Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014

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VOLUME 159 NUMBER 2 FALL 1996

. Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War 11: 47 ill) The International Debate Goes On R. C. Raack

Ukraine's Niche in the U.S. Launch Market: 55 Will Kiev's Hopes Come True? Victor L. Zaborsky

Ghana: Lurching Toward Economic Rationality 64 Ho-Won Jeong

Will Russia Be Crushed by Its History? 72 Nikolai V. Zlobin

America the Beautiful Europe 85 Herb Greer SNO Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014

Vol. 159 No. 2 FALL 1996 47 "J Stalin's Role in the CODling of World War 11 THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE GOES ON

RV R. C. RAACK R. C. Raack is professor emeritus view of Stalin and his aims-he was most cer­ of history at California State tainly their author-fit exceptionally well the University, Hayward. 'est un monstre," French Foreign Minister larger picture of Stalin's personality now being C Georges Bidault said of Stalin following rounded out by contemporary Russian writers an overlong session of negotiation and enforced Edvard Radzinsky and Arkady Vaksberg. In ~iety, lasting almost until dawn, in the Krem- books first published in Russian but placed 1 .. 1 in December 1944. The social exchange recently before Western readers in translation centered around a buffet and film seance com­ (Radzinsky, Stalin; Vaksberg, Stalin and the 3 manded by Stalin. In the course of the evening Jews, Hotel LUx, and Die Verfolgten Stalins ) with Charles DeGaulle and his advisers, Stalin both writers have taken the historical measure had volunteered several times to speed negotia­ of the long-time Soviet leader whom only the tions to a conclusion by shutting up "boring" French, among his executive-level wartime diplomats with a machine gun-never making Western visitors, caught. Radzinsky and Vaks­ wholly clear whether he intended to include the berg fix in their pages the figure of evil that Frenchmen present in his proposed massacre. I must inform any assessment of Stalin's war­ Perhaps Bidault was rendered excessively time, pre-war, and Cold War plans beyond the judgmental by what may have appeared to him borders of the Soviet Union. as a close encounter with le faucheur sovie­ The breakout this year of the discussion of tique. But he then expressed a view of Stalin Stalin's war goals on a second national front, now almost universally accepted, except by his part of the newly lively international discussion most fanatical devotees-at least when the on the effects of the opening of many former issue becomes the Soviet boss's appalling East Bloc archives to independent researchers, lestic misdeeds. Yet it was a view that, at the may signal a turning point in the history of the time, obviously eluded more naive Westerners, debate. The fact that for several years Stalin's like Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roo­ adventurous foreign goals have been mainline sevelt, though each spent many more hours than historical discussion in Russia suggests the vast DeGauIle's group in wartime negotiation and amount of new historical information on Stalin )matic society with the Soviet boss. and his successors now emerging from the for­ Better informed anglophone observers of the merly closed archives. The multiform layers of time were not misled. One was George F. Ken­ concealment the Soviet boss created are gradu­ nan, then influential in the U. S. Embassy in ally unfolding-but without the help of, indeed Moscow, if largely ignored in RooseveIt's in the face of, apparently deliberate stonewall­ White House. He wrote to his Washington col­ ing by many Western editors and history writ­ league, Charles Bohlen, in January 1945,SNO ers, not to mention the current Russian govern­ before the Yalta conference had finished: "Sovi­ ment. Among the Westerners, there appears to et political aims in Europe are not ... consistent be a clear unwillingness to accept, or even to with the happiness, prosperity or stability of publicize, what is known. Someone among the international life on the rest of the Continent." former Soviets clearly just doesn't want us to To attain Europe's weakness and disunity, know. The Russian government has closed the "There is no misery, and no evil, I am afraid, most important political archive to independent which they would not be prepared to inflict, if researchers.4 One can only imagine the racks of they could, on the European peoples."2 This skeletons desiccating in that closet. Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014

