy, move over,' and the latter resented both the order and the manner in which it was given." The driver put both men off the bus after which they started fighting with knives. Grey was wounded in the back and was accordingly taken to the hospital, while McCleod was accordingly taken to the guardhouse. 249 In a similar incident reported from Will Rogers Air Base in Oklahoma City, black enlisted men took

offense at the comment of a white officer on a bus and

an argument followed. On 3 August, 1945, black enlisted men riding on a bus destined for the airfield overheard a white officer remark to his companion, "to the effect

that 'I am not fixing to have any niggers sit beside me.'" The enlisted men took exception to his remark and

the result was "a verbal altercation." After the bus arrived at the airfield, military police at the gate took the names of all the parties and they were later

interviewed. At staff meeting the following day it was decided that no one would be court-martialed "but that all parties involved would be admonished." It was also decided that "the Intelligence Officer would lecture on the racial subject to all new classes of incoming officers"^^ because the soldiers had a right to sit anywhere they wanted on the bus.

The soldiers' sensitivity to racial insult has to be understood, as Burran observed, "in the context of their insistence on being given the dignity they thought the uniform carried." In their world view, a

soldier fighting in the United States Armed Forces was a soldier and should be treated as such, regardless of his color. It is for this reason that the soldier at 250 Camp Gibbons in 1941, objected to the white officer referring to the waiters in the mess hall as

"lightning" and "smoke," and asked to be addressed "not as such, but as a 'soldier. ' This attitude is also reflected in the petition filed by the soldiers at Camp Wheeler...against a white PX employee who called them

"niggers." On 13 August, 1944, according to the intelligence officer at Camp Wheeler,

Negro soldiers took offense at being referred to as 'niggers' by a white PX employee... and the following day presented their commander with a three page protest signed by 74 colored soldiers. The petition stated in part: 'we the undersigned do hereby protest the slanderous remarks made at PX No. 14 on the 13th of August, 1944 at 4:30. This remark has been made against our soldiers, once too often. Regardless of our color, we are still American soldiers and would appreciate if the matter was looked into promptly.

Officials at the base reported that the PX employee had been transferred and that the matter was under investigation.

In summary, black soldiers in World War II exhibited a marked sensitivity to racial slurs, whether directed to them as individuals or directed against the race; they tended to respond very quickly. The sensitivity to racial slurs was not new, but was evident even among black soldiers serving on the western frontier prior to World War I. Moreover, social 251 scientists found a similar sensitivity to racial slurs among southern youth, both iniral and urban, whom they studied in the 1930's.

The use of racial slurs was consequently responsible for many of the racial "incidents,"

"physical racial friction," and "individual and small group battles" which became commonplace at many posts. When intelligence officials at Louisiana submitted their evaluation of the overall racial situation in the state for November of 1944, they indicated that

"another federal investigative agency^^ had described the racial situation in the state...as having deteriorated," and the primary cause was "the friction in and about the military camps." The "agency" asserted that "the Negro line is that Negro soldiers are 'Jim Crowed' and insulted to such an extent that they are not responsible for retaliations which they commit. The protest was not always violent, though. The tendency was to protest insulting speakers or entertainers by walking out and to protest the insults of their officers by reporting them, either to military authorities or to the black newspapers. Physical violence was generally the response to racial insults from other white enlisted men. They could not "deck a white officer for his racial slurs," but they could. 252 and did, "deck" white enlisted men. What is significant

for purposes of this study is that the evidence does

not support the belief that black soldiers were passive or acquiescent to humiliation or to discriminatory practices. This will be become even more evident as we explore their response to segregated facilities, both

on and off military installations and to discriminatory treatment on and off the base. 253 ENDNOTES

1. Marvin Fletcher.The Black Soldier and Officer in the United States Army. 1891-1917 (Columbia, Mo : University of Missouri Press, 1974), 25, 100, and 158. 2. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma; The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 761.

3. A "peckerwood," was a derogatory term for a lower class white person.

4. Charles Johnson, Growing Up in the Black Belt (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941), 287.

5. Ibid., 288.

6. Allison Davis and John Dollard, Children of Bondage: Personality Development of Negro Youth in the Urban South(Washington. D.C.: American Cultural Education, 1940), 93 and 241.

7. Johnson, Growing Up in the Black Belt. 287-288.

8. Ibid., 295.

9. John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1937), 256.

10. Johnson, Growing Up in the Black Belt. 287.

11. Arnold Rose, The Negro's Morale: Group Identification and Protest (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), 120-1. 12. A portion of this letter is reproduced in Myrdal, American Dilemma. 958. The full text is found in Time. "Letters to the Editor," 25 August, 1941.

13. Interview with Sgt. Willie Lawton in Mary Penick Motley, Invisible Soldier: The Experience of the Black Soldier, World War II (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), 103. 254 14. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Eighth Service Command, Dallas, 23-30 December, 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives.

15. Interview with Major Pernell Shelton in Motley, Invisible Soldier. 56.

16. Myrdal, American Dilemma. 958. 17. Ibid., 761.

18. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Seventh Service Command, 10-17 February, 1945, in Box 263, RG 107, National Archives.

19. War Department, SIC Field Office 29, Macon, Ga., 12 September 1944, "Subject: Racial Incident, Camp Wheeler, Ga.," in Box 261, RG 107, National Archives. 20. Memorandum, 15 December 1944, Army Service Forces, Portland Sub-Port of Embarkation...Portland, Oregon. Subject : "Racial Incident, Vancouver Barracks, Wash., 13 December 1944," in RG 107, Box 261, National Archives. There is no question of the veracity of the report because officers from the Intelligence and Security Division were present at the performance and it was they who advised the post commander of the incident. Normally, security and Intelligence has to investigate an "incident" after it had occurred. On this occasion, they were eye-witnesses.

21. "Weekly Intelligence Summary," Headquarters, Fifth Service Command, 21-28 October, 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives. The report the following week indicated that white patients were upset, and that relations were strained. A white patient said that the incident was not closed and all that was needed for a general riot was "a damned good opportunity." He said he and other white patients frequently saw dead white soldiers on the battlefield but never saw a dead 'nigger,' and combat troops resented the fact that Negroes were assigned to quartermaster details. This, coupled with the "domineering attitude on the part of Negro patients," upset them. His attitude was not unusual. White soldiers resented the assignment of black soldiers to "safe" jobs in the rear, though on opinion surveys they continually voiced the opinion that blacks would not 255 make good fighters. It was also not unusual to find resentment against the "arrogant" attitudes of black soldiers, both by white officers and soldiers. White soldiers especially resented being lectured on how not to offend black soldiers.

22. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Third Service Command, 12-19 October, 1945, in Box 264, RG 107, National Archives.

23. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Eighth Service Command, Dallas, 11-18 August, 1945, in Box 262, RG 107.

24. Memorandum, War Department, Headquarters, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, 4 April 1945, Subject : "Inflammatory Anti-Negro Statements Distributed by Unknown Persons and Attributed to Commanding Officer, 995th Engineers Squadron, Venice Army Air Field, Florida," in Box 261, RG 107, National Archives.

25. Phillip McGuire, He too Spoke for Democracy: Judge Hastie. World War II and the Black Soldier. (Westport, CT; Greenwood Press, 1988) 57.

26. U.S. War Department, The Command of Negro Troops. Pamphlet No. 20-6 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944), 6.

27. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, 24 February to 3 March, 1945, in Box 263, RG 107, National Archives. The seriousness with which some service commands took the use of racial slurs is indicated by a report from the Louisville District in which they spared no effort in trying to identify a white officer from the AAF Distribution Center who, "a confidential informant" alleged, had referred to local blacks as "niggers" while he was in a night club. 28. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Eighth Service Command, Dallas, 14 to 21 April, 1945, in Box 263, RG 107, National Archives.

29. Ibid. 30. Interview with Sgt. Willie Lawton in Motley, Invisible Soldier. 103. Davis and Dollard found, in Children of Bondage, that whether or not black youths 256 took the term "nigger" as an insult indeed depended on the perceived intent. Little Edward told Dollard that his white playmates called them "niggers" sometimes but they did not mind because they knew that in doing so the white boys were "just imitating what the black boys did among themselves." When Mrs. Martin, however, referred to Edward and his friends as "li'l niggers," they took it as an insult because "she had made it sufficiently plain that she did not like them." (Children of Bondage. 93).

31. Interview with Sgt. Bill Stevens in Motley, Invisible Soldier. 75.

32. Interview with Lester Stevens, in Motley, Invisible Soldier. 49.

33. Interview with Major William Pernell Shelton in Motley, Invisible Soldier. 56.

34. Weekly Intelligence Report, Headquarters, Third Service Command, 13-20 October, 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives.

35. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Ninth Service Command, Ft. Douglas, Utah, 3-10 February 1945, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives.

36. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Ninth Service Command, 10-17 February, 1945, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives.

37. Military Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, June 30, 1945, in RG 107, Box 263, National Archives. 38. Weekly Intelligence Summary, 9th Service Command, Ft. Douglas, Utah, 15-22 September, 1945 in Box 264, RG 107, National Archives.

39. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, 20-27 January, 1945, Box 262, RG 107, National Archives. 40. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, 9th Service Command, 21-28 July, 1945 in Box 263, RG 107, National Archives. 257 41. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Eight Service Command, Dallas, 4-11 August, 1945.

42. Anonymous to Walter White (ca. September 8, 1941), from Camp Gibbons, N.C., in RG 107, Box 185, National Archives.

43 .Headquarters, Fourth Service Command, Army Service Forces, Atlanta, 11-18 August, 1944.

44. Most likely the FBI, who always had "spies" in the black community attempting to uncover the foreign "agitators" and "subversives" responsible for racial disturbances. They refused to believe that the protest was indigenous.

45. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Eight Service Command, Dallas, Texas, 18-25 November, 1944. CHAPTER VI

THE PROTEST AGAINST RACIAL "SEPARATION"

Benjamin Davis, Sr., was correct in asserting that

the enforcement of segregation laws was a persistent source of irritation to black soldiers, especially to

those unaccustomed to them.^ The enforcement of these laws was most resented and most resisted, even by

soldiers who were accustomed to racial segregation in

civilian life. The protest against racial segregation formed a significant part of the "war for democracy at home." Resistance and protest took a wide variety of forms, however, forms which military officials

characterized as evidence of "low morale" and "lack of discipline."2 This chapter examines the protest in its various manifestations, from the most concealed to the most overt.

Most black servicemen recall that their initial response to racial segregation was usually shock and humiliation. Northern blacks, like Edward Soulds, seem not to have expected that they would be segregated.

Soulds was a Northerner, born and reared in Montana, and had been achieved some reputation as an athlete in

258 259 high school. He had three years of college at San Jose State before he decided to enlist in the infantry at

Missoula, Montana on January 22, 1942, a decision which he states was "a deliberate effort to avoid the

draft.He went shopping for a branch of the service

in which to enlist, as all the black volunteers did. He rejected the Navy, because at that time it was still

enlisting blacks only as stewards. He had three years

of college. His stepsister worked in the governor's office in Montana and he used that along with his

athletic reputation to secure a position in the Infantry.

