Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies

Home , Crime in Nigeria, Crime in South Africa, Nigeria Police Force, Philip Heymann, Security police

30 August–1 September 2000 Jan Smuts House, University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg Table of Contents

Introduction 7 Mark Shaw, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), South Africa

Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies – 9 Conference Summary and Overview Mark Shaw, SAIIA, South Africa

Welcoming Remarks 17 Michael Lange, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, South Africa

Politics and Policing in Northern Ireland – The Way Ahead 19 Adam Ingram, Minister of State for Northern Ireland, United Kingdom

South Africa: Crime and Policing in Transition 27 Steve Tshwete, Minister for Safety and Security, South Africa

The Nigerian Experience 29 David Jemibewon, Minister for Police Affairs, Nigeria

AN OVERVIEW OF PROBLEMS AND ISSUES

The New Policing 35 Philip Heymann, Harvard University, United States

Crime, Justice and the Legacy of the Past 61 Adrian Guelke, Queen’s University, Northern Ireland

THE GROWTH, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF CRIME

The Growth, Extent and Causes of Crime: International Crime Overview 69 Anna Alvazzi del Frate, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), Italy

Crime, Violence and Political Uncertainty in Brazil 77 Paulo de Mesquita Neto, University of São Paulo, Brazil

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The Growth, Extent and Causes of Crime: Moçambique 93 Luis Antonio Mondelane, Supreme Court, Moçambique

The Growth, Extent and Causes of Crime: Ukraine 99 Igor Zhdanov, Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, Ukraine

The Growth, Extent and Causes of Crime: Northern Ireland 103 John Brewer, Queen’s University, Northern Ireland

Crime in Russia at the Turn of the 21st Century 111 Vitali Kvashis and Michael Babaev, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Russian Federation

POLICE TRANSFORMATION

Police Transformation: The Palestinian Authority Perspective 117 Assad Mubarak, Ministry of Justice, Palestinian Authority

Police Reform and South Africa’s Transition 119 Janine Rauch, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, South Africa

Police Transformation in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects 127 Innocent Chukwuma, Centre for Law Enforcement Education, Nigeria

Reform of the Police in Ukraine: The Need for Cooperation Between the Police and 135 Public in Tackling Crime Alexey Povolotskiy, University of Internal Affairs, Ukraine

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES AND POLICIES

Crime as a Development Issue 141 Ted Leggett, University of Natal, South Africa

Police Reform and Democratic Consolidation: Chile 151 Hugo Frühling, University of Chile, Chile

Crime and its Discontent: Recent South African Responses and Policies 167 Elrena van der Spuy, University of Cape Town, South Africa

Government Responses and Policies: Poland as an Example 177 Emil Plywaczewski, University of Bialystok, Poland

City Security and Crime in Peru 181 Cesar Benavides, Peruvian Institute of Criminology (Instituto Peruano de Criminalistica Y Pericias), Peru

Government Responses in South Africa: Policy and Implementation 185 Iole Matthews, Independent Projects Trust, South Africa

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THE ROLE AND REACTION OF CITIZENS

Citizens, Crime and Criminal Justice in Central and Eastern Europe 193 Ugljesa Zvekic, United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), Southern Africa

Citizens Perceptions of Crime and Policing in South Africa 197 Antoinette Louw, Institute of Security Studies, South Africa

The Role of “Private Security” in Transitional Democracies 205 Clifford D. Shearing and Michael Kempa, University of Toronto, Canada

“The Politics Fits the Crime”: Competing Interpretations of Victim Empowerment 215 in South Africa Graeme Simpson, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, South Africa

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INITIATIVES

International Strategies for Crime Prevention in Transitional Societies: 229 Problems and Prospects Jeremy Travis, The Urban Institute, United States

International and Regional Initiatives: Providing Appropriate International Assistance 235 Adrian Beck, University of Leicester, United Kingdom

Attempts of Regional Responses to Crime in the Ex-USSR and Eastern Europe 241 Valentin Yakushik, University of Kiev, Ukraine

International and Regional Initiatives: Southern Africa Region 245 Peter Gastrow, Institute of Security Studies, South Africa

Programme 251

Participants’ List 255

Seminar Reports 259

Occasional Paper Series 261

5 Introduction

While South Africa has faced high levels of crime in the first few years of the establishment of democracy, the country is by no means unique. A number of other societies that have also experienced transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule have undergone similar experiences. In almost all cases, such transitions have been accompanied by equally dramatic changes in economic and social circumstances, some of which have resulted in higher levels of crime.

These and related issues were considered at a conference entitled Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies, on which this publication is based. The conference was held at the South African Institute of International Affairs from 30 August to 1 September 2000 and was sponsored by, among others, the Ford Foundation, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the British Council and MTN.

The meeting drew participants from around the world including a number of transitional societies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Nigeria, Moçambique and South Africa. Speakers from Northern Ireland, Palestine and Israel also participated, as did contributors from North America and Europe who are closely involved with funding police transformation and crime-fighting exercises in developing countries.

The issues debated by the conference are of considerable importance in each of the societies represented. While each have very different historical contexts – Latin American countries, for example, experienced a wave of democratisation in the mid-1980s, while in Eastern and Central Europe and in Africa, democratisation occurred later – there are a number of important parallels between them. Most notably – and an issue which was discussed in some detail at the conference – police transformation in each of the societies remains a highly contested and often difficult process. Thus, one of the central questions of the conference was simply: How can old instruments of political oppression be effectively transformed to face new criminal threats?

The conference was characterised by high levels of participation and support from the South African government. The conference banquet was attended by both the Minister for Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete (whose short address is included in the collection), and the Director of Public Prosecutions, Bulelani Ncguka. Both Tshwete and Ncguka in their contributions and in response to questions thereafter outlined many of the challenges that South Africa faces.

The conference itself was designed to ensure maximum debate among the participants. Each contribu- tor was asked to provide a short input along clearly defined guidelines. These papers represent a collection of some of the contributions, where participants agreed to put their ideas into writing. Thus many of the papers represent not only what various participants contributed to the conference, but also some of the debates within individual sessions. The collection is preceded by a summary of the discussions that took place at the conference. This summary provides an overview of all the major themes, debates and some of the conclusions of the conference.

7 Introduction

One important outcome of the conference was agreement that greater cooperation was required between both researchers and practitioners in respect of this topic. In this regard, it is important to note that the holding of the conference was not an end in itself. The event is part of a broader research project that examines the nature and extent of crime and policing problems in countries experiencing transition. It is intended that this research programme will be completed with a detailed publication of the general lessons to be learnt from a range of transitional societies in fighting crime by early 2002.

It is hoped that this publication provides a unique insight into some of the problems as well as success stories of societies that have struggled with violence and crime as they emerge from periods of transition. Its contents emphasise both the degree to which the issue of fighting crime in such societies is of critical importance, and the extent to which the experience of the past decade has ensured the growth of expertise and critical analysis in this area.

Dr Mark Shaw Research Fellow South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)

8 Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies – Conference Summary and Overview

Mark Shaw

BACKGROUND and social transitions in these societies, on the The South African Institute of International one hand, and growing levels of crime as well Affairs (SAIIA) staged a conference on Crime as differing policing responses, on the other, and Policing in Transitional Societies from 30 are little understood. Comparing the links August to 1 September 2000. The event between the transitions and the growth of crime stemmed from the belief that crime and polic- and transformation of the police in these states ing problems in a number of societies that have suggests some important conclusions not only experienced a transition from authoritarian to in respect of the key causal features which gen- democratic rule might hold comparative erate crime in transitional societies but, by lessons. Selected academics, policy analysts implication, also which areas of policy focus and practitioners from transitional societies in may have the greatest impact on reducing Latin America (Brazil, Argentina, Peru and crime. Chile), Africa (South Africa, Nigeria and Moçambique) and Eastern Europe and the for- 1. LINKING TRANSITIONS TO CRIME mer Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine and It has often been said that crime in South Poland) were invited. Africa is related to the transition from authori- Representatives from two other transitional tarian rule to democracy in the country. Similar societies, Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine, patterns appear to apply in other transitional were also present. Additional participants who societies such as those who have moved from have worked in or studied these societies from military to civilian rule in Latin America, the the United Kingdom, United States (US) and former communist regimes of Eastern and Canada as well as the United Nations Office Central Europe, as well as states in Africa, for Drug Control and Crime Prevention most clearly illustrated by Nigeria and (Southern Africa) and the United Nations Moçambique, which have moved from authori- Interregional Crime and Justice Research tarian forms of rule or civil war to fledgling Institute attended. democracies. The following discussion broadly reflects the The rise of crime in periods of political (and debate which took place at the conference. It related economic and social) transition is a does not attempt to be a summary of all the complex phenomenon difficult to analyse. papers presented but instead seeks to give a Statistical data on levels of crime before and flavour of both the issues discussed and some after the transition are difficult to come by, and of the tentative conclusions reached. when available, their accuracy may be open to The overall aim of the conference was to question. In South Africa, for example, there bring together representatives from transitional are no reliable crime statistics for the whole societies to begin a process of comparative country before January 1994. At the same time, analysis which to date has not occurred. The our understanding of crime in authoritarian link between the dramatic political, economic societies is often complicated by the fact that

9 Shaw state repression led to a blurring of the bound- ment, as well as an increase in opportunities, aries of political and criminal activity and that targets and motivation. Thus, dramatic political, the state itself was often a significant source economic and social transitions may be much (although not defined as such at the time) of more disruptive of the internal social organisa- criminal activity. tion, including that of crime prevention and These issues raise important questions about control, of communities than has often been whether or not dramatic transitions lead to the assumed. The conference presentations sug- more visible appearance of older forms of crim- gested that three forms of internal social organ- inal activity in new guises or whether transi- isation may be dramatically altered in a period tions themselves give rise to new forms of of transition: criminal activity. In South Africa, for example, • First, in societies such as in South Africa, the is the increase in crime predominantly the struggle against an authoritarian state pro- result of a displacement of criminal activity duces opposing forms of community cohe- previously contained in townships and which sion and social control, which keeps crimi- has now spread to (white) suburban areas? nality in check. In Northern Ireland, for Have levels of rape, for example, not always example, criminal activities have been been high but now because they are reported restricted given the vulnerability of offenders (and viewed with concern by both government (who are threatened with prosecution if they and citizens) it appears that the transition has do not agree) to being recruited as informers brought with it remarkably high levels of sexu- by the police. al violence? • Second, in communist countries with cen- The answer probably lies somewhere in tralised political structures such as in Eastern between the two positions. Old forms of crimi- and Central Europe and the former Soviet nal activity have undoubtedly been displaced Union the state itself imposed the organisa- (often in new forms) into the new democratic tional network. The collapse of the order, while at the same time they have been communist state led to a breakdown of these joined by growth in the overall level of all structures, fragmenting local forms of social forms of criminality. Of course, this still leaves cohesion without any immediate replace- the question of why a shift from authoritarian ment. rule to democracy should lead to higher levels • Third, in most societies, quite apart from of crime, and if so, how? structures established in a response to, or by, Ironically, and contrary to popular belief, an authoritarian state, some form of commu- increases in crime in transitional societies may nity controls remained. These include struc- be less an issue of declining levels of law tures such as the church, community groups, enforcement and policing than is commonly the extended family and neighbourhood assumed. A comparison of authoritarian groups. A review of societies which have regimes across countries suggests that most cit- undergone dramatic transitions suggests that izens were policed as much for crime control as these structures are weakened and lose their for political control. Yet it is not certain reach into the community. This is a result of whether policing in most post-authoritarian the strength of the two new forms of commu- states has improved in the eyes of the majority nity cohesion outlined above and which are of citizens, and if it has, whether this is not generated by authoritarian states. But it is because the police are more effective in con- also a consequence of the disruptive nature of trolling crime, but because they are now less transitions and the violence that often accom- repressive and thereby less intrusive. panies them, weakening old forms of social organisation which no longer provide an 2. ARE THERE COMMONALITIES? attractive option for increasingly militarised An overview of the growth of crime in a num- and vocal sectors of the society, often the ber of transitional societies suggests a more youth. In addition, traditional forms of social complex reason for the growth in crime: the control are undercut during periods of transi- breakdown of community and related principles tion by the emergence of new social move- of social organisation, including the crime con- ments and non-governmental organisations trol arrangements and reduced risks for punish- (NGOs).

10 Shaw

The breakdown of social and state controls perceived as the most efficient and low risk appears to be the single most common factor avenue to live better now rather than wait for leading to the growth of crime in diverse transi- the uncertain prospects for improvement tional societies. Traditional forms of internal promised by the state. No amount of political social cohesion may be replaced by – or mutate rhetoric about building a new democratic soci- into – a different set of organising principles, ety (except perhaps at the initial stages of col- including criminal organisations or gangs. In lective enthusiasm) matches the economic real- communities feeling threatened by a growing ity of unequal access to the new opportunities group of criminals this may also take the form for wealth. Although these observations are of vigilante groups which come to play an hardly new, they are important in understand- important role in local community cohesion. ing the growth of criminal activity in transition- Changes brought about by the dramatic al societies. impact of the political transition are exacerbated by longer term processes of industrialisation 3. THE OLD REFLECTED IN THE NEW and urbanisation which have themselves had a At the same time as these developments occur, considerable impact on the changing nature of post-authoritarian states are often, as in South community and social controls. In a post- Africa, attempting to secure their hold on the apartheid society, the effects of HIV/AIDS may levers of the security establishment. Here there already be having a considerable impact, both are multiple challenges. The most common on family units and organisation and on cogni- across all societies represented at the confer- tive behaviour. ence is the desire to legitimate the old forces of Post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies order to ensure citizens look to the police for are increasingly subject to structural changes in their safety. What appears clear is that no their economies. While a number of approaches amount of urging by political leaders that the are followed in this regard, transitional soci- police are now legitimate is enough; agencies eties tend to share the experience of changes in of law enforcement have to prove their legiti- the ownership structure (privatisation), the mul- macy through effective operation. There is, as tiplication of economic actors and the influ- yet, the conference concluded, no clear case of ences of globalisation. Many transitional soci- any society in transition being able to build a eties also seek to redefine the role of the state legitimate police agency in the post-conflict by reducing or altering its role in economic phase. The growth of crime itself in transitional activity. In such states, the access to newly-cre- societies has in many cases undercut the growth ated opportunities is not equal for all. This fac- of local forms of policing by ensuring more tor, combined with the requirement for political centralised and militarised responses to disor- legitimacy and the need to attempt to meet pop- der. ular expectations, creates contradictory pres- A key to building the legitimacy of the police sures. In societies such as South Africa, these is to ensure effective forms of local control and pressures are complicated by a political and accountability – in effect, to make citizens economic commitment to improve the lot of believe that the police are responsive to their previously disadvantaged groups. needs, and not those of some bureaucrat in a Such frictions are common to transitional distant capital. Here all transitional societies societies. There appears to be an abundance of have had to balance the requirement of ensur- structural as well as other motivational factors ing local accountability (which remains weak in for the involvement of people in “alternative all cases) with centralised control – the desire opportunities” both in the context of the growth to manage change from the centre to ensure of the informal and the criminal economy. Such both that it occurs uniformly and that local recourse to the illicit is facilitated by the break- groups (who may oppose the central state) do down and loosening of the mechanisms of for- not obtain control of the police in their area. mal and social control, including the dimin- The absence of social and community con- ished risks of punitive and/or resocialising reac- trols and the establishment of a democracy tions. If, over time, poverty and marginalisation bring paradoxical forces into play in most tran- are perceived as a likely reality, the recourse to sitional societies. On one hand, the conditions the illicit is often (particularly for the young) for the growth of crime are enhanced, on the

11 Shaw other, citizens look (as they have never done sures from within the security establishment. In before) to the state for protection. Given the respect of the latter, policing organisations very real constraints on the post-transition state which have undergone dramatic processes of in delivering effective systems of criminal jus- transformation seek security in operations tice (such as low skills levels, lack of represen- which they know and are comfortable with, and tative institutions and poor resourcing) citizens in any event may have been urging as an appro- are likely, over time, to seek alternative forms priate response to crime. The dangers of such of protection. For the poor community this will approaches in post-authoritarian states is that include forms of protection such as vigilante important gains in respect of the protection of groups and for the wealthy (including the busi- human rights may be undercut over time. Such ness sector), the increased privatisation of militarised responses to crime control, while policing and crime prevention. they may often be sold as such, should not be The parallels among transitional societies are seen as the same as problem solving and/or sat- striking. Probably the most effective means of uration policing in more advanced democracies. controlling and preventing crime in the longer The case of the decline in crime in New York term is the one least open to the state: the rein the recent past and the policing approaches establishment of effective means of community used in this respect, are drawn upon in a sur- and social control. Key to the process is both prising number of post-authoritarian states as the establishment of effective local systems of potential solutions to domestic crime problems. democracy through which people can exercise Yet implementation in often fragile democra- their rights and express their grievances as well cies carries the danger of a return (or at least as the support of institutions such as churches, perceptions to this effect) to authoritarianism. schools, sport and youth activities which assist Some distinction should be made, however, in the building of stronger and more cohesive between increasingly militarised responses to communities. The conference noted, however, crime and more specialised responses such as that the difficulty of implementing such pro- the establishment of high profile national inves- jects is great, since there is the added problem tigative units. Given the complexity and sophis- that such initiatives are often difficult to link to tication of criminal organisations, such units reductions in crime in the short term, thus being are an essential addition to the tools available to harder to sell to policy makers. the government to fight crime. The establish- Comparative experience suggests that while ment of such units highlights an additional the state is good at breaking down forms of problem for many countries moving from local social control and cohesion it is notorious- authoritarian rule to democracy: poor coopera- ly bad at reconstructing these. What is clear, tion between law enforcement personnel and however, is that a concentration of improved prosecutors. Given that one of the outcomes of law enforcement alone (however necessary) democratic policing is the presentation of evi- will not stem the long-term crime problems of dence before an impartial court of law, improv- states emerging from periods of transition. This ing these mechanisms is essential to the long- suggests that the implementation of crime pre- term success of post-authoritarian policing. vention projects as understood in the developed world (and often marketed in transitional and 4. EXTERNAL IMPACTS developing societies) is not the most appropri- The conference sought to examine the impact ate route. Instead, comparative experience indi- of foreign assistance provided to countries in cates that much greater debate and effort is transition with significant problems of police required to seek alternative ways of rebuilding reform and crime. Indeed, many of the coun- the social fabric in post-conflict and post- tries have had quite close links with foreign authoritarian societies. funding organisations and the law enforcement The danger, however, in societies in transi- agencies of foreign governments (particularly tion is that responses to crime become increas- the US) who are assisting in both the reform ingly militarised. In many post-authoritarian process and the fight against crime. These inter- societies this results from the dual pressures of ventions have not been uncritically accepted in increased public insistence on government to be the recipient countries. There was consensus seen to act against lawlessness as well as pres- that many assistance programmes were not

12 Shaw designed with the recipient country in mind and the “Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of that assistance such as training was often Offenders”, there was some concern that once offered simply because it was available rather transitional countries sign the convention, in than because it was relevant to the needs of practice they will have limited capacity to transitional societies. In particular, the focus of implement it. The issue of international assis- the US on issues of transnational organised tance is thus of paramount importance. crime and drugs had the ability to distort local law enforcement agencies and focus scarce 5. POLICING CITIZENS AND CITIZENS AS POLICE resource on areas which, while of concern to Nowhere is the failure of societies emerging foreigners, were of little value to the immediate from authoritarian rule more clearly illustrated safety needs of the local population. than in citizens’ perceptions of the police. In It was also suggested that extensive foreign the majority of transitional societies, the police training programmes might have two inter-con- are viewed as ineffective by the citizenry. nected impacts. The first is to undermine the There are clearly exceptions to this, however, development of innovative local responses to and in some cases data suggests that while the crime problems, given that foreign assistance public appear willing to work with the police, often points to particular sets of solutions, little or no advantage is being taken to build despite the fact that these were developed in better community confidence in policing by the other more developed societies. Second, while police through the provision of better levels of there were some advantages in this regard, law service delivery. enforcement and criminal justice agencies in In many societies citizens have begun to take transitional societies could increasingly begin their own initiatives against crime. Most com- to look the same, drawing on similar training monly this takes two forms – the growth of the programmes and heavily conditioned by for- private security industry and the emergence of eign experience (especially that of developed vigilantism. Again, the degree to which this democracies). While this holds out the possibil- manifests itself in any society is dependent on ity of better cooperation between agencies who its history and traditions. In Eastern and Central would be in a position to understand their coun- Europe and the former Soviet Union cases of terparts actions and systems, it also might mean vigilante-type activities appear to be less well that local initiatives will not be encouraged. developed given a historic over-reliance on the Overall it was concluded that the impact of for- state under communism for the delivery of ser- eign assistance on the development of local vices. While citizens are unhappy with the gen- systems of criminal justice in transitional soci- eral level of service provision by the criminal eties were little understood, despite the fact that justice system, they remain reliant on the state. these were likely in the medium term to be one In countries in Africa and Latin America where of the most important influences in their devel- communities have, often in response to authori- opment. tarian rule, sought community responses to In all cases it was agreed that regional ensure local safety, vigilante groups in various responses to problems of criminality were guises have become reasonably common. State essential but, in the main and with the possible responses to these vigilante groups range from exception of Southern Africa, were reasonably attempts to co-opt them to direct attacks upon underdeveloped. It appeared that the develop- them. It is also instructive to note that vigilante ment of mechanisms of regional cooperation groups themselves in some countries were like- were often, although not always, dependent on ly over time, and as they developed dominance the strength of political cooperation among in any particular area, to become involved in states. Regional cooperation held out the the illegal accumulation of resources to ensure prospect of improving the ability of countries to their own survival. prevent crime and combat criminality by ensur- The development of relatively sophisticated ing that neighbouring “safe havens” were elimi- private security industries in the majority of nated or made less attractive for criminals. transitional societies was viewed with concern. While an international convention against In most cases the employment of private securi- transnational organised crime has been agreed ty was designed to protect the rich from the upon at the 10th United Nations Congress on poor, perpetuating old divisions or extending

13 Shaw divisions within the societies along class lines. and specialisation of the police, as well as ade- The cross over between the security agencies of quate “law and order” responses (with due the state and private security companies was respect for human rights). While agreeing that seen as a worrying development. This occurred the above mix is generally the “blueprint” through police officers or other state security always proposed, participants were quick to officials moonlighting as security guards, highlight that the determination of the propor- despite the fact that this was illegal in most of tion of, and the relationship between, each of the countries represented. Or, because former these factors depends on the domestic context members of the security establishment who had in any transitional society. left to establish or work in private security In addition, some agreement was reached operations retained some links to the state’s around the requisites for police reform in tran- security forces. There was a recognition that the sitional societies. It was concluded that these existence of active private security sectors was must be informed; feasible and manageable; a reality that governments would have to strategic; structured but flexible to allow for accept. Ironically, effective regulation of the short-term adaptions; and under constant evalu- private security sector requires law enforce- ation and scrutiny of democratic control. ment capacity; precisely the reason why private Moreover, it was emphasised that police reform security operations were in a position to exploit (or for that matter crime control) is not the the market in the first place. In both the case of exclusive preserve of the police and must vigilantism and private security it appeared that involve external actors such as the private sec- the issue was now less how these security tor as well as community inputs. In this respect instruments which competed with the state NGOs had played an important role in issues of could be eradicated, but rather how they could police transformation in almost all the transi- be managed. tional societies represented at the meeting. While the conference covered much ground UNCOMFORTABLE CONCLUSIONS there was a recognition that some areas had not The conference highlighted both the impor- received the attention they deserved. The tance of social responses to crime control in changing culture of police agencies in the tran- transitional societies as well as the critical sitional period (which one participant described necessity of achieving satisfactory police as “the changing soul of the institution”) reform. However, while there was a concern required some analysis. In addition, issues that military-type law enforcement initiatives related to the justice and corrections system in were likely to increasingly dominate responses transitional societies (although the conference to crime in fledgling democracies with an had explicitly only concentrated on the police) authoritarian past, there was a recognition that should also receive attention. Generally, the such interventions were to some extent conference ended with a degree of pessimism – inevitable given the scale of the problem. It was it was accepted that there was, as yet, no post- strongly urged, however, that such operations authoritarian state which had clearly been able should be balanced with programmes that to achieve significantly enhanced levels of safe- sought to undercut many of the causal features ty for its citizens. If any case seemed to hold of high levels of criminality in the societies the least promise it was that of police reform in under consideration. Nor should a more spe- Nigeria, given both the scale of the country and cialised (and often nationally driven) approach the size of its police agency (approximately to crime control undercut the critical necessity 120 000 for 140 million people) and the extent of improving the service delivery functions of of lawlessness characteristic of Nigerian soci- the local police. What is required is a more bal- ety. anced debate on the correct mix between law At the same time there was a degree of opti- enforcement and prevention; and locally and mism about the growing recognition at the con- nationally driven interventions. ference of the dimensions of the problem and Thus, the conference noted that what is the fact that governments (many of whom were required is a blend of crime prevention, service represented at the meeting) were beginning to orientation, the involvement of local communi- view the issue with concern. Absolutely key to ties, local accountability, professionalisation success in fighting crime in transition societies,

14 Shaw the conference concluded, was an understand- It is envisaged that there will be a number of ing that innovative local solutions were longer term outcomes of the conference. It is required to problems which were often shaped important that the amount of documentation by powerful local influences. It was explicitly available on the subject is increased so that the recognised that despite the fact that autono- richness of the debates is not lost. The confer- mous paths to development are restricted within ence proceedings and papers by selected pre- the context of an increasingly globalised world senters are published in this Konrad Adenauer order, police reform and crime control policy Foundation Seminar Report, which will be which builds on local potential is the most widely distributed. viable strategy. This is even more important in In addition, it is hoped that a more detailed view of another recognition, that is, while dif- research paper will be produced which attempts ferent transitional societies existed in different to draw lessons from a number of transitional contexts, success in one might hold the promise societies. This will be distributed to conference of some success in others. The role of analysts participants. It is clear that the conference has working in the area was not only to scrutinise given rise to a new area of debate among those government pronouncements on crime and working on crime control policy issues in tran- policing policy but to communicate both suc- sitional societies. cesses and failures to their counterparts in other The organisers hope to gather such individu- transitional societies. The latter is at the same als together again to discuss in more detail par- time a very promising avenue for effective ticular aspects of the problem and with more international assistance. discussion on appropriate policy alternatives.

15 Welcoming Remarks

Michael Lange

INTRODUCTION KAF is closely affiliated with Germany’s On behalf of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Christian Democratic Union Party – a centrist (KAF) and the other sponsors, it gives me great political party. It proudly bears the name of one pleasure to welcome you to this conference on of its founding members, Konrad Adenauer: a Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies. German statesmen of great stature, who even- This is not the first time KAF has cooperated tually became the first Chancellor of post-war with the South African Institute of International Germany. Affairs (SAIIA) in preparing a conference of KAF has been cooperating with partners this nature on an issue that is closely related to throughout the world for almost 40 years. the overall objectives of KAF’s work as a polit- Currently, some 80 colleagues oversee some ical foundation in the new South Africa. 200 projects and programmes in more than 100 Questions relating to the consolidation of the countries. In this way, the Foundation makes a new political dispensation in this country – as unique contribution to policies serving peace in other parts of Africa and Eastern Europe – and justice in international relations. are of prime concern to us all. This is particu- KAF is currently running wide-ranging pro- larly relevant when such issues threaten the grammes in different parts of Africa, as well as overall success of political reforms, implement- in the different provinces of South Africa. The ed after years of suffering under a political sys- Foundation cooperates not only with political tem that deprived people of the opportunity to parties and their respective think tanks, but also pursue personal dreams of a better life – on an with reputable academic institutions, as you equal footing – in a democratic society. will surely note from today’s event.

1. BACKGROUND TO KAF 2. CRIME AND TRANSITION KAF, as with the other German political foun- Crime is of major concern to all countries in dations active in South Africa, is a unique fea- transition. This has been proven throughout the ture of today’s democratic culture in Germany. world in recent years, where we have seen The move behind the creation of the political numerous countries – particularly in Eastern foundations was the expectation that political Europe – struggling to come to grips with this and civic education, by way of organising such undesired element in a society freed from the conferences and debates, could help develop shackles of tutelage and oppression. and consolidate democratic dispensations, not Recent polls in South Africa are proof of the only in Europe but the world over. fact that the implementation of democracy and Both in Germany and abroad, these founda- the rule of law, together with the economic tions seek to further develop and encourage transformation currently under way, cannot be people to engage in the political debate, there- continuously implemented without causing frus- by strengthening democracy and promoting a tration and disappointment to many South pluralistic society. Africans who yearn for instant material rewards.

17 Lange

This may be understandable in light of the apartheid, only to have to live with the anarchy fact that approximately 20 million South Afri- of crime. cans, representing almost half the current popu- I trust we all share the conviction that a lation, must be considered poor in the sense process of transition will be successful only if that their incomes fall below the poverty line. democracy, the rule of law and the principle of Polls reveal that crime is of foremost concern a just participation in the economic develop- to most, if not all, South Africans. Many ment of a country by all sectors of society are express the opinion that the rule of law has all understood, accepted and continuously imple- but disappeared. Criminals – some stated – mented. seem better protected under the new constitu- South Africa is considered by many observ- tion than the average law-abiding citizen. ers to be an example of such a country in transi- The challenge for the South African crime tion, on its way to become a legally consolidat- fighting agencies is therefore enormous. Like ed democracy, in which the development of a so many institutions in South Africa during the constitutional, pluralistic state, ruled by the new apartheid years, the police force was never law of the land, appears to be irreversible. designed to provide a broad-based and equi- But by transforming white minority rule to table service to all the people of this country. It black majority government, only the founda- is hoped that the planned establishment of tions of a peaceful democratic society have municipal police services by local governments been laid. By assisting in bringing about this would help address these inequities. conference, KAF and the other sponsors are Policing across cultural lines at the same time hoping to contribute in a meaningful way to the cannot be seen in isolation of the country’s his- consolidation of this new political dispensation tory. Some professional observers of the crime in South Africa. situation have even warned that the situation in particular urban areas, as in some townships, CONCLUSION has moved dangerously close to anarchy. Let today’s conference be an example of the It is also discouraging to read in the newspa- much needed exchange of expertise and coop- pers that more than 14 000 police officers of eration between the South African government, the 120 000-strong South African police force the police services, civil society and partner are currently facing criminal charges ranging institutions from abroad, in assessing possible from murder and rape to theft, bribery and solutions to crime problems in Africa. reckless driving. Let this conference create the opportunity for If we define tyranny as “public order without more comparative analysis and evaluation, freedom” and anarchy as “freedom without which South Africa could use to its advantage. public order”, we somehow seem to witness in And finally, let this conference be our humble the South Africa of today the former being contribution to the quest for peace and stability replaced by the latter. in this beautiful country. We cannot believe that the people of this I wish you all enjoyable, interesting and country struggled so long against the tyranny of worthwhile deliberations.

18 Politics and Policing in Northern Ireland – The Way Ahead

Adam Ingram

INTRODUCTION up with the process of healing divisions and This conference promises to give a fascinating building trust at a community level. Any new insight into crime and policing in societies beginning in policing which does not take this across the world that are now emerging from into account, however good it may be in theo- conflict. It provides a valuable opportunity to ry, is doomed to failure. share experiences and to discuss future plans. This paper will first explain briefly the politi- I came to South Africa as an international cal context and social pressures against which a observer to the 1994 elections. Since then I new police service is now being forged in have followed the progress of South Africa’s Northern Ireland. Second, it will set out some own transition with great interest. of the details of that new beginning. It is proba- Throughout those years South Africa, along bly the most radical experiment in policing cur- with the United States (US), Canada, Finland rently being undertaken in the international and many other countries, has been generous in arena. its support of our own peace process in There is a great need for dialogue between Northern Ireland. specialists in politics and in security or policing Two of South Africa’s distinguished citizens, matters. This dialogue is essential if our soci- Cyril Ramaphosa and Brian Currin, are cur- eties are to make real progress in the transition rently working on particularly delicate and con- from violence and conflict to deep-rooted tentious issues. The eminent criminologist Pro- peace and security. fessor Clifford Shearing sat on the Independent There is an overriding theme which links the Commission on Policing – the Patten Commis- two above-mentioned subjects, namely, the sion – of which will be discussed below. absolute requirement for trust and mutual I was also in Johannesburg and Pretoria earli- understanding in the process of remodelling a er this year (2000) in my capacity as Minister policing service. If each side can appreciate the with responsibility for victim’s issues in pain inflicted on the other by its demands in Northern Ireland. Today, however, I am speak- relation to policing, then there is hope for a ing as the United Kingdom (UK) Minister for constructive resolution of difficulties. This Security, Policing, Criminal Justice and Prisons ability to see the other side’s difficulties in a in Northern Ireland. situation of conflict and division was powerful- The fact that the same minister covers both ly demonstrated in the approach of South security and victim’s issues is not simply a Africa’s President Mandela to the transition whim on the part of government planners. from apartheid in that country. If such under- The issues of security and policing cannot be standing and good will are missing, then the separated from the wider political process, in process of policing reform simply becomes an which the suffering caused by violence has had extension of the conflict, a new battleground such a deep and corrosive effect. for old divisions. Policing issues are therefore inextricably tied In other words, we cannot expect a new

19 Ingram police service to solve problems which we have Ireland; those between Northern Ireland and the not yet resolved in other areas of society. Nor Republic of Ireland – and those between the can we expect that a peace process will deliver British and Irish governments. a crime-free society. Although groundbreaking, these talks did not We can, however, hope that a new beginning include parties which had not established a in policing will become an engine, a driving commitment to constitutional politics. Sinn force for change which will speed up the Féin, which represented the republican move- process of transformation across society. ment, was therefore not yet at the negotiating table. 1. POLITICAL CONTEXT There followed a further landmark in the A brief explanation of the political background 1993 Downing Street Declaration, when the against which successive British governments British and Irish prime ministers charted a way have worked to prepare these new structures for forward for those democratically elected organ- policing, may be helpful. isations that were prepared to commit them- Northern Ireland has a population of around selves exclusively to the democratic process 1.5 million. Roughly 60% are Protestants, and to turn their backs on violence. almost all of whom are committed to keeping As a result, Sinn Féin (the political represen- Northern Ireland within the UK. Around 40% tatives of the Irish Republican Army [IRA] and are Catholics, most of whom wish to see the republican movement), and the UDP and Northern Ireland leave the UK and join the PUP (two parties linked to Protestant loyalist Republic of Ireland. These completely rational paramilitaries) joined the process. Ten months yet diametrically opposed positions lie at the after that declaration, the IRA announced a heart of the Northern Ireland problem. complete cessation of all military activities; the The history of conflict between the two com- loyalist paramilitaries declared a similar cease- munities dates back centuries. The government fire six weeks later. recognises that Britain too has been a participant, not simply an observer, in this relation- 2. THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT (GFA) ship. In recent years, however, the policy of When the Labour Government came to power successive governments has been based on the in the UK in May 1997, it stated its firm inten- recognition that an enduring solution to tion that inclusive negotiations should begin in Northern Ireland’s problems can only come September 1997, with a view to reaching a con- about if institutions can be created that respect clusion by May 1998. The final outcome would the majority, while not alienating or discrimi- then be put to the people of Ireland, North and nating against the minority. South, in separate but concurrent referendums. Over the past 30 years there have been The Agreement reached on Good Friday numerous attempts to achieve this. Some had (GFA), 10 April 1998, was a phenomenal limited success and informed the next step for- achievement for all involved. ward. But governments saw that only if these Skimming through the history of political institutions were accepted as legitimate across developments may make them sound easy, but the whole community, would all excuses for we should remember, particularly in the context using violence be removed. of policing, the depth of bitterness between One of the keys to achieving this came many of the participants in the talks. The lega- through the determination of the two sovereign cy of violence was such that some politicians governments – the UK and Ireland – to try and who signed up to the Agreement had not spo- forge a joint approach. ken directly to their counterparts in some of the This was embodied in the Anglo-Irish other parties and could barely bring themselves Agreement of 1985, which committed both to be in the same room. governments to the principle that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland could only 3. WHAT THE AGREEMENT ACHIEVED change with the consent of the majority of its This made the substance of the GFA all the people. From this building block came multi- more remarkable. Its achievements were as fol- party talks which focused on three sets of polit- lows: ical relationships: those within Northern • It set out arrangements for a devolved power-

20 Ingram

sharing assembly and executive, a truly local such an important part in the process from its administration to replace direct rule from very beginning, agreed to return to Belfast as a Westminster. facilitator in a review of the Agreement. It was • It made provision for closer cooperation during these intensive talks that Senator between Northern Ireland and the Irish Mitchell was reported to have said that “trust Republic and between the UK and the crept in”. Unionists agreed to establish power- Republic. sharing institutions in the expectation of rapid • It laid the foundations for new arrangements progress on decommissioning. in policing, criminal justice, security and On 2 December 1999, devolved government equality. returned to Northern Ireland for the first time in • Crucially, it was founded on the principle of 30 years. The assembly quickly got down to consent – the right of the people of Northern business and the new ministers, drawn from all Ireland to self-determination. major parties, approached their new roles with • It acknowledged the legitimacy of British enthusiasm and energy. The government, how- sovereignty in Northern Ireland for as long as ever, had made it clear that if either side it remained the wish of a majority of its peo- defaulted, whether on the establishment of the ple. administration or the decommissioning of • At the same time, the agreement recognised weapons, it would take the necessary action. the right of a substantial section of the people Without progress on decommissioning, the of Northern Ireland to pursue legitimately the political position of the Ulster Unionist Party goal of a united Ireland, so long as their became untenable and the institutions them- methods were peaceful. selves were threatened. • It injected a maturity into political debate. It was therefore with a heavy heart that the Free from the threat of terrorism, democrats Secretary of State, Peter Mandelson, took the could accept that the aspirations of the other decision to suspend the operation of the assem- side were as firmly held as ever, but would bly and the executive on 11 February 2000. no longer be imposed by violence. Without There was intense disappointment, particular- this recognition, any lasting peace would ly in the nationalist community. But events have been impossible. have shown beyond doubt that this was the But the GFA also contained much that was right decision. Intensive discussions between painful for each side. Perhaps the most difficult the two governments and political parties led to issue was the early release scheme for paramili- further statements on the implementation of tary prisoners. For victims to see their attackers remaining aspects of the GFA. The govern- or the killers of their loved ones at liberty in ments called on the paramilitary groups to their own communities remains a source of real respond positively. The following day, the IRA suffering. issued a statement promising an early confi- Even at the most difficult times, however, the dence-building measure and a commitment to a government has returned to the fact that the process which would result in their arms being GFA received the endorsement of the vast placed “completely and verifiably” beyond use. majority of the people of Ireland. Over 70% in In light of political events in Northern Ireland Northern Ireland voted in favour and over 94% and Irish republicanism, this was an incredibly in the Republic. dramatic statement. The Agreement therefore belongs to the peo- The Ulster Unionist Party found itself able to ple of Ireland. resume government in response to this statement and the institutions were set back to work 4. THE SITUATION TODAY at the end of May. A month later it was con- Two fundamental parts of the Agreement sub- firmed that the two independent inspectors, sequently threatened to destroy the whole edi- President Ahtisaari of Finland and Cyril fice: namely the establishment of devolved Ramaphosa, had successfully carried out their government and the decommissioning of terror- first inspection of a number of IRA arms ist weapons. dumps. Lengthy talks reached an impasse in July This important development has raised confi- 1999 and Senator George Mitchell, who played dence in the future of the restored institutions

21 Ingram and in the prospects of decommissioning. For while at the same time handing it over to an the first time the public now has words and independent commission. deeds to illustrate the IRA’s good intentions. That willingness to let a third party tackle the problem is itself an indication of how 5. THE BIGGER PICTURE intractable and politically sensitive it was. This whistle-stop history of the GFA tends to But the participants in the Agreement also obscure the passions and crises which charac- saw that it provides an opportunity for a new terised the process. It perhaps also masks the beginning, with a police service capable of real potential for further difficulties. But it is attracting and sustaining support from the com- also important for us to be forced to see the big- munity as a whole. ger picture. The Agreement laid out principles for a Looking at the Northern Ireland process from policing service which would be: South Africa enables me to see the reality – • professional, effective and efficient almost incredible a few years ago – of a power- • accountable in law and to the community it sharing government which will resume work serves next week. Also, an IRA statement on its • able to work in constructive and inclusive weaponry which many said simply could not partnership with the community at all levels happen. • rooted in the protection of human rights and I am extremely hopeful that the people of professional integrity Northern Ireland are beginning to see and feel • fair and impartial and free from party politi- the benefits of internal political stability just cal control like the people of South Africa. Here there is a • representative of the make-up of the commu- commitment to achieving a multiracial, multi- nity as a whole. cultural, multifaith society. That broadly encap- These principles have informed our approach sulates what the government has tried to throughout. At their heart lies the determination achieve in Northern Ireland – a political settle- to give ownership of the police service to the ment which values and cherishes diversity of whole community, where previously the Royal faith, culture and political aspirations. Ulster Constabulary (RUC) tended to be identified with one section of the community. 6. SECURITY For many people in Northern Ireland, the earli- 8. THE PATTEN REPORT est and most tangible dividend to flow from the Within weeks of the GFA, the government had GFA was the reduction in security measures. A appointed Chris Patten, former Governor of visitor returning now after 10 years away from Hong Kong, to chair a commission of indepen- Northern Ireland would hardly recognise the dent experts on policing. After extensive con- atmosphere. The paramilitary ceasefires and the sultation over 15 months with political and reduced terrorist threat have allowed the Chief community representatives, police experts and Constable to implement far-reaching reductions literally thousands of ordinary members of the in security. public and numerous study visits – including to The process of normalisation is well under South Africa – the Patten commissioners way, with troop levels at their lowest since reported in September 1999. 1970. A large number of military bases have The report, which set out some 175 recom- been demolished or closed and all crossborder mendations for sweeping structural change, was roads between Northern Ireland and the welcomed by the British and Irish governments Republic have been reopened. Although parties and by the main nationalist party, the SDLP, in may argue over the speed of this normalisation Northern Ireland. Of course, for some, the of security measures, the issue itself is relative- smallest change was a threat. For others, even ly uncontroversial. the most radical transformation was not The same cannot be said of policing. enough.

7. POLICING IN THE GFA 9. IMPLEMENTATION Indeed, the GFA acknowledged the central and The government consulted widely on the report highly emotive nature of the policing issue, and announced that it would implement the rec-

22 Ingram ommendations in full. But the report had to be get and take a central role in the strategic direc- translated into legislation, a process which tion of policing, setting objectives, priorities Patten acknowledged would be a complex task and targets and measuring police performance involving fine judgements and interpretations against a published policing plan. of some of the report’s more general recom- Importantly, operational control and direction mendations. of the police will remain in the Chief Con- This legislation is currently being processed stable’s hands. In short, the Chief Constable through parliament and will come into effect will be in charge of service delivery and the later this year (2000). board will regulate the service provided in a The bill, and the implementation plan which publicly accountable way. The board will have has already been published, show that the gov- exceptional powers to call for reports from the ernment has accepted all but six of the 175 rec- police and to launch inquiries into matters ommendations and of those six, two have been which are of grave concern. Again, these pow- partly accepted and the other four are currently ers are unique in the UK or Ireland, and per- the subject of further consideration. haps anywhere. As Tom Constantine, former head of the US Drugs Enforcement Administration who has 12. DISTRICT POLICING PARTNERSHIPS been appointed to independently oversee the This emphasis on accountability will be carried implementation of change, has said, the reforms through to local level by the creation of district proposed are the most radical seen anywhere. policing partnerships. They will provide a crucial link between the community and their 10. THE NEW BEGINNING police service. Membership of these bodies will We turn now to the key points of the new be made up of local authority elected members beginning, a vision of a new police service and independent members appointed by the shared by Patten and the government. policing board to ensure that the partnerships “Ownership” of the police service by the whole are widely representative of the community. community was central to Patten’s thinking. In The new beginning in policing is about mak- practical terms this translated into a radical ing sure as many people as possible will play emphasis on accountability, representation and their part in the new policing structures, and see human rights. policing as being part of their community, not hostile to it. 11. POLICING BOARD The cornerstone of the Patten Report’s account- 13. OMBUDSMAN ability structures is the proposed policing To provide further reassurance of the integrity board, independent of government, with the of the new service, the government has already specific legal duty of holding the police service enacted legislation to create a police ombuds- to account for its actions and performance. The man whose task will be to investigate com- new legislation will set up the 19 member plaints against the police. This new complaints board, a majority of whom – 10 in all – will be system in Northern Ireland is, we think, without drawn from representatives to the Northern compare. Ireland assembly in proportion to their elected It provides the ombudsman with complete political strength. The remaining independent control and independence from both government members will be reflective of wider community and the police service. Crucially, it involves interests, allowing them to have a voice in how investigation not by the police service, but by the policing is delivered. ombudsman’s own staff who have been given The new board will be given powers of powers of police officers for the purpose. accountability and oversight unique to the UK Far from feeling threatened by this new or the Republic of Ireland. office, the police themselves have welcomed it It will monitor the performance of the police because they can no longer be accused of par- on human rights and many other areas. It will tiality in investigating such complaints. appoint the head of the police service, the Chief Constable, and other senior officers and act as 14. HUMAN RIGHTS their disciplinary authority. It will set the bud- The process of building public confidence and

23 Ingram trust, of which the ombudsman is an important are no less radical for being uncontroversial. element, is further enhanced by a new emphasis The police service will undergo a transforma- on human rights. Indeed, the Patten Report con- tion in management structures, information cluded that the fundamental job of the police technology capability and training, indeed in was to protect human rights. every aspect of police activity. The Chief Constable and the new policing Finally, to bolster this vast programme of board together will be responsible for full com- change, and as an important confidence build- pliance with human rights requirements. New ing measure, the Patten Report recommended officers will be required to take a new human that an eminent person, from a country other rights-based oath. All officers will receive than the UK or Ireland, should be appointed as human rights training, and will be required to an oversight commissioner to supervise the behave in accordance with a new code of implementation of the new approach to polic- ethics. A new Human Rights Act will come ing. Tom Constantine, former Head of the into force in October, guaranteeing fundamen- Drugs Enforcement Administration in the US tal rights and freedoms throughout the UK. and former Chief of Police for New York State, has already taken up this post. He will monitor 15. COMPOSITION and comment publicly on the progress of Patten recognised, however, that new structures change. Once again a groundbreaking concept and accountability might not in themselves be in policing reform, building confidence in the sufficient to redress the balance of representa- process of change. tion in the police service. As mentioned before, 40% of Northern Ireland’s population is 17. EMOTIVE ISSUES Catholic, yet only eight per cent of RUC offi- Given the scale of these changes, it is surpris- cers have been drawn from the Catholic coming to learn that none of them have generated as munity. There are many complex reasons for much pain and raw emotion as the issue of the this, from outright terrorist intimidation to a tra- name to be given to the new police service. ditional alienation from the police in the Cath- Symbolic issues are hugely significant in olic/nationalist community. Northern Ireland. How they are used is often Patten’s radical solution requires the recruit- interpreted as defeat or victory by one commu- ment of an equal number of Protestants and nity or the other. Catholics, from a pool of candidates all of In the case of the RUC, many in the unionist whom, will have qualified on merit. community were deeply hurt by the Patten The report envisaged that these measures Commission’s recommendation that this name would lead to a more representative police ser- should be replaced. They saw it as a criticism vice within 10 years. of the past record of the RUC, an insult to the This is an ambitious programme: it took the terrible sacrifices made in the fight against ter- New York Police Department (NYPD) 25 years rorism. The government recognises the pain to move from 12% of ethnic minority officers caused by this issue and utterly rejects any in 1974 to 33% in 1999. implied criticism of the remarkable service The government has embarked on this pro- given by RUC officers over the past 30 years. gramme in the face of severe criticism that it Patten’s argument, however, that a new name amounts to positive discrimination. But the was essential to achieve a new beginning is in government believes, with Patten, that these the end, persuasive. If this goal could be extreme measures are essential to achieve the achieved without changing the name then it necessary balance and community representa- would not be changed. But that is not possible. tion in the new service. The government has therefore determined Of course, what is really needed is the sup- that the new name will be the Police Service of port of the whole community in Northern Northern Ireland. Ireland to achieve a transformation in the composition of the police. CONCLUSION The government understands the desire of those 16. OVERSIGHT COMMISSIONER nationalists who want to see a break with the There are many other sweeping reforms which past. Equally, it understands the emotional

24 Ingram attachment many people have to the existing violence. But in too many cases mindsets have name, symbols and emblems of the RUC. yet to develop beyond the period of conflict. The Patten Commission took a middle line The process of understanding one’s own between these two positions. It argued that the motives and the motives of others is still at an RUC should not be disbanded and that there early stage. It may take generations. For those should be no complete break with the past. At of us involved in the policing debate, this is an the same time, as mentioned above, it stressed inevitable frustration. The logjams on policing the need for a new beginning – a fresh start. In reflect the logjams in society, in politics and in short, the commission recognised, in the words the minds of individuals. But neither can we of Chris Patten himself, that there are two his- afford to wait. tories in Northern Ireland and two experiences Indeed, policing is so central to any society of policing. Each has legitimacy and each con- that driving forward change in this area will tains real pain and suffering. certainly send ripples across society. Policing This brings us back to the opening theme: the can become an engine of reconciliation and will to see the problem from the perspective of healing. It can help trust to creep in. That is the other is an absolute prerequisite to progress. why policing is so important and that is why Unless the leaders of both communities under- the government is implementing the radical stand the pain and difficulties created for their measures of the Patten Report, some of which counterparts by their own demands on policing, are described above. the most difficult issues cannot be resolved. It will not be easy, but the prize to be gained It is, after all, this ability that paves the way is the greatest prize of all: a society at ease with for constructive compromise. And, of course, it itself, a society equipped to face the real chal- applies to the wider political and social process lenges of criminality and social cohesion which as much as to policing. other “normal” societies are facing in the 21st One of the ironies of the conflict in Northern century. Ireland is that it has bred some of the greatest With commitment, determination, and above poets of the past 50 years, including the Nobel all the will to understand others, we can laureate Seamus Heaney. achieve it and build a better future for the The father of that movement of poets, Louis police and for the society they serve. MacNeice, once wrote: That, I trust, is an ambition we share with “And I envy the intransigence of my own South Africans. We continue to watch your Countrymen who shoot to kill and never progress with interest and admiration. We See the victim’s face become their own know we can rely on your good wishes and Or find his motive sabotage their motives.” continued support as we pursue the same goal Some 60 years later we are moving beyond the in Northern Ireland.

25 South Africa: Crime and Policing in Transition

Steve Tshwete

INTRODUCTION social inequalities or history of authoritarian- This conference is honoured to have as a ism as we do. There is much to learn from our speaker the Minister of State for Northern own experiences and much that we can teach Ireland, Adam Ingram. While we are aware of each other. the significant differences between South South Africa has taken some important steps Africa and Northern Ireland, we have noted towards fighting crime. We recognise that there that both the Patten Commission on a new is still much work to be done, but we remain beginning for policing in Northern Ireland and committed to ending the scourge of lawlessness the Criminal Justice Review which visited in our communities, thereby ensuring safety for South Africa, drew on some of our own experi- all our citizens. We have learnt much, but there ences in reaching their conclusions. is still much to learn.

1. COMMON ISSUES AND COMPARATIVE 2. KEY LESSONS RESEARCH Four key lessons can be drawn from South Police transformation and crime control have Africa’s experience in this regard. These been key focus issues during the past few years lessons relate to the issue of police legitimacy, in South Africa. The immediate aftermath of the need to focus on specific priorities, the role apartheid resulted in high levels of crime and a of politicians and the necessity for regional police agency not immediately able to counter action to counter crime. The following com- the problem. ments are by no means comprehensive, but This experience is consistent with a number may provide some initial observations which of other societies that have also been burdened could be expanded upon during the course of by high levels of crime during periods of politi- the conference. cal transition or dramatic economic and social Firstly, it is often stated that the problem change. with policing in South Africa is one of legiti- These similarities highlight the importance of macy. The police are not accepted by all citi- this initiative by the South African Institute of zens as the enforcers of law and order. While International Affairs to begin a process of com- this may be true, experience suggests that the parative research aimed at drawing lessons issue should be examined further. It is not suf- from societies in transition. It is hoped that this ficient to simply urge citizens to accept the conference, which is only the beginning of a police as their own. Rather, in the new democ- longer term project, continues to draw together racy, citizens expect the police to earn their expertise from across the developing world. legitimacy. South Africa tends to seek solutions too often This can only be achieved through improved from countries in Europe and North America. levels of service delivery and more effective While this approach is important, these soci- operations. In particular, service delivery at eties do not experience the same conditions, local station level can be greatly improved. In

27 Tshwete my tenure as Minister I have, and will continue a whole. This aspect is often not sufficiently to, visit police stations (often unannounced) examined when considering the nature of divid- when it comes to my attention that service is ed or transitional societies with a history of below acceptable levels. Improving levels of conflict. I therefore urge the participants at this service delivery is therefore a key public confi- conference not only to examine detailed issues dence-building measure in societies where the of anti-crime policy, but also the role that police have in the past been repressive and prej- politicians play in managing this process and udiced. promoting the message that crime does not, and Secondly, and closely related to my initial cannot, pay. point, is the necessity for focusing on key Finally, I wish to suggest that the majority of issues in a time of rapid change. One problem transitional societies, be they in Southern or of police transformation within the South West Africa, Latin America or Eastern Europe, African context is that there always seems to be are not in any way immune from ongoing so many issues to deal with simultaneously. developments in their regions. In particular, There is a real danger that too many priorities organised crime does not respect state borders, are set, which in the end becomes meaningless. nor do organised criminals linger about to be In the past two years the police have actively prosecuted by one set of law enforcement concentrated on some of the key areas of polic- authorities when they can find a safe haven ing. I have already mentioned service delivery, elsewhere. In the longer term, more emphasis but we have, in addition, sought of late to con- will therefore have to be placed on building centrate our efforts on those areas where the stronger regional police cooperation. In majority of crime occurs. By focusing on these Southern Africa, significant progress has been areas, it hoped that the national level of serious made in this regard. We will also continue, in crime will be reduced. Greater focus is also partnership with our neighbours, to focus on required on improving intelligence collection as this area in the longer term. well as our ability to analyse and understand the extent of crime in some areas so that we can CONCLUSION act effectively against it. Policing in post-authoritarian and divided soci- Thirdly, it is my own belief that politicians, eties is not only a hotly debated issue, but one at all levels of society, have an important role that is essential to ensure the long-term stability to play in consistently condemning the actions of democratic and peaceful governance. In of criminals and supporting the police. Given Northern Ireland, for example, the outcome of the history of this and other countries, criminals the debate concerning the police seems to be a are often seen as heroes and role models – peo- critical component of the peace process as a ple who have gained wealth quickly without whole. While the societies we are all drawn undue effort. from may be very different, it remains clear It is the duty of leaders in our society to con- that many of the problems, as well as the solu- sistently condemn these practices and to tions, are similar. By combining our energies demonstrate that, not only are these actions we stand a greater chance of reducing crime wrong, but that they are damaging to society as and ensuring safety for our citizens.

28 The Nigerian Experience

David Jemibewon

INTRODUCTION military duties within or without Nigeria as I am honoured and privileged to be part of this may be required by them by, or under the distinguished gathering of experts in safety and authority of, this or any other Act.” security, who have been brought together to At independence in 1960, the NPF was small in share our experiences on the theme of Crime size, well trained, disciplined and equipped. It and Policing in Transitional Societies. was also well focused, effective and efficient, The country I represent, Nigeria, is today as a result of which it was highly respected by undergoing a fundamental and dramatic change the public it served. It also earned international having recently emerged from autocratic mili- recognition having creditably discharged its tary rule on 29 May 1999. The police as an responsibilities in international peace-keeping institution is not left out of this process. In spite operations. Although it was regarded as a Force of our untiring efforts to create a peaceful and – considering the nature of the training as well crime-free society, the issue of crime, as is the as the democratic structure and environment of case in most societies – still poses a serious the police institution at the time – it could not challenge to us. In view of this, I believe the but go about the discharge of its constitutional theme and timing of this conference could not responsibilities in a highly civilised manner have been more relevant to my country. devoid of force. It was no surprise, therefore, that at the cessation of hostilities in the Congo, 1. THE GENESIS OF VIOLENT CRIME IN NIGERIA the NPF was invited to help in the training of Policing is a universal concept. Consequently, the Congolese Police. the statutory responsibilities of any police force In 1966, Nigeria underwent a sudden change the world over are basically the same. These in government following the overthrow by the have to do with the maintenance of law and military of the then civil democratic adminis- order, so that citizens can go about their lawful tration. This led to a gradual but steady decline duties without let or hindrance. in the positive value for which the police were Again, taking a cue from Nigeria, section 4 known. The morale of serving police officers of the Police Act, CAP 359 Laws of the was badly battered and vices such as corrup- Federation of Nigeria 1990, clearly spells out tion, indolence, greed and malpractices of vari- the responsibilities of the Nigerian Police Force ous sorts crept into the police force and gradu- (NPF) as follows: ally overwhelmed the institution. Public confi- “The police shall be employed for the pre- dence in the police force waned as some police vention and detection of crime, the appre- officers became involved in heinous crimes hension of offenders, the preservation of such as arson, robbery and assassinations. law and order, the protection of life and Before the advent of the military in politics, property and the due enforcement of all policing in Nigeria was not much of a chal- laws and regulations with which they are lenge in terms of crimes. Most of the offences directly charged, and shall perform such recorded were of a minor nature. These includ-

29 Jemibewon ed offences such as petty stealing, assaults and established precedents. Besides, some exigen- other lesser crimes, although occasional mur- cies that may arise cannot be anticipated”. ders and burglaries were recorded. Violent As should be expected there were those who crimes – particularly those perpetrated with wanted and fought for change, but there were firearms – were generally unheard of. However, also those who probably would have preferred this scenario changed for the worse after the status quo and those who remained apathetic Nigeria fought a civil war that lasted from 1967 and therefore indifferent to change, not knowing to 1970. During that period, the country began how they would fare under the new system. experiencing armed robberies, and this necessi- The sudden change – which the transition tated the constitution of special tribunals to try from the long years of military rule to a democ- such cases, which then attracted the death ratic dispensation brought on the country – was penalty by firing squad for those found guilty. therefore monumental, and managing it was By the end of the war, some firearms ended up daunting. Virtually every institution had to in the wrong hands. This was the genesis of undergo a learning process, having been mili- violent crime in Nigeria. tarised previously and having no standard to The military’s incursion into politics, and the fall back on due to the absence of a constitu- resulting civil war, therefore led to a downward tional democratic culture and the lack of demo- and degenerating spiral of crimes and violence, cratic institutional structures. as well as the entrenchment of a culture of vio- The Nigerian police force that was inherited lence. The military had been in power for could be said to have suffered gravely from a almost 30 of Nigeria’s 40 years of indepen- lack of such regulatory institutions and a lack dence. During that period, military rule affected of focus. The police force was deprived of vital every stratum of society and penetrated the psy- equipment and other logistics support needed to che of the people. perform its functions effectively. Training was By profession, the military are trained in vio- at its lowest ebb, while recruitment was halted lence and this progressively permeated their for almost six years. Within the same period, approach to governance. Thus any “offending” the public grew apprehensive and almost lost provisions of the constitution – such as that out- confidence in the ability of the police to dis- lawing military coups – were suspended. charge its statutory functions. Obnoxious decrees such as the State Security Yet to ensure a viable, strong and effective and Detention of Persons Decree, under which constitutional government that could attract and persons could be detained indefinitely and stimulate domestic and foreign investments in without trial, were promulgated. The rights of the economy, an effective and modern police the citizenry were subordinated, opposition to force is required to assist in crime detection and government was steadfastly crushed and almost in the enforcement of the law. It was obvious obliterated and the basic human rights of indi- that an articulate and conscientious plan of viduals were not only ignored, but abused. The action directed at overhauling the existing sys- judiciary cowed and, needless to say, the due tem of policing was urgently needed to redeem process of law was thrown overboard. the situation, with a view to re-establishing public confidence in the police institution, as well 2. TRANSITION AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS as helping the police to understand and appreci- Transition from autocratic rule to democratic ate its pivotal role in a democratic dispensation. government in Nigeria brought with it several When Nigeria eventually shifted from auto- changes and problems associated with manag- cratic military rule to democratic rule on 29 ing change. Ordinarily, managing change even May 1999, Nigerians heaved a collective sigh in a normal situation is no easy task. This is of relief, so to speak, at the development as it partly due to the uncertainty that is often associ- guaranteed them the full exercise of their fun- ated with change and because – as observed by damental human rights. Regrettably, our new- Peter Blau and W. Scott in their book Formal found democracy has, to some extent, become a organisation: a comparative approach – source of insecurity and lawlessness, as these “change, whether due to new external develop- rights were misconstrued and exercised without ments impinging on the organisation or to inter- restraint. The past year under this administra- nal modifications, produces situations without tion has therefore seen an increase in crime

30 Jemibewon waves in various parts of the country.Views South Africa, like Nigeria, seems to have which were considered anti-government and more than its fair share of violent crime, as can hitherto suppressed out of fear under the mili- be gleaned from the Internet, print and electron- tary, were now freely expressed and often times ic media. Through these media, we have heard violently too. of armed men and gangs killing police officers, Militant groups that were agitating for one shooting innocent persons and generally creat- thing or another, often armed, sprang up in ing havoc, leading to uncertainty and insecurity. some parts of the country.The police force – In any democratic setting, policing is general- which was not adequately prepared for the vio- ly fraught with problems for law enforcement lent and criminal eruptions that heralded agencies, as the citizenry is usually aware and Nigeria’s democratic rebirth – was therefore often insist on their rights. Nigeria is no excep- stretched to its maximum. tion. It is highly likely that many of the coun- The weaknesses and inadequacies of the NPF tries represented at this conference have similar in coping with its statutory responsibilities of or identical problems, and it is hoped that solu- maintaining law and order were aggravated by tions to these problems will be discussed here. the systematic neglect and impoverishment of the force by successive military regimes. Also, 4. SOLUTIONS OFFERED TO CHECKING CRIME the prolonged years of military rule had drasti- In the short-term, a number of strategies have cally affected and changed the hitherto civil been put in place in Nigeria with the aim of disposition and orientation of the police to their checking crime. These include motorised and duties. This, in itself, has been a major problem motorcycle patrols, anti-crime patrols, stop- for policing in transition. It is, however, gratify- and-search operations involving the random ing to note that we have embarked on a pro- search of suspect vehicles and persons, intensi- gramme of national rebirth, re-orientation and fication of aerial patrol and surveillance, pre- retraining of the police force in line with demo- emptive raids on suspected criminal hide-outs cratic dictates and ideals. and black spots and increased criminal intelligence gathering by the Criminal Intelligence 3. REASONS FOR ESCALATION Bureau (CIB) and the Criminal Investigation The reasons for the increase in crime and vio- Department (CID). The increased highway lence can, to a great extent, be attributed to the patrol activities have, for example, led to a emergence of democracy, which most people drastic reduction in highway robberies in the see as an opportunity to release their hitherto country. Pre-emptive raids of suspected crimi- pent-up frustrations and feelings of dissatisfac- nal hide-outs have resulted in a significant tion with the misdeeds of past military adminis- decrease in crime in the satellite towns of trations. This reaffirms the view of South Lagos and Abuja, while the use of observation African Minister for Safety and Security, Steve tents and posts in strategic locations has greatly Tshwete, that democracy can, and does, create assisted in bringing down crime in the cities. In opportunities for criminals. Tshwete has addition to these measures, the police force is observed that the nature and magnitude of closely monitoring the activities of registered crime in South Africa has changed since 1994, vigilante groups nationwide to ensure their full when that country became “independent”. This compliance with statutory rules and regulations. view was informed by the observed crime trend The Ministry has had to initiate plans aimed in that country. The police have had to deal at revitalising the NPF and has continued to with organised crimes, drug rings, fraud and pursue the implementation of these plans. other crime syndicates that were unheard of This includes improving the NPF’s image, re- prior to the advent of democracy. orientation, modernisation of the police force I would like to add here that Tshwete’s through re-structuring, re-equipping and the observation on the relationship between crime provision of logistics support, beefing up the and democracy is more true in democratic soci- strength of the police force as well as introduc- eties undergoing transition, such as Nigeria, ing better welfare packages. We have also had which has in recent times witnessed an increase a series of discussions with donor countries and in police activities geared towards bringing the organisations, with the view to gaining assis- crime situations under control. tance in the areas of manpower development

31 Jemibewon and logistics support. This is considered neces- A comparison of policing in these societies sary because of the: without due cognisance of the constraints faced • growing trends in international crime, includ- by each, cannot but produce an unreliable ing drug and transborder crimes result. This error could also account for the fail- • breakthroughs in information technology that ure often encountered in fully applying solu- have unfortunately impacted negatively on tions derived from such developed economies the internationalisation of crime to societies in transition. It is a known fact that • enormous financial resources required for the history of a people, their cultural and politi- effective policing of the country cal background as well as economic develop- • belief that a blend of foreign expertise and ment, impact greatly on crime, its nature and local training is needed to provide a multi- prevalence. It is also true that policing is a cost- dimensional approach to the training of an ly venture requiring huge financial outlays, effective, modern police force, which will act which most African countries undergoing tran- as a bridge between the present and our sition cannot easily afford. future dream of a force that is a potent anti- Considering all the above, we believe that dote to all forms of crime. while all efforts should be made to provide In order to rebuild confidence in the public and more logistics support and training to improve to enhance greater security and protection of police performance, solutions to the problem of life and property, we have established a special crime and policing in societies undergoing tran- police vehicular patrol in Lagos and Abuja, sitions cannot be found in stable democratic where violent crimes were daily on the societies wholesale. This is because the root increase. Funds were obtained for the effective causes and the nature of crime, as well as exist- policing of the cities in this pilot project. Patrol ing institutions for crime prevention and prob- cars purchased and equipped for the project lem resolution, differ from society to society were deployed, along with motorcycles and especially between transitional societies equipped with communication equipment. The and advanced stable societies. There is there- success achieved in checking the crime situa- fore a need for a comparative analysis across tion in Lagos and Abuja has today restored transitional and developing societies, to benefit public confidence in the police. from lessons learnt. Also, a case was made to re-organise the NPF It such be noted that in this regard, Nigeria from an eight-zone to a 12-zone structure, and South Africa – two countries which are thereby enhancing command and control of considered to be going through transition – force. The Nigerian President has recently have been comparing notes with a view to approved this recommendation, and measures learning from each other. are being taken to implement the 12-zone structure. It is hoped that its full implementation will CONCLUSION go a long way to improving the effectiveness of There is no doubt that the constraints to crime the NPF. and policing in transitional societies are many, but with determination, efficient planning and 5. RECOGNISING LOCAL CONDITIONS prudent execution of programmes, they are sur- There is a tendency for countries in transition, mountable. Nevertheless, managing and trans- including Nigeria, to compare the performance forming a police force such as Nigeria’s – of their police forces with those of advanced or which suffered from 15 years of decadence and developed countries that have sophisticated deprivation under a despotic regime – to a ser- systems of law enforcement. This approach is vice-oriented, modern and efficient organ of problematic. Critics also go so far as to proffer government capable of providing security for a solutions to perceived problems from such nation, remains the greatest challenge of our advanced countries as Britain, France and the transition from military to a democratic and United States, without considering the constitutional government. resources available to the police in lesser devel- I hope that our shared experiences at this oped countries, the socio-cultural background conference would be mutually beneficial and as well as the advancements made in these will herald the beginning of greater cooperation countries in terms of science and technology. in policing. I wish you all fruitful deliberations.