48 World Affairs

Only last February the intensive interna­ aggressive plans in Europe in 1941. Recently, tional debate over Stalin's aggressive war the Suvorov thesis was gratuitously described plans broke through the odd indifference in by a Swiss academic as an "unspeakably which most of the Western popular media, (unsaglich) pseudo-revisionist argument. .. and the overwhelming mass of academic [that] receives the treatment it deserves"-in a media, had heretofore clothed it. This book of over a thousand pages by an American occurred directly on the German-language historian. That book the reviewer lauds as front-Austrians, Swiss, and Germans, "more than just a future standard work on the eighty or so million comparatively well edu­ history of the Second World War."8 cated Europeans-where the debate had ear­ Some of these comments obviously go far lier been conducted at considerably less than beyond the usual cautious razor cuts employed front-page level. by academic reviewers, I think the reader will To put this key bit of publishing history in agree. But they clearly are comments redolent context, one need only recall the vehement of strongly held passions, as well as of convic­ objections of some of those who have tions that are far more widespread than those opposed the controversial Suvorov "the­ few examples can convey. Three well-known sis"-the argument of the Russian exile German public figures on the Left-one quite author, Viktor Suvorov, first produced in far, to be sure-told visiting Russian television book form as The Icebreaker in 1989. He interviewers in an off-camera discussion that argued that Stalin planned an attack to the even if the Suvorov thesis were correct, his west against Nazi Germany and German­ story should not be told since it disencumbered occupied Europe in July 1941. The Soviet Hitler (and, by implication, the Germans who drive was planned to anticipate Hitler's followed him) of some of the guilt for bringing attack on the Soviet Union, which the Krem­ on the war. Years back, Dr. Goebblels shocked lin master had no doubt was in the works. the civilized world by publicly burning books The Red army was not, however, to march in on the Opemplatz in Berlin. Now there are dis­ a preventive strike, but to carry out a full­ tinguished members of the German Left who, if fledged assault to the west.5 Those reporters not obviously as rabid as some professors, pro­ and historians on an international front who pose to ban history books for political purpos­ did not originally wholly ignore Suvorov's es-and not a genuine Bolshevik, nor, I'm sure, astonishing thesis (and they made up the a sincere devotee of Stalin, among them!9 vast majority) epitomized in their responses Giinter Gillessen was one German writer to his book both outrage and hostiIity.6 Yet who had skepticalIy, but not negatively, by now his history, some of it originally reviewed Viktor Suvorov's first book, The Ice­ rather speculative, has been taken up in sig­ breaker, in 1989 (in the Frankfurter Allgemeine nificant measure by other historians and also Zeitung).lO The German edition had just considerably enhanced, amplified, and fur­ appeared. Other reviewers had drawn similar ther documented.7 A whole new set of cen­ skeptical conclusions. But, a year later, the trally important sources have been found, in English-language editions went almost unno­ spite of the archival blockade erected in ticed in both popular journals of opinion and Moscow, to underpin much of what he professional journals. 11 By 1995-long after wrote. Some will be reported below for the the discussion of Suvorov's argument that Stal­ first time to English-language readers. in had planned to attack Hitler, had Hitler not The reader of my earlier article on this attacked the Soviet Union first, had become a subject will remember some of the respons­ first-page story in Russia and Suvorov's readers es to Suvorov. After his book appeared in had climbed into the millions-several other English, two professors from different sides German writers had taken up the argument. of the globe jumped in to call the argument They relied for their proof mainly on Suvorov that Stalin plannedSNO a war of assault against and the late Aleksandr Nekrich. Nekrich, a Nazi Germany, Suvorov's story, "absurd." Russian emigre scholar attached to the Harvard Not long after that, Suvorov and a number Russian Research Institute, had early found his of others who had written on the subject way into the newly opened Soviet archives. (including, by implication, the writer of this There he found convincing evidence, from the article) were cast beyond the pale of profes­ mouths of Stalin's closest cronies, of a general sional respectability, characterized as "crass plan to unleash the Red army westward, first outsiders" for suggesting that Stalin had against its immediate western neighbors, Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014 Vol. 159 No. 2 FALL 1996 49

