An Integrated View of the Technicity of Action and the Question of Responsibility
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An Integrated View of the Technicity of Action and the Question of Responsibility What is wisdom in practice (phronesis)? Whatdoes it mean to act responsibly? These questions concern us practicallyasweseek the best courses of action, but also as onlookers at what others do, or even as theoreticians.Often these questions accompanypeople silentlythroughout their lives; sometimes they boil up, precipitatinganexistential crisis. To varying degrees these questions are part of the constitutive ambiguities of action. Action is one with of the flow of life, but can, to some degree, be planned. Capabilities enable us to do things, but they confront us in aseries of incapabilities. Instrumentsaugment our ability to intervene in the world, but also increase the impact of unintended consequences. Ethical considerations informour action,but acting in accord- ance with these values generates secondary effects that maycontradict the initial values. Hence, efficacyisbound to ambiguity,and this does not leave us indif- ferent. In this book, Ihavenot tried to dispel these perplexities of action – instead, I have attempted to grapple with them as part of the meaning of human action. Hermeneutics, in combination with insights from the social sciences,has helped me to do so, as Irestricted my view to one dimension of action: its technicity. If there is something like prudent or responsible action, the preceding chapters have gone some waytowardclarifyingwhat constitutes the practical pursuit of it,while stillleaving aside the question of the ethical values thatshould right- fullyinform our action. Proceeding in this way, Ihaveremained true to two significant lessons that can be learned from Paul Ricœur.The first is that the moment of distantiation from action allows us to examine it as meaningful, while assuming aspectator’s perspective.Thus, the more interpretative meansofhermeneutics and the ex- planatory means of social theory¹ enhance our understandingofaction – ex- plaining more helps us to understand better,accordingtoRicœur’sformula. But this is the caseonlybecause of what the second lesson teaches us: people My point is not to reducesocial theory to the function of explanation, but to accord both in- terpretation and explanation their placeintheeffort of clarification in this book. See, for exam- ple, Paul Ricœur, “La fonction herméneutique de la distanciation,” in Du texte àl’action. Essais d’herméneutique II (Paris:Seuil, 1986), 113–32 / “The HermeneuticalFunction of Distanciation,” in From Text to Action: EssaysinHermeneuticsII,trans. Kathleen Blamey and John Thompson (London: Athlone, 1991), 75 – 88 and “Expliquer et comprendre,” in Du texte àl’action,179– 204) / “Explanation and Understanding,” in FromText to Action, 125–43,respectively. OpenAccess. ©2021ErnstWolff, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110725049-012 248 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility gettoknow and understand themselves as agents when they attest to the actions of which they werecapable.² One could saythat attestation does at apractical level what distantiation does at atheoretical level. It is by trying to speak, do, narrate and impute action to oneself, and by attestingtothe varyingdegrees to which this succeedsthat one increasinglygains apractical understanding of one’saction. The two lessons belong together in adouble hermeneutics: the scholarlyreflection on action as meaningful is possible when and because ac- tion has alreadybeenpracticallymeaningful for agents. Iwould like to use this Conclusion in threeways. First,Ireflect on the co- herenceofthe entire enterprise as an outline of atheory of the technicity of ac- tion. Second, Itrace the fact that the hermeneutic-descriptive aspect and the ethico-political aspects of action are integrated in relations of mutual implica- tion. Third, Itrace one of the outer limits of the current project.This limitation, which concerns the philosophyofresponsibility, will have to be dealt with in subsequent research. However,Iwould like to offer an outline of the technical nature of responsibility and the dependence of responsibility on anormative supplement,asafinal conclusion of this book. 1The Technicity of Action – aShortSynthesis The main thesis thatthat Ihavedefended and elaborated on in this book is that – practicallyall human action has atechnical aspect,which provides apartial, but fundamental, perspective on human action in general; – the technicityofaction consists of the combination of acquired capabilities and the use of means; and – the meaning of actionastechnical is integrated (but not fused) with the nor- mative meaning that the ethical aspect of action is adjudgedtohave. Iwillingly assume the general anthropological stretch of these theses. At the same time, Icounted on my hermeneutic approach to maintain the historicity of all formsofhuman existenceand to safeguard the project from essentialisa- tion. In such ahermeneutic action theory,both stable and historicalcomponents can be identified. In turning my attention to “technicity”,Ido not start with technical arte- facts, but define everything to be called “technical” in relation to the technicity Cf. Paul Ricœur, Soi-même comme un autre (Paris:Seuil, 1990), 33 – 35 / Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago,IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992),21–23. 