32 The New Policing

Philip Heymann

INTRODUCTION I will describe generally the practices and The purpose of this article is to examine the theories of policing in each of these three cities remarkable development in law enforcement: and will provide some evidence as to what they the exploration of new forms of policing by are doing better or worse. But then it is worth combinations of police leaders and academics. departing from the broad models, each of This examination focuses on three major cities which may hide too much that is important and – New York, Chicago and Boston – which particular under a single tent that feels almost have developed three different varieties of the as copious as an ideology. We should look combination of problem-solving and new much harder at the underlying operations. And, forms of relationship with neighbourhoods that finally, we should consider the values affected is together often called “community policing”. by, and the risks associated with, the different As a result of these immense undertakings, we forms of policing. The introduction concludes have seen a change in belief in the efficacy of with these subjects. policing. But the changed attitudes towards police functions are accompanied by certain 1.1 The national decline in crime risks. Before turning to the changes in theory and practices of policing and their consequences, 1. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW POLICING we should note the importance of the new I will begin by describing the weaknesses and belief that policing can make a big difference the strengths of the case that new forms of in the amount of violent crime, property crime, policing have had a major effect on fear and and troublesome disorder. In focusing on “the safety in our cities and, through that, on the belief”, I am not trying to raise doubts about quality of life for millions of people. But, the reduction in fear and the increase in safety wholly aside from the amount of evidence for throughout the United States (US). There may this belief, it exists and that in turn has changed be some question as to the role of policing in the attitudes toward policing of citizens and bringing this about – questions that are not political leaders alike. troubling most of our politicians and citizens – It is important to look at New York, Chicago, but there is little doubt about the reduction in and Boston separately, for they represent some- fear and the increase in safety in most places what different approaches based on different throughout the US and particularly in two of theories supported by different police leaders the cities which we will be examining. and scholars. Their apparent successes explain Figures on reported crime and surveys of cit- the change in attitude towards police, but they izens tell the same story. After a rapid increase are not the same along the two dimensions that in crime during the 1960s, there was long-term many consider most important: reduction of stability in the US during the following quarter crime and disorder, on the one hand; and an century.1 That stability included a homicide increase in trust in the police on the other. rate in the US that was three or four times as

35 Heymann high as other western democracies.2 It was also New York, documents the change in the quality widely believed that non-lethal violent crime of life that has been brought about by reduced was far in excess of comparably advanced violence, and perhaps also by reduced property countries. crime and disorder. Cities as far away as Within this long-term trend, something dra- Johannesburg, Moscow and Buenos Aires want matic first happened in the mid-1980s when the to learn whatever there is to learn about the amount of youth violence, particularly killing, relationship of new forms of policing to a won- shot up dramatically, while violence by those derfully improved quality of life in many over 25 was declining. In the early1990s the American neighbourhoods and cities. direction of change reversed and for the rest of If it really is policing that is making that dif- the 20th century, crime, including violent ference, we should be recognising that fact in crime, declined radically to levels we had not terms of a variety of decisions about the expen- seen since the 1960s.3 The trend has continued diture of resources. Resources should be mov- into the current year, although some major ing toward police from the immense human and cities, including Boston, experienced an omi- dollar cost of the present rush towards ever nous spike in the first few months of 2000.4 longer sentences that has made the US one of Between 1993 and 1998, property crimes the world’s two leaders in percentage of popu- declined in the US by 32%, and violent crimes lation behind bars.8 At the same time, the gen- by 27%. The decline has been spectacular with eral public may be willing to bear new personal regard to such non-violent crimes as motor costs associated with intrusive policing mea- vehicle theft or ordinary thefts of less than $50. sures if the benefits are as great as they seem. Moreover, this decline has been about equally In Chicago, for example, tenants of housing sharp for males and females, black and white, projects have voted to authorise apartment urban, suburban and rural.5 Arrests of males searches without the pre--requisites of the under age 18 for violent crimes declined 26% Fourth Amendment, a move rejected by a fed- between 1994 and 1999.6 eral court.9 One area of great public concern did not appear to follow this course. While the use of 1.2 Are the increase in safety and the reduc- illicit drugs had peaked in the late 1970s, and tion in fear results of the new forms of polic- the decline that followed in the mid-1980s was ing in the US? reversed by an epidemic of smokable crack The accelerating reduction in violent and other cocaine, there was a great decline in use in the crime beginning in the early 1990s plainly 1980s and, except for marijuana use, preva- coincided with a series of major changes in lence of use in the population continued at a policing. The three cities we are examining – relatively low level into the 1990s.7 There is, New York, Chicago and Boston – all began however, little, if any, indication that the price new programmes we shall describe shortly of illicit drugs has risen or their purity declined, before 1995. As we shall see, there are also nor is there any reason to think that their avail- common sense and theoretical reasons to ability has lessened. The crack cocaine epidem- believe that the forms of policing have made a ic has greatly abated; but that seems to have far difference; but before awarding the credit to more to do with the natural course of a drug policing we should recognise the claims of epidemic, including the growing desire of other contenders to explain reduced crime. young people to avoid the consequences they see in their addicted elders, than with any suc- 1.2.1 Some other explanations of declining cess in policing, despite mammoth increases in rates of crime expenditure and in rates and duration of impris- There are reasons to look for alternative expla- onment since 1980. nations. Violent and other crime is decreasing Returning to the sudden reduction in vio- in many cities throughout the US, including in lence, particularly in lethal violence, since the cities where policing is very different from early1990s, we should note a number of conse- New York, Chicago or Boston. New York and quences. Evidence ranging from the self-reports Boston have enjoyed remarkable rates of of mothers and children in Boston to the decline, but so have several other cities, which immense increase in optimism and tourism in are doing quite different things.10 Moreover,

36 Heymann changing at the same time are other things immensely in response to the burst of youth which cannot be related to policing but are violence, made a difference.16 Another, quite highly correlated with the conditions we associ- provocative explanation, recently advanced in a ate with crime. Teenage pregnancy has gone leading economics journal, is the rise of down steadily during the past six or seven legalised abortion some 20 years prior to the years.11 The decline in birth rates between 1991 beginning of the decline in crime rates. Indeed, and 1996 among black teens between the ages the paper attributes roughly half of the decrease of 15 and 19 is particularly striking.12 There in crime to the government’s newfound protec- seems to be no obvious relationship between tion of the right to choose.17 policing and teenage pregnancies, although Finally, there are those who would argue pas- there has always been a close relationship sionately, and persuasively, that the reduction in among crime, violence, pregnancy, drug use, violent crime was traceable far less to policing and other forms of social breakdown. That sug- and any increase in the numbers of arrests than gests that a third factor may be at work. to legislation and the longer sentences imposed Several candidates seem obvious. First, the with its consequent prolonged incapacitation of drop in crime could be tied to the sustained violent offenders. We know that a relatively economic boom. Not only has poverty been small percentage of the people born in any declining for juveniles under the age of 18 given year are likely to commit a high percent- since 1993, but the proportion of black juve- age of the crimes and a very high percentage of niles (whose involvement in dangerous vio- the violent crimes. As we lock up a higher and lence as victim or perpetrator has been much higher percentage of the population for longer the highest) who are living in poverty has also periods of time, a very high percentage of this been declining sharply during that period.13 particularly dangerous group is imprisoned Unemployment is at near-record lows; and by because they offend and risk arrest so often. 1996, 86% of young black adults were complet- This reduces the level of violence on our streets, ing high school.14 albeit at great cost. And, somewhat less plausi- There are a number of other available expla- bly, believers in increased deterrence resulting nations, besides new forms of policing, which from the perceived threat of a very long sen- supporters would claim have led to the reduc- tence for whoever is successfully caught and tion of crime and the fear of crime. During the prosecuted, have argued that the reductions in past few years, we have seen the end of the crime are directly traceable to that deterrent.18 crack epidemic in most cities, an epidemic which spawned drug-selling gangs of youth and 1.2.2 The case for new forms of policing as a the varieties of violent crime that we also asso- major cause of reduced crime ciate with the prohibition era of the 1920s. Drug With so many other explanations, why is there markets have stabilised. Dealers in stabilised reason to believe that new forms of policing are industries do not kill each other; so dealers in playing a significant role in the reduction of illicit drugs may be particularly violent only at violence and fear? For one thing, some of the the early stages of a rapidly expanding market.15 sharpest reductions in crime have taken place in Just as the use of crack declined with the gen- Boston and New York where the new forms of erational learning from the degrading experi- policing have been most thoroughly explored ences of one’s older brothers and sisters, the and most enthusiastically implemented. For same learning – but this time about guns – may another, some of the connections between the have happened as a result of the experience of new forms of policing and the reduction in vio- the violence of the late 1980s. A very high per- lence are so plausible that it is hard to imagine centage of young people in disadvantaged their not having a major effect. Finally, some neighbourhoods had friends who had been fairly rigorous evaluation of recent policing tac- killed. tics supports the hypothesis of effectiveness. The efforts of people, other than the police, We know, for example, that the increase in to deal with youth violence also played a role. youth homicide was almost entirely attributable Prevention efforts by committed members of to homicides with guns; that there has been no the community, including organisations such as significant increase in homicide with other churches and schools, efforts which increased weapons.19 And the process has worked in

37 Heymann reverse. As Professor Blumstein of Carnegie in policing – one that does not rely so exclu- Mellon University and Professor Rosenfeld of sively on the theories of a few academics and the University of Missouri-St. Louis have police commissioners. We can usefully disag- pointed out,20 the reduction in national homi- gregate the broad models of policing in cities cides in the mid-1990s was very close to the like Chicago, New York and Boston, identify- reduction in the number of gun homicides, sug- ing first the critical powers of the police and, gesting again that control of guns has been an then, what is new about the way these powers important tactic. We also know that many are being used. It is well to begin with a homicides take place because of quarrels and reminder of the powers, legitimate and border- other events taking place on the streets. line legitimate, we have given the police in the Policing strategies like those of New York, US. It is through using those powers in a partic- which greatly increase the risk of carrying a ular set of tactics that street crime may be gun on the street, particularly among gangs or reduced, either by creating deterrence, or gath- other groups that have more frequently engaged ering intelligence, or establishing a feel of in violence, should therefore lead to reduced police or neighbourhood control of the streets. homicides with guns. In fact, those are the What we know about the use of these powers to homicides which have been declining rapidly. reduce crime should be reviewed, before turn- Similarly, we have believed for centuries that ing to the broader and more complex strategies certainty and swiftness of punishment are criti- that have characterised policing in Chicago, cal to the effectiveness of deterrence. In New York, and Boston. The present powers of Boston, the police are using their powers in the police are relatively well-known: new ways to make sure that the deterrent threat • To arrest, search or engage in electronic sur- to particularly dangerous individuals is very veillance if there is probable cause to con- certain and prompt, targeted specifically on a clude that the person has committed a crime. particular type of conduct such as violence, and • To seek or give a suspect concessions in directly communicated to those most likely to exchange for information or evidence useful use violence. To determine who is most likely against others. to use violence they have analysed data from • To “stop” if there is reasonable suspicion to reports or investigations and have used comput- believe that the person is about to commit a ers to compile information available by obser- crime or has just committed a crime and to vation of associations on the street. Strategies, frisk if there is reason to fear the person may like those adopted in Boston, to assure that be armed. speed and certainty of punishment are present • To “stop” cars on the ground that they are and are known to those likely to engage in vio- being operated in any way, however minor, lence, seem almost certain to reduce violence. in violation of local ordinances or state laws. In both New York and Boston, creating • To seek consent to search the stopped car or, social control and, relatedly, reducing fear, alternatively, to search without consent by have been accomplished by using the powers of either arresting the driver for a traffic viola- the police to take back the street from gangs. tion or developing a reasonable suspicion that The Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile the driver might be armed. Justice and Delinquency Prevention estimates • To take advantage of even obvious confusion that, in 1996, almost 3000 homicides in large by a suspect about whether he/she has a right cities and suburban counties were attributed to to say “no” to a search of his/her home or car gang members.21 Reducing the apparent street or person or to answer questions when not power of gangs competing for status, turf or formally under compulsion not to leave. drug profits seems likely to reduce gang homi- • To imply, deceitfully, that they intend to cides. For all these reasons the importance of exercise powers of arrest or restraint that they new policing to reduced violence seems highly in fact do not have, in order to gain leverage plausible; indeed, likely. to force a recalcitrant witness or suspect to cooperate. 1.2.3 A closer look at what we know about • To suggest a possible use of force even police tactics and reduced crime though its use would be illegal. There is another way to look at developments • To engage in any of these activities in a way

38 Heymann

that is designed to interfere with the subject’s rapid response if the time between the commis- personal or business relations. sion of the crime and the initial contact with the • To analyse material obtained in reports or police exceeds nine minutes. The average investigations of individual crimes and to reporting time for such crimes was 41 minutes gather useful intelligence from these reports. later.24 Nor did random patrol deter crime by Police in the US have long had a tool kit that creating a sense of police omnipresence. Among included at least the powers described above. a group of studies, none of which Sherman Exceeding these considerable powers by deemed especially rigorous, the stronger studies imposing summary punishment or by using suggest that there is no such effect.25 unnecessary force to arrest or by disregarding What does make a difference, careful evalua- someone’s privacy and property rights without tions show, is focusing patrol resources on probable cause is generally a violation of local places and times that have the most crime. The and federal law. To ignore the conditions limit- idea is supported by epidemiological research ing the use of one of these powers – even by that has shown that crime tends to be very actions that would not be a crime if carried out localised,26 and by careful studies in Minne- by ordinary citizens but which misuse the apolis which suggest that twice as much police apparent powers and authority of the police – is presence led to half as much crime in the hot an occasion for department discipline. spots, including when the police were not pre- What do we know about the success of vari- sent.27 It also often led to increased neighbour- ous tactics using these powers, reserving for hood calls for service in the hot spot areas. As later a discussion of the broad strategies that are to the time of day, not enough is known yet to a collection of tactics in Chicago, New York determine whether curfews, particularly for and Boston? There is much guesswork in this. juveniles, are an effective way of reducing But we also know from fairly rigorous recent crime. experiments a good deal about what forms of In a related way, concentrating limited police policing actually reduce crime, and as we shall resources on an identified band of particularly see, many of these are embedded in the broad dangerous individuals or crimes also reduces strategies described in the chapters that follow. crime. We know that a small fraction of a total A review of evaluations done by a team at the birth cohort commits a very high percentage of University of Maryland for the Congress and crimes in any group. Targeting the more dan- the Department of Justice tells us a good deal gerous people had the hoped-for effect of about what “works.”22 reducing crime in Washington and Phoenix.28 In Policing for Crime Prevention, Professor The case is less clear with regard to targeting Lawrence Sherman of the University of dangerous crimes, with two notable exceptions: Maryland evaluates the evaluations of policing seizing guns and drunk driving.29 Efforts to strategy. Here are his conclusions. Sherman detect and seize guns has proven to be finds, first, that, although the evidence is incon- immensely effective in Kansas City. When gun sistent, the more convincing studies show that seizures in a target area rose by 60%, gun crime an increase in the number of police causes dropped by almost 50%.30 reductions in crime in the following year, espe- There are at least short-term effects of focus- cially in higher crime, larger cities. This is sup- ing policing on activities that create a sense of ported by the evidence of epidemics of crime disorder in a neighbourhood – tending to sup- when the police are on strike23 and by the obvi- port the “Broken Windows” theory that is ous logic that the presence of more police described later. But, as in the case of making increases the risk that an individual committing additional arrests for misdemeanors and for a crime will be apprehended, with both a deter- other crimes for which an individual might not rent and an incapacitative effect. previously have been arrested (even if caught in On the other hand, Sherman finds that rapid the act), the deterrent and incapacitative effects response to calls from victims does not have a may be significantly offset by long-term significant effect, in terms of the resources it effects. Studies show that recidivism of juve- requires, on crime reduction. Too many crimes niles increases following arrest.31 The same is are discovered after the fact and even a crime true of some other categories of offenders, for that is discovered promptly is not affected by example, unemployed men guilty of domestic

39 Heymann violence.32 There is a reminder in all this that 1.3 Changes in public and political attitudes the long-term effects of invoking the criminal toward policing justice system for relatively minor behaviour However strong one may find the evidence that can be to increase rather than reduce crime by new forms of policing are far more successful its effect on the life prospects or psychology of in reducing crime of almost every sort, other the individual. than the sale of drugs, the case has been strong As to the specific crime-reduction benefits enough and made persuasively enough to create claimed for conscientious efforts to improve a very substantial change in expert, official and police relations with neighbourhoods, Sherman public expectations about the crime-reduction has this to say. “Neighbourhood watch” groups and other functions of policing. One way of seem to be almost wholly ineffective, perhaps illustrating that change is to examine the because cooperation is least likely to be found change in notions about what the police should in high crime areas where distrust is wide- be held accountable for. spread, although community meetings can help South Africa is one of many countries that mobilise citizen participation in reducing crime. measures the effectiveness of its police by their Making visits to citizens’ homes is also helpful capacity to solve crimes that have been com- for policing, at least among non-minority mitted and the speed with which police can groups, through gathering intelligence and oth- respond to calls. South African police claim, erwise eliciting support. Providing information unreliably, to have reduced response time to an to the neighbourhood rather than eliciting infor- average of a very few minutes. They are now mation from the neighbourhood showed no sign concentrating on improving what happens next: of affecting or reducing crime where it was detective work relying extensively on question- tried in Newark and Houston.33 Finally, ing of witnesses and suspects and on forensics. research consistently demonstrates that individ- In this framework, it makes sense that, in late uals who believe that the police treated them 1999, the South African police would only fairly in their previous encounters, and showed reluctantly take a report from my friend, a dri- respect, are more likely to obey the law in the ver whose rear window had been bashed with a future. A Milwaukee experiment in dealing brick long enough ago that suspects would not with those arrested for domestic violence is the still be there. And my friend could not herself leading example.34 provide a useful description of the suspects. Such specific, fact-based arguments are more There was simply no way to solve such a crime, persuasive than exclusive reliance on the broad- and the police in South Africa are considered er contentions that large changes in violence accountable for solving crimes that have must be attributable to changed policing simply occurred. because there was no parallel in the form of Police in the US have learned that most vic- dramatic changes in social conditions that could tims do not call promptly enough to catch the explain the drop in violence. In fact, as we have perpetrator at the scene of the crime and that seen, there have been dramatic changes in fac- detective work cannot be relied on to solve the tors from the availability of jobs to an end to great mass of street crimes. With that aware- the growth of the crack market that could ness, our policing strategies in the past decade explain a rapid reduction in violent crime. have turned heavily towards prevention of Moreover, even small changes in social con- crimes before they occur, using the help of ditions can result in dramatic differences in those in a neighbourhood and focusing on prob- crime or other social phenomena when there is lems rather than individual events. a contagion effect. A small increase in the Faced with a situation like the attempted car availability of guns, for example, could readily hijacking in South Africa, a problem-solving result in a geometric increase in the number of police department would very much want to young people feeling they need guns and these record and analyse the information; for, togeth- increases could in turn lead to still further geo- er with information on recent and similar metric increases.We simply cannot assume that events at nearby locations, it would suggest a big changes in criminal behaviour can only be set of ways that the hijacking activity could be brought about by dramatic changes of some stopped. Some of these would be imaginative other sort. devices for making arrests and getting convic-

40 Heymann tions, such as sending undercover operatives to particular focus on three major cities at the the location or using leverage on people arrest- forefront of change: Chicago, New York and ed for other crimes in that area to gather infor- Boston. Each has developed its own variation mation. A problem-solving police department of the new strategies of policing. Each has would also consider changing traffic patterns, claimed that its variation is best; and deserves eliminating the stop signs that make it possible the most credit either in terms of reduced to bash the window of a stopped car and imme- crime, increased public acceptability of the diately reach in, etc. And it might try to build a police, or reduced fear. And we will compare community’s support for lawfulness, trust in their strategies with contemporary develop- the police, internal coherence and “social capi- ments in the United Kingdom (UK). tal” to the point that bystanders in the neighbourhood would help deal with the problem. 2.1 Chicago and New York Problem-solving policing has received a great Chicago and New York have taken dramatical- deal of credit for reduced crime. As this has ly different directions in policing. It is revealing happened, the public and elected officials have that both would claim to be operating in the come to hold the police responsible for reduc- mode of “community policing”, a claim that is ing crime and particularly violence by dealing required if a city is to get funds from the federal with the problems that create the opportunity or government to increase the number of its temptation to safely commit crimes that are police.35 Both grow out of the same historical dangerous and create fear. In terms of account- rejection of three approaches to policing that ability, we have come to assume that the work had taken on primary importance: random car of the police can be measured by the crime rate, patrol, rapid response to calls for assistance, not the arrest or conviction rate. Both New and skilled investigation of individual crimes.36 York and Boston have met that standard of Both rejected what had become the accepted accountability remarkably. measure of success: arrest rates. If reducing crime is what the police are com- Not everything about the older model of ing to be held accountable for, there is dis- policing is wrong. Rapid response is in fact agreement with regard to another question: to necessary when the danger of violent crime is whom are they accountable? The South African continuing. Reactive policing and skilled detec- Constitution requires a national police force, tive work are in fact necessary if the same per- accountable to the nation as a whole. City petrator is likely to attack the same or related police departments are held accountable for the victims again. One of the top priorities of polic- crime figures of cities as large as Boston, ing is, in the language of Scotland Yard, “pre- Chicago and New York. But we also believe venting repeat victimisation”.37 Some signifi- that they are accountable to local communities cant measure of success in solving dramatic and for developing ways that local communities crimes is important to maintaining social can impose social control themselves, assist the mores, public morale, and confidence in the police, and focus the efforts of police and police and government. Still, conceding all this, neighbourhoods on what concerns the neigh- the limits of reactive policing and particularly bourhood most. New York attempts to focus the failures of the hopes of random patrol, rapid responsibility at the level of each of its 75 response and detective work, required new precincts. Chicago tries to devolve responsibili- strategies. ty down to the level of a beat officer within a The author has travelled with the police rapid precinct. In short, we are coming to accept the response team (“flying squad”) in Johannes- fact that police are accountable to neighbour- burg as it speeds from emergency call to emer- hoods as well as to cities and for providing gency call, generally reporting burglaries. what the neighbourhood wants as well as for There, as we have found in the US too, the per- assuring reduced danger and fear in the city at petrator was always gone by the time the few large. minutes it took the police to arrive was added to the few minutes it took the householder to 2. THE NEW POLICING STRATEGIES call after the departure of the burglar. The All this is the setting for a more detailed explo- South African police could not use detective ration of what is changing in policing with a work to solve the attempted hijacking described

41 Heymann above, or many, many other crimes. Something Professor Mark Moore and then-Attorney different is needed. General Edwin Meese, a distinguished group of In the US the ineffectiveness of traditional police chiefs, mayors, academics and others modes of policing, which had been established met for five years beginning in 1988 and fur- by careful experiments, came to be reflected in ther developed the “twin poles of modern polic- experiments in neighbourhood-based crime ing”: encouragement of the participation at control.38 The latter also addressed the dangers every stage and in almost every way of the of friction between police and youth in crime- neighbourhood being policed; and addressing infested areas, dangers that had exploded in crime as a problem to be solved prospectively, riots in the late 1960s. The new movements not as an event to be explained as history by were conceptualised in 1979 in a seminal arti- retrospective investigation and, to whatever cle by Professor Herman Goldstein39 calling for extent possible, then remedied by trial and pun- the police to go beyond merely fighting crime ishment.43 and responding to emergency calls for help and to assume the responsibility to find solutions to 2.1.1 Chicago help prevent and reduce a broad range of prob- The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy lems faced by the community. Communities (CAPS) started operating in prototype districts across the country began experimenting with in April 1993. Chicago emphasised the first various applications of problem-solving polic- pole – neighbourhood involvement – more ing. completely and enthusiastically than almost any Three other scholarly developments in the other city. The immediate scholarly background 1980s encouraged the problem-solving aspect for this has been the work of Professor Wesley of what was to become the new policing: the Skogan.44 The more remote scholarly support is development of clear evidence linking disorder the Chicago criminological tradition of empha- to fear of crime; the concept of “situational pre- sising the relation of the demographic and soci- vention”; and the notion of “hot spots”. The ological conditions of a neighbourhood to its first will be discussed in connection with New rate of crime.45 York. The concept of situational prevention, Current studies by Sampson and Earls46 have which originated in England, is that taking added greatly to this tradition. They show con- measures, tailored to particular crimes and vincingly that the disparity in crime rates with- locations that make the commission of the par- in areas of Chicago can be largely accounted ticular crime more difficult, risky, or less for by measurable neighbourhood differences, rewarding, will discourage the commission of including prominent differences in those forms that crime.40 of “social capital” reflected by constructive The theory of “hot spots” developed from involvement in the concerns of neighbours – research and observations indicating that a dis- particularly the willingness to assist in the proportionate percentage of crime is usually upbringing of children. The development of concentrated in small geographical areas, even social capital can be encouraged by working specific addresses or locations.41 Identifying with neighbourhood organisations or helping to hot spots was found to have two benefits. First, develop them. It can be discouraged by allow- identifying hot spots may allow police to apply ing fear to force individuals within their own the concept of situational prevention to increase houses, away from groups and public places. the stakes for criminal or disorderly behaviour The form of policing in Chicago relies exten- in the hot spots, through increasing police pres- sively on the neighbourhood to define the focus ence in a particular area or increasing commu- of police activities as they attempt to support nity efforts to watch an area. Next, identifying social control. If the neighbours are most con- hot spots allows policing analysts to use com- cerned about gangs gathering on the street or puter technology that can combine the hot spot noise at night, then these should become police locations with detailed maps of the surrounding priorities. There is, of course, a risk that the area to attempt identification of location fea- concerns expressed by the neighbours are tures that may help explain the reason for the shaped by assumptions about what the police high rate of crime.42 can do, including doubts about police capacity Under the leadership and sponsorship of to reduce many forms of violence. Still, there is

42 Heymann a powerful democratic claim that neighbour- Committee members included those active in hood concerns should be respected as well as neighbourhood schools, businesses, churches, an instrumental argument that respecting them and other institutions active in each neighbour- empowers the neighbourhood, building social hood. Procedural guidelines such as selection capital and, with that, social control. of officers, term limits, and voting rights, how- This has not been just philosophy. One of the ever, were established by the CAPS manage- unique characteristics of CAPS was the extent ment team. to which there was actual, sustained police- There are organisational implications of an community involvement in identifying prob- emphasis on accountability to neighbourhoods. lems47 of concern to the community. Com- The Chicago policing pushes much of the munity involvement took two forms. The most responsibility in the organisation down to the fundamental form of neighbourhood involve- beat officer, with an expectation that other ment involved the formal practice of regular department resources and personnel will assist meetings between residents and police officers beat officers in their new role.52 One of the first in every police “beat”.48 The practice of regular responsibilities of the beat team53 is to collect neighbourhood meetings was taken far more beat-specific information that is compiled as a seriously than in most cities with community tool for problem-solving and new officer orien- policing where public meetings were limited tation, known as a “beat profile”. A beat profile mostly to initial, kick-off meetings and occa- includes information on community organisa- sional, poorly-attended successors.49 tions and resources; descriptions of problem Beat meetings, designed to identify problems areas and abandoned buildings; identification of concern to the particular community and to of 24-hour businesses, bars, banks and schools; formulate solutions to the problems, were gen- and other relevant information gathered from erally held once a month in church basements specialised units, such as special gang units, and park buildings.50 The CAPS programme with knowledge of the beat.54 encouraged participation of neighbourhood Another new responsibility shared by a beat organisations such as block clubs, community team is documenting in a “beat plan” the three organisations, umbrella organisations, client- or four key problems they will focus on in a serving organisations, churches, and merchants’ particular beat, in order to focus attention on associations in the monthly beat meetings, as the issues until they are resolved, as well as the well as participation by individual residents. officers’ plans for solving the problems.55 In Research of the CAPS programme indicates that formulating the beat plans, officers are expect- different communities do, in fact, have different ed to consider resident input that the officers priorities and concerns.51 Different communities garner from attendance at beat meetings (anoth- also had major differences in their willingness er new responsibility). While the advantages of to become engaged with the CAPS efforts. the “beat” focus are obvious, one great disad- An additional way CAPS attempted to use vantage, compared to New York, is that the the community to identify problems, define pri- instruments the beat officer can control may be orities, identify resources and solutions, and to too few to address a crime problem which may evaluate the effectiveness of local CAPS be much larger than a single beat. efforts, was through establishing district advi- At the same time, the Chicago approach sory committees. In addition to meeting with invites the police to address non-crime prob- district commanders and staff on a monthly lems as well as crime. The beat officer and basis, committees were intended to establish his/her superiors are to focus on problem-solv- sub-committees to help with the identification ing, including community problems that are not and evaluation roles of the committees, concen- initially the responsibility of the police but are trating on specific needs or areas. In keeping within the control of the city government. The with the flexible, community-tailored focus of police officer is a form of ambassador from the the CAPS vision of community policing, the central government of Chicago, able to call on make up of the committees was not established other parts of the government for a variety of centrally. Committees were established by dis- services that can improve the quality of life in trict commanders, based on their view of the the neighbourhood and build social capital at most appropriate membership for the district. the same time.56

43 Heymann

This notion of problem-solving, which is 2.1.2 New York addressed to a wide range of problems of the Wesley Skogan also had played an important neighbourhood as defined by those living there, role as an intellectual father of one of the three contrasts importantly with a sharp focus on central characteristics of New York’s policing. rates of crime. Focused more broadly, Chicago It was his argument in the 1990 book Disorder is likely to have results less dramatic in terms and Decline that gave credibility to a ground- of violent crime rates but more satisfactory in breaking article by James Q. Wilson and terms of community acceptance and, through George Kelling, “Broken Windows,” in the that, on rates of fear. Atlantic Monthly almost two decades ago.62 Evidence measuring acceptance by the com- The central argument of Broken Windows was munity and the effectiveness of the CAPS pro- that disorderly conduct on public streets, some- gramme is mixed. Wesley Skogan led a thing which the police can certainly control, research effort to evaluate the CAPS pro- can undermine social control by frightening, or gramme, focusing on 15 of the 279 police otherwise discouraging, responsible citizens beats.57 In terms of implementation of problem from being in public places and, at the same solving, the overall assessment by the evalua- time, can encourage criminals to believe that tion team was that of the 15 beats, “four were crime would be safe because “obviously, no doing an excellent job, five were fielding rea- one at the scene of disorder cares”. The exag- sonable programmes, two were struggling to gerated perceptions of danger created by disor- make the grade and four failed to implement der were, in themselves, a costly source of fear much problem solving at all”.58 The reasons for that disturbed urban living. relative success or failure seem inextricably As a matter that was secondary in theory but, connected to factors such as the personalities, perhaps, primary in practice, Broken Windows enthusiasm, and leadership capabilities of the policing also justified very large numbers of officers. “frisks” and misdemeanor arrests which had the The variations between the attitudes and twin benefits of making the illegal carrying of efforts of the officers in the “worst” and “best” guns far more risky and picking up dangerous beats, in terms of implementation of problem- people who were wanted for other reasons. The solving, are dramatic. The officers and sergeant case for Broken Windows policing thus relies in the beat that the evaluation labelled as the on both the fact that disorder creates fear and “best”, actively participated in beat team and fear eliminates social control, inviting activities community meetings; developed, implemented, that may only take place in the absence of and followed through with problem-solving social control, and the fact that focusing on dis- strategies; utilised CAPS procedures and city orderly offenses allows and invites aggressive resources; and responded to community priori- street policing. ties. Interestingly, the beat’s population ranked This is a form of problem-solving policing, last of all the beats in terms of being supportive intended to build social control as well as to use of the police.59 In great contrast, the “worst” the capacities that the police already have to beat team’s sergeant and officers had negative deal with dangerous people, but it is unlike the or apathetic perspectives on their capacity to Chicago plan in its lack of dependence on any effect change; the role of community beat form of fact-finding to determine a neighbour- meetings (seeing them as a forum for complain- hood’s definition of problems or any major ing about the police); CAPS paperwork require- effort to encourage community participation in ments; and community policing in general their solution. The New York–style of policing (viewing it as public relations). Participation involves far more independent problem solving and attendance at beat team meetings were by the police than Chicago’s policing, although sparse and unproductive and they did not utilise one of its pillars is the belief, deeply embedded the resources available to them. CAPS proce- in the Broken Windows theory, that disorder is dures were utilised only nominally, if at all.60 a major concern of most responsible people in These patterns are consistent with the other any neighbourhood. “best” and “worst” beats.61 Other evidence of While the Broken Windows theory that citizen reactions is discussed after describing undergirds this strand of New York’s strategy New York’s strategies. has won nearly universal acclaim among schol-

44 Heymann ars,63 it has not been without detractors. One being done about it. The pressure is substantial, especially effective critic has been Professor and may be unnecessary. (Boston’s manage- Bernard E. Harcourt. In a 1998 article in the ment system examines what is happening and Michigan Law Review, Harcourt replicated what could be done in a far less confrontational Skogan’s analysis and took issue with many of way.) Part of New York’s message may be sim- his conclusions. Specifically, he found that cer- ply that the precinct commander should take tain types of crimes, including rape, purse- steps to release and encourage the natural incli- snatching, and pickpocketing, are simply not nations of the police officers to go after crime significantly related to levels of disorder.64 aggressively. But imagination and intelligence Moreover, most other types of crime were not is shared at the same time. related at a statistically significant level when Although close cooperation with neighbour- poverty, stability and race were held constant.65 hood groups and reliance on neighbourhood Harcourt similarly took issue with other empiri- leadership has not been a focus of the new cal evidence cited by proponents of the Broken policing in New York, there have occasionally Windows theory,66 concluding that the data been experiments in these areas. Even at its simply do not support the hypothesis.67 most responsive to communities, however, it A second major strand in New York’s strate- never approached the aims or practices of gies is the energetic, imaginative use of the full Chicago’s CAPS programme. range of police powers and capacities to deal with crime problems as they arise. Deputy 2.1.3 Results in New York and Chicago Commissioner Maple described the four crucial What do we know about the results in New steps of an effective police strategy as: accurate York and Chicago? Both cases remind us that and timely intelligence; rapid deployment; results on the street may depart from strategies. effective tactics; and relentless follow-up and Sometimes Chicago could not develop neigh- assessment. A crime problem might be solved bourhood policing in one beat, although it was by moving more officers into the area, by successful in an adjacent beat. New York has addressing its causes, by putting pressure on experienced a number of very dramatic and people subject to arrest and conviction to pro- inflammatory instances of police abuse which vide evidence, by reducing safe opportunities were certainly not planned as part of its strate- for crime, or in any of a dozen other ways. The gy. And its efforts at developing creative com- object of this second strand of New York polic- munity relations in the 75th precinct also seem ing is to be sure that every alternative use of exceptional – far from integral to its core strate- every available police capacity is considered in gies.69 Moreover, in each case, the studies were addressing what has been identified, promptly done within a very few years of the initiation of after it arose, as a significant crime problem. the strategy; that may be too soon to know the The third notable strand of New York polic- long-term consequences. But it is important to ing is the much admired and, in fact, remark- look at what we know now about two dimen- able system of management by results called sions: effectiveness in reducing crime and the CompStat.68 To assure the conditions of the ability of the police to develop trust within the second strand – early identification of the prob- community being policed. lems, careful and imaginative review of tactics In 1998, two arms of the Department of involving all police capacities, and very prompt Justice (the Office of Community-Oriented response – requires assisting precinct comman- Policing Services and the Bureau of Justice ders with ideas and, in the New York strategy, Statistics) produced a groundbreaking victimi- motivating them powerfully by the risk of sation survey of residents of 12 cities, two of embarrassment or, worse, loss of the command which were Chicago and New York. Questions of a precinct. Both of these objectives are went both to the level of crime, fear, and disor- accomplished by requiring each of the 75 der and to the attitudes of citizens toward the precinct commanders to appear at a very large police. meeting of headquarters staff, other precinct New York had the more serious crime prob- commanders, and prosecutors and be prepared lems but was making more progress in dealing to be examined on any adverse change in crime with them. In 1998, there were in Chicago 68 statistics in the precinct and to discuss what is violent victimisations per 1000 residents 12-

45 Heymann years-old or older; in New York, there were far police, asking for advice from the police, and more at 85 per 1000. The black violent victimi- participating in community activity with the sation rate in Chicago in 1998 was 50 per 1000 police. A significantly higher percentage of citizens for violent crime; in New York it was New York residents felt there was an increased 123 per 1000. A violent victimisation in New police presence in their neighbourhood; it just York was almost twice as likely to involve a took a different form. weapon. But during the period 1993–1997, The Chicago police elicited more satisfied homicides in Chicago decreased by about 10%. reactions from the victims of violent crimes In New York, homicides declined by more than than New York police and a significantly high- 60% from 26.5 per 100 000 to 10.5 per er percentage of Chicago residents said that the 100 000. police were doing a lot of work with the resi- In both Chicago and New York in 1998, residents of the neighbourhoods to prevent crime dents were far more likely to fear crime in their and safety problems. This is far more at the city than in their neighbourhood or on their heart of the Chicago strategy than the New street. Obviously, fears are more exaggerated as York strategy. Seventy-three per cent of the first-hand evidence declines. Along each of residents of Chicago were familiar with the these dimensions, there was slightly more fear term “community policing”. Only 50% of New in Chicago then in New York. Moreover, 25% York residents were, a revealing fact in itself. of the respondents in Chicago said they were One figure combined concern about crime more frightened than they had been a few years and concern about the police. Residents in both earlier and only 15% in New York were more cities were very satisfied with local police. Not frightened. surprisingly, blacks in both Chicago and New As might be expected with Broken Windows York were less satisfied with the local police policing, a slightly smaller percentage of the than were whites. But despite several notorious population in New York reported public drink- incidents of police brutality in New York, ing or drug use, public drug sales, vandalism, blacks there were more satisfied with the local graffiti, prostitution and panhandling in their police than were blacks in Chicago, by a mar- neighbourhood. In Chicago, 36% of the residents gin of 77% to 69%.70 said that conditions of disorder or, activities of the sort just described, made them feel less safe. 2.2 Boston This was true of only 29% in New York. Boston was not part of the Department of Seventy-four per cent of the residents in Justice survey of 12 cities. We do know that its Chicago reported themselves either very or strategies, which will be described presently, somewhat fearful of crime in their city. Only a are different from those of both New York and somewhat smaller figure, 68%, reported the Chicago – different not only in an attempt to same in New York. While most people in both combine parts of each of the other city’s strate- cities felt that their fear had not changed much, gies, but also in making very different use of there was a somewhat greater percentage of problem solving than New York and a very dif- those who felt reduced fear in New York. ferent use of neighbourhood cooperation than Reports on trust-building relations with the Chicago. The rate of homicide reduction in police were also revealing, but cut the other Boston during the past decade was nearly as way. Sixty-seven per cent of residents in dramatic as that in New York.71 Chicago and only 51% of New York residents It is worth reviewing the events that led said the police were doing community policing. Boston to embrace the community policing Thirty-eight per cent of Chicagoans, compared model. Already widely criticised for overly to 23% of New Yorkers, had heard about a aggressive street patrols, in the late 1980s the meeting concerning crime in their neighbour- Boston Police Department encountered public hood in 1998. Along all the following dimen- outrage when it was revealed that officers, sions, a somewhat higher percentage of those faced with the sudden emergence of crack from Chicago, than from New York, had con- cocaine, were indiscriminately stopping and tact with the police: casual conversation, call- searching young black men. The “stop and ing the police for service, providing informa- frisk” scandal came to a head in the fall of tion to the police, reporting a crime to the 1989. Based on widespread suspicion that

46 Heymann police routinely used unconstitutional searches many cities believe that the number of danger- and seizures, a Dorchester judge suppressed ous perpetrators is relatively small and that evidence he believed had been obtained their identities are known.) improperly. The Boston police discovered that youth in That same year, Carol Stuart, a pregnant the dangerous categories were subject to a large white woman, was murdered near a largely number of sanctions and inconveniences of one African-American part of Boston. Her husband sort or another. In Kennedy’s words: Charles, a witness to the crime, reported that a “The Boston Gun Project Working Group black male committed the murder. Based on observed that gangs and gang members left this account, the Boston Police Department themselves open to an enormous range of aggressively pursued suspects from the area, sanctions, exactly because they were so eventually eliciting witness statements that highly criminal. Gang members committed incriminated a local black resident. These large numbers of crimes that were open to charges turned out to be false when Charles ready police enforcement: they sold drugs Stuart was later implicated as the murderer. on the street and they committed large num- Stuart killed himself before the investigation bers of disorder offenses like drinking and could be completed. The widespread reports of using drugs in public, trespassing, and the police abuse, coupled with the appearance of like. Gangs and gang members were often racism within the department, exacerbated pub- the subject of longer-term enforcement lic hostility towards the police, particularly attention, such as undercover drug investi- within the African-American community. gations. They were frequently on probation, Recognising that they needed approaches that sometimes on parole, and they routinely were effective and less divisive, the Boston violated their conditions of probation and Police Department implemented a variety of parole, which could include curfews, area problem-solving and community-policing restrictions, restrictions on how many and strategies. The most notable “problem-solving” which people they could associate with, strategy in Boston is what David Kennedy, of abstinence from alcohol and other drugs, Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School and the like. They were often out on bail of Government, has called “Pulling Levers.”72 awaiting trial or sentencing, with similar In contrast to Broken Windows, it has not made conditions which were similarly frequently misdemeanor arrests, stops, and frisks a key to violated. Juvenile offenders were often reduced homicides by increasing the risks of under formal Department of Youth Services carrying guns, the most lethal weapon. Pulling (DYS) supervision but still living in the Levers is instead based on a form of deterrence community. And gangs and gang members that is new and yet grounded in a very old theo- were often implicated in large numbers of ry. ‘cold’ cases such as unsolved assaults and For some centuries, it has been accepted that homicides.”73 certainty and swiftness of punishment is more The threat of use of these sanctions could be likely to be effective in changing conduct than conveyed in person to the individuals whose longer penalties imposed without certainty or conduct had to be changed. Absent evidence of speed. This may be particularly true of youth- a serious crime, which could be hard to come ful, violent offenders who are likely to discount by, the police might not be able to stop all the sharply both the chance of getting caught and anti-social or criminal conduct of an individual the costs of future punishment and who may specifically warned of the amount of attention know little about actual punishments. Working and the range of sanctions to which he would with the Boston police, Kennedy found, from a be subject. But the sanctions were adequate to careful review of homicide files, that violence prevent any particular type of conduct, for in Boston was heavily concentrated, on both the example, violence. Indeed, violence may often perpetrator’s and the victim’s side, in gang be something that young people would like to members and among those with long arrest avoid if they could without losing face. In any records. Kennedy also found, not surprisingly, event, it was less important than profit-making that the identities of youth with these character- activities, which would be threatened by police istics were well-known to the police. (Police in attention.

47 Heymann

Thus, the overall strategy is clear and persua- policing precinct of which the Boston police sive. If, as was true in Boston, an identifiable are particularly proud. They take two forms: group of individuals is known or reasonably • modes of serious and continuous consultation believed to be responsible for a large percent- with citizens age of a particular type of crime, and if they are • demonstrations of concern for the well-being individually subject to a wide range of sanc- of young people getting in trouble, not just tions, then it should be possible to prevent them recrimination. from engaging in any type of criminal behav- Serious consultation began with city-wide iour which is not of central importance to them strategic planning with local priorities to be set by making clear, in face-to-face contact, that all by teams in each police district led by the dis- available sanctions will be brought to bear if trict commander but whose membership was they engage in the prohibited conduct. Violent divided between police and concerned, youth could be shown to fall into that category, involved citizens. Real power was devolved as could the crimes of violence that Boston was from headquarters to the district commander in determined to stop. The strategy would work so close association with citizen stakeholders. In long as the critical neighbourhoods – those that the Dorchester district, for example, Captain were home to the youth subject to highly spe- Dunford gives his neighbourhood advisory cific and threatening orders to give up violence council significant influence, even over budget – were supportive and did not regard the polic- allocations and patrol plans. Within each dis- ing strategy as unfair or discriminatory. Finding trict, “team leaders” are assigned special that support, which New York had done much responsibility for the special problems of a par- less well, was one of the objectives of the other, ticular beat. neighbourhood-based half, of Boston’s policing The neighbourhood orientation in Dorchester strategy. is maintained on a daily basis by four commu- Critical to Boston’s efforts to develop com- nity service officers each of whose assignment munity support was the police department’s is to interact with neighbourhood groups in a partnership with the Ten Point Coalition, a particular beat – explaining, learning, relaying prominent group of local black clergy who had concerns and recruiting participation in a made a name for themselves by taking their shared “Project Safeguard” to provide neigh- ministries to Boston’s most dangerous streets. bourhood safety. Despite historically tense relations, the two Finally, even prosecution is made subject to groups began to work together once they recog- community influence in still another pro- nised their mutual need: the ministers’ attempts gramme: the Dorchester Safe Neighbourhood to reach at-risk youth were undermined by Initiative whose Advisory Council includes committed offenders who continued to run the local residents as well as police and prosecu- streets, while the police department’s plans to tors. implement community-based strategies depend- The second strand in Boston is a demonstrated on the participation and acceptance of com- ed concern for the well-being of youth already munity members who did not trust them. Much getting into trouble. What the Boston police of Boston’s success in lowering crime and avoid is a sense that they are the dangerous developing community support arises from the enemies of all but the well-behaved among credibility the department developed by virtue youth in struggling neighbourhoods. Adopting of its association with the Ten Point Coalition. the mixed concerns of relatives of youth who This credibility has endured in large part form much of the community, the police are because the Coalition, while cooperative, has determined to make the life of salvageable remained a distinct entity not afraid to criticise youth better, not harder. Thus Commissioner police action. As a community watchdog, Ten Evans uses a federal block grant to pay for clin- Point has helped keep the police accountable ical social workers, who are attached to police and deterred abuses akin to those that have districts such as Dorchester, to advise and sup- plagued New York in recent years. port and introduce to useful programmes, youth The community-based activities, which are referred to them by police. They maintain con- very much part of Boston’s strategy, can be fidentiality and appear in court for the youth illustrated by the Dorchester neighbourhood, a where this seems appropriate to the case.

48 Heymann

Districts like Dorchester also have juvenile jus- sons not of the same household as himself” and tice “roundtables” that involve the police, dis- if the defendant cannot establish that his or her trict attorney, schools, social services, and oth- behaviour was reasonable in the circumstances, ers in regular discussions of what is happening a court order to protect the people in the local in the lives of a list of troubled youth in an government area for a minimum of two years effort to find help for them and to coordinate (and no maximum) is to be issued, prohibiting governmental responses. the individual from doing anything or being The Boston strategy had organisational impli- anywhere described in the order. Violating the cations. While some New York precinct com- order without a reasonable excuse is an manders found CompStat meetings harsh and indictable offense, which carries as much as a threatening, Commissioner Evans expected dis- five-year term. trict commanders in Boston to carry out their There is no requirement that the defendant plans in highly decentralised ways. His role had intended to harass or to cause alarm and was to decide whether to approve a plan and distress. Nor is there any requirement that the then support and monitor it. alarm or distress be “serious.” Moreover, the activities giving rise to the order are intended to 2.3 England and Wales be broader than the acts prohibited by the crim- One final strategy, distinct but related to the inal law. In effect, a magistrate’s court can deal three described above, deserves attention as with people it finds to be engaged in frighten- well, for it combines central elements of all ing behaviour by developing an injunctive law three strategies outlined. Like Chicago’s strate- of its own, a violation of which is punishable gy, the crime legislation introduced by Tony criminally. The primary explanation for bypass- Blair’s Labour Party relies powerfully on the ing general requirements of the criminal law in wishes of the neighbourhood residents and this way is that there are courses of conduct depends upon their initiating action. Like New which involve an accumulation of events, none York, it focuses attention on disorderly and of which is itself criminal but which together, fear-generating actions that are threatening to as an extended course of conduct, warrants individuals; but instead of using statutes that severe measures. The deterrence is even more broadly prohibit a type of conduct (such as specific and focused than Boston’s Pulling drinking alcoholic beverages on the street), Levers. Britain has turned to far more specific requirements that are addressed only to certain named 3. THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY individuals. How could anyone complain about such imagi- Like Boston, the new provisions are specifi- native and apparently successful policing as has cally targeted on individuals whose behaviour taken place, for example, in New York? The has shown them to be troublesome and who are answer is that, in exchange for quite remarkable not subject to present prosecution because of improvements in personal security, we are lack of evidence of an immediate crime. But accepting reductions in the democratic control the British prohibitions include efforts to deter and thus the legitimacy of the purposes for behaviour far less serious than the lethal vio- which the powers of the police can be used. lence that concerned Boston. And we are endorsing significant reductions in The Crime and Disorder Act of 1998,74 for control over the discretion of the police in England and Wales, creates something called choosing specific targets. an “anti-social behaviour order”. Either the We are moving toward a regime of policing police or the local government can apply for where the notions of equal protection, of proba- such an order from a magistrate’s court. The ble cause and reasonable suspicion as predi- defendant does not have to be present at the cates for detention and search, and the very proceedings, which are civil and operate under determination of what conduct will be permit- a “preponderance of the evidence” rule, not ted and what form of disorder is subject to requiring proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.” If prompt sanctions is left in far larger part to the the defendant is found to have acted “in a man- police. ner that caused, or was likely to cause harass- We must count the costs as well as the con- ment, or alarm, or distress to one or more per- siderable benefits of the new policing.

49 Heymann

3.1. The problem of the democratic carrying out whatever are the wishes of mem- legitimacy of the goals for which police bers of a community, and more. powers are used This denial of discretion is surely fiction in In describing the successes of the new policing, almost every country in the world. The police we have implicitly assumed that the goal was to officer is forced to decide on what occasions he reduce serious crime on a city-wide basis. It is or she should use these powers for two major time to examine whether this is in fact accepted reasons. First, in every country, what crimes an as the goal of the new policing and, if not, what officer will be in a position to act upon depends is? Indeed, a prior question remains unan- upon where he/she is and what he/she is look- swered: who is to set the goals? ing for and this involves discretion. Second, if he/she comes upon a minor matter that is crimi- 3.1.1 The inevitability of discretion nal, he/she has to decide whether it is worth To be clear at the start, the police have many his/her time, and the time of prosecutors and responsibilities beyond reducing crime. They judicial officials, to process the matter. In the prevent fights, regulate demonstrations, enforce US we are very frank about such uses of judge- traffic regulations, engage in rescue or other ment or discretion by individual police officers assistance, and much more. I have focused on or, sometimes, by the police department in the the crime reduction benefits of the new policing form of directives to officers. or the neighbourhood trust that it can induce In short, it is wholly implausible to assume because these have been the major subjects of that the goal in the US is to enforce all of the attention in bringing about the changes that criminal statutes enacted by state and federal have occurred since 1990, not because they are legislatures. The larger part of violations of the the only significant functions of a modern, law by 270 million Americans must be ignored urban police department. Second, unavoidably by less than one million police who do not have there are critical choices to be made as to goals, the time to investigate matters they consider even in the more limited area of dealing with unimportant, and who know that prosecutors the effects of crime on continuing danger, pub- and judges will lack the capacity to try cases if lic fear, social control in neighbourhoods and all the small matters are brought to court and public resentment of disorder. that juries are likely to reject the use of the Civil law countries from Argentina to France criminal law as excessive in those cases. We and Germany sometimes pretend that there is have come to assume that even statutes recently not a serious question as to the purposes for passed by a concerned legislature will be which police powers like those described above applied with discretion as to their use. can be used, contending that the police officer is obligated to arrest whenever he sees a crime 3.1.2 Traditional understandings and new and then to take investigative steps at the order choices of a judge whom the officer, carrying out It is how this discretion is used – not any novel- another legal obligation, must notify immedi- ty or recognition of the need for it – that has ately of the crime and the suspect. taken new shape as policing has changed. Until Thus, in 1999, Klaus Hubmann, the senior a few decades ago it was understood that police public prosecutor in Nuremberg, Germany, discretion – use of limited police resources – explained that he had to investigate a failed would be rationed by the seriousness of the attempt 53 years earlier by two Jewish sur- conduct that was being investigated. This seri- vivors of the Holocaust to poison members of ousness was in turn dictated by the people’s the SS.75 representatives in the legislature, who used sen- Political or moral aspects could play no part tencing levels to express their relative disap- in the decision, he explained. Civil law coun- proval of criminal conduct. The assumption, in tries deny that their police have the discretion, other words, was that there was a direct correla- so readily accepted in the US, not only to tion between the sentence imposed and the citi- decline to arrest in very sympathetic situations zenry’s view (as expressed through its elected but also to develop imaginative uses of police representatives) of the relative seriousness of powers for such purposes as reducing disorder, the conduct. As long as police employed sen- preventing violence, building social control, tences as guidelines to seriousness – and, for

50 Heymann the most part, they did – there was a strong views of the importance of each category democratic component to their enforcement should control? Again, there are a number of decisions. Thus, police ignored minor, regulato- alternatives. Whatever category the police lead- ry offenses or left them underpoliced and, ership considers most important might be criti- therefore, underdetected. The measures of cal. To set limits on acceptable goals, we might police performance we developed, focusing on want to forbid decisions that seem intended to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) statistics favour or disfavour the interests of an identifi- as to a few serious crimes, also reflected that able group or class, such as failing to investi- judgment. In recent decades, the focus has gate powerful political figures or concentrating come to include, besides punishing individual police effort in wealthy neighbourhoods and crimes, incapacitating dangerous criminal failing to provide adequate policing in poor groups ranging from organised crime to terror- neighbourhoods, or – a contentious issue – pro- ists to street gangs. But what qualified a group jecting the views of the police, without any for attention was still the seriousness of the popular basis for the choice, as to such issues as conduct in which it engaged: political violence, freedom from fear or what suppressing disorder organised street violence, corruption of offi- requires. cials, intimidation and extortion. A second alternative is that the categories of Both traditional assumptions about the goals crime most deserving of priority are whatever or ends of policing and assumptions about how the police think that the majority of the citizens the available means or powers will be used to of the city want addressed, regardless of the accomplish whatever goals are chosen have views of the people in the immediate neigh- been brought into question by the new policing. bourhood where the problem exists and the Leaving changes in assumptions about means policing is to occur. A closely related alterna- until later, we should focus first on the question tive is that priority should go to whatever prob- of legitimacy of goals. lems the mayor wants addressed, for he/she is Consider the issues presented by “problem- the duly-elected supervisor of the police. solving” policing. What problems should be Another alternative is to give priority to given priority? The menu of possible “prob- whatever problems the police believe the peo- lems” of street crime the police might decide to ple in the particular neighbourhood want address includes: addressed. This could be defined several differ- • Forms of particularly harmful violence such ent ways: “the respectable leadership of the as homicides, rape or regular intimidation by neighbourhood” (where the definition of organised crime, a gang,or individuals. “respectable” may amount to police selection of • All violence. acceptable behaviour); those in the neighbour- • Activities that create fear in many people or hood who volunteer to work with the police; or otherwise discourage social control such as the majority of residents of the neighbourhood, the disorder coming from open-air drug mar- although there is generally no available process kets. for determining majority views in a neighbour- • All forms of drug trafficking. hood. • The security of property against even non- Some of these ways of setting priorities are violent theft. more democratic than others, either in the effort Moreover, these and perhaps other categories by the police to decide whose concerns are to of crime are more or less important, depending be valued or in the making of the actual choice on the place, time and victims of the crime. So by one or another of the different groups. But the choice is among at least five categories of even in the more democratic methods, deep crime with at least three variations of each. In problems lurk. The police may not be very fact, after some discussion, one might well good at determining the views of the majority want to increase the number of choices to well of the public, however we define the relevant beyond 15. public. As always, the size of the constituency also 3.1.3 Whose views should priorities reflect? matters. We know by surveys that people gen- With these reasonable contenders for priority in erally believe their own neighbourhoods to be policing, a critical question becomes: whose far safer than they believe the entire city to

51 Heymann be.76 The people outside a neighbourhood area Or the fear may be of intrusiveness into areas are thus more likely to be influenced by fear, of privacy that one wanted to reserve for one- even if exaggerated, and by the immense effect self and intimates. Owing to these fears, we of rare but dramatic crimes as described by the have come to expect more from the police than media. Neighbourhood majorities are likely to effectiveness in pursuing even carefully chosen have different attitudes than majorities of a far goals. larger, entire-urban jurisdiction. We expect, first, a concern about maintaining Even if the decision is made to focus on the a healthy relationship between the citizen and views of local communities that are smaller the authority and power of the state; i.e., a than entire cities, the result is likely to depend respect for the liberty and privacy of individu- on how one defines a neighbourhood. (Chicago als. Second, we demand an absence of bias in is redrawing borders of neighbourhoods for the use of the powers described above, for these purposes.) But the hardest problem is assertions of police authority and force that are deciding whose views matter. The fact is that systematically biased against a racial, religious different groups want different things. The or ethnic group convey a powerful message of young and the old are likely to have different second-class citizenship. Bias against political attitudes toward disorder. Minorities in a city opponents of the police or their political super- are likely to have different attitudes than visors is also a terrible threat to a vital democ- majorities. Most dramatically, the problem can racy. We expect, third and most broadly, to be be illustrated by the question: What value accorded the respect that a citizen deserves in a should be given to the concerns of rebellious citizen-ruled democracy – respect displayed in minority youth in an urban slum. Some have the way individuals are addressed and handled, treated this group as entitled to concern; others particularly in front of others. To protect all have regarded this group as the object, not the these expectations, we depend on the visibility beneficiary, of policing. and reviewability of significant decisions by In sum, problem-solving policing, whether or police officers. not it takes its goals from those living in a par- In some conflict with these three expectations ticular neighbourhood, requires choice among a the new policing, in many of its manifestations, variety of goals. Even assuming that the objec- involves tactics and strategies which are likely: tive is to choose goals democratically, so that to increase the power of the state at the expense the police are acting in the name of those of the capacity of citizens to avoid or resist that affected by their policing, there is no agreed power; to invite the use of discretion in ways upon definition of whose concerns are to be that are more likely to reveal bias than the older valued, how they are to be determined, and forms of policing; and to increase the likeli- what is to be done when those affected have hood of particular groups of people being sub- inconsistent concerns. jected to embarrassment, and treated without It may not be possible to resolve these ques- respect on the streets. At the same time, the tions persuasively in terms of some political new forms of policing are almost designed to philosophy. But it is certainly dangerous, in be carried out beneath the radar of visibility on terms of democratic values, to leave these ques- which accountability depends. Thus, there is a tions unaddressed. That is a dangerous charac- price to be paid for the great potential of the teristic of the “new policing”. new forms of policing, but the price can be reduced by addressing it carefully. 3.2 The abuse of police powers For many people, the police represent not only 3.2.1 Citizen and state: civil liberties protection against the predatory conduct of Consider the effect of the new policing on the one’s neighbour but also a source of fear them- efforts of the past half-century to control the selves. The fear may be of brutality by the only relationship of the state to the individual and, in legitimate armed force in the community or of particular, of a police officer to a citizen. The the embarrassment of being treated, particularly specific fears during that period focused on publicly, without dignity or respect by mem- police abuse of the powers to search, arrest and bers of an organisation (the police) that repre- interrogate. In the 1960s, the US Supreme sents the authority and the power of the state. Court insisted that all of these powers, even

52 Heymann when exercised by local police officers, must has committed a crime in order to get evidence; satisfy specific conditions – probable cause or and, perhaps most dramatically, the constitu- reasonable suspicion and the Miranda rules – or tional power to arrest some individuals, and not else any evidence flowing from the action others, for minor offenses in order to take would be excluded from trial.77 The assumption advantage of the power to search, within a lim- was that there would be little incentive to vio- ited area, in connection with an arrest.80 late the Court’s rules if the information could Seeking greater freedom of action, a police not be used at trial. A somewhat more lenient officer or department could emphasise these standard was enough to stop or frisk an individ- unregulated powers. And even the regulated ual (reasonable and articulable suspicion), and powers could be violated without much fear of a somewhat stricter standard was applicable to consequences if the purpose was not to sup- electronic surveillance.78 press evidence. Because these standards required the police The new policing is intended, in many to show that, before acting, they had evidence instances, to greatly increase the effectiveness of a crime (and since the focus of policing was of the unregulated powers and to find ways to on very serious crimes), there has been practi- avoid judicial enforcement by the exclusionary cally no use of the equal protection clause to rule of even such regulated powers as “stop and guarantee that minorities are not treated differ- frisk”. Findings by the Attorney General of the ently; they could not be subject to these police State of New York suggest that there has been powers at all unless there was an adequate basis no adequate effort by the New York police to to believe they had committed what was gener- restrict frisks or stops to the situations where ally a serious crime. And there was a final pro- the Constitution permits that activity.81 The tection of which we were very proud: the police result of many tens of thousands of such stops could not arrest or search at all if the basis for has undoubtedly been a sizeable reduction in that activity – the definition of the criminal the carrying of guns and thereby of homicides. conduct of which the police needed evidence – But there is a price for abandoning this part of was so general and encompassing in its cover- the system of accountability for detentions and age or so vague in what it forbade, that it left searches. A rapid increase in misdemeanor the police officer with the widest discretion in arrests or the use of a variety of other formal or deciding whose conduct and what conduct informal sanctions in situations where the aver- should be made the basis of arrest and, perhaps, age citizen would not be subjected to that trial.79 police power recreates the very capacity to tar- It is true and important that these efforts to get specific individuals, gangs and other groups limit the powers of the police and to regulate – particularly minority youth – that the the relations between citizen and state in a way Supreme Court had tried to forbid by outlawing that respects the primacy of the citizen were the use of vague statutes. based on two suppositions that were, at least, In a number of situations in a number of shaky. The first was that police conduct on the cities, a major component of the new policing street would very largely be motivated by the strategy is to rely increasingly on that set of desire to gather evidence for trial, and thus police powers which are substantially unregu- could be regulated by excluding evidence lated by law and to take advantage of the obtained in violation of the restrictions on inability of courts to hold the police account- police behaviour. Second, and equally impor- able by recourse to the exclusion of evidence – tant, the rules did not provide protection all in order to focus unreviewable police discre- against, or regulate in any significant way, tion on those forms of conduct and those indi- some very powerful investigative techniques: viduals that the police somehow determine are the use of informants; the use of grand jury most dangerous. This conscious use of the powers to compel testimony prior to trial; weaknesses in the control system built up since police offers to engage in illegal transactions in 1950 has had dramatic and beneficial results in order to develop evidence; a variety of types of handling crime, but not without significant physical surveillance; a variety of techniques risks of changing the relationship of the citizen for eliciting “consent” to a form of detention or to the state, of the police to individuals on the search; threats to prosecute an individual who street. It may well be that most people in most

53 Heymann neighbourhoods regard the trade-off as highly weak evidence as a basis for finding “reason- favourable to the new policing.82 It is nonethe- able suspicion” and for the invocation of pow- less dangerous to democratic values. ers that do not ordinarily require any justification or form of accountability. Thus, a review 3.2.2 Equal protection: civil rights of 175 000 forms detailing “stop and frisk” There has been only extremely rare use of the activity in New York city by New York State’s equal protection clause to regulate police con- Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer,85 showed that duct, on the theory that important intrusions even police records reflect about nine stops of such as arrest and search are adequately regu- blacks and Hispanics and eight stops of whites lated by the requirements of probable cause and for each resulting arrest. In its focus on prob- that minor intrusions, which have not been reg- lem solving, the new policing also emphasises ulated by the Constitution or statute, hardly the steps that can be taken against an individual deserve special attention. But the second part of without any individualised basis in fact. A fre- this judgement has proven to be inadequate in a quent example is stopping a driver and search- number of ways. Stopping more blacks and ing his/her car for drugs under the pretext of Hispanics than white non-Hispanics either concern that the car’s taillight is not working or without the justification of reasonable suspicion its speed is excessive, and that the car is being or with the justification of having observed a operated therefore in violation of a local ordi- violation of the law – albeit one that is general- nance. Such forms of policing allow and ly ignored in the case of others – may be rela- encourage the use of guesses and probabilities tively unimportant in its immediate effects on that are far less dependent on evidence, com- an individual but of immense importance in pared to what has traditionally been required what it says about the place of black or for a stop or an arrest or a search to gather Hispanic Americans in the society and in terms information. of the felt reality of the promise of equal pro- Weaker requirements of justification for tection of their government they have been police action almost invariably invite more given by the US Constitution. Moreover, it may bias. The Spitzer study showed that “even when be the embarrassment and resentment of being crime is accounted for statistically, minorities singled out as a suspect, far more than the intru- still were being ‘stopped’ at a higher rate than sion on one’s privacy that needs protection, as whites”; blacks were 23% more likely and Chief Justice Warren recognised in writing the Hispanics 39% more likely than white non- opinion in Terry v. Ohio83 sustaining “stop and Hispanics to be stopped by police.86 frisk”. Finally, what may be a minor intrusion, Generalisations about the greater likelihood if it occurs on a single occasion, may be a that a particular group will be involved in a par- major problem if it occurs regularly enough to ticular criminal activity, such as dealing crack fuel the fears and affect the conduct of mem- cocaine, are now more likely to be made the bers of a suspect class (for example, minority basis for substantial disparities in treatment youth in a high-crime area). than they were before strategic emphasis was Beyond the costs of these largely unreview- put on the unregulated areas of police conduct. able uses of powers against those the police Then, even if members of group X were more believe, often correctly, to be more likely to be likely than others to be selling crack cocaine, engaged in a particular type of crime, there is the likelihood of any particular member of X the problem of spillover to clear violations of being engaged in that conduct is generally so the rules with respect to arrest or search or small that it could not satisfy probable cause or interrogation. The brutality and the excessive reasonable suspicion. force displayed in the Louima and Diallo cases Questioning someone (for example, a in New York City increase the sense of insecu- Hispanic youth) on a corner in a way that sug- rity and the reluctance to exercise the liberties gests they are not free to leave, which the of other citizens of African-Americans.84 Supreme Court has allowed,87 or searching a To the extent that the new policing encour- car, or making a street stop of a pedestrian are ages the police to focus investigative attention all likely to be based, to some extent, on the on the earliest signs of criminal behaviour or racial or ethnic characteristics that the police even on disorder alone, it invites using even believe more frequently accompany crimes of

54 Heymann concern.88 A focus on types of dangerous or out danger to themselves or others if they treat criminal behaviour, rather than on the behav- the suspect with respect. All of these are practi- iour of specific individuals, invites these gener- cal reasons from the point of view of law alisations. It is also at the heart of much of the enforcement for insisting on at least the appear- new policing. It is in this context that we should ance of a respectful attitude toward those who understand the debate about racial profiling. are confronted with real or apparent powers of the police. 3.2.3 Respect and civility The issue is at least equally important from Sara Stoutland argues, on the basis of an ethno- the point of view of many law-abiding residents graphic study of the reactions of youth and their in a neighbourhood for whom a continuing older family members in Boston, that neigh- question is whether the police are there to sup- bourhoods which are subjected to the new port them or to protect people in other areas policing in Boston are pleased with the safety it from them or their children. Citizens who feel has provided but concerned about the absence themselves and their children the object of of respect shown to the citizens it confronts. policing intended to protect others and who feel One can detect this disparity in the review of that the steps taken reflect a lack of respect for attitudes towards policing in New York and them as citizens and individuals, are made to Chicago. feel like second-class citizens, used rather than This issue is related to, but different from, valued. They are also taught to fear the police concerns about equal protection and legally rather than to value their services, an attitude defined civil liberties. An absence of respect that creates sympathy for youth in revolt and may be the source of much of the offense given frustration for their elders who need protection by a failure to treat certain stigmatised groups but insist on respect. of citizens equally with other groups; but the Some significant forms of the new policing issue of respect is broader and is applicable to involves dealing with individuals through police interactions with any group of citizens. implicit coercion. In New York, signalling that The difference in treatment between groups it is the police who control the streets by “zero may be attributable to the political influence of tolerance” policing, claiming to decide what is one group which elicits respectful handling by acceptable conduct and what is disorderly the police, while the absence of such influence behaviour, and gathering information by “lean- may invite less respectful relations for the ing on” those who are vulnerable to revocation other. Ethnic or racial bias may not be the of parole or probation – all these may be issue. An absence of respect also often reflects extremely useful steps in creating security but a sense that the individual is without rights extremely costly in denying respect. In Boston, against the state. But here, too, there is a differ- the gathering of information by relatively coer- ence. An officer making a “stop” and then cive questioning on the streets, accompanied by frisking a citizen on a crowded street may be conveying some notion of the power of com- acting well within the parameters of reasonable puterised retrieval of such information, can suspicion that the law imposes, yet the way the have the same beneficial and harmful effects. stop is made may convey humiliating contempt All of this activity is designed to take place for the suspect. beneath the radar screen of judicial review, It is becoming very clear that the cause of another consequence that Chief Justice Warren much violence by youth against other youth is a anticipated when reviewing powers to stop and sense of being treated without respect. The frisk. The effects on the citizens in the neigh- resulting attack is a distorted form of insistence bourhood and on their attitudes towards the on being treated with dignity and as “an impor- police are captured in the statistical assessments tant person”. Distinguished police commission- of policing in Chicago and New York. ers, such as Commissioner Evans in Boston, contend that even forcible encounters like a 3.2.4 The Task of the future: keeping the stop or arrest can, in most cases, be handled in security advantages of the new policing a way that reflects respect for the suspect. while reducing its risks to civil liberties Police officers in the housing projects of There is every reason to believe that the great Chicago report that they can make arrests with- majority of people in almost every city and the

55 Heymann clear majority of those in the neighbourhoods tude of “low visibility” occurrences that are at most threatened by both insecurity and the risks issue. Administrative discipline under rules that to civil liberties would, if forced to choose, pre- are more manageable is one likely solution. fer the new forms of policing. The advantages Regulatory schemes require credibility and of personal security are that great. Indeed, as credibility often requires some form of external noted above, a majority of the residents of oversight, not of individual administrative some Chicago housing projects were prepared determinations but of the adequacy of the func- to give up their right to refuse to have their tioning of the administrative system, as New apartments searched without probable cause in York’s Mollen Commission suggested some the interests of greater personal security.89 years ago. In the past decade independent part- But the choice should not be so stark. Uses of nerships like that between the Boston Police discretion that are beneath the level of visibility Department and the Ten Point Coalition have to courts can be the subject of departmental benefited both organisations and the city as a regulation. The reliance on the exclusionary whole. By blending criticism with approval, the rule as a primary sanction need not mean that it Coalition has helped cultivate the police pro- is the exclusive sanction. What we need, in grammes that are responsible for Boston’s short, is a regulatory system with other sanc- remarkable success. Significantly, the fruits of tions and new rules. We must find ways to have this effort – the drop in youth homicide, drug both civil liberties and security. use, and overall crime – are nowhere more Consider some examples of new forms of apparent than on the streets of Dorchester and regulation. The problem of changed relation- Roxbury, where furore over police abuse first ships between the citizen and the state, between erupted. the resident and the police officer, could be Relationships like this one help fill the void addressed, in part, by requiring the police to left by the erosion of judicial oversight. They make clear when they are asserting authority are, however, comparatively rare. An unfortu- and when they are simply making a request to nate series of events, coupled with an unprece- stop or submit to a search. The Supreme Court dented willingness by Boston’s police chiefs has ruled that this is not required by the and black ministers to work together, brought Constitution.90 But the practice of taking about this unlikely partnership. Its enduring advantage of a citizen’s ignorance of his/her nature testifies to their commitment and mutual rights or his/her unfounded fears remains sub- dependence. As in other cities, there are still ject to political review and it is unwise in light tensions between officers and the minority resi- of an increasing emphasis on control of the dents whom Ten Point represents. This friction streets and the gathering of information by assures each organisations’ independence. informal means. Efforts to keep track of the What remains to be seen is whether cities like percentage of black, Hispanic, and white, non- New York, in the wake of outrage over assaults Hispanic drivers of cars that are stopped and to like those on Abner Louima and Amadou make those figures available publicly are regu- Diallo, will be willing to reach out as Boston latory steps that can have major consequences did following the Carol Stuart murder and the on a sense of discrimination.91 Keeping track of “stop-and-frisk scandal” in the early1990s. the number of complaints against any officer These suggestions are meant to be illustra- for disrespectful behaviour can be an important tive, far from comprehensive. The central idea step in encouraging respect, particularly if it is is that new rules are required to regulate the accompanied by appropriate training. new policing and that these cannot take the Most rules require some sanctions if they are form of judicial review of the admissibility of to be taken seriously. For behaviour that is not evidence. They probably cannot depend primar- generally designed to elicit evidence for crimi- ily on any form of judicial sanctions for viola- nal trials – the situation with regard to much of tions of the rules, both because the rules will be the new policing – the exclusionary rule is developed administratively and because they plainly an inadequate sanction. Nor is there will regulate forms of behaviour that have long much promise in the form of civil law suits, been considered too subtle to justify judicial which are likely to be much too costly for rem- review. What we need is the acceptance of new edying the risks to civil liberties in the multi- forms of responsibility for civil liberties by

56 Heymann police agencies involved in the forms of new outside of the police but it would be of process- policing. Credible oversight must involve those es and structures, not of individual cases.

ENDNOTES 1) See Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Dep’t see, e.g., Eric Lipton, Giuliani Pulls His of Justice, Homicide Trends in the United Charts out for a Review of New York, States § 2 (2000) (visited February 27, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 2000, at B9 (“In the 2000) http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homi- first six months of this year, crimes in the cide/hmrt.htm seven major categories fell 7.8%” in New 2) See Global Report on Crime and Justice York City); Terry, supra (noting that “with 313–14 (Grame Newman ed., 1999) (list- only a few exceptions, violent crime is ing homicide rates for more than three down nationwide” as of July 2000). dozen industrial countries as reported in 5) See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. five United Nations surveys between 1974 Dep’t of Justice, National Crime and 1993). Victimisation Survey, 9tbl.7 3) See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv9 Dep’t of Justice, Homicide Trends in the 8.pdf (reporting sharp decline in property United States § 3 (2000) (visited February crimes); see id. at 11 & 11 tbl.8 (reporting 27, 2000) http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ decline for specific demographic groups). bjs/homicide/oage.txt 6) See Keith Bradsher, Fear of Crime 4) See, e.g., Tom Farmer, Violent Crimes Trumps the Fear of Lost Youth, N.Y. Plunge in U.S., Boston Herald, Aug. 28, Times, Nov. 21, 1999, at D3 2000, at 1 (noting that Boston had already 7) See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t surpassed its 1999 murder total, and that of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice police had reported a 13% increase in Statistics – 1997, at 245 tbl.3.82 (1998). shootings); Brett Martel, Murder on Rise 8) See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. in Major Cities, Chicago Sun-Times, June Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal 23, 2000, at 26 (reporting that murders had Justice Statistics – 1996, at 528 tbl.6.30 increased over 1999 in Baltimore, Boston, (1997). Dallas, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New 9) See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. York, and Philadelphia); Don Terry, In a Supp. 792, 796 - 97 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Turn of the Tide, Bloodshed Rises in Los Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law Angeles, N.Y. Times, July 11, 2000, at and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 A14 (reporting a 7.5% increase in violent L. & Soc’y Rev. 805, (1998). crime over 1999 in Los Angeles, including 10) Compare Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. more murders, rapes, and robberies, but Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Victimisation noting that “with only a few exceptions, and Perceptions of Community Safety in violent crime is down nationwide”). But 12 Cities, 1998, at 9 (1999) (reporting that

57 Heymann

New York’s murder rate fell 65.8% Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising: between 1990 and 1997), with id. (report- A Report to the United States Congress ing that San Diego’s murder rate fell (Lawrence W. Sherman et al. eds., 1997). 53.3% during the same period), and id. 23) Evidence of epidemics of crime when (reporting that Los Angeles’s murder rate police are on strike. fell 42.2% during the same period). 24) See Sherman, supra note 22, at 8-11. 11) See Marc Lacey, Teen-Age Birth Rate in 25) See id. at 8-11 – 8-13 (citing, e.g., Robert U.S. Falls Again, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, Trojanowicz, Evaluating a Neighbourhood 1999, at A16. Foot Patrol Programme: The Flint, 12) See Judith Havemann, Birthrate Drops for Michigan Project, in Community Crime Teens of All Races, Wash. Post, May 1, Prevention: Does It Work? (Dennis 1998, at A1 (reporting a 20.6% drop for Rosenbaum ed., 1986). black teens during that period). 26) See id. at 8-3 – 8-4 (citing epidemiological 13) See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep’t of studies showing that crime is localised). Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau Historical 27) See id. at 8-15 (citing Lawrence W. Poverty Tables – People tbl.3, (visited Sherman & David A. Weisburd, General Mar. 23, 2000) http://www.census.gov/ Deterrence Effects of Police Patrol in hhes/poverty/histpov/hstpov3.html. Crime “Hot Spots”: A Randomised, 14) See National Center for Education Controlled Trial, 12 Just. Q. 625 (1995)). Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 28) See id. at 8-20 – 8-21 (citing Susan Martin 1998 at 17tbl.8 (1998). & Lawrence W. Sherman, Selective 15) See Fox Butterfield, Drop in Homicide Apprehension: A Police Strategy for Rate Linked to Crack’s Decline, N.Y. Repeat Offenders, 24 Criminology 55 Times, Oct. 27, 1997, at A12 (reporting on (1986) (Washington); Allan F. Abrahamse a Justice Department study finding that the et al., An Experimental Evaluation of the “waning of the crack cocaine epidemic” Phoenix Repeat Offender Programme 8 was the “most important reason” for the Just. Q. 141 (1991) (Phoenix)). drop in homicide rates through the 1990s). 29) See id. at 8-24 (citing James W. Shaw, 16) The Boston case study set out in this vol- Community Policing Against Crime: ume provides an excellent example. Violence and Firearms (unpublished Ph.D. 17) See John J. Donohue III & Steven D. dissertation, University of Maryland Levitt, Legalised Abortion and Crime, 115 (College Park)) (guns); Ross Homel, Q. J. Econ. (forthcoming 2000). Random Breath Testing and Random 18) See, e.g., Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Stopping Programmes in Australia, in Levitt, Using Sentence Enhancements to Drinking and Driving: Advances in Distinguish Between Deterrence and Research and Prevention (R.J. Wilson & Incapacitation, 42 J.L. & Econ. 343, 346 R. Mann eds., 1990) (drunk driving)). (1999) (employing a novel approach to 30) See id. at 8-31 (citing Lawrence W. separating incapacitation effects from Sherman et al., National Institute of deterrence effects, and finding that the lat- Justice, The Kansas City Gun Experiment ter were “nontrivial” for a series of 1982 (1995)). sentence enhancements in California). 31) See id. at 8-16, 8-18 (citing, e.g., Malcolm 19) See Alfred Blumstein & Richard Klein, Labelling Theory and Delinquency Rosenfeld, Explaining Recent Trends in Policy: An Empirical Test, 13 Crim. Just. U.S. Homicide Rates, 88 J. Crim. L. & & Behav. 47 (1986)). Criminology 1175, 1196 (1998); see also 32) See id. at 8-19 (citing several studies). id. at 1194 fig.6b, 1195 fig.6c. 33) See id. at 8-25 – 8-26. 20) See id. at 1196. 34) See id. at 8-26, 8-29 (citing an unpub- 21) See Office of Juvenile Justice and lished study). Delinquency Prevention, 1996 National 35) See 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd (Public Safety Youth Gang Survey 32 (1999). Partnership and Community Policing Act 22) Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing for Crime of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, Title I, Sept. 13, Prevention, in Preventing Crime: What 1994, 108 Stat. 1807).

58 Heymann

36) NIJ Papers (ordered). stood as a recurring situation or series of 37) Report of the Commissioner of Police of related incidents (unlikely to be resolved the Metropolis 6 (1999). on their own) that affect a significant por- 38) This sense that traditional modes of polic- tion of the community and can possibly be ing were ineffective also coincided with affected by the resources of the communi- the rise of privately funded security. The ty and the police. See Skogan, et al., On causal link between the former and the lat- the Beat, at 35. ter is certainly open to question, however, 48) For CAPS purposes, the city’s 25 police as privately funded security has grown districts were divided into 279 beats, with inexorably for many years now. See David 9 to 15 beats per district. In 1990, the A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA average beat included 3600 households, or L. Rev. 1165, 1175 (1999). about 9500 residents. See id. at 58. 39) See Herman Goldstein, Problem-Oriented 49) Wesley G. Skogan and Elizabeth M. Policing (1990). Hartnett, Community Policing, Chicago 40) See Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Style 113 (1997). Prevention: Its Theoretical Basis and 50) See id. at 55. Practical Scope, in Crime and Justice: An 51) Skogan, et al., On the Beat at 30 (“Latinos Annual Review of Research, vol. 4, were distinctly concerned about gangs and (Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, eds. poor people about the physical decay of 1983). their neighbourhoods. Concern about 41) Lawrence Sherman et. al, Hot Spots of social disorder was highest in the middle Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and of the income distribution–above the the Criminology of Place, 27 Criminology neighbourhoods that were blighted by 27 (1989). drugs and gangs but below the best-off 42) Wesley G. Skogan, et al. On the Beat: places, which had fewer problems of all Police and Community Problem Solving kinds to report.”). 16-18 (1999). 52) Together We Can: A Strategic Plan for 43) NIJ Papers 1993. Reinventing the Chicago Police 44) See, e.g., Wesley G. Skogan & Michael G. Department 17 (1993); Skogan, et al., On Maxfield, Coping With Crime: Individual the Beat at 59. and Neighbourhood Reactions (1981) 53) Beat teams consist of the officers who WID-LC HV6791.S56; Wesley G. work in the same beat covering all three, Skogan, Disorder and Decline : Crime eight-hour shifts. Each team has roughly and the Spiral of Decay in American nine officers. See id. at 59. Neighbourhoods (1990) HV 6791.S57 54) See id. at 60. 1990. 55) Skogan, et al., On the Beat at 41, 47. 45) See, e.g., Clifford R. Shaw & Henry D. 56) See id. at 36, 41. McKay, Juvenile Delinquency in Urban 57) See id. at 30. Areas (1942); Robert E. Park, Human 58) Id. at 191. Ecology, 42 American Journal of 59) See id. at 192–94. Sociology 1 (1937); Ernest Burgess, The 60) See id. at 194–95. Growth of the City, in The City (Robert E. 61) Id. at 195–205. Park & Ernest Burgess, eds., 1925). 62) James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, 46) R. J. Sampson, S. W. Raudenbush, & F. Broken Windows, Atlantic Monthly, Earls Neighbourhoods and violent crime: 29–38 (March 1982). A multilevel study of collective efficacy, 63) Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the 277(5328) Science 918–924 (Aug. 15, Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence 1997); R. J. Sampson, J. Morenoff, & F. Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Earls, Beyond Social Capital: Spatial Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Dynamics of Collective Efficacy for Policing New York Style, 97 Mich. L. Rev. Children, 64 Amer. Sociol. Rev. 633–660 291, 293 (1998) (“[I]t is today practically (Oct. 1999). impossible to find a single scholarly arti- 47) In the CAPS model, a “problem” is under- cle that takes issue with the quality-of-life

59 Heymann

initiative. It stands, in essence, uncontest- 73) Id. at 461 (footnote omitted). ed – even in the legal academy.”) 74) Crime and Disorder Act of 1998, (31 July 64) Id. at 327. 1998), Royal Assent 27 July 1999. 65) Id. at 327 – 28 (identifying this relation- 75) See Louise Potterton, Germany Pursues ship between disorder and both burglary Holocaust Avengers, London Sunday and physical assault). Indeed, the only Telegraph, October 10, 1999. crime significantly related to disorder once 76) U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of poverty, race, and stability were held con- Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimisation stant was robbery. But when Harcourt and Perceptions of Community Safety in removed a cluster of five Newark neigh- 12 Cities, 1998, NCJ 173940, at 12, 18 bourhoods from the data, and held pover- (May 1999). ty, race, and stability constant, he found 77) See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 no relationship between disorder and rob- (1961). bery victimisation. Id. at 328 – 29. 78) See Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 66) Id. at 329 – 31 (finding inconclusive a 79) See Papichristou v. City of Jacksonville, similar study on the relationship between 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). crime and disorder, Robert Sampson & 80) United States v. Robinson 414 U.S. 218 Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the (1973). Police on Crime: A Replication and 81) Eliot Spitzer, The New York City Police Theoretical Extension, 22 Law & Soc’y Department’s “Stop & Frisk” Practices: A Rev. 163 (1988)); id. at 331 – 39 (suggest- Report to the People of the State of New ing a number of factors, as alternatives to York from the Office of the Attorney the quality-of-life initiative, to explain the General, at 69–72, 160–74, December 1, decline in New York City’s crime rates). 1999. 67) Id. at 329. 82) Tracey L Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law 68) See David C. Anderson, Crime Stoppers, and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 N.Y. Times, February 9, 1997, at Section Law & Society Review 805, 830 (1998). 6, page 47 (describing the CompStat sys- 83) 392 U.S. 1 (1968). tem). 84) See Joseph P. Fried & Blaine Harden, The 69) See Harvey Simon & John Buntin, The Louima Case: The Overview–Officer is East New York Urban Youth Corps and Guilty in Torture of Louima, N.Y. Times, Community Policing: A New Initiative in June 9, 1999, at A1 (conviction); Jane the “Dead Zone”, Kennedy School of Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Government Case Programme (1999); Overview–4 Officers in Diallo Shooting John Buntin, The Community Security are Acquitted of all Charges, N.Y. Times, Initiative Gets Underway, Kennedy February 26, 2000, at A1 (acquittal). School of Government Case Programme 85) See Spitzer, supra note 81 at 111. (1998). 86) Id. at 119, 123. 70) See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. 87) See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Victimisation 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Florida v. Royer, and Perceptions of Community Safety in 460 U.S. 491 (1983); ); Florida v. Bostick, 12 Cities, 1998, at 25 tbl. 34 (1999. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 71) See Fox Butterfield, Cities Reduce Crime 88) United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391 and Conflict Without New York-Style (1992). Hardball, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2000, at A1 89) See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, (noting that according to Professor When Rights are Wrong, Boston Review, 4 Blumstein, New York’s homicide rate fell April/May 1999. 70.6% from 1991 to 1998, while Boston’s 90) See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. fell 69.3%). 218 (1973); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 72) See David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: 429 (1991). Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, 91) See Police Tactics in Question: ‘Stop and and a Theory of Prevention, 31 Val. U. L. Frisk’ in New York, N.Y. Times, Rev. 449 (1997). December 4, 1999, at A16.