Hitler's Germany and its subjected peoples. 12 In fact, the discussion is international. But Suvorov, the reader may recall, had actually set Augstein perhaps calculated that if he made the date for that attack as early July 1941. that point he would likely only strengthen his Then, last February, the former editor of the opponents' case. For if germanophone readers influential German news magazine Der Spiege/, had learned that Suvorov sold editions of a mil­ Rudolf Augstein, let fly a broadside at those lion or more in Russia, they would know that who had indicted Stalin for conniving to bring another people was coping with key historical on the war by making the infamous pact with issues that could bring them further into painful Hitler and later planning to attack him. Aug­ confrontation with, rather than away from, their stein's denunciation was directed at Suvorov intractable history. And the German readers and Gillessen (who had kept up on the discus­ would see that the intractable history being sion of Stalin's war plans in Germany and reported it circumspectly in Germany's leading national newspaper) and a few other Gennan Stalin was as much a racist as Hitler, but one who history writers relying largely on Suvorov and went about his elimination of those peoples that Nekrich for their evidence of Stalin's war plan. obscured his domestic panorama of a greater AJ'...,~tein's denunciation was important enough ir, .~ minds of the Spiegel's current editors to Russia with far more stealth. command the cover of the journal. "Aggressor Hitler, Aggressor Stalin?" read the tide page in five colors. Oddly flattering close-ups of each dir-"tor faced off across the cover. I3 _ .lt there was no real historical contest and regrettably little up-to-date information on the reconsidered abroad also bears directly on the subject of Stalin's war aims inside the Spiegel. Germans' own intractable past-not quite so Augstein made certain that Hitler won indict­ clear-cut a story as Augstein would have them ment as the guilty war party, and the history believe. He also failed to note that English-lan­ writers, all of whom had done a great deal more guage writers, Nekrich and this writer, had also research and reading than journalist Augstein, entered the book and academic journal market were verbally leveled. All of them were Ger­ bearing new materials on the topic generally mans with the exception of Suvorov. The rest of supporting Suvorov. the non-Germans who had written on the sub­ In addition, if the international dimensions ject went unmentioned and, at least technically, of the controversy had been revealed, the Ger­ unscathed. The Spiegel editors, following what man writers might have looked less like gentle­ seems to be modem custom in journalistic manly historical rationalizers for the behavior responsibility, then made certain that no serious of would-be neo-Nazis (as Augstein seemed criticism of Augstein's essay cropped up in sub­ pleased to have them portrayed), the skinhead sequent letters to the editor.14 teenagers whose current antics so embarrass, 'lOugh Augstein commanded the front properly so, civilized Germans. In any event, cover of Der Spiegel, his reading and research Augstein cleansed the palette and removed the on this subject was at least as far behind as foreign matter-and correspondingly censored 1989. But his zeal, committed effectively in the discussion and impoverished his readers. Or defense of the history supplied first by Stalin perhaps he had no choice. Perhaps he suffers an( ; propagandists and still so dear to many from "linguistic isolationism," to use Gerhard hearts, was impressive. And, whether he want­ Weinberg's deft characterization of history ed to or not, he suddenly and effectively pushed writers limited in their intake of vital profes­ the discussion at last out of the closet as far as sional information because they lack foreign the Germans are concerned. He made it open, if language skills. not quite salonfiihig. Yet, as the reader will have Augstein's criticism of the arguments in noted, by aiming only at German writers andSNO favor of Stalin's aggressive designs to the west Suvorov, the lone foreigner published on the was rather mild compared with the vehemence subject in German, he managed to make the dis­ of those members of the academic fraternity cussion seem only national-and provincial. In quoted earlier. Yet his headline treatment other words, Augstein reduced the debate to a assault has yet to inspire the more popular German Federkrieg, local swordplay with organs of political commentary and review on quills. the west side of the Atlantic to take up the sub- Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014 50 World AtTairs