They sent him to Ft. Lewis, Washington, for induction and he loved it there. He was having a very

good time in the Army, actually, until they decided to send him South, to the IRTC (Infantry Replacement

Training Center) at Camp Welters, Texas. He was the

only one in the group they sent to Texas.

Soulds recalls being totally unprepared to be "Jim

Crowed." When he got to El Paso, the military police came to him and asked to see a copy of his orders. He complied with the request. Then they asked him to

follow them. He did accordingly. "I was totally unprepared for what was to happen for the next five minutes," Soulds recollected, "because I was removed 260 from the normal world and life I had known since birth and to a completely foreign world." They escorted

Soulds to another railroad car, and it took him a while to realize that there were no white people there, only

black people. It was then "the horrible realization hit me in the face--I was being Jim Crowed."

His first reaction was panic. He got off the car

and walked back to the platform, and headed back toward the station. He found two white majors and explained to them what had happened. They discussed it with the MPs

and then informed him that the Army had no control over the situation. Whites and blacks in Texas had to ride

in separate cars. He accepted their explanation and went back to the Jim Crow car, frightened and

disillusioned. He looked around. The interior of the car was appalling. The seats were frayed, worn, and

extremely uncomfortable. He figured his accommodations were third class at best. "A sea of black faces like mine swam before me," he recalls, "because try as I may to stop, the tears dropped from my eyes with increasing

rapidity." He found a seat that was totally unoccupied and placed his baggage beside him because he did not

want to speak to anyone. "A wave of resentment engulfed me," he continued,

I immediately felt a strong dislike towards 261 the other blacks in the coach. I felt they caused me to be placed in this predicament because they lacked the guts to demand their rights guaranteed them by the Constitution. A very deep and forbidding hatred of whites, particularly those who had a southern drawl, sprang forth instantly. I found that this resentment of blacks combined with hate for white people provided me with a reservoir of strength from which I drew temporary solace and comfort to withstand the temporary hurt to my pride and dignity as a soldier in the Army of the United States/*

For Bill Downey too, segregation had been unexpected. Downey, as mentioned previously, was a Northerner, b o m and reared in Iowa. He was twenty years old when he saw a Marine recruiting poster and went to Des Moines and enlisted. He was assigned to the Montford Training Camp in North Carolina, and he knew about southern segregation laws. Although he knew about them, however, the impact of being segregated still

"staggered him." At North Carolina, they made him transfer to the "cattle car." There were no seats in the "cattle car," so like the other blacks, he sat on the floor. He recalled that there was also a black officer sitting off in the corner, alone, obviously trying to maintain his dignity. An elderly lady sat down next to Downey. She had a kind face, he thought, like his grandmother, and there was genuine concern in her expression. She said, "first time, ain't it?" He did not answer. She kept on talking to him anyway. 262 "Don't let it snap you," she said; "you just get back at them sometime when you can without getting yesself

killed. She said she told that to all her boys." He

still did not respond but she continued to talk to him. She persuaded him to accept half a chicken which she had "fried fresh that morning." She introduced herself as "Miz Lucy" and proceeded to give him advise on how to survive in the South. As he sat there and listened,

Downey recalled, it occurred to him that "the war was being fought in the wrong place.

Downey's feeling that perhaps he had enlisted to fight the wrong war was shared by many black soldiers.

As the surveys revealed, fully two-thirds of all black soldiers felt that either the war for democracy at home should take priority over the war for democracy abroad, or that both wars should be fought at the same time.

There is a great deal of truth to southerners' complaint that black soldiers were deliberately attempting to break down their "laws and customs." The protest against racial segregation, though rarely coordinated and largely individual, was widespread throughout the war. As was the case with the protest against other types of discrimination, the protest against racial segregation was sometimes indirect. In August of 1944, 263 Intelligence Headquarters at the Third Service Command reported that "a group of Negro soldiers had painted over the segregation signs on the buses running in the vicinity" [of Camp Lee] . ^Similarly, in December of 1944, a bus driver shot a black soldier near Palmer,

Mississippi. The soldier had been caught in the act of bending and defacing a Jim Crow sign at the crossing.’ Machinist Mate Edward Oldham, recounting the story of why his unit was disbanded, recalled that when they arrived at Camp Perry, Virginia, there was a black side and a white side, and signs designating each accordingly. "One day the black guys tore down all the signs. The authorities split up our unit and sent the northern fellows North and the southern fellows farther South."®

Protests over racial separation in public transportation were commonplace but the form of protest varied with the form which racial separation took. In states where racial screens were used, removal of the racial screens was fairly common. This was sometimes done surreptitiously and sometimes openly. For example, in October of 1945, the Intelligence officer for the 8th Service Command reported that

three colored soldiers had boarded a New Orleans bus. There were also three white soldiers aboard. The white female driver heard a noise in the rear 264 of the bus and when she turned around one of the racial screens was missing from the rear of the bus. The driver requested the soldiers to replace the screen, which request was ignored. During the drive to the air base, the other screen was also removed. After the passengers left the bus, the driver went to the rear...and found one of racial screens on the floor. Apparently, one of the screens had been thrown out the window or carried off the bus by one the passengers...®

Most likely they threw the racial screen out of the window, as some black soldiers were inclined to do.

In many instances, the removal of the racial screen was done overtly, as was the case in several incidents reported by Louisiana authorities in 1945. On September 1, a black soldier riding a street car threw the screen down on a seat. When the motorman asked him to stop, he did it again. The motorman said he would have to call the military police, and the soldier told him to "go ahead and get them." When the motorman approached the soldier, "the latter and several of his companions tried to gang up on the motorman." He pulled his gun. The police arrived and placed the black soldiers under arrest. The same day, in a separate incident. Private James Davis of the 416th Quartermaster Service Company became involved in an argument with a white civilian on a street car. He was arrested and spent the night in jail, and was turned over to the military police the following day. The 265 altercation began when Davis removed the racial screen

on the street car. A civilian claimed that Davis became "abusive" when he requested that Davis put it back

where it belonged.^® This incident followed the arrest

only the day before of two other soldiers for "throwing race screen out the window and causing a disturbance.

The refusal to take seats in the rear was the most common form of protest. Typical of such reported

incidents was one from intelligence headquarters in Atlanta, which stated that

a Negro soldier from Godman Field, Ky., was arrested in Columbia, S.C. on June 22, 1945 after he had refused to move from a front to a rear seat of a bus. He was subsequently turned over to MP's at Ft. Jackson and later released to report to his Commanding officer at Walterboro Army Air Force base. . "12

The same fate met Corporal Augustus J. Collaway,

Squadron C, 335th AAF (Army Air Force) unit, who was arrested in Tallahassee, Florida and charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest for refusing to take a rear seat. Collaway boarded a city bus at the corner of Copeland and Madison and took a seat in the front. He refused to move to the rear at the request of the bus driver who proceeded to summon the city police.

They arrived and told him he had to move. Collaway 266 refused. When he resisted arrest, according to the report, one of the policemen struck him over the head

with a black jack. Civilian authorities released him to the Provost Marshall at Dale Mabry Field with the understanding that he would appear in city court for trial on the 5th of July.

Even southern soldiers, accustomed to racial separation in civilian life, resented the enforcement of these laws once they were in the military. Such was the case with Wilbur Walker, who served in both World

War II and the Korean War. Though Walker disputed one of his officers' characterization of Baltimore as a

"southern city," he recalls that "Baltimore in 1942 was a long way from being a city that offered equal opportunities to its black citizens." Everything was segregated: schools, movie theaters, restaurants, hospitals, parks. As was the case in the Deep South,

Blacks were not permitted to try on clothing in department stores. With the exception of a few professionals, they were limited to service and a few industrial jobs. "Blacks did not generally accept the rigid limitations [but] there was little questioning of separation," he recalls. They "looked to the passage of time, for a solution, and to education and training of young people. The cry was for equality of 267 opportunity.

He eagerly signed up for the draft right after

finishing high school in 1942. He was drafted and assigned to the Navy as requested in 1943. He went to

boot camp near Chicago and then to Aviation Metalsmith School in Michigan. He was assigned to Pensacola,

Florida. He knew nothing about Pensacola, but he felt

fortunate not to have drawn Corpus Christi, Texas, which was at the bottom of the wish list of every black

recruit because of the letters they had received from other blacks stationed there.

Upon arrival in Florida, they had to take the bus

from the main base at Pensacola to Whiting Field where he had been assigned. The group for the field consisted

of five soldiers and a few aviation cadets. It was an

extremely hot day and, as they boarded the bus they" spread out, each taking a seat near the window, one behind the other, from the front of the bus." The bus proceeded to a station in Pensacola where a large crowd was waiting to get on. The black soldiers were almost oblivious to their surroundings, according to Walker, primarily contemplating what the new environment at

Whiting Field would be like. They eventually realized that the people at the bus station were talking and pointing at the bus in an "agitated" fashion. It took a 268 while for Walker and the others to become conscious that they were the cause of the commotion. When he looked up, he finally understood that "the cause for concern seemed to be our sitting in seats other than the rear." He had been unaware that "the practice in Florida was for blacks to sit in the rear of public vehicles." He had no intention of moving, however, because "we were travelling under government orders, he said, "and not as private citizens. He "nodded to the others," and without discussion, it was understood that "we did not plan to move from our seats.

Part of the reason that violation of segregation laws was so commonplace lay in the fact that the penalty was really not all that "severe." It was customary for civilian authorities to turn violators over to the military authorities, who either punished the violators themselves or guaranteed their appearance in court where their penalty was a fine. If one could afford to pay the fine, one could violate the law.

When a black soldier could not afford to pay the fine, other soldiers would help him out. This happened in the case of a black soldier from Turner Field, who according to Intelligence officials, in Albany,

Georgia, refused to take a rear seat in a public bus when 269 requested to do so by the driver. He was arrested, charged with disturbing the peace, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest. (On this occasion, however) city police refused to turn him over to the military authorities. He was fined $50 and sentenced to 30 days on each charge, with sentence to be suspended upon payment of fine. The incident caused tension at Turner field (the report continued) especially among the Negro troops, who took up a collection and paid the fine.