60 Crime, Justice and the Legacy of the Past

Adrian Guelke

INTRODUCTION ing order is possible. This model provides a In deeply divided societies, whether they have mechanism for the criminalisation of violence, been subject to minority or majority rule, the as that term is understood by most members of question of justice tends to be hotly debated. a society. It requires a judicial authority that How institutions for the maintenance of law stands over society, employing the resources of and order are viewed in any society has a large the state to enforce its judgements which are bearing on how they function. Thus, in a soci- directed against individuals. Thus, for the pur- ety where the authorities are viewed almost poses of judicial authority, society consists of universally as legitimate, it is possible for the individuals and, if any individual transgresses law to be enforced effectively by a police force the rules of society, he or she is punished. For that uses a minimum degree of physical coer- example, in a simple case of A attacking B, the cion in the vast majority of cases. This is due to state, through the criminal justice system, takes the fact that police officers will be able to rely action against A which concludes the matter. In on the cooperation of most members of society, reality, society may be faced with victim B, but and their authority will rarely be challenged will have difficulty in establishing the identity when they are required to use it to compel obe- of A. The system has to be sufficiently reliable dience. The very fact that the authorities are in punishing the guilty without transgressing able to maintain order effectively, usually with- the rights of innocent people if it is to retain out violating the rights of members of the soci- general public confidence. ety or, to put it more simply, without routinely Also important to the functioning of the rule meting out rough treatment to possible suspects of law model is the principle of “equality and witnesses, tends to reinforce their legitima- before the law”. This principle is, however, cy. By contrast, in any situation where the often not universally upheld in practice, pre- authorities are not seen as legitimate by a sec- cisely because no society is composed of a set tion of society, it is very difficult for the law to of equal individuals. The rich and the well-con- be enforced without resorting to physical coer- nected generally fare better than the poor cion. Furthermore, the brutal enforcement of and/or those from groups with low status in law and order by means of such actions tends society. In both the United States (US) and to reinforce its lack of legitimacy. This per- mainland Britain, racial minorities have consis- spective will affect both those on the receiving tently been poorly treated by the criminal jus- end of such treatment as well as those who feel tice system. The Rodney King case in the US threatened by it. and the Stephen Lawrence case in Britain have highlighted the persistence of this problem dur- 1. THE RULE OF LAW MODEL ing the 1990s. No effective solutions were In relatively homogeneous or moderately arrived at following these incidences, despite divided societies, what can conveniently be the outward political consensus in both soci- labelled the “rule of law” model for maintain- eties that people should be treated equally

61 Guelke before the law, regardless of race. For the most bers of its community will be physically part, however, in moderately divided societies, assaulted by members of the subordinate com- cross-cutting cleavages of one kind or another munity. When such instances occur there is tend to limit the influence of group loyalties on invariably a call for exemplary punishment – the function of the criminal justice system, both to assert the dominant community’s power enough for the rule of law model to retain its and to deter further attacks. credibility. Apartheid South Africa abounds with examples of differential justice as described in the 2. HORIZONTALLY DIVIDED COMMUNITIES four examples above. The relative indifference In the case of deeply divided societies, a dis- of the authorities to crime in the townships tinction needs to be drawn between societies explains one of the paradoxes of the apartheid divided horizontally between a dominant and a era: that South Africa had a relatively small subordinate community, and those divided ver- police force in relation to its population, tically. The former case will be considered first. notwithstanding the image of the country as a Where a society is polarised between a domi- police state.1 Under apartheid, the townships nant and a subordinate community, an individu- proved a breeding ground for self-help and al’s membership of one or the other group is a informal methods of justice, precisely because matter of critical importance and will affect of the ineffectiveness of state efforts to combat how he/she is treated. The simple case of A crime. The priorities of the police were to pro- attacking B typically results in four different tect the white suburbs against crime and the possibilities, which give rise to four very differ- state against political subversion. Punishment ent outcomes. If A and B are both members of in rape cases hinged critically on the race of the dominant community then something perpetrator and victim, with the death penalty approximating to the process of justice under applied to black rapists. Thus, from 1911 to the rule of law model is likely, with A being 1968, only two of the 132 people executed for criminalised as an individual. If A and B are the crime of rape, were white. In both these both members of the subordinate community, cases the victims were also white. the most likely response of the authorities is The unequal enforcement of the law provides one of indifference since servicing the needs of one of the principal means by which a domi- the subordinate community tends to be a low nant community maintains its hegemony over a priority. subordinate community. As long as the domi- In the case where A – the perpetrator – is part nant community is able to maintain its hegemo- of the dominant community and B – the victim ny, such societies may appear orderly and polit- – is from the subordinate community, the bias ically stable, even to the outside observer. of the criminal justice system towards the dom- Indeed, dominant communities frequently asso- inant community will operate in favour of the ciate the condition of peace with acquiescence accused, should matters even reach that point. by the subordinate community which holds an Almost regardless of the precise circumstances inferior social position. The initial reaction of of the case, the accused can expect lenient members of the dominant community to chal- treatment. It will be judged, not in the context lenges from “subordinates” is therefore of the interaction of individuals, but in the light frequently a desire to restore tranquillity by of the dominant community’s fear of resistance suppressing the insurgents. Reform in these cir- by the subordinate community to its status. Any cumstances is fraught with difficulty. This is evidence that B was behaving in a provocative particularly so if, in the context of attempting to manner, from the standpoint of members of the establish the principle of equality before the dominant community, will usually be sufficient law, the legal authorities are perceived as fail- to ensure A’s acquittal. ing to punish sufficiently severely violent acts By contrast, if A – the perpetrator – is a by members of the subordinate community member of the subordinate community and B – directed at those above them. The danger then the victim – a member of the dominant commu- exists that some members of the dominant com- nity, the accused can expect to be extremely munity will take the law into their own hands. severely punished. Every dominant communi- In circumstances where the balance of power is ty’s nightmare is that the most vulnerable mem- shifting from one community to another, such

62 Guelke reactions may set off a vicious circle of retalia- likely to be directed primarily at an exit from tion and retribution. the state through secession, partition or union with another state. In the case of horizontally 3. VERTICALLY DIVIDED COMMUNITIES segmented societies, the issue of equality often Frank Wright coined the expression “represen- becomes a priority among the subordinate com- tative violence” to describe violence in situa- munity. Northern Ireland provides an interest- tions where the victims of violence are per- ing instance in which the subordinate commu- ceived as being chosen, not because of their nity maintains an aspiration to a united Ireland, individual characteristics, but because they are but in which its political representatives have identified as representing a group of people.2 been willing to accept arrangements guarantee- Societies that are vertically divided rather than ing its equality within the existing contested horizontally may also be prone to the creation boundaries, as the basis of a historic compro- of cycles of violence and the institutionalisation mise with the dominant community. Ironically, of representative violence. The effects of con- it has been the dominant community that has flict among vertically segmented groups can be been the more reluctant to accept the settlement just as devastating as those that arise due to the contained in the Belfast Agreement, even breakdown of a dominant group’s hegemony. though it involves acceptance of separation The case of the former Yugoslavia, where no from Southern Ireland until/unless there is a single community occupied a dominant posi- majority vote in favour of a united Ireland. tion during the years of Communist rule, demonstrates this tendency. Indeed, the 4. VIGILANTISM strength of ethno-nationalism in each ethnic A common characteristic of deeply horizontally group was a reflection of a perception common divided societies is that the state’s monopoly of to all of Yugoslavia’s nationalities: that mem- legitimate violence is contested by the subordi- bers of each group had been disadvantaged in nate community. At best, members of a subor- one way or another under Communism. dinate community may acquiesce in the opera- Subordination of all indigenous communities tion of the state’s institutions on the grounds of under colonial rule also tends to produce verti- their community’s powerlessness. Just as cal lines of division. Even when one group is important within a horizontally divided com- much larger than the other – as in the conflict munity is the fact that the dominant community between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus and that often has different attitudes towards issues of between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka – force and violence to those found in societies the larger ethnic group does not see itself, or in where a consensus on these issues exists. This practice constitute, a dominant group. In fact, a stems from the dominant community’s percep- dominant group may constitute a minority of tion of the existence of a serious challenge to the population, as the example of South Africa the legitimacy of the state from the subordinate under apartheid demonstrates. In the case of community. Rosenbaum and Sederberg use the both Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine, the term, “vigilantism”3 to describe pro-status quo dominant community forms a majority of the violence which differs from force or legitimate population. However, in both these instances a violence in that it operates openly, counter to factor contributing to the fearful, siege mentali- the law. What is characteristic of vigilantes is ty of the dominant community is the perception their distrust of the process of maintaining that it forms a minority within a wider frame- order through the criminalisation of individual work: that of the island in the case of Northern perpetrators following a fair trial in the courts. Ireland Protestants and that of the Middle East Vigilantes appear from time to time in politi- as a region in the case of Israeli Jews. cally stable liberal-democracies when the crim- Deeply divided societies are characterised by inal justice system appears ineffective in deal- a lack of consensus on the framework for deci- ing with ordinary crime. The Guardian Angels sion making, and a contested political process patrolling the subway in New York are an in which the legitimacy of its laws is chal- example. In deeply divided societies, however, lenged by one segment of society. In the case of fighting crime may form a nominal justification a vertically divided society, the strategy of the for the activities of vigilantes, but their real – disaffected community (or communities) is and, often openly declared – aim is to quell the

63 Guelke political assertiveness of the subordinate com- for Catholics derived from the rebellion of munity. In any event, a feature of deeply divid- 1798 when the rebels earned this nickname ed societies is that maintaining order, including because of the way they cut their hair. The combating crime, tends to be seen as synony- parades of the Orange Order are still a cause of mous with keeping members of the subordinate immense civil disturbance in Northern Ireland community “in their place”. The greater the today, although they now only pass through perceived threat from the subordinate commu- Catholic areas in a relatively small number of nity, the more aggressively violent vigilantes instances. Nevertheless, controversy over the from the dominant community tend to be. At routes of Orange marches was the cause of riot- the height of Northern Ireland’s troubles, ing in Northern Ireland in the summers of 1995, Loyalist paramilitary organisations engaged in 1996, 1997, 1998 and 2000. a campaign of random sectarian assassinations. Metropolitan authorities (whether one is A widely used slogan was “Any Catholic will referring to the Federal government of the US do”. Members of the Afrikaner Weerstands- in relation to the Deep South, the government bewing (AWB – Afrikaner resistance move- in London in relation to Northern Ireland or an ment) in South Africa were responsible for a imperial centre in relation to the activities of number of random attacks on black civilians in settlers on a periphery) generally condemn the period leading up to and including the coun- mechanisms of communal deterrence. They try’s first democratic elections. But by far the rightly see them as obstacles to the integration best known example of white supremacist vigi- of members of a subordinate community as full lante organisations is the American Ku Klux and equal citizens of the state, and to the estab- Klan, which fiercely resisted the civil rights lishment of the “rule of law” model of ordering movement in the 1960s, particularly in the society. Communal deterrence is also an obsta- Deep South. cle to the efforts of reformers when the hegemony of a dominant community can no longer 5. COMMUNAL DETERRENCE be sustained due to demographic or other rea- Vigilantism is the most extreme form of a much sons. Even when the mechanisms of communal larger pattern of behaviour by members of deterrence themselves are, however, disman- dominant communities in deeply divided soci- tled, the mentality that underpins them may sur- eties, as is encapsulated by Frank Wright’s vive. This is illustrated by the penal policies of term, “communal deterrence”.4 Historically, the southern states of the US, particularly the another such mechanism was segregation, political support within the white community which was not just an assertion of racial preju- for capital punishment. In fact, the siege men- dice or even primarily intended to satisfy tality of dominant communities or formerly atavistic attitudes in the dominant community. dominant communities often remains remark- Rather, its chief purpose was to disempower the ably persistent, even after radical political subordinate community through denying its change has taken place. members access to the full resources of society. One of the milder forms of communal deter- 6. THE LEGACY OF THE PAST rence is the summer parades of the Orange The political representatives of subordinate Order in Northern Ireland. Originally, these communities usually emphasise that their goal parades were a method by which Protestants is equality of status between members of differ- asserted their dominance over Catholics in ent communities, rather than a reversal of roles north-east Ireland, using marches that purpo- in which the formerly subordinate community sively traversed Catholic areas. While the becomes the dominant community and vice marches were ritualistic displays of aggression, versa. Of course, in practice, if the subordinate they served the purpose of uniting Protestants community outnumbers the dominant commu- and underlining sectarian divisions. However, nity, equality will result in representatives of their primary objective was to remind Catholics the former wielding the majority of the political of their subordinate position in society. The power. This may be balanced by the continuing fear behind this objective was encapsulated in influence of the dominant community in other the Orange song which called on “Croppies” to fields, particularly economic. Partly for that “lie down”. Croppies is a colloquial expression reason, even if the ideology of the new ruling

64 Guelke party rejects the old lines of societal division, the first stone may have a profound bearing on the subordinate community’s experience of dis- external views of the legitimacy of contending crimination, and of being on the receiving end parties in a conflict. of aggressive coercion by the dominant com- The language used to justify violence pro- munity in the past, is likely to colour its attitude vides a strong indication of the existence of a in the new status quo. The furore created by the “force field”. Terms commonly used in the con- Nicholas Steyn case in South Africa is a good text of inter-communal conflicts include “retali- illustration of this point. The polarisation of ation”, “deterrence”, “pre-emptive strikes”, opinion on the case along racial lines demon- “holding the line”, “clearing the decks”, “col- strates how difficult it is to escape the legacy of lective punishment”, “tit for tat”, “exemplary the past in relation to attitudes towards the jus- actions”, “exacting a price” and “reprisal”. The tice system. terminology is similar to that used by states in the context of war. It is also worth noting that CONCLUSION the language used when the killing stops also Inter-communal violence creates “force fields”, tends to follow that which is used during war, the effects of which can be very resilient. so there is a “cease-fire”, “a truce”, “a cessa- Violence in the Balkans during the 1990s owes tion”, “a pause” or “a suspension of hostilities”. much to the revival of “force fields” created The image is one of two armies facing each during the Second World War. In particular, other and ready to re-engage. Unfortunately, memories of the mass killing of Serbs in this may not be far from the truth. When a soci- Croatian concentration camps in the 1940s has ety has been magnetised by the existence of a had a major influence on Serbian resistance to “force field”, a single incident may trigger a the re-drawing of boundaries in the Balkans. cycle of violence, re-igniting the conflict. In sit- The new boundaries would leave Serbs as uations in which irreversible political change minorities in a number of independent states has taken place and a new order established, the dominated by other ethnic groups. From the danger is somewhat different. The possibility perspective of other ethnic groups, however, then exists that the effectiveness and legitimacy the blame for conflict in the Balkans lies with of the new dispensation will be undermined by the aggressive attempts by Serbs, led by responses that continue to reflect the “force Milosevic, to carve a Greater Serbia out of the field” that existed under the old order. In addi- break-up of the former Yugoslavia. In reality, tion, if the era of transition is characterised by these views are simply different sides of the both continuing and freshly created social and same coin. However, one should not underesti- economic inequalities, the difficulties of estab- mate the importance of interpretations on the lishing a “rule of law” justice model are initiation of violence. Perceptions of who threw increased.

ENDNOTES 1) See, for example, Gavin Cawthra, Policing 3) H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter C.Sederberg, South Africa: The South African Police and Vigilantism: An analysis of establishment the Transition from Apartheid, Zed Books: violence in H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter C. London and New Jersey, 1993, p.4. Sederberg (eds), Vigilante Politics, 2) See Frank Wright, Northern Ireland: A University of Pennsylvania Press: Comparative Analysis, Gill and Macmillan: Philadelphia, 1976, pp.4-29. Dublin, 1987, pp.11-2. 4) Wright, op. cit., pp.13-20.

65 The Growth, Extent and Causes of Crime: International Crime Overview

Anna Alvazzi del Frate

INTRODUCTION is impossible to take crime rates from country International comparisons of crime statistics A and compare them with crime rates from have always been considered a difficult task. country B without a process of standardisation Not only are criminologists and statisticians of data. This requires the formulation of stan- driven by the desire to compare data on crime dard definitions of crimes that should be com- in different countries, but policy makers also patible across all the countries to be compared. need to obtain reliable information on how Official crime statistics reflect only a portion their respective countries rank with respect to of all crimes that occur, namely those being neighbouring and/or comparable ones. discovered by the police or reported by victims Over time, many attempts at developing or witnesses. For a number of reasons, many international crime statistics have been under- crimes are not reported and are therefore not taken, but the final objective still remains included in crime statistics (dark figure). For unmet. Direct comparisons between countries example, lack of insurance may mean that are very difficult and require extreme caution property crime is not reported, while fear of in order to avoid serious mistakes. reprisal may play a crucial role in preventing Among the most important problems related victims from reporting assault or extortion. to the comparison of international crime statis- Such an apparent failure at effective compar- tics one should consider: ison of crime statistics may on the one hand • differences in legal systems and definitions have frustrated researchers, but on the other of crimes hand has stimulated them to explore new meth- • levels of efficiency of criminal justice sys- ods for estimating the scope of crime. Official tems in preventing and controlling crime data may be integrated with surveys on popula- • different modalities and performance in col- tion (victim surveys) that may provide addition- lecting and recording reported crimes al information on crime, crime victims and • propensity of victims to report crimes to the their attitudes toward the police, reporting rates police and reasons for not reporting, fear of crime and • economic, political and cultural differences crime prevention measures. Victim surveys among countries as well as different levels of were initially mainly confined to developed development, education, urbanisation, etc. countries, where their assimilation was rela- • geographic and climatic differences that may tively rapid, becoming more focused and regu- in part determine lifestyles in different coun- lar, while their presence in the developing tries world was meagre. Several countries regularly • the difficulty in obtaining data referring to collect information through surveys such as the the same time period from different coun- British Crime Survey and the National Crime tries. Victimisation Survey in the United States (US). Crime statistics from different countries cannot Surveys on victims of crime, and to a great therefore be directly compared. For example, it extent official crime data, however, deal pri-

69 Alvazzi del Frate marily with so-called ordinary crime, as 1.1.2 United Nations Survey on Crime Trends opposed to organised crime, crimes against the and Operations of Criminal Justice System (UN environment, trafficking in persons, money Crime Survey) laundering and corruption. This type of crime is The United Nations Survey of Crime Trends not only notoriously under-reported, but is also and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems statistically recorded using considerably differ- (UN Crime Survey) since 1976 provides com- ent methods in different countries. Organised parable information on recorded crimes from a crime remains vaguely defined and to a large number of responding member states. Standard degree subjective, and there is little uniformity definitions of crimes include homicide, assault, across countries in the relevant statistical cate- rape, robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, corruption gories. and drug-related crimes. Government agencies Such crime phenomena are becoming more in each responding country provide official data and more important and require suitable instru- adjusted to standard definitions. Data on the ments to assess their scope. The development fifth UN Crime Survey (referring to 1994, with of new research methods applicable to “non- 91 responding countries) are available on the conventional” crime will provide additional Internet,1 while responses to the sixth survey information on the extent and impact of crime are presently being validated. Ample analysis on citizens and may assist in revealing trends in of the fifth survey results is published in the transnational crime. Integration of data sources Global Report on Crime and Justice (Newman, may be considered as one of the most promis- 1999). Further analysis can be found in ing areas in research on crime statistics (Jehle Kangaspunta et al., 1998. Lewis, 1995; Alvazzi del Frate et al., 2000). 1.1.3 Other international sources: European 1. INTERNATIONAL DATA SOURCES Sourcebook on Crime and Criminal Justice 1.1 Administrative statistics Statistics The most important international sources on A group of experts convened by the Council of administrative crime data are the Interpol statis- Europe at the beginning of the 1990s has devel- tics and the United Nations (UN) Crime oped a model for the collection of comparable Surveys. Rates per 100 000 population are cal- crime and criminal justice statistics in all Coun- culated from data provided by each responding cil Member States. The first model was finalised country. in 1995 and a report containing 1990–96 data Since data recorded in each country relates to was released in 1999 (Council of Europe, 1999) crime categories as defined by respective crimi- with data from 34 European countries. The nal codes, if definitions do not match, it will be European Sourcebook not only makes use of impossible to compare data. Both sources pro- official statistics, but expands information to vide for standard definitions of crimes. include victim surveys and self-report studies Accounting of crime in these surveys – thus performed in the participating countries using their potential comparability – is as accurate as standard methodology (International Crime the typology of crime is unambiguously Victim Survey - ICVS and International Self- defined. Report of Delinquency Study).

1.1.1 Interpol 1.2 Survey data Since 1950, Interpol compiles crime statistics 1.2.1 International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) from a number of countries (presently 115). The First International Survey (1989) covered The data collection form includes broad cate- 15 developed/industrialised countries, one gories of crime departing from legal definitions Eastern European and only one developing envisaged by criminal codes. Interpol warns country. Starting from the second (1992) sur- that such statistics are not intended for interna- vey, a growing number of countries joined the tional comparisons because of different defini- project. As of today, approximately 70 coun- tions, reporting and recording methods. Despite tries have been involved at least once, included major difficulties and gaps in research, Interpol 20 developing countries.2 The ICVS database statistics represent a valuable source of infor- contains a wealth of information that has no mation. precedents in the developing world.

70 Alvazzi del Frate

The questionnaire includes sections on 13 same time, victims may also be more reluctant types of crime, of which each question provides to spend time and money in reporting crimes. a standard definition. Furthermore, the ques- Finally, “in many developing countries, vic- tionnaire explores whether crimes were report- tims, especially those from lower classes, want ed to the police, reasons for not reporting, atti- to have as little contact with the police as they tudes toward the police, fear of crime and crime can. Victims would rather suffer the loss or prevention measures.3 injury, resort to private or informal initiatives, or report only with great reluctance and fear”.7 2. AN OVERVIEW OF CRIME IN THE WORLD: ON These problems related to the reporting of CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT4 crimes are particularly likely to affect proper The relationship between crime and develop- recording of property crime. ment has been the object of many studies over The analysis of the results of the UN Crime the years, but no clear conclusion with regard Survey provides comparable information on to the effects of socio-economic growth on recorded crimes from a number of responding crime has ever been reached. On the one hand, Member States. In 1990, a study on the findings traditional belief suggests that technological of the First and Second UN Crime Surveys8 progress and a more equal distribution of eco- showed that, as development increases (as mea- nomic wealth should reduce social conflict. sured by gross domestic product per capita), so Other theories, however, envisage that socio- does property crime, while the relationship for economic growth and modernisation necessari- violent crime is inversed. ly involve an increase in overall crime rates, in The Fifth UN Crime Survey provided com- particular, crimes against property.5 This theory patible data for 1994 on intentional homicide is supported by the observation that developed and theft9 from 28 countries ranging from the countries generally show higher theft rates and most to the least developed according to the lower homicide rates than developing Human Development Index (HDI).10 By corre- countries.6 lating data for homicide and theft with the HDI However, such conclusions have usually for the respective countries, a positive correla- been reached on the basis of official adminis- tion with theft rates is found again (r 0.596 N = trative data. A country’s ability to produce reli- 28), while a negative correlation between homi- able crime statistics also depends on its level of cide rates and HDI is also found, albeit weaker development. Lack of resources and technology (r -0.204 N = 28). may be the cause of scarce capacity and effi- It should be taken into account that homicide ciency of the police in recording crimes. At the is the type of crime that is least sensitive to official recording procedures. On the other Figure 1: Development and Crime. hand, the recording of theft depends on the Correlation between the Human Development propensity of citizens to report and the efficien- Index, UN Crime Survey and International cy of the police in registering the crime. In Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) for selected many affluent societies minor thefts are report- types of crime ed only if the property was insured. UN Crime Survey ICVS Victim surveys have shown that property official rates victim survey data crime is more frequent in developing countries countries = 28 countries = 53 than in the rest of the world. In this respect, it can be said that the correlation found above between official rates of theft and HDI indi- Homicide –0.204 Assault –0.113 cates rather the existence of a correlation Theft 0.596 Theft –0.560 between level of development and efficiency of Burglary –0.543 the police in recording. In conclusion, the higher the level of development, the more frequent- Sources: Fifth United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the ly property crime is recorded in official statis- Operations of Criminal Justice System, UNCJIN (rates elabo- tics. There is also no strict relationship between rated by UNICRI); Human Development Report 1997, United homicide rates and development. Nations Development Programme, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 1997; ICVS. Another indication of the need to comple- ment administrative statistics of crime with sur-

71 Alvazzi del Frate

Table 1: Total recorded crime, 1997 – rates per 100 000 population

Sweden 13 516 Chile 4396 Fiji 2719 Romania 1601 New Zealand 12 591 Italy 4000 Poland 2568 Japan 1507 Denmark 10 051 Czech Republic 3917 Tonga 2498 Latvia 1496 Belgium 8035 Greece 3591 Ireland 2482 Belarus 1251 Germany 8025 Portugal 3234 Argentina 2275 Ukraine 1162 Finland 7273 Korea, Rep. of 3041 Lithuania 2046 Croatia 1155 Norway 6995 Andorra 3027 Slovenia 1872 Lesotho 1078 Bahamas 6688 Bahrain 3011 Singapore 1833 Hong Kong 1070 Israel 6276 Bulgaria 2909 Spain 1764 Jordan 1053 South Africa 5106 Zimbabwe 2856 Slovakia 1716 Kazakhstan 1047 Hungary 5066 Estonia 2809 Tanzania 1688 Moldova 926 Switzerland 4769 Maldives 2725 Russian Fed. 1627 Kyrgyzstan 804

Source: UN Centre for International Crime Prevention, “Total recorded crime per 100 000 population”. This table includes selected countries. vey data in order to get accurate information on • Countries with less ability to record crime crime levels can be obtained through the analy- may rank lower on crime levels (and thus sis of the category “Total crime per 100 000 look “good”). population” as a result of the UN Crime Survey • Over time, countries improving their ability (Table 1 provides 1997 data). These crime sta- to record crime may rank higher on crime tistics indicate what is recorded as a crime and levels (and thus look “bad”). show huge variations among countries. For example, Scandinavian countries traditionally 3. ANALYSIS OF THE ICVS FINDINGS lead the group with the highest rates per The ICVS reveals that the levels and effects of 100 000 population. Again, a positive correla- victimisation are more pronounced in develop- tion is observed between the data in this table ing countries than in the rest of the world. The and HDI (r 0.467 N = 48). overall victimisation risk of citizens in develop- In conclusion, the quality and comparability ing countries is higher for all property-related of data sets on crime statistics is still relatively types of crime, while the risk of assault with low. A straightforward comparison of official force is equal in industrialised countries, coun- statistics may reveal the following two scenar- tries in transition and the developing world. ios: Apart from corruption (actual requests for bribes to be paid to public officials for services Figure 2: Aggregate victimisation rates for that should normally be provided for free), theft selected crimes over a one-year period in cities of personal property was the most frequent type and urban areas (>100 000 pop.). Percentage of victimisation. of population victimised by type of crime. The ICVS data on victimisation rates for corruption, theft of personal property, burglary and assault all reveal a negative correlation with the HDI. The more developed the country, the less frequent are people victims of corruption (r -0.585 N=53), theft (r -0.560 N=53), burglary (r -0.543 N=53) and, to some extent, robbery and assault (r –0.119 and -0.113, respectively N=53). Moreover, the reduced capacity to minimise the effects of victimisation, through insurance, replacement or victim support, increases the burden of crime on victims in the developing world. These findings support the hypothesis Source: ICVS that crime indeed has a greater effect on citizens in developing countries.

72 Alvazzi del Frate

Figure 3: Percentage of crimes reported to international victim survey data show a nega- the police and level of satisfaction with overall tive correlation between HDI and victimisa- police performance, by groups of countries. tion rates for all types of crime. • Reporting levels vary across countries and in particular, less than 50% of crimes are reported to the police in the developing world. • Taking into account the extent of the “dark figure”, official records of crime do not present the entire crime picture. • It is necessary to integrate police records of crime with survey data in order to monitor crime and crime prevention strategies. • International cooperation is necessary for the harmonisation of data and indicators, the stan- Source: ICVS dardisation of concepts, definitions and classi- fications and the dissemination of internation- 4. REPORTING TO THE POLICE ally comparable data sets for policy analysis. A marked difference between groups of coun- • A coherent strategy in this regard should tries was observed with regard to reporting lev- involve national statistical institutes, min- els for various types of crime. As an example, istries, specialised agencies, and international Figure 3 shows that higher reporting rates were organisations. consistently observed in industrialised countries • Trends over time should be monitored care- for burglary, robbery and assault. It was also fully: higher crime rates may depend on noted that the level of satisfaction with the improved ability of the police in recording police is on average higher in industrialised crime. countries. This finding may support the theory Above and beyond research and policy needs that administrative statistics actually reflect the for good statistics, there are further concerns performance of the various systems in record- with regard to a country’s standing in a coming crime. parative perspective. Higher crime rates in official statistics may reflect in negative media CONCLUSION reports, which may generate fear of crime Due to the gaps in the data series currently across the population and negatively affect the available, it is difficult to provide unique con- propensity for foreign investments and tourism. clusions. However, it appears that a few state- On the other hand, poor statistics do not help ments may hold true: either researchers or effective crime prevention • Crime heavily affects developing countries: and control.

73 Alvazzi del Frate

ENDNOTES

1) http://www.uncjin.org/stats/stats.html 5) See, for example, Shelley (1981). 2) This group of developing countries 6) For example, a study published in the early includes surveys conducted in the capital 1970s (Wolf 1971) observed that, distribut- cities of Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, ing a list of countries according to a series Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, of development indicators on a continuum, Egypt, India, Indonesia, (Lesotho), developed countries showed homicide rates (Nigeria), Paraguay, The Philippines, lower than six and theft rates higher than South Africa, (Swaziland), Tanzania, 600 per 100 000 population. The develop- Tunisia, Uganda, Zimbabwe. Countries in ment indicators used included urbanisation, brackets have not been included in the economic development, literacy, etc. Crime analysis presented here because of unavail- rates considered in the study referred to ability of data at the time of preparation. official statistics as presented by Interpol. 3) Analysis of the ICVS results was published 7) Marenin (1997) p. 470. in van Dijk et al. 1989; Alvazzi del Frate et 8) Newman (1990) pp. 69-102. al. 1993; Zvekic and Alvazzi del Frate 9) The UN Crime Survey categories used here 1995; Alvazzi del Frate 1998; Hatalak et are “total intentional homicide” and “total al. 1998; Mayhew and van Dijk, 1997; theft”. Zvekic 1998. The ICVS website address is 10) The 1994 Human Development Index for www.nscr.nl/icvs the responding countries is taken from 4) Parts of this section have been published in UNDP (1997). Alvazzi del Frate, 1998.

REFERENCES

ALVAZZI DEL FRATE A., ZVEKIC U., VAN DIJK ICVS. 1999. International Crime Victim Survey J.J.M. eds. 1993. Understanding Crime: – international database. Experiences of Crime and Crime Control. INTERPOL. 1997. International Crime Statistics. UNICRI, Rome. JEHLE J.-M., LEWIS C. 1995. Improving ALVAZZI DEL FRATE A. 1998. Victims of Crime Criminal Justice Statistics – National and in the Developing World, UNICRI, Rome. International Perspectives, Wiesbaden, KUP. ALVAZZI DEL FRATE A., HATALAK O., ZVEKIC KANGASPUNTA K., JOUTSEN M., OLLUS N. 1998. U. eds., 2000. Surveying Crime: A Global Crime and Criminal Justice Systems in Perspective. ISTAT/UNICRI, Rome. Europe and North America, European COUNCIL OF EUROPE. 1999. European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice affiliated with the United Nations, HEUNI, Statistics, PC-S-ST (99) 8 DEF, 18-10-99. Helsinki.

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MARENIN O. 1997. Victimisation surveys and Impact of Industrialisation and Urbanisation the accuracy and reliability of official crime on Crime. Carbondale, Ill. data in developing countries, in Journal of UNDP. 1997. Human Development Report Criminal Justice, 25:6, pp. 463-475. 1997, United Nations Development MAYHEW P., VAN DIJK J.J.M. 1997. Criminal Programme, Oxford University Press, Victimisation in Eleven Industrialised Oxford/New York. Countries. WODC, Ministry of Justice of VAN DIJK J.J.M., MAYHEW P., KILLIAS M. The Netherlands, The Hague. 1990. Experiences of Crime Across the NEWMAN G. 1990. Crime and the human condi- World. Kluwer, Deventer. tion, in Essays on Crime and Development, WOLF P. 1971. Crime and development. An edited by U. Zvekic, UNICRI Publ. No. 36, international comparison of crime rates, Rome. Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, pp. NEWMAN G. ED., 1999. Global Report on Crime 107-120. and Justice, United Nations Office for Drug ZVEKIC U. 1998. Criminal Victimisation in Control and Crime Prevention, Centre for Countries in Transition, UNICRI, Rome. International Crime Prevention, Oxford ZVEKIC U., ALVAZZI DEL FRATE A. EDS., 1995. University Press. Criminal Victimisation in the Developing SHELLEY L. 1981. Crime and Modernisation: World, UNICRI, Rome.

75 Crime, Violence and Political Uncertainty in Brazil

Paulo de Mesquita Neto

INTRODUCTION aggression and other forms of violence regis- This paper focuses on the growth of crime and tered in all Brazilian states since 1979. This violence in Brazil since the transition from data is based on the analysis of death certifi- authoritarianism to democracy, demonstrating cates.1 However, a significant number of vio- that this growth is unequally distributed and lent deaths are still registered as resulting from concentrated in specific geographical areas and “events whose intention is undetermined”.2 social groups. The paper suggests that the insti- Furthermore, according to a recent study, the tutional conflicts and political uncertainty Ministry of Health does not register 20% of the regarding the role of the state, civil society and total number of deaths occurring throughout the private sector in public security since the the country.3 transition to democracy, has contributed to the Since the transition to democracy, the state growth of crime and violence in the country. government began providing information on Organised crime, particularly the illegal com- crimes registered by the police. However, the merce of drugs and arms; police ineffective- methods for registering crimes and the quality ness; corruption and violence; and social and of the information vary significantly across dif- economic inequalities – frequently seen as ferent Brazilian states.4 responsible for the growth of crime and vio- A series of victimisation surveys were con- lence – reinforce this trend within particular ducted since the transition to democracy indi- areas and groups. cating that a significant percentage of crimes The growth of crime and violence, however, are not reported to the police. These surveys also reflects the institutional conflicts and polit- include the following: IBGE conducted one in ical uncertainty regarding public security. 1988 (IBGE 1990); UNICRI in 1992 (Zvekic These conflicts and uncertainties contribute to and Frate 1995); PHO in 1996 (Briceño-Leon the absence or weakness of institutions and et al 1999); CPDOC-FGV/ISER in 1995-96 practices to ensure the accountability of public (Pandolfi et al 1999; CPDOC-FGV/ISER and private security services and their respon- 1997); ILANUD/DataFolha in 1997 (Kahn siveness to the law, the community and the citi- 1998); SEADE in 1998 (www.seade.gov.br); zens. NEV-USP in 1999 (Cardia 1999). Most surveys, however, focus attention on 1. THE GROWTH OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE the cities or states of Rio de Janeiro and São Information available in Brazil does not ade- Paulo. The survey conducted by NEV-USP in quately reflect the magnitude and distribution 1999 focused attention on ten state capitals. of crime and violence in that country. The most The survey conducted by IBGE in 1988 was reliable information involves homicides and the only one that had a national scope. other forms of violence resulting in death. The Despite these limitations, the available infor- Ministry of Health provides information on the mation is sufficient to demonstrate that in number of deaths resulting from homicide or Brazil crime and violence, particularly homi-

77 Mesquita Neto cides, has grown since the transition to democ- Comparing the periods 1980–84 and racy. 1990–95, the average homicide rate increased The number of violent deaths or deaths in the Federal District and 24 states and resulting from external causes increased from declined in only two states. The states of Mato 70 212 in 1980 to 117 603 in 1998 (+67.5%). In Grosso (+165.3%) and Sergipe (+161%) regis- the same period, the number of deaths resulting tered the highest increase. The states of Minas from homicide or aggression increased from Gerais (–10%) and Piauí (–2.3%) registered a 13 910 to 41 916 (+201.3%). The percentage of decline in the average homicide rate.9 The aver- the number of deaths resulting form aggression age rate of homicides with firearms increased in relation to the total number of violent deaths in the Federal District and in all 26 states. The increased from 19.8% to 35.6%. The homicide greatest increases were registered in the states rate increased from 11.7 homicides per 100 000 of Roraima (2.600%), Sergipe (333%) and the inhabitants in 1980 to 25.90 per 100 000 in Federal District (268%).10 1998 (121.4%).5 The growth of violence is, to a significant In addition, there has been significant growth extent, concentrated in urban areas and metro- in the rate of homicides committed with fire- politan regions. While the total number of arms. According to a recent study, the homicide deaths resulting from homicide or aggression rate in Brazil increased from 11.7/100 000 in increased from 13 910 in 1980 to 41 916 in 1980 to 23.7/100 000 in 1996 (102.5%), while 1998 (201.3%), the number of deaths resulting the rate of homicide with firearms increased from homicide or aggression in the 27 state from 5.1/100 000 to 14.0/100 000 in the same capitals, increased from 4947 in 1980 to 15 286 period (174.5%). The percentage of homicides in 1998 (209.0%). In the 12 metropolitan committed by firearms in relation to the total regions, the number of deaths resulting from number of homicides increased from 43.6% to homicide or aggression increased from 6552 in 59.0%.6 1980 to 23 770 in 1998 (262.8%). In 1998, the 12 metropolitan regions regis- 1.1 Unequal distribution tered 56.7% of the total number of deaths The available information also indicates that the resulting from aggression, whereas the popula- risk of violent crime is unequally distributed in tion of these areas represented 36.7% of the different geographical areas and social groups. total population in Brazil. Furthermore, even though the risk of violent The two largest metropolitan regions (São crime has increased in all Brazilian states, the Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) registered 15 896 growth rate has varied significantly across dif- homicides or 37.9% of the total number of ferent geographical areas and social groups. homicides in Brazil. The two largest cities, São In 1998, the Federal District and nine states Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, registered 8826 registered homicide rates higher than the aver- homicides or 21% of the total number of homi- age homicide rate for Brazil. Five of these cides in the country. states are in the north and centre-west frontier: Regarding the distribution of violent crime Roraima (51.02), Rondônia (38.71), Amapá across different groups in society, it is clear that (38.71), Mato Grosso (35.64), Mato Grosso do the majority of victims of homicide are men. Sul (33.57). Four of the states have large or The homicide rate for men increased from 21.2/ growing metropolitan regions in the south-east 100 000 in 1980 to 43.5/100 000 in 1996 and north-east: Pernambuco (58.77/100 000), (+105.2%). However the homicide rate for Espírito Santo (57.85), Rio de Janeiro (55.52) women also increased substantially from and São Paulo (39.64). The homicide rate for 2.3/100 000 in 1980 to 4.4/100 000 in 1996 the Federal District was 32.91.7 (+91.3%).11 Seventeen states registered an average homi- Regarding age group, there has been a signif- cide rate lower than the average homicide rate icant increase in the homicide rate for the popu- for Brazil. Six states registered homicide rates lation aged between 15- and 22-years-old. In lower than 10/100 000: Bahia (9.89), Minas the state of Rio de Janeiro, the average homi- Gerais (8.84), Rio Grande do Norte (8.46), cide rate for youths aged 15–17 increased from Santa Catarina (8.11), Maranhão (5.17) and 15.2/100 000 in 1980–84 to 55.5/100 000 in Piauí (5.23).8 1990–95 (+265%). For youths aged 18–21, it

78 Mesquita Neto increased from 38.4/100 000 to 99.0/100 000 in The press and non-governmental organisations the same period (+157%).12 (NGOs) are frequently the major source of In the state of São Paulo, the average homi- information in these areas.18 cide rate for youths aged 15–17 increased from 18.3/100 000 in 1980–84 to 38.3/100 000 in 2. EXPLANATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 1990–95 (+109%). For youths aged 18–21, it Studies on the causes or reasons for the growth increased from 38.3/100 000 to 73.3/100 000 of crime and violence are still in progress in over the same period (+91%).13 Brazil. These studies shape and are shaped, not In 1995, the homicide rate for the population only by academic/theoretical, but also by pub- aged between 18–21-years-old reached lic/political debate. In part, this is a result of the 139.0/100 000 in Rio de Janeiro, the state with growing importance of crime and violence as the highest homicide rate for this age group, public/political issues. It also reflects the large followed by Amapá (94.0), Federal District role played by social scientists in governmental (90.0), Roraima (86.0), Espírito Santo (84.0) organisations and NGOs during the processes and São Paulo (78.0).14 of democratic transition and consolidation (Zaluar 1999; Paixão 1986; Adorno 1983). 1.2 Social inequality Most analysts agree that the quality of infor- Crime maps have indicated that the highest mation regarding crime and violence has homicide rates are registered on the periphery improved since the transition to democracy. It of large cities and metropolitan regions. It is in is clear that improvements in the capabilities these regions that the problems of poverty, for registering crime have resulted in increases unemployment and the lack of adequate hous- in crime rates in many states. However, it is ing and basic services, including health, educa- also clear that increases in crime rates cannot tion, transport, communication, security and be attributed simply to improvements in crime judicial services, are particularly acute. It is registration, but result from actual increases in also in these areas where, despite the transition crime and violence. from authoritarianism to democracy in the There are multiple factors contributing to the 1980s, major human rights violations continue growth of crime and violence in Brazil. to occur. Typical violations include summary Analysts from different disciplines, theoretical executions, torture and arbitrary detention by backgrounds and political positions tend to the police, private security and criminal organi- emphasise different factors and propose differ- sations or groups.15 ent solutions to the problem. There are, howev- In the city of São Paulo in 1999, the homi- er, three major approaches for analysing the cide rate varied from 4.11/100 000 inhabitants growth of crime and violence. These approach- in Moema (a wealthy neighbourhood in the es could be characterised as follows: economic, central region of the city) to 116.23/100 000 in political and social. Jardim Angela (an underprivileged neighbour- Analysts positioned to the left of the political hood in the southern part of the city). In the city spectrum tend to emphasise the contribution to of Diadema, in the metropolitan region of São the growth of crime and violence of economic Paulo, the homicide rate reached 149.76/ factors like poverty, unemployment, economic 100 000 in 1999.16 Similar contrasts are present inequalities and class conflicts (Maricato 1995; in the cities and metropolitan areas of Rio de Oliven 1980; Weffort 1980). This approach Janeiro (RJ), Salvador (BA) and, to a lesser focuses attention on the destabilising and nega- extent, Curitiba (PR).17 tive impact of economic crises, the processes of In rural areas, homicides and gross human capitalist development and, more recently, rights violations tend to be concentrated in globalisation. It explains crime and violence as regions that are distant from urban centres. In strategies for survival and struggle in a society these regions the state and civil society are characterised by high levels of economic absent or weak and intense and violent conflicts inequality and class conflict. between landowners, landless workers, miners This approach has been particularly instru- and indigenous groups exist. It is, however, far mental in analysing political violence and vio- more difficult to obtain information regarding lence across classes or groups as practiced by homicides and gross human rights violations. members of dominant groups and state agents

79 Mesquita Neto against members of subordinate groups, and necessary for securing citizenship and human vice-versa, in rural and urban areas. However, rights. it has been less useful in analyses of interper- From this perspective, crime and violence sonal violence and, particularly, variations in tend to be seen as strategies for solving conflict the level of violence within the same class or in a context characterised by profound racial group. discrimination, social inequality and weak Analysts to the right side of the political democratic institutions and practices. This spectrum tend to emphasise the contribution to approach has been particularly useful in the growth of crime and violence to factors analysing interpersonal violence within the undermining the state’s capability to maintain same class, group or community and gross law and order and to prevent and repress illegal human rights violations. and violent actions. More specifically, they Additional factors contributing to the growth emphasise the weakness of state institutions of crime and violence, emphasised by many and organisations responsible for the mainte- analysts, are the dissemination of drugs and nance of law and order, and the strength and firearms within society and the growth of crim- international status of criminal organisations inal organisations associated with the illegal (Cardoso 2000, Silva Filho 2000; Flores 1992; commerce of drugs and firearms. This factor Vidigal 1989). has been considered particularly important in This approach focuses attention on the desta- Rio de Janeiro (Zaluar 1999; Soares 1996). bilising and negative impact of the processes of modernisation, democratisation and globalisa- 3. RESPONSES TO CRIME AND VIOLENCE tion. It explains crime and violence as strategies The first response to the growth of crime and for maximising gains in a society characterised violence was an increase in the number of by low levels of social control and high levels agents employed in public and private security of impunity. This approach has been particular- services. Public and private spending on securi- ly constructive in analysing crime and violence ty services was also increased. associated with organised crime but is less use- Brazil operates on a federal political system ful in analysing interpersonal crime and vio- whereby the individual states control the main lence. police forces, namely the military police and Analysts at the center of the political spec- the civilian police. The military police are trum tend to emphasise the contribution of fac- responsible for ostensive policing and order tors undermining societies’ capability to ensure maintenance. The civilian police are responsi- the rule of law and basic civil, political and ble for criminal investigation. The federal gov- social rights for the majority of the population. ernment controls the armed forces, the federal More specifically, they emphasise the weakness police and the federal highway police. The of the institutions and practices for securing cit- armed forces, under the control of the Ministry izenship and human rights and the legal and of Defence since 1999, are responsible not only peaceful means for conflict resolution. (Pin- for external defence but also for the mainte- heiro 2000 and 1996; Cardia 2000; Caldeira nance of law and order. The federal police and 2000; Adorno 1999 and 1998; Pandolfi et al. the federal highway police are both relatively 1999, Soares 1996). small forces. The federal police are responsible This approach focuses attention on the long for border control and the investigation of fed- history of authoritarianism, racial discrimina- eral crimes (including, for example, drug traf- tion and social inequality in Brazil. It also ficking). The federal highway police are focuses attention on the nature of the process of responsible for policing the federal highways. democratic transition and consolidation; the In addition to these security agencies, the 1988 persistence of uncivil relations within society; Federal Constitution authorised municipal gov- socially established authoritarianism; and the ernments to employ municipal guards.19 culture of violence in Brazil. The number of people employed in the mili- Finally, this approach focuses attention on tary police increased from 185 000 in 1981 to the limited capacity of democratic governments 234 700 in 1985, 243 000 in 1991 and 339 762 and civil society organisations to strengthen the in 1995. The number of people employed in rule of law and the institutions and practices civilian police forces (including mainly the

80 Mesquita Neto civilian police, the federal police, the federal (approximately US$12.2 billion) a year on highway police and the municipal guards) security services.26 increased from 105 200 in 1985 to 154 400 in The expansion of the police forces and the 1995. From 1985 to 1995, the number of police investments in security services was followed agents and municipal guards increased from by an increase in the number of people impris- 339 900 to 494 162 (+45.4%).20 oned from 28 538 in 1969 to 88 041 in 1988, In the year 2000, Brazil had 472 803 police 126 152 in 1993 and approximately 170 000 in officers (368 900 in the military police, 1997 and 204 000 in 2000.27 103 903 in the civilian police and 20 220 in Questions remain as to whether this growth independent military firefighter corps).21 In the of investment in pubic and private security has state of São Paulo, which has the largest popu- been excessive, sufficient or insufficient for the lation and the largest police forces in the coun- control of crime and the maintenance of law try, the number of agents in the military police and order. However, if the statistics are exam- increased from 54 767 in 1982 to 82 021 in ined, it is clear that these investments have not 2000 (+49.8%). The number of agents resulted in the reduction of violent crime. employed by the civilian police increased from In Brazil, despite the growth in the number of 16 265 in 1982 to 36 883 in 2000 (+126.8%). police agents and municipal guards from The total number of police agents increased 339 900 in 1985 to 494 162 in 1995 (+45.4%), from 71 032 agents in 1982 to 118 904 agents the homicide rate increased from 14.9/100 000 in 2000 (+67.4%).22 in 1985 to 23.9/100 000 in 1995 (+60.4%). Despite the transition to democracy and the In the state of São Paulo, despite the growth virtual absence of external threats, the number in the number of police agents from 71 032 in of soldiers in the armed forces also grew from 1982 to 116 564 in 1998 (+64.1%), the homi- 272 550 in 1981 to 296 700 in 1991 and cide rate increased from 16/100 000 in 1982 to 336 800 in 1994 (219 000 in the army, 58 400 36.1/100 000 in 1996 (+125.6%). in the navy and 59 400 in the air force).23 Conservative groups argue that the invest- Responding to pressures from conservative ment in security services has not been sufficient groups, the Federal Constitution of 1988, and to contain the growth of crime and violence. more recently the complementary law of 97/99, They also argue that the control of crime and established that, not only the police but also the violence requires not only additional invest- armed forces, are responsible for the mainte- ment in security services, but also the expan- nance of law and order in Brazil. The National sion of the authority and the power of the Defence Policy adopted in 1996 decreed that police, the criminal justice and, if necessary, the armed forces should be prepared to protect the armed forces to maintain law and order. the country from armed groups and criminal Groups to the left of the political spectrum organisations in neighbouring countries, partic- argue that investment in security services is too ularly in the Amazon region, or within the high. They maintain that the control of crime national territory.24 and violence requires changes in economic and In addition to the increase in the number of social policies to reduce poverty and inequality. people employed in public security, the number From this perspective, economic and social of people employed in private security services policies focusing mainly on the process of eco- increased from 640 500 in 1985 to approxi- nomic stabilisation have undermined the impact mately one million in 1995. of security services and created favourable con- This figure does not include the police offi- ditions for the growth of crime and violence. cers that hold down second jobs with private Groups to the centre of the political spectrum security companies and other people that are argue that the problem is not so much the mag- not legally or regularly employed in private nitude of the investment, but the quality of security.25 security services and the absence or weakness Accordingly, private investment in security of democratic controls over security services. has surpassed public investments. A recent In particular, they argue that the reduction of study estimated that the public sector spends crime and violence requires reform to improve R$18 billion (approximately US$10 billion), the quality of security and criminal justice ser- while the private sector spends R$22 billion vices. In addition, access to these services must

81 Mesquita Neto be expanded and their accountability and • There are groups in favour and groups responsiveness to the law, the community and against the creation of a national guard. the citizens needs to be ensured. • There are groups in favour and groups The above political debate is very important. against the unification of the military police However, the problem remains that the growth and the civilian police. of crime and violence results not only from • There are groups in favour and groups social and economic inequalities, insufficient or against the development of community polic- inadequate security services and/or the dissemi- ing. nation of arms and drugs. It also results from • There are groups in favour and groups political uncertainty and institutional conflicts against the creation of municipal police not resolved during the transition from authori- forces. tarianism to democracy. These factors under- • There are groups in favour and groups mine the efforts to improve the quality of secu- against the expansion of private security ser- rity and criminal justice services. vices. These conflicts weaken and de-legitimise the 4. POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONAL constitutional rules regulating the structure and CONFLICT functioning of the public security system. They Since Brazil’s transition to democracy, there is render it more difficult, if not impossible, for a great deal of uncertainty regarding the struc- government officials and police authorities to ture of the public security system. This uncer- implement these rules and exercise control over tainty centres particularly on the roles of the security services, ensuring their effectiveness, federal government, the state governments, the efficiency, impartiality, accountability and municipal governments, civil society and the responsiveness to the law, the community and private sector in crime control and prevention. the citizens. The 1988 Federal Constitution promoted very Political uncertainty and institutional conflict limited changes to the structure of the public in the matter of public security since the transi- security system established under the authori- tion to democracy are not directly associated tarian regime. There has, however, been a with the growth of crime and violence. They resisted, contested, but progressive tendency are, however, major obstacles to the improve- towards the reform and decentralisation of the ment of the quality of security services, which public security system, including: are essential to the control and prevention of • the limitation of the role of the armed forces crime and violence within society. and the expansion of the role of the police forces in the matter of public security28 5. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE • the adoption of community policing by the Research has made it increasingly clear that military police in the federal states29 multiple factors contribute to the growth of • the creation of municipal guards crime and violence in Brazil. The problem of • the expansion of private security services. controlling crime and violence cannot be solved This process of decentralisation has contributed simply by reducing economic inequalities to narrowing the gap between the providers of and/or increasing the states capability to punish security services and the communities or the illegal and violent actions. It is necessary also citizens that use and pay for these services. It to improve the quality of security and criminal has, however, increased inconsistencies justice services, their accountability and between the 1988 Federal Constitution and the responsiveness to the law, the community and structure and functioning of the public security the citizens. system. The result is that conflict over the con- Research centres and NGOs, particularly in stitutional rules regulating the structure and São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and functioning of the public security system has Rio Grande do Sul, have intensified their sup- intensified. Some of the issues involved include port of reforms to improve the quality and the following: increase the accountability of security and • There are groups defending the expansion criminal justice services. and groups defending the limitation of the Responding to this movement, the federal role of the armed forces in public security. government announced the National

82 Mesquita Neto

Programme for Human Rights in 1996 and the grammes, with the support of the federal gov- National Programme for Public Security in the ernment, research centres and NGOs, will be year 2000.30 These programmes are extremely capable of reducing the level of political uncer- important, but they are only initial steps in a tainty and institutional conflict, promoting long-term process of change. Furthermore, pub- reform and improving the quality of security lic opinion, state governments, the judiciary and criminal justice services. Perhaps, though, and the legislative have been divided and less they will not be able to overcome the political supportive of reform within security and crimi- uncertainty and institutional conflict that have nal justice services. undermined government programmes and poli- It remains to be seen, however, if these pro- cies since the transition to democracy.

Table 1: Violent deaths resulting from aggression and events whose intention is undetermined, Brazil and the Federal States, 1998

Aggression Undetermd. Population Aggression/ Undetermd./ Uncertain/ 100 000 100 000 Aggression

Brazil 41 916 13 117 161 790 311 25.91 8.11 0.31 Rondônia 494 46 1 276 173 38.71 3.60 0.09 Acre 110 79 514 050 21.40 15.37 0.72 Amazonas 534 65 2 520 684 21.18 2.58 0.12 Roraima 133 1 260 705 51.02 0.38 0.01 Pará 772 194 5 768 476 13.38 3.36 0.25 Amapá 160 420 834 38.02 0.00 0.00 Tocantins 129 34 1 107 803 11.64 3.07 0.26 Maranhão 277 535 5 356 853 5.17 9.99 1.93 Piauí 142 52 2 714 999 5.23 1.92 0.37 Ceará 946 179 7 013 376 13.49 2.55 0.19 Rio G. Norte 222 271 2 624 397 8.46 10.33 1.22 Paraíba 420 24 3 353 624 12.52 0.72 0.06 Pernambuco 4 422 292 7 523 755 58.77 3.88 0.07 Alagoas 582 13 2 688 117 21.65 0.48 0.02 Sergipe 175 566 1 684 953 10.39 33.59 3.23 Bahia 1 271 1 308 12 851 268 9.89 10.18 1.03 Minas Gerais 1 511 2 499 17 100 314 8.84 14.61 1.65 Espírito Santo 1 675 84 2 895 547 57.85 2.90 0.05 Rio de Janeiro 7 596 2 457 13 681 410 55.52 17.96 0.32 São Paulo 13 985 2 196 35 284 072 39.64 6.22 0.16 Paraná 1 624 319 9 258 813 17.54 3.45 0.20 Santa Catarina 408 172 5 028 339 8.11 3.42 0.42 Rio Grande Sul 1 520 588 9 866 928 15.40 5.96 0.39 Mato Grosso Sul 670 144 1 995 578 33.57 7.22 0.21 Mato Grosso 831 31 2 331 663 35.64 1.33 0.04 Goiás 703 890 4 744 174 14.82 18.76 1.27 Distrito Federal 633 78 1 923 406 32.91 4.06 0.12

Source: Ministry of Health/Datasus/SIM

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ENDNOTES

1) Information available on Datasus’ website events whose intention is undetermined. www.datasus.gov.br See Table 1. 2) In 1998, the Ministry Health registered 9) See Table 3. 117 603 violent deaths or deaths resulting 10) See Table 4. from external causes. Within this universe, 11) See Table 5. there were 41 916 deaths (35%) as a result 12) See Table 6. of aggression and 13 117 deaths (11%) 13) See Table 7. resulting from events whose intention is 14) Catão 1999: 18. undetermined and therefore could eventu- 15) For an overview of the problem, see ally be the result of aggression or homi- Pinheiro 2000, Pinheiro et al 1998 and cide. See Table 1. Cardia 2000. 3) See Catão 1999: 9. The percentage is higher 16) See Tables 8 and 9. in the regions north (41.3%) and north-east 17) CEDEC 1997a, 1997b, 1996a, 1996b. (44.9%) and even higher in some states like 18) Among the non-governmental organisa- Maranhão (70.6%) and Piauí (68.9%). tions registering and reporting cases of vio- 4) The state of São Paulo publishes the statis- lence and gross human rights violations in tics of the crimes registered by the police rural areas are Movimento Nacional de every three months in Diário Oficial do Direitos Humanos, Movimento dos Estado de São Paulo www.imesp.com.br Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, Comissão and every year in Anuário Estatístico do Pastoral da Terra and Conselho Estado de São Paulo www.seade.gov.br Missionário Indigenista. 5) Information available on Datasus’ website 19) See 1988 Federal Constitution, articles 142 www.datasus.gov.br and 144. 6) See Table 2. 20) Information for 1981 and 1991, Mesquita 7) See Table 1. Neto 1995 and IISS 1994. Information for 8) These six states have a relatively high 1985 and 1995, from Garotinho 1998. number of deaths that are not registered 21) Ministry of Justice, National Secretary of and/or are registered as resulting from Public Security.

Table 2: Homicide rate and firearms, Brazil, 1980–1995

Homicides Homicides by Firearm

1980 11.7 5.1 1981 12.9 5.3 1982 12.9 5.1 1983 14.1 5.0 1984 15.6 6.1 1985 14.9 6.3 1986 15.5 6.5 1987 17.1 7.8 1988 17.0 7.6 1989 20.5 9.4 1990 22.0 11.4 1991 20.8 10.6 1992 19.1 9.9 1993 20.3 12.3 1994 21.3 14.3 1995 23.9 14.0 1996 23.7 14.0 Source: Ministry of Health/Datasus/SIM, in Catão 1999: 38 and 60

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22) With a population of approximately 35 lopment Bank, the annual cost of violence million, the state of Sao Paulo has one in Brazil can be as high as US$65 billion. police agent for 294 habitants. The ratio is 27) Information on the number of people in comparable to that in Italy, i.e. one police prison is not readily available in Brazil. I agent per 286 habitants. For purposes of thank Fernando Salla, from the Centre for comparison, Spain has one police agent per the Study of Violence, at the University of 276 habitants. France has one police agent São Paulo, for the information provided per 270 habitants. The United Kingdom above. The sources are IBGE 1972, the has one police agent per 407 habitants. journal Revista do Conselho Nacional de Monet 1993: 124-125. Política Criminal e Penitenciária 1:2 23) Mesquita Neto 1995 and IISS 1994. (1994) and the weekly magazine Veja, 24) Àlvares 2000. February 23, 2000. 25) Garotinho 1998: 87. 28) Mesquita Neto 2000 and 1998. 26) See “Aumento da violência faz setor priva- 29) Mesquita Neto 1998 and Muniz et al 1997. do gastar mais que Estado” [roughly: a 30) Both programmes are available at the Min- growth in violence results in the private istry of Justice’s website www.mj.gov.br. sector spending more than the state], in On the National Programme for Human Valor, July 4, 2000. According to a study Rights, see Pinheiro e Mesquita Neto 1999, conducted by the Interamerican Deve- 1998 and 1997.

Table 3: Change in homicide rates, Brazil and the Federal States, 1980–1995

Average Rate Average Rate Average Rate Change (%) Change (%) Change (%) 1980–1984 1985–1989 1990–1995 85–89/80–84 90–95/85–89 90–95/80–84

Brasil 14.8 18.3 22.6 23.6 23.5 58.0 Rondônia 24 45.5 38.6 89.6 –15.2 60.8 Acre 10 20.2 22 102.0 8.9 120.0 Amazonas 10.3 11.6 17.3 12.6 49.1 68.0 Roraima 17.7 23.2 40.2 31.1 73.3 127.1 Pará 10.8 13.2 14.2 22.2 7.6 31.5 Amapá 9.7 11.9 24.7 22.7 107.6 154.6 Tocantins na 7.2 8.4 na 16.7 na Maranhão 3.5 6.2 8 77.1 29.0 128.6 Piauí 4.4 4.6 4.3 4.5 –6.5 –2.3 Ceará 9.6 8.7 10 –9.4 14.9 4.2 Rio G. Norte 8.5 7.3 9 –14.1 23.3 5.9 Paraíba 12 13.6 12.3 13.3 –9.6 2.5 Pernambuco 23.8 32.6 37.2 37.0 14.1 56.3 Alagoas 21.1 27.1 25.9 28.4 –4.4 22.7 Sergipe 7.7 5.9 20.1 –23.4 240.7 161.0 Bahia 4.1 6.6 9.7 61.0 47.0 136.6 Minas Gerais 8 7.1 7.2 –11.3 1.4 –10.0 Espírito Santo 16.8 25 38.5 48.8 54.0 129.2 Rio Janeiro 20.7 26.3 47 27.1 78.7 127.1 São Paulo 18.8 26.9 30.4 43.1 13.0 61.7 Paraná 12.9 11.9 14.3 –7.8 20.2 10.9 Sta. Catarina 7.4 6.9 7.8 –6.8 13.0 5.4 Rio G. Sul 8.3 11.3 15.9 36.1 40.7 91.6 Mato G. Sul 19.5 18.9 25.2 –3.1 33.3 29.2 Mato Grosso 7.5 21.5 19.9 186.7 –7.4 165.3 Goiás 17.1 17.7 17.8 3.5 0.6 4.1 DF 14.3 21.6 33.7 51.0 56.0 135.7 Source: Ministry of Health/Datasus/SIM, in Catão 1999: 37 na = not available

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Table 4: Change in rates of homicide by firearm in Brazil and the Federal States, 1980–1995 Average Rate Average Rate Average Rate Change (%) Change (%) Change (%) 1980–1984 1985–1989 1990–1995 85–89/80–84 90–95/85–89 90–95/80–84 Brasil 5.4 7.6 11.7 40.7 53.9 116.7 Rondônia 13.0 24.7 21.0 90.0 –15.0 61.5 Acre 3.8 10.0 11.6 163.2 16.0 205.3 Amazonas 3.9 5.6 8.7 43.6 55.4 123.1 Roraima 0.6 0.8 16.2 33.3 1925.0 2600.0 Pará 5.7 7.2 8.5 26.3 18.1 49.1 Amapá 3.8 4.6 11.3 21.1 145.7 197.4 Tocantins na 4.1 3.5 na –14.6 na Maranhão 1.3 2.6 3.5 100.0 34.6 169.2 Piauí 1.3 1.5 1.4 15.4 –6.7 7.7 Ceará 3.3 2.8 4.1 –15.2 46.4 24.2 Rio G. Norte 4.2 3.7 5.1 –11.9 37.8 21.4 Paraíba 4.4 5.5 6.4 25.0 16.4 45.5 Pernambuco 13.5 21.9 25.8 62.2 17.8 91.1 Alagoas 10.5 13.1 13.4 24.8 2.3 27.6 Sergipe 2.7 2.7 11.7 0.0 333.3 333.3 Bahia 1.8 3.4 6.1 88.9 79.4 238.9 Minas Gerais 2.8 2.5 3.2 –10.7 28.0 14.3 Espírito Santo 6.0 10.8 19.1 80.0 76.9 218.3 Rio Janeiro 13.3 17.1 37.9 28.6 121.6 185.0 São Paulo 4.3 8.0 11.3 86.0 41.3 162.8 Paraná 6.0 5.5 7.5 –8.3 36.4 25.0 Sta. Catarina 2.9 3.2 3.6 10.3 12.5 24.1 Rio G. Sul 3.0 5.0 10.0 66.7 100.0 233.3 Mato G. Sul 10.5 9.8 14.3 –6.7 45.9 36.2 Mato Grosso 2.9 10.0 9.6 244.8 –4.0 231.0 Goiás 7.4 8.9 9.4 20.3 5.6 27.0 DF 6.0 12.6 22.1 110.0 75.4 268.3 Source: Ministry of Health/Datasus/SIM, in Catão 1999: 57 na = not available

Table 5: Homicide rate and gender, Brazil, 1990–1995 Homicide Rate Total Homicide Rate Men Homicide Rate Women 1980 11.7 21.2 2.3 1981 12.9 23.4 2.5 1982 12.9 23.4 2.5 1983 14.1 25.6 2.7 1984 15.6 28.8 2.7 1985 14.9 27.3 2.6 1986 15.5 28.6 2.7 1987 17.1 31.7 2.8 1988 17.0 31.4 2.9 1989 20.5 38.1 3.3 1990 22.0 40.9 3.5 1991 20.8 38.3 3.6 1992 19.1 35.3 3.2 1993 20.3 37.4 3.4 1994 21.3 39.3 3.7 1995 23.9 44.0 4.2 1996 23.7 43.5 4.4 Source: Ministry of Health/Datasus/SIM, in Catão 1999: 38

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Table 6: Change in homicide rate and age, Rio de Janeiro, 1980–1995

Average Rate Average Rate Average Rate Change (%) Change (%) Change (%) 1980–1984 1985–1989 1990–1995 85–89/80–84 90–95/85–89 90–95/80–84

Total 20.7 26.3 47.0 27.05 78.71 127.05 0–9 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.00 50.00 50.00 10–14 1.9 2.4 4.8 26.32 100.00 152.63 15–17 15.2 22.4 55.5 47.37 147.77 265.13 18–21 38.4 52.3 99.0 36.20 89.29 157.81 22–24 44.6 54.3 100.7 21.75 85.45 125.78 25–29 44.5 55.3 85.4 24.27 54.43 91.91 30–34 37.7 51.0 70.1 35.28 37.45 85.94 35–39 30.4 38.4 57.9 26.32 50.78 90.46 40–44 24.5 26.8 43.7 9.39 63.06 78.37 45–49 19.8 22.0 35.0 11.11 59.09 76.77 50–59 14.4 14.6 22.6 1.39 54.79 56.94 60 and + 10.1 9.9 11.4 –1.98 15.15 12.87

Source: Ministry of Health/Datasus/SIM, in Catão 1999: 51

Table 7: Change in homicide rate and age, São Paulo, 1980–1995

Average Rate Average Rate Average Rate Change (%) Change (%) Change (%) 1980–1984 1985–1989 1990–1995 85–89/80–84 90–95/85–89 90–95/80–84

Total 18.8 26.6 30.4 41.49 14.29 61.70 0–9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 10–14 2.2 3.8 3.5 72.73 –7.89 59.09 15–17 18.3 33.6 38.3 83.61 13.99 109.29 18–21 38.3 62.4 73.3 62.92 17.47 91.38 22–24 39.6 55.3 69.8 39.65 26.22 76.26 25–29 36.3 50.6 61.7 39.39 21.94 69.97 30–34 33.3 45.4 48.7 36.34 7.27 46.25 35–39 27.9 38.0 40.8 36.20 7.37 46.24 40–44 23.3 29.1 31.3 24.89 7.56 34.33 45–49 19.4 21.3 24.4 9.79 14.55 25.77 50–59 14.6 16.2 16.0 10.96 –1.23 9.59 60 and + 9.0 9.9 8.4 10.00 –15.15 –6.67

Source: Ministry of Health/Datasus/SIM, in Catão 1999: 51

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Table 8: Change in homicide rate, City of São Paulo, 1996-1999

District 1996 1999 Dif.% District 1996 1999 Dif.%

Jardim Angela 94.42 116.23 23.10 Vila 37.77 49.61 31.37 Leopoldina Sé 89.42 107.62 20.35 Pirituba 41.58 49.23 18.38 Cidade Ademar 90.79 106.06 16.82 Cidade Líder 41.72 49.02 17.50 Jardim São Luis 69.90 103.75 48.42 Limão 36.92 48.88 32.40 Iguatemi 54.56 100.11 83.47 Bom Retiro 36.00 48.69 35.27 São Rafael 60.10 96.16 60.00 Jaraguá 46.36 48.56 4.76 Grajaú 60.17 95.62 58.93 Ermelio 37.08 48.40 30.51 Matarazzo Campo Limpo 80.23 93.83 16.96 Cangaiba 24.52 47.95 95.52 Brás 37.52 93.47 149.16 Vila Prudente 38.85 47.84 23.16 Capão Redondo 86.39 93.02 7.67 Vila Sônia 42.88 47.51 10.79 Brasilândia 80.34 92.31 14.90 São Lucas 26.28 47.24 79.74 Parelheiros 66.66 91.52 37.29 Aricanduva 29.54 46.89 58.76 CidadeTiradentes 54.12 88.88 64.22 Ponte Rosa 31.49 45.45 44.35 Pedreira 65.87 82.09 24.61 Vila Guilherme 29.90 45.01 50.55 Morumbi 77.85 81.71 4.96 Campo Grande 51.87 44.41 –14.38 Cidade Dutra 70.37 80.64 14.58 Barra Funda 34.88 43.46 24.59 Cachoeirinha 68.17 77.75 14.05 São Domingos 39.78 42.12 5.88 Sapopemba 46.70 77.68 66.35 Santo Amaro 55.58 42.02 –24.41 Itaim Paulista 63.09 76.82 21.77 Freguesia do Ó 33.03 41.78 26.50 Jaçanã 47.98 76.39 59.21 Tucuruvi 24.53 38.44 56.74 Rio Pequeno 66.40 74.51 12.20 Casa Verde 37.12 38.15 2.79 Parque do Carmo 48.10 72.70 51.14 Penha 24.43 37.71 54.40 Guaianazes 92.16 72.62 –21.21 Anhanguera 31.55 36.01 14.13 Sacomã 63.19 67.45 6.74 Belém 32.89 32.10 –2.41 Artur Alvim 47.99 66.83 39.26 Mandaqui 23.55 30.77 30.69 Vila Jacuí 58.01 65.67 13.19 Butantã 28.04 30.74 9.65 Vila Maria 38.88 64.48 65.85 Cambuci 12.47 29.41 135.85 Itaquera 58.54 64.47 10.12 Tatuapé 16.78 28.99 72.74 Lajeado 63.23 64.45 1.93 Lapa 22.24 28.06 26.15 São Miguel 43.36 63.96 41.02 Vila Matilde 27.17 28.01 3.10 São Mateus 65.60 62.35 –4.95 Vila Formosa 32.83 26.91 –18.02 Jaguaré 44.33 61.95 39.73 Campo Belo 43.59 26.88 –38.33 Jardim Helena 57.43 61.79 7.59 Mooca 23.50 26.11 11.11 José Bonifácio 33.69 60.98 81.03 Bela Vista 38.54 25.49 –33.86 Socorro 54.74 59.70 9.07 Agua Rasa 15.00 21.42 42.78 Vila Curuçá 49.73 59.08 18.80 Consolação 17.07 19.60 14.82 Tremembé 30.72 57.80 88.18 Pinheiros 12.95 19.49 50.57 República 40.28 57.11 41.78 Santana 29.55 19.27 –34.80 Jabaquara 69.69 57.05 –18.14 Itaim Bibi 22.59 19.18 –15.09 Vila Medeiros 35.07 55.69 58.81 Saúde 21.23 19.16 –9.75 Pari 51.85 54.16 4.45 Carrão 25.19 18.19 –27.78 Perus 46.89 53.79 14.71 Liberdade 13.99 18.04 28.95 Ipiranga 30.86 53.55 73.52 Alto de Pinheiros 15.80 16.49 4.37 Jaguará 31.10 53.02 70.45 Perdizes 9.64 14.73 52.82 Raposo Tavares 47.03 50.74 7.89 Santa Cecília 27.70 13.75 –50.35 Marsilac 80.94 50.70 –37.36 Vila Mariana 15.30 11.55 –24.53 Cursino 48.05 50.09 4.25 Garden Paulista 6.72 8.22 22.30 Vila Andrade 38.80 50.07 29.05 Moema 14.84 4.11 –72.26

Source: Seade Foundation

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Table 9: Change in homicide rate, metropolitan region of São Paulo, 1996-1999

City 1996 1999 Difference %

Diadema 129.49 149.76 15.65 Embu-Guaçú 61.68 136.57 121.41 Itapeceria da Serra 111.19 105.70 –4.93 Itapevi 54.87 93.76 70.88 Barueri 49.90 92.59 85.55 Francisco Morato 51.04 86.56 69.59 Jandira 45.26 83.29 84.02 Itaquaquecetuba 66.05 82.89 25.50 Embu 105.19 81.50 –22.53 Taboão da Serra 64.80 78.09 20.51 Guarulhos 56.66 72.13 27.30 Osasco 58.69 69.41 18.28 Mauá 57.30 67.64 18.05 Rio Grande da Serra 34.63 66.40 91.73 Cotia 30.81 59.70 93.79 São Bernado do Campo 56.02 58.86 5.07 Santana do Parnaíba 33.39 57.89 73.35 Santo André 44.29 53.84 21.55 Carapicuíba 47.08 53.68 14.02 Ferraz de Vasconcelos 39.51 47.97 21.41 Cajamar 44.92 44.01 –2.03 São Lourenço da Serra 29.74 43.57 46.54 Aruja 35.66 43.52 22.05 Juquitiba 32.09 43.44 35.40 Mairiporã 50.30 42.94 –14.62 Suzano 36.04 41.87 16.16 Franco da Rocha 64.23 41.54 –35.33 Poá 29.54 37.96 28.51 Caieiras 24.50 33.00 34.67 Ribeirão Pires 28.77 28.58 –0.65 Santa Isabel 33.89 27.64 –18.44 Pirapora do Bom Jesus 47.85 25.03 –47.70 São Caetano do Sul 17.86 23.60 32.15 Guararema 22.23 22.20 –0.12 Vargem Grande Paulista 37.80 21.75 42.45 Mogi das Cruzes 29.17 21.42 –26.57 Biritiba Mirim 24.95 14.01 –43.85 Salesópolis 7.55 – –100.00