ject-six years after the appearance of obscured his domestic panorama of a greater Suvorov's book in English, to repeat, a best­ Russia with far more stealth. He simply had seller abroad. those groups he disliked removed to the vast At least one cause behind Stalin's oddly per­ reaches of Siberia and central Asia to perish or sisting reputation as a mainstay of internation­ ultimately dissolve in a sea of peoples, while al peace and a victim of heinous aggression in dealing with individual members of their World War 11, in spite of his obvious collabora­ groups, like the entire panoply of his imagined tion with Hitler in the military destruction of enemies, via public and secret trials. They much of east central Europe, does not wholly quickly passed through his kangaroo courts and derive from genuine historical unawareness. As on to banishment, or were despatched to the an alleged socialist experimenter, Stalin and his Gulag, or to death. Meanwhile, he eliminated state for years garnered many positive senti­ other presumed rivals and "socially dangerous ments from some of the world's certifiable elements" by means of staged accidents, poi­ socialists and other leftist well-wishers whatev­ sonings, and pre-arranged medical "errors." All er he and it did. Indeed, the long-prevailing of the atrocities occurred while his propaganda textbook myth of Stalin's willingness to collab­ organs proclaimed support for international orate with the Western democracies in 1938, to peace and amity. Countless Western "useful save Czechoslovakia from Hitler and thus idiots," and deluded and self-deluding journal­ maintain European peace, has only recently ists, naive or corrupted, who wrote from, or been professionally demolished, once and for returned from Stalin's paradise to witness the all, it appears.16 Stalin's historical reputation wonder of society remade there, covered for his has for years been enhanced by his alleged sup­ dreadful works. Today they are well, but still port for the hapless Czechs in their vain efforts insufficiently, remembered-if, in some cir­ to save themselves from Hitler at the time of cles, it appears, only painfuIlyY Munich-that, we now know, just another Since Suvorov's first book appeared in Russ­ among many other historical illusions carefully ian in 1992, he has written two more volumes, cultivated by Soviet propaganda mills. Den' "M" (Day "M"), which appeared in 1994, His sometime ally and rival Hitler, by con­ and Poslednaia respublika (The Last [or Final] trast, was obsessively, and publicly, dedicated Republic1S), which has just appeared in Russia. to his religio-racialist spatial and purification Each adds substantial proof and additional policies, even then a menacing and unsavory details to the arguments he made for Stalin's nationalist mix. He seemed oblivious to the determination to bolshevize Europe, beginning political need for craft and compromise, even with an attack on Germany in the summer of to the point that his mistreatment of potentially 1941, an attack he imagined would move with friendly "inferior" peoples, like the Ukrainians lightning speed, supported behind enemy lines and BaIts, enemies, real or potential, of some of by uprisings of the local proletariat egged on by his enemies, and his madly systematic local Communist parties, all the way to the approach to the elimination of "non-Aryans" channel. Georgii Zhukov, later the famous Mar­ actually interfered with the successful conduct shal Zhukov, one of the most successful Soviet of his war. Ethnic obsession rather than either commandants of the victorious 'Red Army in geopolitics or realpolitik was the great driving World War n, was the commander he selected force behind his actions. His propaganda was for his anticipated thrust to the west. necessarily directed domestically, for its racial­ Meanwhile other Russian historians, in spite ly exclusionary doctrine, whether played high of the current Russian government's portentous or low for the occasion, had little appeal archival closing, have not been idle. For if the beyond members of his chosen people. His current Russian government has done as much wildly expansionist plans, publicly articulated, as possible to block the central presidential quickly raised the level of energy abroad repository from releasing its facts, ancillary among his enemies to fevered hostility. The archives have been opened and remain so. And primitiveness of hisSNO doctrines only mirrored the details of an enterprise as grand in its favorably by contrast intellectualized "scientif­ dimension, and as macabre in its destructive ic" socialism's international appeal. prospects as that drive to bolshevize Europe to Stalin was manifestly far more clever, if just the west that Stalin planned, had to have left a as mad. Following Vaksberg and Radzinsky, paper trail way beyond the Kremlin offices and Stalin was as much a racist, but one who went apartments and the suburban dachas of Stalin about his elimination of those peoples that and his intimes. A number of those Russian Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014 Vol. 159 No. 2 FALL 1996 51

