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Who's Who in the Singularity

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Who's Who in the Singularity COMPUTER SCIENTIST and now you can either anticipate in the resolution of all human cannot see into the future to predict prediction that individual human and gaseous states of matter: the world (initially under the direction of science-fi ction writer Vernor or sco at many di erent kinds problems, including illness and anything. “Machine intelligence” brains (and most probably their state becomes funda mentally di erent but humans) design the next generation of Vinge sketched out a seminal of singularities. Perhaps the limited life span. The “event represents the prediction that of consciousness) will be replicable in in ways that may not be immediately machines, eventually supe rintelligent Who’s Who In modern singularity hypothesis most inclusive variant is the one horizon” idea corresponds most computers will achieve human- level computerized form, leading to (among perceptible to individuals immersed levels will be reached. The e ect is 15 years ago in his essay “The we label “technotopia,” the closely to Vinge’s original: a con- intelligence and either consciousness other things) virtual immortality. Kevin in it at the time. The “intelligence similar to the accelerating rate of Coming Technological Singularity.” scenario in which computers fl uence of technological changes, or something indistinguishable from it. Kelly’s “phase change” hypothesis explosion” hypothesis, initially technological change anticipated by The Singularity Since then lots of other people reach and exceed human levels of most likely including machine “Uploading,” which is also part of likens the singularity to the changes developed by Turing associate I.J. techno topians, but the path for getting have taken up the cause, so intelligence, essentially resulting intelligence, beyond which we the techno topian vision, refers to the between the solid and liquid or liquid Goode, postulates that as machines there is di erent. —Paul Wallich WHO WHY WE SHOULD KIND OF BASIC ARGUMENT WHAT THEY SAY YOU MIGHT ALSO WHO WHY WE SHOULD KIND OF BASIC ARGUMENT WHAT THEY SAY YOU MIGHT ALSO LISTEN SINGULARITY WANT TO KNOW LISTEN SINGULARITY WANT TO KNOW Created several Technotopia The basic paradigm of Moore’s Law— “ I regard the freeing of the human mind Plans to release a movie Built the first neural Machine Our increasing knowledge of the brain “ I asked the audience how many people Thinks that belief in enormously successful —accelerating exponentially increasing improvement— from its severe physical limitations of later this year based on Marvin network simulator intelligence/ and increasing computing power will wanted to live for 200 years, and no one a singularity could Raymond inventions, including change will not only hold true indefi nitely for logic scope and duration as the necessary his book The Singularity Minsky in 1951. Received the uploading eventually intersect. raised their hand.” inspire people in the Kurzweil ones for pattern, circuits but will also apply to countless next step in evolution.” Is Near. To maximize his Professor of Turing Award in 1969. Currently, however, way that World War II character, and speech other technologies. It will lead to a chances of living until media arts and Developed a theory of the resources being —“It’s 2001: Where Is HAL?” inspired his generation. Entrepreneur, recognition; electronic singularity that will enable us to upload —“The Law of Accelerating his consciousness sciences and of mind involving small devoted to such Information Week podcast, 1 March 2007 inventor, author musical instruments; and our consciousness into machines and, in Returns” (http://www. can be downloaded, electrical subunits of expertise. work are negligible (http://www.informationweek.com; of popular books medical education. e ect, live indefi nitely. This singularity will kurzweilai.net/articles/ he reportedly takes engineering and compared with search on “minsky podcast”) on the singularity occur in about 15 years. art0134.html?printable=1) upward of 200 computer science, MIT the amount of vitamin pills a day. work to be done. Wrote Mind Children and Machine The processes of the brain that give “ The 1500-cubic-centimeter Now works full-time at Has written many Machine Human-level AI may be inevitable, “ The best reason for believing that robots Leading other books on artifi cial intelligence rise to consciousness arise inevitably human brain is about 100 000 times a small machine-vision Daniel books about the nature intelligence but don’t expect it anytime soon. “I might someday become conscious is member Hans intelligence and robotics. and uniquely from chains of physical as large as the retina, suggesting that start-up. Dennett of consciousness and don’t deny the