Source: Seade Foundation

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REFERENCES

ABRANCHES, S. 1994. A Alienação da GAROTINHO, A. 1998. Violência e Criminali- Autoridade: notas sobre violência urbana e dade no Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Rio de criminalidade. In Reis Velloso, João Paulo Janeiro: Hama. (ed.), Governabilidade, Sistema Político e IBGE. 1988. Participação Político-Social Violência Urbana. Rio de Janeiro: José 1988, volume 1: Justiça e Vitimização. Olympio Editora. Brasília: Ministério da Economia, Fazenda e ADORNO, S. 1999. Insegurança versus Direitos Planejamento. Humanos: entre a leie a ordem. Tempo Social IBGE. 1972. Anuário Estatístico 1972. 11(2): 129-153. IISS. 1994. The Military Balance, 1994-1995. ADORNO, S. 1998. Consolidação Democrática e KAHN, T. 1998. Pesquisas de Vitimização. Políticas de Segurança Pública no Brasil: Revista do ILANUD 10. rupturas e continuidades. In Zaverucha, Jorge MARICATO, E. 1995. Metrópole na Periferia do (ed.), Democracia e Instituições Políticas Capitalismo: ilegalidade, desigualdade e vio- Brasileiras no Final do Século XX Recife: lência. São Paulo: Hucitec. Edições Bagaço. MESQUITA NETO, P. 2000 (Forthcoming). ADORNO, S. 1983. A Criminalidade Violenta Police, Armed Forces and Democracy in urbana no Brasil: um recorte temático. Brazil. In Amir, Menachem and Einstein, Boletim Informativo Bibliográfico 35: 3-24. Stanley (eds.), Policing, Security and ÀLVARES, ÉLC. 2000. O Ministério da Defesa e Democracy. Huntsville, TX: OICJ Press. a Segurança Pública. In Reis Velloso, João MESQUITA NETO, P. 1999. Fuerzas Armadas, Paulo e Albuquerque, Roberto Cavalcanti Policias y Seguridad Publica en Brasil: insti- (eds.), Pobreza, Cidadania e Segurança. Rio tuciones y politicas gubenamentales. In Rut de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora. Diamint, (ed.). Control Civil y Fuerzas BRICEÑO-LEON, R., CARNEIRO, L. AND CRUZ, J. Armadas en las nuevas democracias lati- M. 1999. O Apoio dos cidadãos à ação extra- noamericanas. Buenos Aires: Universidad judicial da polícia no Brasil, em El Salvador Torcuato Di Tella e Nuevohacer. e na Venezuela, in Pandolfi et al. 1999. MESQUITA NETO, P.1999. Policiamento CARDIA, N. 2000. Urban Violence in São Comunitário: A Experiencia em Sao Paulo. Paulo. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Revista Brasileira de Ciencias Criminais Center. 7(25): 281-292. CARDIA, N. 1999. Atitudes, Valores e Normas MESQUITA NETO, P. 1995. From Intervention to Culturais em Relação à Violência. Brasília: Participation: The Transformation of Military Ministério da Justiça, Secretaria de Estado Politics in Brazil, 1974-1992. Ph.D. dos Direitos Humanos. Dissertation. Columbia University, New CATÃO, Y. 1999. Mortes Violentas: Um York. Panorama dos Homicidios no Brasil. MUNIZ, J. ET AL. 1997. Resistências e Manuscript. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE. Dificuldades no Programa de Policiamento CEDEC. 1997a. Mapa de Risco da Violencia - Comunitário. Tempo Social 9(1): 197-213. Cidade do Rio de Janeiro. OLIVEN, R. G. 1980. A Violência como mecan- CEDEC. 1997b. Mapa de Risco da Violencia - ismos de dominação e como estratégia de Cidade de Salvador. sobrevivência. Dados - Revista Brasileira de CEDEC. 1996a. Mapa de Risco da Violencia - Ciências Sociais 23(3): 371-376. Cidade de Curitiba. PAIXÃO, A. L. 1986. Crime, Controle Social e CEDEC 1996b. Mapa de Risco da Violencia - Consolidação da Democracia: As Metáforas Cidade de São Paulo. da Cidadania. In Reis, Fábio Wanderley and CPDOC-FGV/ISER. 1997. Lei, Justiça e O'Donnell, Guillermo (eds.). Democracia no Cidadania - direitos, vitimização e cultura Brasil: Dilemas e Perspectivas. São Paulo: política na Região Metropolitana do Rio de Edições Vértice. Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC-FGV/ISER. PANDOLFI, D. C., CARVALHO, J. M., CARNEIRO, FLORES, M. C. 1992. Bases para uma Política L. P. AND GRYNSZPAN, M. (EDS.). 1999. Militar. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp. Cidadania, Justiça e Violência. Rio de

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Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas Editora. SOARES, L. E. ET AL. 1996. Violência e Política PINHEIRO, P. S. 2000. Brazil: The Burden of the no Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: ISER e Past; The Promise of the Future. Daedalus Relume Dumará. 129(2): 119-143. VIDIGAL, A. F. 1989. Las Nuevas Fuerzas PINHEIRO, P. S. 1996. O Passado não está Armadas e los Nuevos Problemas de La morto: nem passado é ainda. Em Gliberto Seguridad. Documentos de Trabajo 8. Dimenstein, Democracia em Pedaços: Santiago, Chile: Comision Sudamericana de Direitos Humanos no Brasil. São Paulo: Paz. Companhia das Letras. WEFFORT, F. 1980. Atitude diante da violência. PINHEIRO, P. S. AND MESQUITA NETO, P. 1999. Ciência Penal 1: 122-130. Primeiro Relatório Nacional sobre os ZALUAR, A. 1999. Violência e Crime. In Miceli, Direitos Humanos no Brasil. Brasília: Sérgio (ed.), O que ler na Ciência Social Ministério da Justiça. Brasileira, 1970-1995 - Antropologia, PINHEIRO, P. S. AND MESQUITA NETO, P. 1998. Volume 1. São Paulo e Brasília: Editora Direitos Humanos no Brasil: Perspectivas no Sumaré e Capes. final do século. Pesquisas 11 - Cinquenta ZVEKIC, U. & FRATE, A. ALVAZZI DEL (eds.). Anos da Declaração Universal de Direitos 1995. Criminal Victimisation in the Humanos. Developing World. Rome: United Nations PINHEIRO, P. S. AND MESQUITA NETO, P. 1997. Interregional Crime and Justice Research Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos: Institute. Avaliação do Primeiro Ano e Perspectivas. Estudos Avançados 30. PINHEIRO, P. S. ET AL. 1998. São Paulo Sem Web Sites Medo (Rio de Janeiro: Garamond). SILVA FILHO, JOSÉ VICENTE. 2000. Reflexões Fundação Seade [Seade Foundation]: para uma política nacional de segurança www.seade.gov.br pública. In Reis Velloso, João Paulo e Ministério da Justiça [Ministry of Justice]: Albuquerque, Roberto Cavalcanti (eds.), www.mj.gov.br Pobreza, Cidadania e Segurança. Rio de Ministério da Saúde/Datasus [Ministry of Janeiro: José Olympio Editora. Health, Datasus]: www.datasus.gov.br

91 The Growth, Extent and Causes of Crime: Moçambique

Luis Antonio Mondelane

INTRODUCTION: SOCIETY IN TRANSITION ject in the country was being implemented – This paper addresses the growth, extent and from 1975 to 1987. The second, starting from causes of crime in Moçambique. An updated 1987 and extending to the present, is the trans- reading of the social and cultural realities of the formation from a planned to a market econo- country is essential for a comprehensive under- my, from one-party state democracy to multi- standing of the causes of crime and, conse- party and plural democracy. The first phase is quently, for the search for an adequate remedy the transition from a colonial-capitalist society to tackle the problem. Such a reading is, how- to socialism and the second, from socialism to ever, not possible in this context, but a brief market democracy. overview shall be given. The revolutionary period corresponds with The growth of crime is a matter of great con- the last stage of development of African cern to all who are confronted with the increas- nationalism that culminated in the indepen- ing rate of crime, violence and fear in our soci- dence of former colonial territories on the con- eties. It is a phenomenon that is not exclusive tinent. Regardless of limited resources, the to industrialised societies but also affects state still had strong capacity to fulfil the role developing countries. Pressures arising from of leading social transformation through law. the globalisation process are, among others, The state was almost omnipresent through factors of crime development in quantity, vari- mechanisms of social representation such as ety and complexity. Globalisation brings with community organisations for self-defence, pop- it, or at least gives way to, a new scenario: ular vigilance and crime fighting. Similarly, the namely, international and organised crime. people’s justice system was an important The growth of crime is associated with rapid instrument for the assurance of peace and tran- economic development, consumerism, the quillity in society. growth of cities and a degeneration of the In a society in transition, crime is also of a social fibre. transitional character. Pillage, sabotage of eco- It is therefore a common concern of people nomic infrastructures and the system of distrib- of good will to try to understand the growth, ution of goods and food, appropriation of state extent and causes of crime, in order to find ade- funds and property, were the most frequent quate mechanisms for fighting both crime and economic and financial crimes. Considering violence. that private property was an exception, one can Moçambique is a society in transition, since easily understand the reason for the high fig- the time of independence – 25 June 1975 – ures in this field. Crimes against life or physi- until the present day. As a result, the nature and cal integrity must also to be taken into account. extent of crime is characterised by transition. They were, however, under the control of the Two different phases should be highlighted state and society due to existing mechanisms of when examining the transition period: first is crime prevention. Those mechanisms were the revolutionary phase when the socialist pro- assured through people’s participation in the

93 Mondelane decision-making process and its implementa- to a situation where the state holds the symbolic tion – through permanent contact and account- role of guaranteeing law and order. The slim ability of state agents to their governors. The presence of the state and the absence of social latter had power to control those in charge of pressure against antisocial behaviour provide running public affairs. The late Samora Machel, fertile conditions for the continuous growth of while addressing members of the transitional crime. government, wisely stated that power can cor- Corruption is now becoming a problem rupt even the most honest man.1 demanding careful attention. It is a social can- Development factors associated with the cer affecting the state apparatus, the judiciary demographic explosion as an enabling environ- and the society en masse. Corruption can sel- ment for the growth of crime were reinforced in dom be seen overtly, but it is still present. Due the Moçambican context by a civil war that was to its bilateral nature, active and passive agents waged from 1976 to 1992. The war cost mil- of crime tend to compromise. Disclosure of lions of lives and destroyed vital economic such agreement only takes place when one part plants and infrastructure. is seriously harmed by another’s miscarriage. As a consequence of the war, thousands of Bribery, nepotism and the appropriation of pub- citizens were forced to abandon their homes lic property, for example, are mentioned in pri- seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. vate, but seldom brought to court. Others were internally displaced and forced to live in main urban centres, thus overwhelming 1. THE EXTENT OF CRIME social services such as health, education, trans- “I made the land safe, so that a lone woman port and basic food distribution. The collapse of could go her way freely, and none would economic and social infrastructures was wors- molest her. I rescued the humble from their ened by the deterioration of social ethics and oppressors. I made every man safe in his moral values, giving way to a criminal mentali- home. I preserved the lives of those who ty. Also, a growth in crime does not necessarily sought my court of justice. The people were result in increased capacity building for law well content under my rule” (Ramses III, enforcers, particularly for police and the courts. 1200 BC).2 The praised values of African and social soli- There is no clear-cut system for measuring the darity were replaced by individualistic, selfish increasing rate of crime.The perceived level of principles like easy money and making fast for- insecurity, the disturbance of public order, fear tunes without the requisite work or sacrifice. to walk in the streets or to travel in places in Some years ago, young people would say they towns and rural areas, are all clear indications aspired to be doctors, lawyers, military men or of the presence of criminal activities. For scien- professors. Today, the youth simply say they tific purposes, however, these indications can- want to be rich, revealing a materialistic and not provide a reasonable instrument for measur- selfish trend in society. This assertion is made ing the level of crime. This is the place of sta- without taking into account the need for any tistics, regardless of the circumspection and reasonable professional activity in order to scepticism surrounding the analyses. realise such an expectation. One can argue that Such scepticism is justified on the grounds this is a natural expectation, without any nega- that statistics cannot reflect the real complexity tive elements within. However, considering that of crime. Sometimes, only a small percentage such an aim is to be achieved at any price, by of criminal activity can be perceived through whatever means and as quickly as possible, we statistics; that is, crimes reported to the police, come to understand that a rich man is now the passed on to the public prosecutor and referred elected hero of society – the new hero. (Ferreira to the courts. 1993: 124). With this in mind, we will review Moçam- This is the main characteristic of the second bique’s criminal records for the past decade. period where society is going through a process The number of cases entered into the court sys- of transition from a planned to a free market tem increased from 18 914 cases in 1990, to economy. From a situation where the state was 22 8853 the following year. From 1992 with providing basic services and basic needs to the 20 210, the number of cases dropped to 10 510 population at a symbolic price, we have moved in 1996. In 1997, the data almost doubled from

94 Mondelane

Table 1: Criminal cases in provincial courts

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Not decided 51 992 61 048 70 249 78 270 84 560 76 468 82 426 81 323 91 831 98 915 Entered 18 914 22 853 20 210 16 744 13 230 12 146 10 510 21 564 14 491 14 712 Decided 9858 13 652 12 189 10 454 21 322 6188 11 613 11 056 7407 7387 Transferred 61 048 70 249 78 270 84 560 76 468 82 426 81 323 91 831 98 915 106 240 the previous year to 21 564, then decreased ment spot for the large quantities of drugs pro- over the following years to 14 491 in 1998 and duced in and exported from the Asian conti- 14 712 in 1999. (See Table 1.) nent, destined for sale in Africa and Europe.3 Again, one clarification has to be made. The Drug trafficking is associated with corruption above analyses have considered only cases and money laundering. A considerable amount brought to the court system. They therefore do of money is generally used in bribery aimed at not include the large number of crimes reported removing barriers. From migration and customs to the police but for whatever reason (lawful or officers to police of any kind, public prosecu- not) were not taken further, or cases referred to tors and judges are elected targets of this new the public prosecutor’s office and not trans- criminal activity. ferred to the courts. Moreover, they do not When examining cases submitted to the include data of so-called “grey crimes” – i.e. courts, it is clear that a diligent effort has been the considerable amount of crimes not reported made to sabotage the legal process. In many to the competent authority and rather dealt with cases, judges are confronted with incomplete or by alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution tampered with files. The responsible persons (e.g. at family level, or by local, traditional or are often permitted to leave the country, even religious authorities). when caught in the act. In most cases only peo- Regarding the extent of crime, it is not possi- ple with minor responsibility – e.g. those used ble to enumerate here on all the categories of in the process of transportation or simple crime as prescribed by law. Crimes against guards of the premises – are arrested and property, life and physical integrity are, howev- charged. Drug trafficking is, however, a crime er, the most frequent cases. In addition, eco- where the victim is the whole society. nomic crimes are increasingly evolving. Fraud resulting in the withdrawal of large quantities 2. CAUSES OF CRIME of money from the state system, public or pri- For the purpose of clarity and objectivity, the vate banks, armed robberies and motor vehicle causes of crime can be grouped into exogenous robberies, are frequently reported, especially in and endogenous causes. Exogenous factors are the major cities such as Maputo, Beira, externally determined factors which create an Nampula and Nacala. adequate environment for crime. Endogenous Drug trafficking cases are also reported factors are those generated within society. almost every year. Several factors have led to The new world economic order, represented this situation, an important factor being the by globalisation and the imposition of market strategic location of Moçambique: its long economy and structural adjustment through coastline and the existence of many natural polices of the Bretton Woods institutions, has ports makes the country a preferable transship- placed tremendous pressure on peripheral

Table 2: Evolution of criminal cases

1991/90 1992/91 1993/92 1994/93 1995/94 1996/95 1997/96 1998/97 1998/98

Not decided 117.4 115.1 111.4 108.0 90.4 107.8 98.7 112.9 107.7 Entered 120.8 88.4 82.9 79.0 91.8 86.5 205.2 67.2 101.5 Decided 138.5 89.3 85.8 204.0 29.0 187.7 95.2 67.0 99.7 Transferred 115.1 111.4 108.0 90.4 107.8 98.7 112.9 107.7 107.4

95 Mondelane economies and on social life, thereby negative- market economy, sorcery is increasingly gain- ly affecting developing countries. The shift of ing popularity in society. The reason may be decision centres from the state to economic that people seek refuge in what has remained in monopolies or transnational entities has debili- terms of African identity. tated the state. Economic globalisation has ren- Moçambican society is still in the process of dered national control meaningless, especially mending its war wounds. The war generated in developing countries. large quantities of arms that are now being used “It has made the decision-making autonomy either for trafficking or violent crimes. of governments vulnerable to choices made Moreover, large caches of weapons and elsewhere, over which they have little influ- ammunitions are found in the forests, providing ence or power” (Faria 2000).4 a permanent source for arms dealers. The gov- Additionally, the privatisation process removed ernment has instituted a project to transform the self-funding capacity of the state, thereby guns into farming tools. Considerable amounts affecting social programmes like providing for of armament were located and destroyed as a basic needs such as health care, education, result, but there is still a long way to go in the housing and social security. Furthermore, pri- struggle to remove weapons from the wrong vatisation has resulted in vast numbers of hands. unemployment and a large number of com- Another important cause of crime is the fact plaints over compensation that have erupted in that, for long periods, people were subjected to labour disputes. violence and war. The consumption of marijua- The new economic order is therefore an na by combatants has created a “readiness” to external imposition to developing countries resort to crime and violence, especially when resulting in large numbers of jobless that, asso- associated with alcohol. In regions deeply ciated to the ever-growing cost of living, is affected by war in the past, violent murders are conducive to criminal activity. frequently reported. The situation calls for a Endogenous causes comprise a combination careful examination of the process of social of distinct elements. We do not aim here to pro- reintegration of former combatants, especially vide a scientific or even a systematic set of child soldiers. causes, nor do we intend to provide an analysis of the individual causes. Rather, we shall refer 3. COPING WITH CRIME to some general social factors leading to crime. It is important to mention current developments As referred to above, an up-to-date reading of in Moçambique that are aimed at tackling the the current social reality is essential for identifi- increasing crime rate. Education is regarded as cation of the causes, especially after the violent fundamental for achieving good results in fight- and large-scale displacement as a consequence ing crime. It is in this spirit that a police acade- of war. my was created to train police members, This being said, it has been pointed out that including criminal investigation officers. excessive consumption of alcohol is often asso- Similarly, an institution for judicial education ciated with crime: most reported murders are was set up and is currently preparing its first committed after the abusive use of alcohol. course. Judges (magistrates), public attorneys, This is a problem affecting both urban and rural defenders, clerks and other justice officials and areas. The consumption of alcohol is tradition- prison guards will attend the centre. Due to a ally pervasive and socially acceptable. It may serious shortage of trained personnel, the centre be argued that it is not a cause per se, but rather will primarily provide basic training courses for a factor that creates an enabling environment judges and attorneys serving district courts, and for crime. who have no legal education. The centre will Another endogenous factor is the consider- also provide induction courses for lawyers able weight of tradition regarding sorcery. embracing the judiciary. Witch doctors alleging that a particular person Joint training programmes for all those has caused misfortune to someone have involved in the administration of justice are inspired a significant number of crimes. As regarded as highly important. These pro- globalisation strips away social and moral val- grammes enhance friendship and good coopera- ues, replacing them with values attached to a tion in the course of work.

96 Mondelane

Drug trafficking is also associated with the wants (H Becker) are no longer accurate. consumption of drugs. To tackle this problem a Societies are now part of a global network. As central body was created, tasked with coordi- referred to above, exogenous factors play an nating efforts aimed at combating crime. important role in creating an enabling environ- Even assuming that well-trained personnel ment for crime. The disintegration of the tradi- are available in the country, a shortage of tional family, of the social fibre and of solidari- resources will still present a great problem. It is ty are also elements conducive to crime. clearly understood that Moçambique cannot Globalisation has blurred national bound- cope alone with highly organised international aries. Cross-border criminal organisations are crime. As a result, solid cooperation in combat- flourishing and operating in various regions ing crime is fundamental among countries in simultaneously. In addition, products of crime the region and at international level. A single are transported from one country to another, country, especially in the developing world, within the region or transhipped to distant cannot eradicate organised and cross-border places. Furthermore, it can be asserted that the crime. It requires joint efforts, good coopera- media and movie industry, which exposes tion, law enforcement and crime combating scenes of violence and crime, are unfortunately endeavours. Countries need to meet regularly to inspiring criminals. exchange information and technology so that The crime rate is growing quantitatively and positive results can be achieved. Different legal in complexity, but it is not followed by a systems, languages and sometime cultures respective strengthening of the institutional should not deter the creation of meaningful capacity to combat it. The police, the first line relationships. Friendship, when inspired by the enforcers, public attorneys and the court system same ideals and goals such as fighting crime are not equipped with adequate tools for com- and developing peace and stability in societies, bating crime. Providing the police and the court is achievable. system with well-trained personnel and the necessary resources, is vital for tackling crime in a CONCLUSION society in transition. Is there a better society; a society without mis- Finally, corruption is a social cancer that ery, abject poverty, joblessness, violence and demands immediate eradication. A global prob- crime? The well-known assertions that every lem requires a global solution. Industrialised society has its deserving criminals (Lacas- and developing countries must combine efforts sagne) or that society has the criminals that it if good results are to be expected.

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ENDNOTES

1) Samora Machel, 1983: 12 A luta contra o extracted from cannabis sativa) in two subdesenvol vimento, “Material, moral and containers were apprehended by the ideological corruption, bribery, the search police. The product was packed in boxes for self comfort, nepotism – that is, favours normally used for cashew nut exports. on the grounds of particular friendships or The man escorting the truck was arrested. preferences in job allocation favouring fam- Another, arrested and charged, was found ily members, friends or people from one’s innocent. Similarities of names (with the own area are part of the system of life that real owner of goods) led to his arrest. we want to destroy … Everyone who Case C: 1996 – a drug plant for the fabri- diverts from our political line will have no cation of mandrax was dismantled by tolerance from us. We will be intransigent police in Matola and 10 Pakistanis were … We will not hesitate in exposing him to arrested. The public prosecutor assigned people harmed by his behaviour.” to the case was expelled after freeing 2) John Henry Wigmore, The Egyptian Legal detainees. System, 1, A Panorama of the World’s Case D: 1998 – 12 tons of haxixe was Legal Systems, 14-15 (West Publ:1982). transshiped in Quissanga, in the northern 3) To illustrate the ever-growing number of province of Cabo Delgado. Many were cases of narcotraffic, the following exam- arrested and charged in connection with ples are offered: the crime. Again, the real owners were Case A: 1993 – 10 containers of goods not found. (clothes) imported from India, were 4) José Eduardo Faria, Judicial power in law apprehended by police – 50 000 and society: draft for discussion on compar- metaquolon, mandrax pills were found. ative judicial policy 2000: 1. Case B: 1995 – 40 tons of haxixe (drug

98 The Growth, Extent and Causes of Crime: Ukraine

Igor Zhdanov

INTRODUCTION figure for Poland was 290 criminal offences This paper will address the characteristics of per 10 000 people; for Russia – 205; Romania the current fight against crime in Ukraine, the – 157; Belarus – 117; and for Ukraine – 111. major problems facing Ukrainian law-enforce- However, the problem of combating crime con- ment agencies, factors affecting the fight tinues to challenge law enforcement agencies against crime and potential crime-fighting and is of great concern to society as a whole. activities. According to an All-Ukrainian sociological Many of the statistics quoted below are survey conducted by the UCEPS in June 2000, derived from the work and surveys conducted combating crime is a problem of the greatest by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and concern to 47.4% of Ukrainian citizens; while Political Studies (UCEPS), which I represent. 31% of the respondents worry about bribery The UCEPS is a public non-governmental and corruption in agencies of state power and organisation engaging in studies in the fields of administration. foreign and domestic policy, national security It should be emphasised that the above-men- and defence. tioned problems rank five and six respectively according to priority and rank just after prob- 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CURRENT FIGHT lems of declining standards of living, wage and AGAINST CRIME AND MAJOR PROBLEMS FACING pension arrears, unemployment, etc. UKRAINIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES We turn now to the major problems facing In 1999 and early 2000, the UCEPS managed law enforcement agencies and that contribute to consolidate positive trends that have showed to the high crime rate. up over the past few years. From 1996 to 1999, The first major problem is the unacceptably the number of registered criminal offences high proportion of serious crimes. In 1999, this decreased by 100 000. There were fewer regis- figure amounted to about 33% of the total num- tered intended murders, including assasina- ber of registered criminal offences. This figure tions, with the proportion of murders disclosed increased almost 2.5 times over the past 10 increasing from 13% in 1995 to 89% in 1999. years. There is no decrease in the number of Juvenile crime has shown a declining trend. criminal offences committed by recidivists The fight against organised crime is on- (22.5%). In 1999, some 1000 criminal offences going: 870 tough criminal groups involving involved the use of firearms and 123 crimes 3200 members were neutralised in 1995, while were committed with the help of explosive in 1999, 1160 criminal groups numbering 5000 devices. active members were disclosed by law enforce- The second major problem is corruption and ment agencies. bribery, which is growing at an alarming rate. If we compare the crime rate calculated per In particular, corruption affects the formation 10 000 people, we find that Ukraine is in a bet- and functioning of state authorities, as well as ter position than its neighbours. In 1999, this the implementation of state policy, and it is

99 Zhdanov

Number of registered acts of corruption 1999. The crime rate is growing in the banking sector as well: in 1999, violations were found in 713 Ukrainian banks and 88 criminal cases were initiated. In the first quarter of 2000, 37 criminal cases were brought against bank employees. A fourth major problem is that criminal groupings consider Ukraine as an advantageous route to transport drugs as well as a lucrative drug market. Some 42 000 criminal offences were registered in 1999 (up 2000 compared to 1998), which were connected with illegal drug trafficking; 759 illegal drug-producing sites were eliminated. According to a United Nations assessment, drug sale profits run at 400$ annually. A fifth problem is the growth in illegal used in political rivalries. The 1990–1999 peri- migration. In 1999, 14 646 illegal migrants od saw registered corruption cases growing 2.6 were detained, of whom 11 000 were appre- times (see graph). According to data of the hended on the western border, with the remain- Procuracy General of Ukraine, in 1999, 2600 der being caught on the Ukrainian–Russian bor- acts of corruption were revealed; 768 criminal der. Ukraine is clearly becoming a transit route cases were initiated in court, including 200 con- for migrants travelling from Asian countries cerning grafts accepted by high-ranking civil (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Vietnam, China and servants. Bangladesh) to Western Europe. The statistics mentioned do not, however, In terms of the current fight against crime, it reflect the full situation. The application of the should be noted that in spite of certain positive Law of Ukraine “On Corruption” resulted in changes, the problems facing law enforcement 5162 administrative law cases being initiated agencies in Ukraine are acute and require ade- against 4300 civil servants in 1999. During the quate responses. first quarter of 2000 alone, 2000 protocols on corrupt offences were referred to the courts. 2. FACTORS AFFECTING THE FIGHT AGAINST The pervasion of corruption is evidenced by the CRIME fact that, as indicated by various assessments, UCEPS experts believe that, in particular, the entrepreneurs in Ukraine spend 6.5% of their following factors obstruct crime-fighting average monthly income to bribe officials. efforts. World Bank experts assess the annual sum of • The legislative regulations for combating bribes in Ukraine to be at the level of a two- crime do not meet the needs of the time. The month trading turnover of the country. Ukrainian Criminal Code in force today was A serious problem is corruption in the sphere adopted in 1961, some 40 years ago. Some of of privatisation. Failure to fulfil investment its provisions are outdated and are no longer obligations following the privatisation act applied. The Code was prepared under condi- creates favourable conditions for corruption. tions of a plan-based socialist system and Today, almost every third privatisation agree- does not contain provisions concerning cor- ment is not being fulfilled. pora delicti of many criminal offences. In Pervasive corruption in the energy sector particular, it does not apply to criminal may bring this strategically vital industry out- offences connected with the peculiarities of side the control of the state. In the first quarter market relations, as well as with new crimes of 2000, 600 criminal offences were disclosed involving the use of information technology. in this sector, with related losses amounting to (According to assessments presented at the 60.4 million hryvnias. 10th Congress on Crime Prevention that took A third problem is the growth of crime in the place in Vienna, April 2000, “computer pira- economic sector. In the year 2000, 18 300 eco- cy” generates profits of $500 million annual- nomic crimes were disclosed, up 34% from ly.)

100 Zhdanov

• Law enforcement agencies are not trained to Regarding crime-fighting legislation, the work under the new conditions. Militia and Verkhovna Rada has received a new Criminal procuracy officers are not experienced to Code that takes into consideration present fight crime in the banking sector or that trends in the evolution of crime and that which is occurring in the privatisation of state embodies advances make in law science. Draft property. They have had to learn on-the-job, laws are being prepared to provide for criminal so to speak, creating specific subdivisions to liability in terms of money laundering and to match current requirements (in particular, ensure a better reflection of the particularities subdivisions to fight crime in the economic in the banking sector and the protection of sector, organised crime, illegal drug traffick- intellectual property rights. ing, corruption, etc.). The Ministry of Internal Affairs is develop- • Logistical and financial support to law ing further cooperation with its counterparts in enforcement agencies is not sufficient. On other CIS countries: the Council of Ministers average, monthly remuneration for militia and the Interstate Anti-terrorist Centre have officers stands at $60, which is barely higher been established. In 1999, 26 people were than the official minimum wage; wages extradited based on demands made by the arrears owed to employees of the Ukrainian Interlope Bureau. Relevant cooperation agree- Ministry of Internal Affairs stands at 63 mil- ments have been concluded with Western lion hryvnias (some $12 million) as of 1 July neighbours, including the Czech Republic, 2000. Law enforcement agencies are short of Poland and Hungary. transportation means, computers and modern Ukraine and the European Union have stated communication facilities. the need to extend cooperation in the field of • Faced with the expansion of transnational law enforcement, in particular, in the fight crime, Ukrainian internal affairs bodies have against illegal migration, organised crime, and failed to establish efficient cooperation with money laundering. A programme entitled their counterparts in other countries. The col- Ukrainian–American Cooperation in lapse of the Soviet Union entailed a break- Combating Corruption and Organised Crime down of a single system of law enforcement for the 2000–2005 period was signed in July bodies, while criminal elements did not lose 2000. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of their established links and even enhanced the Internal Affairs, this programme is expected to efficiency of their activities due to the “trans- result in fewer wilful murders, assaults, rob- parency” of borders between the Common- beries and theft of citizens’ private property in wealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. the first quarter of 2000. Furthermore, in the early 1990s Ukrainian UCEPS experts believe that necessary and crime began its active expansion towards the fundamental conditions to counteract corrup- countries of Western and Central Europe. tion include political will on the part of high- This factor was not taken into full considera- ranking state leaders as well as transparency in tion by law enforcement agencies, lagging terms of state power. The absence of these con- behind the growth in crime both in Ukraine ditions stultifies such counteracting efforts. It is and beyond its borders. The Ukrainian Inter- also necessary to solve the following problems: lope Bureau was only established several • Reducing the number of so-called “bribe- years ago. inclinable” functions of state administration The above mentioned factors exert a negative (issuance of permits, licences, certificates, influence on the fight against crime, contribut- etc. ). ing to its expansion. • Defining, through legislation, procedures for taking administrative decisions. 3. PERSPECTIVES OF THE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME • Ensuring transparency of the decision-mak- IN UKRAINE ing process with the use of competitions, ten- We will now address perspectives on the fight ders, etc. against crime, specific measures taken by law • Raising criminal liability for corrupt prac- enforcement agencies intended to counteract tices. the above-mentioned negative factors, as well To fulfil these tasks, the UCEPS experts sug- as proposals made by UCEPS experts. gest the following measures be taken:

101 Zhdanov

• It is necessary to approve legislatively a code reserve fund should be clearly determined by of civil servant behaviour, which would law, with a practice of regular reports on the embody a system of principles and values of use of such funds introduced. civil service and models of a civil servant’s • Leaders found chargeable with misusing bud- behaviour in certain situations. In particular, get funds should be subject (in addition to such a code should include recommendations other sanctions) to penalties which, for exam- in respect of a functionary’s proper actions in ple, could amount to 5–10% of the budget the event that his/her pecuniary self-interest expenditures used for inappropriate purposes. arises or somebody attempts to offer a bribe • It is necessary to introduce a practice of to him/her, etc. declaring gifts received (worth, for instance, • It is necessary to define legislatively and to more than $10). This would mean fewer make transparent the procedure for granting opportunities for illegal enrichment on the credits guaranteed by state authorities, as part of civil servants. UCEPS experts suggest well as to make transparent the use of budget that the media should publish lists of func- funds and to ensure the implementation of tionaries convicted of corrupt practices, mis- laws already enacted. feasance, peculation, excess of powers, etc. It • Governmental guarantees regarding foreign would be appropriate to impose a life ban on credits for enterprises (institutions, organisa- such persons from taking civil service tions) should be granted by way of exception offices. and only with Parliament’s consent. It is expedient to introduce mandatory public CONCLUSION reports by the head of the government on the The fight against crime can only be effective if effectiveness of using such credits (including the political will on the part of state leadership such reports before Parliament), with detailed exists and if there are highly proficient law information being published in the media. enforcement agencies that interact with society. • Conditions and restrictions in respect of plan- I believe this conference will contribute to ning Cabinet ministers’ spending of the the cause of combating crime.

102 The Growth, Extent and Causes of Crime: Northern Ireland

John Brewer

INTRODUCTION • An exponential increase in gross levels of There is a common sense notion in Northern crime in both parts of Ireland from the 1960s. Ireland, permeating the police and sections of This occurred a decade or so later than in the media, which claims that crime is related to Great Britain and most other industrialised “the troubles” only in that paramilitary vio- societies. lence has siphoned off criminals, and once • A lower crime rate per head of population in peace comes, the former terrorists will become both parts of Ireland than in neighbouring gangsters for real. Ordinary crime will thus British and European countries. escalate in the future, much as it has in other • Historically, a lower crime rate in the north societies undergoing democratic transition. In of Ireland compared to the south, despite its this paper, I challenge this common sense higher levels of industrialisation and urbani- view. I briefly outline the pattern of crime sation. trends in Ireland between 1945 and 1995, with • An increase in the crime rate in Northern particular reference to Northern Ireland. Some Ireland a few years before the onset of “the of the unique features of crime trends in troubles”. Northern Ireland will be identified, which help • Northern Ireland’s crime rate is now higher to explain the relatively low level of ordinary than the Irish Republic’s. crime despite years of civil unrest and commu- • The persistence of relatively low levels of nal violence. Stress will be laid on the struc- ordinary crime in Northern Ireland through- tures of informal social control that have sur- out the years of “the troubles” compared to vived through the conflict, which both help to Great Britain and other European and indus- suppress crime and manage it locally. Contrasts trialised societies. will be made with the structures of informal These trends pose conundrums both for crimi- social control under apartheid, which help to nology and commentators on “the troubles” explain the higher levels of crime in South (conundrums addressed explicitly in Brewer, Africa. The paper will end by speculating on Lockhart and Rodgers, 1999). Of greater inter- the effect the current peace process has on est here though, is the structure of informal these structures of informal social control in social control that persists in Northern Ireland Northern Ireland, and thus the likely patterns of and helps to explain these trends. This structure crime that could accompany Northern Ireland’s is such that Northern Ireland was, and in many transition. respects remains, a traditional society and its crime trends need to be set against this cultural 1. CRIME TRENDS IN IRELAND, 1945–95 backdrop. Official crime statistics reveal several trends in Northern Ireland’s industrialisation took on Irish crime since the Second World War (for traditional forms, being structured by two soli- greater detail see Brewer, Lockhart and daristic communities segregated by religion. Rodgers, 1997): Modernisation expressed itself in traditional

103 Brewer form because it was structured by Northern remnants of these traditional close-knit commu- Ireland’s sectarian divide. Religious differences nities survived, reducing the criminogenic ensured the survival of separate communities. effect of civil unrest. Civil unrest intensified Through such processes as endogamy, residen- some types of ordinary crime, but not all. tial segregation, distinct cultural and political However, in certain working class areas “the associations and a segregated school system, troubles” help to reinforce and reproduce social the social organisation of the two communities tradition, thereby protecting the communities ensured their effortless self-perpetuation in tra- from the social dislocation and breakdown ditional forms. Industrialisation helped sustain occurring elsewhere in Ireland and Britain these traditional forms by reproducing sectarian under the impulse of social and economic division through largely segregated workforces change. The survival of traditional social forms and communal patterns of recruitment. This in some local contexts mediates the social was often reinforced by the fact that industrial deprivation that also characterises these same development was mostly located in one or other areas, further protecting them from the escala- of the segregated communities. Industrial tion in crime seen in similarly deprived areas development in Northern Ireland thus took elsewhere. place in a way that helped to reproduce two Civil unrest, in short, has helped to sustain close-knit, homogeneous, traditional communi- structures of informal social control, reducing ties divided by religion. the otherwise criminogenic effect of communal During the 1950s, however, Northern violence (this is addressed in greater detail in Ireland’s industrial sector changed significantly Brewer, Lockhart and Rodgers 1998). with the decline in Northern Ireland’s old staple industries and the growth of the service sector. 2. CRIME AND INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL With the decline of the traditional industries Sociological theories of crime causation are during the 1950s and 1960s, there simultane- characterised by focusing on the range of social ously began an erosion of the traditional com- forces that impinge upon and constrain people. munities they helped to reproduce. The forms Since Robert Park outlined what has become in which industrialisation had up to that point known as the social disorganisation theory of occurred began to be replaced in the 1960s by a crime causation, senses of community, stability service and public sector that did not so readily and tradition have been associated with lower reproduce close-knit, segregated traditional levels of crime. The causes of crime are linked communities. Recruitment patterns were not so to the erosion of social control as a result of communally based and tended towards the social disorganisation, revealing itself in the employment of women and part-time labour. loosening of neighbourhood, community, fami- The religious and social boundaries that defined ly and religious bonds. these traditional communities also started to These notions are central to the work of change as sectarian patterns were challenged in Hirschi (1969) and what is known as “control the 1960s by the rise of the Catholic middle theory”. Controls, however, can be formal, as class, improvements in Catholic access to high- with the courts and police, and informal, where er education and the emergence of campaigns they reside in the social structure of the com- for civil rights. This challenge to tradition in munity. the 1960s coincided with social changes of Unlike formal sanctions, which originate in other kinds. The North was receptive to the the deliberate effort to control crime, informal influence of British mass popular culture deliv- social controls emerge as by-products of role ered by television and other media and cultural relationships established for other purposes links with Britain, and thus also to the social (Kornhauser 1978: 24). This can be seen mostly changes influencing Britain’s own crime in the family and local neighbourhood, and the increase in the 1950s. role reciprocity involved in a shared communi- Once civil unrest broke out in Northern ty identity. Ireland at the end of the 1960s, the escalation in A great deal of the informal social control lit- ordinary crime provoked by the violence erature focuses on the role of the family in sup- increased the crime rate. Paradoxically, the plying surveillance and control of crime. The continuance of sectarian strife ensured that the family, however, is not the only locus of infor-

104 Brewer mal social control. Bursik and Grasmick (1993) 3. STRUCTURES OF INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL recognised three levels: private (family and IN BELFAST close friends); parochial (local neighbourhood Part of the study that colleagues and I under- and nearby acquaintances); and public (larger took on crime in Ireland in the 50 years follow- communities and external agencies). Recent ing the end of the Second World War, involved research by Taylor (1996, 1997) suggests that an ethnographic study of crime in two parts of the parochial level is particularly important in Belfast. It is perhaps counter-intuitive today to encouraging feelings of social involvement and argue that inner-city neighbourhoods in indus- attachment, and that crime is affected by the trial cities have a sense of community (cf Foster emotional investment people place in their 1995). This sense of community, however, is neighbourhood and their social integration very localised, contingent upon the frames of into it. reference people use, the locality in which they A sense of community and the existence of a live and personal experiences of the quality of shared local culture form a third dimension of relationships that exist in their neighbourhood. informal social control. For example, Foster These variations are not successfully captured (1995) examines the role of informal social by objective statistical measurements for broad control in an east London housing estate with geographical areas. There are several micro statistically high levels of crime, to show its social worlds or social structures co-existing effects on residents’ perception of the area as locally in Belfast, which statistical data cannot not having a “crime problem”, which was itself tap in to because they are so localised. a form of crime prevention. Her work chal- The qualitative data in our study showed that lenges the stereotype that communal structures, local experiences of community were mediated in which informal social control is embedded, by class, being stronger in the inner-city and are absent in poorer neighbourhoods. Hope and working-class neighbourhoods in our study Foster (1992) placed value on the culture of a areas, and by experiences of social transforma- “problem estate” in influencing levels of disor- tion locally. Social change, population reloca- derliness and criminality, and Wilson (1991) tion and housing redevelopment have affected argued that the criminogenic effects of poverty localities in varying degrees, but have not in inner-city ghettos was mediated by the destroyed a sense of community and local iden- different cultural experiences of residents. tity everywhere. Nor is it the case that these According to Hope and Foster (1992: 501), respondents were seeking symbolically to community dynamics in a neighbourhood con- recreate a sense of community because of the sistently affect the crime it experiences (also experience of individualisation in their daily see Foster 1990). lives. People’s accounts of their sense of com- It is in this sense of community and shared munity incorporate the changing way in which culture that Braithwaite (1989) locates his dis- they experience community in modern society cussion of shame in deterring crime and in rein- compared to the past, and in how they describe tegrating the offender afterwards, which the experience of their daily lives rather than a reduces the likelihood of recidivism. Strong symbolic recreation of past senses of communi- social cohesion, with its feelings of mutual ty. People’s accounts of senses of community trust, group loyalties, and densely enmeshed described their experiences of several social interdependencies, is one of the chief defining processes locally, such as neighbourliness, the characteristics of the communitarian society in survival of an extended family kinship network which he sees reintegrative shaming working to and high levels of participation in community reduce crime (1989: 85-6). Shame is less effec- associations and organisations. The social tive as a sanction in a highly mobile and anony- processes of neighbourliness, extended family mous society where people lack social bonds and community identity that describe the local with their neighbours. While Braithwaite sees social structure in some areas of Belfast pro- reintegrative shaming as being undercut by vide mechanisms of informal social control. In urbanisation (1989: 101), it can survive in the criminological literature, informal social con- “urban villages” found in some localities in trol is understood in two ways: surveillance by large cities where strong senses of local com- local residents; and norms of conduct by which munity survive. residents are regulated (see Greenberg, Rohe

105 Brewer and Williams 1985; Rosenbaum 1988). In by the community itself or by the paramili- Belfast, communal structures provide for sever- taries. This sense of outrage can sometimes al mechanisms of informal social control, successfully overcome resistance to police which either facilitate surveillance or socially involvement in official crime management. disseminate norms of conduct. Another mechanism for local crime manage- The first mechanism of informal social con- ment that arises from the survival of communi- trol is a local moral economy. The values of ty structures is the existence of a “local this moral economy were expressed most fre- grapevine”, a network of informal contacts quently in the form that “you don’t steal from which passes on knowledge about perpetrators, your own”. This finding contradicts data from the whereabouts of stolen property, and of the the regular British crime surveys which shows sorts of people who can best apprehend or pro- that the class fraction which performs the most vide immediate satisfactory justice in the crime, at least in volume terms, is also the most absence of reporting it to the police. The victimised. However, members of a mother and grapevine is also the mechanism by which the toddler group on a large housing estate in West local moral economy is socially disseminated Belfast explained that “you would get people in and by means of which gossip is transmitted the private estates to talk more about crime, locally. Such gossip imposes social constraints they’re more burgled than we are. Off the upon offenders arising from shame and is a record, we are sort of cocooned from criminals, means of reintegrating them once their shame they don’t steal from their own”. This moral and contrition is talked about by others down economy therefore rules out crime in certain the grapevine (on gossip in reintegrative sham- close-knit areas, at least by its own local crimi- ing see Braithwaite 1989: 76). As a resident nals, displacing it elsewhere. It also rules out from West Belfast said, “if a crime happened crime against certain categories of people who against an old person or a child, maybe if it are protected by the local moral economy. happened in [name of area], everybody would Thus, several people identified that crimes be talking about it”. A young adult from West against children, the elderly and Church proper- Belfast indicated how the grapevine worked ty were defined as beyond acceptable bounds even on a large estate: locally. An East Belfast community worker “Although this is a large estate, there is said of his neighbourhood: always somebody who knows something, “This is a parochial community around here always somebody. There is not too many and if the crime is against a pensioner, people that keep things to themselves. nobody will be spared. I have known a case There is always ‘did you hear about that’, where a parent actually contacted the police and then it works its way around the when they found out that their son had bro- grapevine.” ken into a pensioner’s house.” The grapevine ensures that knowledge is passed This moral economy only works for criminals on to victims or even the relatives of perpetra- who are from the area and who share the code. tors. This is where neighbourliness and an Local crime is often perpetrated by outsiders extended family kinship network become par- who are escaping the constraints of the moral ticularly useful in local crime management. economy in their area or by people who do not This system permits do-it-yourself policing subscribe to the code. The anti-social behaviour as an alternative to formal social control by the by local youths inflicted on elderly people, for state. Many respondents told of how they react- example, seems to suggest that the values are ed as victims when they knew the perpetrator as not shared by all. Changes are occurring as a result of the local grapevine. Some went structural adaptations to the altered circum- straight to the paramilitaries, some to the stances young unemployed people find them- police, but others used the neighbourhood’s selves in. Some people comment on the decline network of informal contacts to confront the in the ethical code of local lags. However, even parents. A member of a women’s group in if local criminals defy the code, the existence of West Belfast, who was opposed to the paramili- a moral economy results in greater outrage at taries, explained how she would respond: “you crimes performed, with its knock-on effects of wouldn’t like to see a child get punished in a increased effort to apprehend the perpetrators beating, you wouldn’t like to see your own

106 Brewer harmed, so we went around and let the parents offenders were active in West Belfast “well know.” There are many cases of this occurring then, they were fair game to be shot, but if they in the project’s research data. A woman from were outside the area, they weren’t hurting their East Belfast said the same for a Protestant area: own people, and that was OK”. In East Belfast “You would just go to the family.” several people described the paramilitaries as Do-it-yourself policing thus depends for its the unofficial police force. “The paras get efficacy precisely on the survival of community things done”, said one youth worker. structures. Where a sense of community survives, some neighbourhoods are able to be 4. CRIME AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION readily mobilised to manage crime locally. One Civil unrest might appear to make Belfast a of the resources that can be mobilised is the prime example of a city experiencing social remnant of legitimate authority that community disorganisation, but informal social controls representatives still possess. These representa- have survived. The role of paramilitary policing tives, including teachers, priests and pastors, in popular crime management illustrates that and community and youth workers, often civil unrest has played its part in differentiating become alternatives to the RUC. Youth work- people’s experiences of disorganisation in ers and priests, for example, explained how Belfast. local people came to them to deal with specific Paramilitaries offer an alternative system of incidents rather than go to the police. A priest social control. But paramilitary policing is only in West Belfast said he was like a policeman one of the ways in which civil unrest has facili- sometimes, being called out before the RUC: tated popular crime management, since civil “The people wouldn’t ring the police, they’d unrest has also contributed to local senses of ring you directly, you got out and you went and community in some neighbourhoods. Some res- dealt with it.” Other community resources that idents used civil unrest as the key factor in their can be mobilised in local crime management account of the survival of community struc- are the skills, finances and manpower of com- tures. “The troubles have acted”, said one West munity organisations involved in the develop- Belfast resident, “as a unifying force in various ment and servicing of local initiatives against communities.” “This community”, said anoth- crime. er, “if there is an attack on it, you make a stand. The role that paramilitary organisations play There has always been strong links in the com- in informal social control is also significant and munity, it is due to the troubles that have kept is itself heavily conditional upon the survival of the community together.” community structures. These social processes Conflict with out-groups always reinforces disseminate the information that makes para- the sense of solidarity of the in-group, which is military policing possible and efficacious, and why residents from enclaves encircled by provide the push for paramilitary organisations another community always articulate the to engage in it in the first place. Paramilitary strongest sense of community. The following policing is thus embedded in the local social view, from a Protestant estate in West Belfast, structure that survives in some neighbourhoods is typical of all residents in enclave situations. of Belfast. In West Belfast, some respondents He described the area as “like a very small vil- extolled the contribution made by the paramili- lage”. A resident from a Catholic area in East taries to the relatively low crime rate in the Belfast, said much the same: “It is like a small area: “I think it is to the credit of the IRA that village community here, about three thousand crime has been kept so low, because it has people living in a half-mile radius, everybody nothing to do with the RUC, absolutely not.” A knows everybody else, it is very tight knit.” middle-aged man from a large estate, otherwise In certain neighbourhoods, “the troubles” deeply critical of the IRA, described matter-of- have therefore not resulted in social disorgani- factly the situation in his neighbourhood: “The sation but have instead had the effect of inhibit- paras would have been very much a big force ing the processes of social dislocation and com- here in curbing any sort of crime.” Reflecting munity breakdown. In areas where it is most the code of the local moral economy, he intense, civil unrest has produced a voluntary explained that the paramilitaries allowed ghettoisation by restricting geographic mobility repeated offences outside the area, but if and population relocation, producing socially

107 Brewer homogeneous districts in religious, ethnic and tively crime-free areas that explains the coun- class terms. In-group solidarity has been rein- try’s obsession with crime and the perception forced by conflict with an out-group. This among whites that crime rose dramatically with cohesion is reflected in social processes such as the ending of apartheid. the survival of extended kinship networks, Police and the media in Northern Ireland close-knit neighbourhood structures and a sense showed a similar moral panic about crime with of living in solidaristic communities, with their the introduction of the IRA cease-fire in 1994, own local moral economy. Other ethnographies although the crime figures showed little of crime in working class neighbourhoods, for increase between 1994 and 1995. This reflected example, show them to be less vibrant and their key assumption about crime causation in communal than equivalent localities in our Northern Ireland: the paramilitaries are hoods study area (see, for example, Robins’s study of and fronts for organised crime, and once no “Borough” in South London, 1992 and Wil- longer involved in political violence, paramili- liams’s study of New York, 1989). Some of this taries will turn to ordinary crime. This was is due to benevolent housing policies (Northern never an accurate view of most paramilitary Ireland has not seen the infamous tower block organisations (the UDA excepted). While there to any great extent) or employment restrictions has been some increase in the crime rate since on geographic mobility. Northern Ireland is the cease-fire, it is not exponential, nor larger also small, so families tend not to be disrupted than one might expect in any annual time series even where geographic mobility occurs. How- of crime data, although certain ordinary crimes ever, civil unrest has also played its part. have increased, especially violence against the The contrast with South Africa could not be person. greater. Apartheid essentially destroyed the patterns of informal social control that might have CONCLUSION developed in the black townships, and the bru- The reason that crime levels have not exploded talising effect of apartheid far exceeded any- in Northern Ireland is because democratic tran- thing in Northern Ireland. Moreover, apart- sition has not damaged the structures of infor- heid’s form of policing (see Brewer 1994a) was mal social control. Whatever breakdown is essentially to control race relations, leaving likely to occur in these structures with the crime unfettered in the townships so long as it arrival of peace will be slow, and crime is not did not spread to “white areas”. In the absence expected to escalate in the future. Even if the of informal social control structures and with- voluntary ghettoisation diminishes with peace, out much official crime management by the Northern Ireland is very small geographically, police, crime levels were astronomical in the so that population relocation is unlikely to townships during the apartheid era (see Brewer cause any commensurate family breakup. There 1994b). In fact, crime was often seen as a ratio- is no large homeless population for much the nal economic choice in the face of apartheid’s same reason, reducing the criminogenic effect economic restrictions. With South Africa’s of homelessness. democratic transition, crime could no longer be Ordinary crime will increase – this is a truism contained in the townships by the Group Areas of modern industrial societies – but will not Act and it spread to “white areas”. Crime did escalate in the same way as other societies not necessarily increase with South Africa’s undergoing transition. Time series data is need- democratic transition, but it was certainly dis- ed to confirm this and we only await the fig- placed. It is this displacement to formerly rela- ures.

108 Brewer

REFERENCES

BRAITHWAITE, J. 1989. Crime, Shame and Prevention at the Neighbourhood Level. Reintegration. Cambridge: Cambridge Washington DC: US Department of Justice. University Press. HIRSCHI, T. 1969. Causes of Delinquency. BREWER, J.D. 1994a. Black and Blue: Policing Chicago: University of Chicago Press. in South Africa. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. HOPE, T. AND FOSTER, J. 1992. Conflicting BREWER, J. D. (ed). 1994b. Crime and control. forces: changing the dynamics of crime and Restructuring South Africa. London: community on a “problem” estate. The Macmillan. British Journal of Criminology 32: 488-504. LOCKHART, B. AND RODGERS, P. 1997. Crime in KORNHAUSER, R. 1978. Social Causes of Delin- Ireland 1945-95. Oxford: The Clarendon quency, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Press. LOCKHART, B. AND RODGERS, P. 1998. Informal ROBINS, D. 1992. Tarnished Vision: Crime and social control and local crime management in Conflict in the Inner City. Oxford: Oxford Belfast. British Journal of Sociology, 49: University Press. 570-585. ROSENBAUM, D. 1988. Community crime pre- HEATH, A., BREEN, R. AND WHELAN, C. (eds.). vention: a review and synthesis of the litera- 1999. Crime in Ireland 1945-95. Ireland: ture. Justice Quarterly 5: 323-95. North and South. Oxford: Oxford University TAYLOR, R. 1996. Neighbourhood responses to Press. disorder and local attachments. Sociological BURSIK, R. AND GRASMICK, H. 1993. Forum 11: 41-74. Neighbourhoods and Crime. Lexington: TAYLOR, R. 1997. Social order and disorder of Lexington Books. street blocks and neighbourhoods. Journal of FOSTER, J. 1990. Villains: Crime and Research in Crime and Delinquency 34: 34- Community in the Inner City, London: 65. Routledge. WILLIAMS, T.M. 1989. The Cocaine Kids: The FOSTER, J. 1995. Informal social control and Inside Story of a Teenage Drug Ring. community crime prevention. British Journal Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley. of Criminology 35: 563-83. WILSON, W. 1991. Studying inner-city social GREENBERG, S., ROHE, W. AND WILLIAMS, J. dislocations. American Sociological Review 1985. Informal Citizen Action and Crime 56: 1-14

109 Crime in Russia at the Turn of the 21st Century

Vitali Kvashis & Michael Babaev

INTRODUCTION society to social change in the post-Soviet era. During the past several years, the crime situa- Another problem experienced during this tion in Russia has remained somewhat compli- transition phase is that of public corruption. cated due to several destructive factors that Corruption has, for many years, met with very have negatively affected the maintenance of little resistance, which has allowed it to devel- law and order. In addition, criminals are often op into an independent and somewhat influen- protected by certain public institutions. Studies tial social phenomenon. It now, together with have shown that the rate of growth in general crime and ethnic conflict, poses a clear and crime figures during 1999 reflected previous present danger to public security. tendencies. The number of criminal offences Despite significant reform in the manage- increased by 16% and, for the first time in ment of the economy, corruption will remain a many years, exceeded the three million mark. critical problem in the foreseeable future. This By the beginning of 2000, the crime rate had is largely due to the fact that, although the for- reached 2053 per 100 000 people. This increase mula for political power is different today, is the result of negative developments within managerial structures, mechanisms and, more Russian society that occurred in previous years, importantly, social psychology remain un- but whose full effect is only now apparent. changed. Extortion of bribes by bureaucrats for Indicators of victimisation support the con- all manner of permits, registrations, licensing, cept of the complexity of the current crime sit- loans, etc., has reached epidemic proportions. uation in Russia. This is despite the fact that If we believe the maxim that crime is a nor- these indicators are far from comprehensive, mal reaction to an abnormal situation, then one and do not begin to reflect the reality of the sit- can at least understand bribery. However, the uation, even in general terms. However, even time has come for society to recognise the official statistics indicate that the level of vic- gravity and consequences of corrupt behaviour. timisation increased by 20% during 1999 alone, with 1512 victims reported per 100 000 2. FACTORS AFFECTING CRIME LEVELS IN of the population. These figures are evidence of POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA the unacceptably high level of victimisation in It is accepted that any phenomenon should be Russia, even disregarding high latency. viewed within the context of social realities and historical conditions. From that point of 1. PAINS OF TRANSITION view, we should note that the crime situation in The cost of Russia’s rejection of its totalitarian Russia is negatively affected by two main past has proved to be high. The transition to groups of factors: democracy has been painful, and the surge in • External factors: These include economic, crime has been accompanied by an increase in socio-political, psychological, medico-social drug addiction, alcoholism and psychiatric dis- and ecological factors. Economic and socio- orders. Such has been the reaction of Russian political factors are consequences of the

111 Kvashis & Babaev

1998 economic crisis, which in many ways “undesirable” persons, but also the intimi- predetermined: dation of people and society in general. – a general lowering of the standard of liv- – The number of serial murders and sexual ing torture crimes has grown significantly. – an increase in the economic divide, ie., – Acts of violence committed by women the rise of a new stratum of super-rich, and and juveniles has increased noticeably. the descent of part of the middle class into As a result of these factors, violence has indigence expanded into spheres of public life where it – the deformation of Russia’s economic was not previously found, such as politics, structure, and a growing disparity in social finance, industry and commerce. and economic development between regions – the de-industrialisation of the country, 3. THE ROLE OF ORGANISED CRIME AND evidenced in the destruction of industrial ETHNIC CONFLICT potential and a shift of investment to the If one assesses the crime situation in Russia raw materials sector of the economy with specific reference to the problem of organ- – the growing corruption in government ised crime, the following should be noted: agencies and the increase in white-collar The main area in which organised crime in crime. Russia is currently developing, is the economy. Previously planned positive transformation of Further criminalisation of the economy is close- the main macroeconomic indicators could not ly related to the corrupting influence of power. prevent the significant increase in social ten- • Local criminal elements have crossed sion. The number of people earning below the Russian borders, establishing contacts both minimum income level has increased over the with criminal structures and legitimate busi- past decade. By the beginning of 2000 the fig- nesses abroad. The integration of organised ure had risen to 23% of the population (33 mil- crime in foreign business is apparent. lion people). • The scope of illicit trade transactions in • Internal factors: These include high levels of sources of power, strategic materials and raw criminal recidivism and criminal profession- materials has increased. alism; the organised nature of criminal asso- • The material and financial foundations of ciations; underworld customs and traditions, criminal structures has been significantly etc. The impact of these two groups of factors reinforced, due to the expansion of interna- is clearly reflected in the growth of violent tional contacts. crime: • The activity and influence of ethnic criminal – The increase in violent crime (with the groups that have close ties abroad are grow- use of weapons) is connected to the ing. The “shuttle” criminal modus operandi, increased incidence of arms trafficking and language barriers and cultural uniqueness the accessibility of weapons. This was, of make such formations difficult targets for law course, promoted by military conflicts in enforcement agencies. Russian territory and in the former Soviet • The involvement of criminal factions in drug Republics. As a result, the number of mur- trafficking reinforces their organisations and ders, hostage takings and terrorist acts has increases interaction with the analogous increased. structures abroad. This involvement is – The perceived benefits of the material expanding. comforts gained through the use of violence • Trade in contraband firearms and ammuni- have grown rapidly. This is connected, not tion, and their leak from military installations only to the rapid increase in robbery and and military conflicts zones, has reached extortion, but to the assassination of com- menacing proportions. petitors and persons who have political or • The corruption of government agency repre- economic power. sentatives and the infiltration of “under- – During the past five to eight years, a new world” representatives into such agencies is category of violent crime has been formed, purposefully undertaken. namely terrorism. Its characteristics are not Organised crime has therefore become one of only the elimination of competitors or other the most dangerous factors influencing Russia’s

112 Kvashis & Babaev current crime situation. The proportion of criminals in Russia has become the aspiration organised crime within general crime structures to establish themselves within the economy, is increasing each year. During the past seven politics and government. Tough competition years the number of registered crimes commit- over lucrative business opportunities has moti- ted by organised groups and associations has vated criminal elements to organise and arm increased by a factor of 8.5. themselves, draw government managerial staff The growth of ethnic conflicts, generated by into their activities and infiltrate the legislative the struggle for power and the re-distribution of and executive branches of government. The property, has contributed to an increase in crim- absence of an effective government and public inal activity and a surge in the number of ethnic control over the origin and movement of capi- criminal groups in Russia. Ultimately, ethnic tal, finance and other resources, contributes sig- criminal associations have become a permanent nificantly to this. factor, significantly affecting the development of the crime situation in the country. They use CONCLUSION acts of terrorism as a means to achieving politi- The communist system of crime prevention and cal and economic goals. This is precisely why control relied on an established social structure the fight against terrorism is becoming an that regulated and restricted all forms of crime. important priority for Russia’s law enforcement This system has now disintegrated and new agencies. structures and procedures that may provide a The Russian crime situation has been breakthrough in the fight against crime, have extremely complicated over the past few years . not yet been established. The scope and the rate of growth in criminal Predictions concerning future trends in crime activities are the main factors impeding social levels provide little comfort, as experts envis- reform, instilling a fear for their lives and safe- age that crime will continue to grow in Russia. ty in the citizens of the country, and lowering However, this is not inevitable. The situation the level of trust in the government and its poli- can still alter if the dangers of crime to society cies. The aggressiveness of crime and the con- are fully realised, and adequate measures are sequent damage to society have grown and con- adopted to stem the tide. Recent political deci- tinue to grow. Criminals are increasingly able sions and practical steps adopted by the new to avoid detection. More and more people are Russian government do provide encourage- involved in criminal activities. ment. After all, we all know that any disease The most remarkable trend among modern activates the immune system. This is our hope.

113 Police Transformation: The Palestinian Authority Perspective

Assad Mubarak

INTRODUCTION became the most effective procedure. These Generations of political and military occupa- included local and traditional techniques, such tion have significantly divested the civilian jus- as reconciliation and arbitration in disputes tice process in Palestine, which derives from arising in the Palestinian community. two different legal systems, enforced before the A variety of economic, political and social 1967 Israeli occupation. problems provide significant obstacles to the rule of law and to law enforcement in the West 1. TWO LEGAL SYSTEMS Bank and Gaza Strip. Jordanian law, which is still applicable in the As a direct result of occupation and the West Bank, is based on the Continental system, Intifada’s boycott of governmental institutions, while in the Gaza Strip, the judicial structure citizens in the West Bank and Gaza continue to follows the Anglo-Saxon system that applied harbor deep distrust of regulations, public during the British Mandate. After the Israeli order, courts, police and their formal legal occupation of 1967, over 2000 military orders processes. Police therefore have neither the were issued in the West Bank and Gaza. will nor recourse to resume their tasks in the Before the 1987 Intifada uprising, judge- community or to execute civil judgements. ments passed by the Palestinian courts were executed through the police. Palestinian police 2. POST-OSLO ACCORD in the West Bank and Gaza were considered Referring to the changes that have taken place part of the Israeli police. These Palestinians following the peace agreement between Israel were responsible for investigating offences and Palestine – the Oslo Accord – it is worth where there was no Israeli interest, such as reg- noting that certain new facts have arisen, ulating traffic and inter-Palestinian crimes. resulting in problems and challenges regarding They were also charged with executing judge- implementation on the ground. Public order is ments of the civil courts. required as a guarantee of peace and with this Once the Intifada began in December 1987, comes the importance of obedience on the part the Intifada leadership called upon Palestinians of citizens in applying the rule of law. working in the Israeli police force to resign Even practically, it is difficult for the West (almost all of them did so). Police stations and Bank citizen to determine which is the relevant functions were subsequently taken over by the authority in, for example, territories “C” and military. The execution of judgements passed “B” of the accord. The Palestinian police can- by the civil courts therefore suffered as not take precautions or actions in such areas if Palestinians did not ask the Israeli military to an incident or a crime takes place, except after execute a civil judgement against other lengthy communications and coordination Palestinians. Courts and police activities were through the DCO liaison joint committee. thus paralysed. Palestine has a large number of newly trained After the Intifada, alternatives to the courts police officers who were formerly Palestinian

117 Mubarak

Liberation Organisation (PLO) military person- Legislative Council for discussion and endorse- nel. These recruits, however, need legal, inves- ment. tigative and technical training in order to curb During this transition period – that began in reliance on confessions. The police should be 1994 – police have been confronted with cer- given the resources and training to execute civil tain criminal issues that were not handled judgements. before. One of the most frequently mentioned Careful studies are needed of the recommen- areas of legal interaction between Israelis and dation that administrative liaisons between the Palestinians is the surrender of fugitive crimi- police and the courts be appointed to criminal nals. Moreover, police also have to deal with cases in order to ensure police compliance with organised crime in terms of the illegal posses- the law. Moreover, to establish the rule of law sion of weapons, explosives, car theft, traffic and to deal with the legacy of the past requires accidents, drug trafficking and drug sales, a great deal effort. white-collar crime and money laundering.

3. UNIFYING THE SYSTEM CONCLUSION During the first phase of the peace treaty – the As the legitimate leader representing the Gaza and Jericho accords – Palestinian police Palestinian people, the PA is looking ahead to were trained to implement criminal procedures self-determination and, as a consequence, to the according to the Anglo-Saxon system as well as declaration of an independent state. In all according to the Egyptian procedures of inves- respects, this new model of transition must tigation. After the second redeployment of the therefore ensure efficiency and must comply Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, with the obligations to safeguard peace. The PA the PA has had to deal with the fact that two must also ensure its citizens display self-disci- different legal systems are applicable in pline, obedience and restraint in harmony with Palestine. It is therefore difficult for judges, human and fundamental basic rights. prosecutors and police officers to mobilise The Israeli-Palestinian declarations of agree- Palestinian police activities in accordance with ment in principle have created a critical oppor- legal procedures. tunity for Palestinians to build a society based As a result, a plan was implemented by the on discipline and democracy. It is appropriate Ministry of Justice to unify the legal system in that we begin a new era in the Palestinian- Palestine, with the assistance of various Arab lsraeli dispute, as well as in the political, social and foreign countries. Several drafting law and economic lives of the Palestinian people, if commissions were formed and a number of this newly born society is to thrive as a healthy, drafts were transferred to the Palestinian free and democratic nation.

118 Police Reform and South Africa’s Transition

Janine Rauch

INTRODUCTION Despite nominal political independence, the At the time of Nelson Mandela’s release from ethnic homeland forces were subject to signifi- prison in 1990, there were 11 police forces in cant control5 by the SAP, which continued to South Africa, each constituted under its own dictate access to financial and technical piece of legislation, and operating within its resources. own jurisdiction. The largest of these was the By the early 1990s, (all) the police in South South African Police (SAP) with approximate- Africa had acquired a reputation for brutality, ly 112 000 members, the other 10 were the corruption and ineptitude. Police organisations “homeland”1 police forces. Among these, the were militarised, hierarchical and ill-equipped most significant group were the police agencies to deal with “ordinary crime”. Street-level of the four “independent homelands”2 – policing was conducted in a heavy-handed Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. manner, with bias against black citizens and lit- These agencies operated with less interfer- tle respect for rights or due process. Criminal ence from the SAP than those in the “self-gov- investigations were largely reliant on confes- erning” homelands of KwaZulu, Lebowa, sions extracted under duress, and harsh security QwaQwa, KwaNdebele, KaNgwane and legislation provided for, or tolerated, various Gazankulu. In total, there were over 140 000 forms of coercion and torture. Policing tech- police personnel3 in South Africa.The home- niques were outmoded, partly as a result of the land police forces were created during the campaign for international isolation of the 1970s and 1980s, with the core members being apartheid government. However, despite their drafted from the SAP. lack of skill in dealing with crime, the SAP was These members were either black members notoriously effective against their political of the SAP, who were identified on the basis of opponents. their ethnicity, skill and perceived loyalty to It never occurred to the leaders and members the apartheid model;4 or more senior white of the African National Congress (ANC) – the officers who were “seconded” to the home- main democratic opposition party – that the lands on the basis of lucrative fixed-term con- police, who had been so ruthlessly effective tracts. against them, would be any less effective Apart from the financial benefits of being against criminals in the new era. However, deployed to the homelands, the founder mem- coping with the political transition and adapt- bers of the homeland forces found themselves ing to policing in a democratic society have the beneficiaries of rapid promotions, and were been difficult for the police service. able to operate with unusual autonomy from In this paper we review the process of trans- the police headquarters in Pretoria. forming an illegitimate police organisation into This freedom often allowed the creation of one that is legitimate; and we reflect on some networks of patronage and corruption which of the possibilities for, and implications of, came to characterise the homeland forces. rapid change.

