The Decision to Seed Hurricanes
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Reprinted from 16 June 1972, Volume 176, pp. 1191-1202 SCIENCE The Decision to Seed Hurricanes R. A. Howard, J. E. Matheson, D. W. North Reproduced with permission. Readers may view, browse, or download material for temporary copying purposes only, providing these uses are for noncommercial purposes. Except as provided by law, this material may not be further reproduced, distributed, transmitted, modified, adapted, performed, displayed, published, or sold in whole or in part, without prior written permission from the publisher/copyright owner. Copyright© 1972 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science http://www.sciencemag.org time. It is also addressed to the experi- mental question: What would be the value of expanding research in hurricane modification, and, specifically, what would be the value of conducting additional field experiments such as the seedings of Hurricane Debbie in 1969? The Decision to Seed Hurricanes Our approach was to consider a rep- resentative severe hurricane bearing down on a coastal area and to analyze the On the basis of present information, the probability of decision to seed or not to seed this " nominal" hurricane. The level of the severe damage is less if a hurricane is seeded. analysis was relatively coarse, because for the policy decision we did not have to R. A. Howard, J. E. Matheson, D. W. North consider many geographical and meteorological details that might in- fluence the tactical decision to seed. We described the hurricane by a single measure of intensity, its maximum sus- The possibility of mitigating the de- ESSA, both in its technical operations tained surface wind speed, since it is structive force of hurricanes by seeding and in its management and planning this characteristic that seeding is ex- them with silver iodide was suggested function. At the suggestion of Myron pected to influence (7). The surface winds, by R.H.. Simpson in 1961. Early exper- Tribus, Assistant Secretary of Com- directly and indirectly (through the storm iments on hurricanes Esther (1961) and merce for Science and Technology, we tide), are the primary cause of the Beulah (1963) were encouraging (1), but decided to focus the study on the de- destruction wrought by most hurricanes strong evidence for the effectiveness of cision problems inherent in hurricane (8). The direct consequence of a decision for seeding was not obtained until the 1969 modification (6). or against seeding a hurricane is considered experiments on Hurricane Debbie (2). The objective of the present U.S. gov- to be the property damage caused by Debbie was seeded with massive amounts ernment program in hurricane modifica- that hurricane. (Injuries and loss of life of silver iodide on 18 and 20 August tion, Project Stormfury, is strictly scien- are often dependent on the issuance and 1969. Reductions of 31 and 15 percent in tific : to add to man's knowledge about effectiveness of storm warnings; they peak wind speed were observed after the hurricanes. Any seeding of hurricanes were not explicitly included in our seedings. that threaten inhabited coastal areas is analysis.) Over the last 10 years property dam- prohibited. According to the policy cur- However, property damage alone is age caused by hurricanes has averaged rently in force, seeding will be carried not sufficient to describe the consequence $440 million annually. Hurricane Betsy out only if there is less than a 10 per- of the decision. There are indirect legal (1965) and Hurricane Camille (1969) cent chance of the hurricane center and social effects that arise from the fact each caused property damage of ap- coming within 50 miles of a populated that the hurricane is known to have been proximately $1.5 billion. Any means of land area within 18 hours after seeding. seeded. For example, the government reducing the destructive force of hur- If the seeding of hurricanes threaten- might have some legal responsibility for ricanes would therefore have great eco- ing inhabited coastal areas is to be un- the damage caused by a seeded hurricane nomic implications. dertaken, it will be necessary to modify (9). Even if legal action against the the existing policies. The purpose of our government were not possible, a strong analysis is to examine the circumstances public outcry might result if a seeded Decision to Permit Operational Seeding that bear on the decision to change or hurricane caused an unusual amount of not to change these existing policies. damage. Nearly all the government In the spring of 1970 Stanford Re- The decision to seed a hurricane hurricane meteorologists that we search Institute began a small study for threatening a coastal area should there- questioned said they would seed a the Environmental Science Service fore be viewed as a two-stage process: (i) hurricane threatening their homes and Administration (ESSA) (3) to explore a decision is taken to lift the present families-if they could