writers have now been conveniently drawn ter Ribbentrop arrived to join Stalin and Molo­ together by Russian editors in a paperback edi­ tov in signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact and its tion (in Russian), Did Stalin Plan a War of secret protocol dividing large parts of east cen­ Aggression against Hitler?19 Moreover, the edi­ tral Europe between the two rapacious dicta­ tors of the independent Russian professional tors, should convince even the most firm journal, Fatherland History (formerly History doubters of the nature of Stalin's war plans. of the USSR), brought together an editorial "If," Stalin said, "we accept the German pro­ panel to discuss a then-controversial article posal to conclude a non-aggression pact, [Ger­ they would soon publish suggesting yet more many] will attack Poland, and the intervention factual underpinning for the Suvorov thesis. of France and England in this war becomes The editors subsequently have published a inevitable. Western Europe will be subjected to number of articles on the same subject, includ­ serious unrest and disorder [from social unrest ing one by this writer.20 caused by the harsh wartime conditions]. In Most important of all, recently a copy of such circumstances, there will be more of a Stalin's speech to the Soviet Politburo of 19 chance for us to stay out of the conflict, and we August 1939 has been published in the Soviet may hope [later] to be able to find our way press. Suvorov lacked in his first books just this advantageously into the war. [Our] experience kind of archival testimony to Stalin's aims. But of twenty years shows that, in time of peace, it I myself had meanwhile-piqued by his argu­ is not possible to have a communist movement ments and hopeful of closing gaps in my own in Europe powerful enough [in anyone nation] knowledge-discovered three documents prov­ for the Bolshevik party to take power. A dicta­ ing Stalin's secret plan to use the war Hitler torship of this party becomes possible only as Jrought on for the sovietization of all Europe. the result of a great war.... For the realization One came from the once Soviet-friendly of these plans [creating the situation of domes­ Lithuanian foreign minister, who reported what tic unrest and disorder he referred to above] it is he heard from Molotov and his Foreign Affairs unavoidable that the war should last as long as Commissariat subaltern (actually a representa­ possible." That advantageous Soviet entry into tive of the NKVD) V. G. Dekanosov. Another the war, once it had been dragged out as long as proof, also from 1940, and contemporary with possible, Stalin also made clear, was meant to that of the Lithuanian, came from J. Edgar secure the bolshevization of both Germany and Hoover, who likely got it from a paid Soviet France using the power of the Red Army.23 informer he termed a "high Russian source." There is yet more new evidence. Historians And another derived from the Presidium of the have recently produced a more complete text of Comintern, where Stalin was a member, though Stalin's speech and supplementary commen­ he was usually represented in its meetings by taries of 5 May 1941 at the Soviet War Acade­ one of his henchmen.21 Meanwhile, Alexander my. It is a speech long known in various ver­ Nekrich, mentioned above, had also, for some sions, but in the new, more complete version he years unbeknownst to me, been at work in the announced his determination to go to war, jus­ "',rmer Soviet archives unearthing further evi­ tifying moving from a posture of defense to a ~Gnce. These are strong and persuasive, so-far­ posture of assault in the near future. He also unchallenged testimonies to Stalin's war plans spoke of the vast amount of modern equipment in the words of his own Kremlin band. the vastly expanded Red Army and other forces But the new source from Stalin's own mouth had recently acquired. "A modem army," Stalin . , of overriding importance. It is his speech out­ said, "must be an offensive army."24 This ...ling to the Politburo of the party his general speech was made approximately two months scheme for the sovietization of Europe from and a few weeks before the July days the most Germany to the channel. It was evidently given plausible accounts give for the Red Army's to justify his apparent sudden and total reversal march west. of diplomatic course, and to supply the grounds Suvorov was right about the most important for his choice to join Hitler in the Nazi-Soviet parts of the story from the start. Almost all the Pact in August 1939.22 This heretofore unpub­SNOother writers, including this writer, utterly skep­ lished speech is surely the most important doc­ tical of Suvorov's "thesis" for a time, have been ument to appear from out of the Soviet archives wrong. Most remain so. Moreover, to pick up since they were opened half a decade or so ago. the appropriate comparison with the clearly What Stalin told the Politburo on 19 August demonic Hitler once more, who can be certain 1939, four days before German Foreign Minis- whether he, faced directly with the issue at the Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014 52 World Affairs