119 Rauch

1. ORGANISATION AND CONTROL OF THE political association and to reduce police mis- POLICE IN SOUTH AFRICA conduct. 1.1 The beginning of reform • A system of monitors, whose task was to During 1991 the main police force in South observe and report on the conduct of signato- Africa, the SAP, embarked on an internal ry parties and security forces. reform initiative. This was predominantly a The most significant contribution of the Peace response both to the changing political environ- Accord in terms of policing was to create new ment signalled by the release of Nelson procedures for the handling of actual or poten- Mandela and the unbanning of the liberation tial political violence, and to introduce the movements in 1990, and to the pressure of notions of independent monitoring of police changing crime trends and international scruti- action and of multi-agency problem solving. ny. The SAPs 1991 Strategic Plan highlighted While the presence of peace monitors did lead five areas of change: to improvements in certain aspects of policing • depoliticisation of the police force (notably the policing of public gatherings), the • increased community accountability Peace Accord code of conduct and the mecha- • more visible policing nisms for dealing with reported misconduct had • establishment of improved and effective little impact. management practices • reform of the police training system (includ- 1.3 New political arrangements ing some racial integration) The first post-election Cabinet consisted of min- • restructuring of the police force. isters and deputy ministers drawn from the three The 1991 plan indicated the force’s intention to main political parties: the majority ANC, the “manage change itself, in the hope of ensuring National Party (NP), and the Inkatha Freedom that it would not have change thrust upon it Party (IFP). The Ministry responsible for polic- later”.6 ing8 was renamed the Ministry of Safety and Security, a symbolic move away from the previ- 1.2 The National Peace Accord ous title – Law and Order. At provincial level, The National Peace Accord is a multiparty each provincial cabinet appointed a minister agreement (subsequently enacted as legislation) responsible for safety and security. created in 1991 to address high levels of politi- The various components of the police com- cal violence in the early transition period. The mand structure were accustomed to operating Peace Accord introduced a range of structures under the dictates of undemocratic administra- and procedures to prevent and deal with inter- tions. The implications of a democratic style of group conflict. Many of these structures and governance for policing were profound. Apart procedures focused on policing: from the political significance of now being in • A “police board” made up of equal numbers control of the police service, one of the ANC’s of police generals and civilian experts on key policies was to institutionalise civilian policing matters, nominated by the signatory oversight and control, thereby separating (civil- parties to the Peace Accord. The board was to ian) policy functions from the operational com- “advise” the Minister of Law and Order on mand function of police management. This, policy matters. however, remains an area of some debate and • Local and regional peace committees,7 made fluidity. With the new police leadership up of representatives of signatory parties to appointed after 1999 having greater credibility, the accord. These were the primary imple- less emphasis is placed on the need for civilian mentation bodies, and were supported by monitoring and policy making. full-time regional peace secretariats. • Police reporting officers, civilian lawyers, 1.4 The new legal framework: SAPS Act who would receive and investigate com- After a lengthy drafting and consultation phase, plaints against the police. They would then the South African Police Service (SAPS) Act make recommendations to the SAP about was passed late in 1995. Among the significant steps to be taken in respect of each incident. innovations contained in the Act were: • A code of conduct for police and one for • The restructuring of the police service into members of political parties, to enable free national divisions; provincial demarcations to

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match the new provincial boundaries; “areas” forming the police service before the election, (groups of stations in a district) and stations. and embarked on a “confidence-building” cam- These new divisions functioned under vari- paign with the security forces during the nego- ous forms of command with public scrutiny tiations period. This entailed building the confi- at each operational level. dence of the police in the ANC as the likely • The creation of national and provincial “sec- future leaders of the country, and also building retariats for safety and security”, which the confidence of the populace in the hitherto would advise the provincial political execu- alienated police forces. President Mandela, in tives on police policy matters and would his inaugural address in 1994, paid special trib- monitor the adherence of the police to new ute to the good work done by the police in help- policy. This was motivated by the ANC’s ing to ensure the success of the election. desire to see policy control of the police in Following his appointment as Minister of civilian hands. Safety and Security, Sydney Mufamadi • The requirement that the National Commis- embarked on a nation-wide series of mass sioner of Police should every year publish his meetings with police personnel. These meetings plans, priorities and objectives for the year. were intended to reassure personnel regarding This was intended to enhance transparency in the ANC’s intentions to reform the police grad- police policy-making and to enable monitor- ually, rather than radically. They also wished to ing of the efficiency and effectiveness of the spread the message that, although the ANC police service. would not tolerate abuses of human rights, it • The creation of statutory “community–police would not victimise perpetrators of such abuses forums” where local police station commis- committed in the past, if the perpetrators abided sioners would liaise with, and account to, the by new government doctrine. This series of local community. meetings was also critical in presenting the • The creation of a statutory “Independent human face of the new ANC government, and Complaints Directorate” which would receive identifying the ANC as the stable political and investigate public complaints of police authority during the insecure period of police misconduct. The directorate would be inde- force amalgamation. pendent of the police and would report direct- The appointment of George Fivaz as the first ly to the Minister of Safety and Security. National Commissioner of the new SAPS was a Although certain aspects of the Act have been crucial moment in the transformation process. amended, and the entire piece of legislation is At the time of his appointment, Commissioner currently under review to ensure congruence Fivaz emphasised the need to establish the new with the final Constitution of South Africa, SAPS as legitimate and acceptable in the eyes major changes to the Act are not envisaged in of the majority of citizens, and for the SAPS to the foreseeable future. make a “clean and definite break with the past”. These goals were to remain one of the themes 2. CREATING A NEW POLICE SERVICE OUT OF of his leadership. He identified a number of THE OLD other challenges for his new management team, The task of the police force under apartheid to: was to enforce laws of racial segregation, to • curb crime and improve levels of safety and secure the minority government, and to protect security the white population from crime and political • improve police–community relations disruption. This did not require traditional • remove all forms of discrimination within policing skills. Instead it rewarded political loy- and by the police service alty and allowed large-scale abuse of power. • adopt a new “mindset” within the police The new government faced the mammoth task forces of transforming the police service into one that • restore discipline and morale among police would be both acceptable to the majority of the personnel population, and effective against crime. • establish a culture of fundamental rights within the police organisation. 2.1 The campaign for police legitimacy With the establishment of the Truth and The ANC recognised the importance of trans- Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the ANC

121 Rauch government also had to emphasise its position the British model. For example: general on previous abuses by police officials. became commissioner; brigadier became President Nelson Mandela insisted9 that his director; and colonel became senior superin- government was opposed to, and had no inten- tendent. tion of conducting, a witch-hunt against the • This change did encounter some resistance police as a result of activities arising from from within the police organisation, and to orders given to the police by the apartheid this day, informal use of the old ranks contin- regime. He urged police officers not to dwell ues in many areas. on possible investigations by the TRC, and • The uniform was changed. In the old dispen- instead to get on with the job of law enforce- sation, each of the 11 police forces had its ment and community policing. own uniform and insignia. A new uniform Less than two years after South Africa’s first was designed for the SAPS, which was democratic election, the politicians felt that the slightly less militaristic. transformation of the police service was well • A new insignia was created for the SAPS, to under way. In a speech to the top police com- replace that of the 11 former police forces. missioners in late 1995, Minister Mufamadi The new badge consists of the image of an acknowledged that, despite the huge pressures aloe (an indigenous South African plant with they faced, the police leadership had achieved a healing properties) with nine spikes, to sym- great deal. Less than two years previously, the bolise the nine new provinces. police service was regarded as a possible threat • The colour of police vehicles changed, with to democracy. “Today, the relative credibility all new vehicles being painted white with and legitimacy enjoyed widely by the police blue lettering, instead of the bright yellow service is one of the more clear indicators of which had become associated with fire- the successful transition to democracy which brigade-style police in armoured vehicles. our country has made.”10 • In some provinces, the names of police sta- The discourse of politicians and government tions were changed, where they had previous- regarding policing has taken on a rather differ- ly been named after apartheid-era politicians ent tone since South Africa’s second democrat- or police leaders. The most notable was the ic election in 1999. The new Minister for John Vorster Square police station, where Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete, has numerous detainees were tortured and killed emphasised the crime fighting role of the by Security Police. It is now named the police, and has encouraged a more strong-arm Johannesburg Central police precinct. approach to criminals, with far less emphasis These symbolic changes, while superficial, did on the internal problems of police reform. This contribute to changing public perceptions of the discourse has found favour with the South police service. They also required a great deal African public, which is increasingly concerned of internal negotiation and had quite severe about crime and a police service which felt dis- financial implications for the new police ser- empowered by the period of police transforma- vice. tion following the first election. 2.3 A new profile for the police service 2.2 Symbols of a new order Perceptions of the racial profile of the police The new government moved swiftly to change during apartheid South Africa were constructed some of the symbols associated with apartheid around the iconic image of a rather brutish, policing after the 1994 election: uneducated, working-class, white, Afrikaans- • The name was changed to the South African speaking policeman. In fact (viewed together), Police Service, to symbolise the shift “from a the police agencies were, at the time of the force to a service”, which was a key compo- 1994 elections, fairly representative of the nent of the ANC’s policy approach. racial make up of the South African population • A new police leadership was appointed, with – 64% of the combined personnel of the police the National Commissioner appointed direct- organisations was black. Even the SAP alone ly by the President. (which contributed 80% of the total personnel), • The rank system was changed from the previ- was not as dramatically unrepresentative as ous military ranks to a rank system based on many observers had believed – 55% of its

122 Rauch members were black. What did characterise the The ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress SAP, however, was the dominance of white (PAC) reached agreements with the NP govern- Afrikaner males in its senior ranks. The upper ment negotiators with regard to the number of echelons of the smaller, homeland police agen- their members who would be integrated into the cies were dominated by members of black eth- police service. The following groups entered nic groups, according to the ethnic composition the police: of each of the forces. In 1995, personnel hold- • Approximately 200 bodyguards were inte- ing the rank of brigadier11 were 80% white, grated into the VIP Protection Service. with only one female brigadier out of the 202 • A number of ANC intelligence personnel brigadier posts in the combined police forces. were posted to the Crime Intelligence Women constituted 18% of the total police Department of the SAPS – the reformed strength, and only 11% of the officer ranks. In Security Branch. This department, and the 1998, women made up 20% of the police ser- police intelligence component responsible for vice, and 16% of the officer ranks. Internal Security, were both placed under the Even though the issues of race and gender command of ANC appointees. The entry of composition of the police service were not dis- trusted ANC personnel went some way to re- cussed during the pre-election negotiations, the establishing public credibility for these hated new Constitution, with its requirements for units. equality and affirmative action for “previously • A small number of young people who had disadvantaged” groups, has profound been members of the ANC’s self-defence implications for the new police service. These units (SDUs) and the IFP’s self protection implications have become more real to police units (SPUs) were integrated into a commu- organisations in recent years, with the imposi- nity constable group. tion of government-wide targets for a more rep- • A small number of civilians were recruited resentative composition of the senior ranks of into middle and senior posts in the SAPS dur- the public service. By mid-2000, the SAPS had ing the competitive senior appointments achieved most of its targets, with management process. These individuals, largely from ranks now being over 50% black. legal, academic or non-governmental organisation (NGO) backgrounds, took positions in 2.4 Working with the enemy the police legal service, human resources and One of the agreements reached in the negotia- training components. Although some of these tions process was to incorporate members of “lateral entrants” were ANC supporters, lat- the former liberation movements’ armed eral entry was not fully exploited by the new forces12 into the new South African security government as an opportunity to alter the forces. This was a key dimension to negotia- composition of the SAPS senior ranks, until tions around the future of the military, but was 1999. This was partly due to the historical far less significant in negotiations concerning resistance of the police leadership to the the police, for a number of reasons: notion of civilian lateral entry, and partly to • While the liberation movements had trained the lack of policing expertise in South Africa soldiers and intelligence operatives, they did outside of the ranks of the apartheid police not train any exiled members in police work. agencies. The relatively low salaries offered • The main political concern of most of the lib- by the SAPS, and the unpleasant image of the eration movements was with the possibility police, meant that the ANC government was of a right-wing coup from within the military; unable to recruit high-calibre civilians into and thus with the transformation of the influential managerial positions in its new defence force. police service until long after 1994. • Traditional alienation of the police from the black majority made the prospect of working 3. IMPROVING POLICE–COMMUNITY RELATIONS in the police a far less attractive one than The role of enforcing unpopular laws, assigned working in, say, the army or the intelligence to the police agencies during the apartheid services, which was likely to have employed years, created a profound crisis of legitimacy some senior officers from the former libera- for the police in South Africa. In many tion movements. respects, the police played a military role,

123 Rauch crushing popular protest and engaging in South mitted by the various police forces in South Africa’s de facto domestic civil war as well as Africa.17 As a result of this focus, the agenda of being deployed in support of white regimes in the ANC (the main negotiating party in the independence struggles in neighbouring states. transition) focused on establishing satisfactory This resulted in large-scale alienation of the mechanisms for police accountability in the police from the majority black population. post-election period. The ANC wanted to Police officers were not just unpopular, they ensure police accountability on five fronts: were the targets of abuse and violence from • the Constitution, and in particular the Bill of pro-democracy quarters. Rights Notions of “community policing”, gleaned • legislation governing the police from contact with the international police fra- • the elected government ternity, gained currency in enlightened SAP cir- • communities cles in the late 1980s. It was, in part, the influ- • internationally accepted notions of police ence of international policing models13 on both professionalism. the SAP and on local academics, which led to The emphasis of the ANC’s policies during the the introduction of the first community policing transition period lay on community-level structures in the early 1990s. The SAP estab- accountability. This is unsurprising, given that lished a Division for Community Relations in the ANC did not yet have control over execu- late 1992. This division then set about estab- tive or legislative functions, but could rely on lishing police–community forums at local level the support of the majority of South African in all areas of SAP jurisdiction.14 However, the communities. The ANC also emphasised the fact that the SAP deployed a large number of need for independent structures to deal with the former Security Branch officers15 into the new abuse of power which had come to characterise division generated immediate suspicion among policing under apartheid. black communities regarding the initiative. By 1997, the discussion regarding police The Interim Constitution, which came into accountability had become far more sophisti- effect in April 1994, contained a detailed cated. The Draft White Paper released in 1998 requirement that the new police service should proposed that performance against crime, and establish a Community Police Forum (CPF) at accountability for expenditure, should be used every police station. Some local peace commit- as devices for holding the police leadership tees were still functioning at this time, after accountable to the government. their formal disbandment, and these formed the With the appointment of a new National core of the new CPFs. Unlike peace commit- Commissioner from the senior ranks of the tees, membership of CPFs was not limited to ANC in 1999, the pressure for police to be seen political parties, but could include any commu- to be accountable to the government has been nity group and interested individual. The role dramatically reduced. There is now a strong and function of the CPFs was not laid down in relationship between the new Minister and the official policy – other than the SAPS Act, National Commissioner. Police accountability which basically repeated the wording of the is no longer an issue for concern, except per- Interim Constitution – until April 1997.16 The haps to human rights watchdogs and organisa- community policing policy is currently under tions concerned with rising levels of police bru- review, and it is expected that regulations gov- tality in recent years. erning the functioning of CPFs will be issued in the near future. 5. DEALING WITH CRIME The imperatives of the early transition period 4. ENSURING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY were to build the legitimacy of the police, to The apartheid police forces were notoriously introduce a culture of human rights into the unaccountable and unconstrained in their use of police force, and to improve relations between force. Most of the research and advocacy work the police and the black community in South performed on police reform prior to the1994 Africa. Ironically, after four years of image- election focused on human rights violations by building, the South African police once again the police. Numerous international human found themselves facing a crisis of public con- rights bodies highlighted the violations com- fidence. Surveys18 conducted in South Africa’s

124 Rauch major cities prior to the second election found that “foreigners” are responsible for South that public attitudes towards, and satisfaction Africa’s growing crime problem with, the police remained low. • increasing numbers of arrests in certain crime Levels of reported crime rose significantly categories, resulting in a rise, rather than a during the 1990s. During this same period, con- decline, in official “crime figures” (recorded viction rates in criminal trials were dropping, police statistics). and a crisis of confidence began to undermine Recent policy approaches to the problem of the entire criminal justice system. The situation crime have largely abandoned any commitment was also compounded by a steady stream of to social crime prevention by the police, media stories concerning police corruption. attempting to shift this responsibility instead to Early attempts to tackle the growing crime the “social” cluster of government departments problem were bifurcated into an attempt to such as housing, health, welfare and education. emphasise crime prevention and to reform the The government’s two-pronged crime reduction criminal justice system (as contained in the approach now revolves around sustained heavy 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy policing operations (currently known as [NCPS]). In addition, increasingly authoritarian Operation Crackdown), and ongoing reform of policing operations were conducted with the the criminal justice system.19 The “heavy” assistance of the South African National policing approach is underpinned by an ongo- Defence Force, as was first evident in the 1996 ing process of internal police reform, most Community Safety Plan. notably an emphasis on improved service deliv- Feeling the effects of a devastating post-tran- ery to the public. However, this is no longer as sition crime wave, the South African public vehemently marketed to the public as police began to demand tougher action against crimi- reform was in the early days of South Africa’s nals. In this regard, the Bill of Rights became a new democracy. popular scapegoat for police inadequacy. Even the rhetoric of former human rights advocates CONCLUSION in the Cabinet began to harden, and the political In recent years, the police have experienced a language of “war on crime” began to pervade severe lack of resources, which has had the official discourse around crime in the later positive effect of forcing some long-overdue 1990s. This “tough on crime” language has prioritisation in policing strategies, but has also become standard government issue in the post- had many negative effects. The loss of person- 1999 period. It has had the effect of increasing power in key areas has had a profound impact public confidence in the police and in the gov- on police performance (for instance in criminal ernment’s policy approach, but some of its neg- investigations, criminal records and crime intel- ative consequences are beginning to be evident. ligence). These include: However, the police have succeeded in com- • lengthy delays in the criminal courts municating their resource constraints to the • massive overcrowding in South Africa’s pris- public and the politicians, and, as a result, there ons, is some sympathy and understanding for poor • an ever-increasing number of awaiting-trial police performance. In line with its “tough on prisoners crime” policy, it seems likely that the new gov- • increasing numbers of deaths as a result of ernment will be allocating more resources to police action and in police custody policing (and criminal justice in general) in the • rising xenophobia resulting from the notion near future.

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ENDNOTES

1) One of the most visible symbols of grand 10) Minister Sydney Mufamadi, Address at the apartheid was the creation of the “home- SAPS Leadership Development land” system, which segregated black South Programme, 10 November 1995. Africans into ethnic groups, assigned each 11) Brigadier was then the fourth highest rank group a small piece of land, and created in the police organisation. some form of administration for each 12) Also referred to as the “non-statutory “homeland”. This system was brutally forces”. enforced, and fiercely resisted. The end of 13) In particular, the United Kingdom model of apartheid entailed the abolition of the home- police–community consultative groups. land system and the re-incorporation of the 14) This precedent was not followed by the homelands into a united South Africa. homeland forces. 2) These homelands had acquired “indepen- 15) The motivation for using former Security dent” status through the logic of grand Branch (political intelligence) personnel apartheid, which saw Africans not as citi- was that these were often the “cream” of zens of a common South Africa, but as a the SAP personnel. They were politically collection of separate ethnic nations which aware and had the political skills to deal were to be led to full and separate state- with black communities. hood. The goal of this approach was to 16) Community Policing: Policy Framework force all Africans to exchange their citizen- and Guidelines, SAPS 1997. ship for that of an “independent state”, thus 17) c.f. Amnesty International, Human Rights ensuring that there would be no black Watch, The International Committee of South African citizens. The “independent” Jurists. homelands were entitled to issue passports, 18) Institute for Security Studies Victim create defence forces, attempt “foreign Surveys 1997/8 in Johannesburg, Durban, affairs”, etc. Cape Town and Pretoria found that the 3) This figure excludes traffic police public image of the police is generally employed by various municipalities. The poor, and that negative views of the police regular police do not deal with traffic or are held equally by victims of crime and by-law offences. non-victims, although blacks are more like- 4) Marais 1992:5. ly to have negative views than whites. 5) Marais 1992:7. 19) Criminal justice reform, through the inter- 6) Shaw M, (1994) Point of Order: Policing departmental “integrated justice system” the Compromise in South African Review 7 programme, is the only surviving compo- Ravan Press, Johannesburg. nent of the 1996 National Crime Preven- 7) First termed “Dispute Resolution tion Strategy in terms of national govern- Committees”. ment programmes. Most of the more 8) There are ministries of Safety and Security “social” aspects of crime prevention have (police), Justice and Correctional Services. been assigned to other government depart- 9) President Nelson Mandela, Address to the ments or to provincial and local spheres of Opening of Parliament, 17 February 1995. government.

126 Police Transformation in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects

Innocent Chukwuma

INTRODUCTION 1. BRIEF HISTORY OF POLICE–COMMUNITY In a constitutional democracy, the police are DISCONNECTION IN NIGERIA expected to rely on public goodwill and coop- Before the advent of British colonial rule, the eration to carry out their duties. They are various ethnic nationalities that make up expected to operate within the limits of their Nigerian society had some form of community- legally defined powers and are particularly based police services. This ranged from the answerable to the judiciary for any excess in highly developed age-grade system among the the exercise of their powers.1 In Nigeria, how- Igbos of south-eastern Nigeria, the “secret soci- ever, the colonial origin of the police and eties” – such as the Ogboni and Oro cults decades of military rule, have produced a mili- found in several Yoruba communities of the tarised force that has acted as instruments of south-west – to the Ekpe cult among the Efiks oppression at the service of the government of the south. All these societies, rooted in the and is largely alienated from the civil popula- communities, helped to maintain law and order tion it should serve. as well as general community development.2 With the installation of a civilian elected The idea of the modern Nigerian police, government on 29 May 1999, efforts have been however, armed and distinct from civil society, made aimed at reforming the Nigerian police to is a creation of colonial rule. It began its histo- meet the demands of a democratising society. ry and functions in serving the interests of the The reason for this is not far-fetched. The British colonial government. The period police in Nigeria, as elsewhere in the world, are between 1861 and 1904 witnessed British colo- the most visible agency of government. Their nialists subjecting the estimated 400 nationali- ability to relate to the people in a respectful ties3 to their domination. As each of the nation- manner, devoid of egregious brutality and hos- alities were subjected to colonial rule, the tility, is a critical indicator of whether the British established police forces and constabu- Nigerian society is, indeed, undergoing a laries to protect its interests.4 These forces and democratic transformation. constabularies were armed and organised as The aim of this paper is to review ongoing quasi-military squads. Such forces in different efforts at police reform in Nigeria. After giving territories comprised officials who were a brief history of police–community disconnec- strangers in the communities where they were tion in Nigeria and an analysis of the nature of employed. The purpose of this practice of the current democratisation process, the paper alienating the police from the communities will focus on critical issues that must be dealt they served, was to ensure that such officials, with if the police and policing in Nigeria are to when deployed to execute punitive expeditions, transform. It is hoped that this may give insights would act as an army of occupation5 and to individuals and groups who wish to con- deploy maximum violence on the communities. tribute to police transformation in a country that An example of this was in 1863, when the is still in its early stages of democratisation. Colonial Governor of Lagos Colony, HS

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Freeman, wrote a letter to the Duke of New- from a colonial occupation force to serve the castle in which he highlighted the advantage of people. This did not happen. The parties that an estranged police for the colonial govern- were elected into government found it more ment. According to him, deploying policemen convenient to retain all colonial structures of to areas where they were aliens would foster coercion in dealing with the people. Therefore, effective deposit of violence in the community instead of a major reorganisation of the police policed. Consequently, Freeman reported that: to serve and protect the Nigerian people, what “The men [Hausamen recruited into the was witnessed was a ceremonial oath, transfer- force in Lagos Colony] being from the inte- ring allegiance of the Nigerian Police Force rior and professing the mussulman [Muslim (NPF) from the British Crown to the Federal or Islam] religion are hated by the natives of Republic of Nigeria, and a change of their for- these parts who have hitherto only known mer crests bearing the symbol of the British them as their slaves. They [Hausas] are dis- Crown to the Federal Coat of Arms. All other liked also by the Europeans as being of a features of the police that made them widely more independent character than the Lagos feared and despised under the colonial govern- people. They thus have only the government were left untouched.11 ment to depend on, and if properly managed The situation worsened due to persistent will prove a valuable resource to this settle- seizure of political power by the Nigerian mili- ment.”6 tary, which prevented the development of a The arrangement did “prove a valuable democratic culture and adherence to the rule of resource” to the colonial government. As a law in the country. The military takeover of result, 30 years later in 1893, another colonial government in 1966 and the subsequent governor, in a letter to London, reported that: appointment of the Inspector General of Police “In our Hausa force we have a body of men and his deputy as members of the then Federal dissociated from the countries immediately Executive Council under General Ironsi, led to around Lagos both by birth and religion, a marriage of convenience between the police and who are as a matter of fact the heredi- and the military, which endured throughout the tary enemies of the Yorubas. This is such an period of military rule in Nigeria.12 Speaking enormous advantage in any interior compli- on the impact of military rule on the police in cation [opposition to colonial rule] that I Nigeria – in an acceptance speech for an hon- should be sorry to see it abandoned if it orary doctorate award from Imo State were possible to obtain a supply of recruits University in March 1998 – Alhaji Ibrahim in any other way.”7 Coomassie, former Police Inspector General, In essence, there was a colonial interest in noted: ensuring hostility and violence between the “The Force (NPF) has been torn between police and the citizens. The colonial govern- the civil populace and the military, so much ment organised the police as instruments of so that its civil traditions are almost lost to riot, opposition and suppression. They were not military authoritarianism.”13 established as agents for promoting the rule of This was the state of the police before the pre- law, human rights, community safety or for sent elected government came to power. delivering social services.8 The colonial police forces were therefore used in punitive expedi- 2. NATURE OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN tions to further the goal of colonial annexation NIGERIA of territories,9 namely to suppress opposition Democracy in the contemporary world, accord- against colonial exploitation.10 This marked the ing to Philip B Heymann, is sustained by two beginning of police–community disconnection primary forces: in Nigeria. “It can be the result of the rather powerful Police–community disconnection with civil demand of the population ... Democracy can society did not end with Nigeria’s indepen- also be largely the result of international dence from colonial domination and oppres- pressures, especially with the end of the sion. When Nigeria gained political indepen- Cold War.”14 dence in 1960, there were expectations that the When democratic transition is driven by a police would be reorganised and reoriented strong national movement for change, it could

128 Chukwuma be described as a “strong” democratisation police reform”, offers an insight. According to process. Whereas, when it depends essentially him, “during transition to democracy, democra- on external support from powerful countries tic reform of the police is likely to be less and donor agencies, it could be called a “weak” important to emerging democratic governments democratisation process.15 than security”.18 Explaining why this tends to The Nigerian democratic experiment, unlike be the case, he stated: the processes that led to the new South Africa, “Democracy requires stability and order, yet could be said to fall within the latter category. transitions to it, are often accompanied by Two recent developments in the country but- violence and disorder. Threats to regimes tress this assertion. A weekly newsmagazine in always take priority over threats to the ... Nigeria has published two cover stories on the public [subversion over crime]. At the same plot to remove President Obasanjo, this year. In time, the legitimacy of government requires its most recent cover story titled, “Plot to providing internal order for the remove Obasanjo deepens”, the magazine population.”19 reported countermeasures being adopted by the The Nigerian situation not only offers a good government to arrest the alleged plot. Quoting example of Bayley’s thesis, but also shows how an anonymous presidency source, the magazine the dilemma of management of security and reported: reform faced by transitional democracies, can “Apart from routine surveillance measures, lead to the growth or stagnation of the democ- there has been an effort to sensitise ratisation process. The current democratisation Nigeria’s traditional friends (abroad) about project in Nigeria began on 20 July 1998, when the threat to democracy. This has led former General Abdulsalami Abubakar – who assumed United States (US) President, Jimmy Carter, power on 9 June 1998, the day after General and Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas Abacha died – announced his own transition to Pickering, to make statements, during their a civil rule programme. The programme culmi- recent visits to Nigeria, urging restraint on nated in the election and induction of the gov- the Nigerian Armed Forces.”16 ernment of President Olusegun Obasanjo on 29 There was no mention of mobilising Nigeria’s May 1999, making it the shortest of all three people, who ostensibly voted for the govern- transition programmes so far attempted since ment, to resist any move by the military to the second coming of the military on New forcefully take over government. Another inci- Year’s Eve, 1984.20 dent which demonstrates the fragility of the In spite of the electoral flaws observed by democratisation process in Nigeria, is the ongo- local and foreign observers before, during and ing face-off between the National Assembly after the election,21 everybody endorsed it. At and the Executive. This came to a head on 21 least, it offers a new beginning for a country August 2000, when the Legislature threatened that has been devastated socially, politically to pass a vote of no-confidence on the Presi- and economically by more than 15 years of mil- dent. According to newspaper reports, the law- itary rule. There was euphoria in the country makers had to soft pedal when Clinton threat- that the “second coming” of Obasanjo, the dar- ened to cancel his scheduled state visit to ling of Western governments, would bring the Nigeria, beginning 26 August 2000.17 These much desired succour to the people. They did two incidents, in my view, mirror how weak the not know, however, how difficult the journey Nigerian democratic experiment is and how ahead was going to be. heavily dependent it is on external forces. The The installation of democracy as a peaceful question is: How long can these external forces transition could not be presumed. Widespread sustain the country’s democratic experiment mayhem ensued in various parts of the country. without the cultivation of a home base, and Violence in its goriest form broke out, from the what are the implications for police transforma- Niger Delta – where restive youths fighting tion? decades of neglect had perfected the act of Since the focus of this paper is on police abduction and hostage-taking of oil company transformation, we shall concern ourselves with workers – to the south-west, where ethnic mili- the latter part of the question. David H Bayley, tia from the Odua Peoples’ Congress (OPC) in the article “Developing democracy through swore to defend Obasanjo, whom they did not

129 Chukwuma elect. The north and eastern parts of the country democratic police are responsive to the were included as Sharia violence in Kaduna needs of the citizenry and are held account- and its reprisals in Aba and Umuahia, left hun- able for their deeds and omissions through dreds, if not thousands, dead. Naturally, the multiple political and civil mechanisms.”22 government had to respond, since democracy A possible exception to this ad hoc approach to requires stability and order to strive. The gov- police reform in Nigeria is reports in newspa- ernment started by sending the military to pers that the Ministry of Police Affairs – the invade Odi in Bayelsa State, where youths supervisory ministry of the NPF – has drafted a abducted and killed 12 policemen. After the five-year development plan for the police. The complete destruction of the town, however, it major plank of the plan, which had no input was the police, and not soldiers, that were able from civil society in the country, is the recruit- to arrest the suspects. The second was the ment of an average of 40 000 police personnel shoot-on-sight order given to the police against a year for the next five years, which would members of OPC and other ethnic militias bring their numbers from the current 140 000 to involved in one conflict or another. 340 000. This measure, it is hoped, will bring Since then the “panic” response to civil dis- the ratio of the police to the population from turbances has been extended to any dissenting the current figure of one policeman to 714 peo- view from that of the President, even from ple (1:714) to one policeman to 294 people members of the party under which he was elect- (1:294) in five years’ time. ed. The new phrase in our political lexicon is There is certainly a need to build up police “enemy of democracy”, which is loosely used numbers in Nigeria, given the embargo placed to lump together all kinds of people including on recruitment into the force for the five years those who share a different view from the gov- of General Abacha’s regime. There does not, ernment. In line with Bayley’s thesis, invest- however, seem to have been preparation for the ment in security forces for the protection of absorption of the impact of such a massive Obasanjo’s government has taken precedence influx of personnel into the police. It has over investment in needed reforms that would already had an effect at police colleges and bring democracy dividends and the services of training institutions where recruits are now the police closer to the poor and vulnerable seg- undergoing the mandatory six- to nine-months’ ment of the population – who are daily torment- training for enlistment of constables into the ed by the rise in unemployment and property force. crime. In Nigeria today, the democratisation Most of the police colleges and training insti- process has been personalised to the extent that tutions were practically abandoned during the President Obasanjo is democracy, and democ- Abacha regime, given the embargo on recruit- racy is President Obasanjo. ment, and are presently over-stretched beyond capacity due to the influx. Many of the trainees 3. TRANSFORMATION OF THE NPF are made to bring bedding and toiletries from With the foregoing as a background, the gov- their homes. Some could not even get accom- ernment appears rather keen on pursuing ad hoc modation from the institutions. There are no and panicky responses to glaring cases of books in their libraries and to compound mat- police inadequacy. The usual response, espe- ters, they are still using the curricula and syllabi cially with the upsurge of violent crime and developed in the 1970s for their training. armed banditry, is discussions about the enlist- To assist in the reorganisation of the force, 22 ment of more personnel and the provision of civil society groups in Nigeria came together superior fire power to the police, to match those and formed the Network on Police Reform in of violent property criminals – as if guns alone Nigeria (Noprin) to work with the Ministry of would enhance police performance. There is no Police Affairs, the NPF, the National Assem- serious effort to work for transformation of the bly, the private sector, donor agencies and other NPF, from a “regime police” to a democratic stakeholders on safety and security issues in the police. country – to ensure that police transformation According to Bayley: in Nigeria, benefits from the input of civil soci- “Whereas regime police are primarily con- ety. We have identified six critical areas that cerned with what government requires, should be reformed. These are:

130 Chukwuma

• police legislation and standing orders its officers, men and women. In the mid-1980s, • community–police relations the Inspector General of Police established • police operations and accountability police–community relations committees • human resources, training and development (PCRCs) in all police divisional, area and state in the police commands in the country. The PCRCs are sup- • gender and policing posed to serve as liaison bodies between the • police welfare and conditions of service. police and the communities they serve, and thus be in a position to build confidence and cooper- 3.1 Police legislation and standing orders ation between the police and civil society in the The Nigeria Police Act was enacted in 1943 by country. They have, however, not been able to the British colonial government. From 1943 play this role effectively, due to the non-repre- until today, there has been no major review of sentational nature of the PCRCs’ composition the Police Act to bring it in line with the dic- in the communities where they operate, and the tates of policing a democracy. Over the years, fact that they are a police initiative – not successive inspectors general of police have accountable to any civil authority. There is adopted measures to enhance the work of the therefore a need to reorganise the PCRCs and NPF, but the fact remains that unless these to make them a committee of local government measures are backed by law, they cannot councils, with a majority elected membership. endure. A typical case that comes to mind is the Their composition should also be broadly rep- directive by Etim Iyang – Inspector General of resentative of the local council areas in terms of Police in 1984 – raising the minimum educa- religion, gender, age and cultural background. tional requirement for enlistment into the police The PCRCs should represent the consumer of force from secondary class four to school cer- police service, voice the concerns of the citi- tificate. His successor, Alhaji Gambo Jimeta, zens and monitor police performance. did not back this measure and reverted it to secondary class four. His argument was that some 3.3 Police operations and accountability states of the federation would not be able to fill Nigeria is perhaps one of the few countries in their quota in the police force if the enlistment the world where the police is allowed to police educational requirement was school certificate! itself. Unless an aggrieved citizen has the Some of the provisions in the Act have money to proceed to a law court to challenge become anachronistic and in urgent need of abuse of his/her rights by the police, he/she has review. Examples are police training, code of no alternative but to report his/her case to conduct and discipline, superior orders, access police authorities for redress. On occasion, of the public to police records, enlistment of police authorities at state and federal level have women police and conditions of service. The intervened by disciplining erring members Act also needs to be reviewed to provide for, through internal disciplinary procedures, but among others, civil oversight of the police and the whole idea of the police, policing itself in a accountability to the community. democratic system of government, calls for review. In theory, the Ministry of Police Affairs 3.2 Police–community relations is the supervisory ministry of the police in Police–community relations in Nigeria are Nigeria. However, the ministry only has an characterised, at best, by deep suspicion and, at office in Abuja – the federal capital – whereas worst, by violence. Although the NPF has more the police has a presence in the 774 local gov- contact with citizens than any other law en- ernment councils in Nigeria. One can imagine forcement agency in Nigeria, the nature of such the type of oversight the ministry would have contact is involuntary and occurs in the course on the police. There is a need to establish civil- of police discharge of their law enforcement ian review boards at local, state and federal lev- functions. These types of contact situations pro- els to deal with complaints of abuse of power vide little or no opportunities for non-coercive by the police. interaction between the police and citizens. Police authorities are not unaware of the neg- 3.4 Human resources development and ative public image the agency has acquired training over the years, due to the activities of some of The selection and screening process for recruit-

131 Chukwuma ment into the Nigerian police, especially at the the area of law enforcement. Although women junior level (constable and inspector) and the constitute over 50% of the Nigerian population, curricula for training of all levels of the police they make up less than five per cent of the are narrow in scope and should be reviewed. NPF. Research has also established that women For a constable, the selection process emphasis- police officers in Nigeria face many discrimina- es physical stature and stamina. Rigorous tests tory laws and practices in their daily work, for psychological and emotional stability and which in turn impact on police services to social relations skills are not given adequate women in the larger society. The curriculum for attention.23 The curricula emphasise police police training should be reviewed to include duties, drill, physical exercise and limited training on the handling of domestic violence knowledge of criminal law and procedure. The cases. There is also a need to establish an office content of the training is limited and is deficient to provide special care for women and children in liberal subjects such as sociology, psycholo- who are victims of domestic violence, as well gy and political science. as other forms of gender-based abuse in police Furthermore, refresher courses for officers stations in Nigeria. are infrequent. These inadequacies associated with selection, screening, testing and refresher 3.6 Police welfare and conditions of service training for police personnel before promotion Police welfare and conditions of service should at different times in their careers, adversely be improved to enhance staff morale, which is impact on discipline, orientation, attitude, per- presently at a low ebb. formance and conduct of Nigeria’s police and should be addressed. CONCLUSION To summarise: the current ad hoc and limited 3.5 Gender and policing reform measures being adopted by the govern- The gender question in Nigeria has over the ment and the police force may fail unless a fun- years become an important issue recurring in damental reorganisation of the force is all aspects of our national life – especially in embarked upon.

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ENDNOTES

1) SA Asemota, Policing under civilian and 6) Letter from Governor HS Freeman to the military administration, in TN Tamuno; IL Duke of Newcastle, 31 December 1863 – Bashir; EEO Alemika and AO Akano National Archives, Ibadan: cso /i/i/i. This (eds), Policing Nigeria (Lagos: Malthouse force was also known as the Armed Hausa Press, 1993) p.59. Police Force, because it consisted largely 2) IC Chukwuma and Akin Ibidapo-Obe of Hausas who had been freed from slavery (eds), Law Enforcement and Human Rights around Lagos. Creating enmity between in Nigeria (Lagos, Civil Liberties the public and the police was therefore a Organisation, 1995) p.66. colonial policy implemented through 3) O Otite, Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in recruitment and employment, in order to Nigeria (Ibadan: Shaneson, C.I. Ltd, 1990). achieve effective containment of opposi- 4) EOO Alemika (1993a) Colonialism, state tion to colonial rule. See EEO Alemika and policing in Nigeria, Crime, Law and (1988) ibid, Tamuno (1970), Chapter 1, op Social Change, 20:187-219. cit for further discussion. The police forces and constabularies were: 7) Denton and Rippon, 2 August 1893 at the McCorsky Police/Consular Guard (1861); National Archives, Ibadan: cso/1/1/14, Armed Police Force (1863); Gold Coast quoted in Police–Community Violence in Constabulary (1876); Lagos Constabulary Nigeria, Centre for Law Enforcement (1886); The Lagos Police (1895-1897); Education, Lagos, January 2000 and also Annesly Police (1889); Oil Rivers Irregular cited in Tamuno (1970) op cit p.28 and (1892); Court messengers (1892); Niger also in Alemika (1988) op cit. Coast Protectorate Constabulary (1894); 8) See Alemika (1988) ibid; Alemika (1993a) Niger District Police (1900-1905); op cit and F Odekunle (1979) The Nigerian Southern Police Force (1902); Southern Police Force: a Preliminary Assessment of Police Force (1917); Royal Niger Functional Performance, International Company Constabulary (1888); Northern Journal of Sociology of Law 7 61-83. Nigeria Constabulary (1903); Northern 9) Examples include the activities of the colo- Nigeria Police (1917) and Nigeria Police nial constabulary police in the pillage of Force (1930). Benin Kingdom (1897), Opobo nation and For details of these forces, see the ency- the battle for Niger confluence, occupied clopaedic historical work of TN Tamuno by various ethnic nationalities such as (1970) Police in Modern Nigeria (Ibadan: Abinu (Bunu land), Bassa Nge, Oworo, Ibadan University Press) and EEO Alemika Kakanda, Egbura etc. between 1895 and (1930a). From 1914–1966, there was a 1900. The “victory” of the British force led dual police system – those established by to the formation and proclamation of the colonial forces and local police forces that Protectorate of Northern Nigeria with were managed by colonial surrogates, tra- Lokoja as headquarters on 1 January 1900. ditional rulers and native authorities. For a 10) Such instances include women anti-tax detailed discussion of these latter forces riots in the east (1929-1930); in Warri see Kemi Rotimi (1993) and PT Ahire Province (1927-1928); in Abeokuta (1948); (1993) both in TN Tamuno, IL Bashir, industrial labour strikes in Burutu (1945); EEO Alemika and AO Akano (eds) Enugu (1949) and the general strike Policing Nigeria: Past, Present and (1945). Scores of unarmed men and Future, (Lagos: Nigeria Police Force and women were killed or maimed in these Malthouse Press). incidents by colonial forces. 5) EEO Alemika (1993a) ibid and EEO 11) Innocent Chukwuma, Police Powers and Alemika (1998) Policing and Perceptions Human Rights in Nigeria, Law of Police in Nigeria, Police Studies 11 (4): Enforcement Review, Lagos, January- 161-176, and PT Ahire (1991) Imperial March, 1998, p.26 Policing (Milton Keynes: Open University 12) SA Asemota, Policing Under the Civilian Press.) and Military Administration, in Policing

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Nigeria, Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos, Research Report, October 1995, 1993, p.396. www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/167024.txt 13) Innocent Chukwuma and Ogaga Ifowodo 19) Op cit. (eds), Policing a Democracy, Centre for 20) Adewale Maja-Pearce, From Khaki to Law Enforcement Education, Lagos, 1999, Agbada: A handbook for the February p.2. 1999 elections in Nigeria, Civil Liberties 14) Philip B Heymann, Principles of Demo- Organisation, Lagos, 1999, p.33. cratic Policing, in US Department of 21) For further reading on this refer to the Justice, Policing in Emerging Demo- report on the election produced by the cracies: Workshop Papers and Highlights, Transition Monitoring Group, a coalition NIJ Research Report, October 1995, of 63 human rights and civic organisations www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/167024.txt in Nigeria, that monitored the elections. 15) Op cit. 22) David H.Bayley, The contemporary prac- 16) John Okafor, Plots and counter plots, Tell tices of policing: A comparative view, Magazine, Lagos, 21 August 2000, p.24 quoted by Mark Malan in Police Reform in 17) Cosmos Akpunobi, Clinton stops reps, South Africa: Peace Building Without Daily Champion, Lagos, 24 August 2000, Peacekeepers. p.1 http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/8.3/Police 18) DH Bayley, Who are we kidding? Or %20reform.html (8/16/2000), p.1 developing democracy through police 23) Etannibi Alemika and Innocent reform, in US Department of Justice, Chukwuma, Police Community Violence in Policing in Emerging Democracies: Nigeria, Centre for Law Enforcement Workshop Papers and Highlights, NIJ Education, Lagos, February 2000, p.10

134 Reform of the Police in Ukraine: The Need for Cooperation Between the Police and Public in Tackling Crime

Alexey Povolotskiy

INTRODUCTION selected to reflect differing socio-economic From the moment of its establishment as an groups within the city and therefore provide independent state in 1991, Ukraine has chosen vastly different settings for attempting to intro- the road of democratic development. Since duce schemes which may improve relations 1991, all state institutions have faced the chal- between the police and the public. One area, lenge of reform – moving from a situation Komintemovski, is within the heart of the city where they were closely allied to the needs of and has a high population density, together the state, to one where they respect the rights of with a mix of residential and industrial usage. the individual and protect citizens from abuse. The second area, Solonitsevka, is on the edge One of the key state bodies facing this chal- of the city and is a much more rural area with a lenge is the Ukrainian police. mix of residential and agricultural land use. Among the most important tasks of police reformation in Ukraine is improving the rela- 1. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO CRIME AND POLICING tionship between the police and the public, cre- I would like first to present some brief research ating a relationship based on trust, mutual results. understanding and goodwill. This is essential In terms of how the public views the work of as the police cannot successfully tackle crime the police, the views of the public were evenly alone; public cooperation is vital in this split between those who thought they did a process. To date, the process of police reform good job (34%), those was thought they did a in Ukraine has been slow, although a number bad job (32%), and those who did not have an of legislative acts have been adopted by parlia- opinion (32%). In other words, just one-third of ment, by the President and by the Ministry of the population currently believe that the police Internal Affairs. do a good job in terms of solving crime and I would like to consider some of the prob- maintaining public order in their area. lems facing the Ukrainian police and to look When asked about their knowledge of the specifically at a project currently under way in police in their area and the extent to which they the city of Kharkiv, which aims to improve the came into contact with them, those surveyed relationship between the police and the public. showed a significant gulf in contact between The project – funded by the United Kingdom’s the police and the public. More than 80% did (UK’s) Foreign and Commonwealth Office and not know the telephone number of the local in partnership with the Scarman Centre at the police station – the number most familiar to University of Leicester in the UK – adopts a them was “02” (equivalent to 911 in the United research-based approach to addressing the States [US] and 999 in the UK). More than problem. I would like to draw upon data 90% had not been in contact with either a beat recently collected as part of this project from or patrol officer in the past 12 months, while a the police and the public in the two research similar proportion stated that a beat officer had areas selected within the city. The areas were not visited them during the same period.

135 Povolotskiy

When members of the public had been police officers working in the area. This differ- stopped in the street by a police officer, almost ence is partly explained by the increased stabil- half had had their pockets searched and in three- ity and length of tenure of those living in this quarters of cases, the police officer conducting area – people tend not to move very often from the search did not explain to the respondents the this area and therefore had an opportunity to reason why they had been stopped. “get to know” the local police. It also meant Information from the police themselves that “strangers” in the area were often quite showed that they had little time to carry out noticeable and the public were more willing to “patrols” or felt a need to prioritise making work with the local police and certainly had a contact with the public. When they did, it was higher level of contact than their compatriots in to carry out searches or to find somebody will- the Kominternovski area. This situation was ing to be a witness. further facilitated by the fact that many of the Further data from the survey showed the officers working in the Solonitsevka area had extent to which the public had a very negative grown up there and therefore had much closer impression of the Ukrainian police. A large ties to the community than officers in the proportion of those interviewed expressed the Kominternovski area, who on the whole did not view that the police take bribes, regularly come from that part of the city. exceed their powers and act with indifference In terms of particular concerns about crime or hostility when asked for help by members of within the two areas, problems of burglary, the public. Very often respondents described street robberies and general “hooliganism” the police as “rude”, “hard” and “unsympathet- were highlighted. There were also concerns ic”. The public also thought that the police about “youth crime” and their involvement in were selective in their patrols, avoiding those illegal drinking and drug taking. areas which were considered to be dangerous. One of the respondents elaborated this point 2. PROBLEM OF POLICING IN UKRAINE with a local joke: “Excuse me officer, is this Most would agree that the level of remunera- area considered dangerous?” To which the offi- tion for police officers and other state officials cer replies, “If it were dangerous, I wouldn’t be is woefully low. In the past few years, police here!” officers have only received approximately 30% It is obviously easy to focus on the negative of their pay and the average salary is in the findings from the survey, however, some of the region of US$30–50 a month. Clearly, such a results were very positive. For instance, almost small salary can hardly support a family or 83% of respondents could not remember a case inspire officers to fully commit themselves to when the police did not respond to their call for the changing role now required in the “new” assistance. What was even more encouraging Ukraine. Equally, funds are not available for was that when members of the public were equipment to help officers carry out their asked whether they were willing to cooperate duties. Many do not have radios and stories of with the police in the future, some 39% officers not being able to respond to calls since answered yes, with a further 21% saying proba- their patrol cars were out of petrol are common. bly yes and an additional 21% who did not Given this, it is perhaps hardly surprising that know. If we aggregate the first two responses, the rate of officers leaving the police is rapidly then we have nearly two-thirds of the popula- rising or that those who do remain engage in tion willing to cooperate, with perhaps a further “other” activities to bolster their monthly quarter who might be persuaded if the circum- salary. Within the Kominternovski area, the stances were favourable. This is vitally impor- entire police force has changed in the past two tant data which clearly identifies willingness on years. This is hardly conducive to the success- the part of the public to work with the police. ful development of “community policing”. The survey did show marked differences in There is certainly a problem of inertia within opinion between those residents living in the the Ukrainian police and a lack of will to city (Kominternovski) and those in the more change. This is partly understandable – don’t rural area (Solonitsevka). Those in Solonit- get rid of the old until something new has been sevka were generally more familiar with their developed to replace it – but it is also a reflec- beat officer, the chief of the police and other tion of self-interest on the part of senior officers

136 Povolotskiy within local and regional police forces and It is also planned to set up an anonymous tele- within the Ministry of Interior who benefited phone line along the lines of “CrimeStoppers” from the old regime. This can be seen in the in the UK, to enable members of the public to way in which the police continue to be man- offer information anonymously. Other ideas aged with an emphasis on centralised control. include changing the patrol patterns of officers Information generally flows from the centre to focus on known problem areas, to arrange out, and from the top down. Most ordinary and crime prevention visits by local beat officers, to middle ranking police officers do not partici- provide specialist advice to “at risk groups” pate in discussions about police policy or local such as the elderly and the youth and to rede- needs for policing. To show initiative is seen as velop links between the police and local neither positive nor desirable. schools, where such links were abandoned dur- Training of future police officers is also an ing the break-up of the Soviet Union. area which requires review and change. To Second, it is important to look at ways of date, the emphasis has been – certainly for reorganising the police – for example, decen- those entering the police at officer level – on tralisation, making the police more accountable training officers in the minutia of the law. to local needs. The data from the two experi- Surely what is required after four years of edu- mental areas in Kharkiv show that each area cation is trained police officers, not trained has quite different policing priorities, with the lawyers. There is little within the current cur- profiles of crime and public concern varying riculum which highlights the need to provide markedly. It is very difficult for a centralised skills-based training, focusing on developing policing structure to respond effectively to local the individual, such as communication skills, needs. arbitration and negotiation, time management Third, the type of training given to police and the use of initiative and discretion. Little officers needs to be reviewed. Large doses of use is made of role play or of practical work law training does not create an effective police placements to improve the skills of those being officer. Officers need training in how to work trained to enter the police. with the public – how to organise a local Finally, there is still too much emphasis on police–community meeting, how to interact reacting to crime rather than on crime preven- with the public in the street, how to arbitrate tion. Certainly, the public quite rightly expect between different groups, etc. Training is also the police to respond as quickly as possible to required for senior officers as well who need to their calls for assistance and this will remain a develop people-management skills, including key part of policing. Crime prevention, howev- motivation, leadership and appraisal. er, is also important and can be much more Fourth, it cannot be ignored that a central effective in terms of dealing with particular problem is the low level of remuneration and crime problems. the lack of resources available to Ukrainian police officers. It is very difficult to persuade 3. THE WAY FORWARD an officer to increase his/her level of commit- So, what needs to be done? Given the title of ment to the job when his/her salary is reducing this paper, improving the relationship between in real terms. Undoubtedly, this is a political the police and the public is a vital prerequisite. decision although it could be one taken at local As stated earlier, the public are ready to help if level. they are given the means to do so. As part of Currently, local taxes are used towards partly the project now under way, a number of differ- paying for the police in an area and this context ent schemes are due to be introduced. These could be extended in the future. In the UK, include organising local meetings whereby the funding for the police is now evenly split community can discuss with the local police between the Home Office – equivalent to the their problems and priorities. In addition, it is Ministry of Interior in Ukraine – and local gov- planned to set up consultative committees with ernment. Certainly local funding could be used representatives from the police, the community to focus police priorities on local problems. and local government to enable them to discuss Ultimately, without a significant increase in the common problems and, more importantly, to level of funding for policing, many of the develop ways of tackling the problem together. schemes mentioned earlier will have great diffi-

137 Povolotskiy culty getting off the ground more broadly Finally, I would like to thank the UK Foreign across Ukraine. and Commonwealth Office for funding this work as well as Simon Williams at the British CONCLUSION Council in Kyiv for managing the project. I It is worth stating that crime is not only a police would also like to thank colleagues at the problem, but should be seen as a societal prob- Scarman Centre at the University of Leicester lem requiring a range of groups to act together for their contribution. This project is an exam- in partnership – police, non-governmental ple of how academics and practitioners from organisations, local government, community different countries can work together to share groups, the media, etc. Only by adopting a part- experiences on how policing in post-Soviet nership approach can we begin to meet the states can be changed to meet the needs of the challenges facing Ukraine in the 21st century. public, and not the state.

138 Crime as a Development Issue

Ted Leggett

INTRODUCTION tion, authoritarian or statist regimes have given Historically, with a few notable exceptions,1 way to new democracies. In many cases, this the disciplines of criminology and development has meant the surrender of ideologies that have studies have had very few areas of conver- dictated everything from the structure of gence. Most criminological research has been national government to the nature of private focused on generating universal theories of life for decades. deviance based almost exclusively on work The entire world, but especially developing based in the developed world. Development nations, is in a state of flux. Like the heat gen- studies, on the other hand, have focused on the erated by the shifting of tectonic plates, rapid nuts and bolts process of alleviating poverty change necessarily creates friction. The stress and creating sound economies in marginalised of attempting to survive and grow in a world nations. It is only with the recent occurrence of where the rules are constantly changing has major crime problems in Eastern Europe, Latin taken its toll on the delicate fabric of social America, Asia, and Africa that an area of com- cohesion. It is therefore not surprising that this mon concern has emerged. has manifested itself in many individuals, These local crime problems have appeared at groups, and whole nations “falling out of the a time of increasing globalisation, including the loop” altogether. growth in international organised crime. The This brief paper will broadly survey the rela- process of globalisation has also challenged our tionship between crime and development. It understanding of development. There is now will initially examine some of the general ways new emphasis on the importance of attracting in which crime can impede the development investment and developing export-oriented process, and will then consider whether a lack economies that can flourish in a competitive of development necessarily generates crime. global marketplace. International lending institutions, which have tremendous influence in 1. CRIME IMPEDES DEVELOPMENT shaping government policy in developing The following news article appeared in South nations, have insisted that this can only be Africa’s Mail & Guardian national weekly accomplished by downsizing state bureaucra- newspaper on March 19, 1999: cies and opening local markets to international “Thieves make off with PE school competition. While the long-term effects of this THIEVES in Port Elizabeth’s Kwazakhele policy are still unclear, it has certainly resulted township this week stole Sophakama High in immediate hardship for many emerging School. nations. On Tuesday its 11 classrooms were still In addition to this major economic transition, there, but when pupils arrived on many developing countries are simultaneously Wednesday morning, they had vanished, undergoing radical political transformation. along with the surrounding security fence. Driven in no small part by economic globalisa- The only evidence the school had ever been

141 Leggett

there were concrete struts embedded in the incentives”, bodyguards, armoured vehicles and foundation. other security systems, all of which must be ‘I couldn’t believe my eyes!’ said princi- provided and all of which impact on the bottom pal Nkululeko Klaas, adding the struts had line. remained only because ‘they couldn’t get Lack of long-term international attention also them out of the concrete.’ In what Klaas discourages domestic investment, since greater labelled a ‘masterpiece,’ a parade of donkey returns can be found in following international carts, panel vans and trucks had carted money flows. Lack of domestic investment acts everything away overnight. like a vote of no confidence in the local econo- ‘It wasn’t only at night,’ Klaas stam- my by the people who should know best, and mered. ‘People had started coming and discourages international investors further still. hammering away during the day. About The cycle feeds upon itself. 10 m or 15 m from the school there are The World Bank states: houses and the people there didn’t do any- “ . . . many states are performing their core thing to stop them.’...” functions poorly: they are failing to ensure This anecdote humourously illustrates one of law and order, protect property, and apply the more overt ways in which crime can nega- rules and policies predictably. Investors do tively impact on development – the very mech- not consider such states credible, and anisms of social upliftment may be plundered growth and investment suffer as a conse- by those too desperate to wait for long-term quence.”6 benefits. This is not a unique case in South The World Bank requested 69 firms to rate the Africa. A similarly direct pillaging of develop- “credibility” of countries based on a range of ment resources is seen in the theft of copper indicators. After controlling for income, educa- power and communications cable for resale2 tion and policy distortions, a strong correlation and the disassembly of bus shelters for building was found between credibility and both growth materials. Contractors are robbed while they and gross investment as a percentage of gross attempt to construct public housing, and once domestic product (GDP). the houses are built, people may be too afraid to move into them.3 At a more abstract level, educational opportunities are effectively “looted” by the thousands of “ghost” teachers who collect paycheques without ever bothering to instruct a class.4 Crime is a development issue, and, for countries like South Africa, it may be the key development issue. In the international competition to attract the elusive investment capital that characterises the globalised age, domestic crime and corruption are major impediments for developing nations. They represent the kind of instability that only attracts speculation, and this speculation, if it even materialises, generates further instability. Few international corporations will seek to create a substantial presence in countries where imported staff are at risk, local property is subject to loss, and insurance costs are high. For example, a major drawback to investing in Columbia is that foreign executives resident there must be insured against kidnapping. Individual policies for high profile individuals can run into tens of thousands of dollars a year.5 This is aside from any “hazardous duty

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Castells7 argues that local “identity” and grind to a halt. The entertainment industry is quality of life are among the most important not a trivial source of income generation. It is features in attracting investment in an increas- one of the pillars of the United States (US) ingly undifferentiated global marketplace. As economy, and “entertainment” amounts to little the global economy becomes more service- more than the export of American culture and based, value can be generated anywhere there is arts products. America has learned to expand a concentration of highly skilled people, and profits in this area beyond the price paid for the these people are likely to congregate at those creative work itself to include the “merchandis- points with the greatest local character and living” of related style-products, from the generi- ing standards. Crime destroys all this. cally American Levi’s jeans to the range of When local living conditions become intoler- Hollywood derivative toys and games. It has able through fear of victimisation, the wealthy even learned how to manipulate its criminal soon follow their money out of the country. In a cultures into to an internationally marketable poll of emigrating South African managers, product, from movies celebrating the American 60% mentioned crime and 47% mentioned vio- Mafia to the ubiquitous beat of “gangsta” rap. lence as their reasons for leaving.8 This “brain Outside the US, there is also money to be drain” represents a greater loss than just the made from crime, but this process is not with- prospective productivity of the emigrating tal- out its complications. One of the few areas ent. It also means a loss of national investment where global profits continue to flow from the in education, which will have to be replaced at developed to the developing world is illegal the expense of the taxpayer. No less than the drugs. Estimates of the size of the international expropriation of natural resources under colo- drug economy vary widely,11 but most dwarf nialism, this siphoning of human capital repre- the legitimate annual incomes of the world’s sents a form of looting of the third world by the poorest countries. Countries where drug crops first. Ironically, the developing world has are produced or processed (like Pakistan), as become a human capital resource for the devel- well as those used as transit points (like South oped nations in highly skilled as well as Africa), have a strong tendency to develop their unskilled occupations. The poor pay their taxes own substance abuse problems. The prolifera- to train the doctors of the rich. tion of addictive drugs leads to an increase in With the advancing integration of markets prostitution and an overall deterioration of con- and the entry of the massive low-wage work- ditions for sex workers. An increase in the force of China into the international scene, one number of sex workers pushes down the rate of the few areas of comparative advantage left for sex, compelling sex workers to increase vol- to poorer countries is their local culture and umes and accede to customer demands for geography. Global tourism employs 7% of the unsafe sex.12 Thus, both drug use and sex work total global workforce9 and represents one of have links to another great barrier to develop- the few growing sources of lesser skill jobs. ment – HIV/AIDS. Tourism was identified by the United Nations While little research has been performed on (UN) Conference on Trade and Development as the psychological implications of being HIV the industry most likely to attract foreign positive in a developing country, preliminary investment into Africa in the early 21st century, work indicates that the burden of disease and outpacing the food and textiles industries.10 poverty can drive young people into a kind of However, people don’t like to be robbed and violent nihilism.13 Gender violence has also raped on holiday, and high crime levels can been linked to HIV/AIDS.14 It is estimated that scotch a local tourist industry, regardless of half of all children in South Africa who are how attractive the local culture and landscape now 15-year-olds will die of AIDS, many leav- may be. ing children of their own behind.15 In Bots- While local artists may be slightly more wana, the figure is two out of three. South attached to the source of their inspiration than Africa will face an estimated 800 000 AIDS other skilled workers, they too can be fright- orphans by 2010, young people with troubled ened out of their homeland. With this exodus, upbringings and many with no means of sup- the generation of distinctive local culture – an port besides crime.16 These children will have internationally marketable commodity – can great difficulty in gaining an education since,

143 Leggett assuming their schoolhouse has not been stolen, there may soon be a shortage of teachers. Countries like Botswana are already beginning to feel the effect of teacher losses to AIDS. Thus, in a convoluted but indisputable way, drugs lead to HIV, which in turn derails the development process. Drugs represent just one aspect of a diverse global criminal economy, which is deeply intertwined with mainstream commerce. Money laundering has also become one of the few ways in which tiny nations can generate profit on their sovereignty, although international conventions are increasingly eroding this independence. Crime has become a way in which eral demoralisation cannot be adequately tal- poor countries can trade on their marginal sta- lied. It is impossible to determine how many tus. The increasing demand for extraterritorial businesses have folded and how many jobs law enforcement, spearheaded by the US Drug have been lost as a consequence of the burden Enforcement Administration via the war on of crime. The impact of crime on individual drugs, may destroy even this advantage. Even lives – the premature deaths, the lingering trau- within the criminal economy, the developed matisation – is beyond reckoning. world continues to promote its own market The costs of maintaining a large police force, interests. prosecution service, and corrections system Individuals within the government have also must also all be added to the tally. In South learned to capitalise on national marginality. Africa, where most citizens would agree that Corruption is facilitated by the new, scaled- the criminal justice system is not adequately down state, and whole nations can fall prey to resourced, government expenditure on crime- predatory “kleptocracy”.17 Aside from the related services could account for as much as a direct costs to the taxpayer (which can be con- sixth of the non-interest budget.20 This is more siderable), officials may allow the looting of than is spent on any other single area and is local resources and the exploitation of local money that is not being spent on developing the labour by outside interests in exchange for pri- country. vate kickbacks. Leaders like the former Zaire’s Thus, it becomes clear that crime and the fear Mobutu Sese Seko may intentionally sabotage a of crime can impede development in a variety well-developed national infrastructure in order of ways. If it is true that a lack of development, to facilitate further theft. or perhaps the development process itself, is As might be expected, the less developed the responsible for the crime problem, we may find country, the greater the perception of corrup- ourselves in a very difficult position indeed. tion, and perceptions determine investment decisions. A World Bank study indicated that 2. DOES LACK OF DEVELOPMENT PROMOTE counties with high levels of corruption and low CRIME? predictability of payments and outcomes had a It stands to reason that a traumatised populace, gross investment to GDP ratio of 12.3%, com- suffering in poverty and cut off from legitimate pared to 28.5% for less corrupt and more pre- means of income generation, might well be dictable countries.18 Using Transparency expected to engage in a range of crimes. But it International’s 1999 Corruption Perception’s is generally acknowledged that the poorest Index (CPI), ratings for 96 countries can be countries are not the most crime ridden, and seen to be positively correlated with their relatively affluent ones, like the US, have seri- Human Development Index (HDI), as the fol- ous crime problems. Thus, it is pretty clear that lowing scatterplot suggests.19 crime has a negative impact on development, Aside from these arguments, the costs of vio- but does the lack of development really cause lent and property crime in terms of direct med- crime? ical costs, lost assets and productivity and gen- The relationship between poverty (and the

144 Leggett social problems related to it) and crime has that people living in areas of anonymity and been thoroughly explored in the field of crimi- heterogeneity, particularly poor urban youth, nology. The three major schools of classical generate their own subcultures of crime. criminology (anomie/strain, learning/differen- Youths brought up in these areas learn to tial association, and control theory) all deal become criminals by association with others with the issue. Each of these theories has found subscribing to these subcultures. Rather than empirical support among it proponents and has simply defying the rules to attain prescribed been empirically contested by detractors. Each goals, they generate their own “rule of the of these theories predicts an increase in crime streets”, where qualities not sanctioned by in countries undergoing the process of develop- mainstream society (such as a capacity for vio- ment. lence) are valued. By labelling those who The anomie/strain theory was first advanced engage in crime as “criminals” and excluding by Merton in 1938. It is based on Durkheim’s them from the mainstream, society forces these coinage of the term “anomie” to describe the individuals to become “secondary deviants”, state of “normlessness” that he witnessed in fully embracing the alternative value system. France during its industrial period. Generalising The fragmented and heterogeneous nature of from this experience, he postulated that: many developing countries makes them prime “During periods of rapid social change, tra- candidates for the growth of alternative crimi- ditional norms may be viewed as no longer nal cultures. In countries emerging from many applicable to behaviour, leaving people free years of civil war or political oppression, the to pursue any ends by any means.”21 veneration of violence may already form part of Anomie/strain theory has come to focus on the the dominant culture. In development theory, pressures experienced (especially among young the “social exclusion” hypothesis was advanced males) when society promotes a goal that is not in France to explain how many aspects of attainable by a segment of the population. This “poverty” could persist despite widespread has been especially applied to ghetto youth in a access to state provided income, housing and materialistic America, but has also been applied health care.25 to wealthier people in situations of “relative For a variety of reasons, certain segments of deprivation”. The core idea is that people fed a society can find themselves excluded from par- materialistic value system without being sup- ticipation in the political, economic and social plied with the means of attaining material goals mainstream of a country. This can result in the are likely to engage in crime, including proper- excluded group engaging in a range of anti- ty crime, instrumental violent crime and frus- social and even self-destructive behaviour, tration violence. This is clearly a scenario including criminal activity. applicable to countries entering the world of Control theory is probably best articulated by globalised capitalism. Hirschi.26 Control theory posits that human Many observers of international development beings naturally break the law when sufficient have objected to the way the Western market- social bonds do not constrain action. Hirschi ing machine has pushed consumerism in coun- describes social bonds enforcing conformity to tries where the means of achieving material law as consisting of four elements: attachment, objectives are limited. An entire movement of commitment, involvement and belief. academics and activists have rallied to contest “Attachment” promotes conformity for emo- this type of cultural imperialism,22 though gen- tive reasons, out of sensitivity for the feelings erally without reference to the possible effects and opinions of others in one’s social network. it might have on local crime. It is disturbing “Commitment” is defined as the rational deci- that Western commercial interests are relent- sion not to risk social investment by deviance. lessly promoting a value system that Western The extent of individual “involvement” in scientists acknowledge contributes to increas- mainstream activities also limits opportunities ing crime across the planet. for crime, due to simple time constraints. The learning/differential association theory Finally, and perhaps most powerfully, “belief” was founded on the work of Sutherland,23 but is in social norms places strong internal controls also associated with the work of the Chicago on behaviour. All of these elements are threat- School.24 The central idea behind this theory is ened by rapid social change, including democ-

145 Leggett ratisation, economic development and adjust- tion are positively correlated with criminality, ment to globalisation. but there remain many discrepancies and con- In development theory, the notion of “social tradictions. For example, unemployment has, in capital” has risen to prominence.27 This theory many studies, been found to be negatively cor- acknowledges that the intangible networks of related with delinquency.30 trust and exchange that develop within stable Attempting to perform cross-national quanti- communities have a very real economic value. tative comparisons on the basis of development Recognition of the cost of losing this capital indicators and crime statistics would seem to be due to the social disruption caused by global a relatively straightforward procedure. Stand- capitalism provides an economic dimension to ardised, development-related national statistics strain theory. are collected by a number of organisations, While the development process disrupts including the UN and the World Bank, and social control on individuals, it also limits the most countries keep some sort of record of capacity of the state to provide deterrents for crime. However, different countries define dif- criminal activity. States investing in basic edu- ferent crimes in different ways and collect dif- cation, infrastructure development, and indus- ferent types of information regarding crime. In trial support may lack the necessary resources addition, some developing countries lack the to support an effective criminal justice system. capacity to assemble reliable national figures. States may find themselves torn between work- Many interpersonal crimes, such as rape and ing towards crime prevention by provision of assault, are severely underreported in most employment and social services on the one countries. However, the degree of underreport- hand, and establishing social order as a founda- ing varies greatly according to the stigma tion for economic development on the other. attached to victimisation in the local social con- In addition to these classic theories, a number text.31 Even if crimes are reported, different of analysts have viewed criminality from a jurisdictions have differing policies on the purely economic perspective.28 Crime becomes importance of recording these reports if there a rational choice where the benefits to be appears to be insufficient evidence to merit an gained outweigh the risks. This is certainly the investigation or prosecution. Instances of some case in many developing countries, where state property offences that are well reported, like law enforcement apparatus is insufficient to automobile theft, vary greatly in accordance provide real deterrence, and where other eco- with local access to resources. There is very lit- nomic opportunities are limited. Countries in tle auto theft in countries with very few motor transition are often emerging from authoritarian vehicles, for example. Other types of crime, regimes, where the brutalised populace had such as drug crimes and prostitution, are entire- positive political motivation for discovering ly reliant on police initiative for enforcement. how to circumvent the mechanisms of social Thus, the international crime figures published control. However, when a more democratic by the United Nations Development Pro- government takes power, new restrictions are gramme (UNDP)32 provide the following coun- placed on law enforcement, while the law- terintuitive results: breaking skills acquired by the populace • Canada has one of the highest recorded rape remain. Unlike the situation in developed coun- rates in the world (267 per 100 000), second tries, where most crime is centred on depressed only to Estonia in the UNDP figures. inner city areas, in developing countries rapid • The rate of drug crimes in Switzerland (574 population movement has caused similar insta- per 100 000) is more than 10 times that in bility in large rural areas. Policing techniques Columbia (40 per 100 000). that work well in the developed world may be • The rate of total reported crimes in Denmark useless in this context.29 (10 508 per 100 000) is more than five times Empirical testing of the predictive capabili- higher than in the Russian Federation (1779 ties of these theories is fraught with difficulty. per 100 000) and more than 100 times that of Contradictory evidence has even emerged in Indonesia (80 per 100 000). studies conducted exclusively within the devel- There also exists much literature (primarily in oped world. All these theories predict that economics) dedicated to manipulating these many of the classic indicators of social depriva- sorts of dubious figures in various arcane ways

146 Leggett to arrive at ambitious conclusions regarding the single best predictor of homicide rates in the universal nature of crime. Most of this is disre- study was religion. The greater the percentage garded by specialists, who focus instead on the of Christians in a developing county, the higher one crime variable that seems fairly unambigu- the homicide rate. The greater the percentage of ous – homicide. Muslims in a developing country, the lower the Unfortunately, even homicide is not as clear- homicide rate. While the deterrent effect of cut as it may seem. Interpol defines the crime sharia law seems to provide the most obvious “murder” as “any act performed with the pur- explanation of this finding, Neapolitan explains pose of taking human life,” which, of course, it by referring to the instability generated by includes attempted murders. There is some colonisation, where Christian missionaries sense to this broad definition since, for the pur- undermined the social cohesion provided by poses of international comparison, an assault traditional religions. He also posits, along producing a given injury may be disproportion- anomie/strain lines, that cultural integration and ately lethal in countries with poor or inaccessi- traditional values are stronger in Muslim coun- ble medical facilities. However, the decision to tries and that individualism and materialism class a crime as an attempted murder rather may be higher in Christian nations. than a serious assault is highly discretionary, The relationship between Westernisation and even within a single jurisdiction. As a result, crime was also explored by Huang,34 who many of the figures collected for global com- examined what Durkheim terms “moral indi- parison contain attempted murders as well as vidualism” and murder rates. This characteris- actual killings. In addition, the criteria used for tic, perhaps the flip-side of the individualism defining attempted murders are by no means intended by Neapolitan, is defined as the standardised. Using South Africa as an exam- respect for individual rights found in the collec- ple, including attempted murders would more tive morality of a modern society. Using a than double the murder rate, while adding in all quantitative measure of political and civil serious assaults would multiply it by 10. rights, Huang established a negative relation- Perhaps partly due to this ambiguity, attempts ship between “moral individualism” and to correlate various social and economic indica- murder rates. He concludes that, “concern for tors with homicide rates have produced mixed individual rights and personal dignity have de- results for nearly every variable screened. creased levels of murder in the countries we According to Neapolitan,33 correlations have studied”. been found in some studies, and not found in Without even careful examination of the others, for each of the following variables: manner in which civil rights are quantified, it • GDP per capita should be noted that Huang did not use data • urbanisation from countries experiencing rapid transition. • proportion of youth in population None of the former Soviet states or Eastern • population density Bloc countries were included, nor was South • infant mortality Africa – all countries that have, arguably, expe- • unemployment levels rienced crime booms since individual rights • cultural integration were officially recognised. Instead, 12 of the 29 • religion counties are in Western Europe and all but five All of these studies confronted the problem of are considered countries of “high human devel- determining what constitutes a “representative opment” by the UNDP. This sort of conve- sample” of nations, and most focused on coun- nience sampling undermines the slight correla- tries where statistics were most accessible and tion on which Huang hangs his conclusions. most reliable (i.e., developed countries). Another exploration of the impact of “west- Neapolitan attempted to rectify this bias by ernisation”, this time limited to a single country focusing on a large sample of developing coun- across a certain time span, is the work of Deng tries. In his analysis, one of the most promising and Cordilia in China.35 Since economic reform explanatory variables – income inequality – was initiated in 1979, China has experienced failed to show a significant correlation with several distinct crime waves, the most recent homicide rates. Other “social deprivation” indi- climaxing in 1991 and settling at a plateau of cators also failed to show a correlation. The approximately 140 crimes per 100 000 from

147 Leggett

1992 to 1995. There has also been an increase chronic, as free market capitalism is based on in the number of serious violent and property the necessity for constant change and innova- crimes between 1988 and 1995. Deng and tion, and demands high levels of mobility and Cordilia attribute this change not only to a flexibility from its workforce. decline in social control, but also to the active The process of development in the globalised assertion of Western materialist values, encap- world can be expected to create consumerist sulated in the official slogan “to get rich is glo- desires in those least capable of satisfying rious”. They thus draw on, and expand, tradi- them, inevitably leading to fragmentation and tional control and anomie/strain theories. They the generation of deviant subcultures. It is like- point out several ways in which the Chinese ly to undermine whatever community and system of social control was unique, and sug- familial social structure still remains without gest that theoretical understanding of the causes providing alternate structures for social invest- of crime will have to be expanded to encom- ment and meaning. Involvement in crime may pass the reality of non-Western nations. become a rational decision where legitimate employment is not forthcoming and state law CONCLUSION enforcement apparatus is not sufficient to pro- It is likely that the Chinese scenario, with local vide real deterrents. Developing countries may variations, will be played out in other countries find themselves caught in a vicious cycle in in transition. Rapid social change is ubiquitous, which the more rapidly they try to develop, the capitalism is competitive, and not everyone can more the costs of social transition stunt devel- be a winner. These problems may become opment.

148 Leggett

ENDNOTES

1) See, for example, Clinard, M and D. ders, but it isn’t exactly a holiday. Sunday Abbot (1973) Crime in Developing Times, August 14. Countries. New York: Wiley, and the 11) Ibid. p 169. Castells mentions the estimate more recent Sumner, C (1982) Crime, of $500 billion, more than the global trade Justice, and Underdevelopment. in oil. According to the UNDP World Aldershot: Gower. Development Report 2000, the total gross 2) Jacobson, C (1998) Power surge wreaks national product for all of sub-Saharan havoc: Thieves steal copper wire worth Africa was just $311 billion. R40 - and cause R1m damage in 12) Leggett, T. (1999) Poverty and Sex Work Joburg suburb. Sunday Times, in Durban, South Africa. Society in 7 September. Transition 30(2). 3) African Eye News Service (2000) Crime 13) LeClerc-Madlala, S. (1997) Infect one, keeps low cost houses empty. Electronic infect all: Zulu youth response to the Mail and Guardian, August 25. “More AIDS epidemic in South Africa. Medical than half the houses in a R17.9 m low-cost Anthropology 17. housing project in Northern Province are 14) Pendry, B (1998) The links between gen- standing empty because beneficiaries der violence and HIV/AIDS. Agenda, 39. don’t like the location and are afraid of 15) Pretoria News, 28 June 2000; information crime in the area.” from UNAIDS, June 2000. 4) Munusamy, R (1999) Net closes on rings 16) Whiteside, A. and K. Michael (1998) ripping off province. Sunday Times, 7 AIDS and development. Indicator South November. Africa, 15(3). 5) Pelton, R., C. Aral, and W. Dulles (1998) 17) Bayart, J, S. Ellis, and B. Hibou (1999) Fielding’s The World’s Most Dangerous The Criminalisation of the State in Africa. Places. Redondo Beach, Fielding’s Oxford: James Curry. International. Pelton states: “In 1996, there 18) World Bank (1997) World Development were a reported 1439 cases of kidnapping Report. New York: Oxford. [in Columbia], a 35% increase over 1995. 19) A high CPI index is indicative of low cor- About a third of the abductions were car- ruption, while a high HDI is indicative of ried out by rebel groups, while common high development. CPI data are taken criminals attached to kidnapping gangs from the 1999 Transparency International snatched 885 victims ... Kidnapping has Corruption Perceptions Survey: become a US$350 million industry in http://www.transparency.de/documents/cp Colombia ... In 1996, at least 45 foreigners i/index.html. HDI data from the United were abducted and more than US$160 Nations Development Programme’s million paid to kidnappers in Colombia ... Human Development Report 1999, CD- Fewer than one in 30 kidnappers are ever ROM edition. The CPI is generated by caught and sentenced. Fewer than half the weighing data from a variety of survey kidnappings that actually take place are sources, including the International Crime ever reported.” Victims’ Survey. The HDI is calculated by 6) World Bank (1997) World Development weighing three variables: gross domestic Report. New York: Oxford University product per capita, adult literacy, and life Press, p 5. expectancy. Pearson’s correlation is sig- 7) Castells, M (1998) The Power of Identity. nificant at the .01 level (2-tailed), as are Oxford: Blackwell Press. the correlations for all three HDI compo- 8) Mittner M (1999) Why SA managers are nent variables. packing for Toronto. Finance Week, 16 20) Department of Finance, Republic of South April. Africa (1999) National Expenditure 9) Castells, M (1998) End of the Millennium. Survey. Pretoria: Government Printers. Oxford: Blackwell Press, p 151. 21) Elliott, D., S. Ageton, and R. Canter 10) Bennett, J (2000) Tourism can do won- (1979) An integrated theoretical perspec-

149 Leggett

tive on delinquent behaviour. Journal of 30) Ploeger, M (1997) Youth employment and Research in Crime and Delinquency, 16. delinquency: Reconsidering a problematic 22) While not directly concerned with cultural relationship. Criminology, 35 (4). imperialism, see, for example: Smart, B 31) Van Dijk , J. and P. Mayhew (1993) (ed) (1999) Resisting McDonaldisation. Criminal victimisation in the industrialised London: Sage. world: Key findings of the 1989 and 1992 23) Sutherland, E and D Cressey (1960) A International Crime Surveys. In A. theory of differential association. Alvazzi del Frate, U. Zvekic, and J. van Principles of Criminology. Dix Hills, New Dijk (eds.) Understanding Crime: York: General Hall. Experiences of Crime and Crime Control. 24) Shaw, C. and H. McKay (1942) Juvenile UNICRI: Rome. Delinquency in Urban Areas. Chicago: 32) United Nations Development Programme University of Chicago Press. (2000) Human Development Report. 25) Bhalla, A. and F. Lapayre (1997) Social Oxford University Press: New York. exclusion: Toward an analytical and oper- 33) Neapolitan, J (1997) Homicides in devel- ational framework. Development and oping nations: Results of research using a Change, 28 (3). large and representative sample. 26) Hirschi, T (1969) Social bond theory. International Journal of Offender Therapy Causes of Delinquency. Berkeley: and Comparative Criminology. 41 (4). University of California Press. 34) Huang, W (1995) A cross-national analy- 27) Putnam, R (1995) Bowling alone: sis of the effect of moral individualism on America’s declining social capital. murder rates. International Journal of Journal of Democracy, 6 (1). Offender Therapy and Comparative 28) For example, see Becker, G (1968) Crime Criminology. 39 (1). and punishment: An economic approach. 35) Deng, X. and A. Cordilia (1999) To get Journal of Political Economy, 76. rich is glorious: Rising expectations, 29) Leggett, T (2000) Law enforcement and declining control, and escalating crime in international gun trafficking. In Lumpe, L contemporary China. International (ed.) Running Guns: The Global Black Journal of Offender Therapy and Market in Small Arms. London: Zed Comparative Criminology. 43(2). Books.

