ICPSR Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, 1800-1986
Ted Robert Gurr
ICPSR 9263
This document was previously available in paper format only. It was converted to Portable Document Format (PDF), with no editing, on the date below as part of ICPSR’s electronic document conversion project, supported in part by the National Science Foundation (SBR-9617813). The document may not be completely searchable. No additional updating of this collection has been performed.
September 1999
ICPSR Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, 1800-l 986
Ted Robert Gurr
ICPSR 9263
POLITY II: POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND REGIME CHANGE, 1800-1986
(ICPSR 9263)
Principal Investigator
Ted Robert Gurr University of Colorado, Boulder
First ICPSR Edition Winter 1990
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research P.O. Box 1248 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
BIBLIOGRAPHIC CITATION, ACKNOWLEDGMENTOF ASSISTANCE AND DATA DISCLAIMER
ALL manuscripts utilizing data made available through the Consortium should acknowledge that fact as well as identify the original collector of the data. In order to get such source acknowledgment listed in social science bibliographic utilities, it is necessary to present them in the form of a footnote. The bibliographic citation for this data collection is:
Gurr, Ted R. POLITY II: POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND REGIME CHANGE, 1800-1986 [Computer file]. Boulder, CO: Center for Comparative Politics [producer], 1989. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1990.
The ICPSR Council also urges all users of ICPSR data to follow some adaptation of the following assistance/disclaimer statement, with the parentheses indicating items to be filled in appropriately or deleted by the individual user.
The data (and tabulations) utilized in this (publication) were made available (in part) by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for POLITY II: POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND REGIME CHANGE, 1800-1986 were originally collected and prepared by Ted Robert Gurr. Neither the collector of the original data nor the Consortium bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.
In order to provide funding agencies with essential information about use of archival resources and to facilitate the exchange of information about ICPSR participants' research activities, each user of ICPSR data resources is expected to send two copies of each completed manuscript or thesis abstract to the Consortium. Please indicate in the cover Letter which data were used.
DATA COLLECTION DESCRIPTION Ted Robert Gurr POLITY II: POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND REGIME CHANGE, 1800-1986 (ICPSR 9263)
SUMMARY: Carried out under the auspices of the Data Development for International Research (DDIR) project, POLITY II was designed to develop longitudinal indicators of political structures and regime change. This file encompasses most member states of the international system from 1800 to 1986, and consists of annual codings of regimes' structural characteristics, institutional changes, and the directionality of changes on underlying dimensions of democracy, autocracy, and power concentration. CLASS IV
UNIVERSE: Annual observations from 1800 to 1986 of 20 historical countries and 132 contemporary countries encompassing virtually all independent countries with populations of one million or more in the 1980s. NOTE: This collection succeeds an earlier study by the principal investigator and Erica Gurr titled POLITY DATA: PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS, 1980-1971 (ICPSR 5010). Each case represents a country-year observation. The data contain blanks and other nonnumeric codes.
RESTRICTIONS: Copies of pre-publication papers using the POLITY II dataset should be sent to the authors of the related publication cited below.
EXTENT OF COLLECTION: 1 data file DATA FORMAT: Card Image and SPSSX EXPORT file
Part 1: Card Image File Part 2: SPSSX EXPORT File File Structure: rectangular Cases: 12,459 Cases: 12,459 Record Length: 80 Variables: 54 Record Length: 80 Records Per Case: 4
RELATED PUBLICATION: Gurr, Ted R., Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore. "The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power since 1800." STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (forthcoming).
July 6, 1989
TedFbbertGurr KeithJaggers Will H. Moore Center for CIkmpamtive Fblitics Deprbwnt of Political Science University of Colorado cempus Box 333 Baulder, 00 80309
Piarch 20, 1990
To: POLITY II Users From: Will H. Moore, Keith Jaggers & Ted Robert Gurr Re: Minor Errors
Through feedback from a number of you as well as our own analyses we have discovered a number of minor errors in the POLITY II data. Rather than redistribute the data via tapes and diskettes we have decided to circulate a memo which details the errors and leave it to you to make the corrections.
THE FU&GWINGCHANGKS SHOULDBE MADE:
United Province of Central America (0891, 1838 - CHANGEshould be 2 (from .). Columbia (1001, 1853 - CHANGEshould be 4 (from 1). Paraguay (X0), 1985-86 - PAMXMP should be 2 (from 7). Denmark (390), 1866 and 1945 - CHANGKshould be . (i.e., missing) (from 0). Nigeria (475), 1978 - CHANGEshould be 2 (from .) and Scope should be 88 (from 2). Lesotho (5701, 1983-86 - REGION should be 23 (from 3). Elotswana (5711, 1986 - RGGIGN should be 23 (from .). . Ottoman Rnpire/Turkey (640), 1919-1922 -The AUTHORITYCHARACI'lBSISTICS during the transition from the Ottoman Empire to Turkey during the years 1919- 1921 should be 77 (from .). For 1922 they should be 88 (from .). All of the other variables should remain as coded. ban (6981, 1970 - CHANGEshould be 4 (from .). Korea (730), 1876 - #is year is entered twice. Australia (920), 1965-67 - REGION should be 3 (from .).
AURX! & DEMOCDURING POLITY TR4NSITIONS/IWICBJS/INTKRKEGNUMS:
When there is a polity interruption or interregnum (i.e., authority characteristics = 66, 77, or 88) both AUTUC snd DEMGCare coded as zero. It makes sense to change these to a missing value such as 99.
'II-ERE ARE 'IWO CASES THAT ARK MISSING:
1. The year 1977 is missing for Sierra Leone (451). The Polity data are the ssme as 1976 except DIP which changes from 7 to 6. The economic data are missing.
THE VARIABLKS ARE LISTED INTHE FULIBWINGORDER:
LINE 2: TERM1 TKRM2 TERM3 TKfU'l4 ORIGl GFUG2 ORIG3 oRIG4 CRIGS MODEL DIR AU'IUC DEMOC LINE 3: CCNCENINSTCH COHERPEFBISTCNAME REGTYPE coupS CGNCHGCHIEFKXPREMIEK ~EMsELM=PARLCABsI~CcABcHGMcHG~LEGsELM=~CNGM: XCURNGFtEVRCUR LINE4:NACl'SATYPEACURSOUFtCEXRSD@lVAL YEAR.: 1977 451 23 3 2 4 1 3 0 3 3 2 6 . TEm1: ., . i 2'3 ' . . .
CONCEN: 2' 1 l 16 SIERRA LEtl 100212222010 2 21 . . NACl'S: . . . .
2. Guinea-Bissau (404) is missing. The Polity begins in 1974.
THE VARIABLES ARE LISTED IN THE J!0LJ,oWINGORDER:
LINEl: YEARCCODEREGIONXRREG~X&OPENm3NOX~STPARREGPARCOMP~ SCOPE CHANGE LINE 2: TERM1 TERM2 TERM3 =4 ORIGl ORIGZ ORIG3 ORIG4 ORIGS MODEL DIR AU'lQC DEMCZ LINE 3: C0NCEN INS'ICHC0HERPERSISTCNAMEFaGTYPECOUPS -CHIEFEXpREiMIER ExrypEExs~cPARLcABsIzEcABcHGMcHGLEGEFwEGsELEcLM;ELEcNGM- . XaJR NGREVRCUR LINE4:NA~ATYPEACURSOUFCEXRSDOMVAL
YEAR: 1974 404 23 2 1 4 3 3 0 4 1 1 5 1 TEEN : 3 .
* 3 i 7'1 l (.xMcEN:' 5 1 GUINEA-B'AU 1 0 1 9 1 1 120 . . -: . . . .
YEAR: 1975 404 23 2 14 3 30 4 1 1 3 TEmll: : . . .
. '7 ; 1 l CXINCEN: 5 l 1 1 1 GUINEA-B'AU 1 0 119 10 12 0 . . Ni4C.E: . . . .
YEAH: 1976 404 23 2 1 4 3 30 4 1 1 1 4 TEFM: 3 . . . . 3 i 9'7 i CONCEN: 5 1 1 GUINEA-B'AU 1 0 0 212 3 121 0 0 120 . . NACTS: . . . .
YEAR: 1977 404 23 2 1 4 3 3 0 4 1 1 1 TERM: : . . . . . ' 9 i 1'
CXINCEN: 5 l 1 1 GUINEkB'AU 1 0 0 212 2 116 0 0 121 . NACXS: . . . .
YEAR: 1978 404 23 2 1 4 3 3 0 4 1 1 1 TERMl: : ......
. l 9 7 1
CONCEN: 5 l 1 2 GUINEA-B’AU 1 0 0 2 1 2 2 117 10 1 2 0 . . NACTS: . . .
YEAR: 1979 404 23 2 1 4 3 30 4 1 1 1 . !rEF?Ml: ...... ’ 9 7 1 CONCEN: 5 ’ 1 3 GUINEA-B’AU 1 0 0 2 1 2 2 119 0 0 1 2 0 . . NACTS: . . . .
YEAR: 1980 404 23 1 3 3 0 4 1 1 1 4 . TERMl: . 1 . . . 1 0 9 5 ’ -: 4’ 3 GUINEA-B’AU 3 1 1 3 2 4 3 013 11 0 0 0 . . NACTS: . . . .
YEAR: 1981 404 23 1 3 3 0 4 1 1 1 . TERMl: ...... 9 5
CONCEN: 4 l 1 GUINEA-B’AU 3 0 0 3 2 4 3 016 10
0 0 0 . .
NA(;Ts: . . l .
YEAR: 1982 404 23 1 3 3 0 4 1 1 1 . ml?Ml: ...... 9 5
CONCEN: 4 l 2 GUINESB’AU 2 0 0 3 1 4 3 121 10
0 0 0 . .
NACIS: . . . .
YlL4.R: 1983 404 23 1 3 3 0 4 1 1 1 TERMl: : , . . . . . l 9 il
CONCEN: 4 l 3 GUINIXA-B’AU -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 - 9 -9 -9 -9
-9 -9 -9 . .
NACTS:
YEAR: 1984 io4 23 2’ ’ ‘1 3 0 4 1 1 2 TEmll: : i ...... ’ 8 mcm : 5 ‘3 4 GUINEA+jt’AU -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 .,:s., . . .’
.
-9 -9 -9 . . NACTS: . . . .
YEAR: 1985 404 23 2 1 3 0 4 1 1 2 . TEuMl: ......
CoNcw:' 5 . '8 i5 GUINEA-B'AU -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 . . NACTS: . . . .
YEAR: 1986 404 23 2 1 3 0 4 1 1 3 .
TEuMl: . l ...... 7 i CONCEN: 5 '1 6 GUINEA-B'AU -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 . . NA(ITS: . . . . I. OVERVIEWOFF0LITY II PROJECT1
Carriedout under theauspices of theData Developntfor International Research (DDIR) project, the objective of the POLITY II studv was to develop longitudinal indicators of political structures and regime change. Encompassing most member states of the international system from 1800 to 1986, this dataset consists of annual codings of regimes' structural characteristics, institutional changes, and the directionality of changes on underlying dimensions of democracy, autocracy, and power concentration.
The present study builds on the first author's earlier study of "Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971," which used a more restricted dataset of the same kind to determine which authority traits characterized the more durable political systems, in different regions and in different historical periods (Gurr, 1974). In the POLITY I study the unit of analysis was the "polity" or political system, each of which was described in terms of six dimensions of authority patterns. When a polity was transformed by an abrupt, major change on one or more of these authority characteristics, we treated the change as the termination of the old polity and the establishment of a new one. The dependent variables in the analysis were the persistence and adaptability of each historical and contemporary polity. The measure of persistence was the number of years a polity endured without abrupt, major change: adaptability was the number of minor and gradual changesin a polity's authority traits during its lifespan. We found, not surprisingly, that the most durable polities were ones which had undergone a number of minor or gradual changes in authority characteristics. Another significant finding was that polities which had internally consistent ("coherent") democratic or autocratic traits tended to be more durable than polities characterized by mixed authority traits. Only in Europe, however, were democratic regimes significantly more durable than autocracies. Among historical polities--those no longer functioning in 1971--the relationship was reversed: autocracies had been more durable than democracies.
Some of these findings were confirmed, others qualified in subsequent reanalyses of the PQLITY I data by Ward (1974), Harmel (1980), Lichbach (19841, and Thiessen and Bays (1986). Harmel found that when heemployed more restrictive definitions of abrupt polity change, democracies proved to have been more persistent and adaptable than autocracies, historically and in most regions as well as the contemporary world. Whereas the other analyses were cross-sectional and cross-regional, Lichbach was concernedwith s equences of Political change in 49 historical andcontemporary European states. He foti no evidence that European states as a group followed similar patterns of change over time with respect to any one authority trait. He did find, however, that "Incoherent polities tended, eventually, to become coherent. Coherent polities tended to remain that way. That is, incoherent polities were short-lived experiments while coherent polities were longer-lived systems" (Lichbach 1984: 137). In other words there was no cotmnon, unidirectional movement in European societies toward
l Jeff Ringer, Dick Andrews, and Leslie Babski contributed to the preparation of the Polity II dataset, in addition to the authors of this Codebook. Mark Irving Lichbach (University of Illinois, Chicago) and Zeev Maoz (New York University) provided helpful advice on the structure of the dataset and a draft of the codebook.
1 coherent democracies. Rather, there was a century-long process of political experimentation in which the surviving polities gradually bifurcated into two sharply distinct groups: coherent democracies and coherent autocracies.
It ~8s difficult to use the original polity dataset for longitudinal analyses because of its structure: each polity's authority pattern was profiled only twice, one at its inception and once at its termination. beginning in 1986 we began to work on a new dataset, POLITY II, in which authority traits are coded annually. This has required mOre thorough screening of historical sources to identify and code minor changes in authority traits. At the same time the dataset has been undated to 1986 and a number of additional countries added. As presently constituted, the dataset encompasses 132 contemporary countries, including virtually all of those whose present population approaches or exceeds one million. The long-established members of the international system are coded beginning in 1800. More recently-established countries are coded for the year in which their first independent government was formed--usually the year of independence' sometimes a few years earlier or later. The polities of 20 historical Eurasian countries also are included, that is, countries like the ottoman Kmpire, Bavaria, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which once enjoyed independence but subsequently broke up or were absorbed by others.
The POLITY II dataset also incorporates some conceptual changes. Nine authority traits, identified below, are coded for each polity in contrast with the six traits coded in POLITY I. And more precise operational guidelines have been devised for coding institutional developments during periods of transition from one authority pattern to another.
The authority traits coded in the POLITY II dataset for 152 countries can be analyzed in alternative ways. Kach of the d'imensions of authority can be examined separately, a procedure Lichbach (1984) followed using the POLITY I dataset to study historical sequences of political develomt in Europe. Alternatively, these 'indicators are amendable to creating composite scores. In our initial analysis of POLITY II we have constructed three composite indicators of general properties of political systems: democracy, autocracy, and the centralizationof power (Gurr, Jaggers and Moore, 1988). These indicators, coded annually, are included in the F0LITY II dataset.
The POLITY II dataset also incorporates 14 variables from Arthur S. Banks' 1986 version of the Cross-Polity Time-Series dataset, documenting a variety regime characteristics. Moreover,fiscalandnationalaccountsdataarealsoincludedinthe dataset to enable researchers to perform longitudinal and/or cross-sectional analyses of thechanges in gove rnment involvement in national economic activity. The three main variables are gove rnwnt expenditures, governmen t revenues, and national accounts.