Civilian authorities became increasingly irritated at the perceived leniency of military authorities, however, and refused to turn black soldiers over to the military for punishment. This was indeed the case when eleven black soldiers were arrested in Warrensville,

S.C. on 28 September 1944 for causing a disturbance on a public bus. The Provost Marshall conducted a special investigation at the request of the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War because the incident had been leaked to the black press. The incident began, not because the soldiers had violated the seating arrangements. In fact, they were sitting in the back of the bus as was customary but the driver alleged that they were talking loudly and using abusive language. He asked them to quiet down. When the bus got to

Warrensville, a black woman got on and she took a seat in front of a white passenger. The driver told her that she would have to move and, when she refused, her money was returned and she was told to catch another bus. The 270 driver alleged that, on the way out, she called him a "white son of a bitch." He slapped her, and she hit

back at the driver with her purse. It was at this time

that the soldiers came forward and rushed the driver. He claimed he was hit in the back several times. He

ordered the soldiers to move back to the rear of the

bus. They refused and he called the police. A Fred Booth of Augusta, a white passenger, allegedly

substantiated the driver's version. He also added that he had overheard one of the soldiers say, "Let's treat him as we would a Jap," in reference to the driver. The

reviewing officer believed that the "beating" which the

driver alleged was merely the result of the crowding of the driver when Collins slapped the woman.

The investigation revealed that the eleven

soldiers involved were arrested and detained in the Aiken county jail. They were tried on 25 September,

1944. Two sergeants were fined $25 or 30 days on the

chain gang. The sergeants paid the fine. The nine

enlisted men were fined $15 or 30 days on the chain gang. They were unable to pay and were ordered to be put to work the next day. Military police came over

from Camp Gordon about the time of the trial, the investigator found, and requested that the eleven soldiers be turned over to them. The magistrate refused 271 and

stated in substance that it had been his observation that when military personnel were turn over to the military police for action of a punitive nature none was taken and he was going to teach these Negro soldiers that they could not cause disturbances on public buses in Aiken County.

The investigation revealed, however, that the following day a group of black soldiers came over from Camp

Gordon and brought money with them with which to pay

the fines of the enlisted men who were unable to do so. They were released, the investigator said, and he did

not believe that any of the black soldiers spent more than a day on the chain gang.^®

In fact, white southerners blamed the growing

tendency of black civilians to violate the segregation laws on the presence of black soldiers. Military

intelligence officers in San Antonio, Texas interviewed several bus drivers and reported that the opinion of the drivers with respect to the arguments and frays with Negroes riding the busses is that it is daily becoming an increasing danger. At least once a day a driver has trouble with one of the Negro passengers who take seats in the white section of the bus. These drivers who have been long residents of the South state that it appears the majority of this action on the part of the population is due to the fact that a large number of soldiers and their families have come from the northern part of the United States and have imparted to the local population that they should ride anywhere they please on the busses and now the many local colored passengers boarding the bus sit wherever they please. Formerly when they 272 infrequently had to be asked to move to the rear, there was no argument or hesitation. Presently in the majority of the cases..an argument or fracas ensues... ^’

The violation of "seating arrangements" on public

conveyances became so commonplace and so repetitive in their reports that, by mid-1944, military officials decided that they would describe only the most serious ones and merely aggregate the others.

The reports of civil disobedience over racial separation occurred on other types of public

transportation conveyances as well. In August of 1945, the Atlanta headquarters reported that

a Negro soldier from Ft. Bragg had become boisterous and used profane language when white MP's questioned him for being in a white coach on a train on 26 August. The Negro refused to return to the Negro coach and, while MP's were attempting to remove him, the other Negro soldiers came to his assistance and assaulted the MP's. The MP's drew their guns and forced the Negroes back into their coach. Two Negro officers failed to assist the MP's, and reportedly stated that they hoped their men would "tear up the place." The Negro soldiers and officers were taken into military custody and returned to Ft. Bragg.

Similarly, eight black soldiers who were being

transferred from McDill field created a disturbance in

Valdosta, Georgia on January 24, 1945 when the railroad agent requested that they move from the white waiting

room to the "colored" waiting room. They refused to do so and the agent reported that one stated, "I am being 273 sent overseas and I will sit where I damn well please." They allegedly threatened the agent when he left to

telephone the military police. The military police forced them back into the "colored" section of the station until the train arrived.

Similarly, on March 2, 1945, thirty-three black

soldiers who were being transferred from the motor pool at Ft. Knox, Kentucky to Camp Livingston, Louisiana left the "colored" compartment of the Texas and Pacific train on which they were being transported and began to mingle with the white passengers. The conductor and the military police finally got them back into their own coach. In retaliation, however, they locked the doors of their compartment and would not allow anyone to pass through the train. Upon reaching Stonewall, Louisiana, the conductor telephoned the Provost Marshall at Barksdale Field and a detachment of military policemen and state troopers from Barksdale took the soldiers into custody. At the time the incident was reported, they were "being held pending action by their commanding officer."

In a somewhat related occurrence, three black soldiers became disturbed and reportedly used "profane and obscene language" when they were refused service in the diner of a train in Knoxville, Tennessee. They 274 proceeded to argue with the white conductor and

"attempted to band some other soldiers together and

start trouble." As a consequence of the protest, they

were told that they would be served after all. However, they changed their minds and refused to return to the

diner. The military police allowed them to proceed to their destination after they were cautioned about their

conduct.

The type of racial discrimination black soldiers

the most objectionable, however, was discrimination in military owned and operated facilities. The assertion

that they were all fighting for the same cause and

should be treated the same was repeatedly voiced among black soldiers. As was the case with the protest

against public facilities, the protest against

facilities on base took a variety of forms. Sometimes the protest was passive, as was the case

in Camp Forrest, Tennessee in 1943. Lt. Byron Minor, told his friend Truman Gibson (Civilian Aide to the

Secretary of War) that black soldiers at Camp Forrest "had been barred [initially] from all the base theaters except Theater #1, in which 14 seats were set aside for

some 1000 quartermaster and signal construction

troops." Upon arrival of the 931st Field Artillery at the base, however, all the theaters were opened to them 275 because they threatened to complain to the Inspector

General. The base commander attempted to limit black soldiers to a designated side of Theater #1 on the pretext that it was close to the area of the Camp occupied by black soldiers. The black officers refused to attend the theaters, permitting the row of seats reserved for them to be vacant at all times.

However, a new Commander arrived at Camp Forrest and instructed them that black soldiers would be expected to "participate in all of the activities of the camp." It is not clear how he became aware that they did not go to the theater, but he appeared to know. In accordance with his directive, the black officers resumed attendance at the theaters, but they sat in the section reserved for officers. rather than that reserved for black officers. On the evening of May 6, 1943, Lt. Minor and several of the officers went to the theater, brought their tickets as usual, and were ushered into the seats reserved for officers. They sat down and proceeded to watch the picture. They had been watching for about forty or fifty minutes when Lieutenant Taylor, one of the black officers, turned around and saw the commander of their unit. Colonel Ray, come to the rear entrance of the theater. Thinking that there was an officers' 276 meeting, the black officers all rose and went to join Col. Ray in the lobby. There were six other black officers already there with the Colonel. While they were standing there, a military police officer went past them, went down the aisle and looked over the officers' rows. Shortly thereafter, the door to his office opened and Col. Ray beckoned them to come in.

Inside was the Post Commander and a number of the black enlisted men.

Byron Minor could not recall the Post Commander's exact words, but they were something to the effect that, first, "he thought he had straightened out the question of the officers and men of the 931st FA Bn (Field Artillery Battalion) and their attendance at the

War Dept.[sic] Theaters on the Post," and second, "we could go back to the show that night but we were not to come again." The black officers stepped out of the office to find that they "were surrounded by military police with sub-machine guns in a position of readiness." They were forced to march through a gauntlet of military police, who flanked them on either side of the door.

The black officers never went back to the theater. "As for the theater situation now," Minor told Gibson, "we just don't go. A 'Jim Crow' section has been set 277 aside, but we will just have to do without going if we

can't go as officers.Their boycott represents the protest in its most passive and indirect form.

By 1944, however, protests against discrimination on base had become more direct. Though designation of facilities by race had been forbidden by military

regulations for quite a while, base commanders could

designate facilities for the exclusive use of a particular unit. This accomplished the same thing. In July of 1944, the War Department issued a directive which indicated that black soldiers were entitled to use any facility on base, no matter where it was located. The order was still violated but from 1944 onward black soldiers had military regulations on their side.

Generally, the protest was individual, as was the case in Cochran Field, Georgia in September of 1944. In a confidential memo, the Security and Intelligence Division reported that

On 8 September 1844, a Negro soldier entered the civilian cafeteria at 7:30 am. This is reported to have been the same Negro who was reported by S/I (Intelligence Summary) dated 4 September... to have utilized the cafeteria on 4 September and possibly the same Negro who had breakfast in the cafeteria on 6 September 1944. On both 6 and 8 September, he was served and ate his meal in the cafeteria with white people...The cafeteria has heretofore been used exclusively by white people with the exception of the three occasions described above 278 when a lone Negro soldier breakfasted there...

Racial segregation in base theaters also came

under attack, as it did at Camp Selby, Mississippi, when, on August 31, 1945,

a group of Negro soldiers...occupied the entire section of the post theater and refused to move despite requests from the manager. As a result of the Negroes' defiant attitudes, the theater was closed and not opened until 9 September.

The base authorities reported no further problems once the theatre was re-opened.

Military intelligence at all camps supported the findings of the office in Atlanta that black soldiers exhibited a "tendency toward provoking racial incidents on the basis of the War Dept.[sic] memo." They reported further that "Negro officer personnel have evidenced resentment over what they allege was an effort to suppress publication of the...letter." There is indeed merit to Ulysses Lee's assertion that, in the racial disturbances after 1943, the black soldier was just as likely to be the aggressor as the victim.^®

Black officers, perhaps even more so than the enlisted men, were inclined to confront racial segregation head on.^^ Such was the case at Ft. Banning, Georgia in January of 1945 when, 2nd Lt. David A. Blake, a black Athletics and Recreation officer at 279 the base, "entered the main post bowling alley and

stated that he wished to bowl." The white civilian

manager told Blake that he could not bowl. Lt. Blake

left and returned at 9 p.m. and this time "he rolled a few balls down the alley" and left. Before he left,

however, he was alleged to have made the statement that "he would return the next day with other soldiers to take over the alley."

He returned the following day at approximately

8:20 p.m., accompanied by five enlisted men. They told the manager they wanted to bowl, and on this occasion,

the manager made no effort to prevent them from doing so. Rather than sharing lanes, however, Lt. Blake

instructed the enlisted men to "spread out" and he

"declined the manager's request that they double up." When they started to bowl, the bin boys, who were

German prisoners of war, refused to set up the pins for them. The civilian manager claimed that he had given no such order to the German prisoners. The manager called the Provost Marshall who came and asked Blake and the enlisted men their names and units. They supplied the information and the Provost had the incident under investigation at the time of the report. The violation of racial segregation by the black servicemen was alleged to have aroused "considerable feeling among the 280 white soldiers.