possibility a priori; I just that we human beings are conscious, of the Moravec events and in accordance with matching overall human behavior Codirector of intelligence, including think it is vanishingly unlikely in the and we are a sort of robot ourselves.” Brights, Adjunct physical principles. They are therefore will take about 100 million MIPS of the Center Brainstorms: Philosophical foreseeable future.” (From Dennett’s book Cognition, a group professor, reproducible with a sufficiently computer power.” for Cognitive Essays on Mind and Computation, and Consciousness, 1994) dedicated to promoting Studies and Psychology (1978), The “the civic understanding Carnegie- powerful computer. —“When Will Computer Hardware professor of Intentional Stance (1989), and acknowledgment Mellon Robotics Match the Human Brain?” Journal of philosophy, Consciousness Explained of the naturalistic Institute Evolution and Technology, 1998 (http:// Tufts University (1991), and Brainchildren— worldview, which is free www.jetpress.org/volume1/moravec.htm) Essays on Designing Minds of supernatural and Cofounded World Technotopia Assuming that we don’t render ourselves “ I would…assign less than a 50% Had a short career as (1998). mystical elements.” Transhumanist extinct, technological progress should probability to superintelligence being a stand-up comic. Has built many robots Technotopia Any extrapolation of technological trends, “ I am a machine. Was featured in the Nick Association; writes lead to superintelligence and indefi nitely developed by 2033.” that emulate the behavior particularly exponential ones, decades So are you.” 1997 movie Fast, Cheap, Bostrom extensively on machine extended life spans; once the singularity Rodney of simple animals. One into the future isn’t likely to be accurate. (p. 71 in this issue) and Out of Control. intelligence, life extension, comes near, we will all be kicking ourselves —“How Long Before Superintelligence?” crucial aspect of his Director, Future of Brooks and philosophical for not having brought it about sooner. (http://www.nickbostrom.com/ work is demonstrating Humanity Institute, issues surrounding the superintelligence.html) Professor of how little cognition, Oxford University singularity. robotics, MIT understanding, or memory is required for apparently Wrote the critically Event horizon— In a seminal 1993 essay, he wrote of “ In my 1993 essay, ‘The Coming A chapter of his recent complex behaviors. Vernor acclaimed novels A Fire fundamentally the period following the development Technological Singularity,’ I said I’d novel, Rainbows End, Coined the term virtual Machine There’s no real evidence that computer “ If computers are to become smart Wrote an entertaining Vinge Upon the Deep (Hugo unpredictable of machine intelligence: “From the be surprised if the singularity had not grew out of a story reality; was CEO of VPL intelligence representation of a brain will actually enough to design their own successors, 1995 essay in the Journal Award, 1993) and A human point of view this change will happened by 2030. I’ll stand by that he published in the Jaron Lanier Research, a pioneering produce a mind. Furthermore, true AI initiating a process that will lead to God- of Consciousness Studies Science-fi ction Deepness in the Sky be a throwing away of all the previous claim.” (p. 77 in this issue) July 2004 issue of Interdisciplinary virtual-reality start-up. can’t arise from current patterns of like omniscience after a number of ever titled “You Can’t Argue author; professor (1993); tackled issues rules, perhaps in the blink of an eye, an IEEE Spectrum. scholar-in- software development because those swifter passages from one generation With a Zombie.” It of computer that included human exponential runaway beyond any hope of residence at patterns are fatally flawed. Meanwhile, of computers to the next, someone is zinged Daniel Dennett, science at San confrontation with control. Developments that before were the Center for accelerating technological change going to have to write the software that Daniel Dennett’s critics, Diego State superintelligent thought might only happen in ‘a million Entrepreneurship could still make the world as we know it gets the process going, and humans have Dartmouth students, University for beings. years’ (if ever) will likely happen in the & Technology, nearly unrecognizable. given absolutely no evidence of being and philosopher David 28 years (retired) next century.” University of able to write such software.” Chalmers, among others. California, Sample line: “Arrogance Has developed a theory Intelligence Each generation of intelligent human- “ Deep Blue’s engineers Working on the Berkeley —“One-Half of a Manifesto,” Wired, is always a bad strategy for building “friendly” explosion machine collaborations uses its might say,
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