2 II. INBEX1oVARIABLgs INfXUXD IN THE POLITY II DATASEP
Nine groups of variables are included in the POLITY II dataset. They are listed here and described in detail below. !f!!sE (1) SPATIAL-TMKRALaDcplwN ------^------5 1.1 YEAR: Year (F4.0) _--____------5 1.2 CCQDE: Country Code (F3.0) ------5 1.3 CNTRYEAR: Country Code and Year (F7.0) _____----___------5 1.4 REGION: Region C&e (Fz,O)------5
(2) BASICAUIWXWIY -IsqyW (-JF poLI= ------6 2.1 XRREG: Regulation of Executive Recruitment (F2.0) ---d------w-- 9 2.2 XRCCW': Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (F2.0) ------e--e-- 10 2.3 XROPEN: Openness of Executive Recruitment (F2.0) ------__--- 11 2.4 MOW: Monocratism (F2.0) ------c------~~~~--~~~~---~~-- 13 2.5 XCONST: Executive Constraints (F2.0) ____-----__------14 2.6 PARREG: Regulation of Political Participation (F2.0) ------17 2.7 PARcxiwz Competitiveness of Political Participation (F2.0)------18 2.8 CENT: Centralization of Political Authority (F2.0) ------21 2.9 SCOPE: Scope of Government Activities (F2.0) ------21
(3) mm@'ImflC)N OF MAJC& m PoLITy m _-___---__------26 3.1 CHANGE: Polity C-e (Fz.O)------30
(4) EimTs IrelImATELY HzEcEDING/cAusING POLITY TEFuaNATIm ------31 4.1 TEFH: Old Polity, Loss of Autonow (F1.O) ---_------31 4.2 TERM2: Old Polity, External Conflict (F1.O) ___-----_------31 4.3 TEFM3: Old Polity, Domestic Violence (F1.O) -__------31 4.4 TERMI?: Old Polity, No Domestic Violence (F2.0) --____------32
(5) m SIMFy-JJqG poLITy mmc)N ------33 5.1 ORIGl: New Nation, Polity Origin (F1.O) -----__------33 5.2 ORIG2: New Nation, Polity Birth (F1.O) -----^------33 5.3 ORIG3: Old Nation, External Conflict (F1.O) -__------34 5.4 oRIG4: Old Nation, mstic Violence (Fl.O)------34 5.5 ORIG5: Old Nation, No Domestic Violence (F1.O) ------35 5.6 MODEL: Model for New Nation (F2.0) ------___^______35
* Variables are listed using the alpha labels that appear on the tape. Variable formats are given in parentheses.
3 (6) mIa= m m, AvIocRAcy ANl) STAm m _-_---___-_____------36 6.1 AU'lQC: Institutionalized Autocracy (F2.0) ------_------~~~~- 37 6;2 DEMGC: InstitutionaJized Democracy (F2.0) ------38 6.3 cX!NCEN: Power Concentration (F2.0) ------39 6.4 COHER: Coherence of Political Institutions (Fl.O)------40 (7) mmIoN& ~~~IL-jJy ANT) -I------____I_____ 41 7.1 INSTCB: Nmber of Institutional Changes (FZ.O)------41 7.2 PERSIST: Polity Persistence (F3.0)------41
(8) CgMRAL mm-,KEvENuIss &NATIoNAL------41 8.1 NGEX: Government Eqpfit-es (~8,2)------43 8.2 XCUR: &pa&j-me Currency (~6)~------44 8.3 NGREV: Government Revenues (F8.2) ------_------46 8.4 RCUR: &venue Currency (AS)------46 8.5 NACI'S: National &counts (F8,2)------46 8.6 ATYPE: Type of National Amounts (A3)------46 8.7 AGUE: National Accounts Currency (As)------46 8.8 souR.cE: Sowe of Economic j)ah (Fz.O)------47 8.9 IXIMVAL: EScchange Rate (~6,5)------47 8.10 XRS: &change &te Some (Fl,O)------48
(9) BANKS’ RXITY mmm ------48 9.1 REGTYPE: Type of Regime (F2.0) ------~~~~~--~~~~-----~~- 48 9.2 coups: N&ber of Coups d'Etat (F2.0) ------se--e------e- 49 9.3 CONCHG: Number of Major Constitutional Changes (F2.0) --_----_---w----m- 49 9.4 GBIEFEX: Hea of State (F2.0)------49 9.5 PREMIER: Premier (F2.0) __------49 9.6 EXTYF'E: Effective Executive (Type) (F2.0) ------49 9.7 ExsELEc: Effective lkecutive (Selection) (F2.0) ____---_-_------es 50 9.8 PARL: parliamentary Responsibility (F2.0)------50 9.9 CABSIZE: Size of Cabinet (F2.0) _--^___-----_------_------w------m- 50 9.10 CABGBG: Number of Major Cabinet Changes (F2.0) ------50 9.11 EXCBG: Number of Changes in Effective Executive (F2.0) ------51 9.12 LEGEF: Legislative Effectiveness (F2.0) ------51 9.13 LEGmLEc: Legislative Selection (F2.0) _--____-----__------51 9.14 LEGELEC: Nmber of kgislative Elections (F2.0) ---_------51
AlTBlDlX A: CUMRYcxl[DEsANDDATA~ ------L---_I______52
APPENDIX B: aummMIssINGAND Bm DATA ____-_----______-_-- 69
APPENDIX c: was CITED ------70 4a
ICPSR Note 30/11/89
The table below gives variable locations within the card-image datafile:
Variable Ret St ,art End Format
YEAR 1 4 F4.0 CCODE 1 i 8 F3.0 CNTRYEAR 1 10 16 F7.0 REGION 1 19 F2.0 XRREC 1 :; 22 F2.0 XRCOMP 24 26 F2.0 XROPEN : 27 28 F2.0 MONO 1 30 31 F2.0 XCONST 1 33 34 F2.0 PARREG 1 36 37 F2.0 PARCOMP 1 39 40 F2.0 CENT 1 42 43 F2.0 SCOPE 1 45 46 F2.0 CHANGE 1 48 49 F2.0 TERM1 1 1 F1.O TERM2 : 3 3 F1.O TERM3 2 6 6 F1.O TERM4 2 7 8 F2.0 ORIGl 2 10 10 Fl.O ORIC2 12 12 Fl .0 ORIC3 ; 14 14 F1.O ORIC4 2 16 16 Fl .0 ORIC5 18 F1.O MODEL G :: 21 F2.0 AUTOC 2 23 24 F2.0 DEMOC 2 28 27 F2.0 CONCEN 29 30 F2.0 COHER s 33 F2.0 INSTCH 2 :: 36 F2.0 PERSIST 2 39 41 F3.0
NGEX 3 1 8 F8.2 XCUR 3 10 16 A6 NCREV 3 17 24 F8.2 RCUR 3 26 31 NACTS 3 33 40 ::.2 ATYPE 3 42 44 A3 ACUR 3 46 51 A6 SOURCE 53 54 F2.0 DOMVAL 3 56 61 F6.5 XRS 3 63 63 F1.O REGTYPE 4 1 2 F2.0 COUPS 4 4 6 F2.0 CONCtiG 4 7 8 F2.0 CHIEFEX 4 10 11 F2.0 PREMIER 4 13 14 F2.0 EXTYPE 4 16 17 F2.0 EXSELEC 4 19 20 F2.0 PARL 4 22 23 F2.0 CABSIZE 4 25 26 F2.0 CABCHG 4 28 29 F2.0 EXCHG 4 31 32 F2.0 LEGEF 4 34 35 F2.0 LEGSELEC 4 37 38 F2.0 LECELEC 4 40 41 F2.0
III. DESCNXTION CT VARIABL&s ANDamNG~
1. SPATIAL-THYRXALlXMAIN
ThePOLITY II study includes all independentmembers of the international system, as defined in the Correlates of War project, with some modifications. (1) For inclusion states must have achieved independence by 1975 and have a population greater than l,OOO,OOO in the 1980s. (2) Authority characteristics (variables 2.1-2.9) are coded annually beginning in 1800, for states that were then independent (even if they were not yet members of the international system, as defined in the CXN project), or from the year in which the state first .gained effective autonomy (which in some cases is earlier than the year in which system membership begins). Coding ceases when a state is occupied or absorbed by another, and resumes if a state regains its independence. (3) Fiscal and national accounts estimates (variables 8.1-8.10) are coded, insofar as they are available, during the period of independence, as defined above. They are not recorded for periods of colonial rule or foreign occupation.
A complete list of states, country codes, andthe time-spans for which each group of variables is coded is provided in Appendix A.
1.1 YEAR
A four digit code is used.
1.2 COUNTRYCODE
Each country in the POLITY II dataset is defined by a three-digit numeric code, derived from the Correlates of War's listing of nation members of the interstate system, 1816-1986.
1.3 COUNTRYYEAR
A unique identifier for each country year, consisting of the country code followed by the year. This variable was created to facilitate merging.
1.4 REGION: Region Code
KEGIcNamE AREA 01 Western Europe: Scsndinavia, Germany and the German States, Austria, (but not Hungary except as part of the Au&m-Hmgary mire), Italy and its predecessors, and all countries to the west of them including Iceland.
02 EasternEurope: All continental European countries to the east of the above, including latvia,Estonia, Iiithuania,andtisia, but excluding Turkey. REGIoNcollE ARGA COUNIRIES 03 European-Settled U.S., Canada, S.Africa, Australia, Countries: Australia,NewZealand, Israel, Cyprus
11 Continent-al South American countries, Latin America: Venezuela and south.
12 Other Latin Mexico, Central American countries, America: Latin Caribbean countries, Haiti, Jamaica.
21 south and East Pakistan and all continental Asian Asia: and island states to the east of Pakistan to Japan, Philippines and Indonesia inclusively.
22 Near and Middle All Islamic countries from Aghanistsn East, North to Morrocco, including Turkey and Africa: Lektanon,but excludingIsraelandsuch Saharan and sub-Saharan states as Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania, etc.
23 Black Africa: saharan and sub-saharan African countries, including Madagascar and Mauritiusbut excluding South Africa.
A complete regional breakdown is provided in Appendix A.
2. RASICAITlWWTY cIWWXWuSTIcSoFIOLITIW
Theconceptual framework for the polity studies was derived from Harry Eckstein's analytic scheme for describing patterns of authority. The scheme was designed "to applyto authority patterns inany and all socialunits, regardless of variations...and regardless of whether the units exhibit great or little overall asymmetry between superordinates and subordinates" (F&stein and Gurr 1975, p.41). It identifies six different clusters of dimensions on which authority patterns vary, including four dimensions of influence relations between superordinate and subordinate strata (Directiveness, participation, Responsiveness, and Compliance); two dimensions of inequality between these strata (Distance and Deportment); three dimensions characterizing relations among superordinates (Conformation, Decision-Rules, and Decision-Behavior); the Competitiveness of recruitment to superordinate positions; and the Bases of legitimacy, whether personal, substantive or procedural. A number of these dimensions consist of several subdimensions. The polarities of each dimension are identified, along with intervening categories on them.
This complex scheme permits far more detailed analysis and more subtle distinctions among authority patterns than does a simple democratic-autocratic continuum. On the other hand, only some of its distinctions are relevant to our understanding of differences among political systems, and not all of these can be
6 assessed operationally over the long historical run. Consequently the FQLI!lY II project focuses on nine operational indicators of political authority patterns, with special attention to the Influence dimensions, the Recruitment of chief executive, and aspects of Conformation, i.e., governmental structure.
Using multiple historical sources for each country, along with reference to a variety of standard sources, the nine operational indicators of authority characteristics were elaborated into a series of ordinal scales. These scales are interpreted below. First, a brief discussion on the standardized codes used across all of these variables is in order.
A score of "88" in variables 2.1-2.9 indicates a period of transition. Some new polities are preceded by a "transition period" during which new institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put into effect. Democratic and quasi-democratic polities are particularly likely to be so established, in a procedure involving constitutional conventions and referenda. During this period of transition, a.& authority characteristic indicators are scored "88". Two examples:
1) In Argentina, after 6 years of state terrorism, economic decline and, finally, the humiliating defeat in the Falklands war, the military junta wasdissolved in June 1982. Headed by retiredGenera Bignone, the interim government established a dialogue with the major political parties and promised to hold elections in October 1983. Competitive elections were held in October and Raul Alfonsin was inaugurated in December 1983. The transitional period is the period from June, 1982, through October, 1983. However, operationally, only 1982 is coded as the transition period. Constrained by our use of an annual time-series format, transition periods are only coded if the new polity is formally established in a different year than that of the previous polity's demise. An "88" is entered in the year of the polity's demise rather than the yew of its origin, regardless of the month in which either event occurred.
2) Cuba, in the imediate post-revolution years, demonstrates that an individual's attempt to consolidate power can also result in periods of transition. In January 1959 Fidel Castro and his rebel troops captured Santa Clara, Santiago and Havana, forcing Batista to resign and flee the country. Manuel Urrutia was named provisional president by Castro shortly thereafter. It was not until December 1961 that Castro declared himself aMarxist4.eninis-t and announced the formation of a unified party to bring (ITammcsm to Cuba. Thus, 1959 and 1960 are coded as transitional years.
When using the "88" code, the question of whether a new polity has been formed must be decided before dealing with the question of when. The criteria for operationally determining a "polity change" are discussed below (pp. 00-00).
A score of "66" in variables 2.1-2.9 represents a period of "interruption". Operationally, if a country is occupied by foreign powers during wartime, terminating the old polity, then reestablishes a polity after foreign occupation ends, we code the intervening years as an interruption if the pre-war polity is reestablished. However, if the post-war polity is fundamentally different from the prewar polity then we code this as an interregnum ("77"). Periods of interruption are also coded for the participants involved in short-lived attempts at the creation of ethnic, religious,
7 or regional federations. During periods of interruption a&authority characteristic indicators are coded "66".
"77" in variables 2.1-2.9 indicates periods of interregnum, during which there is a complete collapse of central political authority. This is most likely to occur during periods of internal war. Lebanon between 1978 and 1986--in which internal factionalism, civil war, and external military intervention has at times reduced the scope of the regime's central authority to a few square blocks of Beruit--is a recent example of an interregnum. During an interregna1 period, & variables of authority characteristics are coded "77". Moreover, like the "88" and "66" codes, a "77" is entered for the year in which the interregnum began, regardless of the month of its origin, and for each year prior to the year in which central authority is regained or a new polity is established. Two caveats are associated with the "77" code:
1) If the interregna1 period results in the formation of a new polity, and it is less than ayear, the period is usually incorporated without separate mention in the "transition period" of the next polity.
2) If a country is occupied by foreign powers during wartime, terminating the old polity, then reestablishes a polity after foreign occupation ends, the intervening years are coded as an interregnum if a "new" polity is established.
For variables 2.1-2.9, missing data is denoted by "99".
Before discussing these variables in detail, a brief word on the reliability of the authority codings is in order. The reliability of the indicators developed here depends on the accuracy and consistency of the coding of the constituent authority variables. The POLITY I data were collected in the mid-1970s by a single coder, Erika B. K. Gurr, who worked with increasingly refined versions of category definitions and coding guidelines. Cn three occasions all information gathered to date was reviewed and recoded by the coder, in consultation with the first author, to ensure its consistency with revised guidelines. Multiple historical sources were used for each country, along with reference to a variety of standard sources. The first step was to identify historical andsocial science works for each country, then to compile from them a basic political chronology. Periods of substantial change were identified in this process and then examined in detail to determine whether events met the specified criteria for changes in and of polities. The same sources provided information for the coding of authority characteristics.
The POLITY I Codebook, dataset, and narrative su5nar ies of the political chronologies for each polity, with source lists , were deposited with and subsequently distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Gurr and Associates, 1978). The reliability of authority codings have been taken as a given by most of the investigators who have used them in secondary analyses. The principle exception is Lichbach (1984), who detected some ambiguities about the timing of minor changes in authority traits when converting the European codings to time-series form. He resolved them by further reading in historical sources. The construction of POLITY II was begun by Mark Lichbach, who converted the remaining POLITY I codings to annual data, and CompletedbyKeith Jaggers, who recoded and extended the dataset using a wide variety of historical and contemporary source materials. The first author reviewed much of the coding, with special attention to questions of consistency, and (relcoded
8 Directiveness for all polities. The POLITY II coding guidelines were amplified and refined in the process.
No intercoder reliability tests have been carried out. We are reasonably confident that the coding guidelines have been applied consistently, because they were developed and used by four people who worked with them intensively and over a long period of time. The fact that coding was done by four individual also lends confidence that the judgments do not reflect the idiosyncratic interpretations of one individual- -and if they do, the idiosyncracies are explicit in the coding guidelines and thus subject to revision by other scholars.