Protests against racial segregation occurred even in military hospitals, as was noted in incidents above, especially among blacks who had served overseas. This is demonstrated by an incident which occurred at Kennedy General Hospital in Memphis on January 15,

1945. It was dinnertime in the enlisted patients' mess hall at the hospital and patients had lined up for their meals. The assistant mess officer noticed that about four of five black patients were standing in line with the white patients. He walked over and told them that they were "in the wrong line" and would have to move. They had no reaction. He repeated the statement as he thought they might not have heard him. They refused to move. He reported the incident to the mess officer, Lt. Vaughn, who decided to be present at the evening meal the following day. When the lines formed for the evening meal, again the four black patients stood in line with the white patients. Lt. Vaughn ordered the black patients to move and they again refused. He then notified the Provost Marshall to come to the mess hall immediately. In the meantime, the four black patients went through the mess line. Three of the four sat at a table reserved for civilian employees, and the other sat at a table with white patients. L t . 281 Hines, the Provost Marshall arrived, at the mess hall at 6:20 and arrested the four black enlisted patients, who protested their arrest with the statement that

"they had fought and lived with white soldiers overseas and did not see any reason that they should be separated now."

Shortly after the arrest of the four enlisted men, another group of four black patients, led by a Sgt.

Richard Caldwell, came to Lt. nine's office to protest the arrest of the other enlisted men, "stating that they were 'sticking up' for their race." Hines had them arrested and confined to the guardhouse with the other four arrested in the mess hall.

There were, as the report explained, three lines of tables in the mess hall. One line was reserved for white patients, one for black patients, and the remaining one for civilians. The Commanding General of the hospital had ordered black and white soldier patients to eat at separate tables. The War

Department's memo was obviously ignored, as was the case at military installations throughout the South. Upon hearing of the arrests, black civilians working in the kitchen became disturbed. They stopped working and "congregated in groups discussing the arrest and gave indication of disapproval." A civilian 282

guard was placed on the civilians in the k i t c h e n .

The Commanding General, according to the report,

investigated the incident and "ordered all the

protestors (sic) released." The records do not reveal

if he was the same commanding general who ordered the segregation in the first place, if he desegregated the mess hall, or if the protests continued. From 1944

onward, however, black soldiers had military

regulations on their side in the fight against racial separation in military facilities.

There were times when the protest against racial separation took on the form of a coordinated and persistent attack, reflective of the tactics of an incipient civil rights movement. This was apparently the case at Tuskegee Air Base in 1944. Soon after the issuance of the War Department memorandum, which the clerk at Tuskegee was suspected of distributing, black soldiers and civilian employees obviously began cooperating in what amounted to a "movement" to break down segregation in the mess halls. Reports from August onward indicated that black soldiers and civilians were "taking their meals in the white cafeteria." At first, they sat together. The whites ignored them. A week later, white personnel came in to discover black soldiers and civilians sitting "one to a table, in such 283 a manner as to inconvenience white people," according to the intelligence officer. Officials then changed the lunch time for white personnel from 11 to 11:30 a.m.

Black civilian personnel, to the chagrin of the white personnel, succeeded in having their lunch times

changed. The intelligence officer was convinced that it was no coincidence, that it was part of an attack on

the "white" cafeteria, but he was never able to ascertain who was directing it.^^

As the incidents described revealed, protests

against segregation and discrimination in facilities, both on and off base, became a daily occurrence, and

these protests formed part of the "war for democracy at home." The protests, again, took a variety of forms as the incidents revealed, everything from passive resistance to outright civil disobedience. Black servicemen protested racial segregation by defacing racial signs, throwing racial screens out of the windows, refusing to take seats in the rear of buses, by occupying the "white" section of the base theatres and in a variety of other ways. Black soldiers felt entitled to the same rights as any other soldier

serving in the military. 284 ENDNOTES

1. War Department, Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for the Inspector General, from Benjamin 0. Davis, Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Subject: "Survey Relative Conditions Affecting Racial Attitudes at Ft. Clark, Texas," in Record Group (RG) 107, Box 205, National Archives.

2. Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops United States Army in World War II, Special Studies. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), 374.

3. Edward H. Soulds, Black Shavetail in Whitey's Army (New York: Carlton Press, 1971), 2.

4. Ibid., 9-12. Soulds became a career officer. His response can best be characterized as what James Scott calls "cautious resistance." He occasionally violated the Jim Crow laws, but would push so far and then stop. Mostly, he "learned to get along with the South." He dated a young lady he met while at Banning and she was from one of the well-to-do black families in Atlanta. He took her on dates on the bus, and he sat in the back with her because they got into arguments when he violated the Jim Crow seating arrangements. When he went into town on his own, he and the other officers shared the cost of a taxi. Eventually, he did what well-off southern blacks did to avoid the humiliation of Jim Crow laws : he bought a car. 5. Bill Downey, Uncle Sam Must Be Losing the War: Black Marines of the 51st. (San Francisco: Strawberry Hill Press, 1982), 9-11.

6. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Third Service Command, August 12-19, 1944, in RG 107, Box 262, National Archives. 7. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, 23 to 30 December, 1944, in Box 262, RG (Record Group) 107, National Archives. 285 8. Interview with former Machinist Mate Edward Oldham in Mary Penick Motley, The Invisible Soldier: The Experience of the Black Soldier. World War II (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), 116.

9. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Eighth Service Command, Dallas, 22-29 October 1945, in Box 263, RG 107, National Archives. 10. Intelligence Summary, Eighth Service Command, Dallas, Texas, 25 August-1 September 1945, Box 263, RG 107, National Archives.

11. Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Eight Service Command, 1-10 September, 1945, Box 263, RG 107, National Archives.

12. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, 9-15 Sept, 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives. 13. Wilbur L. Walker, We Are Men: Memoirs of World War II and the Korean War (Baltimore: Heritage Press, 1972, Repr., 1980), 2-3.

14. Ibid., 15

15. Intelligence Summary, 9-15 September, 1944, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives. 16. Memorandum, War Dept., Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, "Confidential, War Department, HQ Distr. No. 3, Place: Ft. Jackson, 28 September 1944, Box 261, RG 107, "Subject: Racial Incident, Eleven soldiers Arrested For Disorderly Conduct on Bus," Supp. Report," in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives. 17. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Eighth Service Command, 14 September 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives. 18. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, August 1-7, 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives. 286 19. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command (Atlanta) 26 August 1945, in Box 263, RG 107, National Archives.

20. Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, 27 January to 3 February 1945, Box 262, RG 107, National Archives.

21. Memorandum, Army Service Forces, Headquarters, Eighth Service Command, Dallas, "Racial Incident, Stonewall, Louisiana," in Box 263, RG 107, National Archives.

22. Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, 26 August 1945, in Box 263, RG 107, National Archives.

23. Byron Minor to Truman Gibson, November 21, 1943, RG 107, "Camp Forrest," in Box 185, National Archives.

24. Memorandum "Confidential," War Department S.I.D Field Area 29, 8 September 1944, Sub: "Racial Situation, Cochran Field," Box 261, RG 107, National Archives. 25. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, 7 September 1945, in Box 263, RG 107, National Archives. 26. Ulysses Lee, The Emolovment of Nearo Troops. United States Army in World War II, Special Studies. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), 366.

27. This conclusion has to be made with some caution because education, as the Research Branch found, was the key variable in predicting racial militancy among black soldiers. Because of the limited number of officer positions available for blacks, there were a large number of black enlisted men who were highly educated. 28. Memorandum, War Dept., Domestic and Counterintelligence Branch, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, 18 January 1945, Box 261, RG 107, National Archives. 287 29. Military records describe repeated incidents in which black southern civilians protested the treatment of black soldiers and where local prominent blacks helped them out. Some did feel, like Curtiss Todd, that northern black soldiers "had a chip on their shoulders."

30. Memorandum, War Dept., Headquarters fourth Service Command, 17 January 1945, Subject: "Racial Incident at Kennedy Hospital," in Box 261, RG 107, National Archives.

31. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, August, 25, 31, September 8, October 4, in RG 107, Box 262, National Archives. CHAPTER VII

SO, WHAT DID IT ACCOMPLISH?

The question most often asked about this study is what did the protests accomplish, what difference did

it all make since the armed forces remained segregated from the beginning to the end of World War II? This

study finds that it did matter, that black servicemen continued "to protest, and contest and fight precisely because they were effective. Moreover, while segregation remained in place throughout the war, Bernard Nalty's finding that "segregation softened as the war progressed" is also correct, as is his contention that it was not a reward for any "heroism on the battlefield but rather a response to a series of violent outbursts by black servicemen.^ This study finds, however, that the moderation of segregation was not a response to violent resistance alone but a reaction to non-violent protests as well.^ The protests served to ensure that racial segregation worked, as Hobsbawm expressed it, "to their minimum disadvantage.

An impressive body of literature has documented the fact that subordinate groups help to determine the

288 289 shape of the societies in which they live. When looking at the factors that determined the shape of m o d e m society, the role of the peasantry, for example, had received little attention. It was assumed that all the power was in the hands of the landowner, and therefore he determined the shape of the peasants' world. It has become increasingly clear, however, that the outcome of the modern world could not be explained by the actions of the upper classes alone.®

What the examination of peasant or rural resistance reveals is that subordinate groups helped to determine the contours of their world, often without resorting to violent revolution. Eric Langer found, for instance, that though unlimited power is usually ascribed to the landowners, the hacendado(landowner) in

Bolivia was unable to exercise unlimited authority over the agricultural laborer. The _aborer had options. By resisting but also by accommodating, the "hapless victim" helped to shape his world.®

The same can be said of black soldiers within the military. The military environment was shaped by soldiers, both black and white.’ It was not a result of the desires of the military establishment alone.

Black soldiers, in fact, persisted in their protests precisely because they were affecting military 290 policies in a variety of ways. They persisted in letter writing, for example, precisely because it did get them

"some of what [was] due them."® In so many instances, letter-writing took care of a specific problem. While

Iva Bluford's letter to his mother did not end segregation in the military, Iva Bluford was paid. The office of the Inspector General investigated the one

specific charge that could be investigated, namely, that his unit had not been paid. As a consequence, Bluford's unit was paid.®

Military authorities actually were afraid of letter-writers. Willard Savoy, one of the Tuskegee Airmen, knew this, and used it to his advantage.

Richard Jennings, who was a member of the 477th with

Savoy and Coleman Young, recalled that Savoy was always writing letters to the undersecretary of War. Savoy

"would [deliberately] leave the letters on his desk." Because he was from Washington, "the wheels thought he had connections in the Capital." As a result, Jennings asserted, "Savoy always passed [his flight training classes]. I have always believed that his letter- writing got him through; he plain 'psyched' the 'man. '

It was because all their efforts to stop letter- writing were a dismal failure that military authorities 291 finally decided to seek better relations with the black press, for example. The Army was very upset by the

publication of the letter about the demotion of Reed

and Clemons at Camp Lee. It launched an investigation

of the Afro-American and its editor, Carl Murphy. Military intelligence conducted an extensive investigation covering, among other things, its

finances, its readership, its editorial policies and its influence among black soldiers. Its survey revealed that seventy-six percent of black soldiers read the

Afro-American. The Army claimed that the newspaper's stories "so distorted the truth that soldiers

themselves have voiced disapproval." Among the recommendations by military intelligence was that the

Army take legal action against Murphy and that they conduct counter-propaganda among the black civilian population. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel for the War Department rejected punitive measures and decided to cultivate good relations with the black press. Among the recommended changes in policy was that they set up a special section for the Negro Press which will assist its representatives to get correct information on Army activities which they request that can properly be furnished to them and furnish them additional constructive news articles and mats for pictures on Negro activities in the Army. 292 Request the Secretary of War to comment on occasion at his press conferences on some phase of Negro activities in the Army.