150 Police Reform and Democratic Consolidation: Chile

Hugo Frühling

INTRODUCTION • Latin American police used force more A number of Latin American countries have frequently than the police of developed, made progress in transforming their police ser- democratic countries in dealing with similar vices over the past several years. Among these, situations. the most notable are: the creation of new civil- • There was definitely less monitoring of ian police forces in Haiti and El Salvador; police activity than in the democratic coun- efforts to rid the police of corruption and to tries. establish a new institutional structure in the • The degree of public support for the police Colombian national police force; the refashion- was probably low. ing of the security system of the province of • The internal organisational functioning of the Buenos Aires; and the implementation of a police was inevitably based on a military community policing strategy by the military model, i.e., a hierarchical system in which police of São Paulo. power was centralised in the high command, These changes are still in the early stages, with many levels between subordinate per- but they constitute a response to the serious sonnel and the upper levels. Furthermore, problems that police forces have encountered subordinates obeyed orders but lacked auton- in dealing with today’s challenges. In a paper omy to respond creatively to problems.2 written five years ago on the relationship There is no doubt many of Bayley’s points are between police and the military in Latin valid, despite differences from country to coun- America, David Bayley stated that many Latin try.3 In reality, the police forces in a number of American police forces demonstrated militaris- South American countries face serious ques- tic features.1 In his opinion, this meant that tions and criticism as a result of: the use of police forces were not totally differentiated excessive violence in carrying out their func- from the armed forces, and at times they in fact tions;4 corruption;5 a lack of professional assumed a role that was subordinate to the mili- autonomy with respect to the armed forces;6 tary. Based on this characteristic, Bayley for- institutional corporatism;7 and serious prob- mulated a series of hypotheses on the relation- lems with regard to professionalism.8 With the ship between police and community: partial exception of Chile, very few people • A significant percentage of complaints reach- have confidence in police efficiency.9 Even in ing the police involved reports of serious Chile, the people have less trust in their police crimes. In other words, unlike in the devel- than United States (US) citizens have in oped, democratic countries, the public only their’s.10 resorted to the police when absolutely neces- It is precisely this dissatisfaction with exist- sary. ing police systems that has led to contradictory • The police were much more responsive to the efforts to refashion or reform them. The result government’s needs than to the demands of has been efforts to create new civilian police citizens. forces or to reform existing forces with pro-

151 Frühling grammes to decentralise command, bring the easy process, since it must be accomplished police closer to the people, and strengthen exactly at a time when these countries are suf- mechanisms for monitoring police activity. The fering an acute crime wave, precipitating first of these alternatives is present in countries demands to slow down the reform process in that have recently undergone internal armed order to respond forcefully to criminal activity conflict and have moved beyond it with the and to deal with it “on its own terms.” In help of international cooperation and support Brazil, models of community policing that have (El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti). The second is been implemented have, in some cases, been being tried in cases where distrust of the police reversed in favour of more traditional policing. affects public security, and the legitimacy of This will sometimes occur following the elec- political authorities, to an extent that has tion of a new governor, as was the case in Rio become intolerable. Assessment and documen- de Janeiro. In addition, reform is taking place tation of these reform processes is not yet com- against a background where police functions plete, though reports exist that contain valuable are no longer a public sector monopoly; thus, information on the subject.11 On the basis of the more influential segments of society have these experiences, the steps to be taken in access to private security systems, which weak- bringing about police reform have been system- ens their support for police reform. atised,12 and suggestions have also been made for advancing the reform process currently 1. NEW FEATURES OF MODERN POLICE under way.13 INSTITUTIONS There has not always been consistency The police represent the public security force. among different efforts. Most projects have run More precisely, they constitute a specialised, into problems and, on occasion, have been professional public organisation authorised to reversed. Recent sharp increases in violent use coercion to enforce the law.14 Institutions crime have therefore at times prompted civilian and individuals responsible for maintaining authorities to order military patrols of the public order have been in existence since the streets in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras earliest times. However, the emergence of and in Rio de Janeiro. police as we now know them, occurred more The hope is that this paper will contribute to recently. Only in the modern age was a spe- the debate on the reform process by examining cialised, professional public force organised to three major aspects. The first section deals with fulfil this function. the main directions of police reform in recent The police are a public body, in that they are years in developed, democratic countries. In primarily directed and financed by the commu- describing this, emphasis is placed on the nity or the state, are subject to their direction, change of doctrine that is occurring in modern and are designed to serve all citizens equally.15 policing, including the importance of employ- Originally, the police responded to the need to ing properly trained personnel and of using create a body able to uphold order when social planning and research as driving forces for groups were unable to do so on their own. police action. These changes provide a frame of A third feature of the modern police force is reference that is influencing the process of that it is a professional body, in the sense that it reform in Latin America. The second section makes an effort to maintain a proper and mea- outlines some of the reforms currently in surable level of efficiency. This is reflected in progress in South America, attempting to iden- the criteria used for recruiting and training per- tify common features. Finally, conclusions are sonnel; in rules governing promotion and retire- presented, drawn from existing experience, ment; and in a substantive interest and empha- including the problems encountered when theo- sis on knowledge and the use of technology.16 retical models from developed countries are Increased crime in both western Europe and superimposed on the social and cultural reali- the US, which began in the 1950s, has pro- ties of Latin America’s urban environment. voked considerable thought on determining Police reform in many of the region’s coun- new police strategies to ensure order in the tries is believed to be indispensable in guaran- modern-day societies of developed countries. teeing economic development and improving There is also a need to forge new relationships the quality of democracy. It is not, however, an between the police and society, as well as a

152 Frühling need for modern resource management strate- actions they take in violation of the law. In gies to guarantee the efficiency of the police. addition, there are mechanisms in place to This process of debate points to the need for ensure that the police are accountable for the reform and suggests particular approaches.17 strategies they adopt to protect the public, for The elements that define this process of the efficiency or seriousness with which they transformation include: changes in police doc- carry out their duties and for respecting the trine aimed at incorporating democratic values views, interests and values of the people. in police activity so that police relate to citizens As Stone and Ward point out, this definition as equals; establishment of a police recruitment of accountability goes well beyond complying and training process aimed at producing better- with legal obligations, and requires numerous trained police officers; and an effort to imple- monitoring and management mechanisms that ment police research and planning to respond exceed mere judicial measures.19 more effectively to public needs.18 In this view, the police as an organisation, and its members, are personally responsible 1.1 A new police doctrine both for reducing public insecurity and fear, The meaning of professionalism, as it is gener- and for any corrupt or improper conduct within ally understood by the police, is to enforce the the organisation. With a legalistic approach, law effectively. This view does not, however, however, the line of accountability points take into account political or social values that upward to government officials responsible for go beyond its limited objective. By this stan- public order and peace, and to the judges and dard, mere adherence to current law is suffi- prosecutors in charge of investigations. cient guarantee that the police are protecting On another level, the police are also responsi- democratic values. Such a notion is, in a sense, ble for interfacing with society. This could take a recipe for failure, and will inevitably lead to the form of citizen security committees that strong distrust of police performance. may be formed at neighbourhood level, neigh- This interpretation of professionalism derives bourhood associations, and the media. from the fact that police training is essentially Within a democratic policing approach, legalistic. The authority that police officials police must be held accountable for abuse have over subordinates, their authority over the under internal monitoring systems, through public, and their immunity from undue interfer- their chains of command and – if they have ence from the political realm, are based on cur- committed crimes – through the courts.20 From rent law. Respect for the law leads naturally to this perspective, the police are not only subject the argument that the police are a completely to scrutiny for illegal activity, but also for the professional institution whose purpose is to efficiency and timeliness of their performance. maintain order in any situation and to reinforce Furthermore, monitoring is exercised both by the stability of any government. Legalistic pro- institutions, whose sole purpose is overseeing fessionalism, however, is not conducive to police performance (for example, civilian respect for concepts such as democracy and review boards in the US that process com- human rights. These concepts are accepted to plaints against the police) and by other entities the extent that they are supported by current with other functions. law, but their incorporation into police activity A range of mechanisms for investigating is slow to show itself. The lack of respect for complaints from the public against police offi- concepts of democracy and human rights as a cers has developed in recent times. While in guiding force leaves the police distrustful of the Europe and Latin America these remain essen- citizenry. As a result, police strategies for com- tially internal, Canada and the US have a strong bating crime pay scant attention to the concerns external component to disciplinary and man- of the people. agement monitoring through civilian review The democratic concept of police doctrine is boards. These organisations process complaints as follows: from the public concerning police behaviour The police observe a code of conduct that and recommend sanctions, which in turn are respects human rights. They perform their applied by the police hierarchy. The rationale duties in the public interest, guided by a sense for the existence of these committees relates to of public service, and are accountable for any the lack of transparency associated with inter-

153 Frühling nal investigations conducted by the police such as that of São Paulo, training has been themselves.21 In Latin America in recent years, provided by members of human rights organi- institutions have been created to provide exter- sations. In cases involving the creation of new nal monitoring of police performance, as an police forces, training has been conducted by adjunct to the function of the courts, in cases of international advisors. criminal activity. A Police Monitoring Office for the state of São Paulo was therefore created 1.2 Emphasis on training of police personnel to handle complaints against the police. In El Given that the ability of the police to reduce Salvador, the Attorney General’s Office for the crime is clearly limited, more emphasis is now Defense of Human Rights publishes annual being placed on improving the quality of per- reports and channels complaints about police sonnel. There is, however, a lack of clarity in behaviour to various public entities, although it defining selection criteria – beyond those of is not exclusively dedicated to fielding com- academic background and minimum health plaints against the police.22 standards. The responsibility for monitoring police effi- The challenge of redefining selection criteria ciency has also shifted in recent years from to meet the challenges of modern society is not political authorities to citizens’ groups. Citizen by any means trivial. The police forces of other advisory groups in Sweden and Denmark have historical periods required a different type of ongoing relations with the police and provide a individual from what is needed today. Among citizen perspective on their work. In Santiago, the Chilean police, old-timers often remark Chile, a similar experiment was carried out, that, in the old days, the force would recruit although its success was regarded as limited. agricultural workers who valued patriotic sym- In the following case of a community polic- bols and were untainted by big-city life. Such a ing project in the state of São Paulo, both view clearly regards discipline as having a far design and implementation involved the partici- higher priority than a knowledge of the urban pation of a number of committees with socially environment. diverse memberships. This necessitated the for- It is important to begin by defining the mation of an Advisory Committee for the features of police doctrine as well as major Creation of the Community Police that engaged strategies for protecting the population. These in dialogue with police to assess any problems strategies will dictate the necessary qualities to arising during implementation. Although the be sought when recruiting personnel, ie. disci- establishment of such a committee was certain- plined, obedient individuals with strong influ- ly an achievement, relations between its civil- ence or personality on the one hand, or ian members and the police were difficult, as resourceful, inventive individuals with strong Paulo de Mesquita Neto relates in his paper.23 interpersonal skills, on the other. The police took note of problems expressed In short, the type of individual to be recruited during meetings, but there was rarely any rigor- will depend on having first defined the objec- ous follow-up on the measures that were decid- tives and characteristics to be sought in a police ed upon. Community security councils, force, since this in turn will determine what autonomous in their objectives and manner of constitutes a good police officer. function, were established by state government Recruits must, of course, possess a demon- decree. They convene monthly and forward the strable level of emotional stability, as measured minutes of their meetings to the Public Security by psychological tests and interviews. A mini- Councils Coordinator, which is an organ of the mum level of education is also necessary, since State Security Secretariat. The dialogue that police work requires that officers understand takes place in these councils between police the laws to be enforced. In addition, it would and citizens does not appear to be highly pro- seem prudent to determine whether the appli- ductive, although it does represent a first step cant has a police record or other background toward citizen involvement in police monitor- that would make the individual unsuitable for ing.24 the profession. Efforts to socialise the police and instill new In developed, democratic countries, educa- democratic concepts have taken the form of tional requirements for police have risen, par- human rights training for police. In some cases, ticularly for commanding officers. This is

154 Frühling understandable since the police are entrusted beyond what can be covered in this paper. not only with a great deal of power, but with Nevertheless, a number of general observations considerable human and material resources. can be made. Firstly, the extent of training at a In England at present, at least half of the police academy will depend on the previous commanding officers possess a university schooling of the recruit, with more intense degree. In the US, the average education for training provided for those who have less previ- police workers increased considerably between ous education. Secondly, instruction should 1969 and 1990. In 1969 the average education combine technical elements (particularly on level was a secondary school diploma, while in legal issues) with actual application to specific 1990 the average was two years of college edu- cases and practical exercises. Special attention cation.25 In Chile’s carabineros, police officers should be paid to basic analysis of dangerous must have three years of instruction. To situations in which police must exercise good become a colonel, an officer must study an judgment: arresting suspects, reacting to attack, additional two years at the Instituto Superior de etc.27 Carabineros. Many potential human rights abuses and use Some police forces, such as the Japanese, of firearms by police could be prevented by accept college graduates who, after a year of adequate firearms training or through proper training at the police academy, occupy impor- training on how to deal with various situations, tant command posts, particularly in planning such as the arrest of dangerous suspects. and administration. All of these approaches are Finally, it is important that training approxi- valid, however, they cannot be evaluated in a mates, as closely as possible, the actual experi- vacuum. Each approach depends on the struc- ence that recruits will eventually face as police ture of the police force in question, where officers. This entails training them to respect recruitment may be stratified by rank or may be the rights of persons who may be violent, and egalitarian, allowing all officers to rise to the to act quickly in high-stress situations. Without highest levels based on their merit and seniority. this training, the new police officer is bound to The educational qualifications of police offi- experience a major gap between what was cers will also depend on the available candi- learned and real-life situations he or she may dates, which in turn will be a function of the encounter. employment conditions that the police service The British system, in which the student can offer. Thus, at times, the police will have to police officer is trained for a number of settle for the best personnel they can find, months, followed by three months at a police rather than what they require. station under the tutelage of an experienced There are successful cases of police improve- colleague, appears to be an excellent model. At ment, which may serve as examples. The case the conclusion of this period of practical expe- of DESEPAZ, an initiative in the city of Cali, rience, the student returns to, and graduates Colombia, is one such example. Having deter- from, the academy. During this final stage, mined in an initial evaluation that police offi- he/she can discuss field experiences with teach- cers had an average of two years’ secondary ers, including the discrepancies between theo- schooling, the Programme for Citizen Peace retical training received and the actual reality of and Security organised a project to ensure that police work. all police officers complete secondary schooling within 18 months.26 1.3 Police planning and research Police recruitment requires the largest possi- For a police force to be successful in today’s ble number of candidates from different cultur- world it requires effective anticipation of prob- al and social backgrounds. If the objective is to lems, the planning of strategies to solve them, introduce innovative police strategies, it is daily evaluation of results, and the institution of desirable to employ people who are free of any organisational changes that may be neces- prejudices or preconceptions about the work sary. they are to undertake. The police service must change from being One final consideration is the quality and an organisation that primarily performs routine, content of the training provided for new police pre-established procedures to a flexible entity recruits. This is a subject that extends far that can mobilise around goals, combining tra-

155 Frühling ditional law enforcement duties – such as arrest entities, by police forces themselves, by private and interrogation of suspects – with other research organisations, and by universities. socially-oriented services, such as providing In 1992, for example, the Kent police sur- information on crime prevention, organising veyed 4000 persons with whom the police had activities for young people, etc. dealt, in order to gauge their opinion in areas In dealing with crime, the importance of such as: research and planning is evident. Police must • degree of public satisfaction with police ser- be thoroughly familiar with the spatial and tem- vices poral distribution of criminal activity, have a • perceived level of police presence realistic view of changes in the patterns of • degree of victims’ satisfaction with services criminal activity, and track geographical received changes in these patterns. The former Police • relation (in percentages) between crimes Commissioner of New York, William Bratton, detected and crimes committed summarises the duties he faced on assuming his • speed in responding to calls post as follows: • degree of satisfaction among persons lodging • To determine, on a daily basis, where crimes complaints with the action taken are occurring and at what times they are • response time in reacting to emergency calls occurring. • response time for emergency calls • Once this data is mapped, the various police • degree of satisfaction among all persons who divisions must be coordinated effectively in have had contact with the police order to provide quick response. • criticisms of the police.29 • Before arriving at the scene of a crime, it is The increase in research applied to crime fight- essential for the police officers to know in ing within some police forces not only creates advance what tactics will be necessary. Will greater efficiency, but also fosters a more cre- there be a need for investigation of crimes ative and challenging work environment for already committed; for the major deployment police officers. Ultimately, police officers will of police to reduce criminal activity in a par- be trained by a professional process in which ticular area; or the necessity for the institu- performance is evaluated on the basis of results tion of a community policing programme? and public opinion, rather than on the basis of • The last element in this strategic outline is a personal relations with superiors. further set of questions to aid in assessing It is also important to emphasise that the indi- effectiveness: Are current tactics producing cators used to evaluate police efficiency are results? Is the local police commander able to changing from the exclusive reliance on statis- coordinate efforts with other officials? tics of arrests and crimes to equally important Finally, what statistical changes can be iden- qualitative aspects of police work. tified in the wake of implementing particular The concerns of proponents for police reform strategies?28 therefore reflect a combination of factors that Planning must be a multi-level process, not are not always complementary. On the one solely a central one, and must include all police hand, there is an interest in using modern man- stations. It is clear that in today’s world, decen- agement techniques to address new social chal- tralisation is essential to effective policing. lenges, while on the other, there is concern for Local commanders, however, inevitably face respecting the rights of individuals who are crucial limitations. They lack the authority to actually or potentially affected by police activi- select their own personnel, and they are com- ty. Although Latin America has its own particu- pelled to operate within a budget and with larities, these same concerns exist in their own resources over which they have no control. context. Decentralisation of the planning process should produce a more focused approach in responding 2. POLICE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA effectively to local, as well as general public There is a distinct range of programmes aimed needs. at police reform. Here, three examples of There has also recently been rapid expansion reform projects currently in progress are in the number of entities assessing police ser- described, with emphasis on what appear to be vices. Currently, this is carried out by public common elements.

156 Frühling

2.1 Public security system reformation in the engage, as needed, in finding peaceful solutions province of Buenos Aires to social conflicts. In 1997, two events contributed to the decision In addition, it was proposed that neighbour- to intervene in the operation of the police force hood security forums comprising non-govern- in the province of Buenos Aires. Firstly, there mental community organisations or entities was a marked increase in citizens’ concerns recognised for their social participation, be about crime. Secondly, it was proven that mem- formed. These would be involved in evaluating bers of the Buenos Aires police force had par- the performance and activity of the province’s ticipated in an attack against the Jewish com- police forces, and could participate in planning munity headquarters, AMIA, as well as in crim- to prevent activities or events of a criminal inal activities involving José Luis Cabezas, a nature or that would be harmful to public secu- reporter from the print media.30 rity. The executive branch initiated active inter- Finally, the Municipal Security Advocacy vention in the Buenos Aires Police, creating a was created to protect the public’s individual Ministry of Security that would be responsible and collective rights vis-à-vis actions, or failure for dismantling the force as it existed. The to act, on the part of government, police forces entire upper command was dismissed, and or private policing firms.31 more than 300 police superintendents and With regard to the internal monitoring of senior officers were removed. The existing sin- police conduct, an Ethic’s Court was estab- gle police force was replaced by 18 departmen- lished in addition to an appointive commission- tal security police units, a police force responsi- er for internal affairs which operated under the ble for investigation, a service for the transport Ministry of Security. and custody of arrestees, and a proposed Objective evaluations of Buenos Aires’s municipal street police unit. The departmental police reform process are not yet available. security police units were to function However, by the end of 1999, electoral consid- autonomously but would be interrelated. Their erations guided the governor of the province to principal function would be the prevention of appoint a new minister and a new head of the crime (Government of the Province of Buenos police. It is clear that not all aspects of the Aires, 1998). In addition to the decentralisation reform process have been implemented. of command, the project sought to dismantle the existing networks of corruption through a 2.2 Colombian police reform process of functional differentiation. This Unlike the situation in the province of Buenos would be achieved through the creation of a Aires, the reform of the Colombian police force number of police organisations that would per- – which had traditionally been considered cor- form the functions previously carried out by a rupt, inefficient and was widely thought to be single entity, thereby decentralising command. infiltrated by drug traffickers – was initiated by In order to ensure external monitoring of the institution’s own leadership, rather than police efficiency and to assess the manner in through political intervention. Today, the which the police functioned, departmental secu- results are generally considered to be highly rity councils were created. These comprised: a positive. Both international observers and representative of the municipalities’ Municipal national public opinion reflect a considerable Security Advocacy; one provincial assembly increase in confidence in the police force.32 deputy and one provincial senator; two execu- The reform process began with the appoint- tive department heads from the municipalities ment of Major General Rosso José Serrano as comprising the judicial district; the judicial dis- head of the National Police in 1994. He trict’s prosecuting attorney; a representative of obtained authorisation from Congress to the bar association; and representatives of remove officers who, on the basis of sound evi- unions, business, and religious institutions. The dence, were suspected of having engaged in function of the councils, established by provin- corrupt activities. Approximately 7000 police cial law, is to monitor and assess the perfor- officers were dismissed. Unlike other opera- mance and activity of the province’s police tions to purge corruption, this effort was per- forces, to obtain reports from the heads of the ceived as credible, and affected not only subor- various newly established police forces and to dinates, but upper-level officials as well.

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The second step involved altering the struc- 2.3 Community policing plan for the military ture and culture of the force and introducing police of São Paulo management concepts from modern business The Military Police of São Paulo, like the mili- culture. The School of Administration of the tary police in all of Brazil’s states, is an auxil- Universidad de los Andes collaborated with the iary force of the army that performs preventive police in this phase of the project. police functions but is regulated, organisation- The 1998 Institutional Strategy Plan recom- ally and functionally, through the Ministry of mended six institutional policies: community the Army. participation, a new work culture, strengthened Between the 1980s and the 1990s, the state of operational capacity, management develop- São Paulo, like the rest of Brazil, experienced a ment, an emphasis on knowledge and effective huge rise in crime. According to Health management of the administrative system. Ministry data reproduced by Paulo de Mesquita Flowing from these policies were strategic Neto, the number of deaths due to homicide or goals and tasks for each police division. In intentionally inflicted injuries increased from order to encourage creativity, a less hierarchi- 3452 in 1980 to 12 350 in 1996, with the homi- cal, less concentrated structure was created in cide rate reaching 36.20 per 100 000 inhabi- place of the old one. tants. This was accompanied by a dramatic rise This comprised three levels: governing enti- in theft. ties; consultation and support entities, including Faced with this situation, the failure of the the Office of the Inspector General, which per- police was reflected in a number of areas. forms the important task of developing indica- There were frequent incidents of police vio- tors to determine whether the strategic plan is lence, which received wide coverage in the being met; and executive entities which devel- media. In 1995, 618 citizens were killed by the op and perform the tasks necessary to imple- military police. Furthermore, surveys indicated ment the entire process.33 that as a result of people’s view of the police as The predominant discourse with regard to inefficient, and their fear of involvement with this reorganisation process is the enhancement the police, only 33% of crimes were actually of officers’ management abilities and substan- reported to the police.35 tial improvement in resource administration. In On 10 December 1997, the top commander addition, the discussion includes a community of the military police officially adopted the collaboration component. concept of community policing as a philosophy This is reflected in a number of ways, includ- and operational strategy. ing “consultation with the citizenry to provide This model of police activity acquired great the basis for a new police service, the creation favour in the US and Canada in the 1980s, of new, expedited channels of communication though components of it have long been for complaints and claims, including the provi- applied in England. Today, its application is sion of customer-service lines and lastly, the being discussed in a number of Latin American creation of so-called citizens’ consortiums for countries. change. Definitions of the community policing model These consortiums are interdisciplinary work vary,36 but certain essential elements are com- teams led by the National Police, and involve mon to all: the development of formulas for fostering con- • Preventive activity in very small geographic ditions in which everyone can live together areas. peacefully. An example of this is the “Plan • Establishment of close relations with the Dorado” which draws together public and pri- community, attempting to maintain ongoing vate service providers who work at the El consultation with citizens, in order to provide Dorado international airport.34 monitoring of police action and to ensure that The transformation of the Colombian police the perceptions of people are taken into has had a distinctly positive effect on public account.37 confidence in the police. A more detailed • Efforts by the police to involve the communi- assessment is, however, needed concerning the ty in preventive action. nature of community interaction, as well as the • A concerted initiative to engage the police in effect on crime rates. studying the conditions and circumstances

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that lead to the commission of crimes or to manders chose the neighbourhoods where the violations that disrupt the lives of the people. project was to be implemented. The number of A community police programme requires that companies involved in the project gradually the radius of police action is reduced to a spe- grew, and as of August 1998, 7269 police offi- cific neighbourhood. A group of police officers cers were involved in community-based work. work in the area on an ongoing basis, patrolling The new plan of action led to more preven- on foot to gain familiarity with the neighbours, tive patrolling in selected areas, and the estab- the existing security situation, and the risks that lishment of permanent 24-hour police posts. In the residents face.38 addition, efforts aimed at school security and Police engage in ongoing consultations with drug abuse programmes were undertaken. In neighbourhood residents. These consultations order to provide officers with training in com- fulfil a number of main functions, they: munity policing, courses on the subject were • inform the police of local interests and needs, offered – 16 963 police officers attended during which at times are different from the needs the first semester in 1998.41 that the police perceive Community participation in the process of • establish a means for the police to educate implementing reform in the police force was the public about crime prevention behaviour lacking in some respects. The attendance of cit- • allow citizens to express their complaints izen participants at meetings of the Advisory directly to the police, providing an immediate Commission for the Implementation of and direct public means of assessing police Community Policing declined with time, while, efforts.39 as has been indicated, the proportion of police In the case of São Paulo, the main body respon- officers participating increased. sible for implementing the community policing Governmental decree also established com- programme was the Advisory Commission for munity security councils. These comprised the Implementation of Community Policing. individuals from a particular police district who This commission does not have a fixed number would meet to discuss public security problems of members. In August 1998 it comprised rep- and to propose solutions in collaboration with resentatives from human rights centres, com- the police. Paulo de Mesquita Neto states that munity councils, the Federation of Industry and these councils have functioned more as venues business councils, among others. for individual complaints about, and demands Within the Commission, discussions were of, the police than as a means of solving collec- held on public security problems, and an tive problems. Use of the councils for political attempt was made to set priorities and to identi- purposes, as well as lack of interest and training fy solutions. This led to a defined set of goals on the part of both the police and the civilian and objectives for the police, including an participants, are some of the problems that have emphasis on democratic values and respect for hindered the success of these councils. human rights, which had never been a part of Furthermore, the success of community military police doctrine. The goals set are: policing projects depends on altering the organ- • to implement the community policing model isational and command structure of the police. as an organising strategy of the military There is a need for greater decentralisation, police with greater accessibility between the various • to improve the quality of police instruction hierarchical positions, thereby creating a more and training horizontal relationship between personnel. • to improve the recruitment and promotion There is also a need to instill democratic cultur- system al and professional values in police personnel. • to integrate the police with other public enti- The reality is that there are many serious obsta- ties cles to implementing the community policing • to improve the status and rights of the model as long as a military structure remains in police.40 place.42 Forty-one military police companies were chosen for the project including patrols, women 2.4 Possibilities for change, criticisms and police officers, traffic police, railroad police, preventive measures forestry police and firemen. Company com- This brief overview of three current examples

159 Frühling of reform demonstrates that the impetus for instances, such as in São Paulo, it plays a more change is always an acute crisis – one that at secondary role in other situations, such as times calls into question the very existence of Buenos Aires, where the central emphasis was the police force in place. Once the reform on dismantling the criminal networks within the process begins, two primary sources of resis- provincial police. tance can be observed. The first comes directly Finally, another element in the reform from the police and its employees. Paulo de processes described above, particularly in the Mesquita Neto states that the low degree of case of Buenos Aires, is the incorporation of professionalism of the Brazilian police, particu- new institutions to ensure better internal and larly in the smaller cities, weakened their resis- external monitoring of police activity. When tance to a community policing strategy, since reform also involves the implementation of a professionalism accentuates the separation or community policing programme, grassroots differentiation of the police from society.43 organisations are usually formed to monitor and Paradoxically, in this case, while a low degree evaluate police work. of professionalism opens the door to internal In certain cases, the reform process is likely reform of the police, it later becomes an obsta- to emphasise the restructuring of police admin- cle to implementing the new strategy. The sec- istration and management in response to the ond source of resistance is from society itself increased fear of crime.This measure could be and from conservative political leadership. the first step towards a more democratic Here, the perception that changes in the police approach to policing. In other cases, the prima- have contributed to improved crime control, as ry emphasis will be on implementing a commu- in the case of Colombia, is an all-important nity policing strategy with broad societal partic- component of reform. ipation. Thus, though the initial motivating In some cases, resistance to reform has actu- crises have many common elements, the final ally led to attempts to reverse what has already product of the reform will undoubtedly vary. been achieved. For example, some of the com- There is also considerable risk that insurmount- munity policing programmes in Brazil have able obstacles will be encountered in the ceased to function due to political changes that process. have ushered in governors with hard-core, law- Police reform projects that are of a more and-order stances who have little concern for democratic and less conventional nature will democratic issues. This occurred recently in certainly face significant difficulties. Worthy of Rio de Janeiro, and resulted in an increased note is the view of Sofía Tiscornia. She exam- number of civilians killed by the police.44 ines existing differences between the prevailing Something somewhat similar seems to have social structure and cultural climate in Latin happened in Buenos Aires. America, and those that characterise the Most recent reform programmes emphasise English-speaking societies that are the source new decentralised police management models. of the new public security paradigms discussed These incorporate comprehensive quality crite- in this paper. According to Tiscornia, anti- ria, resulting in efforts to provide incentives for authority actions and the impugning of the greater flexibility in the police force, as well as established order are more prevalent in Latin for promoting personal initiative rather than American history than efforts to achieve the compliance with a rigid set of rules. Influenced rights needed to create a society of equals.45 by experience at international level, police This view sees minimal possibilities of gen- forces are emphasising planning, as well as the uine interaction between the police and the peo- establishment of indicators to measure police ple. Furthermore, according to Tiscornia, effectiveness. Efforts in this respect are, how- democratic culture in the US is based on a soci- ever, in the very initial stages. ety of equals, while Latin American societies Part of the reform process described above are hierarchical. The former seeks consensus involves an ongoing dialogue with the commu- through social participation, while in the latter, nity, including the need to involve the commu- participation normally results in a struggle nity in managing security policy. However, against oppression.46 Tiscornia’s conclusion is while such community participation is an inte- therefore that the cultural and social climate gral part of the reform process in some necessary to produce participation and coopera-

160 Frühling tion between the police and the community is receive. There is thus increased pressure on absent in Latin American cultures. police resources.49 A notable imbalance in the representation of different social and political sectors on commu- CONCLUSION nity councils and forums constitutes a major One conclusion that can be drawn from the dis- problem for programmes of this type. Thus, the cussions outlined above, is that transformation community councils that are viewed as having of the police service requires at least a minimum had the greatest success in the São Paulo pro- level of professionalism among police person- gramme, described above, are those in which nel. Without this, grassroots work can ultimate- the Brazilian business community participates ly be counterproductive. Such professionalism actively. However, it is the poorest and most cannot be replaced by mere community rela- marginalised sectors, which are not similarly tions, and it represents the only safeguard involved in the councils, that have the greatest against the police being co-opted by local elites. public security needs.47 At the same time, many of the problems dis- In addition, it is said that there are neighbour- cussed here are common to other public ser- hoods or districts where drug alliances, rather vices, and extend beyond strictly police-related than a sense of community, prevail, since the issues. Rather, they involve the quality of a drug-trafficking gangs preserve the neighbour- democratic system and must be dealt with by hood’s security from the threat of external the state, as well as by the police. It is the state criminals.48 that must guarantee the police the resources Finally, there is a common view that the necessary to provide an equal service to the dif- prevalence of local inequalities, reinforced by a ferent segments of society. It is also the state’s system of political clients and bosses, is responsibility to provide minimum training in enhanced by systems in which the police, rather security to those social sectors that work with than answering to the law, answer to the prefer- the police. Without these elements, a communi- ences of a community that lacks any genuine ty–police relationship that operates on the basis autonomy. of equality will remain no more than a dream. These foregoing observations are based on The crisis facing Latin American police real problems facing reform programmes, par- forces is, indeed, serious. Current reforms and ticularly in South America. However, commu- those described here hold forth the prospect of nity policing in the US also has its problems. A police management models that are more demo- study by the Vera Institute of Justice demon- cratic and more respectful of the rights of indi- strates that mobilising the community is some- viduals. This potential may, indeed, come to times difficult, due, in part, to fear of reprisals fruition. It may also fail if it does not succeed in by criminals living in the area, as well as to his- producing solid results within a given time peri- torically poor relations with the police. These od. Proper monitoring of the process and careful programmes also encounter resistance within documentation of strategies that are followed many police departments, since the methods are can provide a major contribution to future viewed as overly lenient in dealing with crime. experiments. One thing is abundantly clear: Furthermore, community work on the part of what is needed is a dynamic that involves the the police does not bring about a reduction in gradual abandonment of the region’s traditional the number of emergency calls that the police paradigm for police organisation and activity.

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ENDNOTES

1) Bayley, David, 1993. 1994; Bayley, David H. and Clifford D. 2) Bayley, David, 1993:33 -36. Shearing, 1996; European Forum for 3) Rico, José María, 1998: 173-187. Urban Security, 1996. 4) Mingardi, 1996: 283; Zaffaroni,1993. 18) Frühling, Hugo, 1998b. 5) Schmid: 301; Oliveira and Tiscornia, 1998. 19) Stone, Christopher and Heather Ward, 6) Costa, 1998. 1998: 2-5. 7) Frühling, 1998. 20) Stone and Ward, 1998:4. 8) Pinheiro, Paulo Sergio, 1998: 183 -187. 21) Kravetz, Katharine, 1998; Lapkin, Gerald 9) The ACTIVA project of the Pan-American S., 1998. Health Organisation found that those who 22) Palmieri Gustavo: 329 -332. considered police efficiency poor or very 23) De Mesquita Neto, Paulo: 69-71. poor constituted 15.6% of the population in 24) De Mesquita Neto, Paulo: 71 -74. Santiago, 18.1% in San Salvador, 25.1% in 25) Bayley, David H., 1994:85. Cali, 27.6% in Caracas, and 28.7% in Rio 26) Guerrero, Rodrigo, 1996: 7. de Janeiro. An ADIMARK survey in Chile 27) Goldstein, Herman, 1977:274. in 1996 showed high support for the 28) Bratton, William with Peter Knobler, 1998: General Director of Carabineros and the 224. Director of the Investigatory Police in their 29) Bayley, David H., 1994: 94-95. fight against crime, around 70%. 30) Saín, Marcelo, 1998: 70. 10) A recent survey by El Mercurio and 16 31) Of particular interest for acquiring a more other newspapers in Latin America and the thorough familiarity with the Security United States (US) found that 81% of those Advocacy role are the texts headed “El surveyed in the US had high or some confi- Defensor de Seguridad”, published in dence in the police, while the percentage in Milenio (summer 1998): 99-122. Chile was only 38%. In general, the aver- 32) LaFranchi, Howard, 1998. age confidence in the police in the 15 Latin 33) Policía Nacional: no date, 40-41. American countries involved was under 34) National Police no date: 16-17. 28%. See “Espejo de las Américas”, in the 35) De Mesquita Neto, Paulo: 22-23/ Economía y Negocios section of El 36) Moore, 1992. Mercurio, April 16, 1998, pp. 8 and 9. 37) Sherman, Lawrence, 1995: 339. 11) Costa, 1995; Garst, 1997; National 38) Kelling, George L., 1988:3-4 Coalition for Haitian Rights, 1998; Neild, 39) Bayley, 1994: 105-120. Rachel 1995; Serrano, Rosso José, 1997; 40) De Mesquita Neto, Paulo, September 1998: Riedmann, Arnold, 1996. 40-48. 12) Costa, Gino, 1994: 106-108. 41) De Mesquita Neto, Paulo, September 1998: 13) De Mesquita Neto, Paulo: 1998. 66. 14) Bayley, David H., 1985:7-14. 42) De Mesquita Neto, Paulo, September 1998: 15) The concept of majority public funding is 89. used because of the increase in sources and 43) De Mesquita Neto, Paulo: 17 y 18. resources flowing from the private sector 44) Cano, Ignacio, 1998. to police forces. Examples are: contribu- 45) Tiscornia, Sofía, 1998. tions from large companies for the con- 46) Tiscornia, Sofía, 1998. struction of police headquarters, contract- 47) The Washington Office on Latin America, ing of police as private guards by the 1998:14. municipalities within the city of Lima 48) Botelho Junqueira Eliane and Jose Augusto (Carlos Rivera Paz, 1998: 6-7); and pay- de Souza Rodriguez, 1993: 123-130; ment for police guards at events such as Frühling, Hugo, 1998 B:36. concerts and sporting events. 49) Sadd, Susan and Randolph M. Grine, 1994: 16) Bayley, H. David. 1985: 47-50. 121-132. 17) Goldstein, Herman, 1977; Bayley, David,

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editor Waldmann, P. Medellín: Biblioteca RIVERA PAZ, C. 1998. Los Municipios y la Jurídica Diké, 284 -299. Seguridad Ciudadana. La Institución del MINGARDI, G. 1998. Problemas da Policia Serenazgo en Lima. Policía y Sociedad Brasileira. O Caso Paulista. Pena y Estado Democrática Boletín No 2 : 6 - 7. No 3: 143 - 153., 1998. SADD, S. AND GRINE, R. M. 1994. Issues in MOORE, M. H. ,TROJANOWICZ, R. C. AND Community Policing: Problems in the Imple- KELLING, J. L. 1998. Crime and Policing. mentation of Eight Innovative Neighbour- Perspectives on Policing 2. National Institute hood-Oriented Policing Programmes. New of Justice, John F. Kennedy School of York: Vera Institute of Justice. Government, Harvard University. SAÍN, M. 1998. Democracia, Seguridad Pública MOORE, M. H. 1992. Problem-Solving and y Policía. CELS Documentos de Trabajo del Community Policing. Modern Policing, ed. Seminario “Las Reformas Policales en Tonry, M. H. and Morris, M. Vol. 15 de Argentina”. Crime and Justice: A Review of Research. SANDOVAL, L. AND CAMUS, P. 1993. Prevención Chicago: Chicago University Press. de la Delincuencia a Nivel Local. Un Estudio NATIONAL COALITION FOR HAITIAN RIGHTS. Preliminar en la Comuna de Conchalí. 1998. Can Haiti’s Police Reforms be Cuadernos del CED No 24. Sustained? Washington: Washington Office SANJUÁN A. 1997. La Criminalidad en Caracas: on Latin America. Percepciones, Realidades Objetivas y NEILD, R. 1995. Policing Haiti. Preliminary Políticas. Presented at the Conferencia orga- Assessment of the New Civilian Security nizada por el Banco Interamericano de Force. Washington: The Washington Office Desarrollo sobre “Crimen Urbano”, Río de on Latin America. Janeiro. OLIVEIRA, A. AND TISCORNIA, S. 1998. SANTOS ALVINS, T. 1998. Policía y Democracia Estructuras y Prácticas de las Policías en la en Venezuela. Pena y Estado No 3: 199 - Argentina. Las Redes de la Ilegalidad. 218. Control Democrático del Mantenimiento de SERRANO, R. J. 1997. La Transformación la Seguridad Interior. Frühling, H. editor. Cultural en la Policía. Presented at the Foro Santiago: Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo, Internacional de Gestión Pública, unpub- 157-174 . lished. PALMIERI, F. G. 1998. Reflexiones y SHERMAN, L. W. 1995. The Police. Crime. Perspectivas a Partir de la Reforma Policial Wilson, J. Q. and Petersilia, J. editors. 327- en El Salvador. Pena y Estado No 3 : 313 - 348. San Francisco: Center for Self- 340., 1998. Governance. PINHEIRO, P. S. 1998. Policia e Consolidacao SCHMID, R. 1996. La Corrupción en la Policía Democratica: O Caso Brasileiro. In Paulo Preventiva del Distrito Federal de México. Sergio Pinheiro et. al. São Paulo. Sem Medo. Justicia en la Calle. Ensayos sobre la Policía Rio de Janeiro: Garamond, 175 - 190., 1998. en América Latina ed. Waldmann, P. POLICÍA NACIONAL. No date. Transformación Medellín: Biblioteca Jurídica Diké, 301 - Cultural. La Fuerza del Cambio. 320. POOLEY, E. 1996. One Good Apple. Time STANLEY, W. 1996. Protectors or Perpetrators? (January 15): 24-26. The Institutional Crisis of the Salvadoran RICO, J. M. AND SALAS, L. 1998. Inseguridad Civilian Police. Washington, D. C.: A Joint Ciudadana y Policía. Madrid: Editorial Report of the Washington Office on Latin Tecnos. America and Hemisphere Initiatives. RICO, J. M. 1998. La Policía en América STONE, C. AND WARD, H. H. 1998. Democratic Latina: Del Modelo Militarizado al Policing: A Framework for Action, presented Comunitario. Pena y Estado No 3 : 173 -187. at the seminar of the Vera Institute of Justice RIEDMANN, A. 1996. La Reforma Policial en and of the Ford Foundation, on Democratic Colombia. Justicia en la Calle. Ensayos Policing, March 23 and 24, 1998. sobre la Policía en América Latina ed. THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA. Waldmann, P. Medellín: Biblioteca Jurídica 1995. Demilitarising Public Order. The Diké, 215 - 239. International Community, Police Reform and

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Human Rights in Central America and Haiti. WALDMANN, P. 1996. Introducción, Justicia en Washington: The Washington Office on la Calle. Ensayos sobre la Policía en Latin America. América Latina, ed. Waldmann, P. Medellín: THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA. Biblioteca Jurídica Diké. 1998. Community Policing. Material to be WALKER, S.1989. Sense and Nonsense About published. Crime. A Policy Guide. California: TISCORNIA, S. 1998. Seguridad y Comunidad. Brooks/Cole. Documentos de Trabajo Seminario ZAFFARONI, E. R. 1993. Muertes Anunciadas. Internacional sobre Seguridad Pública. Bogotá: Editorial Temis. Instituto de Política Criminal y Seguridad Provincia de Buenos Aires, November 17 and 18, 1998.

165 Crime and its Discontent: Recent South African Responses and Policies

Elrena van der Spuy

INTRODUCTION need to invest in job creation (social recon- The following four observations may help if struction and development) as a more structural we are to put the South African government’s approach to the problem of crime, while at the recent shifting crime policies in context: same time expanding and fine-tuning the leg- First, there is no single composite framework islative framework for asset forfeiture. in terms of which South African policies Governmental responses to crime thus follow regarding crime have been constructed over the many logics rather than one – a consequence past eight years. Crime control debates and no doubt of our more recent appreciation that practices draw freely from different sets of crime is truly a multifaceted phenomenon, principles and a large pool of competing ideas. rooted in different sets of causes and amenable For example, in the case of young offenders we to different strategies. are implored to find ways of making peace There is not much that is unique or home between victims and offenders within the para- grown about this eclecticism. The diversity, digm of restorative justice. In the case of sex fragmentation, and even contradiction, which offenders, however, many argue in favour of a characterise South African debates and strate- much more punitive and segregative approach gies, are echoed in other countries. If esteemed to “justice” for those who prey off the flesh of international commentators are to be believed, women. In other quarters too we speak with this eclectic diversity is a common feature of forked tongues: calls for zero-tolerance and crime control discourse and practice at the state-driven saturation policing coexist with global level (Garland 2000). calls for greater tolerance to others and self- The second point is that governmental poli- help policing. We remain divided if not con- cies are currently devised in a very fluid con- fused on matters such as the proper role of the text. The business of crime control takes place state vis-à-vis the central business of crime in a truly mixed economy in which three cen- control. We profess the necessity and desirabil- tral actors participate: the state, the market and ity of partnerships only to reassert the sover- community (civil society). There is at present eignty of the state to deliver safety and securi- little clarity as to the contractual rules guiding ty. In addition we subscribe to very different such interrelationships. In part this is so theories on crime causation. On the one hand, because we have come to indulge in radical we talk of offenders as pitiful victims of mater- questioning of the role of the state at a both a ial deprivation (caused by colonial conquest factual basis and normative level: How effec- and white minority rule), but on the other hand tive is the state in the business of safety and insist that criminals are rational opportunists security? How central should the state be? How skillful at exploiting the opportunities for ille- successful can it realistically be expected to gal enterprise within a weak transitional state. be? Different causative models lead to competing The third point to emphasise is that within crime prevention policies too: we talk of the the current era, crime policies are increasingly

167 Van der Spuy being shaped by the rough and tumble of a category) occur. A critical question in the cur- highly politicised public debate and not by rent debate is whether despite very different sound criminal justice or criminological exper- social settings, there are common causes tise. Crime and its control have become the fuelling patterns of violent criminality rates in bread and butter issues of competitive party transitional societies across the continents politics. This reality has meant that government (Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa). responses are increasingly driven by popular demands. Although there are currently moves 2. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO CRIME afoot in South Africa to expand the base of 2.1 Two-stage revolution: from nation criminological research, such developments building to state building have to contend with increasingly vociferous It seems possible to identify two rather distinct, demands for “law and order” strategies. but overlapping, phases in the development of The fourth point is that in transitional con- recent South African crime policies. Phase one texts, a central institutional actor involved in stretches from 1994 to 1998. The spirit of this crime control and prevention, the police, is the period is exemplified in a key crime policy doc- object of considerable restructuring. Judging by ument – the National Crime Prevention South African experiences, transitional politics Strategy (NCPS) of 1996. The second phase, and their demands for policies such as affirma- which roughly coincides with the run-up to the tive action severely affect the soul and psyche second democratic elections, has had a more of the police institution. Post-authoritarian introspective and state-centred approach to police agencies – and the South African Police crime. Perhaps it is best described as the phase Service (SAPS) may be the leading example – of state building exemplified by the creation of suffer from a sense of political displacement, a specialist policing and prosecutorial unit, the social bewilderment and rank-and-file demoral- Directorate of Special Operations in 1999 under isation. The social effects of this turmoil – in a the auspices of the National Directorate of context where crime is increasing – are all too Public Prosecutions – a unit commonly known often played down in analyses of the challenges as the Scorpions. facing policing in a society such as our own. Let me briefly try to discuss key features of But it is a situation that is bound to affect, each of these two phases, and outline some of indeed often to dislocate, the intended form and the changes in the socio-political context content of governmental responses to crime. against which the shift from an inclusive to a With such introductory comments in mind, more specialist approach to crime control has what can be described as the central features of taken place. The conclusion will attempt to governmental responses to crime which have identify some challenges facing governmental come to characterise post-apartheid gover- strategies in the near future. nance? What constitute the main challenges facing our society on this front? 2.1.1 Phase one: the imperatives of nation building: the NCPS, 1996 1. TRANSITIONAL POLITICS AND INCREASES IN Much has been spoken about the form and con- CRIME tent, the rise and decline of the NCPS. There is Discussions on crime trends in transitional soci- no need to deliberate on points made in more eties are complicated by the fact that in such substantive excursions elsewhere (Simpson & societies the margin of error built into official Rauch, 1999). It is fair to say that the NCPS crime statistics is much greater than in stable was the first official document of the new democratic societies. A degree of caution over democracy that attempted to set radically new and above the usual criminological scepticism parameters for crime policy by creating a com- regarding any official crime statistics is neces- prehensive macro-strategy. Notable features sary. Having said that, however, official crime were: statistics do have their uses. Comparative • its insistence that crime was a truly social analysis suggests that in transitional contexts issue rooted in the structural features of post- the “equilibrium” rate of crime breaks down apartheid society and that sharp increases in the rates of violent • that crime policy had to be embedded in a criminality (to name but one “serious crime” macro-developmental framework

168 Van der Spuy

• shifting the focus toward crime prevention NCPS was renamed the National Crime and away from mere reactive crime control Prevention Centre with interventions planned in • a demand for the inclusion of victims as a support of the programmes. This review was constituency of importance informed by the ideas encapsulated within the • its proposal for an inter-departmental 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security. The approach to crime drawing on the expertise latter argued for a closer coordination of law of departments other than those of the crimi- enforcement and crime prevention, an expan- nal justice sector, such as health, education sion of partnerships and moved toward a closer and social welfare in particular definition of the role of different tiers of gov- • the active pursuit of alliances (or “partner- ernment in respect of crime prevention. A ships”) between the state and non-state agen- prominent concern of the review was patterns cies, intended to give further impetus to com- of violent criminality and the need for concert- munity involvement in crime prevention ed action on this front. • the identification of seven national priority With hindsight it can be said that as a discur- crimes: those involving firearms, organised sive framework and operational strategy, the crime, white-collar crime, gender violence, NCPS has had some lasting influences. Five in violence associated with inter-group conflict, particular come to mind: vehicle theft and hijacking, and corruption within the criminal justice system. 1. Coupling crime control and crime prevention The NCPS became synonymous with the four- The NCPS has injected a degree of modernity pillar approach to crime prevention which into our debates on policing and crime contain- relied on a) a radical overhaul of systems with- ment. It is now generally acknowledged that in the CJ machinery, b) environmental design, crime control strategies need to be synchro- c) public education, and d) attending to the nised with crime prevention initiatives. In pub- gaps within which transnational crime would lic discourse there is routine references to the breed. need for balancing crime control and crime pre- Radical policy, however, provides few guar- vention efforts and for developing both short- antees for good practice. Sweeping as the term and long-term strategies. For example, the strategic framework of the NCPS may have need for a “conceptual distinction” between law been, two years after the unveiling of the enforcement and crime prevention (particularly NCPS, critics were quick to lament that social crime prevention) is embraced very although the strategy was strong on policy, it explicitly within a key policing strategy – the was dismally weak on implementation (Simp- Policing Priorities and Objectives for son & Rauch 1999). It soon became clear that 1999/2000. The role of the SAPS is much more the faltering implementation of the NCPS was closely identified with law enforcement as not an isolated problem besetting the criminal opposed to social crime prevention. For purpos- justice system but rather a common ailment of es of effective law enforcement, the SAPS is policy implementation besetting the public ser- tasked to increase the effectiveness and effi- vice as a whole. The findings of the ciency of criminal investigations, invest in visi- Presidential Review Commission of 1998 sug- ble policing and improve services to victims. In gested that across the entire public service, bold contrast to the earlier period of police reform, policy visions often faced faltering implemen- by 1999 a much sharper delineation of the role tation for a number of reasons: of the SAPS has developed with effective • limited managerial capacity policing in itself considered as one crucial vari- • bureaucratic intransigence able in the broader crime prevention equation. • weak information management systems In the process, the crime prevention function of • extreme difficulties of intersectoral coordina- the SAPS has been hived off elsewhere. In this tion and establishing vertical authority regard the creation of new structures such as • bad budgeting. the NCPSC which is to exist parallel to the SAPS is an important development. The 2.1.1.I CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE NCPS NCPSC is charged with two functions in partic- A review of the NCPS was undertaken in late ular: social crime prevention and achieving an 1999 (NCPS Vol 1 No 1 June 2000). The integrated justice system. The list of priorities

169 Van der Spuy for policing remain long and arduous: firearms, ulus in the expansion of criminal justice infor- criminal organisations, crime against women mation and research. The development of crime and children, corruption within the SAPS, forecasting methodologies, automated geo-cod- active visible policing, investigative services, ing of crime scenes, multivariate analysis of victim empowerment, budget and resource crime patterns, and the development of geo- management and professional conduct. graphical information systems (GIS) undertaken by the Centre for Scientific and Industrial 2. Interdepartmental cooperation and justice Research (CSIR) through a series of pilot pro- clusters jects are also worth mentioning. The CSIR is The NCPS takes credit for advocating the prin- currently involved in the development of ana- ciple of interdepartmental cooperation in the lytical and statistical capacity for mapping terrain of safety and security. While the princi- crime in certain pilot areas. In its pilot phase, it ple has become widely accepted, its institution- has succeeded in mapping hijacking incidents alising remains incomplete in part because the over a one-year period in two-hour slots, in difficulties of forging such a cooperation both days of the week, pin-mapping of hijack inci- within the criminal justice sector and beyond dents, and undertaking hot-spot analysis of were underestimated. At the same time it is fair hijacking incidents. to say that considerable effort has gone into the creation of structures and processes through 5. Fighting crime: state, market and active which interdepartmental cooperation on a wide citizens front can be instilled. In the Western Cape, for The doctrine of active partnerships between example, the MADAM structure very much state, market and civil society was first personifies the spirit of interdepartmental coop- entrenched in the NCPS, further elaborated eration around issues of safety and security, within the White Paper on Safety and Security with observers often suggesting that its poten- and is now routinely espoused in political cir- tial still needs to be realised. cles. Strategic analysis and police plans make regular reference to the desirability of such 3. Crime and its complexity partnerships. Big business remains a critical The NCPS has been instrumental in spawning a partner in the state-market alliance. However, much more sophisticated debate on the com- as for active community involvement, there is plexity of the crime problem, the range of much variance across regions. Many analysts causative factors feeding into different crimes argue that the fervour for close community- and the need for crime prevention strategies tai- police links has evaporated. It is probably fair lor-made to the specific crime. In addition, one to say that although there has been rhetorical has seen a move towards identifying critical commitment to the notion of partnerships crime priorities and channelling resources (loosely defined and often ill understood) their toward them. Over the past four years the annu- practical institutionalisation has been difficult. al reports on policing priorities pay testimony Perhaps understandably so in a context where to this greater acceptance of setting priorities the constituency of active citizens is diverse rather than attempting to do everything. and recalcitrant.

4. Base-line information and research 2.1.2 Phase two: The imperatives of state Effective policing everywhere depends on reli- building: making war on organised crime able information. Good quality information is While the NCPS dominated crime debates in the backbone of tactical, operational and strate- 1996, from 1998 onwards a shift in governmen- gic plans. On this score, the SAPS has been at a tal gear was evident as the project of police particularly severe disadvantage. While the reform became redefined, from broad-based quest for solid crime information remains legitimacy to police effectiveness, and as a con- bedevilled by many difficulties (for a frank dis- cern with making effective war on organised cussion see the introduction to quarterly CIAC crime became more prominent. Reports), various initiatives have been forth- By 1998 in a fast changing socio-political coming. The installation of technological hard- landscape, grand policy of the ilk of the NCPS ware and software has been one important stim- with its somewhat nebulous philosophical dis-

170 Van der Spuy position no longer seemed so appropriate – nei- toughness soon made headway, as bail condi- ther with politicians keen on dramatic action tions were tightened, mandatory sentences pro- nor with an increasingly sceptical public. mulgated and the legislative framework for pre- Violent crime was commonly perceived as get- venting organised crime developed (Van Zyl ting worse rather than better. Such perceptions Smit 1999). On the streets, the battle cries for were combined with those of a state authority “law and order” and “zero tolerance” gave either unwilling to, or incapable of, acting on inspiration to clampdowns, saturation policing crime. It created a momentum for community- and blitzkrieg strategies in which areas were based self-help initiatives (ad hoc or organised) sealed off, people and property searched and which increasingly overstepped the polite hundreds of people detained – with so-called boundaries of community policing defined in “illegal” immigrants often bearing the brunt of due process terms. While poor communities the crackdown. made do with the ideas and tools they had at On a policing front, Operation Crackdown their disposal, the discerning customers of mid- demonstrated the SAPS’s new crime combating dle class communities turned towards the pri- strategy: a reliance on the geographical target- vate security sector for what the public sector ing of high crime areas, and intelligence driven could not deliver. In both instances the state policing efforts particularly focused on organ- was no longer considered a capable guardian of ised crime syndicates – all of which are sup- safety and security – a major source of vehe- posed to be backed up with medium-term ment criticism of the post-apartheid state and at socio-economic development. Within the strat- the same time a lucrative source of growth for egy, 140 hot spot areas have been identified the private security sector. that need to be “stabilised” and public confi- From 1998 onwards there has been a change dence in the criminal justice system improved. in gear and direction in state thinking. A con- A critical review of the first experiments certed attempt was made to reassert the pres- (March 2000) of Operation Crackdown on the ence of the state and to clarify its role regarding streets noted that it lasted a week, involved the safety and security. The need for police effec- deployment of more than 1000 police and sol- tiveness soon outstripped earlier talk of the diers, the setting up of 114 roadblocks, the need for creating broad-based political legiti- searching of 22 568 vehicles and 293 buildings macy. In commandeering the foot soldiers, the entered. Close to a quarter million people were political masters promised tough talk and searched (Pelser 2000). Questions have already tougher action. The by now familiar soundbite been asked about the knock-on effects of large- of a tough talking Minister in June 1999 is scale cordon and search operations executed at worth mentioning: the front of the criminal justice system. In addi- “The criminals have obviously declared war tion, questions about the sustainability – in both against the South African public. What is a financial and human sense – of such opera- required now is a ruthless implementation tions have been raised. A more recent estimate of the NCPS as a matter of urgency. We are has suggested that by September 2000 ready more than even before, not just to Operation Crackdown has already gobbled up send a message to the criminals out there all projected police personnel overtime costs set about our intentions, but more importantly aside for the rest of the financial year. to make them feel that the tyd vir speletjies is nou verby. We are posed to rise with 3. MILITARISATION OF CRIME CONTROL IN THE power and vigour proportional to the enor- MAKING? mity and vastness of the aim to be achieved. From 1998 onwards we have seen a certain mil- We dare not disappoint our people in this itarisation of crime control discourse. It is a dis- regard.”1 course that in the opinion of some stands in Before long the style of the bullish Minister of sharp contrast to the social re-constructionst Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete, came to spirit that pervaded the NCPS in 1996. For oth- personify the spirit of the new era: war on ers, the militarisation of crime control coexists crime and war on organised crime in particular. alongside the much softer talk about social The tough talking was not merely of symbolic crime prevention. Is there necessarily a contra- significance. A legislative and administrative diction between the two? Or should we heed

171 Van der Spuy the commentary of the American scholars, could claim that the challenges facing the Kraska and Keppeler (1997), in whose view a police in the Western Cape were extraordinary symbiotic alliance of sorts exists? In the South – with unique situations requiring unique strate- African context, and particularly in the Western gies. How then would the police machine Cape, concerns about public order and state respond to the challenge and what can be said security have accentuated this militarisation of about the implications of such responses for crime control discourse. policing more generally? The imperatives for making war gained momentum as the spectre of organised crime on 4. KEY DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING LEGISLATIVE the one hand, and urban terror on the other, FRAMEWORKS AND POLICING STRUCTURES developed in the Western Cape. Gang battles Since 1994 we have seen the fine-tuning of the on the Cape Flats have for decades been pro- legislative framework and administrative sys- ducing their annual toll of dead and injured tems to deal with public order, state security bodies. Homicide rates in the Western Cape and terrorism. (For a more detailed discussion have traditionally been the highest in the coun- of the arsenal of anti-terrorism legislation see try. But the battle for turf between competing Schonteich 1999.) The National Strategic gangs cranked into higher gear as the opportu- Intelligence Act created NICOC – a body nities for illicit enterprise and profit multiplied intended to ensure the coordination of intelli- with the advent of democratic rule, the opening gence by SANDF, SAPS, NIA, NISS. The up of borders, and the penetration of global Organised Crime Act provided inter alia for the crime networks into local soil. By late 1996, the state confiscation of personal assets merely sus- mobilisation of certain constituencies (such as pected of having been obtained by illicit means. Pagad) against drug lords in particular added a Finally, an Anti-Terrorism Bill is under consid- further complicating factor to the cyclical pat- eration that would free police operatives from terns of death and injury in gang controlled the burdensome constraint of constitutional areas. guarantees regarding habeas corpus. A low intensity conflict has developed in the The creation of specialist units to implement Western Cape over the past four years this new legislative arsenal has followed. This (1996–2000). In the early period it involved fascination with such units is not a recent afflic- drive-by shootings, pipe-bombs and assassination. There has been a long-standing, almost tions between two protagonists: gangs and knee-jerk, reaction to crises in policing by cre- gangs on the one hand, and gangs and so-called ating specialist units. However, by 1999 the “anti-crime groupings” on the other. At first the concept of specialisation was given more dra- war was pretty much contained in certain geo- matic meaning with the formation of an elite graphical locations. But by late 1998 there was policing and prosecutorial unit, the Scorpions. a measure of displacement as conflict spiralled One special chapter in the South African into new areas and involved new targets: tourist manual of making war on organised crime must destinations (the Waterfront), police stations, contain a reference to the Scorpions. The for- recreational spots (gay bars, shopping malls). mation of this elite crime-fighting unit (which As the pattern of conflict shifted into the is “mean and lean”), has specific relevance. greater Cape Town area, a familiar concept was Based on the Troika principle, the Scorpions plucked off the policing shelf and used to (formally the Directorate of Special describe the new policing environment: “urban Operations) combine the functions of intelli- terror”. As allegations of a global conspiracy gence, investigation and prosecution in one sin- for the establishment of an Islamic state gained gle unit. It is meant to boost infrastructural ground, and G-force elements within Pagad capacity to tackle serious crime, to dovetail were thought to have gained the upper hand, investigation and prosecution on the ground the concept of urban terror was put to both and to allow for better coordination within the political and operational uses. In short, the security establishment. The unit is to consist of argument simply became that the policing of two specialised parts: an Investigations Unit urban terror (orchestrated by bands of militants) and a Special Prosecutors Unit. A staggered required special strategies, special laws and approach to staff recruitment is to be followed. specialist units. In provincial quarters the police The remit of the Scorpions includes focusing

172 Van der Spuy on serious cases of crime related to organised gies to be undertaken in a select number of crime, terrorism, serious economic crime as high crime areas. well as corruption in the criminal justice sys- • Prosecution-led and intelligence-driven tem. investigations to be pursued by the But the creation of this new unit has not Directorate of Special Operations regarding received universal acclaim. The concerns priority crimes and the improvement of intel- voiced include: ligence gathering. • a lack of clarity with regards to jurisdictional • A steering committee to improve co-ordina- authority between the Prosecuting Authority tion with a view to greater service delivery. and the SAPS • Expansion of sector partnerships particularly • the lack of overall confidence in the inves- with the private sector. tigative and prosecutorial abilities of the ordi- The plan entails a consolidated two-part strate- nary police and prosecutors that the creation gy involving a geographical approach and an of the Scorpions implies organised crime strategy. The latter involves • the possibility that the Scorpions become a the targeting of organised crime groupings in a source for further internecine rivalry and much more consolidated and integrated fashion fragmentation. Already there are worries that through the regrouping of specialist units. the new unit will set off a competitive scram- Detectives are to be brought under a single ble for lucrative positions unequalled in the command.2 SAPS, contribute to a further depletion of human resources amongst the SAPS rank and CONCLUSION: FUTURE CHALLENGES file, and foster a sense of turf and territoriali- Sensible governmental policies everywhere ty amongst non-Scorpion personnel require clarity about the normative framework • a potential blurring of the boundaries for crime prevention, sound administrative between the investigative and prosecutorial capacity, reliable data about crime, and recep- functions tivity to criminological expertise. In all four • the wide-ranging power of the unit as cur- matters the South African state has a severe rently anticipated may result in a dilution of capacity deficit. To be more specific: constitutional principles. Balancing crime control and crime preven- On balance it would appear that the fortunes of tion: It is vital that we continue to engage criti- the Scorpions are bound to affect, for better or cally with the normative framework within for worse, the larger institutional destiny of which governmental responses in the terrain of post-apartheid policing and with that, govern- crime prevention and crime control are mental responses to crime. designed. Such an engagement is necessary in order to balance the concerns of hard core 5. PROFILING ORGANISED CRIME AND PUBLIC policing (organised crime) and soft core polic- ORDER ing (routine policing). The concern with organised crime and public Administrative capacity: Six years of transi- disorder was one prominent component that the tional governance have made for more political newly appointed National Commissioner Jackie realism regarding the systemic constraints with- Selebi emphasised while announcing a consoli- in which policies have to be devised. We have dated three-year plan to combat crime in 1999. stopped thinking that the only problem is one of The plan presented the Justice Cluster’s attitude among Boerish state officials. Beyond response to President Mbeki’s State of the the surface of bureaucratic intransigence lie Nation Address on 25 June 1999. The three- major deficiencies of both a human and a phys- year crime-combating plan is designed to ical capital nature. Engaging with this capacity address the incidence of crime, public disorder deficit has become crucial. There are encourag- and inefficiencies in the justice system ing signs that a mood of administrative realism (Schonteich 2000). Containing a mixture of old is developing. One crucial example is to be ideas and new initiatives, some of the strategic found in the sentencing framework which is interventions involve the following: currently being drafted under the auspices of • Social crime prevention, through particularly the South African Law Commission. The draft poverty alleviation and urban renewal strate- framework insists that one crucial variable

173 Van der Spuy which needs to inform sentencing practices is vides further proof of less rather than more the actual capacity of the criminal justice sys- transparency in public sector governance. The tem to apprehend, convict and punish wrongdo- moratorium comes in the wake of an acrimo- ers. The message is simple: government needs nious debate between President Mbeki and var- to think through the practical implications of its ious women’s lobby groups as to the accuracy policy frameworks. Of course, administrative of the evidentiary base in terms of which rape realism could easily become an excuse for of women in South Africa can properly be diluting constitutional or due process princi- termed an “epidemic.” The need for sound ples. However, there is surely nothing excep- base-line data on which policies can be based tionable about insisting on the need to balance can only be reiterated. issues of principles with capacity. Judging by Criminological expertise: The need for crimi- the zero-sum terms in which the protagonists nological expertise to inform governmental from the human rights lobby and law and order strategies cannot be underestimated. Sound and lobby frame their positions, both need to move respectable research is not in abundance but towards a balanced position. there is much potential at the local level to gen- Crime statistics: Governmental strategies erate the kind of criminal justice data on which remain bedevilled by the absence of reliable sound policies should depend. However, there crime statistics – that is, despite recent effort to are at present questions to be posed about the overhaul the data-gathering capacity from sta- receptivity of the political masters, their operation level upwards. The debate on crime statis- tional footsoldiers as well as the public to such tics has recently taken a dramatic turn with the criminological research and expertise. Much decision by the Minister of Safety and Security like in the days of old, the onus will be on those to place a moratorium on the release of crime on the outside (tertiary based institutions, non- statistics until such time that issues of reliabili- governmental organisations) to deliberately ty and validity have been resolved. The deci- seek opportunities to get buy-in on the part of sion has met with some outrage and much scep- both government and the broader public, scepti- ticism about the political interests to be served cal of yet more academic and “do-gooding” by this decision. To many, the decision pro- discourse.

ENDNOTES 1) Speech by the Minister of Safety and 2) See discussions of the Security and Security, Mr S Tshwete – Parliamentary Constitution Affairs Select Committee, 24 Briefing, 28 June 1999. May 2000.

174 Van der Spuy

REFERENCES

CALLAND, R. & MASUKU, T. 2000. Tough on PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE held on 1 March Crime and Strong on Human Rights: The 2000, Selebi and the Strategic Focus 2000- Challenge for Us All. Paper presented at the 2003. International Conference on Crime and PELSER, E. 2000. Operation Crackdown: The Human Rights co-hosted by the faculties of new policing strategy Nedbank ISS Crime Law of the Universities of the Western Cape, Index, No. 2, 7-10. South Africa and Ghent, Belgium, 28-29 July PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW COMMISSION, 1998. 2000. Developing a culture of good governance. DEPARTMENT FOR SAFETY AND SECURITY, 1998. Report of the Presidential Review White Paper on Safety and Security: “In Commission on the reform and the transfor- Service of Safety,” 1999-2004. Pretoria. mation of the public service in South Africa. Department of Safety and Security. South Africa. GARLAND, D. 2000. The Culture of High Crime SAPS: POLICING PRIORITIES AND OBJECTIVES Societies: Some Preconditions of Recent FOR 1999/2000. Troika 1, 1-3. “Law and Order” Politics British Journal of SECURITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS Criminology, Vol 40(3), 347-375. SELECT COMMITTEE, 24 March 2000. Safety JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS and Security & Justice: Replies to Provincial PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE, 2 September 2000. Concerns, 1-10. Directorate of Special Operational Bill: SIMPSON, G. & RAUCH, J. 1999. Reflections on Hearings, 1-29. the National Crime Prevention Strategy in KRASKA, P. & KAPPELER, V. 1997. Militarising Maharaj, G. (ed) Between Unity and Diver- American Police: The Rise and sity. Cape Town: David Philip Publishers. Normalisation of Paramilitary Units Social NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGY BI- Problems, 44 (1) 1-17. ANNUAL NEWSLETTER, 2000 (June). Update SCHÖNTEICH, M. 2000. The Directorate of on the National Crime Prevention Strategy. Special Operations: Deadly Poison for VAN ZYL SMIT, D. 1999. Tough justice: South Criminals? Crime & Conflict, No. 21, 19-23. African style? Unpublished paper. Institute of MINUTES OF THE SAFETY & SECURITY Criminology, University of Cape Town.

175 Government Responses and Policies: Poland as an Example

Emil Plywaczewski

INTRODUCTION tion in the larger cities escalating to dramatic The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of proportions. Even now – from preliminary pro- communism in Eastern Europe has brought ceedings to the final non-appellable sentence – with it the criminogenic features of the market a case takes on average over one year; in large economy, despite the obvious and numerous urban areas, it can take several years. This con- advantages of a free market-based system of tradicts the commendable idea of the “visibili- economic organisation. At the same time, the ty” of justice. aggravation of many criminogenic factors The increasingly extended period of proceed- formed in previous times is emphasised. When ings is also a serious impediment to the possi- discussing those factors of crime, processes bility of proving an offender’s guilt, since even taking place at an international level are also those witnesses with above-average recall of considered, as an increase in crime can be events cannot rely on their memory after a mat- observed in all post-communist countries. The ter of years. It therefore comes as no surprise fact that those countries are becoming increas- that delaying proceedings for as long as possi- ingly open to economic and tourist exchanges ble is among the favourite tactics used by the makes it easier for international crime to come accused and their defence counsels. into existence and to expand. This is accompa- Procedural delays are becoming the Achilles’ nied by the growing importance of problems heel of the Polish justice system and require connected with organised crime in many coun- radical remedial action. The continuing tries with development market economy. increase in the number of judges’ posts (demanded by judges themselves and the 1. INEFFICIENCIES AND DELAYS National Judiciary Council) cannot, however, The considerable increase in both crime and be the answer. Even now, Poland ranks among the number of criminal cases directed to the those European countries with the highest num- courts is not accompanied by a proportional ber of judges. In only a few European countries rise in the funding of the police and the justice (including Germany, Austria and Hungary) is system. The level of state budget allocations the number of judges comparable to Poland or for the combating of crime in its widest sense slightly higher. essentially remains fixed. This naturally prevents the police, prosecution services and 2. CHANGES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS courts from working efficiently. We now move on to discuss the changes and It is well-known that justice needs not only new institutions in the penal code and the penal to be done (though here, too, as far as Poland is proceedings of 6 June 1997, which became concerned there are some question marks), but binding law on 1 September 1998. The new to be seen to be done: meanwhile, the average penal code introduced changes which provide length of time that a criminal case spends in the for an efficient legal instrument in the fight courts is constantly increasing, with the situa- against crime, including that of an organised

177 Plywaczewski nature. There is some, though limited, hope that Regulations on the protection of confidential the new codes will help shorten penal proce- bank data are being gradually developed. Under dure: they provide for mediation, voluntary the Banking Act of 1997, implemented on 1 subjection to penalty and other simplified pro- January 1998, information containing confiden- cedural paths. However, the main tasks to tial banking data can be released to the prosecu- undertake if proceedings are to be speeded up tor before investigative proceedings in the are to increase judges and support staff (includ- event of a justified suspicion of money laundering raising their salaries and qualifications), to ing activity. improve the technical resources of the courts New legislative regulations facilitate the and to make every effort to ensure that the par- activity of investigative authorities responsible ties involved conform to procedural discipline. for prosecuting certain types of crime and to The new measures involve an extraordinary furnish them with new detection instruments. mitigation of punishment with regard to the This in particular applies to controlled purchas- perpetrators of crime who agree to cooperate es, secretly monitored deliveries, and accep- with investigative authorities and release infor- tance or handing out of material benefits. mation concerning persons participating in the The changes in the structure and form of crime and related circumstances. In light of the criminal activity led to changes in the operating new legislation, perpetrators are deprived of principles of investigative authorities, mainly material benefits directly or indirectly derived the police and the prosecutor’s office. Separate from a crime. The property originating from units for fighting organised crime have been crime is subject to obligatory forfeiture to the created. The Organised Crime Bureau was state, unless returned to the victim or an autho- formed in the Ministry of Justice in 1996 as rised party. part of the National Prosecutor’s Office to It is expected that many provisions of the new coordinate the prosecutor’s office’s activities criminal legislation should effectively improve with the operations of national security agen- crime fighting. For instance, the problem of wit- cies and other investigative authorities. The ness fear of revenge by criminals will be above measures were adopted to fight organ- addressed by introducing a new type of witness ised crime even more efficiently. – the “incognito witness” – whose identity will The spreading of crime, including its organ- be secret and who will not testify at trials. The ised forms, prompted the authorities to improve only way for defendants and their counsel to ask the safety of crime victims and to develop the questions of such witnesses will be to use the Victims’ Charter of Rights. The charter lists the court or the prosecutor as intermediaries. rights available to crime victims, including According to some scholars, the situation of clear instructions as to what assistance the vic- crime victims will also improve radically under tims are entitled. The main goal of this measure the new criminal legislation. The new Penal is to ensure that the victims’ rights are executed Code makes the severity of punishment depen- in practice. dent on, among others, the perpetrator’s attitude In my opinion, some time will still have to toward his/her victim, including the issue of pass before one can assess to what extent the whether the offender repaired the damage. New new provisions really work in practice. In the provisions improving the victim’s position will meantime, the current assessment is that for make the Polish code unique in its progressive several years now, the Polish justice system has approach. faced a very difficult situation of personnel The Immunity Witness Act of 1997 is the shortages and rising organisational and finan- first legal act which contains procedural regula- cial problems. Prosecutors and courts find tions solely for the purpose of prosecuting themselves under the burden of impossible organised crime. The above regulations and the caseloads, while backlogged cases keep piling extended principles of extraordinary mitigation up. The number of prisoners behind bars and in of punishment under the new penal code have juvenile detention centres is also rising. The sit- been designed to weaken the solidarity and effi- uation demonstrates that the system is in deep ciency of criminal groups. The Act also facili- crisis and immediate action is required. But the tates the acquisition of key evidence in penal current legal framework, personnel shortages, proceedings. the state’s financial situation and the lack of

178 Plywaczewski modern technical equipment, all compound the There is no other choice, however, but to crisis. remain hopeful that somehow at least the worst We must also keep in mind that in many symptoms of the crisis will be addressed gradu- cases, the justice system needs more than just ally. money. Increasing the number judges is there- There certainly seems to be enough aware- fore neither the only nor the best method for ness and goodwill to initiate the process of get- alleviating the backlogs in Polish courts. ting back to normalcy. The problem is how to secure enough finances, infrastructure and CONCLUSION organisational change to transform this good- The outlook for the future remains gloomy. will into concrete results.

179 City Security and Crime in Peru

Cesar Benavides

INTRODUCTION forced people to take some protection to avoid This paper will address city security and crime future property violations. in Peru, and will be divided into two sections: When we refer to small communities where first, it will discuss definitions, principles and all people knew each other, security measures understandings of city security; second, it will were simple; not as complex as today where discuss crime and how criminality develops in rules govern thousands of inhabitants within a emerging nations such as Peru. community. As the world progressed and More than 2000 years ago, the philosopher became more complex, man’s threats and, Socrates stated: “If you do something wrong, it therefore needs, increased. This brought up is because you don’t know that you are doing security as a principle. The human being was wrong.” In Peru we add: “... you do it because granted the highest value, as established in the you are immersed in the obscurity of igno- first chapter of all constitutions throughout the rance”. We can therefore say that social prob- world. So, in 1960, the principle of world secu- lems are caused by a lack of education or train- rity became predominant, while facing up to ing in which ethics are found. Everything in the threat of a nuclear war. Later, in the 1970s life can change, other than ethics. and 1980s, threats arose from local enemies, such as terrorists and drug traffickers. The idea 1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECURITY of national security brought up a principle that Security has always been one of humanity’s was understood before in terms of national ter- main concerns. This dates back to the times ritorial defence and threats to the external and when man started living in communities, and internal security. sharing with other human beings. More specifically, security concerns arose with the concept 2. CITY SECURITY of property ownership. In the 1990s, the idea of city security started in Social problems appeared due to excessive the emerging countries. The concept originated eagerness for property or for profit – mine, in Spain and was adopted by almost all Latin yours or ours. At this stage, ambitions devel- American countries and the United Nations oped in human beings and agreements were (UN) through its regional body known as Ilpes- therefore hardly reached in a civilised manner Cepal. In 1997, the first Latin American City by the parties. Security Projects Assessment and Preparation The meaning of property started when man course took place in Chile, which was attended arrived at the end of the nomadic stage and by two members of the Peruvian Institute of began practising a more sedentary lifestyle, Criminology, which I represent. We were occupying stables or fixed spaces within a tribe exposed to several definitions on the subject, – a space that had to be respected by other but we believe that the closest definition to our members and tribes. Agreements were not reality is as follows: always followed, giving way to crime, which City security can be understood as the con-

181 Benavides cern about quality of life and human dignity in caused, in which people were injured, valuable terms of freedom, access to the market and documents were lost and large-scale damage to social opportunities shared by all individuals public property was caused. Several suspicious within a social environment, defined by the ter- people were arrested. This happened on the ritory of a country. Security is the support of same day as Peruvian President, Alberto democracy. Fujimori’s, re-election to office. This news Certain basic security risks, such as nuclear spread all over the world and affected Peru’s war, have been minimised due to globalisation Independence Day celebrations. Due to the cur- and the business mergers of large multinational rent government’s discredit, we think that the groups. There are, however, serious threats to opposition party will not believe the results of human security. Some of these include insecu- the investigation. rity regarding: At the beginning of 1999, a group of 33 pro- • the economy fessionals carried out a national survey in order • employment to determine the insecurity level in Peru. It was • food found that 10 out of seven people had been vic- • health tims of crime. In June 1998, the national survey • personal (against felony) carried out on 999 families ended. It was re- • political and legal uncertainty. vealed that Peru had almost 1000 gang organi- We therefore believe that city security has sations. In the district of San Juan de Lurigan- turned into national security, because a nation cho alone, there were more than 100 such with good prospects for city security, reflects a organisations. good economy where society develops based Peru has between 20 000 and 30 000 gang on proper education and training guidelines. members, each gang consisting of 15 to 30 Based on security, capitalists invest not only in members whose ages vary from 10 to 24. These equity terms but also in social terms, because figures might have dropped due to government we have to care more for human capital than repression. for corporate assets. We believe that the reason behind the increase in gangs and crime is the lack of 3. CRIMINALITY organisation among local governments or We will now focus on the negative impact municipalities and the national police force. caused by felonies combined with violence, There is also a lack of leadership which could particularly violent crime. We have only men- solve this conflict situation. tioned two causes of felony: education and eco- Corruption in public administration has nomic poverty. There is a third and remarkable become a public institution. Almost every one – the reason why an individual without national institution charges extra to deal with mental disturbances commits a felony: self- even the most basic tasks or requests. esteem. We know that the causes of crime are International financial organisations, such as many. In order to face and analyse it, a multi- the World Bank and the International Monetary disciplinary team is required. We believe that Fund, gear the so-called poor nations by means nobody in Peru has ever conducted a serious of loans where expenses are commensurate. contextual study of crime. There is a lack of monitoring on the perfor- At the first Latin American conference on mance of works to avoid the appropriation from city security, participants from 10 different the borrower state. With these examples of Latin American countries agreed that violence impunity against felony commission, how can would worsen after 2000, especially kidnap- we ask for morality and honesty from hungry ping, terrorism and drug trafficking crimes, as a people? result of greater socio-economic differences between rich and poor countries. The high CONCLUSION regional crime rate reflects this situation. We can draw the following conclusions from In Peru and other countries, a violent social the above synopsis: environment is evident. Due to a “political ini- • Citizen’s safety is understood as a concern tiative of protest”, six private security guards of for quality of life and human dignity where the Banco de la Nacioon died. A fire was the aspects that most affect it are poverty,

182 Benavides

lack of education and self-esteem. is provided free because of rampant bribery • If we wish to reduce gangs and create a better and corruption. society we need to emphasise morality. The • More developed nations, transnational corpo- country’s structures should change, begin- rations and international organisations, while ning at the upper hierarchical levels as well being related, should condone as much as as changing the school system. Youths must possible Peruvian and Andean countries’ be taught values and there is need for leaders indebtedness, because they will always live to set good examples. with the menace of growing domestic and • Peru’s judiciary system (judges, prosecutors international terrorism. and police) lacks credibility because its com- • During the past 20 years, Peruvian society petency is doubted and because much abuse has been ruled by a political power that is not is committed in the name of justice. responding to the needs of the population. • Peruvian society has experienced a tremen- Above all, those involved in political corrup- dous dehumanisation where hardly a service tion seem to go unpunished.