The related question is whether the sources examined prior to coding were sufficiently complete and accurate. This is a potential threat to the reliability and validity of the codings for some minor European and Latin American states during the nineteenth century for which sourcematerials are scarce. Accurate coding of Executive Constraint, for example, requires political analyses with a depth not often included in summary histories. A few of the predecessor states of Imperial Germany that nominally qualify for inclusion in POLITY I and II were not coded for lack of adequate English-language sources.
EXEWTNE RECRUITMEKT (vars. 2.1 to 2.3)
According to Eckstein and Gurr,
Ejcecutive recruitment involves the ways in which superordinates come to occupy their positions . ..In current sociological jargon this is a species of 'boundary interchange," amatter of crossing lines between superordinate and subordinate positions (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:150).
ThePOLITY II dataset contains three indicators of the structural characteristics by which chief executives are recruited: (1) the extent of institutionalization of executive transfers, (2) the competitiveness of executive selection, and (3) the openness of executive recruitment.
2.1 XRREG: Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment
In considering Recruitment, we must first determine whether there are any established modes at all by which chief executives are selected. Regulation refers to the extent to which a polity has institutionalized procedures for transferring executive pawer. Three categories are used to differentiate the extent of institutionalization:
(1) ®ulate&Changes in chief executive occur through forceful seizures of power. Suchcaesaristic transfers of powerare sometimes legitimized after the fact in noncompetitive elections or by legislative enactment. Despite these "legitimization" techniques, a polity remains unregulateduntil the de facto leader of the coup has been replaced as head of government either by designative or competitive modes of executive selection. However, unregulated recruitment does not include the occasional forceful ouster of a chief executive if elections are called within a reasonable time and
9 the previous pattern continues.
(2) Desimational/transitional: Chief executives are chosen by designation within the political elite, without formal competition (i.e., one-party systems or %igged" multiparty elections). Also coded here are transitional arrangements intended to regularize future power transitions after an initial unregulated seizure of power (i.e., after constitutional legitimization of military rule or during periods when the leader of the coup steps down as head of state but retains unrivaled power within the political realm as head of the military). This category also includes polities in transition from designative to elective modes of executive selection (i.e., the period of "guided democracy" often exhibited during the transition from military to civilian rule) or vice versa (i.e., regimes ensuring electoralvictorythrough the intimidationof oppositional leaders or the promulgation of a "state of emergency" before executive elections).
(3) Fkgulated: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession or in competitive elections. Ascriptive/designative and ascriptive/elective selections (i.e., an effective king and premier) are also coded as regulated. The fundamental difference between regulated selection and unregulatedrecruitment is that regulatedstructures require the existence of institutionalized modes of executive recruitment, either through constitutional decree or lineage. Moreover, in regulated competitive systems, unlike the designational/transitional mode, the method of future executive selection is not dependent on the particular party or regime currently holding power.
2.2 XFUXW: Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment
Competitiveness refers to Yhe extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates (Gurr, 1974:1483)." For example, selection of chief executives through popular elections matching two or more viable parties or candidates is regarded as competitive. If power transfers are coded Unregulated ("1") in theRegulation of ExecutiveRecruitment (variable 2.1), or involve a transition to/from unregulated, Competitiveness is coded 00. Three categories are used to measure this concept:
(1) Selection: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both, as in monarchies whose chief minister is chosen by king or court. Examples of pure designative selection are rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidentsbefore their terms end; recurrent militaryselectionof civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selectionof successors; repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties, etc.
(2) Dual/Transitional: Dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election. Also used for transitional arrangements between selection (ascription and/or designation) and competitive election.
10 (3) Election: Chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections matching two or more major parties or candidates. (Elections may be popular or by an elected assembly.)
2.3 XI&PEN: Openness of Executive Recruitment
Recruitment of the chief executive is "open" to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process. If power transfers are coded Unregulated (1) in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable 2.1), or involve a transition to/from Unregulated, Openness is coded 00. Four categories are used:
(1) Closed: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, e.g. kings, emperors, beys, emirs, etc. who assume executive Bowers by right of descent. An executive selected by other means may proclaim himself a monarch but the polity he governs is not coded "closed" unless a relative actually succeeds himas ruler.
(2) Dual Ex&ive -- Designation: Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister.
(3) LhaalExecutive -- Election: Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister.
(4) Open: Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, canpetitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and election.
Some examples may clarify the coding scheme outlined above. The Soviet Union's profile on these variables, since the accession of Khrushchev, is De&national/ Selection/Open. Victorian Britain's profile was E.egulated/lYansitional/Dual Executive:Election, whereas contemporary Britain, alongwith other modern democracies, is coded Eegulated/Election/Open. The polities of leaders who seize power by force are coded Unregulated, but there is a recurring impulse among such leaders to regularize the process of succession, usually by relying on some form of Selection. A less cornnon variant, asin modern Iranand Nicaragua under the Somozas, is one in which a Caesaristic leader attempts to establish the principle of hereditary succession. We code all such attempts at regularizing succession as Transitional (under Regulation, variable 2.1) until the first chief executive chosen under the new rules takes office.
A translation of the conceptualizations of executive recruitment used in POLITY I into the coding scheme outlined above is presented in Table 2.1. Transitional concepts are presented in Table 2.2.
11 Table 2.1 Translation of Concepts of Executive Recruitment Using POLITY II Indicators ------F!oLITY I POLITY II Indicators Concept Brief Definition of Executive Recruitment
(V2.1) (V2.2) (V2.3) REGuLAmm aY@mT- aPmNEss
Ascription Succession by Regulated(3) t Selection(l) + Closed(l) birthright
Dual Exec: Ascriptive and Eegulated(3) t Selection(l) t DualDes(2) Ascription t designated Designation rulers coexist ------______^__------Designation Informal comp- Transition(2) t Selection(l) t Open(4) etition w/in an elite ------Dual Bzc: fkscriptive and Eegulated(3) t Transition(2) t BualEle(3) Ascription + elected rulers Election coexist
Caesaristic Self-selection Unregulated(l) t NOT (00) + NcYr (00) by seizure of APPLICABLE APPLICABLE power ------Election Formlcomp- Regulated(3) t Election(3) + open(4) etition among publically SUppOI-t.ed candidates ttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt~t*t~t*t~t~t*~t*t*t~t~*t*t*tt Table 2.1.2 Translation of Transitional Concepts of Executive Recruitment Using POLITY II Indicators
POLITY II Indicators Transitional Concept of Executive Recruitment
(m-1) (V2.2) (V2.3) RHxlLATIm - -
Shifts to/from Caesaristic Transition(2) t NOT (00) t Nor (00) APPLICABLE AFmICABLE ------Shifts between Designation lkansition(2) t Transition(2) t Open(4) and Election ------___------
12 lzlBmNs-:‘IIIg-OF-m (wars. 2.3, 2.4)
One of the key characteristics of authority patterns is the extent to which the head of the unit (in states, the chief executive ruler) must take into account the preferences of others when making decisions. According to Eckstein and Gurr:
There is an important qualitative difference in Responsiveness that is analogous to the distinction between sufferance and suffrage. In some authority patterns the supers are obliged to incorporate some preferences of subordinates into decisions, in others they need only consider them. Most ruling Communist parties follow the latter pattern: there are regular (even if limited) opportunities for party members to express their views on matters of party policy, but ordinary members seldom are empowered to make choices among alternative policies. Most political parties in Western democracies, and some labor unions, have institutionalized the provision of choice for at least some kinds of policies (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:381).
The POLITY II dataset incorporates two relevant characteristics of Responsiveness: (1) the extent to which the chief executive is dependent either formally or informally for his position on a cabinet, council or junta, and (2) the magnitude to which decision rules constrain the executives actions.
2.4 MONO: Monocratism
According to Eckstein and Gurr, the independence of the chief executive can be dissected into a single, fundamental dichotomy:
The simplest and sharpest distinction we can make is between patterns in which monocratic (one-man) rule prevails and those in which some kind of assent is required, whetherbyespecially prestigiousminorities of supers, numerical majorities, or virtually all of them. We label the latter "concurrent" patterns, to distinguish them as a group from "monocratic" ones (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:375),
Operationally, POLITY II focuses on the structural character of the chief executive, distinguishing between pure individual and collective executives and specifying three intermediate categories.
(1) Pure Individual Executive: The executive is a single individual, not dependent either formally or informally for his position or authority on a cabinet, council, or junta. An executive who is a "front man- for a "strong man" behind the scenes is also coded here. Monarchsarealmost always "pure individual executives"' , presidents and dictators usually are. Premiers and generals-as-executives are usually dependent, at least formally, on cabinets, councils, or juntas; if so their polities are coded 2 or 3, depending on the extent of dependence, below.
(2) Intermediate Category (3) Qualified Individual Executive: The executive is fonaally a cabinet,
13 supremecouncil, or junta, but one member is "firstaamg equals" and holds substantially more effective authority than the other members. Most parliamentary, junta, and Ckmnunist regimes are of this sort.
(4) Intermediate Category
(5) Collective Executive: The executive is formally .and effectively a comittee, supreme council, or junta. It may have a chairman, but no one individual or position clearly dominates it. "Permanent" collective executives (codedhere) must be distinguished form "temporary" ones (coded under l-4, above). The general rule is that collective executives whose members proclaim themselves as temporary, and who rule collectively only until the election, or emergence, of an individual executive, are "temporary. " The following operational rules were followed:
1. If a new constitution or similar d ocument is issued which institutionalizes the collective executive, it is Wpexmanent,tl however long it lasts.
ii. If a collective body rules during an emergency such as war or civil war but afterwards gives way to an individual executive, it is Wtemporary." iii. If a collective body changes its chairman without a dominant individual executive emerging, it is "permanent".
iv. If a collective body rules for more than two years, but without any of the above kinds of evidence about whether it is "transitional" to an individual-executive pattern, it is "permanent."
Note 2.1: If a polity is coded on variable 2.3 as having a dual executive (codes 2 or 3), the Monocratism variable is coded as either Qualified individual (3), (4), or Collective executive (5), depemding on whether one member of the executive team exercises predominant authority. If authority fluctuates between them overtime, it is coded as Qualified individual (3).
Note 2.2: In a one-party Comunist state, if one person regularly holds both the Party chaimanship and chai rmanship of the supreme executive organ -- Council of State, Presidium, etc. -- it is coded as Pure individual executive (1). If the two posts are regularly held by two persons, it is coded as Qualified individual (3).
2.5 XCDNST: Executive Constraints (Decision Rules)
According to Sckstein and Gum, decision rules are defined in the following manner:
Superordinate structures in action makedecisions concerning the direction
14 of social units. Making such decisions requires that supers and subs be able to recognize when decision-processes have been concluded, especially "properly" concluded. An indispensable ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered to have been taken (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:121).
Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposedby any "accountability groups." In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful. advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. A seven-category scale is used.
(1) Unlimited Authority: There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations). Examples of evidence:
1. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored.
ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive's initiative.
iii. There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called and dismissed at the executive's pi&sure.
iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can remove them at will.
V. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive.
vi. tilebydecreeis repeatedlyused.
Note 2.3: If the executive isgiven limited orunlimited power bya legislature to cope with an emergency and relents this power after the emergency has passed, this is poJ a change to unlimited authority.
(2) Intemdiate *Worsr
(3) Slight to Moderate Limitatium an Executive Authority: There are some real but limited restraints on the executive. Evidence:
1. The legislature initiates se categories of legislation.
ii. The legislature delays implementation of executive acts and decrees.
iii. The executive fails to change some constitutional restrictions, such
15 as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term.
iv. The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independently of the executive.
V. The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the executive.
vi. There is an independent judiciary.
vii. Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, but in which policy decisions, for all practical purposes, reflect the demands of the military.
(4) Intermediate Catefzory (5) Substantial Limitations cm Executive Authority: The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them. Examples:
1. A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action.
ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive.
iii. The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts.
iv. The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.
(6) IntemmliateCateRory
(7) Executive Parity or Suboxdination: Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive inmost areas of activity. Examples of evidence:
1. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation.
ii. Theexecutive (president, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen tit-J= accountabilitygroup &is dependent on itscontinued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems).
iii. In multi-party democracies, there is chronic "cabinet instability."
EXTENT OF POLITICAL CXMPETITION AND OF'KMTICN (vars. 2.6, 2.7)
A third general authority trait of polities is participation. As E&stein and Gurr defined participation, it involves the following:
16 Subordinates need not be merely Passive recipients of direction, and they seldom are. Some of them generally attempt to influence the directive activities of supers. Acts by which subs attempt to wield such influence are acts of participation (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:60).
The operational question is theextent to which the political system enables non-elites to influence Political elites in regular ways. The POLITY II dataset measures this concept in two ways: (1) by the degree of institutionalization or "regulation" of political participation, and (2) by the extent of government restriction on political competition.
2.6 PARPEG: The Regulation of Participation
Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. tie-party states and Western democracies both regulate Participation but they do so in different ways, the former by channeling Participation through a single Party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion; the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring grouPs to compete nonviolently for Political influence. The Polar opposite is unregulated Participation, in which there are no enduring national Political organizations and no effective regime controls on Political activity. In such situations Political competition is fluid and usually characterized by recurr ing violent conflict among shifting coalitions of Partisan groups. A five-category scale is used to code this dimension:
(1) Wnregulated Participation: Political Participation is fluid; there are no enduringnationalpoliticalorganizations andno systematic regimecontrols on Political activity. political grarpings tend to form around Particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national Political life varies substantially over time. "Unregulated participation" may or may not be characterized by violent conflict among Partisan grasps.
(2) Factional or Transitional: There are relatively stable and enduring Political grouPs which compete for Political influence at the national level -- parties, regional groups, or "factions," notnecessarilyelected - - but competition among them is intense, hostile, and frequently violent. Extreme factionalism may be manifested in the establishment of rival governments and in civil war. This coding is also used to charar=terize transitionsto/fromuninstitutionalizedparticipationandbetween factional and institutionalized participation.
(3) Factional/Restricted: Polities which oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalismand restriction: when one group secure s Power it restricts its opponents' Political activities until it is displaced in turn. Also coded hereare polities in whichpolitical groups are factional but Policies of genocide or politicide are routinely carried out against significant Portions of the population that historicallyhavebeen excluded from Positions of Political Power (for example, Indians in some South American countries). Transitions between factional/restricted and
17 Regulated Participation, as well as shifts among Factional/Restricted and Restricted modes of behavior are coded here.
(4) Restricted: Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process.
(5) Regulated: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.
2.7 PARCCMP: The Competitiveness of Participation
The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursuedin the political arena. Political competition implies a significant degree of civil interaction, so polities which are coded Unregulated (1) on Regulation of Participation (variable 2.6) are not coded for competitiveness. Polities in transition between Unregulated and any of the regulated forms on variable 2.6 also are not coded on variable 2.7. Competitiveness is coded on a five-category scale:
(1) Campetition: No significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party. Totalitarian party systems, authoritarian militarydictatorships, and despoticmonarchies are typically coded here. However, the mere existence of these structures is not sufficient for a Suppressed coding. The regime's institutional structure must also be matched by its demonstrated ability to suppress oppositional competition.
(2) Restric~itionalnaltition: Someorganized, politicalcompetition occurs outside gove rnment, without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the male adult population) from participation. ' "Restricted Competition" is distinguished from "Factional Competition" (3 below) by the systematic, persisting nature of the restrictions: large classes of people, groups, or types of peaceful political competitionare continuously excluded fromthe political process. As an operational rule, the banning of apolitical partywhich received more than 10% of the vote in a recent national election is sufficient evidence that competition is "restricted." However, other information is required to determine whether the appropriate coding is (2) Restricted or (3) Factional Ccmpetition. This category is also used to characterize transitions between Factional and Suppressed or Restricted ccnnpetition. Examples of "restricted" limitations are:
1. Prohibiting some kinds of political organizations, either by type or group of people involved (e.g., no national political parties or no political organizations among blacks).
