Risk, Uncertainty and Catastrophe Scenarios
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Climate Ethics and Climate Economics: Risk, Uncertainty and Catastrophe Scenarios Conveners Simon Beard (Centre for the Study of Existential Risk) Kai Speikerman (London School of Economics) th th May 8 – 10 2017 Workshop Report 1 Contents Workshop Summary 2 Summaries of Papers Presented 2 Summaries of Public Lectures 6 Should we Care about the Worst-Case Scenario When it Comes to Climate Change? 7 Workshop Summary Kieran Marray (Oxford) examined high-stakes decision making with limited information. Mariam Economic analyses of the effects of global Thalos (Utah) discussed under which warming often focus on the scenarios analysts circumstances precautionary policy is appropriate believe are most likely to materialize. However, in rather than the maximization of expected utility, recent years, both economists and moral and Iñaki San Pedro (University of the Basque philosophers have paid increasing attention to the Country) addressed the problem of motivation in possibility that climate change could prove much dealing with catastrophic risks. Tina Sikka worse than we expect. However, it is not clear (Newcastle) related feminist epistemology to just how likely such possibilities are. Analysts and scientific uncertainty, and Eike Düvel (Graz) decision makers thus confront the problem of examined moral and political problems connected decision not only under risk, but under with stranded carbon assets. uncertainty. How should we respond? Coupled with the workshop were two public One keynote speaker—Hilary Greaves (Oxford lectures by our keynote speakers. Opening the University) addressed the problem of conference, Doyne Farmer argued that compared ‘cluelessness’ about the consequences of our with the study of natural processes like climate actions, and its implications for the effective change, we actually have a poor understanding of altruism movement. The other, Doyne Farmer our collective effects on our own societies, and (Oxford), discussed the prediction of the effects of that greater resources could and should be future forms of technology. John Halstead devoted to understanding it. At its close, Hilary (Oxford) and Matthew Rendall (Nottingham) Greaves examined the connection between presented papers on decision making when we population growth and climate change, and are uncertain which empirical or moral theories argued that while it may well be a problem, the are true, while Elizabeth Baldwin (Oxford) and relationship is not a simple or linear one. Summaries of papers presented terms of this taxonomy, the majority of the Full versions of many of these papers can be existing literature on cluelessness focusses on downloaded from the simple sources. I argue, contra James http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/climateethicsecono Lenman in particular, that these would-be sources mics/papers/workshop-5.aspx of cluelessness are unproblematic, on the grounds that indifference-based reasoning is far Keynote: Hilary Greaves (University of Oxford) – less problematic than Lenman (along with many Cluelessness others) supposes. Decisions, whether moral or prudential, should be However, there does seem to be a genuine guided at least in part by considerations of the phenomenon of cluelessness associated with the consequences that would result from the various ‘complex’ sources; here, indifference-based available actions. For any given action, however, reasoning is inapplicable by anyone’s lights. This the majority of its consequences are ‘complex problem of cluelessness’ is vivid and unpredictable at the time of decision. Many have pressing, in particular, in the context of Effective worried that this leaves us, in some important Altruism. This motivates a more thorough sense, clueless. examination of the precise nature of cluelessness, and the precise source of the In this paper, I distinguish between ‘simple’ and associated phenomenology of discomfort in ‘complex’ possible sources of cluelessness. In forced-choice situations. The latter parts of the 2 paper make some initial explorations in those One of Weitzman’s arguments, which has directions. received very little attention in the literature, appears to run as follows: Keynote: Doyne Farmer (Oxford Martin School) - 1. The Empirical Claim and the Moral Claim How Predictable is Future Technology? entail that strong action on climate change has extremely high, perhaps infinite, Recently it has become clear that many expected utility, whereas rival reasonable technologies follow a generalized version of theories entail its expected utility is Moore’s law, i.e. costs tend to drop exponentially, bounded and much lower. at different rates that depend on the technology. 2. Rational policymakers ought to have non- Here we formulate Moore’s aw as a correlated negligible credence in the Empirical Claim geometric random walk with drift, and apply it to and the Moral Claim. historical data on 53 technologies. We derive a 3. Rational choice is a function of the degree closed form expression approximating the of credence one has in different normative distribution of forecast errors as a function of theories, and the stakes of the choice time. Based on hind-casting experiments we according to the theories in which one has show that this works well, making it possible to credence. collapse he forecast errors for many different 4. Therefore, rational climate change policy technologies at different time horizons onto the should be guided by the Empirical Claim same universal distribution. This is valuable and the Moral Claim, rather than by because it allows us to make forecasts for any reasonable rival theories. given technology with a clear understanding of Call this the Metanormative Climate Change the quality of the forecasts. As a practical Argument (MCC). demonstration we make distributional forecasts at different time horizons for solar photovoltaic The question of how it is rational to act in the face modules, and show how our method can be used of moral uncertainty has only recently received to estimate the probability that a given technology significant attention. My aim is assess the will outperform another technology at a given soundness of the MCC. If it is sound, the MCC point in the future. shows that some of the arguments made by opponents of tail risk-based arguments for strong John Halstead (University of Oxford) - Moral action on climate change face an insurmountable Uncertainty and Climate Change burden of proof. However, it remains very unclear whether the MCC succeeds because many of its Some climate economists, most notably Martin premises are questionable. It is unclear whether Weitzman, have argued for strong action against metanormativism is true, unclear whether MITE is climate change on the basis that unmitigated true, and unclear whether the requisite empirical climate change brings a non-negligible probability assumptions about climate policy hold. of a catastrophic outcome. Those who ignore these catastrophic tail risks and focus instead on Matthew Rendall (University of Nottingham) - the costs of the most likely levels of warming will Betting on Theories: The Nordhaus-Weitzman tend to advocate for more moderate action on Debate climate change. Many of those especially worried about the tail risks of climate change make some Martin Weitzman’s (2009) paper ‘On Modelling variant of the following claims: and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic • Empirical Claim: The probability of Climate Change’ prompted a high-profile debate extreme global warming sufficient to with William Nordhaus. Weitzman had estimated destroy, or otherwise undermine the long- a roughly five percent chance of more than ten run potential of, human civilisation is degrees of warming in the next two centuries >~1%. without strong action, and about a one percent • Moral Claim: Destroying, or otherwise chance of more than twenty. Nordhaus argued undermining the long-run potential of, that for such a catastrophe to materialize, the human civilisation would be extremely, climate would have to prove improbably sensitive perhaps infinitely, bad; the costs would to greenhouse gas emissions, the damages from swamp many times over all levels of climate change would have to be improbably warming that would not destroy, or high, and scientists and governments would have undermine the long-run future of, human to remain improbably complacent in the face of civilisation. danger signs. Weitzman’s reply was noteworthy. Suppose, he wrote, that a policymaker found his claims or another economist’s less alarming ones 3 equally credible. The policy maker should accord Kieran Marray (University of Oxford) - Dealing his conclusions greater weight in decision with Uncertainty in Ethical Calculations of making, because the consequences of ignoring Existential Risk his advice would be far more serious if it proved to be right. Weitzman was effectively advocating Taking Bostrom’s definition of existential risk, this Pascalian wagering in response to expert paper will argue that either we are not able to disagreement. make guesses from our temporal perspective as to the certainty of things which we predict, or the This paper explores how to conduct such current approach to assessing the gravity of wagering. Policy analyses often implicitly follow existential risk needs qualification. the ‘maxiprobability method’. The analyst selects the theory she believes most credible, and Firstly, the paper looks at the current approach of recommends the policies optimal if it is right. This using expected-value utility as a guide to ranking