Invite representatives of the Negro press to attend events of special interest to them, such as the maneuvers of the 93rd Division... Commission the making of a film on the part Negro troops are playing in the War.

These recommendations and others were indeed

implemented and followed, the records revealed,

throughout the war. The black press accompanied black

soldiers to all the theaters of war. The making of a film about the activities of black soldiers was also accomplished. The film. The Negro Soldier, was the

result and was shown to black and white enlisted men

and to the general public.The black newspapers, in return, agreed to attempt to verify letters received before printing them, and they did so, as the

innumerable inquiries to the Civilian Aide suggest.

The soldiers were able to affect military policies in other areas as well. In one instance, officials at

Muroc Army Air Field, Utah, reported that "it had been the policy to place only white guards in charge of white prisoners but it was changed when colored guards

complained of discrimination." Thus far, they told military headquarters, there was no repercussion.“ Similarly, a black unit at the Norfolk Navy Yard forced 293 authorities to give them better boats when they

complained theirs was inferior to the ones given to the

Italian prisoners of war. Apparently, closed boats were supplied to the Italian prisoners while the black service unit were given open ones. Black soldiers

believed that the open boats were less safe. On one

occasion, they refused to get into the boats until the

commanding officer got into one first to demonstrate that they were safe. As a result of their persistent

complaints, however, they were "given better craft[s]."“ Likewise, military authorities in

Buckingham Army Air Field in Florida recommended a

change in the policy of white civilian supervision of black soldiers after an argument erupted between a white civilian employee and a black soldier on 12 May

1945. The white civilian drew a knife and threatened to kill the black soldier, but eight other black soldiers

intervened and restrained the civilian. Base authorities concluded, however, that "as Negro soldiers resent taking orders from white civilians, it has been recommended that all directions from civilians be

issued through non-commissioned officers." Black soldiers had advocated such a change in policy for a long time. The use of black military police increased 294 everywhere largely due to persistent protests by black

soldiers. Military policies with respect to the use of military police were guided by the principle that black people "looked up" to white people, but not to their

own. They refused to believe that black soldiers would follow directives from other blacks. As the war wore on and incidents between white military police and black soldiers mounted, it became more and more the standard to use black military police in dealing with black soldiers. Black soldiers perceived white military and civilian authorities as racially biased, even when there was no evidence that they were. Black military police were still resented but were perceived as being more fair. In the March 1943 survey of black soldiers attitudes, 768 (10%) of the 7442 soldiers surveyed thought "Negro MB's are usually not fair." However, 2461 (33%) of the same 7442 thought that the "white military police were usually not fair." An ovenfhelming 6035 (81%) of the black soldiers found black military police either "usually fair," or thought "about half are; half are not. Eventually, the military began to take heed.

Military authorities in Tampa, Florida, for instance, reported that In an attempt to reduce racial incidents and to 295 alleviate the strained relations between Negro military personnel and military police, a special unit consisting of twenty-three carefully chosen Negro soldiers who have been selected because of their military and civilian backgrounds has been established by the Tampa Area Provost Marshall for the handling of Negro military personnel.^®

A month later, authorities at the base were pleased with the results. The racial situation at the Army Air

Forces Tactical Center, as well as in the Orlando area was "excellent," they felt. They credited the change to effective countermeasures, including the use of "an efficient Negro military police who patrol that portion of Orlando frequented by Negro troops." In addition, they indicated that they had "made arrangements with the Orlando Police Department to turn over to military authorities all colored military personnel whom they have occasion to arrest. "

As a result of the protests against racial insults, military authorities took a variety of steps to ensure that black soldiers were not referred to in terms that they found insulting. In response to the protest against the white Lieutenant who substituted the word "nigger" for "darkie" during the performance at Vancouver Barracks, the Commanding officer ordered the Special Service Branch to "check all materials to be presented at shows and to eliminate anything that 296 might offend a race, friendly nation, or religious

group." The Special Services Branch was also required to "warn all participants that such material will not be interjected in their performances."^®

Contrary to portrayal of them, black soldiers were

conscious of their ability to affect change. Blacks were often aware of the many options available to them and they exercised these options to get what they wanted. Violent rebellion was always the final, and desperate, option.

Most of the time, however, protest was directed toward remediation of a specific situation, rather than the achievement of larger policies. A threat to bring publicity, to appeal to outside agencies or above the head of his superiors produced the desired result for a black officer at Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. The military intelligence officer reported that the

"colored orientation officer threatened to make an issue of the arrest of 3 EM (Enlisted men) by white military police at Pottsville" on October 21, 1944. The three soldiers had been AWOL from a detachment headed overseas. The military police apprehended them in Pottsville and beat them severely in the process. Authorities at the base agreed that it appeared the military police "might have used excessive force." The 297 black officer insisted that the military police be punished, stating that "the matter would be referred to

Washington or the NAACP if [the] MP was not dealt with suitably." The following week's report indicated that the Provost Marshall had disciplined the white MP and that "the tension among colored troops at the ASFTC

(Army Service Forces Training Center) had been reduced" as a result.

Black servicemen knew that they could get rid of a racist commanding officer, and without killing him. Lieutenant Edward Soulds, who became a career officer and who could not be characterized as a racial

"radical" by any definition, recalled that he did just that. He was transferred from Georgia to Ft. Huachuca,

Arizona, as one of the new black officers assigned to the 364th Infantry Division.At Ft. Huachuca, the

Captain who commanded his unit seldom spoke to the black officers. All communication with them was through the Executive Officer, a white second lieutenant who

Soulds described as "a real top drawer officer...well liked and highly respected by all the black G.I.'s." After he had been there for several months, he noticed that the Captain was still cold to the black officers. "He spoke to them out of sheer necessity," Soulds recalled, "often just to pass out a verbal reprimand." 298 One day he decided to confront the Captain and he asked permission to speak to him. Soulds wasted no time in getting to the point. "I challenged the Captain... about his demonstrated indifference towards his black officers and troops." The Captain asked if Soulds wanted the answer plain or sugarcoated, Soulds indicated his preference for the former. "I was unprepared," Soulds recalled, "for what followed. The Captain stated that

he was compromising his dignity to work with niggers; that he hated them, didn't want to eat with them or talk to them or anything else. Furthermore, he would only do what he absolutely had to since he was in the Army.

Soulds thanked the Captain for his honesty, and told him that he "felt deeply sorry for him." Except for an occasional glance, there was no further communication between Soulds and the Captain.

Soulds soon learned that the unit was about to be shipped to Camp Van Dorn, Mississippi and "visualized all sorts of horrible things in the offing if we were to be commanded by our present co (sic) at the new duty station." Soulds decided to take his concern to his superiors, and without even going through channels. He went directly to the battalion commander, who was a New

Yorker, and "a fine officer, fair, square and non­ 299 prejudiced." Colonel Bryant, the battalion Commander,

listened for about half an hour while Soulds described what he perceived as the repercussions of sending the unit South under the Command of a white captain who hated black soldiers. Soulds won. Before the regiment departed for Mississippi, "the captain was transferred out. "21

Major Purnell Shelton did the same to his commanding officer. Shelton was an early draftee, who began his twenty-six year military career four months before Pearl Harbor. He was a New Yorker, and had been a member of the 369th Infantry (of World War I fame).

He left the 369th after he was accepted to Officer

Candidate School. After his training at Camp Davis, North Carolina, he served briefly with the 227th

Infantry, which was disbanded after they rioted at Camp

Stewart. He was then assigned to the 864th Infantry, also at Camp Stewart, Georgia.

His new Commander, Shelton recalled, was a Col. H., and he "signified his attitude" toward black officers by his opening instruction to the officers which was "I want all junior officers to sit on the right, senior officers on the left. That automatically divided the officers according to race. To ensure that the black officers understood his intent, he decided to 300 make it explicit. He informed them that

he had been born on the ground this camp occupied. He loved his country and was willing to die for it. He had nothing against 'nigras' but he had not seen, nor had he ever met, a 'nigra' qualified to be an officer in the United States Army. But we had a job to do and he was there to see that we did it. He also assured us that he would see that everyone of us was reclassified before we left his command.

Relations with the Colonel deteriorated from that point onward.

Shelton and the Colonel "had a couple of run-ins about my paying dues for a club I could not attend, and so Colonel H decided to see to it that Shelton was the first to be reclassified. Shelton was determined to see that this would not happen. He decided instead that he would rid himself of the Colonel.

The Colonel saw his chance to reclassify Shelton when the base motor pool failed an inspection. The base commander "chewed the Colonel's butt off" and gave him a week to bring the motor pool up to standards. The

Colonel sent for Shelton and put him in charge of the motor pool. He neglected, however, to relieve Shelton of his regular duties as platoon leader in weaponry. Shelton succeeded, to the Colonel's chagrin. The base motor pool passed inspection the following week.

"Disappointed at my success and hoping to break my 301 spirit," according to Shelton, "the Colonel assigned me permanently to the motor pool."

The next round in the skirmish belonged to Major Shelton, however. There was a black sergeant from Hinesville, Georgia in the motor pool, "the true

stereotype of an Uncle Tom," Shelton recalled. One day

Shelton observed the sergeant working on a civilian

automobile. Further investigation revealed that the car belonged to the Colonel. "Being a firm believer in

rules and regulations," Shelton reminded the sergeant that 'Army regulations prohibit him from working on a

civilian car, "on government property, with government tools, or [to] have government parts placed in them."

The sergeant considered himself reminded and continued to work on the car. Shelton then ordered him to stop working on the Colonel's car immediately. The sergeant looked shocked but obeyed. The sergeant naturally informed the Colonel. "Things got hotter" for major Shelton.

A few weeks later, Shelton noticed a civilian car parked just outside the fence surrounding the motor pool. "It was the Colonel's car again. The sergeant had cleverly parked it outside in the ditch and was "steadily working away." He looked at Lt. Shelton as he approached, and smiled slyly, as if to say, "it's not 302 on government property." Lt. Shelton smiled back and began to walk around and examine the tools he was using to work on the car. "They were all government property." At a leisurely pace, Shelton walked around and recorded the serial numbers. He walked back to his office and "wrote up charges on the Colonel," for

instructing a subordinate to violate a military directive. "The man had insulted me," Shelton asserted,

"he had been unfair, and was waiting for the opportunity to reclassify me. It was beyond his comprehension that a 'nigra' would dare to strike back."