outset of the war, would have begun a war cal­ tyranny that had preceded it firmly in place. culatedly determined to stretch it out, whatever The popular victor, Marshal Zhukov, a poten­ the cost-for Stalin said nothing of costs-for tial rival in Stalin's view, was banished to the the longest possible time. Obsessed as Hitler provinces and even banished from filmed "his­ clearly was, he never thought in terms of Marx­ tories" celebrating the military triumph. In ist-Leninist long-term timetables, but only in them, Stalin took over retrospectively as the terms of lightning victories. He thought only of victorious strategist and supreme commander. acting quickly before his imagined mission to Zhukov's double removal was one immediately save the German people was aborted by what visible aspect of the vast purges Stalin was he thought would be his early death. But his soon to recommence, as well as an external war became Stalin's war; and Germany's disas­ sign of the otherwise invisible dementia in the ter flowed from both. Kremlin. One senses that a long repressed public spir­ A Cold War with sometime allies had sud­ it questing for truth and justice in Russia strug­ denly quickened in the aftermath of the military gles to master the evil legacies Stalin left. victory over Germany. The Cold War's con­ Thanks to Russian researchers, we now have flicts first developed as Western attitudes Stalin's scheme for an attack on Germany, toward their former ally hardened when they starting that war to the west, right from his own met his looting and raping Red Army and bar­ mouth. All of the remaining evidence of his barous NKVD in the middle of Europe. Those purposes is reciprocally supporting and like­ attitudes were further solidified when the West­ wise suggests the authenticity of this docu­ erners contemplated the sovietization Stalin ment. Those arguing to the contrary, here and pushed, if sometimes temporarily concealed abroad-and they are many-can only con­ behind the fac;ade of creating anti-fascist tend, and they do vigorously still contend, that democracy, wherever the Red Army was in the supportive information is still insufficient­ control. Along with that new war came another although some deny that there is any evidence. exhausting armaments program-in part domi­ But somewhere in the great, ineffable subcon­ nated by an accelerated push to match the scious of the former Soviet peoples the longing American atomic bomb-reimposed on the for an honest history, telling the past as it actu­ tired Soviet peoples. ally happened, has clearly persisted through all Outside of Russia, with the exception of the those agonizing Soviet years, persisted, for recent publicity given the subject in Germany, sure, more strongly than the quest for historical the mass of Western scholars and writers writ­ truth among Suvorov's Western opponents, ing on the war and on the Stalinist period have Suvorov may at first only have guessed correct­ simply kept silence on the historical issues ly much of the time in joining the parts of his Suvorov raised. The stillness of reviewers in tale where he had little or no persuasive evi­ the face of his once shocking thesis tells part of dence, but somehow he was on the trail of this the frightening story of apparently voiuntary amazing story from the outset. vows of silence making up an ineffable, but Stalin brought almost every possible disaster effective, censorship. Where have the New to the door of the Soviet peoples as a result of Yorker, The New York Review of Books, The his plan to sovietize Europe. It was "humanity's New York Times, journals that dote on war sto­ greatest genius" himself, imagining that he ries and recapitulations and reviews on the sub­ could get off the mark before the Germans, ject, been? Where Time, where Newsweek? who brought the Nazi Wehnnacht to the Soviet Indeed, one approach of no doubt carefully border. Even his "Great Patriotic war," which selected reviewers, when the subject of Stalin's the Germans began with a giant first leap, fin­ aggressive war plans was noticed, has been to ished with a hollow Soviet victory. At war's scald the authors who have argued for their end, the western Soviet lands were ugly scenes existence with doubt, unsupported to be sure, of the sheer devastation of the past barbaric or to ignore books and articles directly on the conflicts. The remainingSNO vast countryside had subject.25 The very fact that Stalin's speech of been ruthlessly and heedlessly scavenged to 19 August 1939, which has been available in support years of pell-mell industrialization and Russia for over a year, has until now, as I write war production for Stalin's war. in the summer of 1996, gone unreported in the The Soviet Union ended the war with count­ United States and perhaps elsewhere in the less millions dead or in work camps, with a cor­ West suggests that something has indeed gone rupt domestic tyranny as vicious as the pre-war wrong. Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014 Vol. 159 No. 2 FALL 1996 53