18 ii. Prohibiting some kinds of political action (e.g., Comnmist parties may organize but are prohibited from competing in elections).
iii. Systematic harassment of political opposition (leaders killed, jailed, or sent into exile; candidates regularly ruled off ballots; opposition media -- press, radio stations -- banned, etc.). This is evidence for either "Factional" or "Restricted," dependins on its persistence.
Note 2.4: A newly enacted right to engage in political activities is most likely a change from category 1 to 2.
(3) Facticzd Cuwetiticm: Polities with factional or factional/restricted patterns of competition.
(4) Transitional Ccametition: Any transitional arrangements from Restricted, or Factional patterns to fully Competitive patterns, or vice versa. Transitions to Competitive are not complete until a national election is held on a fully competitive basis.
(5) Canpetitivetititim: There are relativelystableand enduringpolitical groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level. Competition among them seldom causes widespread violence or disruption. Very small parties or political groups may be restricted in the "Competitive" pattern.
(00) Not Awl&able: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position , in Regulation of Political Participation (variable 2.6).
By combining scores on Regulation of Political Participation (variable 2.6) and the Competitiveness of Participation (variable 2.7) variables, a relatively detailed picture of the extent of political competition and opposition emerges. A translation of the POLITY I categories of political participation into the coding scheme used here is presented in Table 2.3.1. Transitional concepts are presented in Table 2.3.2.
19 Table 2.3.1 Translation of POLITY I Conceptualizations of Political Participation Using the POLITY II Indicators ------Political Participation POLITY I (V2.6) (V2.7) concept Regulation Ccmpetitiveness
Uninstitutionalized Unregulated (1) + m (00) APPLICABLE
Factional Factional/Pans (2) + Factional (3)
Institutionalized Regulated (5) + Competitive (5)
Factional/Restricted Factional/Rest. (3) + Factional (3)
Restricted Restricted (4) t F&xtricted/Tkans (2)
Suppressed Restricted (4) t suppressed (1) +tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt
Table 2.3.2 Translation of Transitionary Concepts of Political Participation Using FOLITY II Indicators __----_____------Political Participation W-2.6) (V2.7) Transitional Concept Regulation Competitiveness
Shift to/from Factional/Tram. (2) t NOT (00) Uninstitutionalized AEm1cAELE
Shift between Factional/Tram. (2) t 'Ikansitional (4) Factional and Institutional
Shift between Factional/Rest. (3) t Restricted (2) Factional/Restricted andRepressedor suppressed
Shift between Factional/Rest. (3) t Transitional (4) Factional/Restricted and Institutional
20 WTION: THE CEWRALIZATION OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY (var. 2.8)
The centralized/federal distinction is an important structural property of national political systems that is related to several dimensions of authority patterns postulated by Eckstein and Gurr. In purely structural terms it is an aspect of Conformation: federal polities have greater complexity of Conformation than do centralized polities. Opportunities for Participation also tend to be higher in federal systems, and regional units of government potentially are more responsive to local inputs than are centralized governments.
2.8 CENT: Centralization of Political Authority
(1) centralized: Unitary state: nomore thanmoderate decision-making authority is vested in local or regional governments. Many nominally "federal" systems, like the Soviet Union, are in fact centralized in this sense.
(2) Intermediate Category
(3) Decemtralized: Federal state: local and/or regional governments have substantial decision-making authority. Switzerland, Canada, and theUnited States arecontemporary examples ofeffectively-decentralized governments. scow(Dm l?uNcrIoEEs (var. 2.9)
Directiveness is defined as "the extent to which activities in a social unit are subject to directives, rather than being left to the free discretion of members" (Eckstein and Curr, 1975:53). Directiveness varies from the Regimented extreme, in which "everything done in a social unit is dealt with, in every detail, by rigidly enforced directivness" to Permissive, a situation in which there is "a tendency to issue directives only insofar as the existence of the unit clearly requires it" (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:54).
2.9 SCOPE: Scope of Government Actions
Scope is an operational version, applicable to the state, of Directiveness. It is a continuum which refers to the extent to which all levels of governmen tcombined - -national, regional, and local -- attempt to regulate and organize the economic and social life of the citizens and subjects of the state. The Scope dimension does not refer to the regulation or restriction of political activity, which is registered in the Political Participation variables 2.6 and 2.7.
In the realm of the state, we characterize the regimented extreme of Scope as Totalitarian. Operationally, the Soviet Union during Stalin's rule and China during the Cultural Revolutiondefine this end of the continuum. Stateandpartyduringthese periods attempted to direct or regulate virtually every aspect of social interaction, material production, distribution, and consumption. The Minimal state is one in which government functions are limited to such core functions as maintenanc e of the ruler's authority and dispute resolution. Even these activities may only be carried out in the core regionsof the national territory. The minimal state is typified by virtually all European states before the 18709, by Ethiopia and Pakistan before the 196Os, and
21 by Nepal before the 1970s.
The POLITY I coding of Scope used a five-category scale. POLITY II coding employs a nine-category scale: the five categories described verbally below plus four intermediate categories.
(1) Totalitarian: Gove rnments that directly organize and control almost all aspects of social and economic life. Stalin's Russia and the contemporary Cuban states are examples.
(2) Intexmediate Variable
(3) Segmental Plus (t): Governments whose activities are intermediate between segmental and totalitarian. These governments that provide almost all basic social services for their populations, and/or control large economic sectors, directly through state ownership or indirectly through detailed planning and regulation. Contemporary Prance and Sweden are examples, as are Mexico and Yugoslavia.
(4) Intermediate Variable
(5) Segmental: Public authorities provide a wide range of basic services plus close regulation of significant segments of social a&/or economic activity, but leave large sectors free of direct state involvement. Examples: the contemporary U.S. and Canada.
(6) Intermediate Variable
(7) Sewrental Minus (-): Public authorities provide limited basic services, e.g. public education, postal service, commmication and transport facilities, and use state regulatory powers to ensure provision of some basic social services (e.g. for the unemployedand elderly). Most European democracies had this level of Scope by 1900, most Latin American countries by the 1940s.
(8) Intermediate Variable . . (9) Mm3.m.l: Gove rnments whoseoperations are largely orwholly limitedto such core functions as maintenance of internal security and administration of justice. "Extractive" or flpredatory" governments which exploit a population primmily for the benefit of the elite also are coded here; Haiti under the Duvaliers is an example.
All early 19th century states are coded 9. We screened their subsequent political histories for landmark legislation and policy initiatives that expanded the state's role in education, social services, and economic activity. Such policies marked coding shifts from 9 to 8, 7, and 6. By 1900 most European states were at 8 or 7, several at 6. In the POLITY I coding of Scope we also used data on central government expenditures per capita to help track the expansion of state activities, particularlyduring the first half of the twentieth century. The thresholds associated with shifts in the coding categories are specified in Table 2.5. We judged the dollar
22 "thresholds" of each category mainly by reference to per capita expenditures in countries whose Scope we had coded on the basis of other substantive information. These were not applied mechanistically, but rather were used to supplement more judgmental assessments made on the basis of information about state regulation and management of economic activity, and about the nature and scope of public education and social services.
Table 2.4.1 POLITY I Guidelines For Coding Scope based on Per Capita Central Government Expenditures in US $
Countries&Periodl Minimal : Segmental Minus I Segmental I Segmental Plus I ! : : 1860-1914 : I I : : : 1 : Wealthy I I I I Nations* i I : I (Europe in ; $ l-8 ; $ 9-20 I $ 21t : part, Latin I : ! : America in : 01 I : part) : I I : ------I------I------~------~------Other I l-4 I 5-8 : 9-20 I 21t ---a-----m-s----;------;------~------;------:------I------~------I------1920-1960 f I I I i I 1I : Wealthy : 1-15 I 16-75 f 76-300 : 3oot Nations* I : I I ------:------I------~------~------Other I l-8 I 9-15 1I 16-75 : 76t
*Wealthynations (a partial listonly): France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, U.K., U.S.A., Argentina, Uruguay, Chile.
For the POLITY II coding we made systematic use, beginning c. 1950, of data on central gove rnment spending as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GKxp/GDP), calculated form annual data reported in Arthur A. Banks Cross-Polity Time-Series Dataset (1986 version). This index could be constructed for most countries beginning c. 1946. In the edition of the dataset with which we worked the GDP data were missing after c. 1980. Based on a preliminary analysis of these ratios for all countries and various subgroupings, we specified ranges associatedwith various levels of Scope, as shown in the accompanying table 1. Separate ranges were identified for the poorest, "Fourth world" countries," based on our observation that minimal government functions in them require proportionally larger shares of their very limited productivity than in more prosperous countries.
The thresholds in Table 2.6 were used as general guidelines. Scores were adjusted to take into account particular regimes' programmatic objectives, policies in the economic realm, and other substantive information. Anumber of coding rules based on these considerations were formulated and applied, as shown in the notes to
23 the table. The GExp/GL)P ratios were particularly suspect as guides to the Scope of the state socialist regimes, which necessitated some additional guidelines.
In the POLITY I codings, Scope scores based on expenditure and policy criteria were assignedthrough 1970. The new GExp/GDPindicator was available for a substantial overlapping period, c. 1950-1970. Comparisons of FOLITY I Scope scores with those suggested by table 2.4.2 for the overlapping period seldom showed differences of more than 1 category on the nine-category scale. It was possible to account for most discrepancies by taking into account contextual information on state policy, using the table 2.4.2 guidelines. In all countries we recoded back to the late 194Os, relying mainly on the GExp/GDP indicator.
Table 2.6 Guidelines for Coding Scope Based on G&p/GDP Patios, 1950-1986
Scope We in Developed, Developing ScopeCodein Range of Patios Countries Poor Countries
.07 or less 9 9
.08 to .ll 8 9
.12 to .16 7 8
.17 to .22 6 7
.23 to .30 5 6
.31 to .38 4 5
.39 to .48 3 4 above .48 3, 2, or 1 depending on patterns of policy ------
Note 2.4: GENERALGUIDELINESToSC0PETABLE
a. "Poor countriesl( are those in the bottom quartile of per capita income, including most countries of South and Southeast Asia, most of tropical Africa, and a few Latin American countries such as Haiti and Paraguay. Countries such as India andNigeria moved out of the "poor" category during the periodcoded.
b. When GExp/GDP ratios fluctuates substantially form year to year, a change in Scope ordinarily is not coded unless the ratio passes the threshold of the next category and remains more or less consistently above it thereafter. but if GExp/GDP ratios increase and decrease substantially in coincidence with the incumbency and ouster of a regime that follows activist socioeconomic policies, the Scope coding should reflect the year- to-year changes.
24 C. In federal systems, l/3 is added to the GE&GDP ratio. Empirical comparisons show that this ratio is typically 30-40% lower in federal systems than in otherwise-similar centralized systems.
Note 2.5: GUIDELINES SPECIFIC Xl PAl'l'ERM OF POLICY
a. In advanced state socialist polities:
1: If there is total state control of the economy, code 1.
1: If small-scale free-market activity is encouraged, or if agriculture is largely non-collectivized, code 2.
* If large-scale free-market activity is encouraged, code 3.
b. In predominantly agrarian societies:
* If there are major laud reform programs, subtract 1 or 2 from the Scope score derived from Table 2.4.2, depending on how extensively the progrsm is implemented.
1: If the state establishes control of the marketing of cash crops, subtract 2 from the Scope score derived from Table 2.4.2.
C. In non-socialist societies:
* If the state implements extensive nationalization, or directive national economic planning, subtract 1 or 2 form the Scope score derived from Table 2.4.2, depending on the extent and impact of the intervention.
r If the state implements extensive denationalization, add 1 or 2 to the Scope score derived from table.
1: If the state invests in or establishes new industry, no adjustment is indicated in the Scope score because the effects of the policy should be reflected in the GExp/GDP ratio.
d. Instates with corporatearrangements at the national level subtract 2 from the Scope score derived from Table 2.4.2. In quasi-corporate states, subtract 1 from the Scope score.
e. Inoil-rich countries, discount GExp/GDPratios because state expenditures are mainly externally-funded. Iran, IraqandSaudi Arabiaare codedbased on Ah&y's detailed study of the expansion of state activities and expenditures in those countries (Ahady 1986).
f. Discount the short-term impact of rapidmilitarization during large-scale conflict on GExp/GDP ratios. Such ratios typically increase inmediately before/during war, then decrease afterwards. Change the Scope coding only
25 if they remain high thereafter.
3. IDENl!Il?ICATICNOFMWCR,ADRUPTF0LITYCHANGE
This variable derives from Gurr's POLITY I dataset on regime persistence and change through 1970. The POLITY II datasethas extended the codings of "major, abrupt polity change" through 1986. The coding criteria for this variable are based on the direction and rate of change of the variables used in the POLITY I dataset. In an attempt to make the POLITY II dataset internally consistent, we have decided to translate the coding guidelines for this variable into the POLITY II language. For example, while a "major polity change" can be defined by a simple shift from "Designation" to "Competitive elections" in the "Selectionof Executive" variable under the POLITY I guidelines, the POLITY II dataset defines this change as a multi-variable shift from "Transitional t Selection t Open" to "Regulated t Election t Open" in the "Regulation", "Competitiveness", and "Openness" of Executive Recruitment variables, respectively. In order to explain this complex procedure, both POLITY I and POLITY II guidelines will be provided.
*Determining Polity Changes*
A polity comprises the basic political arrangements by which autonomous, national political communities ("countries") govern their affairs. Its basic elements are its structures of rule-making and rule-application and their relations with citizens or subjects. The life-span or durability of a polity is the length of time it endures without major, abrupt changes in the pattern of authority relations among these basic elements of authority relations.
(1) Abrupt Changes defined:
Any one major change (defined below) that is accomplished in ten years or less is an abrupt change.
(2) Major Changes defined:
These are operationally defined in terms of the authority variables, 2.1-2.9. The following changes in authority patterns are "major":
26 (2a) hecutive Recruitment: POLITY I FOLITY II
Selection of Executive Executive Recruitment
(V2.1) (V2.2) (V2.3) REGUL4TION CCMPETITIVENBS OPENNESS
1) Fraa Chwaristic --->Unregulat.(l) t N[rr (00) + Ian- To APPLICABLE
Election --->Fkgulated (3) t Election (3) t Open (4) or Designation --->Transition(B) t Selection (1) t Open (4) or Ascription --->Fkgulated (3) t Selection (1) + Closed (1) or Dual Executive --->Regulated (3) t Transition(2) t Dual/Ele. (3)
Regukd (3) t Selec~on (1) + Jha&es. (2)
2) Fkan Election --->F&gulated (3) t Election (3) t Open (4) To Caesaristic --->Unregulat.(l) t NOT (00) t NOT (00) APPLICABLE AFPLIcABLE or Designation --->Transition(2) t Selection (1) t Open (4) or Ascription --->Regulated (3) t Selection (1) t Closed (1) or Dual Executive --->Regulatd (3) t Transition(P) t Dual/Ele. (3)
ReguY:ttd (3) t SeleZion (1) t Lb&es. (2) ------3) FrmDesignation --->Tramition(2) t Selectim (1) t Open (4) To Caesaristic --->UnreguLat.(l) t NOT (00) t NOT (00) AFFL1cAE%E AITLICABLE! or Election --->Regulated (3) t Election (3) t Open (4) or Ascription --->Regulated (3) t Selection (1) t Closed (1) ---____------4) Frah Ascription --->ReguLated (3) t Selection (1) + Closed (1) To Caesaristic --->Gnregulat.(l) t NOT (00) t Nor (00) AFFL1cABLE APF%ICABLE or Electicm --->Regulated (3) t Election (3) t Open (4) or Designation --->Transition(2) t Selection (1) t Open (4) ______------5)FmnIh.adExec. --->Regulated (3) t Transition(P) t Dual/Ele. (3)
Sated (3) t SelecZn (1) t Dudok (2) To Caesaristic --->Unregulat.(l) t NOT (00) t Nor (00) APPLICABLE AFFL1cABLE or Election --->Fkgulated (3) t Election (3) t Open (4)
27 2b) Monocratism:
For both the POLITY I and POLITY II datasets, an abrupt change to or from the "Collective Executive" category (#5 in the POLITY II dataset) is considered a major polity change.