1The Technicity of Action – aShort Synthesis 249 of human agency and action. Correspondingly, Idevote fairlylittle attention to the nature of technical artefacts in this study. However,Iconstantlybore in mind theirrich variety,and Ibroached the question of the mode of existence of technicalobjects by discussing the “autonomy” of means, relative to their pro- ducers and users (see Chapter 1, §4 and Chapter 2, §3,2 [point 1]). In the tradition of philosophyand social theory,there are numerous typolo- gies of technical formsofaction (for example, instrumental or goal-rational forms of action) and of the formsofreason guiding such action (as is the case in utilitarianism or rational action theory).However,inthis study, my approach was first of all resolutely non-typological.³ In this,Ifollow Hans Joas in his work on the creativity of action.⁴ ForJoas, creativity is not acategory of social action that has to be added to completeexistingtypologies of rational or normative ac- tion,⁵ adimension of action that requires an alternative approach to the typolog- ical approaches to human actionand their residual categories. “Creativity”,in Joas’swork, refers to an aspect of all action. In asimilar vein, Iaim to clarify the technical aspect of action. Second,the flux of everydayaction is identifiedasthe primary point of ori- entation in this theory of action. This insight from pragmatism is confirmed with referencetoAnthonyGiddens (see Chapter 5, §3.1). Establishingthe primacy of the flux of action allows us to draw on pragmatist and phenomenological philos- ophies of action in which we can then analyse the relation between continual living-forth (Hinleben)and the myriad of hindrances to asimple flow of action.⁶ See Chapter2,§3.1. Hans Joas, Die Kreativität des Handelns (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992),inparticular Chapters 3and 4aswell as Ernst Wolff, “‘Technology’ as the Critical Social Theory of Human Technicity,” Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (2016): 333 – 69. Joas, Die Kreativität des Handelns,15f,213f. The phenomenological and hermeneuticapproach Ihavefollowed in this book shows aclear familyresemblancewith the main traits of pragmatist thought: anti-foundationalism,fallibil- ism, the social character of the self, the importanceofresearch and metaphysical pluralism (par- aphrased by Joas in Antje Grimmler,Hans Joas and RichardSennet, “Creativity,Pragmatism and the Social Sciences,” Distinktion 13 (2006): 5–31, here 24–25,explicitlyderivedfrom Richard Bernstein, “The resurgenceofpragmatism,” Social Research 59,no. 4(Winter 1992):813–40. This does not mean that this proximity has always been appreciated by scholarship – as is docu- mented by Patrick L. Bourgeois, “Phenomenology and Pragmatism: ARecent Encounter,” in Phenomenology World-Wide,ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka(Dordrecht: Springer,2002), 568–70. Closer to the theme of the technicity of action, the proximity of pragmatism and phe- nomenology is confirmed by Jens Kertscher, “Washeißteigentlich Primat der Praxis? – WieHei- deggerund Dewey eine erkenntnistheoretische Dichotomie überwinden,” Journal Phaenomeno- logie 32 (2009 – Phänomenologie und Pragmatismus):59–70;and Robert Innes, “Dewey’s Aesthetic Theory and the Critique of Technology,” in Studien zumProblem der Technik (Phäno- 250 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility In the order of phenomenological constitution, the technicity of actiondepends on anon-technical, mainlybiological thrust (equivalent to Aristotle’s “orexis”) that lies at the centreofthe flux of action(see Chapter 2, §1 and Chapter 3, §2.1 [point 2]). This implies that our consciousness of action is constitutively sec- ondary to the flux of action; to be precise, it results from disruptions of simple acting.⁷ My examination of five forms of incapability that impact on capability (in Chapter 3, §2.1)clarifies the interplaybetween flow and disruption. Disrup- tions of the flow of action vary in intensity.Often they are quite subtle and barely enough to arouse alight monitoringofaction (another term borrowed from Gid- dens, see Chapter 5, §3.1). Even at the level of the