Many history writers in the West, those who 2. Kennan to Bohlen. 26 January 1945, United for years have written their accounts of the war States National Archives, Records of Charles in one way or the other in line with the original Bohlen, 1942-1952, Bohlen correspondence, Box 3. 3. Vaksberg: Stalin and the Jews (New York, Soviet propaganda story of how the war came 1994); Hotel Lax (Paris, 1993); Die Verfolgten Stal­ about, have been often naively unaware of what ins. Aus den Verliesen des KGB (Reinbek bei Ham­ they were doing. For years the crucial East Bloc burg, 1993). Radzinsky, Stalin (New York, 1996). archives were closed to independent research­ 4. Serge Schmemann, in The International Her­ ers. But when they did open, many writers with ald-Tribune, 27 April 1995, 2. 5. Viktor Suvorov, The Icebreaker. Who Started impressive bibliographies were simply unpre­ The Second World Wt1r? (London. 1990), and under pared to take advantage of the grand new re­ a slightly different subtitle, New York, 1990. search opportunities. Some were functionally 6. R. C. Raack, "Stalin's Role in the Coming of illiterate in the languages they needed to under­ World War II: Opening the Closet Door on a Key take acute research in the vital, newly available Chapter of Recent History," World Affairs, 158 (1996): 198-211. sources. Others perhaps felt trapped by profes­ 7. Joachim Hoffmann, Stalins Vernichrungskrieg sional publication histories, the keys to impres­ 1941-1945 (Munich, 1995); WaIter Post, Unterneh­ sive academic careers, they would be loath to men Barbarossa: Deutsche und Sowjetische Angrif.f­ p'oudiate. Yet by long supporting in print, spliine 1940141 (second ed., Hamburg, 1996), Wem­ )licitly or implicitly, the Stalinist line that the er Maser, Der Wortbruch: Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Munich, 1994). Of the three books, dictator's purposes were regularly defensive, Maser's has much less new than the other two to many historians suddenly have much to lose, offer. See also Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, in both in money-from best selling textbooks note 9, below. This writer, however, was originally ?"d other editions-and in reputation, if skeptical of the time Suvorov set for the Soviet attack, early July 1941, and remains partially so, ~ 10rov'S thesis were ever generally accepted though more and more convinced that the summer of as correct. As the archival documents now 1941, perhaps even later in July, is correct. The sum­ emerge, some must now sit increasingly uneasy mer of 1941 is the time now held to by Hoffmann in their professorial chairs. Hence, perhaps, one and Post, and it seems increasingly plausibly sup­ cause of the conspicuous silence. ported by their arguments and those of others. Hitler was the "icebreaker," as Suvorov 8. Raack, "Stalin's Role," 206-07, and notes 20, 34-36; Bernd Bonwetsch, in a review of Maser, argued from the virtual beginning of the debate. Osteuropa, 3 (1995): 286; Stig Forster, in a review of Suvorov's chapters and proofs, one by one as Gerhard Weinberg's A World at Anns: A Global His­ they appear, now get headline copy and provide tory o/World War 11 (Cambridge, 1994), in Das His­ Sunday supplement material in Russia's lead­ torisch-politische Buch, 112, (1996). Weinberg ing independent newspapers. But a search writes, "certainly there were no plans for a Soviet preventative attack into the German buildup; the through the current, 1995-1996 version of Germans never considered such Soviet action likely; Books in Print will show the reader that none of they found no evidence of such a project after the his books is currently available in English. That invasion; and they were assured by their own mili­ editorial chistka on this side of the Atlantic, and tary adviser in the Soviet Union before June 22 that on much of the Continent, as of this writing there were no signs of aggressive intentions" (204)'. He cites as proof for the statement, the wartime r· '.ins almost total. diaries of two German generals, a report of the Ger­ Dut the genie of truth is now out of the bot­ man military attache in Moscow, and an unprinted tle, at least in Europe, thanks to former editor conference paper from 1991. But the documents Augstein, who sought but failed to bury his per­ printed by Walter Post, Unternehmen Barbarossa, sistent historian-opponents with a recapitula­ 353-65, from a number of German generals and oth­ ti of antiquated Stalinist and post-Stalinist ers certainly testify to Hitler's and other German chieftains' awareness and fear of a possible Soviet propaganda, and to industrious Russian histori­ attack on Germany. (In fact, Weinberg somewhat ans andjoumal editors who have recently found misstates the issue: Stalin was not planning a "pre­ key supportive documents in the campaign to ventative attack," he was planning a war of assault to identify Stalin's ghastly war game. How long bolshevize, or help bolshevize Germany.) will it be before the battle to broadcast the 9. The Russians went on to tell the story to Dr. Joachim Hoffmann, who has also written on Stalin's debate over Stalin's bloody wartime adventureSNO war and who was one of the chief victims of Spiegel is joined on behalf of the broad reading and editor Augstein's farrago of Soviet disinformation, viewing public on the west side of the Atlantic? misinformation, and lack of information. The three current German notables may be able to count on an NOTES American associate in realizing their wish for histor­ I. Jean Laloy, "A Moscou: entre Stalin et De ical suppression. That associate is professor. Bev­ GauIIe. Decembre 1944," Revue des etudes slaves. eridge Prize-winner, etc., and endowed chair-holder, 54 (1982): 151. Melvyn Leftler. He compiled a review for Foreign ...