Shelton decided to follow proper military procedure and submit the charges through channels. He submitted them to his immediate superior--the Colonel.

The Colonel would not process the charges. He kept returning them on the flimsiest pretext, such as a missing punctuation mark. Shelton asserts that he submitted the charges at least sixty times and each time they were returned. Finally he "got tired of the game of 'I've got you blocked' and forwarded the originals to battalion headquarters and sent a duplicate copy to the base commander, which was quite legal."

He got a response. The Commander of the base sent 303 for Shelton and "asked that I do him a favor in return for a favor. He asked me to drop the charges and I'd

have to trust him but the trouble would stop." Shelton agreed, because he felt he had little alternative.

The Base Commander kept his part of the agreement: The Colonel was relieved of his command. Before the

Colonel left however, "he got in a solid counterpunch." He transferred Shelton to Camp Maxie, Texas, into an

ordnance unit which was headed for combat. The Colonel told Shelton that "the commander there was a buddy of his. He assured me that his buddy would see to it that

I was killed."

The Colonel obviously did not get his wish.

Shelton applied for a transfer as soon as he arrived at Camp Maxie. The orders came through before he could be shipped with the ordnance unit into combat. He served out the next three years of the war in the rear, with the 3755th Quartermaster in Hollandia, New Guinea.^

Colonel Jack Little would have disagreed with any assertions of the powerlessness of black soldiers. They effectively destroyed his career. In response to a letter received from black enlisted men at Ft. Clark, Texas, the Inspector General's office sent a team, headed by Benjamin Davis, Sr., to investigate the base 22 July 1943. Colonel Little had become very angry at 304 his unit, the 9th Cavalry, because it failed an outside inspection. He went to the barracks of Troop E shortly

after the inspector's departure and found that the barracks was untidy. He began to berate the soldiers for causing him to fail the inspection. He began to pull the covers from over the bunks, and found that one

soldier had hidden books and black newspapers under his bunk. The Colonel became even more angry. The soldiers

claimed that he stated that "such newspapers are filled with propaganda and pictures of nigger whores." Colonel Little admitted that the terms he used were racially

insulting but he denied saying the ones attributed to him. He told the Inspector General that his exact words were "I would not be surprised to find a Negro whore in these beds." Whatever words he used. General Davis' report concluded that they were "offensive, unbecoming, and caused a great deal of stir on the part of the enlisted men." He felt that as a result of the racial slur, the Colonel's usefulness with the Division "has been greatly impaired." He recommended that he be relieved of command. Another member of the team, Lt. Col. Lamar Tooze of the Third Army, thought that General Davis' recommendation was unduly harsh. Several black soldiers had testified that the Colonel had not used these terms 305 previously, though he was given to "salty" language. He had also had a good record with black soldiers prior to the incident. Tooze recommended that an official reprimand be placed in Colonel Little's file. Little was a career officer and advancement was of paramount importance to a career man. There was no need to relieve Colonel Little of his command, Tooze argued because, with an official reprimand in his file. Colonel Little would never get a promotion. His military career was officially over.

Commanding officers in fact sometimes perceived black soldiers as having "all the power," rather than being the "hapless victims." Major James Smith, a white

Texan who commanded, apparently reluctantly, the 6401st

Vehicle Motor Vehicle Company at Oran, (North Africa) the 228th Ordnance Evacuation Company at Naples, and two ammunition companies at Naples, held this view. He experienced considerable difficulties getting his units to work. He said they "were constant troublemakers overseas," that Negroes were not afraid of court-martials or prison sentences, and know that because of policies dictated from the top in the Army, the Negro will not receive the full punishment that he deserves,

Other white officers voiced similar complaints. 306 Lieutenants Alan F. Wagner, George C. Rea and Bryson S. Caskey had worked with several Quartermaster trucking companies in Europe. They reported that "the men were

largely not amenable to discipline," which was manifested in for instance, a tendency to leave camp

"in improper uniform and without passes." The efforts

of white officers "to correct the situation were

fruitless" and compounded the other problems in the unit. They contended that

the enlisted men were aware of the scrupulous desire of the Army to avoid any semblance of prejudice, and exploited this cautious attitude for their own benefit, for disciplinary action almost invariably drew the cry of racial discrimination....The well intentioned desire on the part of all authorities to avoid any appearance of discrimination contributed greatly to the laxness of discipline...This caution resulted in a failure to uphold some court martial charges and in lack of firm support for junior officers in the enforcement of discipline.*®

Lt. Roland J. Schwartz, who had returned from an inspection tour in the Pacific, brought a similar story. He reported that he had heard from a Captain Kessler (an officer with one of the black units he inspected) that a soldier had spoken insubordinately to an officer and the officer hit him with the butt of a gun. Other Negro soldiers complained to the Inspector General and the officer was relieved. The officer went to see the soldier in the hospital and the soldier rose to welcome him. The officer asked him if he had learned his lesson and he 307 replied that he certainly had. The Captain gave Schwartz the impression that if the I6D would not always support Negro complaints discipline would be better. Negro soldiers know they can contravene almost any discipline through the Inspector General.^’

The records reveal, in other ways, that sometimes black soldiers were directly responsible for the

softening of segregation which was evident by the end

of the war. Black servicemen hated the racial signs,

for example. When Contractors erecting the new training auditorium at Aberdeen Proving Ground (Maryland), in

June of 1944 put up signs designating "white" and "colored" entrances to the latrines, a group of black soldiers stationed at the base protested. Military

officials had the signs removed.^® In response to the letter sent to the Inspector General by Lt. Coleman

Young and the officers at Midland Field, authorities at Midland were forced to "rectify discrimination." They reported that colored personnel were being offered the same privileges as white personnel, i.e. membership in the officers club, non-discrimination seating at the War Department theater, usage of the post swimming pool, usage of the white service club, and entry to the Post theater restaurant.®* Major Richard Jennings, then a second Lieutenant with the Tuskegee group stationed at Midland Field, verified the incident. He recalled, however, that the letter was 308 written by him, Cyril Burke, and Willard Savoy (the soldier mentioned previously who persistently wrote

letters to the Undersecretary of War). All the officers signed it, however, including Coleman Young, as

military intelligence reported. The military

intelligence officer came around, in fact, trying to get them to say that Coleman Young had written it and

that there was some kind of "conspiracy" led by Young. Jennings and the others thought the suggestion

ridiculous. At any rate, they sent one copy to the base commander, as regulations required, but also took

another copy off base and mailed it directly to

Washington. A week later, "an officer from Washington

arrived and turned the base upside down. The base

commander was transferred and we were informed that henceforth all facilities would be open to us." Though base officials did not indicate it, Jennings is correct

in his assertion that the change in policies was a consequence of the Inspector General's visit. To argue that their protests were ineffectual because segregation remained intact may also perhaps overestimate the importance of desegregation to many soldiers. Some did not seem to protest racial segregation, as long as it worked, to paraphrase Eric Hobsbawm, "to their minimum disadvantage. It must 309 be remembered, in fact, that a sizeable minority of blacks surveyed by the Research Branch thought, for a

variety of reasons, that "separate" facilities was "a good idea." Forty percent (40) of those surveyed in

March of 1943 thought "separate" Post Exchanges (PX) "a

good idea," and forty-seven percent(47) agreed that it

was "a good idea" to have "separate" service clubs Lt. Clyde Blue's experience reinforces this point.

He served with the 518th Quartermaster at Camp Van

Dorn, Mississippi, and had "hardly passed through the gates when we learned that there was a black PX and a

white PX, the latter being out of bounds to us." The same applied to the entertainment. "We objected but on the whole our guys were regular fellows, they weren't 'causophiles.'They ran their mouths and let off a lot of steam but that was about far as it went. As I said, the men talked a lot but which is usually par for the course (sic) in the Army,

It was not just that they did not care. They also had to be concerned about the consequences of protest. His experience also serves to highlight the point that the protest within the military was carried out in what

Scott terms "an atmosphere of routine repression.

In fact, his unit did protest, at first, but ...our white officers weren't receptive to our ideas...The Inspector General was sent to Camp Van Dorn. He is supposed to learn what was wrong and correct it. Our hopes soared 310 with his visit and when we had our chance to have our say we told all. He was most understanding and sympathetic...We were naive, that sucker had hardly cleared the gates when reprisals began to fall on those who had told it just like it was...^^

There were many avenues available to commanding

officers to silence protests. Troublesome individuals simply disappeared from a unit. It was also common practice to ship troublesome units overseas, prepared

or otherwise. This explains why so many black units went overseas insufficiently trained.^® The Articles of War covered every conceivable offense. The 96th Article of War, covered any behavior that could not be

subsumed under the others. It punished any behavior which was "prejudicial to the good order of the

Army."^’ That particular article was used repeatedly to punish protestors. In extreme cases, protest against racial segregation could also be fatal. A white officer, Lt.

Kenneth G. Allen, reported to military Intelligence official at the New Orleans Port of Entry that he was

"present at a dance for WAC's and white soldiers" while on an inspection tour of the Pacific in 1945. "A Negro soldiers tried to force his way into the dance," he told them, "and an Air Force officer shot him dead."

The Lieutenant acknowledged that he "did not see the 311 actual shooting" but he "heard the shot and viewed the body at once. The man had been shot through the

heart."^®Thus the soldier who wanted to protest discrimination had to be mindful of the consequences. Given the conditions under which they were carried out,

the extent of protest within the military was indeed remarkable.

As indicated earlier, it seems that most were willing to come to terms with segregation, as long as

it was not disadvantageous to them. An incident from actor Sidney Poitier's World War II experience supports

this conclusion. Poitier lied to get into the Army at age 15 because he was cold and hungry, and living temporarily in an orphanage in New York City. He thought the Army would feed him, and also send him someplace warm. They fed him, but instead of sending him to a warmer climate, they sent him to Camp Upton, on Long Island. He worked in a veteran's hospital for the duration of his stay. As many black soldiers pointed out, racial prejudice in the North was not much different, as Poitier's experience reveals. On weekends, he said, they used to pile into their trucks and head for Oyster Bay or Huntington, each of which had a sizeable black community and a couple of bars.

Military police accompanied them everywhere to make 312 sure they behaved. On one particular evening, while patrolling the town of Oyster Bay, e of the MB's said to the other, "hey, let's get a beer and sandwich." The

MP behind the wheel nodded in agreement and they maneuvered their truck into the parking lot of a roadhouse restaurant located in the white section. "The place was jammed and they noticed no blacks but they walked up to a lady bartender and asked if it was possible for them to have a couple of sandwiches and two beers to take out." The MP "weren't looking for trouble," he contends. They emphasized that they

"intended to take the sandwiches outside to eat." The

"lady bartender" stared them directly in the face and said, "We don't serve niggers in here." Neither MP reacted outwardly. They continued to smile but

"internally they felt a holocaust coming and tried to abort it." One of the MP's, smiling even more broadly, said, "Well miss, all we want are two sandwiches and two beers and we're going to take them out to eat in the truck." She repeated her original response, this time "with pronounced emphasis, "We don't seirve niggers in here." The MP's said, "well, may we speak to the manager?" She left and returned with the manager. The

MP said to him, "Good evening, sir, we just asked for a beer and a sandwich and the lady said that she's not 313 going to serve us." The manager confirmed the policy. "That's right," he stated, we don't serve niggers in

here." The MP said simply, "okay, thank you," and left the diner, "followed by a trail of derogatory remarks,

catcalls and laughter from the patrons at the restaurant."

