A Conversation Lvith Daniel C. Dennett

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A Conversation Lvith Daniel C. Dennett In the following pages we return to a topic first addressed in FREE INQUIRY in its Fall 1994 issue ("New Conceptions of the Mind "). Some of the foremost researchers in the field discuss what is known about the nature of consciousness and the direction further examinations should take.-EDS. F1 Interview A Conversation lvith Daniel C. Dennett Daniel C. Dennett is Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, and author of such highly praised books as Consciousness Explained, Elbow Room, and Brainstorms. His latese book is Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (Simon & S<;huster, 1995). The following interview was conducted by FREE INQUIRY editors Tom Flynn and Tim Madigan.-EDS. REE INQUIRY: Synthesizing the subsection of the brain. It is, if you like, an Fwork of many thinkers, yourself artifact of the organization of the brain. included, Adam Carley wrote a recent Tne unity is imperfect and changing and article in FREE INQUIRY (Fall 1994) in problematic, and it is something that is which he described "consciousness" as an achieved-it's not something one is born illusion arising from the operation of with. The idea that one has, for instance, short-term memory. In his view, con­ an immortal soul, which is the locus of sciousness is an evolutionarily useful fic­ responsibility-we replace that idea with tion that enables the intelligent brain to one of a developing, virtuai center of con- reflect on its own decision-making trol, what I call "the center of narrative OJ c C processes and learn from its experiences <D gravity." Once it develops, and once it is more effectively, but it is altogether fic­ C trained by enculturation and learning, then tional in any naive sense of reality. What the body that is thus organized has a self, do you think of that model, and how ~ is a person, and is a locus or responsibility. would you go about testing it? ~ But we are all familiar with the ways in DANiEL DENNETT:. I think that's partly which people move the boundaries of the right, but it's very misleading in some this is provided in limited useful form by self. There is nothing mme familiar than regards. The way I would put it is that the the way the brain is organized. This gives to hear somebody say, after having uttered brain needs what's called a "user illusion" rise to the illusory sense that there is this something terrible, "That wasn't me the same as when we use a word proces­ one place-which I call "the Cartesian speaking, no, no, I discwn the recent sor. You can use a word processor without theater"-where it all comes together: the motion of my own boc;;. The real me knowing what's actually going on inside subject, the ego, the "1." There's no deny­ would never have said anything like thaL" the computer. You need to have some use­ ing that that's the way it seems. But that is FI: "It WlS the booze [lIking." ful metaphors though, and that's the user jllst the way it seems. That is the benign DE~~"ETT: Yes. "The ccvil made me do illusion. But notice, it's a benign and illusion of consciousness. it." Or "That wasn't me, that was just the extremely useful illusion. FI: If we dismantle the Cartesian the­ darn urge that I have somewhere that Well, the brain works similarly-the ater, if we abandon the idea of an "I" who sometimes takes control." This is a very brain of a human being, not of any other makes our decisions, what are the impli­ natural way of talking and there's an ele­ species. It is equipped with a very power­ cations for moral philosophy? Is there any ment of truth in it. That is to say, a person ful user illusion. It sounds like a trick with point in talking about moral responsibility is in fact a rather delicately poised com­ mirrors, I know, but I'm saying that the if the moral agent cannot be conceived as mirrc ::--or not even sor.:,:!thing as well brain is both the user and the provider of a unitary entity? organized as a committee-sort of a the user illusion. There are various agen­ DENNETT: The moral agent can be crowd of sometimes co o ~rating , some­ cies in the brain that require information conceived as a uni tary entity, but not <:i s a times competing agencic_ . and one is just from other agencies within the brain, and sort of organ of the brain, or a particular the sum total of them. A..-:d in fact; when Fall 1995 19 people say, "That wasn't me," we very ogists have been willing to admit, and the DENNETT: British opera, theater, and often disallow that, and say "Now, take residual antagonism to the idea has to be television director and polymath Jonathan responsibility." As I put it in Elbow Room, exposed, analyzed, and finally dismantled. Miller, the Chicago neuropsychologist if you make yourself really small you can I think eventually-I'm not sure how Jerre Levy, and I were invited to a week­ externalize just about everything. long it will take-people will calm down end retreat for ABC television executives. FI: If you do away with the idea of the about this. It's been hundreds of years When we got there we found that our role soul as an immortal entity and a moral since Copernicus and Galileo overthrew was to be the heavies-to debate with agent, what implications does this have the idea that the Earth is the center of the believers in the paranormal and other for religion, in particular for Christianity? universe, and now every school child sorts of West Coast holistier-than-thou Do you see Christianity and other Western learns that without tears or terror. This is mystics. We tore them to shreds. The dis­ religions as being opposed to your ideas, not a deeply troubling idea, it turns out, cussion wasn' t ferocious or embittered­ in the way that many are opposed to the although there was a time when it caused we just made nice mincemeat of them. At theory of evolution? a lot of anxiety. In due course, every child the end of the workshop, Jonathan taught DENNETT: It continues to fascinate me will learn about the four-billion-year his­ me a lesson. He asked the assembled how ambivalent Christians are about the tory of evolution on this planet, and how group of several hundred people-highly relationship between morality and part of from self-replicating macromolecules educated people, movers and shakers in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Nietzsche every living thing on this planet is the very competitive world of televi­ was wonderfully scornful of the vision of descended, without divine intervention at sion-how many of them, before the Christianity that made morality depend any point. But the date when calm accep­ weekend, had thought there was some­ upon pie in the sky; that is, be a good boy tance of the truth is widespread is still a thing to the paranormal. Perhaps 20 to 30 or girl now and in heaven you'll get your ways off. I'm very actively advocating percent put up their hands. "Now, after reward. On the face of it, this is an igno­ that the time has come to say to the cre­ this weekend," he asked, "How many · of ble foundation for morality. It concedes ationists and the "intelligent design" theo­ you think there's something to the para­ the selfishness of the agent. It abandons rists, "Come on, give us a break. This is a normal?" Maybe 50 or 60 percent of the the hope of an agent's conceiving of his or losing battle. You 're only upsetting your hands went up. This was really disturbing her acts as worthy in their own right, inde­ children and prolonging the agony. to me. "Well, Dan," he said, "you've got pendent of any reward. ~e idea that a Eventually, and perhaps quite soon, to understand, the way these people are reward in heaven or a punishment in hell they're going to know that you tried to thinking is, if these three industrial­ is a necessary foundation for morality is a misinform them when they were children, strength academics work this hard to deeply pessimistic, almost nihilistic, idea. and that's a really bad thing. That's an combat it, there must be something to it." And yet, of course, there it is, enshrined in unforgivable sin." That's a depressing lesson. many aspects of the Judeo-Christian and I'm reminded of an occasion in I think that people are almost immune Islamic traditions. I think that most reli­ Sweden, in 1967. On one shocking and to rational persuasion about some of the gious thinkers recognize this, and, if wonderful weekend an amazing thing things that they really want to believe. pressed, would disavow the importance of happened. Drivers were instructed to They are sometimes candid and self­ heaven and hell and even of immortality switch from driving on the left to driving reflective enough to say, "I don't care of the soul as a foundation of ethics. We on the right side of the road. The change . about your arguments, I don't care if the can have ethics; we can have responsibil­ was planned very well. and carried out arguments on my side are invalid or ques­ ity without pie in the sky and ~ithout the with scarcely a hitch.
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