54 Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014 World Affairs

Affairs (July/August 1996) of books on the cold war Western journalists' failures to point out Soviet real­ from English-language books mainly published ities to readers at the time of the Stalinist Reich. both recently. But he failed to review, or even mention, especially hard on The New York Times. went unno­ my recent book, Stalin's Drive to the West. 1938- ticed and unreviewed (according to Book Review 1945: The Origins o/the Cold War (Stanford, 1995), Digest and Books in Print) by any of the major news­ which is published by the same press as his book on papers in the States. I refer to lames William Crowl's the immediate post-war period. No other historical Angels ill Stalin's Paradise: Western Reporters in study focusing on the close connection of the Stalin's Russia. 1917-1937 (Washington, D.C., wartime origins of what was later called the cold war 1982). and Sally Taylor's Stalin's Apologist. WaIter with Stalin's pre-war and wartime plans has yet been Duranty (Oxford, 1990). See also, for contrast with published in English, nor in any other language. In our domestic journalistic silence on past error, an addition, the book is securely based on revelations honest and reflective journalist's report on reportori­ from a number of the recently opened former al conditions in Stalin's Russia, Paul Winterton's "enemy archives," perhaps on more of the latter than Report on Russia (London, 1945). most other recent books on the cold war. So it unde­ 15. See Markus Wehner, "Der letzte Sowjet­ niably fell directly into the context of Leffler's myth os," in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, ID review, dramatically titled "Inside Enemy Archives: April 1996. The Cold War Reopened." I cannot imagine that Pro­ 16. Igor Lukes, Czechoslovakia between Stalin fessor Leffler's Foreign Affairs editors would not and Hitler (New York, 1996). want to clear up the matter of the odd gap in his cold 17. See Paul Hollander, Political Pilgrims (New war reportage. York, 1981); and note 14. 10. 27 April 1989. 18. The first printed in Kiev; the second in 11. See note 6. Moscow, 1996. 12. Aleksandr Nekrich, "A Wise Design," Per­ 19. Gennady Bordiugov, ed., Gotovil li Stalin spective (Boston), I, number 2,2-3, 7. nastupatel'nuiu voinu protiv Gitlera? (Moscow, 13. Der Spiegel 6/96, 100-25; The American 1995). reader must try to imagine a bookish historical 20. "S zasedaniia redkollegii," Otechestvennaia debate on a matter of such relatively antique prove­ istoriia, number 4/5, 1994. As of this writing, I am nance-fifty-seven years-and yet central historical aware of no discussion-to print or not to print-{)f importance making the covers of Time or Newsweek. the subject at such an editorial level reported in an The recent "Enola Gay" fracas comes to mind-yet English-language journal. See also Bordiugov, 6-63, that was about a museum exhibition suddenly to be and the citations in my previous article on this sub­ unveiled for popular consumption in a national and ject in World Affairs, 158 (1996): 211, note 39. The publicly supported center. In. that case, no debate Russian translation of.this writer's article, "Stalin's based on a sudden outpouring of vital new insights Plans for World War Two Told by a High Comintern in books and articles based on new historical materi­ Source," first published in The Historical Journal, als directed to a stunning new historical argument 38 (1995): 1031-36, appeared in Otechestvennaia had occurred. Germany, of course, lies unmercifully istoriia, 3 (1996). As of this writing, I have not seen entwined in its past, and is not the United States of a copy of it. America, and history, and historians, are regularly 21. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 21-28, and taken seriously over there. supporting footnotes, especially notes 19-22 to chap­ 14. In the experience of this writer, journalistic ter one. See also, Raack, "Stalin's Plans for World style today appears to be to print one letter one for, War II Told to a High Comintern Source," passim. one against, the original writer-unless the writer is 22. For the background of the reversal of an outside authority for whom readers strongly take alliances, please see the citations in note 21, above. sides, for or against. In this case, this historian sent a 23. From the copy found by T. S. Bushuevaia in letter, in German, to the editors pointing out the the "Secret Booty Funds of the Special USSR antiquity of former editor Augstein's information, Archive" (Tsentr khraneniia istoriko-dokumental­ much of which was simply a repetition of the claims nykh kollektsii,byvshii Osobyi arkhiv SSSR), f. 7, of Stalin and his foreign ministers. I also noted that op. I, d. 1223, first published in the journal Novy; the only writers on the subject of Stalin's intended Mir in 1995. march west were not solely native germanophones 24. See Post, 274-78 and V. A. Nevezhin, "Vystu­ plus Suvorov. The argument for Stalin's war plan plenie Stalina 5 maia 1941 g. i povorot v propa­ could, therefore, not be easily put aside as the sinis­ gande. Analiz direktivnykh materialov," in Bordiu­ ter fantasies of right-wing German extremists. Of gov, 147-67. course, my letter, a serious professional criticism of 25. See, for example, Steven M. Miner's review Augstein's account, went unprinted. Perhaps other of Radzinsky's Stalin, in the New York Times Book professional critics got the same treatment, for none Review, 5 May 1996, 14-15, for expressed, but was offered to Spiegel readers (see 811996). Stalin's unsubstantiated doubts, and no suggestion of the reputation is still tenderly guarded in the Spiege/'s overwhelming documentary evidence establishing Hamburg, as well SNOas, it appears, in a number of New Stalin's war scheme. See also note 9, above. York editorial offices. Two books harshly critical of

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