The MP's got back into the trucks and returned to where they had left Poitier and the rest of the unit and related what had transpired. They called a meeting outside and one of the men said, "well, I think we

should all go over and order fifty sandwiches and fifty beers." The suggestion met with unanimous agreement. About sixty of them, Poitier thinks, "piled into the trucks and drove across town and backed them up to the entrance." They walked up to the bar with the MP's in the lead. The manager and the lady bartender recognized them "and one of them said, 'what do you want?'" The MP said, "All of us would like sandwiches and beers." The manager said "I thought I told you we don't serve niggers in here," and that "was all he got out before one of the MP smashed his fist into his nose." After that, "all hell broke loose." The female bartender screamed and ran toward the back of the room.

"She climbed up to the window to jump out and one of the men helped her out: by giving her a kick with his 314 army boot." They then proceeded "to tear the place." They broke "near every damn bottle in the place," he

said. Moreover, "white people were flying out the window, through the doors, wherever there was the slightest chance of escape." It only took a few

minutes, as he recalled, but they completely destroyed

the diner, and then "got back into the trucks, drove back to the base, and went to sleep."

The next morning, the bugle sounded promptly at 5:30 and "the captain was out on the parade grounds,

'madder than a hatter.' He was screaming, everybody

out--everybody!" The one hundred and fifty men in his unit "crawled out," those who had been involved in the incident and those who had not. He informed them there

"had been a disturbance on Oyster Bay and it was his understanding that at least half of them were involved." In order not to punish those who were not,

"he asked those who were involved to take a step forward. All 150 stepped forward." He said, "it's going

to be like that, eh; well, everyone is restricted to base. There will be no leaves whatsoever for six months." One of the black servicemen in Poitier's unit was a lawyer, however, and he pointed out to the

Captain that this was illegal under Army regulations. The captain acknowledged that he was aware that it was. 315 He replied, "I know that I can only put you on for one month, but I can put you on for a month, and take you off then put you on for another month, and take you off

and put you on and take you off...until somebody tells me what happened last night." In the meantime, Army

investigators were coming to the base to "get to the bottom of this." The investigators came and nobody talked. They were put on restrictions and the captain finally let them "off the hook" after three months.

The first weekend following the lifting of the restrictions, "it occurred to one of the guys that we never did get our sandwiches" and another suggested that they "maybe we should go back and see if our order is ready." The same group "piled into the trucks" and went back to Oyster Bay and headed for the roadhouse.

"It had been refurbished, and it was very crowded. They backed the trucks in, as they had done before, got out and walked up the manager (the female bartender was not there). The MP spoke for the group, as he had done before. He said. Good evening, sir, we would like to have sixty sandwiches and sixty beers. The manager responded, 'it will take a little while because it's busy back there, but we'll see what we can do.' It took about twenty-five minutes but we had sixty sandwiches and sixty beers. We did not press the issue....We didn't ask to be seated or anything. We just took our beers and said it was okay to wrap 316 the sandwiches to go. Everything was neatly packed in a box and courteously delivered. We thanked the manager for his troubles, we paid him, and left.

What was noteworthy about the entire story was

Poitier's repeated assurance that they had "never asked to be seated." They did not go to the restaurant to challenge racial segregation at the beginning. Two

hungry MP's simply wanted two beers and two sandwiches. The records reveal a similar kind of cautious

protest, even on military installations, where soldiers

sought to make change in a specific situation, rather than a change in the entire structure. On many occasions, they only asked only for facilities,

privileges, or services equal to that given to white

soldiers. Authorities at Muroc Air Field in California,

for example, reported that their "Negro Troops [had] protested because no provision had been made for the use of the enlisted men's swimming pool by the Negro personnel." In response to their protests, a "schedule was adopted to permit the Negroes to use the pool."

They noted "an improvement in the general racial climate as a result of the change." ^“Similarly, three black officers at Boca Raton Air Force base complained to the Inspector General that they were discriminated against in the hospital mess because the "the table set 317 aside for colored personnel was at the back of the room and was never serviced with sugar, coffee and

condiments as were the tables reserved for white personnel." They had no further complaints after the

table was moved to a "more desirable" location and serviced in the same manner as the others.

The finding that some black soldiers protested racial segregation while some did not is consistent with the findings of civilian researchers, such as

Charles Johnson and John Dollard. Bollard, it must be remembered, found that "lower caste Negro [in the urban south] did not look upon the 'Jim Crow' car as a humiliation," that protest against segregated transportation came more often from "mulattoes. In the military, almost all blacks seem to have objected to racial discrimination but not all protested racial segregation.

As the foregoing discussion demonstrated, black soldiers persisted in their protests precisely because protest worked. Like black civilians, blacks within the military were conscious of their ability to affect change and were, like civilians, feeling a sense of their political power. They knew that they could affect military policies by writing letters to the black newspapers, the NAACP, to the Inspector General, to the 318 Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, to President Roosevelt, and even more important, to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. On other occasions, they used options

available to them within the military itself, as Soulds

and Shelton did when they wanted to get rid of their commanding officers. On most occasions, the protests

were directed toward achieving a specific goal, rather than a change in the entire social structure of the military. They were quite successful in this regard.

Though segregation was intact at the end of the war, it

had indeed softened, as Bernard Nalty contends. Though it still existed, the soldiers' protests sought to ensure that it was working "to their minimum disadvantage." 319 ENDNOTES

1. Samuel Reed to Roy Wilkins, December 10, 1942, in RG 107, Box 185, National Archives. 2. Bernard Nalty, Strength For the Eight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 156.

3. Dalfiume emphasized the role of pressure from outside organizations in the desegregation of the military. See Richard Dalfiume. Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts. 1939-1953 (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1969), especially Chapters, 2, 3, and 5. MacGregor, offers a counter-argument, namely, that the decision was based on considerations of military efficiency. Morris J. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces. 1940-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, U.S. Army, 1981), Introduction, passim.

4. E.J. Hobsbawm,"Peasants and Politics," Journal of Peasant Studies. Vol 1, No. 1 (1973): 13. 5. Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary," in Robert Weller and Scott Guggenheim, Power and Protest in the Countryside : Studies of Rural Unrest in Asia, Europe, and Latin America (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1982), 157.

6. Eric Langer, Economic Change and Rural Resistance in Southern Bolivia. 1880-1930(Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1989), 191.

7. The extent to which soldiers, black and white, helped to shape military policies requires further research. Though they had been physically removed from the civilian world, most soldiers mentally "never joined the Army," Lee Kennett found. They often forced the Army to adjust to them rather than the other way around. See Lee Kennett, G.I.: The American Soldier in World II (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1987), Chapter 3, "The View From the Barracks." 8. Statement is a paraphrase of the one made by Pvt. Elwood Smith to the NAACP, letter dated 10 September, 1944, 335th Base unit, Squadron C, Dale Mabry Field, in RG 107, National Archives. 320

9. Letter from "Iva (Bluford)," Battery D, Camp Davis, North Carolina to Mrs. Mazy Bluford, Jersey City, New Jersey, in RG 107, Box 185, "Camp Davis," the National Archives, Washington.

10. Interview with Major Richard Jennings, in Mary Penick Motley, The Invisible Soldier; The Experience of the Black Soldier. World War II (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), 69.

11. March 1, 1943, Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-I, Subject: "Afro-American Company," and Memorandum, December 3, 1942, To Commanding General, Third Service Command, Baltimore, Md., Subject: "Untruthful and Subversive Publications," in RG 407, Box 148, National Archives.

12.Weekly Intelligence Summary, Ninth Service Command, 27 January, 1945, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives.

13. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Third Service Command, 27 October to 3 November, 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives.

14. Weekly Intelligence Summary, 4th Service Command, 5 May to 12 May, 1945, Box 263, RG 107, National Archives.

15. Percentages computed from Survey #AMS032N, "The American Soldier in World War II: Attitudes of Negroes, RG 330 (Records of the Research Branch/Information and Education Branch), National Archives. 16. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, 6-13 January, 1945, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives.

17. Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, 24 February to 3 March 1945, in Box 263, RG 107, National Archives. 18. Memorandum 15 December 1944, Army Service Forces, Portland Sub-Port of Embarkation, Portland, Oregon. Subject: "Racial Incident, Vancouver Barracks, Washington, 13 December 1944, in RG 107, Box 262, 321 National Archives.

19. Headquarters, Third Service Command, Intelligence Summary, 20-27 October 1944, and 27 October to 3 November 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives.

20. Soulds stated that he heard that the 364th Infantry had rioted against white officers and so they put out the call for black officers. The rumor was correct. The 364th had rioted at Camp Stewart, Georgia in 1943. See Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Nearo Troops. United States Army in World War II, Special Studies (Washington, B.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), 349. They began to train more black officers, and Soulds was one of them.

21. Edward H. Soulds, Black Shavetail in Whitey's Army (New York: Carlton Press, 1971), 37-38.

22. Black officers had to pay dues to support the officers' club, he claims. At Camp Stewart, the black officers had "separate and unequal facilities." Shelton and the other black officers never saw the inside of the white officers' club.

23. See interview with Major Purnell Shelton, in Motley, Invisible Soldier. 57-59.

24. War Department, Washington, B.C., Memorandum 3 August 1943, Subject: "Special Inspection of Colored Troops at Ft. Clark, Texas," in National Archives, RG 107, Box 205, Camp Folder, Ft. Clark, Texas. Roger Walden, a black career officer who served in World War II and in Korea with the 24th Infantry, was interviewed by Motley for the Invisible Soldier, and he described the circumstances which caused him to resign from the Army. It began when his brother-in-law was under pressure to resign from the Air Force because his father was "thought to be, or might be a Communist." His brother-in-law refused to resign and fought it, and eventually the Army apologized, though his career reached a dead end from that point. His sister, who was Walden's wife, was vaguely mentioned in the reports on her brother. On the basis of this vague reference to his wife, they tagged Walden a "security risk" and his military career was also basically dead. The "security risk" followed him for the remainder of his career. He explained that "I was promoted in such a manner that I 322 could never become a full Colonel, and when you can't move up, you move out." See Motley, Invisible Soldier. 65-67.

25. Army Service Forces, Office of the Commanding General, Technical Intelligence Report, Washington, from Third Service Command, 14 May 1945, Subject : "Unsatisfactory Performance of Negro Troops," in Box 263, RG 107, National Archives.