2c) Executive Constraints:
POLITY I POLITY II
Any change among the categories Any change of two or more is a polity change except changes categories is a polity from "Slight/Moderate Limitations" change (1 to 3, 5 to i, to "Substantial Limitations" or 4 to 6, etc.) except changes vice versa. from 3 (Some Limits) to 5 (Substantial Limits) or 5 to 3.
2d) Political Participation:
POLITY I POLITY II
Political Cuupetition Political Participation
(V2.6) (2.7) F?.TZGULATION COMPETITION 1. Frapa Uninstitutionalized --Nnregulated (1) t W (00) To APPLICABLE Institutionalized -->Regulated (5) t Competitive (5) or Restricted -->R.estricted (4) t Restricted/Trans (2) or Suppressed -->Fkstricted (4) t Suppressed (1) ------2a. Frop Factional -->Fact/Trans (2) t Factianal (3) To Restricted -->Restricted (4) t Restricted/Trans (2) or Suppressed --Bestricted (4) t Suppressed (1)
2b. Frcm Factional/Rest. -->Fact/Restric.(J) t Factional (3) To Suppressed --Xkstricted (4) t Suppressed (1) or Competitive -->Regulated (5) t Competitive (5) ------_------3. Fna Institutionalized --Xkgulated (5) t bmpetitive (5) To Uninstitutionalized --Wnregulated (1) t NUT (00) APPLICABLE or Restricted -->Restricted (4) t Restricted/Trans(2)
28 or Suppressed -->Restricted (4) t Suppressed 11) 4. Fmm Restricted -->Restricted (4) + RJ=whms (2) To Institutionalized -->Regulated (5) t Competitive or Factional -->Fact/Trans (2) t Factional I& or Fact/Restricted(???) -->Fact/Restric.(S) t Factional (3) or Uninstitutionalized -->Unregulated (1) t NOT (00) APPLICABLE ------5. Fran suppres=d -->Restricted (4) t suppressed (1) To Institutionalized -->Regulated (5) t Competitive (5) or Fact/Restricted -->Fact/Restric.(3) t Factional (3) or Factional -->Fact/Trans. (2) t Factional (3) or Uninstitutionalized --Wnregulated (1) t NOT (00) AFmICAERAE ______------2e) Centralization of Authority (Variable 2.4):
For both POLITY I and POLITY II, an abrupt change from "Centralized" to "Decentralized" or vice versa is considered a major polity change.
2f) Scope of Government Activities (Variable 2.9)
FOLITY I : POLITY II I i Anychange of 2 points : Any abrupt change of 4 points or (categories) or more on : more on the scale, e.g., from the scale. : Totalitarian (1) to Segmental I (4) or from Minimal (9) to Segmental : (4).
New laws or constitutions are not necessarily "major changes." Formal changes of the kinds listed above are regarded as "major chang " only if accompanied by substantial changes in practice. However, formal changEI are usually a clue that changes in practice have occurred and are now being legally ratified or a clue that changes in practice are to be attempted. If more detailed information is lacking, a formal, constitutional change of any of the specified types can be regarded as %ajorM provided the country has a history of attempting to govern by constitutional prescription.
Note that major changes in practice are "major" whether or not they are accompanied by formal, constitutional change.
"Revolutionary" seizures of power are not necessarily indicators of "major changes." Seizures of power often change only the office-holders, not the basic authority patterns of government. Similarly, the new "revolutionary" leaders may
29 temporarily change the level of executive constraints or the extent of competition or regulation of participation -- say for a few months or a year and a half -- but then allow a return to "government as usual." Such temporary deviations from a basic authority pattern are not "polity changes." "Revolutionary" changes are like major constitutional changes: we need evidence that real changes are seriously attempted before we can decide that a new polity has been established.
Temporary 'major changes" in authority are sometimes made by governments during crises. Political competition may be restricted during wartime. The executive may assume emergency powers during an economic crisis or natural disaster. These are not polity changes unless they are kept in force after the crisis has passed.
Several real, major changes often occur together. In Russia, for example, the period from 1917 to the mid-1920s saw a shift from ascriptive selection of the executive to designation, from a pure individual to a qualified individual executive, and from restricted to nonexistent political competition. These changes together constitute a single polity change, not separate changes. Any series of linked changes, even if separated by several years, constitutes one not several polity changes.
3.1 CHANCE: Coding Polity Changes
Major, abrupt polity changes arecoded to reflect theapproximate dates of polity termination and establishment as well as whether or not the polity change occurred in a new or established nation. Changes in polity authority characteristics are coded during the year in which they occur, even if they occur very late in the calendar year. Similarly, the circumstances of polity formation are attributed to the year in which the polity is fully operative, not to the beginning of a transition period. And the circumstances of polity termination are attributed to the year in which the polity is terminated, whatever the month in which this happens. Exceptions to this rule exist when two or more major, abrupt polity changes occur in the same year. For example, in 1919 Hungary experienced the formation of two successive polities. The authority characteristics and circumstances of establishment and termination of the first 1919 polity are all coded for 1919. The authority characteristics and circumstances of the establishment of its successor are coded for 1920.
The following four categories are used:
(1) New Natiak, New 1Rolity (2) Old Naticm, Polity Temimtion (3) Old Natian, New pblity Established (4) Old Nmtim, Old lblity T e ted and NewlWity Establi8hed(intbesageyear)
It is important to note that the year of a polity termination will usually be identical to the date of establishment of the next polity, thus a coding of "4" will occur quite frequently. However, there may be an intervening period of civil war, or a period of foreign occupation, or transitional government which works out the ground-rules for the new polity, in which circumstance scores of "2" and "3" are used.
Note 3.1: If no polity establishment or termination occurs during a year, variable 3.1 is left blank. Similarly, variables 4.1 to 5.6 (below) are coded only for those
30 years in which a corresponding change of polity has occurred.
4. EvEwmIM%DIA!rELYF%zECEDING/CAUsINGNGLITY~~oN
These four variables indicate the general circumstances of a polity's "death" or transformation, with special attention to the presence of crisis or violent conflict, if any. These variables are coded only if "major, abrupt polity change" is coded either 2 or 4. E&.&I of the variables is mutually exclusive except that, rarely, a polity is terminated under circumstances of both external conflict (variable 4.2) and violent internal conflict (variable 4.3). Categories within each variable are mutually exclusive: only one can be coded for each polity.
4.1 TERMl: Loss of National Autonomy
Code for nations whose polities end when the nation itself gives up autonomous existence.
(1) Nation voluntarily joins another, new or established state, or a confederationis dissolvedvoluntarily,resulting inseveralnewnations.
(2) Nation is forcibly assimilated into or conquered by another natim.
(3) ~~onjoins~~newor~~~shedstate~violent~fmrn internal groupe, e.g. Austria, 1938.
4.2 TEFM2: External Conflict
Code for polities terminated in circumstances of international war, threat, or intervention. Code here only if the nation or its component parts maintain their autonomy; otherwise code under Old polity, loss of autonomy, above.
(1) Polity change to deal with foreign war or threat.
(2) Polity changes imposed or directed by foreign power(s) (inchding foreign agencies like the CIA and internaticmal bodies like the U.N.), without directmilitargintervention.
(3) Fblitydxange imposedby occupying foreign power(s) (West Germany in 1949, for example).
(4) Other polity changes in the context of war. Note that conditions (2) and (3) can occur in an existing nation without necessarily destroying its autonomy.
4.3 TERM3: Violent Internal Conflict
For polities terminatedduring or as a direct result of coups and internal wars.
31 (1) Folitychangeis the directresultofa successful coup or assassination or a small military uprising (barracks uprising).
(2) Politychange is thedirect result ofan unsuccessfulcoup or assassination (for example, whenan unsuccessful coup inspires the executive to eliminate political opposition permanently).
(3) Polity change is made by victorious rebels directly following an internal war.
(4) Polity change is made by i ncwobentrulers duringorafteraninternal war or massive tuxmoil.
(5) Other: Polity change is made because of violent internal conflict under circmstances not classifiable under ,,l", "2" or "3" (for example, interregnun, gove rrm2ntdisintegration, or lack ofpreciseinformation).
Note 4.1: Coups are seizures of power involving relatively few individualsand brief, relatively nonviolent conflict. Internal wars are longer-lived, large scale events such as revolutions, civil and guerrilla wars, and popular revolutions.
4.4 TERM4: Nonviolent Internal Political Transition
For polities terminated under internal circumstances other than those listed under variable 4.3.
(1) Personalistic changes, without apparent internal crisis.
(2) Personalistic changes, in the context of internal political crisis.
(3) Institutional changes, without apparent intenvrl crisis.
(4) Institutional changes, in the context of internal political crisis.
(5) Other nonviolent polity transitions , not classifiable above (for example because not clear whether persanalistic or institutional).
(6) war d3ange in political participation in the ccmtext of internal political crisis.
Note 4.2: Minor turmoil may occur during a "nonviolent" transition.
a. Personalistic changes: Polity changes that mainly enhance the position of the executive and/or his imediate supporters. Establishment of dictatorial rule and suppression of peaceful opposition are usually Wpersonalistic" changes unless accompanied by substantial change in such variables as scope of government activity or degree of centralism/federalism.
32 b. Institutional changes: Changes in the basic structure, scope, and/or operations of government (for example, the creation of a one-party state, a shift from dictatorship to constitutional government, changes in the selection of the executive, etc.).
C. Internal crisis: Internal conditions or conflict which (explicitly or implicitly) place stress on govenunental operations. Examples (notan exhaustive list) are natural disasters; economic depressions; intense class, ethnic, or religious conflicts; demands for massive socioeconomic change; factional conflict within the elite; demands for representation; etc.
5. m sIGNImmLITY FQlmmIoN
The following variables indicate the circumstances of a new polity's "birth," with special attention to the presence of crisis or violent conflict, if any. Five sets of coding categories are listed below: two for new nations (variables 5.1 and 5.2) and three for established nations (variables 5.3-5.5). For established nations, the circumstances of a "polity termination" (variables 4.3 and 4.4) are usually but not necessarily the same as those of origin for the next polity. The exceptions are most likely for polities which originate with a "transitional period." For hypothetical example, the old polity may terminate with a coup d'etat, followed by a several-year transitional period that is concluded by nonviolent institutional changes. The institutional changes that characterize the transitional period are coded here.
5.1 ORIGl: Origin of New Nation's Polity
(1) Polity imposed under the tutelage of the fornrer ocapyhg power, while still in authority.
(2) J?olitydirected by the former occupying poktzr,oranothercomtry, after, or as part of, the attainment of formal indepenrlen=e .
(3) Polity developed by citizens or the head of state of the new country, whether ornotborrowd fransaneother source.
5.2 oRIG2: Ci rctolstances of New Nation's Birth
* Nations Established in Circumstances of 1: International or Internal War:
(2) F&&an secedes fmpalargernaticm.
(3) Successorstateorstatestothebreakuporprtitiunofanation,conquest state, empire, federation, etc.
33 (4) Cudition or unian of formerly-separate states or territories. X Nations Established in Circumstances Free of J: Violent Conflict: (5) Colonybeaau~indepedent. (6) FIegion secedes from a larger nation.
(7) Successor state to the breakup or partition of a nation, etc.
(3) Cualitian or union of formerly-separate states or territories. (9) ~rnewnati~:for~~le,establi~tofnewstatesinpreviously uncolonizedareas (like the Orange Free State).
5.3 ORIG3: Established Nations, External Conflict
For polities established in existing nations, and after an interregna, in circumstances of external war, foreign threat, or direct intervention.
(1) Polity change to deal with foreign war or threat. (2) Polity change imposed or directed by foreign power(s) (including intemationalagenciesandagencieslike theCIA)withcnrLdirectmilitary interventicm.
(3) Polity change imposedby omupykg foreign power(s) (West Germany in 1949, for exmple).
(4) Other polity changes in the context of war. Note 5.1: The conditions in categories (2) and (3) can occur in an existing nation without necessarily destroying its autonomy.
5.4 CRIG4: Established Nations, Violent Internal Conflict
For polities established in existing nations during or as a direct result of coups, internal wars, or massive turmoil (riots, demonstrations).
(1) Polity change is the direct result of a successful couporassassination orsmallmilitaryuprising (barrads uprising).
(2) Politychange is thedirectresult ofan unsuxessfulcoup or assassination (for example, whenan unsuccessfulcoupinspirestheexecutivetoel~~ political opposition permanently).
(3) Political change is mde by victorious rebels directly following an internal war.
34 (4) Polity change is made by i ncmbentrulersduringorafteranintemalwar or massive turmoil.
(5) Other: Polity change is made because of violent internalconflict mder circunstances not classifiable under 1,2 or 3 (for example interregna, governmnt disintegration, or lack of precise information).
Note 5.2: See note 4.1.
5.5 ORIG5: Nonviolent Internal Political Transitions
For polities established in existing nations under circumstances other than those listed above.
(1) Personalistic changes, without apparent internal crisis.
(2) Fkrsondistic changes, in the context of internal political crisis.
(3) Institutional changes, without apparent internal crisis.
(4) Institutional changes, in the context of internal political crisis.
(5) Other nonviolent polity transitions, not classifiable above (for temple, because not clear whether personalistic or institutional.
(6) Fbjor change in political participation in the context of internal political crisis.
Note 5.3: See note 4.2 for definitions of personalistic and institutional changes.
5.6 MODEL,: Source of Model
The source or inspiration of the new polity's pattern of authority relations is coded here.
(1) New, m: The polity is one that is new to the country and is imposed orprescribsdby external agents. Examples are the imposition of a new form of autonomous government by an invading foreign power, such as the Vichy Regime created in France after the German +nvasion in 1940-41; institutions established by a decolonizing power, such ss the Polities of almost all independent African countries; and institutions created under the tutelage of foreign conkssions, e.g., in Albania in 1913 and in West Germany, 1949.
(2) New, Borrowed: The polity model is modeled after some foreign system but is chosen and implemented without external coercion or persuasion. Most
35 Latin American states chose new polities at the time of their independence that were modeled after the United States, for example.
(3) New, 'Indigenous: The new polity is mainly an indigenous creation, not visibly the result of imitation. The Nazi polity established in 1933 is an example. The French Fifth Republic is another; it is a "presidential" system, but not one designed in imitation of the U.S. or some other model. (It also is not a nreversion,tt described below, because previous "strong executive" polities in Frenchhistorywere headedbynon-elected monarchs).
(4) Reversion: A return to a pattern of political arrangements in effect in the country within the past generation. The Colombian polity established in 1958 following a five-year dictatorship was clearly a reversion, with temporary modifications, to the president-dominant polity of the pre-1953 era.
(5) Continuation: Continuation of previous polity structure.