183 Government Responses in South Africa: Policy and Implementation

Iole Matthews

INTRODUCTION United Nations (UN) in 1998 based on research Over the past ten years South Africa has under- in El Salvador suggests: gone rapid and acute social change which has “One should not underestimate the likely been matched by an apparent upsurge in crime, extent of crime, especially organised crime and in particular violent crime. This period of that can develop during a transition to new transition has also seen the South African police institutions, especially in countries Police Service (SAPS) embark on a transfor- that have experienced prolonged civil con- mation process intended to facilitate change flict and a tradition of impunity ... estimates from a “force” dedicated to the enforcement of should take in to account the demobilisation apartheid to a more people-orientated “ser- of large numbers of former combatants vice”. from both sides, lack of employment and This transformation process has not been pervasiveness of military arms.”2 without problems and has occurred in a context In fact South Africa remains one of the most where public perceptions and relations with the heavily armed countries in the world with just police were severely tarnished by their use as licenced firearms making up an estimated 4.2 enforcers of apartheid policy. million for a population of 42 million. This poor public image, coupled with Coupled with these problems are other fac- increasingly poor service, has resulted in a situ- tors. It has been argued that the relaxation in ation in which it became “increasingly accept- border controls have contributed to the increase able to blame crime and violence on the police, in crime, and that this has had an especially rather than adopting a broader understanding of devastating effect on the South African econo- the whole problem”.1 This has had, and contin- my, undermining many well-intended policies. ues to have, dire societal consequences in the Lax border control has been accompanied by form of private militias, a proliferation of pri- many problems, including illegal border cross- vate security companies who now outnumber ings and immigration, a rise in corruption police by nearly four to one, vigilantism, kan- among border officials, increases in disease garoo courts and the use of violence as a prob- owing to fewer health inspections, tax evasion lem-solving mechanism. due to smuggling, the illegal movement of The number of unemployed and unacknowl- endangered species, and syndicates moving edged ex-combatants who where never assimi- contraband and smuggled goods in both direc- lated into formal structures at the end of the tions. Both SAPS and Home Affairs argued struggle, contributed to the types of crime and that this had an impact on crime in South the use of force as demonstrated by the mili- Africa, and the Minister of Home Affairs sug- tary-style bank heists experienced through gested repeatedly that South Africa was losing 1996 and 1997. billions of rands in revenue that could alleviate The problem of ex-combatants appears to be poverty and build prosperity.3 a common one as recommendations to the The long-term impact of all of these factors

185 Matthews has been a downward spiral. Societal attitude is dination and cooperation. However, they are one of “no faith in the police”, coupled with a almost impossible to implement without a well loss of faith in the justice system. Crime, and functioning state bureaucracy, which not only the fear of crime, has become a serious concern understands the objectives of the policy but is of many South Africans. In 1998 and 1999, committed to achieving them. crime emerged as the major factor fuelling emi- As early as 1996, there were warnings of the gration decisions, with 62% of respondents in a potential problems this ambitious strategy recent survey citing crime as the issue that posed for a new government within a transi- would push them to consider emigrating in the tional environment. Graeme Simpson noted future.4 that: It is within this context that the South African “In demanding the establishment of pro- government had to develop and implement grammes and policies which cut across vari- crime prevention policy and provide a response ous government departments (and which to its citizens. In examining government therefore demand a degree of horizontal response and policy one needs to examine two accountability between these departments), time frames, the period prior to 1998 and the this approach ignores the extent to which a period 1999/2000. During this former period, new political leadership is actually strug- policy was developed and police transformation gling to assert vertical lines of accountabili- was a priority. In the latter period, the govern- ty within individual departments and ment has come under increasing pressure to bureaucracies which were inherited from deliver on the policy and for the SAPS, service the former government.” became an increasing priority. The response of Once a policy exists, an administrative struc- government has changed considerably over that ture which constantly develops and enforces time, no doubt due to both a changing external that policy, both horizontally and vertically, environment and internal changes of personnel. throughout the various departments must be put in place. In the case of many departments, a 1. THE PERIOD 1993 TO 1998 major hindrance was the creation of policy In the post-1994 period, the South African gov- without the internal structures and mechanisms ernment, drawing on its traditional intellectual to support and ensure its implementation – bud- power base within non-governmental organisa- gets did not reflect policy objectives, there was tions (NGOs), trade unions and universities, an absence of training to ensure the develop- produced consistently excellent and visionary ment of new and appropriate skills, information policy, the failure of which can be attributed in was poorly disseminated and vertical account- part to the over-investment of the state in the ability was non-existent. political symbolism of policy rather than its Apart from the necessary administrative practical implementation. While it is appropri- structures needed, the NCPS is exactly the kind ate for social policy to carry a broader symbolic of ambitious policy which also requires a significance than its simple technocratic ends – detailed programme of implementation in order indeed all states use policy for purposes of for it to be successful. Clear action plans, time legitimisation – problems occur when policy is frames, monitoring mechanisms and criteria for driven more by political imperatives rather than evaluation were sometimes lacking and, where practical considerations. In South Africa there they existed, they were seldom adhered to or is a tendency to believe that the mere promul- enforced. This meant there was no way to gation of policy constitutes changes.5 ensure the cooperation and coordination The White Paper on Safety and Security and between government departments that was nec- the National Crime Prevention Strategy essary. The lack of a detailed strategy for (NCPS) are key examples of the kind of vision- implementation also ignored the inevitable ary policies which have proved to be extremely power plays and jockeying for position that difficult to implement. These policies demon- occurs within these departments; issues which strate government’s understanding of crime are particularly prevalent during transformation prevention as a long-term social development processes. issue requiring the participation of multiple role Over much of the four years following the players as well as tight interdepartmental coor- elections, the government has appeared to be

186 Matthews unable to provide, or support, any of the condi- civilian oversight bodies, by frequent accusa- tions necessary for real change to occur. What tions of racial bias, and by difficulties in inte- this may reflects on, is often the sheer size and grating members from the 11 different services. complexity of the task, rather than the will to This was compounded by the lack of a clearly succeed, or lack of it. Nevertheless, the lack of defined, well-communicated strategy and clear decisive leadership and well formed strong decisive leadership. Members could not human resource management policy and mech- commit to a vision they could not see. It is easy anisms within departments had a particularly to criticise with hindsight, yet it is worth noting negative effect and created a space in which the that while “there was no change management focus of many individuals was on self interest, process to let police know what in the old order rather than service delivery . (actions and attitudes) needed to be left behind, Many of the departments expected to con- and which attitudes and actions need to be cele- tribute to crime prevention initiatives were brated and taken forward”,7 today there is still themselves in states of flux and transition, no clear reward for “good” behaviour and which created additional problems. This was equally no real punitive action against “bad”. especially true within the SAPS; one of the key Station management continues to be unclear departments targeted for massive transforma- about the behaviour expected from them, with tion. Organisations throughout the world under- no job descriptions and no clear performance go major transformations in response to the objectives. The new Labour Relations Act external environment and there are known tools which was intended to “advance economic and techniques for handling these processes. development, social justice, labour peace and However, due to political pressure, internal democratisation of the workplace” has also had conflicts and unrealistic expectations, the an unintentionally negative effect. Management process was not handled as effectively as it are poorly informed about the details of the might have been. Act, believing that it prevents them from deal- International research from as early as 19836 ing with insubordinate staff. At station level determined key factors that hinder organisa- and above, misconduct is often ignored and tional change processes, of which the top six corruption tends to be dealt with only through are: fear (both of the unknown and of failure in prosecution rather than through better manage- the new system); lack of trust; loss of status or ment. Managers almost never act, even against security; disruption of cultural traditions; inter- substantial transgressions. This sends out a organisational disagreements or personality clear message that wrongdoing is not punished, conflicts; and poor reward systems. which fosters a culture of impunity. The change process in the SAPS exacerbated These problems must rest squarely on the all of these factors, contributing to the difficulty government’s inability to establish effective in achieving any measurable outputs. The systems of human resource management within SAPS, with its tendency to manage “paper” departments. Within the SAPS, this failure has more effectively than “people”, was unable to been blamed on lack of resources and limited effectively manage the “human” side of the management skills among members, alternated transformation. The resultant loss of morale, with promises that everything is about to decrease in performance and increase in stress change with the introduction of “this” or “that” among members has had dire long-term conse- new programme. While resources are undoubt- quences. The most visible changes such as new edly a problem, many of the initiatives taken to uniforms and new symbols not only encouraged improve police management have also been internal resistance, they also failed to convince poorly thought out and reflect a “knee jerk” anyone on the outside that real change had reaction, rather than a clear strategy defined in occurred. response to an accurately identified need. The entire change process was marked by Similarly, human resource management lacks conflict both internally and externally, as coherence and integration. It has been noted demonstrated by the inability of Commissioner that: George Fivaz and the Minister for Safety and “The continuing lack of a coherent and inte- Security, Sydney Mufumadi, to work together, grated training, deployment, development, by constant tensions between the police and the and succession strategy geared towards

187 Matthews

enhancing local service delivery means three years to succeed in combating crime” and there is no systemic incentive for rewarding statements such as “fighting crime remains the innovative or effective practice at the local single most important hurdle that government – level.”8 through the SAPS – must overcome”. This rein- While attempts have been made to integrate the forces the belief that police are solely responsi- various human resource management compo- ble for the reduction of crime – despite global nents, in real terms training operates in virtual acknowledgement that the police alone cannot isolation from career planning and personnel stop crime, especially in the longer term. services. Human resource management is fur- Four years after the NCPS’s inauguration, the ther hindered by the vertical lines of command government has still been unable to demon- which see every decision centralised at national strate any measurable coordination between level and limited horizontal communication at departments in terms of crime prevention, espe- provincial level. Once again the structure is cially at provincial level. In KwaZulu-Natal, as often the problem rather than the people. well as in many other provinces, the relationship between justice and police at regional and 2. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE POST-1998 area level is non-functional at best, and often During the past few years we have seen a adversarial. marked retreat from many of the principles In the much-hyped Victim Empowerment which underpinned the government’s early pol- Programme, the police, once again, take most icy, with talk of development and human rights of the initiatives and most of the blame. The being replaced with the rhetoric of action. The Welfare Department, which has responsibility government has declared its commitment to for Victim Empowerment, has often been “hitting criminals where it hurts” and warns unable to spend its allocated budgets. Early this that “there will be no place to hide. We will year, research found a direct link between age give you hell”. The focus of crime prevention is and crime with 2283 out of every 100 000 men entirely on police performance, often backed up between the ages of 18 and 20 being convicted by statistics that are openly acknowledged as of committing a crime – a figure almost double being inaccurate and which are now classified. that of older offenders. Crime prevention pro- Meanwhile, there is less talk, if any, of social jects aimed at reducing the risk for youth crime prevention, job creation or education pro- offenders are urgently needed and yet the grammes for the youth. Department of Education – which might be These are concerns that seem to have fallen central to this initiative – is visibly absent, with back into the arena of civil society and NGOs. senior officials stating that crime prevention in At ground level there is still no sense of coor- schools is the responsibility of the police. And dination and there is a limited understanding of so, despite the impressive policy displayed the possible roles to be played by various within the NCPS, the government is still failing departments in terms of crime prevention. The to tackle crime holistically within the frame- government’s response has been to encourage work of social crime prevention. local level crime prevention initiatives such as The current response of national government the Safer City projects in Durban, Cape Town to crime in terms of policing is around two sep- and Pretoria. However, local government’s arate mechanisms – the SAPS’s “geographical mandate to coordinate crime prevention initia- strategy”, whereby large numbers of police are tives is hampered by its lack of control of any directed to high crime areas for anti-crime provincial departments and the centralised operations, and the creation and use of elite bureaucracy of the police. Government seems units such as the Scorpions. to be in the double bind of wanting to keep con- “Operation Crackdown” – an example of the trol while simultaneously avoiding responsibili- strategy of “geographical targeting” – has been ty . celebrated as being responsible for high arrest The reductionist blaming of the police is figures, said to clearly demonstrate the impact compounded by the media, which tends to on crime. This follows the trend of previous focus exclusively on the police when reporting “crime blitzes” such as the “Sword and Shield” on crime. Headlines talk about “police opera- anti-crime campaign in 1996/97, which appar- tions bearing fruit”, “police give themselves ently saw the arrest of more than 300 000 sus-

188 Matthews pects. However, high arrest rates also com- The Scorpions, with their questionable reach pound the chaos in prisons, which currently of power and their establishment outside of the have an average occupation rate of 163% (and system, could also pave the way for an unfortu- higher with some, such as Westville, having an nate swing to the secrecy and lack of account- rate of 211%). Awaiting trial prisoners make up ability of the past. The Justice and 36% of these numbers and unless the backlogs Constitutional Development Portfolio Com- in the Justice Department are dealt with, the mittee have already raised questions about their whole exercise is pointless in the longer term. legitimacy in terms of our constitution. Despite Equally important is whether the high arrest these concerns, the public, with its cries for rates are then translated into high prosecution more aggressive policing and the death penalty, rates. appears to be more than ready for old-style While one applauds the government’s policing. However, we have seen the results of attempts to respond to crime in a very visible repressive policing and might want to think manner, it is arguable whether these operations awhile before following that route again. can have an impact on crime in anything other Finally, there remains a massive disjuncture than the short term. Policing based on short- between what is said at national level and what term, large-scale operations that draw members happens at the local level. Policy and strategy away from their stations and can displace crime are essentially generated in Gauteng and there to other areas, also ignores the needs of ordi- is little cognisance taken of the environment in nary people who want an accessible local which these will finally have to be implement- police station that provides a competent and ed. The documentation that filters down to the effective service, with members who can, and ground often makes little sense in an under- want to, do their jobs. resourced rural station in rural KwaZulu-Natal. One must also question government’s com- The continuing misapprehension that issuing a mitment to station level policing when one sees standing order or instruction at national level is the conditions in which much policing is taking enough to ensure its application, is still a source place. In Inanda, north of Durban, a station of of frustration. 164 members has three satellite stations, and serves a predominately “black” 882 km² peri- CONCLUSION urban area which includes 17 informal settle- The refrain from officialdom is always that ments. A baseline assessment by the IPT9 they are on top of things and that statistics found Inanda to be 58% understaffed according show they are gaining the upper hand in the to SAPS Management Services. Presently, fight against crime. However, real success will there is one police member for every 5182 peo- only be achieved when it is the citizens them- ple. The brutal truth is that many disadvantaged selves who say things have improved. Until that communities have traded repressive policing time the perception will continue, with the for no policing. inevitable negative repercussions that South The second mechanism currently being given Africa is an unsafe country in which to live. priority by national government is the If we seriously intend to fight crime we will Scorpions. While no one would argue that the have to do it on the ground. This will require Scorpions are a valuable addition in respect of the devolution of power and budgets to area serious and organised crime, it is important that and station level. It will require that members they are seen as an addition to, rather than a are held accountable for their actions and that substitute for, sustained and effective policing non-performing members are released from the at station level. With South Africa’s high rate service. It will also mean that national govern- of social fabric crime such as rape, family mur- ment enforces and supports its own policy – der and domestic abuse, it is vital we do not policy that could be considered as some of the move further away from the fundamentals of most impressive and visionary in world. Rather social crime prevention. than changing it, we should now implement it.

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ENDNOTES

1) Robin Lee and Judy Kilpin, Faculty of 6) Carson T. C., Organisational Change and Management, University of Witwatersrand, Strategies for Turbulent Environments Crime and Conflict No 8 Summer 1997. www.dcpress.comlpage21.htm 2) Stanley, W. and Loosle, R. El Salvador: 7) Scharf W., Police Transformation in South The Civilian Component of Peace Africa – What not to do. Presentation at Operations, Institute for National Strategic Queens University, Belfast, NI 1999 Studies 1998. 8) Pelser, E., Can the community police fora 3) Griggs, R., Overview of South African work – revisiting a key policing strategy, Borders, Idasa, 1999. Crime and Conflict No 18, 1999. 4) Bennett J., Crime still rattles SA’s skilled, 9) Griggs R., An evaluation of the Victim Sunday Times Business Section, 12 March Empowerment Programme in six stations of 2000. the SAPS, IPT, June 2000. 5) Jansen J. C., Why Education Policies Fail, Indicator SA 1998 Vol 15 No1.

190 Citizens, Crime and Criminal Justice in Central and Eastern Europe

Ugljesa Zvekic

INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL opportunities appeared. Any return to the pre- CONSIDERATIONS vious regime would both diminish the political The relationship between citizens and the state superiority of the “surviving system” and, per- is one of the most crucial indicators in the haps more importantly, hamper the exploitation assessment of the level of democratisation of a of newly created opportunities and new politi- country. In this context, confidence between cal and economic integration at both regional citizens/victims and the police is of particular and global levels. importance. In this paper, changes in policy Central and Eastern European countries are and attitudes towards crime and policing in heterogeneous, but still share certain common Central and Eastern European countries – the traits which originated long before the commu- so-called countries in transition – are explored nist period of their history. Among these com- on the basis of the International Crime Victim mon traits, the following are of special signifi- Surveys (IVCS). These surveys were per- cance: many share the Slavic origin of their formed in 1992 and 1996/97, in some 20 coun- peoples; some belonged to the three great tries of that region. empires before the end of the First World War The group of countries undergoing transition and the majority of the peoples are Orthodox or represents the largest geo-political grouping Catholic Christians. participating in the ICVS. The third sweep of More recently, the most influential common- the ICVS (1996/97) covered all but two – ality among Central and Eastern European Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina – countries was the fact that they belonged to the Central and Eastern European countries as well communist world and its regional military- as Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan. This was by no political (the Warsaw Pact) and economic trade means coincidental. arrangements. The political and economic shift from a total- Furthermore, out of 20 countries participat- itarian communist system to a system of plural- ing in the third sweep of the ICVS, eight were ist democracy, with market driven economies part of the former Soviet Union, five were fed- and a commitment to individual human rights, eral entities of the former Yugoslavia and two as well as the integration into new regional composed the former Czechoslovakia. All of arrangements, drew much attention from inter- these countries gained independence in the national donors. This attention was triggered early 1990s. Independence for some occurred by ideological and political concern as well as peacefully (though not without tensions) and economic interest. The downfall of commu- some, like the former Yugoslav republics, nism was interpreted to mean that the typical through violent conflict. Western model survived last centuries’ histori- Thus, out of the 20 participants of the ICVS, cal test of two opposing methods of political those eight which emerged following the and economic organisation. Moreover, new downfall of their previous “mother land” share markets were opened up and new market an even stronger core common heritage.

193 Zvekic

What distinguishes this group of countries is 1.1 Feeling of safety the intensity of deliberate change within a rela- Public concern over crime involves many fac- tively short period of time. This quality and tors, however the “feeling of safety” is tradi- intensity of deliberate change paradoxically tionally held to be the most important. applies both to their transition into a communist When comparing levels of concern over system, as well as their transition from the crime in various countries, it has been found communist system. that more than half of people living in countries It is within this context that the relationship experiencing transition feel unsafe. This is the between citizens and the state, as measured highest percentage throughout the world. through reactions to crime and criminal justice, Conversely, the lowest percentage (13%) of gains particular significance. people who feel “very safe” in the streets after dark, live in countries in transition. 1. CRIME AND CRIME REPORTING IN CENTRAL Against this background of crime and insecu- AND EASTERN EUROPE rity, indices of the relationship between citizens Concern with crime, as well as evidence of an of Eastern European countries and the criminal increase in many forms of conventional crime justice systems, in particular the police, are and organised crime, corruption and economic somewhat negative. This can be extrapolated to crime, are common to all Central and Eastern present an indicator of the public’s confidence European countries. in the state. This does not mean that levels of crime and insecurity are consistent throughout the region, 1.2 Reporting crime to the police but certain trends are common, including the With regard to the percentage of crimes that are following: actually reported, far fewer crimes are reported • Burglary contributes more significantly to to the police in Eastern Europe than in industri- crime totals than in industrialised countries. alised regions. • Between 20% and 25% of all crime involves Moreover, no significant change in these sta- violent personal crime in almost three-quar- tistics was recorded over the period 1991–96, ters of these countries, and this trend is on the for which data is available. increase. For example, burglary is reported less often • Theft of and from cars makes up one third of in Eastern and Southern Europe than in the the total crime figures, and this trend is also industrialised world, but more often than in on the increase. developing countries; robbery is reported far • Theft of personal property increased in all less than in the industrialised world, Asia and countries experiencing transition. Africa and assault is the least reported crime • Consumer fraud was consistently high when compared with data from other regions. throughout the region. These figures are consistent, specifically, • Corruption of public officials is far more with countries in transition that are in the prevalent than levels recorded and reported in process of reassessing and reorganising the role the industrialised world, and just slightly of the police within society. It would seem that lower than those of the developing world. critical and negative attitudes towards the

Feeling of safety at night Reporting to the police – one year

194 Zvekic

Satisfaction with the police – 1996 There is still a great deal of dissatisfaction with the police, particularly with regard to the methods used to deal with reported cases and control of residential areas. Corruption of public servants and, in particular, of the police is very high in countries in transition. This is both as perceived as well as experienced by the citizens. Citizens are concerned with outcomes, every day police behaviour and police culture in general. There is a need to change police organisation and culture. In addition, the population’s image of the police needs to be altered from that of guardians of the state or party interests, to ser- police impact on levels of reporting no less than vants of the public and upholders of the rule of the type of crime in question. law. In some countries it was noted that esteem of the police declined somewhat in the immedi- 1.3 Levels of satisfaction with the police ate period following independence. This was The level of satisfaction with the police is partly due to a crisis of expectations with regard another factor that supports the data presented to the new era following the collapse of commu- above. The ICVS found that Latin America and nism as well as an alteration of the value system Central and Eastern Europe had the least num- from one of totalitarianism to one more typical ber of citizens who were satisfied with local of a market economy. It was also noted that, in police work. Moreover, the general level of sat- some countries in transition, police managers isfaction with police control of local crime in and mass media portray the crime situation as these regions has, contrary to expectations, almost exclusively composed of organised either decreased or remained constant during crime, money laundering, etc. and demonstrate the period between 1991 and 1996. In both less concern with every day crime and public sweeps of the ICVS none of the countries in order issues. In a few Central and Eastern transition, with the exception of Slovenia in European countries where the process of eco- 1991, had a majority of citizens satisfied with nomic and political change has not made much the police. On average, less than 25% of all cit- progress, policing is still seen as the repression izens were satisfied, and almost 50% were of political dissidence, rather than effective reported as being dissatisfied. crime prevention for the service of citizens. In conclusion, it has been found through sur- CONCLUSIONS veys like the ICVS, that elementary features of Seeking safety, fewer crimes and reduced fear good policing include high success rates in of crime is a universal goal. However, although solving crimes and apprehending criminals, crime prevention and crime control involves sensitivity to the every day needs of citizens, each and every citizen in Central and Eastern service orientation and high levels of public European countries, it still remains very much confidence. In Central and Eastern European the responsibility of the police. Efficiency and countries all these factors must be seen within the trust and respect of citizens and victims are the broader context of a deliberate socio-eco- key ingredients if the police are to succeed in nomic and political change and the develop- this quest. These components unfortunately still ment of a new sense of service orientation and do not exist in Central and Eastern Europe. public administration. The police within these Despite investment in police reform, the overall regions face the challenge of meeting new insti- results, as evaluated by citizens and victims, are tutional values, as well as the expectations of far from satisfactory. the public.

195 Citizen Perceptions of Crime and Policing in South Africa

Antoinette Louw

INTRODUCTION 2. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS REGARDING SAFETY This paper will briefly address some perspec- The transition has seen a decline in public con- tives on the public perception of crime, safety fidence in the government’s control over crime and policing in South Africa since 1994. The as well as in feelings of safety. points below are based on the results of various The transition seems to have been accompa- surveys: i.e. the Institute for Security Studies nied by declining feelings of safety. Since 1994 (ISS) victim surveys in metros, small towns and – which was marked by the euphoria following deep rural areas; the Human Sciences Research the first democratic elections – feelings of safe- Council (HSRC) national opinion surveys and ty declined until by 1998 and 1999, more peo- the national Victims of Crime survey. What we ple felt unsafe than those who felt safe. are interested in here is the transition. But as far But this picture is a little misleading. When as crime statistics are concerned – whether compared with survey data from 1991, it reported to the police or to surveys – saying emerges that more people felt safe in 1999 than anything about the pre-1994 period with cer- in the pre-1994 election years. The 1994 trend tainty, is difficult. Most of the data below there- is in fact an outlier, and the exception rather fore refers to the post-1994 period. than the rule. This should not, however, obscure important differences underlying these 1. THE CRIME SITUATION overall perceptions – differences that help to Some of the trends in police crime statistics explain the perception in society that a “crime since 1994 set the scene for considering public wave” has accompanied the transition. perceptions about crime and policing: The survey data shows that public concern • Reported crime in South Africa is increasing. has shifted from political violence to criminal Between 1994 and 1999, serious crime violence since 1994. This is linked to the sig- increased by 15% (more than the population, nificant differences in perceptions of safety which increased by 11%). between race groups in South Africa. • Several serious crimes increased at a faster The decline in concern about political vio- rate than the national average during this lence since the early 1990s corresponds with time: most worrying is robbery and house- improved feelings of safety among black South breaking. Africans. For white South Africans, the oppo- • On a year-on-year basis, crime increased at a site has been true – fear of crime has grown faster rate between 1998 and 1999 than at among whites during the transition. any other time since 1994. Currently, white and Indian South Africans • Murder is the only serious crime that has are more likely to feel unsafe than blacks and consistently decreased since 1994. coloureds. This probably relates as much to dif- • Despite this, violent crime as a whole ferent experiences of violence and insecurity (including robbery) seems to be increasing during the transition years, as to actual vulnera- faster than property crime. bility to criminal victimisation.

197 Louw

• The survey also shows that it is the middle Victims of Crime survey show that a key rea- income groups – as opposed to the poor and son for public dissatisfaction with the police well off, who fear crime the most. These are relates to the lack of follow-up after reporting a the people with property worth stealing but crime and to poor investigation of crime – who are less able than the wealthy to buy essentially the work of the detective service. protection. They are thus more vulnerable to Ironically, it is this sector of the police that crime than others. seems to have received the least attention since • ISS victim surveys have shown that black 1994. Most emphasis has been on improving and coloured South Africans are more at risk the legitimacy of the police via the community of violent crime. When asking about feelings policing policy that has had little impact on the of safety in the places where people live as detective service in the SAPS. The value of this opposed to the more general questions about approach should not, however, be underesti- safety used in the HSRC surveys, the data mated. suggests that the fear of crime is higher Second, surveys show that although levels of among black and coloured South Africans; satisfaction with policing are generally low, probably a reflection of the greater risk faced many people are willing to work with the police by these people. and to participate in community safety initia- • This might explain why in the past two years tives. the gap between the proportion of white and More importantly, those who are least satis- black South Africans who feel unsafe is clos- fied with policing – the poorer communities in ing. South Africa – are most likely to indicate a Perceptions of safety are complex to manage in willingness to work with the police to make any society. During times of transition in which their neighbourhoods safer. different sectors of society are not equally at One explanation could be that the standard of risk of crime and receive very uneven treatment policing is so low in these areas that people from law enforcement, perception is even more believe that unless they take action to secure difficult to manage. their own safety, none will be provided by the This means that we, and government in par- state. ticular, need to consider very carefully – if not However, this would not explain the clear guard against – reacting too directly to public willingness to “work with the police”. This is perceptions of safety. undoubtedly a sentiment that would not have Equally risky is using public perception as a been expressed before 1994. policing objective and measurement tool – as is This is significant because, although the mis- the case with the South African Police trust and fear of the police before the transition Service’s (SAPS’s) new high-density opera- has been replaced by a lack of confidence in the tional strategy. police’s ability to fight crime, people are nevertheless now willing to assist the police. 3. PERCEPTIONS OF POLICING People think that crime is increasing and that CONCLUSION the police’s ability to protect them is limited, The transition in South Africa seems to have but this trend is evident in many countries, even fostered high crime rates and fear of crime. But those where crime levels have been decreasing the fact that so many South Africans – and par- for years. Two trends regarding perceptions of ticularly those who receive the lowest standard policing in South Africa are important in the of policing – are prepared to work with the context of the transition. police, must be seen as a positive result of the First, the ISS victim surveys and the national transition.

198 Louw

Percentage of white and black South Africans who feel unsafe, HSRC survey

South Africans who feel unsafe, November 1999, HSRC survey

199 Louw

People who felt safe, October 1991–November 1999, HSRC surveys

South Africans’ changing feelings of safety, 1994–99, HSRC surveys

200 Louw

People who felt very unsafe walking in their neighbourhoods after dark, 1997–98, ISS surveys

People who were satisfied with the police when reporting a crime, Pretoria 1998, ISS survey

201 Louw

People who thought the police were doing a “good job” at controlling crime in their area, Pretoria 1998, ISS survey

How individuals can help make their communities safer, Pretoria 1998

202 Louw

Reporting of crimes to police (%), 1998, National Victims of Crime survey

203 The Role of “Private Security” in Transitional Democracies*

Clifford D. Shearing and Michael Kempa

INTRODUCTION Shearing 1996; Johnston 2000; Shearing and This paper will address the role of “private Stenning 1981). In the first instance, security security” in nations undergoing transition to for sale means that those who cannot afford it democracy. Where governments have cannot have it. It means that paid security agen- addressed the issue of how best to bring about cies pursue the security priorities of their internal security within new democracies, they employers (again, the well-to-do), meaning that have for the most part devoted their energies to security ends up less a democratic right than a supporting reform of public police services commodity monopolised by the powerful. (Johnston 2000; Marenin 1998). While it is Many worry, quite rightly, that security con- undoubtedly important to reform state agencies trolled by the rich is not accountable to govern- – such as the police – that were instrumental in ment and can therefore operate in the “fringes” maintaining previous authoritarian arrange- of acceptable legal conduct. In the second ments, evidence from around the world illus- instance, vigilante activity that appropriates the trates that such efforts are not sufficient for judicial function while meting out brutalising promoting safety and security in transitional punishment violates the most basic of democra- states. Despite concerted efforts to reform the tic human rights. In the first section of this police, new democracies are burdened with paper, we will examine the way in which these high degrees of both violent and property negative outcomes have played themselves out crime. In response to the consequent demands in the particular context of South Africa’s tran- for increased security made by citizens of new sition to democracy. We will illustrate the ways democracies, “private security” is proliferating in which the forms of private security most globally (De Waard 1999; Johnston 2000; active in South Africa in the 1990s have in 1992; Kempa et al. 1999). Thus far, the domi- many ways blocked the transition to democracy nant modes of “private security” that have through revisiting and reinventing the mentali- taken hold in transitional democracies are paid ties, structures and practices of apartheid. private policing agencies and citizen-initiated Despite all this, we will suggest that there is vigilante activity (Bukurura 1993; Hillyard a very large and, counter-intuitively, positive 1993; Johnston 1992; Kempa et al. 1999; Nalla role for “private security” to play in governing 1998; Schönteich 2000). nations like South Africa through the transition An over-reliance on these familiar forms of to healthy democracy and beyond. While this is private security leads to all manner of outcomes an unusual position, it is dependent upon three that offend democratic principles (Bayley and premises.

*The ideas expressed in this paper are informed by ongoing discussions with colleagues and team members who are addressing questions in innovations in governance, situated at the School of Government, University of the Western Cape, South Africa, The Centre for Studies and Investigations in Human Rights, Faculty of Law, Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina, and at the Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, Canada. We invite correspondence and commentary related to the developing ideas presented in this paper.

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• First, state resources for governing security, forming the police force of the apartheid such as the police, should be recognised as regime that focused on order maintenance into simply one node in a broader network of a democratic police service that is working to available resources. be more integrated with the community and • Second, we advocate a much broader concep- respectful of all citizens’ rights (for an tion of “private policing,” taking this concept overview see Cawthra 2000). International to mean all non-state agencies that con- “best practice” has been imported into policing sciously participate in the process of bringing structures and procedures in South Africa, lead- about and guaranteeing security. ing to such welcome initiatives as the commu- • Third, we suggest that through linking up – nity policing programmes that have been pro- or “networking” – all of these non-state moted across the country. policing nodes both amongst themselves and Despite a high degree of dedication to change with state structures, many of the strengths of and much good will on the part of many in the “private” modes of governance can be max- new government and within the police, crime imised while many of the problems we have rates have boomed in South Africa over the mentioned related to the commoditisation of past decade. There are many reasons for this, security can be minimised: “optimising” but we have not been asked to present on that (Johnston 2000; 1999) democratic policing here. The point we wish to impress in this con- outcomes. text is that the proven inability of the police to Accordingly, in the second major section of our single-handedly produce security within the paper, we draw upon international experience nation has created a vacuum in security. Many to outline a plan for realising “networked nodal South Africans feel insecure – both in terms of governance” as a mode of optimal democratic their personal and family lives and in their policing, and indicate the types of security affairs of business. Accordingly, they have agencies that would be supported within such sought other means for obtaining this security. an approach. While today we present the plan This vacuum in the provision of security in terms of reforming the governance of securi- evinced in times of transition presents a key ty in South Africa, we wish to highlight the moment of opportunity for two sets of agen- notion that this model, drawing as it does upon cies: most obviously, the paid private security concrete international experience, can be adapt- sector, and less obviously, for the state itself. ed and transferred to practical use in many We will deal first with how the private security nations of the world – including the established sector has responded to the opportunity that democracies of the West. public demand has opened to them. We then In turn, we will close by spelling out some of move to discuss how the state might usefully the potential implications for democracy asso- respond to the present situation, both in terms ciated with the emergence of these new polic- of redirecting the activity of paid private and ing forms. To preface these remarks, we will vigilante security forms, as well as marshalling here stress that innovative approaches to net- and amplifying the emergent involvement of worked nodal governance value the full partici- civic and other “voluntary” policing agencies in pation of local citizens in bringing about securi- South Africa. ty outcomes. As such, it amounts to a political approach that is not only respectful and tolerant 1.2 Paid private security and vigilantism: of diversity, but actively benefits from it. This apartheid revisited is a crucial element for any approach to democ- While the state has been busily transforming ratic governance within the increasingly inte- the public police, what has happened in the grated global society. realm of private security? Bluntly put, the major forms of private security that have been 1. GOVERNING SECURITY IN TIMES OF most active in policing the transition in South POLITICAL TRANSITION – THE SOUTH AFRICAN Africa have preserved, and in many ways EXPERIENCE extended, apartheid. They have done so through 1.1 Reforming the public police catering to public demands for security that are The new government of South Africa has guided by old ideas for what security “looks devoted much attention and resources to trans- like”, carving up the country’s landscape into a

206 Shearing & Kempa archipelago of secure “fortified fragments” to its ultimate conclusion: the self-contained from which “undesirables” are barred entry or “gated town”. permitted to enter for circumspect sets of rea- There is one such new development that is sons. While this new apartheid bears a striking progressing in stages at Somerset, Western resemblance to the official governmental pro- Cape, called “Heritage Park” (see the develop- gramme that preceded it, it has several qualities er’s website www.heritageprk.com). The devel- that make it distinct and even more worrisome opers explicitly market the homes, office build- in its implications than the hardships that have ings, and plots that comprise this gated com- gone before. plex on the basis of promised security: it is First and foremost, we must point out that advertised, first and foremost, as a secure place this newer mode of “sorting society though to live, to raise a family, and to do business gates” is by no means unique to South Africa. (McGreal 1999). The parallels to a bye-gone In democratic nations around the globe, expan- feudal era are rendered explicit in the promo- sive tracts of space are emerging to which the tional materials of the developer: “the concept public has full access but is at minimum partly of whole town fortification has been with us privately owned (Shearing and Stenning 1981). since medieval times, and it seems appropriate Within these spaces, proprietors are permitted to take a leaf out of our past and install it into a to exercise legal rights of ownership to define safe future” (www.heritageprk. com). the types of behaviour that will be tolerated Accordingly, an electrified fence surrounds (and therefore types of people that will be the entire village, which is “suitably removed” admitted). In effect, this creates a national land- from any major city centre, and is designed to scape that is dotted by millions of overlapping be self-contained. The entire perimeter of the “private orders”: a political arrangement that town is monitored by a staff of 40 private secu- draws many parallels to the feudal order of rity agents (paid through pooled community medieval Europe. Undesirable modes of con- resident fees) and sophisticated computer secu- duct – typically those that interfere with the rity equipment. Getting into this village is not security necessary to achieve the imperative of like the simple business of driving or walking profit making – are not permitted, and engage- into a typical residential community. Rather, ment in those behaviours, or the appearance of one must pass through one of four entry points the potential to engage in those behaviours, staffed by security guards, who will be happy results in being denied admittance to the frag- to admit you – once your residential or visitor ment to begin with, or being ejected from it or employment status is properly checked and after the event. As forms of conduct that inter- registered. Combining these exclusionary “sort- fere with profit making are directly linked with ing processes” with sophisticated monitoring economic capacity, the effect is that poor peo- technology makes the efforts of the former ple are systematically (though not officially) apartheid government to administer very simi- excluded from fortified spaces. In the context lar “sorting processes” (such as the pass laws) of the new South African democracy, wealth appear amateur in comparison. remains tightly linked with racial background, Once in, there is no real need for “respect- so that the flow of persons through gates able” citizens to ever venture outside of their remains largely structured along the original fortified fragment, wherein one may go about imaginary race lines drawn by the old system of the familiar business of leading an undisturbed official apartheid. Euro-style family life under the African sun- Let us now discuss a few of the most extreme shine. National problems such as poverty and examples of the exclusionary security arrange- racial disharmony disappear for residents of ments of this “neo-apartheid” (or, “neo-feudal”) Heritage Park – or very nearly disappear at order to highlight some of its most deep run- least. Immediately adjacent to a remote corner ning and worrisome characteristics. Consider of the village, but outside of its electrified first the instance of the “gated community.” fence, the developer has established a township The popularity of this form of mass private of 142 very modest homes where the residents property has spread widely in North America of the squatter camp that used to stand where (Blakely and Snyder 1997). Here in South the new homes now do, have been relocated. Africa, developers have extended this concept The positioning of this block of homes is out of

207 Shearing & Kempa the sight-line of village residents, whose atten- enter the mall provided that they intend to tion is focused on the more pleasant image of engage in “shopping for entertainment” and the salmon-filled ponds of the grounds. The outwardly appear that they have the wherewith- developer captures the essence of the value pri- al to do so. orities of his village best, where he describes And anyone may live in Heritage park pro- the relocation of the township to the modest viding they want to live in a detached home of homes thus: “it is a win-win situation. They get either Cape Dutch or English Victorian variety. free homes, and we have dealt with an unsight- Neo-apartheid, much as its official predeces- ly problem” (quoted in McGreal 1999). The sor, works through co-opting non-whites into poor may be “unsightly” to the developers’ eye, participating in its processes. The new system however, their underlying “beauty” as local achieves co-option more completely than the inexpensive labour has not been missed: the old one, however. This is achieved in a number hope has been expressed that some of the resi- of ways, but perhaps the most important of dents of the settlement will find work in the these ways in terms of influencing peoples’ shops and as domestic workers inside the wire sensibilities are the very types of space that (McGreal 1999). The parallels here with the developers and retailers are making conscious bantustans of the old apartheid era are obvious. decisions to put into place in response to the Let us now briefly turn our attention to the inability of the state to effectively govern secu- “shopping mall” – a phenomenon which is also rity within its territories. Malls choke tradition- everywhere present around the globe at the al street commerce and street life, removing the moment. These spaces are heavily “policed” by element of “civility” and thereby perception of paid private agents who apply the property personal safety for people passing through out- rights of their owners and manipulate zoning door space. Gated communities and villages, bye-laws to exclude and eject undesirables while sanitised on the interior, push crime and from the premises. While malls are very com- “undesirables” into the public spaces occupied mon around the globe, in South Africa in par- by less wealthy people. Those among the less ticular they take on a special quality in that they well-to-do who have the ability to escape inse- constitute one of the few “open” urban spaces cure living conditions do so, and of course, the whose security is perceived as very nearly most prevalent option open to them is to move guaranteed. As such, whites who are afraid of themselves within the walls of gated communi- truly public spaces may frequent the mall on ties. In short, “respectable” citizens of all ethnic the basis that it offers much the same type of backgrounds in search of security gravitate to security that the apartheid government used to these tightly controlled enclaves. in fully public spaces (Moore 1999). Once in, all existing “behaviour cues” are Unlike the previous apartheid regime, how- geared towards the Western values and aesthet- ever, persons of colour have the same official ic of mass consumption and responsible citizen- rights as whites to enter such fortified spaces as ship. Originally seeking security, people who malls and gated communities. While such legal enter these spaces are co-opted into participat- rights are a very important development in the ing in the types of activity that take place with- transition to full democracy, we suggest to you in these fortified fragments, so that what starts that the new apartheid evinced in mass private out as a search for security becomes a pro- spaces is premised upon a more nuanced mode gramme of socialisation and indoctrination into of racism that is not overtly and singularly Western values. Security therefore – or more premised upon questions of race. It amounts to properly, the inability of state governments to a new binary racism that connects race with guarantee it and the perception of insecurity cultural tastes that are closely correlated with associated with this vacuum in the public – has economic standing. Anyone of colour is permit- become one of the major homogenising forces ted to enter the new fortified fragments of the in our new global society. Unlike the official new apartheid, providing they are both econom- political programme of apartheid, which happi- ically capable and willing (these two things are ly was overcome through a combination of con- intimately intertwined) to engage in the types certed resistance within South Africa (and in of activity characteristic of North American and the international community) and the sheer European cultures. For instance, anyone may non-sustainability of a state-coordinated effort

208 Shearing & Kempa to keep ethnic groups physically separate, the has recognised many of the problems related to new apartheid is self-sustainable in that it oper- social exclusion and lack of accountability ates through the consensual participation of associated with paid private security (Irish persons of all races, and resonates loudly with 1999). Efforts have been made to regulate the economic and cultural trends (the two are paid private security industry more tightly. increasingly intertwined) around the globe. These initiatives have focused on traditional Associated with the propagation of the legal modes of regulation that seek to prohibit Western values of mass-consumption and heav- particular aspects of industry conduct. Such ily interrelated political notions of the “respon- attempts by the state to tame the industry sible citizen” who takes care of his or her own through legal prohibition have been largely affairs, is the reinterpretation of the meaning of ineffective – plagued by industry opposition “poverty” (Rose 1999; Walters 1994). and lack of compliance at every turn (see for Specifically, the poor come to be regarded as example Ngobeni and Powell 1999). persons who have failed to take responsibility In our view, there are three fatal flaws under- for themselves, and as such are regarded as pinning the new government’s efforts to regu- morally responsible for their fate. Insecurity in late the private security industry to date. First, the spaces inhabited by the morally suspect traditional prohibitive legal frameworks prob- poor – spaces that are found outside of the for- lematise (or “address”) issues – in this case pri- tified fragments and the conduit spaces that vate security – in terms of negative potentiality connect them (such as major motor ways and that must be contained. As such, a reliance on pedestrian spaces situated between adjacent the regulatory power of the law has resulted in enclaves) – is therefore not the concern of the a highlighting and privileging of the problems “righteous” (well-to-do) who have “chosen” associated with private security as opposed to fragment space. its potential positive contribution to the gover- It is within this context that the rise of brutal nance of security during the transition and vigilante activity in South Africa (and else- beyond. where) can be situated (on the rise of vigilante Second, there is a basic structural difficulty activity in South Africa, see: Aitkenhead 2000; in regulating independent private security agen- Cawthra 2000; Ngobeni 2000). Wealthier per- cies through traditional legal approaches sons who are paying directly for private securi- administrated by the traditional centralised state ty are not likely to want to also pay for its pub- justice apparatus. Many private security lic provision through state taxes, the result arrangements that operate independently from being a paucity of resources available to demo- the state police are informal, transitory, or cratic state structures to secure the ungated occur on a piecemeal basis. Such arrangements, public spaces inhabited by the poor. Frustration while doubtless often engaging in democrati- over escalating crime in these areas, and the cally unacceptable conduct, are difficult to inability of state structures to process the load monitor from the position of centralised of charges passing through the system, has accountability bodies and are thereby difficult boiled over in many instances into unacceptable to discipline through the traditional legal violent vigilantism. In this instance, the new approach of holding a particular agency or indi- apartheid is associated with public indifference vidual accountable. regarding crime and injustice in poor areas Third, the paid private security industry removed from their own experience – just as remains more responsive to the demands and the old apartheid was with regard to racially pressures of the market than to the constraints segregated townships and informal settlements. of law: so long as there is public demand for security services of a particular sort, the indus- 2. THE CHALLENGE TO THE STATE: A try will find ways around legal constraints to PROGRAMME FOR DEEP DEMOCRACY meet that market demand. While the continuance of apartheid in its new The way out of this regulatory conundrum is market-based guise is a horrifying prospect, we to address these three issues head on: would hasten to add that the trend we have • The government can begin by examining the identified is far from an irreversible process. To issue of whether and which aspects of private their credit, the new South African government security can be put to positive public ends.

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• The state can develop and put to use more more directly responsive to both the conditions local agencies, structures and capacities for that threaten the security of the area, as well as monitoring and checking the activity of pri- the demands and concerns of persons who vate security bodies. inhabit that area. There is most obviously a • The state can shape the uses made of private great democratic appeal in the capacity for pri- security towards democratic outcomes vate agencies to be responsive to the needs and through engaging the markets to which the demands of local citizens. industry is responsive. To make use of and enhance the obvious Allow us to develop each of these issues in democratic strengths of private policing while sequence. countering its drawbacks, government must The issue of whether private security agen- begin by reformulating its understanding of the cies can be put to positive ends can be role for the state in governing security. The answered quite simply: it will have to be. As institution of “the police” is not in itself a pub- we have stated and as experience has repeated- lic good – rather, the outcome of security is. ly shown, public policing bodies are not capa- The role for the state in governing security ble of fulfilling the old sovereign promise to should therefore not be conceptually equated maintain peace within the territory of the nation (or limited) to funding a state police agency state. The concentration of authority for all (along with an ancillary role in attempting to aspects of policing within a single state body legally check the activity of an autonomous pri- was a project for the modern period of nation- vate sector), rather the state should set as its building that spanned the middle decades of the objective facilitating access to the outcome of 19th century to the middle decades of the 20th security for all of its citizens. (Johnston 2000; Bayley 1994). It was a project To do so, government must work within the unique to that historical period (which indicates very real parameters of the political present. In that it is not at all a “natural” or the “only” way light of the many bodies presently engaged in of going about governing security). What is producing security, governments must begin by more, even at the high-point of the strong wel- establishing clear principles for what policing is fare liberal state, the objective of a self-suffi- intended to accomplish. The state must then cient professional police force was in no nation derive suitable mechanisms for holding diverse accomplished (Johnston 2000; 1992). Private participants accountable to these principles. security agencies have always been active in Finally, the state must find creative ways of producing multiple private orders; in our pre- helping all its citizens have full access to the sent, as is particularly apparent in South Africa, markets for security that dominate the present. private agencies are more active in the process Facilitating market access enables citizens (and of governance than ever before. Accordingly, not just the wealthy) to shape the types of secu- the state must be realistic to accept that private rity services offered to their own needs and agencies are an integral part of contemporary preferences. governance. These issues have begun to be probed within Is this necessarily a bad thing? Setting aside the context of the recent efforts of the indepen- the distributional inequalities and concerns over dently appointed Patten Commission to rein- accountability that relate to market-based jus- vent policing in Northern Ireland, itself a soci- tice, private security offers many strengths over ety deep in the midst of political transition. The public modes of justice. Its fundamental report published by the Commission in 1999 emphasis on the prevention of future harm (ICPNI 1999) outlines a very clear statement compliments the de facto public police role of regarding the objectives and purposes of demo- punishing past transgressions. This difference cratic policing, and proceeds to delineate a in emphasis in practice (if not in theory) relates number of very concrete suggestions for mech- to the differences in the tools available to pri- anisms to translate these objectives for the gov- vate security agencies versus those of the state: ernance of security into political practice. property rights and liability law (which is prevention-oriented) versus the criminal law 2.1 The purpose of democratic policing (which is punishment-oriented). Second, securi- The Commission begins by arguing that polic- ty that is directly employed by local agencies is ing must fundamentally work towards the pro-

210 Shearing & Kempa tection of human rights. Upon this bedrock that is recognised to occur through multiple principle, the Commission founds two further agencies. general objectives that we feel are central to By placing control over the state budget for the any contemporary effort to conduct the gover- governance of security in the hands of a public nance of security in a democratic fashion: agency other than the police, and permitting • First, policing must seek to mobilise local that agency to fund and scrutinise the activity knowledge and capacity in both the direction of multiple security nodes, the Patten and delivery of policing, and; Commission intends that the state extend its • Second, policing practice must be responsive involvement in public security beyond merely to local needs, as well as be transparent and maintaining an institution to enabling locally accountable through democratic practices. generated security projects that meet its criteria As such, democratic policing is that which for democratic practice and outcome. Unac- works towards the development of security as a ceptable practices or outcomes could be dealt public good: it places ownership of policing in with either through legal sanction or through the hands of citizens by rendering state and termination of funding. non-state security services accountable and responsive to all citizens rather than a particular 2.3 District policing partnership boards class of citizens or set of market imperatives. The Commission also proposed the creation of local boards that would be responsible for sup- 2.2 Mechanisms – policing boards and porting the development of networked policing policing budgets at the district level and for ensuring that the Central to the Commission’s approach is the participants of the emergent network were recommendation that the state establish a working together in harmony to achieve effec- “policing” rather than “police” budget, to be tive and legitimate policing. These partnership administered by a “policing” rather than “police boards were permitted to raise taxes at the local board”. A policing board is intended to be level to support the development of equitable empowered as an administrative body responsi- nodal policing arrangements in their areas. ble for putting together effective and democrat- Situated as a programme facilitating and ically satisfying networked arrangements for monitoring body at the district level, these governing security. Its role in this regard con- boards would overcome many of the structural sists of three principal elements: difficulties in holding diverse participants in the • It is to develop such plans through extensive process of governing security that we have consultation with a range of players with an noted above. Inappropriate conduct on the part interest in promoting security – including, but of local participants could be dealt with either not limited to, the public police, paid private through removal or funding or through other security agencies, local grass-roots organisa- municipal mechanisms, such as the denial of tions, and community members. licensing or application of fine. • It is to facilitate in the implementation and maintenance of such programmes by acting 2.4 Emergent networked policing forms as the funding agency controlling the flow of We will now discuss the types of policing ini- public funds into the networked approaches tiatives that the Patten approach to state regula- to security that follow. tion of the governance of security might foster • Its purpose is to act as an overall monitoring in South Africa. One thing which we want to body to hold all agencies participating in the stress, is that the programme outlined above is networked process of policing accountable. not intended to simply give poor people the The Commission recommended giving the ability to purchase the same types of private policing board full legal powers to scrutinise security services that more wealthy people are the actions of all policing bodies after the employing within their fortified fragments. You fact. In so doing they replaced the more will remember, after all, that simply giving established state practice of affording the poor people (which in this country especially is public police “operational independence” associated with race) the ability to buy the with the notion of “operational responsibili- products presently available on the market is ty” as the rationale for addressing policing another way of colonising them in the image of

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Western or European values. Rather, the polic- resources to pay peace committees for each ing budgets outlined in the Patten Commission case in which they successfully adhere to the are intended to be construed as the redirection rules and values of democratic practice. of tax resources to enable and facilitate the Provision is made for the committees to divide development of structures, practices and other these state funds between costs to maintain the resources that are rooted within the ways of life peace process, community-building funds, a in particular communities. Further, the powers loan fund to support local micro-enterprise, and of audit afforded to the policing board are payment for the members of the peace commit- designed to ensure that the practices and out- tees to recognise the value of the work they do. comes of such programmes are not offensive to Such a policing arrangement and funding struc- democratic principles. ture is intended to give participating communi- Most fortunately for the present government ties democratic ownership over the ways in of South Africa, there is a particularly rich fab- which they are policed, and direct say in the ric of non-state structures that exist in poor way in which some tax dollars are expended communities which have survived through the within the community. Furthermore, such old apartheid regime. Many of these could use- policing initiatives are directly aligned to the fully be amplified and effectively regulated three central objectives of the South African though the type of framework outlined by the government, namely: crime prevention; work- Patten Commission. State support and regula- creation; and nation building. tion of such structures would go a long way State regulation that begins with a recogni- toward providing democratic forms of policing tion of the limits of direct public police provi- in South Africa’s poorest townships and com- sion and goes on to address head-on the reali- munities. To cite a leading example, the South ties of the market, has the potential to foster African Law Commission (2000) has recently non-state policing nodes of the above variety. recommended as the basis for future official As such, at the centre of the programme for a policy, a model for people-driven policing and “new regulatory state” (on this mode of gover- community justice along these lines. nance more generally, see Braithwaite 2000) Drawing upon the established experience of a that we have outlined herein, lies the principle local peace-making initiative that has been of “deepened democracy”. developed through a collaboration between the community of Zwelethemba (near Worcester, CONCLUSION north of Cape Town) and the School of In this paper we have sought to identify the role Government, University of the Western Cape, of non-state loci of governance as resources to the model seeks to apply local resources and be used in the provision of governmental ser- capacities towards the twin challenges of vices through times of democratic transition resolving past disputes and preventing their and beyond. We used an empirical discussion reoccurrence in the future. It does so through of the present growth and negative applications constituting local volunteer community mem- of conventional private security in South Africa bers into “peace committees” that convene and to highlight the importance of the government facilitate open discussion in community “gath- directly engaging the private sector. erings”. Within these meetings, strategies are At the heart of our argument was the con- worked out to repair damages and prevent the tention that government must expand its frame- reoccurrence of the disturbance to the peace. work for understanding policing beyond the Within the Law Commission’s framework, institution of the public police in order recog- reports pertaining to the content and outcome nise the role it might play in regulating the net- of gatherings are required to be submitted to works of agencies which are presently active in state-led bodies that perform an external scruti- governing security. ny function. As such, these processes draw With an understanding of some of the upon the strengths of private practice (i.e., pre- dynamics underlying these networks – most venting future harms) while ensuring that the importantly in the South African context, mar- outcome of security is distributed in a democra- ket forces such as public demand that is still tic fashion. linked to apartheid values – the government is The framework allows for the direction of tax better equipped to engage these networks in

212 Shearing & Kempa ways that will influence the nature of the final and respectful of the liberal democratic value of security arrangements that will emerge. Two preserving individual differences. particularly important modes of influence Approaches to democratic governance in the include regulating participant bodies through contemporary context must therefore find ways local accountability structures, and influencing of addressing diversity as an asset, rather than the distribution of security by giving the poor treating it as nuisance variation that makes cen- meaningful market power. tralised planning more difficult. The framework We moved from an abstract discussion of outlined by the Patten Commission achieves these ideas to propose a programme for reinsti- this by reorienting the conception of the “busi- tutionalising the governance of security in ness of government” from centralised planning South Africa that would integrate and network and provision, to a key role of balanced state and non-state resources, including the engagement of multiple processes and capaci- resources of the commercial security sector. ties that reside within civil society. This For this, we drew extensively on the recom- approach to governance is very different from mendations of the Patten Commission. In clos- the increasingly popular conception of non- ing we would like to reflect briefly on what this interventionist, minimal “neo-liberal” govern- all means for some of the more general trends ment. A “regulatory state” of the form outlined that can be recognised within governance. in this paper is firm only in its principled demo- In our increasingly global society, govern- cratic objectives: it leaves it to non-state bodies ments have been wrestling with the problem of to find the means of achieving these objectives, how to address diversity. The standard tools for and then fosters objectives that appear to be state government that have been honed and working particularly well and holds emergent developed to address issues related to relatively practices accountable to the standards of homogeneous national populations that conduct democracy. Within such a scheme for a regula- their affairs largely within the boundaries of the tory state, the strengths of a multiplicity of nation state – for instance the criminal law – diverse local programmes can be amplified, are proving insufficient in regulating a society providing that they work towards a unity of that has become increasingly interconnected democratic outcomes.

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AITKENHEAD, D. 2000. Rough Justice. Daily JOHNSTON, L. 1992. The Rebirth of Private Mail and Guardian (29 May 2000). Policing. London: Routledge. BAYLEY, D. 1994. Police for the Future. New KEMPA, M., R. CARRIER, J. WOOD, AND C. York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. SHEARING. 1999. Reflections on the Evolving BAYLEY, D., AND CLIFFORD S. 1996. The Future Concept of “Private Policing”. European of Policing. Law and Society Review. 30(3): Journal on Criminal Policy and 585-606. Research.7(2): 197-224. BLAKELY, E. J., AND M. G. SNYDER. 1997. MARENIN, O. 1998. United States Police Fortress America: Gated Communities in the Assistance to Emerging Democracies. United States. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Policing and Society 8: 153-167. Institution Press. MCGREAL, C. 1999. Electric Fences Make BRAITHWAITE, J. 2000. The New Regulatory Good Neighbours. The Daily Mail and State and the Transformation of Criminology. Guardian (01 February 1999). British Journal of Criminology. 40: 222-238. MOORE, A. 1999. Shopping Malls and the BUKURURA, S.H. 1993. Vigilantism in Architecture of Abandonment. Daily Mail Tanzania. Pp 131-138 in M. Findlay and U. and Guardian (29 November 1999). Zvekic (eds.) Alternative Policing Styles: NALLA, M. 1998. Opportunities in the Cross Cultural Perspectives. Boston: Kluwer Emerging Market. Security Journal 10: 15- Law and Taxation Publishers. 21. CAWTHRA, G. 2000. Beaten on the Beat. NGOBENI, E. WA KA. 2000. Vigilante Group www.vso.org.uk/pubs/orbit/71/beat.htm Sweeps the Suburbs. Daily Mail and DE WAARD, J. 1999. The Private Security Guardian (25 January 2000). Industry in International Perspective. NGOBENI, E. WA KA., AND I. POWELL. 1999. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Security Industry Crisis Deepens. Daily Mail Research 7(2): 143-174. and Guardian (27 August 1999). HILLYARD, P. 1993. Paramilitary Policing and ROSE, N. 1999. Inventiveness in Politics: An Popular Justice in Northern Ireland. Pp. 139- Essay Review of A. Giddens, “The Third 156 in M. Findlay and U. Zvekic (eds.) Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Alternative Policing Styles: Cross Cultural Cambridge: Polity, 1998.” Economy and Perspectives. Boston: Kluwer Law and Society 28(3): 467-493. Taxation Publishers. SCHÖNTEICH, M. 2000. Fighting Crime With INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR Private Muscle: The Private Sector and NORTHERN IRELAND (ICPNI). 1999. A New Crime Prevention. www.iss.co.za/Pubs Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland. SHEARING, C., AND P. C. STENNING. 1981. Belfast: Independent Commission on Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Policing for Northern Ireland. Implications. Pp.193-245 in M. Tonry and N. www.belfast.org.uk Morris (eds.) Crime and Justice: An Annual IRISH, J. 1999. Policing For Profit: The Future Review of the Research, Volume 3. Chicago: of South Africa’s Private Security Industry. University of Chicago Press. United Nations Development Programme. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION. 2000. White JOHNSTON, L. 2000. Policing Britain: Risk, Paper on Safety and Security in South Africa. Security and Governance. Harlow, England: South African Law Commission. Longman. WALTERS, W. 1994. The Discovery of JOHNSTON, L. 1999. Private Policing in Context. Unemployment. Economy and Society. 23: European Journal on Criminal Policy and 265-291. Research 7(2): 175-196.

214 “The Politics Fits the Crime”: Competing Interpretations of Victim Empowerment in South Africa

Graeme Simpson

INTRODUCTION this paper that conditions which face societies Competing approaches to victim empowerment in transition from autocracy to democracy, lie at the heart of debates over punitive and therefore present unique challenges to our restorative models of justice in the newly notions of secondary victimisation and conse- democratised South Africa. These debates play quently to the strategies for victim empower- themselves out not only inside the criminal ment. In particular, considering the magnitude courts of the country, but more overtly within of the agenda of attempting to transform and South Africa’s national reconciliation enter- rebuild popular confidence in inherited crimi- prise, particularly through vehicles such as the nal justice institutions themselves, it is clear Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). that strategies to deal with secondary victimisa- Within this broad national endeavour, two key tion that operate in an isolated manner or challenges face South African society: to exclusively within the sphere of the criminal rebuild the credibility of politically polluted justice process alone, cannot begin to effective- criminal justice institutions which were inherit- ly redress the more expansive experiences of ed from the past (undemocratic) regime, along secondary victimisation which are premised on with a legacy of public mistrust, thereby seek- perceptions of state institutions as remaining ing to restore the integrity of the rule of law, illegitimate or unaccountable. while at the same time facilitating a supposedly In South Africa, attempts to ameliorate the victim-centred process of reconciliation based experiences of secondary victimisation are con- on truth recovery, public victim testimony and ventionally framed by reference to the extent to a highly controversial conditional amnesty for which the criminal justice process fails or perpetrators of past human rights abuses. alienates victims who come before it. This is Needless to say, these two distinct challenges usually understood by reference to the experi- frequently give rise to potentially competing ences of people inside the criminal justice priorities within South Africa’s system of tran- process, rather than by reference to cyclical sitional justice. patterns of social conflict and generational pat- These dilemmas of transitional justice – and terns of victimisation, shifting patterns of the experiences of victims within them – are social conflict and the more expansive popular exacerbated by some of the hidden liabilities perceptions of the role of the institutions of embedded in the very nature of South Africa’s criminal justice in this evolution. In contrast to negotiated political settlement. They are further this approach, it is argued here that in South compounded by the fact that, far from this Africa, secondary victimisation must be under- political settlement resulting in an end to vio- stood as a societal problem rather than a merely lence, the transition has instead witnessed sus- individual experience which is the product of tained levels and cyclical patterns of violence, an institutional process. These experiences of which are increasingly labelled as criminal secondary victimisation are, in fact, embedded rather than political in character. It is argued in not just in the criminal justice process, but in

215 Simpson the very cyclical and generational patterns of criminalisation of politics and the politicisation repetitive violence – along with the fluctuating of crime in South Africa, are flip sides of the fortunes of government crime prevention same coin. approaches and an embryonic human rights In view of this, it is arguable that far from paradigm (which themselves fall victim to the representing a dramatic shift in the nature of populist politics associated with post liberation violence in South Africa, the post-election peri- hysteria about burgeoning crime rates). od simply witnessed a selective “re-labelling” In short, the politics of transition fits the of violence which was in fact testimony more crime. As apartheid’s assassins walk free on the to continuity than to any dramatic process of basis of a conditional amnesty agreed to within change. It may be suggested that considering the negotiated settlement, there is an almost the rather fine line that separated political from absurd simultaneous expectation that in a new criminal violence under apartheid – and consid- democratic dispensation, the bicycle or chicken ering the popular rhetoric associated with the thief should miraculously acquire a new respect “miraculous” negotiated settlement which for the rule of law. brought apartheid to an end – South Africans were rather predisposed to interpreting most of 1. HIDDEN LIABILITIES OF A NEGOTIATED the violence which occurred before the election TRANSITION as political, while selectively reframing such Far from resulting in an immediate or automat- violence in the post-election phase as criminal ic decrease in the levels of violence, the shift in nature. from the politics of confrontation to negotiation Returning to the key issue of governance, the politics in South Africa was actually accompa- above analysis serves to frame one of the most nied by an increase rather than a decrease in vital disguised liabilities embedded in the com- the levels of political and social violence. A promises necessary to achieving South Africa’s temporary increase in the levels of political vio- negotiated peace. This was the fact that a new lence was, in some respects, inevitable and Government of National Unity (GNU) inherited understandable. More striking than this sus- its criminal justice institutions, practices and a tained political violence during the negotiation substantial part of its personnel – lock, stock phase, is the suggestion that the relative and barrel – from its anti-democratic predeces- decrease in political violence after the 1994 sor. Quite apart from the amnesty agreements election (which heralded the end of the negotia- for perpetrators of human rights abuses which tion phase), was ostensibly associated with an lay at the heart of the negotiation process (and equally dramatic increase in the levels of crimi- which will be dealt with in more detail below), nal violence – and this reflects importantly on this also went hand-in-glove with another fun- the questions of effective governance and the damental political compromise manifested in a capacity of the post-apartheid government to “sunset clause” negotiated between the African transform its criminal justice institutions. National Congress (ANC) and the former However, it is arguable that this analysis of a National Party (NP) government, as a backdrop simple shift from political to criminal violence to the Interim Constitution. This sunset clause ought not to be taken too literally. A key legacy provided that civil servants from the apartheid of apartheid’s political exclusion of the majori- regime could not be evicted by the new democ- ty of black South Africans, was the extent to ratic government, for at least the following five which this effectively criminalised ordinary years. In combination with the amnesty agree- political and social activity, thus blurring the ment, this meant that the new democratic gov- dividing line between political and criminal ernment effectively inherited – largely intact violence. This, combined with the illegitimacy and with their existing personnel – institutions of apartheid’s criminal justice institutions, ren- of state from the former regime, and with them dered it noble to be on the wrong side of the a legacy of popular mistrust and a crisis of law in pre-democratic South Africa. The flip legitimacy in respect of these critical criminal side of this coin was that the political context justice institutions. also provided a shield of legitimacy for many This presented a fundamental challenge dur- activities that would in any other circumstances ing the first years of the democratic GNU. The simply be framed as criminal involvement. The process of negotiations had effectively disman-

216 Simpson tled old illegitimate sources of repressive Police, therefore entailed: the need to de-politi- authority, but had been considerably less effi- cise the police and develop mechanisms for cient in rebuilding new, legitimate and consen- increased community accountability; reform of sus-based alternatives. This created a vacuum the entire police training system; restructuring in which there was substantial potential and of the force to incorporate the nine former space for criminal activity to flourish. The chal- “bantustan” forces; to render policing practice lenge therefore was how to transform these subject to the constraints of a constitutional dis- inherited governmental institutions, which had pensation and bill of rights; and to fundamen- been the primary violators of human rights tally re-focus policing priorities from political under the old government, yet were now tasked to criminal activities. The dominant concern in as the guardians of a new constitution and bill the early period of the new government (and of rights and as the primary guarantors of safety even during the negotiation phase which pre- and security – in the context of sustained levels ceded the 1994 election), was therefore essen- of violent crime. This presented a further chal- tially to win legitimacy and rebuild popular lenge to organs of civil society over whether or respect for these criminal justice institutions by not to even engage within governmental institu- making a clean and definite break with the past, tions such as the military or the police – pre- on the one hand, and to secure the loyalty of cisely in order to transform them – considering inherited police membership to the new politi- the apartheid history in which these very insti- cal leadership, on the other. tutions of state were considered to be “the One further consequence of the political enemy”. dynamics of negotiated settlement is that it fre- The importance of these compromises, which quently serves to define reconciliation by refer- were rooted in the very nature of the politically ence to the party-political process associated negotiated peace process – as well as the prob- with formal democratisation. Implicit in this is lems of legitimacy which the new government the danger that such formal political processes consequently inherited – cannot be underesti- fail to engage directly with the needs, experi- mated in their enduring impact on both the pace ences and historical traumas of victims of such of transformation in South Africa under conflicts, ignoring the dramatic potential for the apartheid and the enduring impact of burgeon- resultant unresolved trauma to play itself out – ing levels of violent crime. Nor can the magni- in sometimes transmuted forms – over genera- tude of the challenge to overcome this legacy tions. Instead, victim empowerment interven- be minimised. It has entailed far more than just tions tend to be undervalued and treated as achieving institutional reform and a culture merely remedial measures (frequently merely change within these government agencies complicating the prospect of negotiated settle- (itself a massive undertaking), but has also ment), rather than proactive interventions in involved the establishment of rules, sanctions cyclical patterns of conflict and violence. In and practices that are consistent with a new bill contrast, it is argued here that the South African of rights and constitutional practice. The criti- example demonstrates very powerfully the cal example of welfare institutions illustrates potential of victim empowerment interventions that this transformation agenda also entailed in preventing the cyclical and transmuted mani- reorganising government departmental budgets festations of new forms of violence. So too that were previously designed to service the does the Bosnian case, which powerfully illus- exclusive needs of a small minority of white trates the long-term impact of residual memory South Africans, so that they became functional of victimisation as a key factor in the initiation to servicing over 40 million South Africans of and escalation of new violent conflicts – over all races. All this was also to be achieved with- periods of hundreds of years. Needless to say, in the boundaries of fiscal constraint and creep- this perspective presents huge potential chal- ing economic recession – which generally lenges in respect of such conflicts as manifest- determined that these new service objectives ed in such cases as the Rwandan genocide. The would have to be undertaken within the same need to understand such violent civil conflicts budgetary limits as before. as social phenomena which have a range and The key challenges of criminal justice trans- complexity of causes, dynamics and psycholog- formation as they affected the South African ical impacts, clearly precludes short-term or

217 Simpson quick fix prevention measures, rooted in politi- crime prevention mechanism, as well as at the cally or diplomatically negotiated “resolution”. level of failed reparative measures as a product It is my view that unresolved issues of vic- of the TRC. timisation and trauma at a massive level in The critical point here is that such victim- society, constitutes a “sustained crisis” which, centred interventions must not be viewed as over time, takes on a structural character – merely remedial, but must also be viewed as especially when associated with historical roots critical, proactive interventions in cyclical pat- in past racial or ethnic conflict. Such enduring terns of violence in South Africa, which have crisis may merely be masked by formal politi- by no means run their full course. In many cal or diplomatic settlements and peace agree- respects this has already been powerfully illus- ments. As a result, latent conflict may not trated by the spectre of vigilantism, which – it immediately present as violent, but will may be argued – is as much the product of inevitably manifest itself in patterns of violence communities feeling under attack and unpro- which are cyclical in nature, frequently dis- tected (due to the absence of any effective vic- placed, and which may well eventually play tim empowerment services), as it is a manifes- themselves out along different lines of social tation of their loss of confidence in criminal cleavage from the original political conflict. A justice institutions more generally. Victim critical component here (which will be empowerment interventions, as well as curbing addressed again below) is the sustained impact cyclical patterns of violent crime, are also a key of unresolved issues of insecurity, fear and the potential mechanism for intervention in the culture of impunity for perpetrators who are transformation process regarding criminal jus- never brought to book. tice institutions. This is clear from the simple In the South African context, both the TRC prevalence of preventable “repeat victimisa- and the government’s National Crime tion” which is a dominant crime phenomenon Prevention Strategy Victim Empowerment in South Africa – particularly as regards vio- Programme (VEP) , suggest a substantial con- lence against women and domestic crime. cern to deal with the needs and experiences of Furthermore, victim empowerment approach- victims of both ongoing criminal violence and es also force a change process within the crimi- past human rights abuses. However, neither of nal justice environment through demanding the these approaches alters the fact that a substan- overhaul of systems of justice that have the tial vacuum exists in South African society in alienating effect of secondary victimisation for respect of victim aid and empowerment ser- those who take up their cases in the criminal vices and policies. While government and TRC courts. The central assertion here, however, is rhetoric speaks loudly regarding the interests of that unresolved trauma associated with victimi- survivors of human rights abuses or victims of sation – whether political or criminal – if violent crime, this simply has not translated untreated, may well result in today’s victim into any capacity or expertise to practically becoming tomorrow’s perpetrator. This is by no empower such victims, particularly in respect means an automatic process – which would be of the most vulnerable and voiceless members to condemn all survivors to the fate of becom- of South African society – women and children. ing perpetrators of violence. However, whether In particular, the lethargy and spectacular manifested in generational patterns of cyclical non-delivery of any meaningful services to vic- violence, or more constrained loops of revenge tims by the government’s VEP – as well as the and retribution, failure to engage effectively virtual non- existence of any reparation mecha- with the experiences and identity associated nisms for those who have testified before the with victimisation, is a naive path to sustained TRC – simply cannot be ignored or excused and unpredictably changing patterns of vio- any longer. In the shifting locus of accountabil- lence. ity in an embryonic democracy, there is no sub- A powerful illustration of sustained yet stitute for effective service delivery. This changing patterns of violence is offered by an applies as powerfully to the areas of victim examination of the trajectory of youth politics empowerment as any other – and we need to in South Africa. This is partly due to the fact reflect very critically on the failures of the state that this strategically vital social constituency in this regard, both at the level of the VEP as a statistically represents both the primary perpe-

218 Simpson trators and the primary victims of violence in which took place in South Africa from the poli- South Africa. Indeed, it is arguable that vio- tics of confrontation to the politics of negotia- lence has symbolically become inextricably tion, this very youth constituency was once intertwined with youth identity in this South again marginalised as “the struggle” moved Africa. from the streets to the boardroom, from the Historically, young black South Africans hands of these young foot-soldiers, to those of a were the barometer of marginalisation under largely grey-haired or balding, male, exile- apartheid. They were systematically driven on based community. On the very eve of liberation to the margins of society and were rejected – which so strongly symbolised their victories – entirely by the dominant culture. They were these youngsters, who had grown up on the rendered politically voiceless by a system of streets, were told to go back to school, at a time legislated discrimination based on race. They when the snails-pace nature of transformation were educationally disempowered by the sys- meant that very little had actually changed in tem of “Bantu Education”, which was deliber- the schoolroom. ately utilised as a means of colonial control, The youngsters of 1994 were not the same designed only to create “hewers of wood and people as the youth of the Soweto uprising of drawers of water” to service the exploitative 1976, but notionally they confronted a striking- labour needs of affluent white-owned industry. ly similar experience – except that formal They were economically powerless due to democratisation had removed much of the recession and inevitable joblessness. Further- attraction from the politics of resistance. It more, apartheid had decimated the alternative ought to come as no surprise, however, that the sources of social cohesion and places of youth of the mid-1990s displayed exactly the belonging for these young people: the family same resilience in response to their marginali- (both nuclear and extended family forms) was sation. It should also come as no surprise that in destroyed as a source of social authority and lieu of the political movement, the youth of the belonging; the school was transformed into a 1990s found an alternative place of belonging highly politicised site of struggle, as was the and social cohesion within the criminal youth case in the workplace for those who were fortu- gangs. Like the political party before it, the nate enough to get off the streets. gang offered a cohesive alternative subculture Yet, throughout the oppressive years of the to the dominant culture which had rejected 1970s and 1980s, these young people proved these children. The gang too boasted its own themselves to be incredibly resilient in the face uniform, its own language and, through crimi- of such systematic marginalisation. They nal activity, it also filled a void through offer- forged alternative places of belonging and iden- ing alternative forms of wealth creation. tity – largely through political organisations However, what is perhaps most significant and through the violent politics of resistance. here is the fact that the gang also entrenched As the shock-troops of liberation, fighting guns violence as a key means of acquiring status and with stones, young black South African men graduating within its hierarchical structures. established an alternative subculture and place For example, the gender-specific nature of this of social cohesion, which simultaneously predatory violence, meant that it became the placed them back on the front pages of the mark of masculinity in these social conflicts, daily newspapers – centre stage within the very with women disproportionately suffering as the society which had so rejected them. Indeed, victims. Youth identity has thus remained fun- political organisation clothed them in a new damentally enmeshed with violence as a means uniform represented by the colours and the ban- of acquiring power and status. ners of the political party. It had its own lan- However, while the marginalisation of young guage in the songs of liberation and the rituals people during the apartheid era gave rise to vio- of protest politics. It represented a truly cohe- lence that was categorised as socially functional sive alternative subculture which gave young – due to it being in the name of liberation – the men a key stake in society, largely premised on same experiences of marginalisation now gave their direct involvement in violence, which was rise to violence that is deemed to be anti-social socially approved in the name of liberation. and criminal in nature. There is a striking irony that in the shift Perhaps the most striking component of the