be freed from areas in which decision analysis (4, 5) prohibition against seeding threatening professional liability. might make significant contributions to hurricanes and (ii) a decision is taken The importance of the indirect effects to seed a particular hurricane a few stems in large part from uncertainty hours before that hurricane is expected to Dr. Matheson and Dr. North are with the decision about the consequences of taking either analysis group, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, strike the coast. Our study is con- decision. A hurricane is complex and California 94025. Dr. Howard is with the department of centrated on the policy decision rather engineering economic systems, Stanford University, highly variable, and at present meteor- Stanford, California 94305, and is a consultant to the than on the tactical decision to seed a decision analysis group, Stanford Research Institute. particular hurricane at a particular in hurricane wind speeds with time, a probability distribution for wind changes could have been based largely on these past data. Wind-change data were not available, but data were available for Fig. 1. Maximum sus- tained winds over time. changes over time in the central pres- sure of hurricanes. The central pressure and the maximum wind speed of a hur- ricane are closely related; Holliday has shown that the available data can be summarized fairly well by a linear rela- tion (10). We combined this relation with observations of the change in central pressure over a 12-hour period, using the ologists cannot predict accurately how the sequences are uncertain for both alterna- assumption that the discrepancies from behavior of a hurricane will evolve over tives; the decision-maker does not know the Holliday relation are independent over time. The effect of seeding is uncertain what amount of property damage will be a 12-hour period and independent of also; consequently, the behavior of a sustained if the hurricane is seeded or is the change in central pressure. These hurricane that is seeded will be a not seeded. We may illustrate the assumptions imply a probability combination of two uncertain effects: situation facing him in the form of a distribution on wind changes over a 12- natural changes and the changes in- decision tree, as shown in Fig. 2. The hour period that is normal with a mean duced by seeding. decision-maker must select one of the two of zero and a standard deviation of 15.6 The seeding decision would remain alternatives, seeding or not seeding. The percent (11). difficult even if the uncertainty were decision cannot be avoided for inaction Therefore, present information is removed. Suppose that, if the hurricane is is equivalent to selecting the alternative consistent with rather large natural changes not seeded, the surface wind intensifies of not seeding. Each alternative leads to a in hurricane intensity over a 12-hour as shown by the curve w(t) in Fig. 1 and set of possible consequences: property period. There is about one chance in six that, if the hurricane is seeded, the damage caused by the hurricane and the that a hurricane whose maximum behavior of the wind is that shown by the responsibility incurred by the sustained wind speed is 100 miles per curve w'(t). The effect of the seeding has government. These consequences are, in hour will intensify over a 12hour period been to diminish the wind, thus reducing turn, related to the intensity of the to a maximum wind speed of over 115 miles per hour; there is also about one property damage, yet the wind speed w'(t1) hurricane and whether or not it was when the hurricane strikes land at time t is seeded. The consequences for each chance in six that the winds would 1 higher than the wind speed when the alternative are uncertain at the time the naturally diminish to less than 85 miles per hour. In assessing these probabilities seeding was initiated at time to. Even if the decision is made; the uncertainty will only general historical and meteorological decision maker were certain of w(t 1) and be resolved after the decision-maker information has been used. In a specific w'(t 1), he would still have a difficult choice.selects his choice. This decision under If he chooses not to seed, the citizens uncertainty may be examined according hurricane situation additional may have more property damage. On the to the usual procedures of a decision meteorological information might indicate other hand, if he chooses to seed, the analysis. We use the information that is that the hurricane would be more likely citizens may not perceive themselves as currently available to develop a to intensify or more likely to diminish. better off because of his decision. probability distribution over changes in Instead, they may perceive only that the the intensity of the hurricane as measured storm became worse after the seeding and by its maximum sustained surface wind Effect of Seeding they may blame the decision-maker for speed for each of the two decision his choice.