6. INDICA'l'ORSOFDlXlCFMX,AvrocRAcy.AND -zATIoN OF FumR
Three broad processes have reshaped the global landscape of state structures during the last two centuries. One is an extraordinary expansion in the absolute and relative power of the sate, a process that began in Europe. The new states created by the American and French revolutions marked the threshold between a political world dominated by monarchies, whose claims to absolutism were belied by the fact that most social and economic life was autonomous from state control or extraction, and a political world in which state power was based on ever-widening control and mobilization of human and material resources in exchange for broadened rights of popular participation. An integral part of this process was the development of bureaucracieswith high capacities toregulate, tax, and mobilize people in the service of state policy
The second process was the transformation of the structures of political participation and legitimation. This transformation followed one of two petths, toward plural democracy or mass-party autocracy. The popular side of the bargain by which most West European rulers built state power in the nineteenth century was to acknowledge the right of widespread participation in policy making. That right was given institutional expression in elected assemblies which could review, and sometimes initiate, public policy; in elections, direct or indirect, of chief ministers; and in recognition of citizens' rights to voice and act on political opinions. The concept of bargain is a metaphor for sequences of political crises and reforms in which these rulers granted rights for participation, however limited, to all significant social classes and groups, while simultaneously extending the state's right and cawity to regulate, tax, and mobilize the human and material bases of state power.
The process of political democratization had its own logic and dynamic which, in most of Western Europe, eroded all but a few symbolic vestiges of traditional autocracy (see for example Bendix 1978). Nonetheless, pressures to extend democratization have always contended with the self-interested desire of rulers to preserve and enhance their autonomy from political constraints. The empires of Central
36 andEastern Europe--Germany, Russia, Austro-Hungary--implementedthe trappings but not the substance of effective democratic participation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And all of them collapsed under the combined pressure of unsuccessful was and internal dissension. The revolutionary Soviet state in Russia provided a new model of autocracy which combined democratic forms--a mass party and nominally representative institutions--wi th near-absolute state control of social, economic and political life. In the middle run the new model has proven, in Europe end China, to be almost as resilient as the Western democratic forms, although less efficient for some social and economic purposes.
The third general process has been the "Westernization" of state structures elsewhere in the world. 'Ihe European-derived models have been widely imitated, beginning with the establishment of derivative democracies in the newly independent states of nineteenth century Latin America and concluding with the socialist autocracies of most of the post-revolutionary states of contemporary Afro-Asia.
In an attempt to facilitate empirical analysis of these and other historical trends, we have constructed annual scores for democracy, autocracy, and centralization of state power. Derived from Gurr's authority characteristics data (variables 2.1- 2.9), composite indicators of these general properties of political systems were constructed.
6.1 AWI'OC: Institutionalized Autocracy
"Authoritarian regime" in Western political discourse is a pejorative term for some very diverse kinds of political systems whose common properties are a lack of regularized political competition and disconcern for political freedoms. We use the more neutral term Autocracy and define it operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and one in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. Most modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over social and economic activity, but we regard this as a function political ideology and choice, not a defining property of autocracy. Social democracies also exercise relatively high degrees of directiveness. We prefer to leave open for empirical investigation the question of how Autocracy, Democracy, and Directiveness have covaried over time.
Aten-point Autocracyscale is constructed additively. Our operational indicator of autocracy is derived frcnn codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable 2.7), the regulation of participation (variable 2.6), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables 2.3 and 2.4), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.5).
37 Authority Coding Scale Weight
Competitiveness of Farticipation: Suppressed t2 Restricted t1
Regulation of participation: Restricted t2 Factional/Restricted t1
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment: Selection t2 Openness of Executive Recruitment (only if Campetitiveness is coded Selection): Closed t1 Dual:designation tl
Constraints on Chief Executive: Unlimited authority t3 2 (intermediate category) t2 Slight to moderate limitations t1
The logic of this "Institutionalized autocracy" scale is similar to that of the Institutionalized democracy scale, below, and it is subject to the same kinds of operational redefinition to suit different theoretical purposes. Note that the two scales do not share any categories in cormnon. Nonetheless many polities have mixed authority traits, and thus csn have middling scores on both Autocracy and Democracy scales. These are the kinds of polities which were characterized as "anocratic" and "incoherent" in the POLITY I studies. As a group they proved to less durable than coherent democracies and autocracies (see Gurr 1974, Harmel 1980, Lichbach 1984).
6.2 DEMOC: Institutionalized Democracy
Danccracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalizedconstraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Thirdis the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. We do not have coded data on civil liberties. Instead our operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable 2.7), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables 2.6 and 2.5), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.4).
The Democracy indicator is an additive ten-point scale, constructed using these weights.
38 Authority coding Scale Weight
Competitiveness of Fblitical Participation: Competitive t3 Transitional t2 Factional t1
Canpetitiveness of Emcutive Fkcruitment: Election t2 Transitional tl
Openness of Executive Recruitment (only if Ccmpetitiveness is Election or Transitional): Dual: election tl Election t1 constraint on Chief Executive: Executive Parity or subordination t4 6 (intermediate category) t3 Substantial limitations t2 5 (intermediate category) tl
This "Institutional deuccracy" indicator follows a logic similar to that underlying the POLITY I analyses. There is no "necessary condition" for characterizing a political system as democratic, rather democracy is treated as a variable. For example, the scale discriminates among Western parliamentary and presidential systems based on the extent of constraints on the chief executive. Charles de Gaulle as president of the French Fifth Republic operated within slight to moderate Political limitations. Thus the early years of the Fifth Republic have lower Democracy scores than the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany, where constraints on the executive approach parity. Similarly, the onset of "cohabitation" in France during the second phase of the first Mitterand presidency is eked by a shift toward Parity on the Executive Constraints scale and a concomitant increase in France's Democracy score.
If the composite indicator of institutionalized democracy is inappropriate for someconceptual purposes, it canbe easily redefined either by altering the constituent categories and weights, or by specifying some minimum preconditions. A mature and internally coherent democracy, for example, might be operationally defin& as one in which (a) political participation is fully competitive, (b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial.
6.3 CONCEN: Concentration of Power
As suggested above, we regard the concentration of power in the hands of state authorities to be analytically and functionally distinct form democracy and autocracy. The typical nineteenth century autocracy exercised less effective control over its subjects than the typical activist welfare democracy of the late twentieth century. "Power" has many meanings, two of which can be indexed more or less directly using the POLITY II dataset.
39 Scope (variable 2.9), as coded, is a measure of the extent to which the state uses its powers of regulation and conmsnd to direct social and economic activity. An alternative measure of power concentration is based on the institutional characteristics of the polity. Institutional power is least in polities where political competition is divisive and unregulated, where political authority is dispersed smong different individuals and institutions, and where peripheral regions have some autonomy form central authority. The opposite traits --institutional control of competition and executive recruitment, concentration of national power in a unitary state headed by a strong executive-- signify a high degree of institutional power. Our composite ten-point indicator of power concentration is built on the regulation of participation (variable 2.6), regulation of executive recruitment (variable 2.1) competitiveness of executive recruitment (variable 2.2), constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.5), monocratism (variable 2.4), and centralization of authority (variable 2.8).
Authority Coding Scale Weight
Regulation of Participation: Regulated t2 Restricted t1
Regulation of Executive Recruitment: Regulated t1
Ccmpetitiveness of Executive Rzcruitment: Selection t1 Election t1
Constraints cm theChiefllxecutive: None t3 2 (intermediate category) t2 Slight to moderate limits tl
Monocratiam: Pure individual executive tl
Centralization: Unitary state t2
Itwill be observed that this indicator includes some categories that are among the defining properties of both democratic and autocratic polities, as well as several other authority traits. While the highest concentrations of institutional power are to be found in highly autocratic polities, high power concentrations are not uncommon emongmodern democracies.
6.4 CUHER: Coherence of Political Institutions
Eckstein (1969: 300-307) proposed that polities with coherent (internally consistent) authority patterns should outperform and outlast those with incoherent
40 patterns. Research using the POLITY I data set indicator of Coherence generally supported the argument (Gurr 1974, Harmel 1980, Lichbach 1984). "Coherent" polities in POLITY II are defined operationally as those which score 7 or more on either Autocracy (variable 6.1) or Democracy (variable 6.2).j The index is dichotomous, 1 = coherent, 0 = incoherent.
7. FoLITYADAPrABILITYAND~IsTENcE
These indicators are constructed to permit testing of hypotheses about relationships among authority patterns (or other independent variables) and the adaptability and persistence of polities. They are more precise intervally-measured equivalents of indicators used in the POLITY I studies.
7.1 INSTCH: Number of Institutional Changes
This is a count of the number of changes on the authority dimensions (variables 2.1 through 2.9) that occurred between the previous year and the present year. They can be used as an indicator of the Adaptability of polities. The indicator makes no distinctions regarding the extent of changes on any of the authority dimensions. For example, a change of either 1 or 4 categories on var. 2.9, SCOPE, is counted as a single change.
Generally, INSTCH scores are highest in years of Polity Change, as operationally defined in variable 3.1. But not always, since a number of changes that we have defined a priori as "minor" may co-occur in a single year. And in some instances a single "major, abrupt" change, hence a polity change, occurs on one dimension without any parallel changes on other dimensions. Thus the INSTCK scores can be used, among other purposes, to construct alternative operational definitions of Polity Change.
7.2 PERSIST: Polity Persistence in Years
This is a measure, in years, of the current age of a polity, i.e. the number of years since the last fundamental, abrupt polity change as defined on variables 3.1 and 5.1-5.5. For polities that were formed before 1800, the appropriate number of years were added to the score for 1800. The U.S.'s first (and thus far only) polity dates from 1789, thus the 1800 value for the U.S. on this variable is 11. Some pre-modern autocracies were assign& ancient dates of origin based on limited historical information: for example, we dated the Kingdom of Korea from the late 14th century (1800 = 408), Imperial Japan from the mid-13th century (1800 q 550).
8. NATIONAL EcQNaMIC A-
Fiscal and national accounts variables are included in the data set to enable researchers to perform longitudinal, cross-sectional (or cross-regional), and
3 This is precisely comparable to the procedure used to index Coherence in the Polity I studies. See Gurr 1974: 1497.
41 longitudinal-cross-sectional analyses of the changes in governmen t involvement in national economies. The three main variables are government expenditure (variable 8.1), government revenue (variable 8.3), and national accounts (variable 8.5). The type of currency and the type of national accounts are also included as separate variables for each indicator. The data source used is noted in variable 8.8. Data on exchange rates from the Capabilities dataset of the Correlates of War (COW) project have been included (with adjustments) so that most of the fiscal and account series can be converted into U.S. dollars (see variables 8.9 and 8.10).
Sane caveats are necessary. Equivalency of national-level economic data is especially problematic. The scope and definition of fiscal and productivity data vary across polities, which threatens the validity of cross-sectional comparisons. Longitudinal comparisons are impaired by internal changes in accounting procedures. Those who have worked with this type of data, even from the s tandardized sources we relied on (see below), will be familiar with the seemingly endless array of notes and symbols pointing out breaks or inconsistencies in time-series data for particular countries. We have documented the basic characteristics of the fiscal and productivity variables, but have not replicated the source notes and qualifications. It is essential for users to recognize that the data are not necessarily suitable for all the comparative questions that they might be used to study. For detailed interpretations, researchers are urged to refer to the sources and the notes therein. Several more specific issues are discussed below.
The first specific issue is inflation. To compensate for this problem, economists calculate real or constant values. This process involves deflating the current values by factoring out the rate of inflation measured from a specified base year. The resulting figure is typically expressed as a constant base year value (i.e., constant 1960 $US). While this is a useful technique for improving the longitudinal (and cross-sectional) equivalence of national economic data, it requires that all of the data being compared are measured from the same base year. Obviously, in a data collection effort as deep and wide in scope as this, such a process is cost prohibitive. Thus, all of the fiscal and national accounts data are reported in current (or market) prices. We also include exchange rates so that researchers can convert national currencies into current U.S. dollars. This resolves some comparability problems but creates others, as noted in the discussion of variable 8.9, below.
The second issue is cross-sectional in nature: because there is no precise agreement on international definitions of such basic concepts as Gross National Product, Total Expenditures orTotalF&venues, different countries operationalize these concepts in different ways. Variations in accounting procedures, and the lack of a universally accepted fiscal year, further complicate matters. Thus, while one state may include social security transfer payments or develomt plan outlays in total expenditures, another will not, and so on. The picture is just as frustrating in longitudinal analyses: accounting procedures change often, fiscal years are changed, new currencies are minted, and old ones held static until a large adjustment can no longer be avoided, making comparison from one year to the next problematic.
Despite these limitations of the data, they can nonetheless be used for two kinds of comparative analysis. One involves the construction of ratio variables (e.g., revenues as a percentage of national product). Even if currencies and fiscal years change, they ordinarily change together on all three variables included here. 42 Expenditures and revenues, for example, are very highly correlated. Thus, cross- sectional and longitudinal analyses of ratios calculated from these variables have greater validity than analyses using the raw data. Second, research designs in which broad and general comparisons are made across long time-spans may be justifiable. The more macro are the inferences to be drawn from the data, the less problematic are minor differences in fiscal reporting procedures and types of national accounts. It will be difficult to assess questions of equivalence in comparisons of more limited scope.
Nonetheless, we have included documentation of each variable to make it possible to assess equivalence. Thus, the researcher who wishes to perform extensive comparability checks can do so by using the documentation provided in the data set, or by returning to the original data sources themselves.
Two sources of data were used for collecting these variables: B.R. Mitchell's three volume set of historical economic statistics4, and the Europa Yearbook.5 Mitchell divides the world into three regions: Europe, Africa &Asia,sndThe Americas & Australasia. The European volume covers the years 1800-1969, and the latter two volumes 1800-1974 (some countries have data prior to 1800, but they were not entered in the POLITY I data set). For a listing of the years and variables covered see Appendix A. The Europa Yearbook was used to continue the time-series through 1985 (again, see Appendix A for polities and data). This raises the issue of comparability across two different sources. We comparedall fiscal data series across the transition between sources. In a few cases where serious disjunctures occurred we either made adjustments based on other sources or, where that was not possible, eliminated the Europa Yearbook data. t33- EPENDl.'lURB, vars. 8.1 and 8.2
Included here are government expenditures (in millions of units of national currency) and the nsme of the currency.
8.1NGEX: Government E-qxmditures
The sources ordinarily do not indicate whether the figures reported are for central (national) gove rnment outlays or include other levels of governments. Spot- checking against other sources suggests that all figures are national outlays only. This introduces systematic error which is most serious for federal systems, in which state or provincial government expenditures typically make up a third or more of general (total) gove rnment expenditures. There are some post-1950 time-series data
4 European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970, New York: Columbia University Press, 1976; International Historical Statistics: Africa & Asia, New York: New York University Press, 1982; International Historical Statistics: The Americas & Australasia, Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983.
5 The Europa Yearbook: A World Survey, London: Europa Publications Limited, annual (1969-1988).
43 on general government finances for most of the advanced industrial countries, for example in recent editions of the U.N. Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, but for longer-run comparisons (of the kinds for which POLITY II is intended) only central government fiscal data are available.
8.2 XCUR: Expenditure Currency
This alpha variable records the type of currency inwhich government expenditures is measured. For a list of the abbreviations used in this field, see Table 8.1. TABLE 8.1: Expenditures/Revenues/National Accounts Currencies
Code Currency afghan Afghans bale Bahts balb Balboas birr Birrs boli Bolivares cedis Cedis cfafr CFAFrancs colon Colones cord CO??dObE%S crown Crowns cruz Cruzeiros crzd cruzados dinar Dinars dirh Dirhams doll Dollars drach Drachmae escud Escudos forint Forints franc Francs gourd Gourdes Guaranies guild Guilders kina Kinas koruna Korunnas kroner kronur Kronur kwach KW&Zhas kwanza KWanzaS kyat Kyats lemp Lempiras leon Leones leva Levas lira Lira markaa Markaas marks Marks milre Milreis
44 Currency naira Nairas ncruz New Cruzeiros ndinar New Dinari ndr New Drachmae nfr New Francs ngu1t New Gultrum nleva New Levas nmarka New Markaas npeso New Pesos nrube New Rubles ntdol New Taiwanese Dollars nurupi NewRupiahs nushek New Shekels ougi Ougiya papeso Paper Pesos pengo Pengos peseta Pesetas peso Pesos pula PLllaS poti Pounds quetz Quetzales
Id-IS Rhodesian Dollars rials Rials riyal Riyals rlbs Rhodesian Pounds rube Rubels rupee Rupees rupiah Rupiahs schill Schillings shekel Shekels sole Soles sucre SUCreS sylis Sylis Takas won wons 3Ten YW YUEUlE Zaire zaires zloty Zlotys
45 cDiMMWW F?EVHWB, var.-s. 8.3 arm3 8.4
8.3 NGREV: Government Revenues
This variable is the value of revenues for each country-year (case), expressed in millions. The comments made about expenditures (above) hold here.