26. Army Service Forces, Technical Intelligence Report, Subject: Negro Troops, Report No. 922, 20 July 1945, Theatre of Operation: European. Source: Alan F. Wagner, 1st. Lt. QMC, Motor Transport Officer; and George C. Rea, 1st Lt., QMC, Assistant Motor Transport Officer, both of the 2048th Quartermaster Trucking Co., and Bryon W. Casney, 1st Lt., Motor Transport Officer, 2049 Quartermaster Truck Co., recently returned from the ETO,(European Theater of Operation), interviewed at BNPE (Boston Port of Embarkation), in Box 265, RG 107, National Archives. 27. Army Service Forces, Technical Intelligence Report, From: Intelligence and Security Division, New Orleans POE, Source: Lt. Roland J. Schwartz, Subject: "Negro Troops," Theater: Pacific, in Box 265, RG 107, National Archives.

28. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Third Service Command, 29 June 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives.

29. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Eighth Service Command, Dallas, 21 to 28 October, 1944, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives. See also Interview with Richard Jennings in Motley, The Invisible Soldier 71.

30. Interview with Major Richard Jennings, in Motley, The Invisible Soldier. 70-71. The records support Jennings' assertion that the decision to open facilities to them was a consequence of the Inspector General's visit. The initial report which described the mailing of the letter to Washington was in the Intelligence Summary dated October 7-14, with a follow- up memorandum on October 19. The report of the decision to "rectify discrimination" was made in the Intelligence Summary of October 21-28. 323 31. James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), xv, and E. J. Hobsbawn, "Peasants and Politics," Journal of Peasant Studies Vol. 1, No. 1 (1973), 13. Scott borrows the phrase from Hobsbawm who argues that, "most subordinate classes after all are less interested in changing the larger structure of the state and the law than 'working the system to their minimum disadvantage.'"

32. Stouffer, et. al.. The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life. 568. Percentages do not add up to 100 because in each category, the remaining participants indicated that they were "undecided," meaning sometimes they did not care or it did not or "should not" matter. The results of these surveys were discussed in Chapter 2.

33. Interview with Lieutenant Clyde Blue, in Motley, The Invisible Soldier. 125-6.

34. Scott, Weapons of the Weak. 246.

35. Interview with Lieutenant Clyde Blue, in Motley, The Invisible Soldier. 125-6.

36. Colonel Donovan Queen, an Army regular, pointed this out in his interview with Motley, The Invisible Soldier. 39. Also note that this was the fate that Colonel H., had planned for Purnell Shelton.

37. Army Service Forces, "Educational Program for Colored Troops," in "Camp Stewart," RG 107, Box 185, National Archives.

38. Army Service Forces, Technical Intelligence Report, 28 April 1945, From: Intelligence and Security Division, New Orleans P.G.E., in Box 265, RG 107, National Archives.

39. Sidney Poitier, This Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 68-71.

40. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Headquarters, Ninth Service Command, Ft. Douglas, Utah, 31 June to 7 July 1945, in Box 263, RG 107. 324 41. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Fourth Service Command, Atlanta, 27 January to 3 February 1945, in Box 262, RG 107, National Archives. 42. John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1937), 256. CONCLUSION

The foregoing study demonstrated how black soldiers responded to segregation and discrimination during World War II. It disputes the complacent and compliant image normally associated with black soldiers. It finds that protest, rather than passivity, was the most typical response to the segregation and discrimination and that protest took a wide variety of forms. It found, furthermore, that the protest often had an impact on military policies, and that part of the credit for the eventual demise of racial segregation in the military has to be given to the soldiers who helped to destroy it from within. To explain why black soldiers were inclined toward protest, the study began by exploring the pre-service environment out of which black soldiers emerge and by placing them in the context of the times in which they lived. It found that on the eve of World War II, members of the black community. North and South, were discontented and angry. They were angry about persistent discrimination in employment, about discrimination in the armed forces, about lynching,

325 326 about segregation, and the myriad injustices to which black Americans were subject simply because they were black.

Black Americans were angriest about the denial of economic opportunity. When the nation began to mobilize

for war, blacks were still disproportionately represented among the unemployed. They had been the

first fired during the Great Depression, but they were

the last to be rehired. Unlike the situation that existed at the beginning of World War I, there was also a large pool of white workers available. As long as

there were white workers available, employers preferred them to blacks. The anger they felt about the other injustices in society was compounded by their almost

total exclusion from the war industries.

In addition to the discrimination faced in civilian life, blacks who attempted to volunteer for

the armed forces at the beginning of the war found that they faced both discrimination and exclusion. The

Marines and the Air Force excluded them, while the Navy would enlist them only as messmen or servants for officers. They could enlist in the Army, but only if

there were spaces in the four segregated units that Congress had set aside for blacks. Most blacks looked at discrimination and exclusion from the military not 327 just as denials of citizenship rights, but as a denial of economic opportunity.

On the eve of World War II, then, members of the black community were angry, perhaps angrier, at what the Pittsburgh Courier termed, "the War Against

Negroes." The discontent, all researchers agreed, was no longer limited to the small, educated elite, but increasingly reflected the mood of the entire population. Many blacks were in no mood to be asked to save the world for democracy. They were more concerned with the lack of it at home.

Besides, the memories of World War I were still alive when World War II began. In World War I, blacks had done as their leaders had urged and "closed ranks" with the white majority to "make the world safe for democracy." Instead of sharing in the benefits of democracy, however, blacks were the objects of discrimination in the military as well as in civilian life. When World War I ended they found, in fact, there was actually less democracy at home than there had been at the beginning of war.

Leaders in the black community decided that they would not be so naive again. This time black Americans would fight for democracy at home at the same time that they fought for democracy abroad. The popular symbol 328 for the war was a "V," to symbolize victory over the forces of totalitarianism abroad. The Pittsburgh Courier adopted the symbol of the 'Double V, ' to

symbolize victory over the enemy at home as well as

abroad. The 'Double V' campaign received wide popular support. It was agreed that the wartime emergency

should be used to make positive racial gain, that the protests would continue throughout the war. The popular mood was symbolized by the Crisis editorial of January, 1942, which declared, "Now Is Not The Time To Be

Silent." It is out of this environment that blacks were drafted and it is these attitudes that they bring to bear on the military experience.

As soon as researchers within the military examined the statistics on black draftees, they came to the same conclusion that civilian researchers had: that the black soldier was "different" from what his father had been only a generation ago. Their educational levels, though still far below those of white draftees, had improved remarkably in comparison to their predecessors in World War I. In addition, the decade between the wars had witnessed an enormous expansion of newspapers and radios, even in the South. These developments helped to produce what everyone termed the "New Negro." It is the "New Negro," all researchers 329 agreed, who went into the military in 1940.

White commanding officers, like their white

civilian counterparts, were prepared to deal only with

the "old Negro," prepared to handle only the stereotype of the contented "darkie." This was the stereotype they had acquired of black soldiers in World War I, and

this was the stereotype they persisted in seeing,

despite evidence to the contrary, in World War II.

They persisted in believing that black soldiers,

especially southern blacks, were contented with their status within the military, just as they had been contented with their status in civilian life. Protest was accordingly written off as "ignorance" or "lack of discipline."

It was neither, in many instances. As Stouffer and his colleagues at the Research Branch found, because whites were satisfied with the racial status quo, they assumed that blacks were satisfied as well. The

surveys conducted by military researchers on the attitudes of white soldiers mirrored the results of surveys conducted on white civilians. The overwhelming majority, in both civilian and military surveys, believed that most blacks were satisfied with their status. This was indeed not the case. The situation was not helped, as the study revealed, by the tendency 330 of blacks to hide their true feelings from white people.

The vast majority of black soldiers, the researchers found, were dissatisfied both with their status in civilian society and with their status within

the military. Their attitudes, in fact, mirrored those

of civilians. Support for the 'Double V' campaign was widespread among the soldiers. Surviving evidence

suggests that they agreed with their civilian

counterparts, that "Now is Not the Time to Be Silent," that the wartime emergency should be used to make positive racial gain.

Most black soldiers, in fact, began to protest as

soon after they discovered that they really did have to transfer to the "cattle car" on the way to their bases in the South. Most black soldiers, including northerners, served in the South because that is where most of the bases were located. Northern black soldiers, accustomed to the more subtle form of segregation under which they lived in the North, were especially unprepared for the blatant form that existed in the South. Even the southern black soldier, once he was in the Army, resented the enforcement of segregation laws and other forms of discrimination. It did not take them very long to get over the humiliation 331 and to begin to fight back.

A persistent theme in the recollections of black veterans is that, rather than being the passive victims of racist policies and practices, they fought back in a wide variety of ways. Military records support their claim. The records reveal that the protest against racial discrimination by black soldiers was widespread and persistent throughout the war. The protest took a variety of forms, however, ranging from passive resistance to outright defiance. It is for this reason that the protest cannot be defined as a movement in common sense definition of the term. The "movement" within the military was largely unorganized, it had no recognized leader, no headquarters, and strategy, and no manifesto. Yet everyone agreed that the "agitation for racial rights" was persistent, and sometimes resembled the movement outside the military.

Sometimes the struggle took forms that were non- confrontational. Black painted over the Jim Crow signs, surreptitiously removed the racial screens, and wrote anonymous letters and smuggled them out of camp. Other forms of passive protest, which were documented by military officials included desertion, not "giving their all" to the war effort and avoiding combat duty. The findings of this study are, in fact, at variance 332 with the mythology of the black soldier. The surveys revealed that black soldiers were actually reluctant to go overseas and into combat and that the reluctance was

a consequence of their opposition to military racial policies. The surveys revealed, further, that those who were the most eager to fight the war for "democracy" abroad were those who were the most convinced that the war would result in more "democracy" at home. Like their civilian counterparts, they were willing to fight the war, as long as they were convinced that it would benefit the race.

Open protest, however, appears to have accelerated as the war progressed. The black population was beginning to feel a sense of political power in the decade just prior to the beginning of the war. It was also beginning to gain a legal right to racial equality, as the successes of the NAACP's legal campaign demonstrated. They no longer had to beg for their rights, in some instances, but were rather entitled to them by law. This thinking governed their response to racial policies within the military. Some soldiers felt that they no longer had to beg for their "rights" or fight for them surreptitiously. They became increasingly more assertive as the war progressed. 333 Moreover, as the war progressed, black soldiers had military policies on their side in the struggle for

racial equality. The armed forces had always claimed that they did not discriminate. Black soldiers repeatedly challenged the military to live up to this assertion. A weary military, besieged by critics from within and without, found it extremely difficult to prove that "separate" was indeed "equal," or even to make it so. Even before the war ended, the Army had prohibited the discrimination in and segregation of facilities by race on all military installations.

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Interviews :

Ossie Davis, National Public Radio, May 24th 1993.

Robert Decater, WPCN Radio, Cleveland, Ohio February 10, 1993.