219 Simpson youth criminal subculture in the past decade in systems inherited in such countries. Therefore, South Africa, is the pervasive experience of successful prosecutions can at best be only young perpetrators of violent crime that their selective and symbolic. Although this may be own victimisation is frequently perceived to lie critical to at least symbolically re-establishing at the root of their paths into criminal activity the rule of law in such societies, such a punitive and lifestyles. Sometimes, this experience of justice model cannot be assumed to satisfy the victimisation is attributed to growing up in needs of the vast majority of victims and sur- “loveless families”, sometimes to more graphic vivors – either in respect of bringing the perpe- experiences of domestic abuse (either as direct trators to book, or in respect of any form of victims or as witnesses to such abuse), some- reparation or rehabilitation. This raises some times it is directly related to poverty and rela- important challenges for the punitive justice tive deprivation associated with the experiences paradigm inherent in most motivations for the of political oppression. In truth, what this offers establishment of a permanent International is a graphic illustration of how continuity in the Criminal Court (ICC). experiences of marginalisation of young people However, many South Africans are more in South Africa, has resided at the root of much than eager to market South Africa’s “reconcili- of the violence which has continued to domi- ation” model as either an alternative or as a nate this society. complementary model which – it is argued – is The preceding pages offer an incomplete more responsive to the needs of victims and image of the complex process of negotiated survivors. It is argued here that if there is an transition in South Africa. However, hopefully, important debate over this which is intrinsic to this brief outline offers some insights into the the TRC process in South Africa, then it is most social experiences of secondary victimisation appropriately framed as a debate on the merits which challenge both South Africa’s reconcilia- of restorative as opposed to punitive systems of tion model, as well the victim empowerment justice, rather than one framed between suppos- enterprise which is so frequently glibly linked edly incompatible “justice” and “reconcilia- to this. tion” models. Either way, what is most striking about these debates is that virtually all the pro- 2. ADDING FUEL TO THE FIRE? AN EVALUATION tagonists motivate their approaches as being in OF SOUTH AFRICA’S “RESTORATIVE JUSTICE” the best interests of victims and survivors of ENTERPRISE human rights abuse – and it is therefore a criti- The final section of this paper will therefore cal objective of this paper to evaluate these briefly attempt to evaluate South Africa’s claims. restorative justice aspirations (with all of its Considering that the obligation to grant claims to being victim-centred) as manifested amnesty (which was to be operationalised by by the TRC and will attempt to scrutinise the TRC) was in fact originally entrenched in whether in fact the TRC does all that is often South Africa’s newly negotiated Interim claimed to redress these sustained experiences Constitution, it is no surprise that some of these of secondary victimisation. debates were actually waged before the advent Some of the most striking lessons to be of South Africa’s new Constitutional Court learned from the South African TRC in fact itself. Furthermore, this constitutional challenge relate to the fundamental clumsiness of crimi- to the TRC Act was brought by the survivors of nal law, both as a tool for achieving reconcilia- some of apartheid’s most notorious victims. tion, as well as for best servicing the needs of In their papers before the Constitutional victims and survivors of gross human rights Court in the matter of AZAPO and Others v The violations. In societies emerging from extensive President of the Republic of South Africa and and intense civil conflict involving widespread Others, the applicants argued that section 20(7) violations (such as Rwanda, the former of the TRC Act was unconstitutional. The perti- Yugoslavia, Cambodia and South Africa), the nent part of section 20(7) provides that: prospects of successful prosecutions are in most “No person who has been granted amnesty cases remote, due both to the lack of evidence in respect of an act, omission or offence necessary to secure such prosecutions, and shall be criminally or civilly liable in because of the disintegrated criminal justice respect of such act, omission or offence and

220 Simpson

no body or organisation or the State shall be the Interim Constitution was explicitly commit- liable, and no person shall be vicariously ted. liable, for any such act, omission or The Court could have further substantiated its offence.” argument that the right to prosecute is really an The central contention of the applicants was abstract right by making reference to the state that section 20(7) of the TRC Act violated the of South Africa’s criminal justice system. Even right of access to court enshrined in section 22 if the evidence to prosecute perpetrators of of the Bill of Rights, which provides that: human rights abuses did exist, the criminal jus- “Every person shall have the right to have tice system was simply not practically capable justiciable disputes settled by a court of law of processing thousands and thousands of such or, where appropriate, another independent prosecutions. Although it was not framed as or impartial forum.” such by the Constitutional Court, in the absence It was argued by the applicants that by extin- of the evidence necessary to achieve effective guishing the criminal liability of perpetrators to prosecutions, coupled with the absence of a whom amnesty has been granted and by pre- functional criminal justice system capable of venting victims from bringing civil claims securing such convictions, this raised the spec- against those who had violated their rights, sec- tre of the one scenario which clearly would do tion 20(7) violates individuals’ rights of access more damage to the forward-looking agenda of to justice. rebuilding public confidence in the legal system In a controversial yet much vaunted decision, and the rule of law in South Africa, than the the Constitutional Court held that the amnesty apparent impunity associated with amnesty: provisions in the National Unity and Reconcil- that is, impunity based upon a failed prosecu- iation Act (the TRC Act) were in fact constitutions process. Were this to happen, the few per- tional. This was based on several arguments, petrators who were tried and acquitted would most central of which was the fact that the then be able to deny their involvement in amnesty granted was not a blanket amnesty and human rights abuses, thus perpetuating a cul- that it was not unconditional, but instead was ture of impunity, eroding any residual faith in premised on full disclosure by perpetrators as a the rule of law, and potentially leading to even quid pro quo for indemnification. However, one greater anger and cynicism on the part of vic- further motivation behind the judgment tims and survivors. requires even more scrutiny. In evaluating the Furthermore, even where such prosecutions right to criminal justice claimed by the victims do take place, it is highly debatable whether opposing the amnesty provision, the Court held this satisfies the needs and expectations of vic- that in the majority of instances the right to tims and survivors to the extent that is often prosecute those who have committed gross vio- assumed. Certainly in the South African case, lations of human rights is, in any event, an criminal convictions do not jurisprudentially “abstract right”.1 This is because in most cases find any automatic civil claim for compensation the evidence necessary to obtain convictions – on the part of the injured party. The conse- or even to sustain civil claims – does not exist quence of this is that the few South Africans or has been deliberately destroyed. It is in this who enjoyed the prospect of successful prose- context that the Court argued that one of the cution of those who killed their loved ones – only ways in which victims could obtain the and who are poverty stricken and marginalised truth about human rights abuse was if perpetra- by virtue of their very victimisation – in most tors were provided with an incentive to come instances still faced a lack of access to civil jus- forward and make full disclosure as to the tice on the simple basis that it remained unaf- crimes that they committed. The removal of fordable. Furthermore, even where it was criminal liability was regarded as precisely affordable, the rules of prescription applying to such an incentive. In addition, the Court held such civil claims would most likely have ren- that the process of encouraging perpetrators to dered most claims inoperable. reveal their crimes would make them confront Until these jurisprudential anomalies are their past and help society understand its histo- eliminated, or the South African justice system ry. It further added that these are important is substantially transformed, the Constitutional parts of the process of reconciliation to which Court may be right – there is only an abstract

221 Simpson right of access to justice for victims of by presuming to speak on behalf of victims apartheid. rather than rendering the voices directly audi- Yet this punitive justice model, which is per- ble, victims are in fact rendered silent. haps least functional in servicing victims’ needs The discourse of “forgiveness” which has for some form of direct compensation or repa- embroidered much of the TRC’s work, which ration, is all too easily motivated as being in characterised the dominant Christian religious their best interests. In fact, this discussion character of many of the TRC’s proceedings demonstrates not only the clumsiness of puni- and which was prevalent in the media reporting tive criminal law as a tool for meeting the of the public hearings of the Human Rights reparative needs of victims and survivors, but it Violations Committee, is perhaps most illustra- also illustrates the grave danger which resides tive of how this denigration of complex victim in seeking to speak on behalf of victims and needs played itself out during the hearings of survivors, instead of more directly rendering the TRC. their own complex voices and needs audible. In many senses, the onerous expectation was The harsh reality is that for the vast majority of set up that reconciliation was premised on vic- South African victims of gross human rights tims’ ability to forgive. Indeed, at one stage, the violations, they probably stood to gain more head of the TRC – Archbishop Tutu – actually from the opportunity to tell their stories (cou- chastised those victims who challenged the pled with the very meagre reparations which constitutionality of the amnesty clause in the the TRC promised), than they were likely to TRC Act, claiming that they were opposed to gain from the punitive criminal justice route. reconciliation. Yet in truth, the TRC was no None of this should be taken to deny the devas- more about forgiveness on the part of victims, tating impact (both individually and in legal than it was about contrition on the part of per- principle) of the ultimate compromise which petrators who sought amnesty. If the Com- this entails for those few exceptions – such as mission did offer an opportunity for dealing the Biko and Mxenge families who opposed the with wounds of the past and for healing, then it amnesty provisions before the Constitutional has to be acknowledged that expressions of Court – who stood an excellent chance of suc- anger and the desire for revenge (rather than ceeding through the criminal and civil courts. It forgiveness) on the part of victims, may in fact also offers scant consolation to suggest that be more functional to the sort of substantive their sacrifice represents the bitter pill which recovery best characterised by the shift in iden- has to be swallowed in the name of the general tity from “victim” to “survivor”. It is the strong good – and as part of a difficult transition to view of this writer that true reconciliation in democracy in South Africa. South African society can only be achieved by Much has already been said of the failures of integrating the anger, sorrow, trauma and vari- punitive justice to serve victims as well as is ous other complex feelings of victims, rather often presumed. More still needs to be said than by subtly suppressing them. about the dangers of presuming that TRC- A proper evaluation of the TRC process based “reconciliation” – itself a contested term reveals that victim needs were neither static, – necessarily achieves a greater amount: in both nor consistent or constant. They were complex instances, the disservice to victims resides in and changed over time, very much in keeping the common tendency to treat their needs as with complex human identity, shaped by the uniform and static. Generalised and convenient- enduring and complex impact of trauma. For ly summarised victims’ expectations tend to some, they craved more than anything else the denigrate the complex and inconsistent human basic information about disappeared relatives, identity of such victims and survivors, ignoring for others the need was for widespread the extent to which needs vary from victim to acknowledgment of their torture. Some sought victim and change across time. Presumptions direct confrontation or victim-offender media- that victims need or demand punitive justice are tion interventions with the perpetrators respon- no more reliable than are the claims that vic- sible for their suffering, others only wanted to tims are willing to forgive perpetrators who know of the systemic issues and the commands confess, or that they merely seek acknowledg- given which gave rise to their abuse. Some ment and symbolic reparations. In both cases, rejected the TRC enterprise entirely and

222 Simpson demanded full justice. For some, their needs mony, but also in the amnesty applications of were intensely personal and private, for others perpetrators. the quest was for community-based or political Another critical role of such survivor support vindication. Not only did these needs vary from structures is that they complemented the TRC’s survivor to survivor, but the needs of any one own concerns to provide direct emotional sup- victim also changed over time. For many, who port for victims who endured the anguish of re- initially sought no more than acknowledgment living traumas through their testimony before and symbolic reparation from the process, these the Commission. However limited the TRC’s needs understandably changed when – some psychological support to victims may have time after they testified – a perpetrator con- been, the simple recognition of the need for an fessed for the first time to having killed their integrated victim aid and empowerment com- loved ones. Similarly, as the prospects of mate- ponent of the Commission is a valuable lesson rial reparation measures became more real, so for others who may tread a similar path. Built did the demands from some victims for mone- into this recognition ought also to be an tary compensation. In still other instances, as acknowledgment that the simple process of tes- the TRC failed to uncover or investigate the tifying or of telling the story, does not inherent- facts behind some cases, so some victims ly entail psychological healing or reconcilia- became embittered and disillusioned with the tion. TRC process. Unresolved trauma through such a process All of these complex victims’ voices are can equally lead to very destructive responses, legitimate and all are integral to the challenge rendering all the more important the delivery of of building reconciliation in a traumatised soci- psychological services as an integral component ety enduring a transition to democracy. The of the truth recovery process. This is equally central lesson of all this, however, relates to the important to developing tools for “self-care for importance of victim support structures and an the care givers” so as to deal with the vicarious organised voice for victims as critical to the tra- traumatisation of the commissioners and other jectory and outcome of the process – particular- TRC staff who are exposed throughout the ly when both the Commission and its political process by having to listen rather than speak. architects are too often willing to compromise However, having said this, it is nonetheless for the sake of politically based reconciliation. important to sound a warning that is critical to Indeed, it is clear from the South African expe- any evaluation of the provision of such psycho- rience of dealing with past human rights viola- logical services to victims to ameliorate the tions, that survivor organisation is potentially experiences of secondary trauma which those critical to ameliorating the secondary victimisa- testifying may experience. Through extensive tion of those who enter the process in an other- research conducted with survivors who did tes- wise atomised and isolated manner. In South tify before the TRC, CSVR researcher Brandon Africa, there was some early organisation of Hamber has argued that there is a real danger in survivor support groups and organs of civil the increasingly prevalent (international) trend society, able to articulate the organised of providing trauma and other psychological demands and needs of victims during the life of counselling interventions as an isolated strategy the TRC and thereby capable of playing at least for victim empowerment. Indeed, he argues that some role in shaping the process as it unfolded. such interventions are often treated as a substi- This organisational approach proved to be very tute for more effective, comprehensive and important in creating some effective advocacy often more expensive forms of rehabilitation in respect of accessing the TRC hearings, set- and reparation. Hamber strongly asserts that ting the agenda, ensuring the provision of psy- such interventions frequently seek to conve- chological support for those who testified and niently detach counselling-based rehabilitation lobbying for attention to be given to the issue from survivors’ more generalised needs for jus- of reparations. Survivor organisation was also tice and reparation, with the result that they significant (although not always successful) in often short-circuit an integrated process of heal- also ensuring that victims and survivors were ing and thereby jeopardise rather than build any informed and in some instances able to partici- sustainable individual or collective reconcilia- pate not only in human rights violations testi- tion.

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In this context it is also appropriate to turn to which it currently appears is unlikely to be an evaluation of the TRC’s reparations provi- matched by any substantial form of individual sions. This has been a hotly contested terrain reparation. dominated by competing interpretations of Quite apart from the problems of magnitude what survivors want and need from the TRC (and the implicit risk that the democratic state process, but in which the victims themselves could easily be rendered bankrupt in an attempt have often been silenced. This has also – not to meet the compensatory obligations of its surprisingly – been an area in which victims’ oppressive predecessor), the current state of expectations and needs have been particularly government-sponsored victim empowerment complex and often contradictory. Some victims services in South Africa strongly suggests that simply expressed a desire for symbolic repara- this is an arena which perfectly illustrates the tions, such as the provision of a tombstone to new government’s grave difficulties in translat- commemorate the death of a loved one, while ing creative and visionary policy into meaning- others have demanded financial assistance to ful implementation and service delivery. These compensate for the loss of a breadwinner. Still limits on the “reach” of the state in transition others have rejected any form of reparation as demonstrate the vital need for transformation of an inadequate substitute for punishment of the inherited governmental social welfare services, perpetrators, or out of a rejection that the dam- along with the institutions of the criminal jus- age suffered and the losses sustained could ever tice system which have already been discussed. be remedied by means of monetary compensa- The bottom line is that government is highly tion. unlikely to satisfy the recommendations of the The issue of state-sponsored reparation has TRC in respect of reparative measures for vic- also been implicitly central to the constitutional tims and this will undoubtedly raise some retro- status of the TRC. Notionally at least, the con- spective questions about the soundness of the stitutionality of the whole TRC process rests on Constitutional Court’s perspective. It is sug- the state’s substitution for perpetrators in pro- gested here that the TRC has been inadequate viding reparation to survivors in lieu of legally in monitoring the changing needs and expecta- based compensation or damages claims. This is tions of the majority of victims who will cer- because the granting of amnesty to perpetrators tainly not be satisfied with notions of symbolic has effectively denied victims the possibility of reparations – and many of whom are under- any civil claims. The means of meeting this standably extremely sceptical of government’s obligation took the form of a commitment by commitment to providing direct forms of com- the TRC to provide reparative measures for vic- pensation. More importantly, it is arguable that tims which will, nonetheless, obviously fall far despite its overt concerns to express the prima- short of the extent of monetary compensation cy of victims’ needs in the process of building which would have been payable as a result of reconciliation, though creating the anticipation successful civil claims.2 However, unlike the of reparation, the TRC process itself did a great decisions of the Amnesty Committee, which deal to compound rather than to resolve the sec- are only subject to review by a court of law, the ondary victimisation of those who invested in Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee of the process through their testimonies. the TRC was only empowered to make recom- In defence of the TRC, it ought to be recog- mendations – or policy guidelines – which nised that the question of reparation is an remain dependent on the apparently non-exis- extremely complex one, especially in a society tent political will and financial capacity of like South Africa with competing developmen- government if they are to be implemented. In tal concerns and severely limited financial theory, such reparations will not merely operate resources. To some extent, this is also an through monetary provisions to individual vic- intractable problem considering the TRC’s tims, but will primarily focus on collective and reliance upon government to implement any often symbolic reparative measures – another reparations proposals. Even more striking is the significant source of contention and political tension between individual needs and demands controversy, considering the expectations that on the TRC on one hand, and the economic and were created through creating a harrowing and political rationale that underpins the notions of traumatic system of individual testimony, communal reparation, on the other. Ultimately,

224 Simpson all this amounts to an unresolved tension which was designed as non-inquisitorial, on the between reparation for individual victims of other. While the former demanded proven gross violations of human rights as defined in truths which could not accommodate contradic- the Act, and the wider concerns of the new gov- tion, the latter psycho- social “truth” could ernment with redress of historically entrenched never exclude such complexity and contradic- inequities more generally. In this regard, much tion. criticism has been levelled at the TRC for not The TRC therefore often reinforced the terms adequately engaging with the full spectrum of of a largely sterile debate between restorative economic beneficiaries of apartheid. and punitive justice, as if the two were mutual- Furthermore, there certainly has been little or ly incompatible. In so doing, it arguably did no apparent voluntary commitment from the more to hide than it did to reveal the complex corporate community to invest in any form of victim identities on whose behalf the TRC was reparation or restitution – let alone in in-house supposedly designed. transformative reconciliation programmes. In There are undoubtedly times when all coun- some respects, these criticisms of the TRC are tries may have to sacrifice legal principles in accurate, but this is also slightly unfair to the the name of political pragmatism, in order to TRC, which can realistically only be one of end wars or to achieve peace. However, so long several vehicles for such redress. In other as this is done with scant regard for its impact words, to do full social and economic justice, on the credibility of the criminal justice system these failures cannot really be placed at the and of criminal justice processes, we breathe door of the TRC alone, but relate to the wider life into the culture of impunity that is a foun- process of transformation in South African dation stone of criminal behaviour in any soci- society – in which endeavour the TRC is, at ety. At some point when amnesties are granted, best, a junior partner. someone has to bear the moral responsibility, not only for the political violence of the past, CONCLUSION but also for the burgeoning violent crime that If the TRC was a complex creature, then it was has emerged in many countries after transition not just because of the competing political to democracy and within newly deregulated and interest groups and agendas within it, but also emerging economies, once the so-called politi- due to the internal tensions between competing cal violence has decreased. Ultimately, in South notions of what “truth” was in fact being recov- African society, the practical translation of the ered. rhetoric of reconciliation into reality depends This is well illustrated by the constant tension upon whether reconciliation initiatives reach in TRC hearings, between a quasi-judicial dis- beyond the limits of formal political and consti- course defined by the terms of the National tutional change, to tackle those deep rooted Unity and Reconciliation Act, concerned with social imbalances, which – at the most funda- cross- examination, fact-finding and formal or mental structural level – underpin the culture of “legal” truth based upon verifiable facts, on one violence and which give rise to the social expe- hand, and a supposedly victim-centred and psy- riences of cyclical, repeat and secondary vic- chologically sensitive story-telling enterprise, timisation.

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ENDNOTES

1) By this the Court did not imply that such claims at the national level rests on the rights were purely theoretical, or that they commitment to at least symbolically substi- were not claimable against the state. This tute government’s contributions for the per- reference to an “abstract right”, although petrators’ in providing some form of repara- open to misinterpretation, should rather be tion for survivors, then ought this not also taken to mean that the rights conferred were apply to any suspension of international tangible, but in large part were impossible criminal jurisdiction? Would it not be to exercise in practice. The same could appropriate for the international community arguably be said of civil claims that may be to, for example, extinguish the crippling severely impaired in practice by South international debt incurred by the apartheid African rules of prescription, which dictate regime, on condition that this is reinvested that civil claims prescribe after three years. in collective rehabilitation of apartheid’s 2) There is an interesting point to be made victims, thereby making a significant contri- here in relation to the debates over interna- bution to sustaining and maintaining an tional jurisdiction as well. If the notional embryonic democracy? basis for extinguishing criminal and civil

226 International Strategies for Crime Prevention in Transitional Societies: Problems and Prospects

Jeremy Travis

INTRODUCTION leading to a concern over a “safety gap” This paper takes two themes – comparative between the two. Despite these differences and perspectives on crime in societies in transition, trends, one is struck by the commonality of the and international initiatives on crime preven- victimisation experience: tion – as a starting point to ask some funda- “The notion of high crime rates as unique mental questions about the role of the interna- features of some unfortunate nations is not tional community in developing more effective supported. The experience of being crimi- responses to local crime. Stated differently, this nally victimised has become a statistically paper aims to raise some questions about the normal feature of urban life all over the rationale for international involvement in the world, though the type of victimisation prevention and control of local crime condi- varies.”2 tions. Unlike so many other challenges facing the international community – e.g., hunger, disease 1. CRIME AS A UNIVERSAL EXPERIENCE; CRIME or poverty, which are devastating in certain AS A UNIQUE EXPERIENCE countries – the challenge of crime is faced by The background to this discussion is the fact all societies. that crime is a nearly universal phenomenon. In At the same time, crime rates reach troubling the United Nations (UN) Global Report on portions in certain parts of the world at certain Crime and Justice (1999), Jan van Dijk pre- times. Consider the following: sents data from the International Crime • According to official police records, the Victimisation Survey (ICVS) showing that half homicide rate in Mexico increased by 50% of urban respondents throughout the world from 1990–95, robberies increased six-fold reported that they had been victimised by crime in 15 years and kidnappings are becoming over the past five years.1 There are some increasingly common, numbering over 1500 important variations in this finding. a year. Victimisation rates are highest in Africa and • In São Paulo, Brazil, the per capita murder Latin America where three-quarters of urban rate has nearly doubled in the past 15 years. respondents reported they had been victimised São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have the high- at least once. The rates were lowest in Asia. est murder rates in the world, 66 per 100 000 There are intriguing regional differences – in (São Paulo) and 60 per 100 000 (Rio).3 Western countries, men are assaulted at about • In South Africa, the seizures of crack cocaine the same rate as women, whereas in Latin tripled from 1998 to 1999, the amount of raw America and Africa the risk of being assaulted cocaine confiscated increased tenfold is 50% higher for women than for men. The between 1994 and 1998, and the number of overall trends are positive for developed coun- cocaine dealers arrested nearly doubled from tries – crime is on the decline – but the trends 1997 to 1998.4 Between 1997 and 1998, in crime are upward in developing countries, South Africa, already rated number one in

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the world for murder, rape, robbery and vio- response. A society should simultaneously lent theft per capita, saw its numbers of rob- work to prevent crime, through two broad beries, burglaries and thefts rise significantly, strategies, and to ensure an effective response while murder rates held steady and rapes to crime. declined.5 On the one hand, “crime prevention” can • Between 1985 and 1992, the rates of violent occur as a result of public and private activities juvenile crime, and juvenile homicides com- that have the consequence of reducing the inci- mitted with guns doubled in the United States dence of crime. Under this definition of a (US). Over the same seven-year period, the “crime prevention activity”, developed by the number of male minority youths arrested for University of Maryland in its report to the US drug-related crimes also doubled in the US.6 Congress entitled “Crime Prevention: What So, if crime is a nearly universal experience, Works, What Doesn’t and What’s Promising,” with both developed and developing countries crime prevention activities cover a wide range affected, with important regional differences, of social policies – from prenatal health care, to and with “hot spots” of crime epidemics break- educational programmes, to targeted police ing out in different cities and countries around interventions, to incarceration. Each of these, in the globe, how should we conceptualise the carefully controlled evaluations, has been found appropriate international response? to decrease the incidence of criminal behav- Before tackling that task, some definitional iour.7 It is important to note that the programme clarifications are in order. For purposes of this or initiative need not be intended to reduce paper, we will distinguish between three types crime – rather, it is a crime prevention activity of international engagement on issues involving if it has the result of reducing crime. criminal behaviour. The international commu- Accordingly, the types of activities that can nity is appropriately concerned about transna- be listed under the heading “crime prevention” tional crime and about human rights violations cover a wide range of public and private activi- carried out in the criminal justice arena. These ties, many of which, such as health care pro- international activities are not the concern of grammes, are justified primarily because of the paper. Rather, this paper will focus on the their other socially desirable outcomes, not issue of the appropriate international response their crime prevention outcomes. to common crimes occurring in societies that On the other hand, we can approach the issue are undergoing uncommon periods in their his- of crime prevention from a different perspec- tory; the issue of common crimes committed by tive, and ask, “What factors in community life common people in societies that are undergoing are correlated with low crime rates?” In uncommon periods in their history. Finally, by answering this question, we refer to another “international assistance”, we mean the menu body of research literature documenting that of governmental (e.g., UN initiatives, bilateral communities that share common values, treat programmes, multilateral treaties) and non-gov- community members with respect, and care for ernmental (e.g, foundation support, assistance the well being of the children of the communi- from financial institutions, university pro- ty, are communities with low rates of violence.8 grammes) responses that we would see in the Accordingly, seen from this perspective, the health, nutrition, agricultural or other social activities that would be funded under the head- policy arenas. ing of “crime prevention” are activities that With these observations in hand, our task is build strong communities, develop a shared to develop a rationale for international assis- sense of community purpose, and focus particu- tance in supporting the work of national gov- larly on the future of the young people coming ernments and local communities in responding up in that community. to crime, a social phenomenon that is, by defin- There is a third dimension to crime policy, ition, quite local. namely, the effectiveness and legitimacy of the formal apparatus established to respond to 2. THE COMPONENTS OF CRIME POLICY: crime. Setting aside any discussion of the effec- PREVENTION AND RESPONSE tiveness of the police at reducing crime, one It is useful to think of crime policy as a three- can still argue – from a simple governmental legged stool – two parts prevention, one part efficiency perspective – that the police should

230 Travis be evaluated in terms of their capacity to own experiences in the light of relevant com- respond to crime reports, solve crimes, appre- parisons. hend offenders, and do so in accordance with This minimal level of assistance is within established standards of fairness and decency. reach, with assistance from the Internet age, Similarly, setting aside any discussion of the and should help communities around the world role of prosecutions, convictions, and appropri- develop more effective local responses. The ate punishments in deterring criminal activity, academic community, the philanthropic sector, one can still argue that the prosecutors, courts the criminal justice professions, are all increas- and corrections agencies should be evaluated in ingly international in their outlook and content. terms of their ability to adjudicate allegations The UN has historically played this role, of criminal behaviour swiftly and fairly and to through the regional institutes and research treat offenders and victims in a manner reflect- such as the UN Crime Survey and ICVS. The ing established professional standards. natural forces of globalisation will dramatically Putting these three perspectives together, a increase this form of international assistance. society’s crime policy would seek to meet three Yet we should acknowledge honestly that the goals: first, encourage those policies that international response, even at this level, has reduce crime; second, develop the capacity of been anaemic, particularly when compared with communities to produce their own levels of other arenas of policy. Take, for example, the safety; and third, build a justice infrastructure relatively mature and robust infrastructure of that responds to crime efficiently, fairly, and the international agricultural research commu- justly. nity. The Consultative Group for International 3. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR EFFECTIVE Agriculture Research (CGIAR) conducts sys- CRIME POLICIES tematic analysis and projections of agricultural The next step in our analysis is to ask what role issues across countries.9 It has a sophisticated the international community can play in local data and research infrastructure. Established in efforts to develop effective crime policies. We 1971, it describes itself as an informal associa- must recognise at the outset that whatever level tion of 58 public and private sector members of international funding is made available is that supports a network of 16 international agri- likely to be infinitesimal compared to the cultural research centres. The CGIAR budget investments of national and local governments. for 1998 was $340 million and was fully fund- So, the international investments must be care- ed by member contributions. The World Bank, fully targeted to maximise return. I think there the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the are three levels of international assistance pos- UN, the UN Development Programme and the sible. UN Environment Programme are all co-sponsors of CGIAR. They work to strengthen 3.1 Information assistance national agricultural research in developing Returning to our three-legged stool, we can see countries, to conduct research programmes in some opportunities for international support. partnership with a variety of other institutions, Clearly, as at this conference, one of the most and, in their words, seek to “mobilise the best important roles the international community in agricultural science on behalf of the world’s can play is to provide a forum for the exchange poor and hungry”. of ideas about what works. The international There is no similar international research community, particularly the research communi- group focusing on the issues of crime and jus- ty, can help local practitioners think about the tice in transitional societies. There is no similar efficacy of various interventions. The interna- commitment to the development of knowledge tional community can work to develop a coop- about the issues discussed at this conference. erative framework for comparative research, to Just imagine if there were a consultative group provide yardsticks for measures of effective- on international crime and justice research, ness, to articulate standards for the performance linking research institutes around the world, of the police and criminal justice agencies, and funded at $340 million. Our level of knowledge to conduct surveys, such as the ICVS, that and the effectiveness of our practice would be assist local communities in understanding their significantly enhanced.

231 Travis

3.2 Technical assistance of new crime prevention and crime control A second level of international engagement is strategies. Here, the role of the international to provide on-site technical assistance in devel- community is to develop new policies, test oping the indigenous capacity to prevent and them, analyse the results, etc., working with respond to crime and administer justice. This local governmental agencies. We have seen this would mean working with police agencies to type of assistance in other social policy arenas. provide training, helping the courts to develop At the Urban Institute, for example, our standards of adjudication, providing education International Activities Centre works with a on the rights of victims of domestic violence, number of countries, principally in the former assisting the establishment of drug treatment Soviet Union, to help them develop and admin- and other rehabilitation programmes for offend- ister new policies on housing, retirement bene- ers. This level of international response consists fits, management of local resources and facili- of active technical assistance, with the goal of tation of community involvement in policy building local infrastructure that is self-sustain- making. ing after the international support has ended. There are examples of such efforts in the An example of this form of assistance, under- crime policy arena as well Here in South taken on a large scale, was the involvement of Africa, there are a number of international the West German legal and criminal justice efforts to work with local agencies to develop community in supporting the adoption of and test new policies. To cite one example, the Western legal practices in the former East Vera Institute of Justice, with funding from the Germany following unification. Similar efforts Soros and Ford Foundations, has established are under way here, as nations of Southern the Bureau of Justice Assistance here in South Africa work together to combat crime across Africa. This is a non-governmental entity, borders. The Community Peace Programme of working closely with the Justice Ministry and the University of the Western Cape, funded by the Prosecutors Office, to undertake initiatives international foundations and governments, that that are remarkably central, not peripheral, to is developing new approaches to the resolution governmental functions. For example, Vera has of conflicts in townships across South Africa, is helped developed pre-trial release policies and another example of this form of assistance. actually administers the Pre-trial Services Indeed, it is remarkable how much assistance Agency.10 The Bureau of Justice Assistance is the international non-governmental organisa- facilitating a strategic planning effort designed tional (NGO) community has provided to South to enhance the effectiveness of prosecutions for Africa during this time of historical transition. car hijacking and to reduce the incidence of that But, remembering the role of strong commu- particularly pernicious criminal activity in nities in producing safety, we would think of South Africa. It is remarkable that these core other community development efforts as part of activities are made possible by international a crime prevention programme. For example, assistance. programmes designed to develop NGOs gener- Yet, I am struck by the limitations inherent in ally, or local governance structures generally, this more ambitious form of assistance. In some could have the result of reducing crime and areas of policy, it would be quite natural for a social conflict. So these efforts should be national government to call upon the interna- counted as “crime prevention”. This would tional community for assistance. If the social ill require a rethinking of traditional international were an outbreak of a new strain of disease, or development efforts, but they can have crime crop failure, or malnutrition, we would not be prevention consequences. Following this way surprised to see calls for an international of thinking, the work of UN development pro- response. Yet when violence is on the rise, or grammes generally would be coordinated with corruption is increasing, the first reaction is that the unique needs of transitional societies to pro- these are local (i.e., national) concerns and no vide for safety and justice. international assistance is requested. Maybe we are saying that there is no international exper- 3.3 Strategic assistance tise in responding to these kinds of crime epi- A third level of engagement would be to pro- demics, that our knowledge base is too shallow vide international assistance in the development to think that an emergency response team could

232 Travis make a difference. Maybe national and local open competitive markets and public respect leaders are reluctant to acknowledge that the for the processes of government. Given the crime problem is beyond local control. interest of the international financial community in creating and sustaining those open mar- 4. THE SPECIAL CASE OF CRIME IN SOCIETIES IN kets, it is noteworthy that only recently have TRANSITION organisations such as the World Bank elevated Does the outbreak of crime in societies that are the corruption issue on their agenda. At the moving from totalitarian regimes to democratic same time, the intractability of the corruption regimes, from regulated economies to open phenomenon in transitional societies is a economies, constitute a distinct rationale for reminder that progress in this area will require international assistance? If so, what form of significant time, investment and perseverance. assistance? So, if we place a value on democracy and Let’s imagine two countries, Country A and open markets, then there is a compelling case Country B. Country A is a developing nation, for significant international assistance in the struggling with a fragile democracy that is sev- early years of these transitions. eral decades old but is by no means secure. Its This assistance, to be effective, would need murder rate has increased by 50% over the past to be offered at all three levels, with strong five years. Country B is a developing nation, strategic support, good data collection systems struggling to establish a new democracy after to measure effectiveness, and significant invest- several decades of authoritarian rule. Its murder ments in the development of effective and fair rate has also increased by 50% since democra- systems of law enforcement and the administra- cy was established five years ago. Do these two tion of justice. countries have equal claims on the international community to respond to their crime condi- CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A tions? TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY I think an argument can be made that Having made the case for a significant interna- Country B has a stronger claim, principally tional response when crime threatens societies because failure to deal with its rising crime rate in transition, we must acknowledge how little is more likely to create conditions that could we know about the underlying phenomenon. undermine democratic reforms and encourage There has not been much research on the rea- harsh penal policies. The fear of crime may cre- sons behind these rapid shifts in crime patterns. ate a groundswell of public opinion favouring a We do not know much about the effects of the return to more oppressive responses to crime; loosening of controls upon the anti-social the governmental authorities may translate this forces in our society. popular demand into directions or expectations Ultimately, we need to conduct research of the police, prosecutors and judges to “get using these natural experiments so that we can tough”; the laws would then be enforced too learn from each case study in ways that will stringently, rights would be violated, harsh pun- inform policy in the next country to undergo ishments imposed, all in the name of preserving such a transition. This may be the ultimate role domestic peace. As a result, a democratic gov- for the international community – to document ernment, created by a movement to end repres- these cycles, to create an international dialogue sion, could end up recreating new forms of on the dynamics that are unleashed at these governmental repression, this time sanctioned points in history. by the democratic regime. If democracy is valued, and open markets are The issue of corruption poses separate chal- valued, then they are threatened by the crime lenges. Many societies have experienced a rise impulses that are born at the same time that in official corruption following the transition to societies in transition give birth to new govern- democracy and more open economies. Failure ments and new economies. Our ultimate task is to respond to the problems of corruption at an to shed light on these seismic shifts so that the early stage in the transition could arguably next burst of democratic fervour is not accom- make it much more difficult later to establish panied by rising crime.

233 Travis

ENDNOTES

1) Van Dijk, Jan J. M. 1999. The Experience 7) Sherman, Lawrence W., Denise C., of Crime and Justice. Global Report on Gottredson, Doris L. MacKenzie, John Crime and Justice. pp. 25-42: United Eck, Peter Reuter, and Shawn D. Nations. Bushway., Dept. of Criminology and 2) Van Dijk, Jan J. M. 1999. The Experience Criminal Justice, University of of Crime and Justice. Global Report on Maryland.1997. Preventing Crime: What Crime and Justice. pp. 25-42 United Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising. Nations. A Report to the United States Congress for 3) Buckley, Stephen. Brazil’s Brutal the National Institute of Justice. Washing- Economic Gap: Disparities Blamed for ton: Office of Justice Programmes, U.S. Wave of Violence. June 2000. Washington Department of Justice. Post Foreign Service. The Washington 8) Sampson, R., Raudenbush, S., Earls, F., Post.: Washington D.C. 1997. Neighbourhoods and Violent Crime: 4) Jeter, Jon. Crack Gains Hold on South A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy. Africa."August 2000. Washington Post Science, Vol. 277. American Association Foreign Service. The Washington Post Co.: for the Advancement of Science. Washington D.C 9) For more information on The Consultative 5) Swarns, Rachel L., South Africa in an Group for International Agriculture Uphill Fight Against Crime."May 2000. Research (CGIAR), see the website at New York Times: New York, New York. http://www.cgiar.org/ 6) Blumstein, Alfred and Wallman, Joel. 10) For more information on the Vera Institute (Eds.). 2000. The Crime Drop in America. of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, see the website at [email protected] United Kingdom.

234 International and Regional Initiatives: Providing Appropriate International Assistance

Adrian Beck

INTRODUCTION siderable resources to attempting the reform of Since the collapse of the Soviet Union a decade police in former Soviet states. It then considers ago, numerous European countries and the some of the problems associated with “export- United States (US) have provided assistance to ing” policing, especially models of community the police forces of former Soviet Union states. policing as has often been the focus of donors This help has come in many different forms from the UK and the US. This is followed by a ranging from organising seminars on interna- review of some the underlying prerequisites of tional topics such as transnational crime and providing international assistance, in particular money laundering, to the provision of specialist the need for work to be grounded upon a solid equipment such as forensic and investigative foundation of research, and the importance of tools. The range of providers is also extensive any effort to be context-driven and truly collab- and includes police forces, government agen- orative in its design and delivery. cies, academics and charities. It is often difficult to quantify the “value” of this assistance or 1. RATIONALE FOR ASSISTANCE the factors motivating the donors. Discovering why assistance is made available This paper seeks to consider some of the rea- to police forces of countries in transition1 is sons why international assistance has been pro- neither easy nor straightforward. However, two vided in the past and, more importantly, what key motivators can be identified: increased can be learnt about providing help in the future. political stability and the process of democrati- In part it draws upon the experience of a pro- sation; and future practical assistance in tack- ject currently under way in the Ukraine that ling international crime. seeks to introduce context-driven community The motivation for the involvement of indi- policing in the city of Kharkiv. The project is vidual police forces can vary from the practi- sponsored by the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) calities of having to cooperate with the recipi- Foreign and Commonwealth Office and is ents of assistance in the future on common administered by the British Council in Kyiv, crime problems, to individual police officers Ukraine. It is an ambitious three-year project perceiving such help as an opportunity to pro- bringing together academics from the Scarman vide philanthropic assistance to “fellow” police Centre at the University of Leicester in the UK, officers. police practitioners from the West Midlands At a governmental level the impetus for Police in the UK, experts from the Ministry of international assistance is very often a desire to Interior University in Kharkiv, and police offi- foster the “democratisation” process within cers operating in two districts in the city of countries emerging from the Soviet bloc. Kharkiv. Agencies such as the UK’s Foreign and The paper begins by exploring some of the Commonwealth Office and the Department for reasons that may explain why some govern- International Development, together with the ments and organisations have committed con- US’s Department of Justice, routinely develop

235 Beck programmes of assistance designed to facilitate The perceived need to collaborate operates change that will support political reform.2 As on at least two levels: practical policing prac- part of this approach, a range of agencies and tices; and the provision of training and equip- groups – such as those involved with constitu- ment. The former seeks to develop working tional reform and emerging political groups – relationships that will assist in catching crimi- are often provided with assistance. nals who may exploit international boundaries In addition, the criminal justice system, to commit crime. Recent practical examples including the courts, prisons and police, are include UK police officers liaising with their perceived as potential recipients of help and in Russian counterparts on the policing of football need of reform. This is often offered under the matches between teams competing in the banner of the promotion of human rights or as Champions League; and Customs and Excise part of the support for opportunities for free staff in the UK working with colleagues in speech, peaceful demonstration and political Lithuania and Latvia on the illegal import and diversity. It can certainly be argued that a cen- export of motor vehicles. Much of this work is tral tenet of the democratisation process is the being increasingly formalised into working pro- reform of the police service. Police workers are tocols and intergovernmental agreements such arguably the government agents most immedi- as extradition treaties. ately and intimately involved in the well being At another level, “donor” police forces often of individuals and the health of communities.3 provide training and equipment for security The police have the responsibility of enforcing agencies undergoing rapid social, political and the laws of democratic government. However, economic change. This can take the form of they also have the power to deprive individuals training material (sometimes translated into the of their human rights and are authorised to use recipients language, sometimes not); visits by force, even deadly force, as part of their duties. “experts” to provide “training the trainers” They can therefore be seen, on the one hand, to courses or to attend seminars and conferences; be advancing the cause of democracy by acting visits by recipients to donor countries “to see fairly and “serving the public”, and yet on the how it is done” and the provision of specialist other hand, they can actively impede the demo- equipment such as forensic analyst tools, vehi- cratic process by acting in ways that are per- cles, radios and weapons. For the most part, ceived to be illegal, unjust and corrupt. this type of assistance tends to be ad hoc in The second major stimulus for encouraging nature with little donor country coordination. assistance, particularly between police forces, Separate police forces may often be operating is the perceived increase in the internationalisa- within the same country without this being tion of crime. Many types of crime, including readily apparent. In the UK, for instance, there the trafficking of illegal drugs, people and is no central coordination of assistance to coun- weapons, and money laundering, now tran- tries of the former Soviet Union.4 scend traditional country borders. Growing In attempting to understand the motivating concern over such problems has led police factor behind many assistance initiatives, one forces in different countries to seek ways of should not underestimate the philanthropic collaborating with each other in order to tackle activities of individual police officers who may what is perceived as common problems. have visited a particular country on holiday or Countries of the former Soviet Union are seen perhaps through the work of representative as a particular “risk” by Western European organisations such as the International Police policing and security agencies for the following Association. Certainly “helping fellow police reasons: they encompass large geographic areas officers” is a recurring theme and therefore bordering both Western Europe and Asian plays an important role. This phenomenon can countries, thereby facilitating the movement of also be partly explained by the increasing com- illegal drugs; they are for the most part, eco- mercialisation of policing and the opportunities nomically weak and dysfunctional; reeling available to “sell” services by responding to from the collapse of established social orders; government agency requests or by proactively and vulnerable to organised crime groups that proposing types of assistance that could be have been seen to enter the void left by the made available.5 departing Communist Party regime. The problem with many of these forms of

236 Beck assistance is that they tend to be small in scale mental aspect of community policing, namely and highly localised, with few opportunities for the provision of policing which is sensitive to broader dissemination. They also suffer to a the needs of the local community through trans- certain extent from the “we have this available parent and “human rights friendly” methods, so you can have it” approach. Potential recipi- are difficult to criticise. However, as with many ents with very few resources are highly unlike- initiatives, the devil is in the detail and many ly to refuse any offer, but there is a real danger “community policing” strategies have failed with this approach that the agenda for assis- because the realisation of the idea is often more tance is set more by what is available rather difficult than its conception. than by what is needed. In addition, if levels of crime are an indicator of the “success” of Western models of policing, 2. EXPORTING POLICING then their pedigree is at best questionable. In recent years academics and police practition- Reported crime in England and Wales has more ers, particularly from the US and the UK, have than doubled in the past ten years, and is 10 advocated a model of policing based upon their times higher than it was in 1950. Burglary and own experiences of what is usually described as assaults increased by 73% between 1981 and “community policing”. Definitions vary consid- 1995, and studies like the British Crime erably as to exactly what this term means, Surveys suggest that the real level of crime although a commonly agreed theme is the might be as high as 16 million crimes commit- development of “a new kind of relationship ted a year, with annual spending on the crimi- between the police and the public” based upon nal justice system now exceeding £10 billion.9 close consultation and cooperation.6 How this Similar problems can be seen in the US with is brought about and sustained is far more open consistently high rates of murder and gun-relat- to debate. Some of the much heralded commu- ed offences and the highest incarceration rate in nity policing initiatives such as “neighbourhood the world.10 While it would be disingenuous to watch” have been found wanting when rigor- suggest that high and increasing levels of crime ously evaluated in terms of their actual impact are directly correlated to adopted models of on levels of crime and the fear of crime.7 policing, or indeed that the police are in some Indeed, suggestions that a policing system way responsible for it, as an “advert” for over- can be imported from one country to another seas “sales”, some would argue that the product are often based on a rather rose-tinted view of is yet to fully prove its worth. the quality and effectiveness of the given system. Unfortunately, representatives from the 3. CONTEXT AND COLLABORATION US and the UK are particularly guilty of this Critical to successful international assistance is approach, especially regarding ideas concern- a thorough understanding of the context within ing community policing. As Brogden neatly which the aid is to be provided. Without a com- summarises: plete grasp of the context within which any “There is almost a unilinear perception of form of help might take place, interventions are police development … a process occurring likely to be misconstrued, mismanaged and largely independently of local policing ultimately meaningless. mandates, cultures and patterns of organisa- Understanding context requires the acquisition. What appeared to offer promise in tion of knowledge at a number of different lev- small-town America, and in the prosperous els. Potential providers need a complete grasp white suburbs, is being exported by a new of the current social, economic and political brand of academic and police salespeo- milieu within which they will be operating. ple…”8 They also need institutional level information Certainly advocates of the community policing focusing on the current structure of the police, philosophy have not been slow in advancing its culture, practices and procedures, and the the apparent value of “their” way of policing resources available to them. There is also a societies to countries experiencing transition – need to fully understand the historical frame- it has become almost a mantra to be chanted as work within which recent change has taken part of any presentation to policymakers and place and how the potential recipient of assis- police practitioners. Without doubt the funda- tance has grown over time. For example, many

237 Beck of the police forces of the former Soviet Union Based in two police districts in the city of are severely under resourced – some police Kharkiv, the project sought to investigate ways officers patrol without radios, officers in cars in which the guiding principles of community are often unable to respond to calls for assis- policing could be used to inform police reform. tance because of a lack of petrol and investigat- The first phase of the project was devoted to ing officers rarely have access to modern foren- understanding the context within which the pro- sic equipment such as DNA testing facilities. ject team would be operating. This phase lasted Virtually all police workers receive a state one year. As part of the project, public surveys wage that rarely covers the costs of living.11 were performed in each of the participating The offer therefore of a week-long seminar areas to determine current views on crime and on the use of DNA evidence in a court of law policing and expectations for the future. will undoubtedly be readily accepted but in Surveys soliciting the views of all police offi- reality its impact will at best be marginal. The cers working in the areas were also performed. vast majority of police officers participating in In addition, in-depth interviews were carried such a seminar will not have the necessary out with a random selection of police officers equipment, while significant differences in the and members of the public in order to obtain mechanics of the provider and recipient crimi- more detailed information on attitudes to crime nal justice systems will render most of the and policing.12 The research team also collect- information interesting, but largely irrelevant. ed demographic information on each of the par- Understanding context requires time and ticipating areas as well as all the crime data research, but also needs close collaboration currently available (including data for the with colleagues in the recipient country. region). Successful international assistance should be Because one of the key objectives of the pro- premised upon a close working relationship ject was to initiate change in the way the police with those targeted to receive it. Deciding force was organised and operated, various lev- whom this should be and recognising where els of collaboration were vital to the success of they currently operate and at what level within the next phase of the project, namely “scheme an organisation, are clearly highly dependent implementation”. Collaboration occurred at upon the nature of the proposed assistance. four different levels: Minister of Interior level Such factors will have a dramatic effect on the in order to receive “political” permission to nature and outcome of any collaboration. For enable experimental restructuring of the police example, while police officer-to-police officer to take place; Chief of Police for the Region contact may facilitate a good working relation- level to sanction the specific schemes being ship on matters of mutual interest concerning proposed; Chiefs of the Participating Districts particular criminal incidents, it is unlikely to in order to facilitate the implementation of the impact upon the strategic policy of each police schemes; and academics and trainers at the force in formulating protocols for future assis- University of Kharkiv to perform the context- tance. Providers therefore need to forge links specific research and design and to deliver the with contacts in appropriate organisations with necessary training programmes, to help get the the requisite authority to deliver the specified proposed schemes “off the ground”, and to aims of the intended assistance. monitor their progress. The final phase of the project is an evaluation 4. A CASE STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE period when the lessons of the project can be In 2000, a three-year project aimed at introduc- learnt and any successful practices disseminat- ing context-driven community policing in ed to as broad an audience as possible. Once Ukraine was initiated. It was based upon a again the multi-layered collaborative frame- phased approach that sought to maximise suc- work will play an important role in this process cess through a clear understanding of context – the Chief of Police for the local region and and the development of concrete collaboration. the Minister of the Interior nationally. The three phases were: While the design of the project is perhaps not • understanding the context new, it has sought to follow a number of key • implementing experimental schemes principles. The project was initiated by acade- • evaluation. mics at the University of Kharkiv approaching

238 Beck academics in the UK with the original idea. The date is extremely difficult and few completed project was firmly rooted in a thorough under- studies have sought to “measure” the impact of standing of the context, which then guided the such work. What is important to recognise is second phase of experimentation and imple- that assistance should fulfil a recipient’s specif- mentation. It made use of the experiences of ic need and may not necessarily coincide with UK police forces more as a means of offering what providers simply have available to offer. guiding principles, innovative practices, and It should also operate with a clear understand- lessons learnt in practical application, rather ing of the context within the country that is than a model to be uniformly adopted. Finally, being offered help. This requires that funding it recognised the need to seek collaboration at agencies recognise the need for research to be different levels if the project was to have any an integral part of any assistance proposal. If chance of success. this issue is not recognised, good intentions may well flounder on ignorance and inaccura- CONCLUSION cy. International assistance for crime fighting and Finally, those providing help need to work policing is a complex issue. There are now a closely with local collaborators in order to significant number of providers, ranging from enable programmes to be self-sustaining and governmental organisations to individual police capable of being disseminated to as wide an officers, operating in the international sphere. audience as possible. Accountable and transpar- Little is known about precisely who is doing ent policing that recognises the importance of what and where. Coordination within donor human rights for all groups in society is an countries is at best partial and is virtually non- ideal that all countries should strive to achieve. existent between countries. The rationale for This goal can be brought closer through well- such work ranges from political determinism to organised, sensitive and appropriate coopera- the pragmatics of policing an increasingly tion and assistance. The international communi- “open” world. ty should see this as a key priority for the new Determining the success of these activities to century.

239 Beck

ENDNOTES

1) The term transitional is used here to repre- 6) Skolnick, J. and Bayley, D. (1987) Theme sent those countries that have experienced and Variation in Community Policing, in rapid social, political and economic change M. Tonry and N. Morris (eds) Crime and although it is recognised that this interpre- Justice: A Biannual Review of Research, tation is open to debate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2) An example would be the “Good 7) Laycock, G. and Tilley, N. (1995) Policing Government” initiative that was part of the and Neighbourhood Watch: Strategic UK’s Department for International Issues, Crime Detection and Prevention Development’s Know How Fund. Series Paper No. 60, London: Home 3) Travis, J. (1998) Policing in transition, Office. Security Journal, Vol. 11, Nos. 2-3, 8) Brogden, M. (1999) Community Policing pp.151-154. as Cherry Pie, in R. Mawby (ed), Policing 4) This is partly a function of the decen- Across the World, UCL Press: London. tralised nature of the police in the UK and 9) Crawford, A. (1998) Crime Prevention and the ability of each force to develop its own Community Safety: Politics, Policies and overseas contacts without necessarily seek- Practices, Longman: London. ing permission from the Home Office. 10) Cavadino, M. and Dignan, J. (1997) The 5) Two examples from the UK of this is the Penal System: An Introduction, Sage: Thames Valley Police that now have a London. Income Generation Unit designed to raise 11) See Shelley, L. (1999) Post-Socialist funds through training, consultancy and Policing: Limitations on Institutional donations, and the Hendon Police Training Change, in R. Mawby (ed), Policing College which is involved in a long-term Across the World, UCL Press: London. project funded by the Department for 12) A report from this work is available in International Development to provide electronic format by contacting the author training and study visits for police officers via email at [email protected]. studying at the Police University in St Petersburg, Russia.

240 Attempts at Regional Response to Crime in the Ex-USSR and Eastern Europe

Valentin Yakushik

INTRODUCTION (especially trade in women), trade in children Ex-communist East European countries, and human organs, various forms of trade in including the states comprising the former stolen goods (especially cars and cultural Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), relics) and computer crime. face many similar problems and tasks concern- • Perfecting the institution of extradition, etc. ing the issue of criminal justice, among others. It would therefore be logical to assume that 1. CORRUPTION AND DECLINE OF POST- these countries – belonging to one large geo- COMMUNIST PUBLIC SERVICES graphical region and possessing extensive com- The past decade has seen a decline in the quali- mon historical backgrounds – would not only ty of public service work in a number of post- have arrived at many similar responses to exist- communist countries. This has been largely due ing challenges, but would have also undertaken to the general degeneration of many social joint regional initiatives. institutions. Criminals are often much better Among the shared challenges concerning the equipped, trained and organised, including fight against crime in East European states internationally, than the state is. The scarcity experiencing transition, the following ones and mismanagement of state resources (in par- should be mentioned: ticular, low salaries and salaries arrears) have • Institution building and/or restructuring, and forced a great number of experts in policing to in particular, adaptation to the post-commu- resign. In addition, the future generation of nist environment. This usually presupposes public servants has been discouraged or dis- real or at least formal democratisation of the suaded from pursuing careers in policing. ministry of interior, security service, office Rampant corruption has led to the intermin- of the Attorney General, investigation units, gling of “pure” criminal circles and the authori- courts, penitentiary system, etc. ties at various levels. This corruption, to a con- • Changing the outdated regulative base and siderable extent, prevents many post-commu- developing a coherent body of laws, relevant nist countries from implementing effective by-laws and other regulations governing international initiatives in some spheres. Areas police work and other related functions. This that are particularly affected are the fight would include, for example, establishing against money laundering and the detection of clear and transparent standards for policing. fraud committed by the corrupt elite. • Preparing to combat international crime and new types of crime, for example, money 2. EASTERN EUROPE AS A UNITED REGION? laundering, drug trafficking, terrorism, enlist- It is debatable whether Eastern Europe, or the ment and export of mercenaries, contracted ex-USSR, even exists as a united region. There killers and racketeers services, trade of peo- is no doubt that this political and socio-eco- ple (illegal emigrants, including modern nomic region existed during communist slave workers), the sex-for-sale industry (socialist) rule when there existed rigid region-

241 Yakushik al infrastructures and superstructures, one between East European nations is created by major centre of power and a whole set of coor- international symposiums (conferences, semi- dination and subordination ties, including with- nars, training courses, etc.), conducted or spon- in the sphere of criminal justice. The ex-com- sored by international donor organisations. munist countries have, however, all chosen dif- There exists an absence of adequate internal ferent paths of development, often with dissim- resources within relevant post-communist state ilar economic, political and cultural trajectories. institutions, as well as a lack of interest on the It would therefore be true to say that, in Eastern part of available possible internal donors. This Europe, there is a common criminality, but no is particularly true of powerful and wealthy unified approach to criminal justice practices. oligarchic structures, the respective national Most of the old traditional institutional ties are foundations and influential political parties. In broken or significantly weakened, however, the response to this lack of resources, Western new ones are only emerging or are even still donors have adopted the role of the state, waiting to appear. national bureaucracies and political elites. This The Commonwealth of Independent States is especially true in the case of creating and (CIS), a loosely based institution, plays a dual maintaining forums for the discussion of press- political role. Firstly, it acts as a mechanism for ing issues and establishing possible effective a “civilised divorce” of the former Soviet regional responses to them. republics. Secondly, it is an instrument for The most significant role in this respect is managing regional problems. Both functions played by the USAID, EU TACIS and PHARE are not very effective and often remain rather programmes, the British Council, the Canadian formal. The major CIS institutions involved in International Development Agency (CIDA), criminal justice are: the Council of Ministers of similar Dutch and German agencies and pro- the Interior (of CIS countries); the anti-terrorist grammes, and by international financial institu- centre and the centres for bilateral cooperation tions, including the World Bank, International within the relevant law enforcement agencies of Monetary Fund and the EBRD. each CIS member country. It is interesting to note that most of the for- Irrespective of the rupture of old ties and the mer Soviet republics underestimate the extent lack or weakness of new ones, the common of the positive potential of programmes pro- regional problems facing neighbouring Eastern posed by India (via its Ministry of Foreign European countries, as well as pressing global Affairs ITEC scheme) and Taiwan (through a issues, are forcing governments to seek cooper- number of channels). This attitude demon- ative and concerted solutions. In the absence of strates a rather primitive understanding of the an actual common regional centre (or centres), pro-Western orientation adopted by the majori- these actions are usually organised either ty of these new independent states, and their around the activities of universal international naïve Euro-centrism. In many cases, this Euro- organisations – especially via the National centric approach is due to the inexperience of Bureau of Interpol and the United Nations spe- senior civil servants with regard to, for exam- cial programmes and projects – or via pan- ple, an understanding of Taiwan’s real status European organisations, for example, the and its huge capacity for providing advise, Council of Europe and the Organisation for training and financial assistance. There is also a Security and Cooperation in Europe. This last lack of recognition of the necessity for diversi- organisation has been particularly instrumental fication of sources of technical and other kinds in adapting national legislation and institutions of donor assistance and partnerships with bilat- to European standards. Many similar mecha- eral cooperation. nisms function on the basis of agreements between the European Union (EU) (and its 4. COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST EUROPEAN member states) and individual East European COUNTRIES countries. With regard to the intensity and effectiveness of bilateral cooperation between East European 3. THE VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE countries, Ukrainian Interpol experts stress that An interesting mechanism for establishing the most effective is the relationship between common positions and developing regional ties Ukraine and Poland, Hungary, Moldova and

242 Yakushik

Slovakia and, quite surprisingly, not Russia. into account the major peculiarities of local Unofficially, Russia as a state is accused of political conditions. behaving in a rather arrogant fashion, and allegedly has little interest in real coordination 5. THE ROLE OF RUSSIA of policing efforts. This is despite the fact that, The role of Russia in regional cooperation at a personal professional level, Russia is the between ex-Soviet states deserves special atten- major reference for international experience for tion. After 1991, Russia’s new political elite the majority of public servants in Ukraine and implemented a specific set of policies towards the rest of the former Soviet republics. other former Soviet republics. These policies The active role played by Poland in many have combined some fairly incompatible ele- Ukrainian reform programmes, including that ments, including: of criminal justice, may be explained by several • the remnants of a traditional imperial approach major factors: • self-imposed isolationism • The personal interest of the intellectual and • cultural and political servilism towards some organisational leadership of Poland in the political trends, while ignoring core national implementation of a radical administrative interests and the norms of political moral. and general institutional reform within One of these actions, on a broader, interna- Ukraine. tional scale, was revealed by the disclosure to • Clear understanding by the Polish establish- the then apartheid South African authorities, ment and political elite of the role of Ukraine the sensitive and confidential information in its national security. regarding African National Congress (ANC) • Close historical ties of various forms and relations with the USSR with various implications. • the virtual dismantling of the country’s inter- • Relevant encouragement of Poland by its nal potential to cooperate with other post- Western partners. Soviet states. Polish experts have been used in a number of A strong post-imperial syndrome exists at top projects, in particular EU TACIS projects, as an government levels within the majority of post- additional “bridge” between the EU and the Soviet countries, with the possible exception of West in general and Ukraine. They have a good Byelorussia, Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan. This understanding of the local conditions, the lan- – combined with the conscious or subconscious guage and people’s attitudes. United States tendency of the main Western partners to limit, (US) political and cultural actors (not only the and sometimes even marginalise, Russia’s State Department, but also George Soros) pro- political and cultural role on the post-Soviet mote Poland’s role by supporting bilateral space – are the additional factors contributing Polish–Ukrainian projects. It is symptomatic to post-imperial convulsions among some cir- that, at a civil institutional level, George Soros cles of Russia’s elite, and their homologues in has attempted, via his foundations, to promote a the rest of the ex-USSR. Both extremes are similar leading role for Ukraine in Byelo- counterproductive to each individual post- russia’s reform. Soviet country, to the region, and to the world Following the collapse of the USSR at the in general. Under these conditions, a dynamic end of 1991, Turkey was encouraged by the and effective post-Soviet empire will not be West to adopt a leading role in relations with viable, and attempts to create it may become Central Asian and Caucasian post-Soviet quite dangerous. republics, since these countries are ethnically Conversely, attempts to marginalise Russia and linguistically quite similar to Turkey. The and to limit its cultural and organisational role intention was that Turkey would, to some in the post-Soviet Northern Eurasia are histori- extent, replace the traditional role of the cally doomed to failure, besides also being Russian Federation there. somewhat dangerous and destructive. However, the exercise was not altogether successful, and Russia remains culturally and CONCLUSION infrastructurally much stronger than Turkey in The future of regional cooperation in Eastern these regions. It would seem that Turkey has Europe depends mostly on the evolution of the overestimated its role and was unable to take states in this geographic area, and, to some

243 Yakushik extent, on the reassessment of the effectiveness states been wasting, not only billions of US of international assistance to these countries. In dollars worth of international assistance, but conclusion, with reference to these issues, the also the opportunity to become real actors in following questions can be raised: How was regional and global politics, including the Taiwan able to utilise US assistance so effi- sphere of criminal justice? Why do these coun- ciently in the 1950s and 1960s? How was tries so often remain simply terrains for the Poland able to drastically transform its politi- implementation of other actors’ programmes? cal and socio-economic structures in the 1990s? These questions are among the many that Why is contemporary democratic South Africa need to be addressed urgently and followed up exhibiting vivid signs of further progress within with dynamic action on the part of both the a multiracial and multicultural society? Con- post-communist governments and public, and versely, why have a number of post-Soviet the international community.

244 International and Regional Initiatives: Southern Africa Region

Peter Gastrow

INTRODUCTION programmes. Donor countries tend to support The Southern African Development Com- those countries with policing projects that have munity (SADC) is made up of 14 member the most pressing needs and that they can polit- states. They fall into the category of developing ically afford to engage with. There is a realisa- and least developed countries in which cash- tion that besides the lack of resources, those strapped police agencies are finding it difficult countries that are undergoing a transition are to fulfill many of the basic policing functions experiencing the added strain caused by the that developed countries would take for grant- weakening of state structures and insecurity ed. The different political, constitutional and about the future. This merely adds to the economic policies and programmes that are in already enormous pressure under which such place within the SADC member states make it structures operate as a result of a lack of clear that the region is far from homogeneous. resources. In the area of policing, which is cru- In Angola, a civil war has been waged for cial to managing a transition, this is particularly decades. Malawi is struggling to move from an pronounced. authoritarian one-party state towards a more In Malawi, for example, the 5000-strong open democratic society. Zimbabwe is trying to Malawi Police Service is recruiting and train- ward off mounting internal security problems ing an additional 3000 members following an and an economic collapse, while South Africa outcry from the public about crime that has and Botswana enjoy relative stability within reached uncontrollable levels. Under the pre- democratic systems. Depending on the defini- 1994 one-party rule of President Banda, crimes tion of “transition” that is applied, all of these such as armed robbery were highly unusual countries are experiencing one form of transi- occurrences. During those years the often- tion or another, even if the transition in some feared paramilitary Malawi Young Pioneers Southern African countries is not necessarily and the civilian Malawi Youth Leaguers assist- directed towards a more open democratic sys- ed the police to keep order. Their disbandon- tem or economic market economy. The word ment and demise subsequent to the country’s “transition” does in fact become a misnomer if democratisation in 1994 is regarded by many in it is used to describe any phase of political, Malawi as having created a vacuum which social or economic change. More thought criminals have exploited, resulting in steep needs to be given towards developing a defini- increases in crimes such as armed robbery, tion of “transition” that can be used as a guide- murder, car-jacking and drug dealing. line for those who wish to examine its impact Firearms, including assault rifles such as the on crime and policing. AK-47s are now readily available and are fre- As a result of the significant differences quently used by criminals. A police spokesman between states in Southern Africa, international has explained away the unacceptable levels of initiatives to assist policing in the region have crime as a sign of development. consisted largely of targeted bilateral assistance Moçambique, which is one of the poorest

245 Gastrow counties in the world, emerged from a destruc- text gives an indication of what is soon to be a tive civil war in the early 1990s with its infra- global “law” against transnational organised structure and economy in tatters. There was a crime. stage when the Moçambique Police had three The draft convention aims to promote inter- motor vehicles available to police its capital national cooperation to prevent and combat Maputo, a city of two million people. Although transnational organised crime more effectively. they are now better equipped, the Moçambique It creates offences such as participating in an police remain seriously under-resourced in the organised criminal group and the laundering of face of a steep rise in crimes such as armed rob- criminal proceeds. It provides for the confisca- bery, motor vehicle theft and drug trafficking. tion and seizure of proceeds of crime. It con- The long conflict in Moçambique, and the tains measures dealing with extradition, mutual ongoing civil war in Angola and the Demo- legal assistance, joint police investigations, spe- cratic Republic of the Congo, contributed to a cial investigative techniques, witness protec- massive proliferation of small arms in the tion, cooperation between law enforcement Southern African region. This has had a pro- agencies, and training and technical assistance. nounced impact on crime patterns with which While the draft convention constitutes the every country in the region is now struggling. most significant global response to transnation- The frequent use of firearms when committing al organised crime to date, the question needs violent crimes is a phenomenon that is being to be asked what its impact will be on policing experienced in most Southern African coun- and crime in the developing and least devel- tries. All these countries have also experienced oped states of Southern Africa once their gov- increases in organised criminal activities. ernments accede to it. The draft convention was It is against this brief background that the rel- sponsored and shaped primarily by developed evance and impact of international and regional states. For understandable reasons they brought initiatives relating to crime and policing should their resources and expertise to the negotiation be assessed. I will not refer to the bilateral process to ensure that their needs relating to the development and assistance programmes that combating of transnational organised crime are governments and their agencies from the devel- met as far as possible. It is common cause that oped world have in place with Southern many of the poor countries of the world will African police agencies. Many of these are find it very difficult to live up to the require- aimed at police reform and training. Nor will I ments of the convention because of a lack of refer to the work done by international agencies resources. And yet, those poorer countries have such as the United Nations (UN) Office for indicated that they intend to do everything pos- Drug Control and Crime Prevention, as their sible to implement it, as it will assist their fight efforts have already been referred to at this con- against transnational organised crime. The ference. Instead, I will confine myself to one added carrot that the draft convention offers is global initiative that could have an impact on international assistance to poorer countries to crime and policing in Southern African states, enable them to comply with and implement the and on one regional initiative that has emerged convention. from within the region. For developed and some developing countries such as South Africa, the fight against 1. INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE: THE DRAFT UN transnational organised crime is very high on CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL the policing agenda. They will make the neces- ORGANISED CRIME sary legislative changes and resource alloca- At the international level, 121 member states of tions to live up to and benefit from the conven- the UN recently unanimously approved the text tion. However, the question needs to be asked of a draft UN Convention against Transnational whether some of the very poor Southern Organised Crime. Representatives from a num- African states can afford to deflect scarce ber of Southern African states were present at resources that are available for conventional the meeting. Although this UN draft convention policing towards complying with the conven- still has to be adopted by the UN General tion when domestic policing is in crisis and Assembly, and thereafter signed and acceded to local crime levels are unacceptably high. by governments before it comes into effect, its It will therefore be incumbent on developed

246 Gastrow countries that want to utilise the convention to (d) To ensure efficient operation and manage- address their own domestic crime and policing ment of criminal proceeds recovered and needs to provide significant assistance to many the effective joint monitoring of cross-bor- developing and least developed states to enable der crime taking full advantage of the rele- them to implement the convention. Unless this vant facilities available through Interpol, happens, those countries in Southern Africa (e) To make relevant recommendations to gov- that face a policing crisis during their transition ernments of member countries in relation to periods could have their problems exacerbated matters affecting policing in the Southern by directing scarce resources towards initiatives African region, that are likely to be of greater benefit to devel- (f) To formulate systematic regional police oped countries than to Southern African states training policies and strategies taking into in transition. The danger therefore exists that account the needs and performance required international initiatives such as the new con- of the regional police services/forces, vention could further widen the gap between (g) To carry out any such relevant and appro- the developed and developing countries. A new priate acts and strategies for the purposes of form of “global order” in the area of crime pre- promoting regional police cooperation and vention and combating, driven by well- collaboration as regional circumstances may resourced countries, could result in developing require. countries focusing on assistance programmes Following the adoption of the SARPCCO that further the policing interests of developed Constitution, an “Agreement in respect of Co- countries more than their own. operation and Mutual Assistance in the Fields of Crime Combating” was signed in Harare on 2. REGIONAL INITIATIVE: SOUTHERN AFRICAN 1 October 1997 by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, REGIONAL POLICE CHIEFS COOPERATION Malawi, Moçambique, Namibia, South Africa, ORGANISATION (SARPCCO) Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This organisation was established in 1995 at the This agreement is in effect and has facilitated initiative of the chiefs of police from 11 the exchange of crime intelligence, evidence Southern African countries. It was motivated and expert investigators. primarily by the escalation of cross-border The SARPCCO police chiefs set about iden- criminal activity in the region. The 11 police tifying a number of priority crimes in the chiefs met on 1 August 1995 in Victoria Falls, region. Two of the key ones were motor vehicle Zimbabwe, and agreed to form SARPCCO. On thefts and trafficking in firearms. They con- 2 August 1995 the government ministers cluded that murder, car-jackings, bank rob- responsible for policing in the 11 states adopted beries, general lawlessness and banditry had the police chiefs’ recommendations. It was also experienced a major escalation in the region agreed that an Interpol Sub-Regional Bureau and that the flood of illegal weapons had con- should be established in Harare and that it tributed significantly to the escalation of these should become the Secretariat for SARPCCO. crimes. Since its establishment, SARPCCO has Article 3 of the SARPCCO Constitution organised a number of joint operations in dif- spells out the objectives of the organisation. ferent countries of Southern Africa aimed pri- Some of these are: marily at the illicit cross-border trade in stolen (a) To promote, strengthen and perpetuate co- vehicles. Hundreds of stolen vehicles have been operation and foster joint strategies for the retrieved and arrests made. The advantage of management of all forms of cross-border joint regional operations versus actions taken and related crimes with regional implica- by the police agency of one specific country tions, only, lie in the benefit of pooled resources. (b) To prepare and disseminate relevant infor- Crime intelligence from different countries is mation on criminal activities as may be nec- pooled, joint operations can succeed because of essary to benefit members to contain crime local knowledge of the environment by a com- in the region, ponent of the operation and, where necessary, (c) To carry out regular reviews of joint crime hi-tech communication and other equipment management strategies in view of changing can be provided by those countries that can national and regional needs and priorities, afford it such as South Africa.

247 Gastrow

A series of joint cross-border operations domestic policing policies of developing coun- organised by SARPCCO have also been aimed tries. It does so by ensuring that the activities of at the illicit trade in firearms. In addition to domestic police agencies also address global contributing significantly to violent crime in the needs or the needs of developed countries. This region, illicit firearms are used as a medium of is also likely to happen in some Southern exchange for illicit drugs, stolen motor vehi- African states. cles, diamonds and other goods. Large firearms A further potentially negative consequence caches have been located and destroyed in flows from the first. A poor developing country Moçambique and many illicit firearms seized in might have no option but to accept international other parts of the region. SARPCCO has also assistance, or become part of an international played a pivotal role in drafting a SADC initiative, even though some of its policing pri- Protocol on Firearms and Ammunition. This orities might have to be diverted towards protocol, once adopted by the SADC Summit, aspects that serve global interests rather than will contribute towards curbing the prolifera- immediate domestic ones. tion of arms in the region and thereby assisting Again to use Moçambique as an example: the Southern African police agencies in their task. Moçambique police have confiscated large SARPCCO has also been responsible – often quantities of narcotics smuggled into the coun- with assistance from donor countries or the UN try from the East. That country is an insignifi- Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention cant consumer of illicit drugs but it is a known – for organising joint training courses for mem- transit country. It must therefore be assumed bers of their police agencies ranging from man- that the seized drugs were in transit and on their agement issues to detective training and border way to the wealthy consumer markets of control. Europe and other more developed states. For the target countries, the activities of the crimi- CONCLUSION nal group in Moçambique that was responsible Countries in the developing world are for the trafficking of the drugs constitute a seri- inevitably the hardest hit by the dislocation and ous threat, but not necessarily so for Moçam- new pressures that arise from political and eco- bique. In terms of its domestic policing priori- nomic transition. They are also least able to ties or the national interests of Moçambique, rely on their own resources to successfully that country may well regard the activities of overcome transitional problems. This applies to the drug smugglers as less dangerous than, for policing as much as it applies to developmental example, the criminal groups that are responsi- issues. International assistance therefore plays a ble for wide-scale motor vehicle theft in that crucial role, also as far as policing is concerned, country. in assisting developing countries to overcome Should Moçambique accede to the new UN transitional problems. However, such reliance Convention against Transnational Organised exposes developing countries to some poten- Crime, its international obligations may well tially negative consequences. require it to allocate more of its scarce policing One of them is that the assistance provided, resources to combat international drug traffick- or the international initiative undertaken, might ing than it would have done if domestic polic- not necessarily be designed primarily to meet ing priorities had been the criteria. Should this the needs of the country concerned effectively: happen, it is likely to impact negatively on the that is, the needs as its government and citizens ability of law enforcement to police the transi- might perceive them. Global criteria, that are tion effectively. Although developing countries often more in line with the needs of developed are dependent on international assistance, and countries, have a strong influence on the nature although it is normally in their interest to of the assistance that is provided by internation- become part of international instruments such al programmes. The developed world – often as the new convention, the resultant new rela- the driving force behind bilateral and multilat- tionships and obligations come with mixed eral assistance programmes and international blessings. The increasing dependency on donor initiatives such as the new Convention against funding as well as the problem of sustaining Transnational Organised Crime – is therefore such programmes in the longer term are some increasingly playing a role in impacting on the of the inevitable negative consequences flow-

248 Gastrow ing from international assistance to developing SARPCCO, carries fewer risks and is more countries. likely to address such needs. If developed coun- The domestic policing needs of poorer countries could strengthen such regional initiatives, tries, particularly those undergoing a transition, their contributions are more likely to assist the therefore need to be uppermost in the minds of police in coping with crime in transition than all the parties concerned. It would appear that a would be the case with some of the ad hoc well thought out regional initiative, such as bilateral assistance programmes.

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