8.4 RCUR: Revenue Currency
As in Table 8.1.
NATIONAL AC!COWB, vars 8.5 to 8.7
8.5 NACTS: National Accounts
This is the value of the national accounts for each country-year (case) in millions of units of current national currency.
8.6 ATYPE: Type of National Accounts
There are several different kinds of estimates of national productivity, but often the differences among them are insufficient to pose difficulties for broad comparative analyses. However, this depends on the research agenda. Variable 8.6 uses the following alpha codes to denote the type of national accounts:
api Annual private Income gdp Gross Domestic Prcduct Gross Material product gnP Gross National product nmP Net Material product nnP Net National product
8.7 ACUR: National Accounts Currency
This variable lists the currency in which the national accounts are measured; see Table 8.1, above. Ordinarily national accounts and fiscal data in any given year are reported in the same currerncy for each country. Where this was not the case (e.g., in Mitchell some national accounts series have been estimated retrospectively, using the currency units in effect at the time the retrospective estimates were calculated), we made every effort to convert them to one common currency. A few disjunctures remain.
46 8.8.SoURCE
This single unit variable denotes the source of the national accounts data:
1 Mitchell 2 (Not used) 3 EuropaYearbook 4 country studies
EXCHANGERATE, vars. 8.9 and 8.10
Cross-national and temporal incomparabilities in fiscal data can be reduced or eliminated by converting to a cornnon unit of currency. We have made use of the exchange rates in the CCW project's Capabilities datsset to facilitate such conversions. There are limitations in the exchange rates from this data source, some of which we have overcome and some not.
1. Exchange rates before 1914 are for converting the national currency to Pounds, after 1919 for converting to dollars. To standardize the rates we used the dollar/ Pound exchange rates for 1800-1914 to convert all Pound rates to dollar rates.
ii. No exchange rates are reported in the Capabilities data set for years that a country was not a member of the international system (as defined by the CCWproject), or for 1914-18 or 1940-45. There are substsntial dis- continuities in exchange rates across these war Periods for many countries. Further research is needed to obtain estimates, where Possible.
iii. The Capabilities exchange rate series end in 1970. We have not attempted to update them.
iv. Incountry yearswhere currencies were revaluedor underheavy inflationary pressures, the shift in exchange rates in the Capabilities dataset often does not coincide with the timing of the shift in fiscal or national account series. We inspected all series for such disjunctures and, in most instsnces, were able to adjust either the fiscal and account series or the exchange rate series so that all country-year entries are in compatible values. Some of these adjustments were made by reference to information in Franz Pick-Rene Sedillot, All the Monies of the World: A Chronicle of Currency Values (New York:Pick Publishing, 1971). Further adjustments, using more detailed sources, maybe indicated.
8.9 KPlVAL: Currency Excharge Pate Units of national currency equivalent to $1.00 U.S.
47 8.10 XRS: Source of &change Pate Two source codes are used: l= Correlates of War Capabilities dataset 2 = our adjustment of exchange rates from COW 3 q (reserved)
9. BANKS' POLITY CHARGERISrICS, vars. 9.1 to 9.14 The following 14 variables are derived from the 1986 version of Arthur S. Banks Cross-Polity Time-Series Dataset. By incorporating these variables with the polity indicators reported here, we have assembled what we regard as the most comprehensive dataset on authority characteristics available to date. Some of the Cross-Polity indicators can be used to test the validity of the POLITY II codings, others can be used to complement and extend it, e.g. to index the extent of military domination of the polity and the occurrence of elite instability.
Complete documentation of the Banks dataset is available in the Cross-Polity Time-Series Archive: A User's Manual (1975). The category descriptions are from this source.
NOTE: These variables differ slightly in coverage from the POLITY II wdings. The Cross-Polity coding covers the period 1815 to 1982, but, like the CQWdataset, omits 1914-18 and 1940-45. &I the other hand the Cross-Polity dataset includes codings for most country years that POLITY II codes as transition periods and interregna (see the introduction to Section 2, above).
9.1 REGTYPE: Type of Regime
(1) Civilian: Any government controlled by a nonmilitary component of the nation's population.
(2) Military-Civilian: Outwardly civilian government effectively controlled by a military elite. Civilian holds only those posts (up to and including that of Chief of State) for which their services are deemed necessary for successful conduct of government operations. Anexample wouldbe retention of the Kmperor and selected civilian cabinet members during the period of Japanese military hegemony between 1932 and 1945.
(3) Military: Direct rule by the military, usually (but not necessarily) following a military coup d'etat. The governing structuremayvary from utilization of the military chain of coznnand under conditions of martial law to the institution of an ad hoc administrative hierarchy with at least an upper echelon staffed by military personnel.
(4) Other: All regimes not falling into one or another of the foregoing categories, including instances in which a country, save for reasons of exogenous influence, lacks an effective national government. An example of the latter would be Switzerland between 1815 and 1848.
48 9.2 CUUF'S: Coups d'Etat
The number of extraconstitutional or forced changes in the top government elite and/or its effective control of the nation's power structure in a given year. The term "coup" includes, but is not exhausted by, the term "successful revolution". Unsuccessful coups are not counted.
9.3 CONCHG:Major Constitutional Changes
The number of basic alterations in a state's constitutional structure, the extreme case being the adoption of a new constitution that significantly alters the prerogatives of the various branches of government. Examples of the latter might be the substitution of presidential for parliamentary government or the replacement of monarchical by republican rule. Constitutional amendments which do not have significant impact on the political system are not counted.
9.4 CHIEFEX: Head of State
(1) Mormrch: hief of state is a monarch (either hereditary or elective) or a regent functioning on a monarch's behalf.
(2) Fkesident: Chief of state is a president who may function as chief executive or merely as titular head of state. In the latter case he will possess little effective power, even though serving as presiding officer of a legislative assembly or state council.
(3) Military: A situation in which a member of the nation's armed forces is recognized as the formal head of government. In cases of conflict between (2) and (31, coding is determined on the basis of whether the incumbent's role is intrinsically military or civilian in character.
(4) Other: In practice, this category is used when no distinct head of state can be identified. In theory, it includes any distinct head of state not included in (l)-(3), such as a theocratic ruler.
9.5 PRBTIER: Premier
(1) Formal executive is rrremierial in character
(2) Formal executive is mm-premierial in character
9.6 ECTYPE: Effective Executive (Type)
Refers to the individual who exercises primary influence in the shaping of most major decisions affecting the nation's internal and external affairs. The "other" category may refer to a situation in which the individual in question (such as the part first secretary in a Communist regime) holds no formal governmental post, or to one
49 in which no truly effective national executive can be said to exist: (1) Monarch (2) President
(3) Premier
(4) Military
(5) Other
9.7 lcL%LEc: Effective Executive (Selection)
(1) Direct Election: Election of the effective executive by popular vote or theelection ofconnnitted delegates for the purpose of executive selection.
(2) Indirect Election: Selection of the effective executive by an elected assembly or by an elected but uncotitted electoral college.
(3) Nonelective: Any means of executive selection not involving a direct or indirect mandate from an electorate.
9.8 PARL: Parliamentary Responsibility
Refers to the degree to which a premier must depend on the support of a majority in the lower house of a legislature in order to remain in office.
(0) Irrelevant: Office of premier does not exist. (1) Abent: Office of premier exists, but there is no parliamentary responsibility.
(2) Inccmplete: The premier is, at least to some extent, constitutionally responsible to the legislature. Effective responsibility is, however, limited.
(3) mete: The premier is constitutionally and effectively dependent upon a legislative majority for continuance in office.
9.9 cABs1zE: Size of Cabinet
Defers to the number of ministers of "cabinet rank", excluding undersecretaries, parliamentary secretaries, ministerial alternates, etc.
9.10 CADCHG: Major Cabinet Changes
The number of times in a year that a new premier is named and/or 50% of the cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers.
50 9.11 EXCHG: Changes in Effective Executive
The number of times in a year that effective control of the executive power changes hands. Such a change requires that the new executive be independent of his predecessor.
9.12 LEGEFJ: Legislative Effectiveness
(0) -None: No legislature exists. (1) Ineffective: There are three possible bases for this coding: first, legislative activity may be essentially of a "rubber stamp" character; second, domestic turmoil may make the implementation of legislation impossible; third, the effective executivemay prevent the legislature form meeting or otherwise substantially impede the exercise of its functions.
(2) Fhrtia.lly Effective: A situation in which the effective executive's power substantially outweighs but does not completely dominate that of the legislature.
(3) Effective: The possession of significant governmental autonorqy by the legislature, including, typically, substantial authority with regard to taxation and disbursement, and the power to override executive vetoes of legislation.
9.13 LIEGSELEC: Legislative Selection
(0) N-: No legislature exists. (1) Non-Elective: Examples would be the selection of legislators by the effective executive, or on the basis of heredity or ascription.
(2) Elective: Legislators (or members of the lower house ina bicameral system) are selected by means of either direct or indirect popular election.
9.14 LEGELEC: Legislative Election
The number of elections held for the lower house of a national legislature in a given year.
51 APPENDIX A: (ZOUMRY CODESAND DATA -
lTMFC%G DCMAIN COVERAGE: AWI'HORITY DATA POLITY CHANGEYEARS
Fxm 2: EXF'ENDITUREDATA GAPS IN EP. DATA lum 3: REVENUEDATA GAPS IN REV. DATA
RIlw 4: NATIONAL ACCWNTS DATA GAPS IN ACXXJNTS DATA l=wEmEIw EumPE
AUSTRIA 305 1800-1986 1848, 1861, 1920, 1934, 1946 1800-1986 1916-22, 1938-47 1800-1986 1916-22, 1938-44 1913-1986 1914-23, 1938-46
BADEN 267 1818-1871 1841, 1848
BAVARIA 245 1800-1871
BELGIUM 211 1831-1986 1853 1831-1985 1913-19, 1940 1831-1985 1913-19, 1940 1913-1985 1914-23, 1925-26, 1928-29, 1931-33, 1940-42, 1944-45
DENMARK 390 1800-1986 1849, 1915 1854-1985 1853-1985 1870-1986 1915-20
FINLAND 375 1917-1986 1931, 1944 1917-1986 1917-1986 1926-1986
FRANCE 220 1800-1986 1814, 1848, 1852, 1863, 1877, 1940, 1946, 1958 1815-1985 1815-1985 1950-1985
6 Listed alphabetically by region.
52 255 1871-1945 1919, 1933 1872-1934 1872-1942 1871-1938 1914-24
GERMANFED- 260 1949-1986 REPUBLIC 1950-1986 1946-1986 1950-1986
GREECE 350 1827-1986 1833, 1844, 1864, 1915, 1924, 1936, 1944, 1949, 1967, 1974 1833-1985 1918, 1944-45 1896-1985 1918, 1927, 1941-53 1928-1985 1941-45
ICELAND 395 1918-1986 1964-1985 1983 1964-1985 1983 1964-1985
IRELAND 205 1922-1986 1923-1986 1922-1986 1929-1986 1930, 1932, 1934-35, 1938-46
ITALY 325 1861-1986 1928, 1948 1862-1986 1982, 1985 1862-1986 1982, 1985 1861-1986
LuxEMBaTRG 212 1867-1986 1965-1984 1967, 1969-70 1965-1984 1967, 1969-70 1965-1984
MODFBR 332 1815-1860
1815-1986 1840, 1917 1845-1985 1845-1985 1969 1900-1985 1940-48
NORWAY 385 1814-1986 1884, 1898 1830-1985 1830-1985 1865-1985 1940-45
53 PAPAL STATES 327 1815-1870 1850
PARMA 335 1815-1860
235 1800-1986 1823, 1834, 1836, 1842, 1907, 1908, 1911, 1930, 1976 1878-1984 1903-15, 1919-20, 1934 1879-1984 1904-18, 1920-21, 1969 1950-1984 1951-52, 1978
PRUSSIA 255 1800-1867
SAFDINIA 324 1815-1860 1848
SAXONY 269 1806-1871 1831, 1849
SPAIN 230 1800-1986 1820, 1823, 1837,1871, 1873, 1876, 1923, 1931, 1939,1978 1850-1983 1939, 1972 1850-1983 1939, 1971 1906-1983
SWEDEN 380 1800-1986 1812, 1917 1881-1985 1881-1985 1801-1985
SWI- 225 1848-1986 1849-1985 1850-1985 1913-1985 1914-23, 1925-28
TUSCANY 337 1815-1860 1848, 1849
54 Two SICILIES 329 1816-1860 1820, 1821
UNITED KINGDCPl 200 1800-1986 1800-1985 1800-1985 1850-1985
WLJURG 271 1800-1871
ALBANIA 339 1914-1986 1925, 1946
?3ULGARIA 355 1879-1986 1881, 1883, 1886, 1894, 1918, 1935, 1947 1879-1985 1942-69 1879-1985 1942-69 1924-1985
CZEKXSLAVAKIA 315 1918-1986 1945, 1948 1919-1985 1920, 1938-69 1919-1985 1920, 1938-46, 1947, 1951-59 1948-1985
ESTONIA 366 1917-1940 1936
GERMAN 265 1949-1986 DEMOCRATIC 1950-1986 1984 REFvBLIC 1970-1986 1984 1950-1980
HUNGARY 310 1867-1986 1919, 1920, 1948 1868-1986 1941-69 1868-1986 1941-69 1900-1986 1901-11, 1913-20, 1922-24
LATVIA 367 1920-1940 1934
55 LITHUANIA 368 1918-1940 1928
FOLAND 290 1918-1986 1926, 1949 1924-1985 1938-46, 1969 1922-1985 1938-69 1950-1985
RUMANIA 360 1859-1986 1864, 1866, 1938, 1941, 1948 1862-1985 1916, 1939-49 1883-1985 1896, 1915, 1944-49
SERBIA 344 1830-1915 1838, 1859, 1861, 1869, 1903
U.S.S.R. 365 1800-1986 1905, 1917, 1922, 1953 1803-1985 1915-23, 1935-37, 1941-49, 1951, 1954, 1957 1803-1985 1915-23, 1935-37, 1941-49, 1951, 1954, 1957 1928-1985 1941-44
YUGOSLAVIA 345 1921-1986 1929, 1939, 1946 1925-1985 1941-45 1921-1985 1941-44 1947-1985
AUSTRALIA 900 1901-1986 1901-1984 1901-1984 1901-1984
CANADA 020 1867-1986 1870-1986 1867-1986 1867-1986 1868-69, 1871-79, 1881-89, 1891-99, 1901- 1909, 1911-19, 1921-25
CYPRUS 352 1960-1986 1975 1960-1986 1960-1986 1960-1986
56 ISRAEL 666 1949-1986 1949-1983 1949-1983 1950-1983 1976-80
NEWZEALAND 920 1857-1986 1876 1857-1985 1872 1857-1985 1931-1985 1940-42
ORANGEFREE 564 1854-1902 STATE
SOUTH AFRICA 560 1856-1986 1910 1910-1985 1910-1985 1911-1985 1976-80
U.S.A. 002 1800-1986 1800-1985 1800-1985 1800-1985
ARGENTINA 160 1825-1986 1835, 1853, 1930, 1937, 1940, 1948, 1957, 1966, 1973, 1976, 1983 1864-1986 1864-1986 1900-1975
BOLIVIA 145 1826-1986 1836, 1839, 1864, 1873, 1876, 1880,1936, 1956, 1985 1888-1984 1897, 1936-37, 1974-75 1885-1984 1950-1975
BRAZIL 140 1824-1986 1889, 1894, 1934, 1946, 1948, 1958, 1965 1832-1985 1832-1985 1861-1985
CHILE 155 1818-1986 1891, 1925, 1974 1857-1986 1857-1986 1981-1983
57 COLCMBIA 100 1832-1986 1853, 1861, 1867, 1886, 1904, 1930, 1948, 1957 1905-1985 1922, 1977, 1981 1907-1985 1922, 1977, 1981 1945-1985 1981
ECUADOR 130 1830-1986 1901, 1925, 1948,1961, 1968, 1972, 1979 1885-1986 1894-96, 1983 1863-1986 1875-77, 1880-83, 1894-96, 1983 1939-1986
GR4N C!QLOMBIA 099 1821-1830
GUYANA 110 1966-1986 1975, 1980 1966-1985 1980-83 1966-1985 1980-83 1966-1985 1970-79
PARAGUAY 150 1816-1986 1870, 1936, 1940, 1947, 1954 1881-1983 1901-1912, 1917-18, 1933-34, 1951, 1954- 1957 1881-1983 1903-1912, 1917-18, 1933-34, 1952, 1954- 1957 1950-1984 1970-80
PERU 135 1821-1986 1822, 1824, 1828, 1835, 1836, 1837, 1839, 1879,1886,1896, 1920,1933, 1968, 1980 1846-1984 1856-60, 1865-68, 1881-86, 1895, 1977-79 1846-1984 1856-60, 1865-68, 1881-86, 1895, 1977-79 1942-1984 1976-80
URUGUAY 165 1830-1986 1904, 1952, 1967, 1973, 1985 1869-1985 1870-72, 1877-78, 1880-82, 1889-91, 1893, 1895-1897, 1900-01, 1903, 1919 1870-1985 1871, 1873, 1878-79, 1881-83 1955-1985
101 1830-1986 1936, 1958 1830-1984 1979 1831-1984 1979 1950-1984 1976-81
58 12= CEKIRAL AMmIcA &THECARIBBEAN
COSTA RICA 094 1838-1986 1883-1986 1978-80 1884-1986 1978-80 1950-1986 1976-83
040 1902-1986 1928, 1933, 1955, 1962 1900-1986 1909, 1938, 1959, 1966-83 1902-1986 1938, 1959, 1966-83 1903-1986 1929, 1931, 1932, 1934, 1935, 1937, 1959- 1961, 1975-83
DCMINICAN 042 1844-1986 1865, 1932, 1962, 1978 REPUBLIC 1905-1984 1905-1984 1940-1984 1947-49
EL SALVADOR 092 1841-1986 1903, 1931, 1950, 1964, 1972, 1984 1883-1985 1930 1883-1985 1939-1985 1945-50
GUATEPlALA 090 1839-1986 1848, 1854, 1873,1876, 1880, 1896, 1898, 1900, 1920, 1932, 1944, 1950, 1954, 1958, 1963, 1966, 1974, 1982, 1986 1882-1986 1887-90, 1892, 1900, 1975 1882-1986 1887-89, 1975 1923-1986 1975
HAITI 041 1820-1986 1918, 1935, 1950, 1958 1917-1984 1960, 1964 1898-1982 1960, 1964, 1975, 1980 1955-1984 1976-82
HONDURAS 091 1839-1986 1894, 1904, 1908, 1936, 1956, 1982 1979-1986 1884-85, 1889-91, 1897, 1903 1879-1986 1889-91, 1903 1925-1986
JAMAICA 051 1959-1986 1959-1982 1979-82 1959-1982 1979-82 1959-1982
MEXICO 070 1822-1986 1835, 1880, 1917, 1930 1825-1983 1914-16, 1977-78 1825-1983 1914-16, 1977-78 1925-1983
59 NICARAGUA 093 1838-1986 1909, 1936, 1981 1900-1984 1905-09, 1912, 1950 1900-1984 1905-09, 1912, 1950 1953-1984 1980
PANAMA 095 1903-1986 1968 1909-1985 1909-1985 1946-1985
TRINIDAD & 052 1962-1986 TOBAGO 1962-1982 1976 1962-1982 1976 1962-1982 1976-79.
UNITED PROVINCE 089 1824-1838 OF CWIRAL, AMERICA
21=SOUTHANDEASTASL4
BANGLADESH 771 1972-1986 1975, 1976, 1982 1971-1985 1971-1985 1972-1985
BHUTAN 760 1907-1986 1973-1987 1975-76, 1978-84 1973-1987 1975-76, 1978-84 1982-1987
BURMfi 775 1948-1986 1962, 1966 1946-1984 1946-1984 1947-1984 1980
CHINA (FRC) 710 1800-1986 1912, 1914, 1949, 1977, 1978-1986 1978-1986 1978-1986
INDIA 750 1950-1986 1950-1985 1950-1985 1950-1985
INDONESIA 850 1945-1986 1946, 1950 1950-1985 1950-1985 1951-1985
60 JAPAN 740 1800-1986 1868, 1952 1868-1986 1868-1986 1885-1986 1945
K‘AMFUCHEA 811 1949-1986 1955, 1972, 1976 1949-1971 1949-1971
KOREA 730 1800-1910
Km, 731 1948-1986 DEMOCRATIC 1953-1986 PEOPLE’ s 1953-1986 RERJEiLIC OF
Km, 732 1948-1986 1952, 1960, 1961, 1963, 1972 REPUBLIC OF 1949-1985 1955 1949-1985 1953-1985 1976-77
LAOS 812 1958-1986 1959, 1975 1966-1981 1974-76 1966-1981 1974-76
MALAYSIA 820 1957-1986 1957-1985 1980 1957-1985 1980 1957-1985 1976-79
MONGOLIA 712 1924-1986 1934, 1952 1966-1986 1971, 1973 1966-1986 1971, 1973
NEPAL 790 1800 1846, 1951, 1959, 1960, 1981 1966-1983 1969, 1978 1966-1983 1969, 1978 1974-1983
PAKISTAN 770 1947-1986 1948, 1956, 1958, 1962, 1971, 1977 1947-1985 1947-1985 1950-1985
61 PAPUANJZW 910 1975-1986 GUINEA 1976-1985 1976-1985 1982-1985
PHILIPPINES 840 1935-1986 1972 1935-1986 1941-44, 1979-81 1935-1986 1941-44, 1979-81 1946-1984
SINGAF'ORE 830 1959-1986 1965 1964-1985 1984 1964-1985 1984 1960-1985 1976-79
SRI LANKA 780 1948-1986 1978 1948-1985 1948-1985 1948-1985
TAIWAN 713 1949-1986 1950-1986 1950-1986 1951-1986
THAILAND 800 1800-1986 1935, 1958, 1969, 1971, 1974, 1976, 1978 1892-1985 1892-1985 1946-1985
VIETNAM, 816 1954-1986 DEHOCRATIC REFVBLIC OF
VIETNAM, 817 1955-1975 1963, 1967 REPUBLIC OF 1956-1973 1956-1973
22= NEAR k r4lmI.a EAST, Nc%zTHAFRIcA
AFGHANISTAN 700 1800-1986 1925, 1965, 1973, 1978 1970-1979 1970-1979 1975-1979
62 ALGERIA 615 1963-1986 1970 1964-1981 1964-1981 1973-1983 1977-81
EGYFT 651 1811-1986 1923, 1930, 1936, 1953 1821-1986 1822-32, 1834-35, 1837-41, 1843-45, 1847- 1951 1821-1986 1822-32, 1834-35, 1837-41, 1843-45, 1848- 1951 1950-1975 1951-52, 1954-56, 1971
IRAN 630 1800-1986 1925, 1941, 1947, 1955, 1979 1920-1986 1984 1920-1986 1984 1959-1975
IRAQ 645 1924-1986 1936, 1941, 1958 1927-1981 1975-79 1927-1981 1975-79 1950-1975
JORDAN 663 1946-1986 1951, 1957, 1973 1951-1986 1951-1986 1959-1986
KUWAIT 690 1963-1986 1976, 1981 1972-1984 1972-1984 1981-1984
LEBANON 660 1944-1986
LIBYA 620 1951-1986 1964, 1969, 1978 1963-1975 1963-1975 1963-1975
600 1800-1986 1956, 1965 1938-1983 1955-58, 1975 1920-1983 1930-37, 1975 1952-1975
698 1800-1986 1970 1974-1984 1974-1984 1976-1986 1978-81
63 o?TcMANEMPIRB 639 1800-1918 1876, 1877, 1908
SAUDI ARABIA 670 1926-1986 1965-1984 1975 1965-1984 1975 1966-1984 1975, 1982
SYRIA 652 1944-1986 1949, 1950, 1952, 1954, 1961, 1963 1944-1984 1951, 1962 1944-1975 1951, 1962 1963-1984 1976-81
TUNISIA 616 1959-1986 1965-1982 1965-1982 1961-1984
640 1923-1986 1946, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1973, 1980 1923-1985 1923-1985 1948-1985
YENENARAB 678 1918-1986 1948, 1962, 1977 REPWLIC 1968-1984 1968-1984 1979-1982
YEmN PEOPLE'S 680 1967-1986 1978 REPUBLIC 1968-1980 1968-1980
23= BUCK AFRICA
ANGOLA 540 1975-1986 1915-1984 1974-77, 1982 1915-1984 1945, 1956, 1974-77, 1982 1980-1982
BENIN 434 1960-1982 1965, 1970, 1972
64 BOTSWANA 571 1966-1986 1966-1985 1966-1985 1966-1984 1969-70, 1972
BURKINA FASO 439 1960-1986 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1980 1962-1986 1972-75 1962-1986 1972-75 1965-1983 1979-80
BURUNDI 516 1961-1986 1965 1966-1986 1967 1966-1986 1967 1983-1986
CAMERCON 471 1961-1986 1978-1986 1979-80 1978-1986 1979-80 1962-1983
CENTRAL AFRICAN 482 1962-1986 1979 REFUBLIC 1962-1985 1974-75, 1978-80 1962-1985 1974-75, 1978-80 1975-1985 1978-82
483 1962-1986 1975 1925-1985 1935-50, 1958-60, 1966-78, 1979 1925-1985 1935-50, 1958-60, 1966-78, 1979 1977-1982 1978-79
CONGO 484 1961-1986 1963 1961-1984 1964-67 1961-1984 1964-67 1983-1984
EI'HIOPIA 530 1855-1986 1975 1947-1983 1947-1983 1960-1983 1961-62
481 1961-1986 1925-1986 1935-50, 1958-59, 1965-75 1925-1986 1935-50, 1958-59, 1965-75 1956-1986 1957-59, 1971, 1980-82
GHANA 452 1960-1986 1970, 1972, 1979, 1981 1850-1985 1862-67, 1873-74, 1956 1850-1985 1862-67, 1873-74, 1956 1950-1985
65 GUINEA 438 1958-1986 1984 1975-1979 1977-78 1975-1979 1977-78 1980-1982
GUINEA-BISSAU 404 1974-1986 1976, 1980
IVORY COAST 437 1960-1986 1960-1984 1960-1984 1960-1984 1961-62, 1976-77
KENYA 501 1965-1986 1965-1984 1965-1984 1965-1975
LEsm 570 1966-1986 1970, 1978 1966-1982 1972, 1975-76, 1979-80 1966-1982 1972, 1975-76, 1979-80
LIBERIA 450 1847-1986 1884, 1980 1964-1985 1963-1985 1965-1975
MADAGASCAR 580 1961-1986 1972 1964-1978 1971 1964-1978 1971 1962-1975 1963
MALAWI 553 1966-1986 1966-1985 1979-81 1966-1985 1979-81 1966-1985 1974-79
MALI 432 1960-1986 1968 1961-1984 1968 1961-1984 1968 1981-1982
MAURITANIA 435 1961-1986 1979 1965-1979 1977 1965-1979 1977 1970-1979 1976-77
66 MAURITIUS 590 1968-1986 1968-1985 1968-1985 1968-1985 1976-81
MOZAMBIQLrE 541 1975-1986 1938-1984 1974-75, 1979 1920-1984 1974-75, 1979 1982-1984
NIGER 436 1959-1986 1974 1976-1984 1976-1984 1976-1983
NIGERIA 475 1960-1986 1966, 1979, 1984 1960-1983 1975, 1980 1960-1983 1960-1983
RWANDA 517 1962-1986 1973 1968-1983 1968-1983 1968-1983 1979
SENEGAL 433 1960-1986 1964, 1983 1963-1979 1962-1979 1960-1979
SIE$RA LEONE 451 1961-1986 1978 1961-1984 1970-73 1961-1984 1970-73 1963-1983 1976
SOMALIA 520 1960-1986 1969 1976-1984 1979 1976-1984 1979 1979-1981
SUDAN 625 1954-1986 1958, 1965, 1971, 1986 1901-1981 1976, 1980 1901-1981 1976, 1980 1955-1981 1976-78
TANZANIA 510 1963-1986 1970 1963-1984 1963-1984 1964-1984 1976-80
67 461 1961-1986 1967 1961-1984 1961-1984 1964-1984 1976-78
UGANDA 500 1962-1986 1967, 1971 1962-1983 1973-75 1962-1983 1973-75
ZAIRE 490 1960-1986 1963, 1967 1962-1982 1962-1982 1968-1982
ZAMBIA 551 1964-1986 1970, 1972 1964-1984 1964-1984 1964-1984
ZIMBABWE 552 1923-1986 1980 1960-1984 1960-1984 1960-1983
68 APFXNDIXB:COBlESREMISSIWAND INAPPLICARLE DATA
Block 1: Spatial-Temporal Domain
No missing data.
Block 2: Authority Characteristics
99 is missing; Blank is inapplicable.
Blocks 3, 4, 5 & 6: Polity Charges, Termination, Formation & Type
No missing values; 99 means unknown; Blank is innaplicable.
Block 7: Adaptability & Persistence
No missing values; Blank is none.
Block 8: Fiscal Data
Blanks are missing.
Block 9: Banks' Data
Blanks are missing.
69 -lx c: KRKS CITRD
AHADY, Anwar (1986) "The Politics of Abundance: Resource Allocation in the Public Sector in Developed and Oil-Rich Countries," Ph.D. Dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, Northwestern University.
BANKS, Arthur S. (1986) "Cross-National Time-SeriesData File." Binghamton, NY: Center for Comparative Political Research, State University of New York.
BENDIX, Reinhard (1978) Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press.
ECKSTEIN, Harry (1969) "AuthorityRelations and Governmental Performance: A Theoretical Framework," Gbps.rative Political Studies 2 (October).
ECKSTEIN, Harry, and GURR, T. R. (1975) Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry. New York: Wiley-Interscience.
GURR, T. R. (1974) "Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971," American Political Science Review 68 (December): 1482-1504.
GURR, T. R., and Associates (1978) Comparative Studies of Political Conflict and Change: Cross National Datasets. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
GURR, T. R., JAGGERS, Keith, and MCX33E,Will H. (1988) "The Transformation of the Western State: Indicators of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power Since 1800." Paper prepared for the Hoover Institution Conference on the Measurement of Demc=-=y, 27-28 May, forthcoming Studies in Cbpsrative Intexnational Lkvelopent.
HARMEL, Robert (1980) "Gurr's 'Persistence and Change' Revisited: Some Consequences of Using Different Gperationalizations of 'Change of Polity."' European Journal of Political Research 8 (June): 189-214.
LICHBACH, Mark Irving (1984). Regime Change and theCoherence of European Governments. Denver: Graduate School of International Studies, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 21, Book 1.
THIESSEN, Heather, and BAYS, Martha (1975) "A Survival Analysis of Polity Persistence and Change: AI&analysis of 'Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800- 1971.'" Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association meetings, Chicago, April.
WARD, Michael D. (1974) "Authority Dimensions: A Study of the Reliability and Validity of the Polity Data." Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Department of Political Science, unpublished research paper.
70