An Integrated View of the Technicity of Action and the Question of Responsibility

What is wisdom in practice (phronesis)? Whatdoes it mean to act responsibly? These questions concern us practicallyasweseek the best courses of action, but also as onlookers at what others do, or even as theoreticians.Often these questions accompanypeople silentlythroughout their lives; sometimes they boil up, precipitatinganexistential crisis. To varying degrees these questions are part of the constitutive ambiguities of action. Action is one with of the flow of life, but can, to some degree, be planned. Capabilities enable us to do things, but they confront us in aseries of incapabilities. Instrumentsaugment our ability to intervene in the world, but also increase the impact of unintended consequences. Ethical considerations informour action,but acting in accord- ance with these values generates secondary effects that maycontradict the initial values. Hence, efficacyisbound to ambiguity,and this does not leave us indif- ferent. In this book, Ihavenot tried to dispel these perplexities of action – instead, I have attempted to grapple with them as part of the meaning of human action. Hermeneutics, in combination with insights from the social sciences,has helped me to do so, as Irestricted my view to one dimension of action: its technicity. If there is something like prudent or responsible action, the preceding chapters have gone some waytowardclarifyingwhat constitutes the practical pursuit of it,while stillleaving aside the question of the ethical values thatshould right- fullyinform our action. Proceeding in this way, Ihaveremained true to two significant lessons that can be learned from Paul Ricœur.The first is that the moment of distantiation from action allows us to examine it as meaningful, while assuming aspectator’s perspective.Thus, the more interpretative meansofhermeneutics and the ex- planatory means of social theory¹ enhance our understandingofaction – ex- plaining more helps us to understand better,accordingtoRicœur’sformula. But this is the caseonlybecause of what the second lesson teaches us: people

 My point is not to reducesocial theory to the function of explanation, but to accord both interpretation and explanation their placeintheeffort of clarification in this book. See, for example, Paul Ricœur, “La fonction herméneutique de la distanciation,” in Du texte àl’action. Essais d’herméneutique II (Paris:Seuil, 1986), 113–32 / “The HermeneuticalFunction of Distanciation,” in From Text to Action: EssaysinHermeneuticsII,trans. Kathleen Blamey and John Thompson (London: Athlone, 1991), 75 – 88 and “Expliquer et comprendre,” in Du texte àl’action,179– 204) / “Explanation and Understanding,” in FromText to Action, 125–43,respectively.

OpenAccess. ©2021ErnstWolff, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110725049-012 248 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility gettoknow and understand themselves as agents when they attest to the actions of which they werecapable.² One could saythat attestation does at apractical level what distantiation does at atheoretical level. It is by trying to speak, do, narrate and impute action to oneself, and by attestingtothe varyingdegrees to which this succeedsthat one increasinglygains apractical understanding of one’saction. The two lessons belong together in adouble hermeneutics: the scholarlyreflection on action as meaningful is possible when and because action has alreadybeenpracticallymeaningful for agents. Iwould like to use this Conclusion in threeways. First,Ireflect on the co- herenceofthe entire enterprise as an outline of atheory of the technicity of action. Second, Itrace the fact that the hermeneutic-descriptive aspect and the ethico-political aspects of action are integrated in relations of mutual implication. Third, Itrace one of the outer limits of the current project.This limitation, which concerns the philosophyofresponsibility, will have to be dealt with in subsequent research. However,Iwould like to offer an outline of the technical nature of responsibility and the dependence of responsibility on anormative supplement,asafinal conclusion of this book.

1The Technicity of Action – aShortSynthesis

The main thesis thatthat Ihavedefended and elaborated on in this book is that – practicallyall human action has atechnical aspect,which provides apartial, but fundamental, perspective on human action in general; – the technicityofaction consists of the combination of acquired capabilities and the use of means; and – the meaning of actionastechnical is integrated (but not fused) with the normative meaning that the ethical aspect of action is adjudgedtohave.

Iwillingly assume the general anthropological stretch of these theses. At the same time, Icounted on my hermeneutic approach to maintain the historicity of all formsofhuman existenceand to safeguard the project from essentialisa- tion. In such ahermeneutic action theory,both stable and historicalcomponents can be identified. In turning my attention to “technicity”,Ido not start with technical artefacts, but define everything to be called “technical” in relation to the technicity

 Cf. Paul Ricœur, Soi-même comme un autre (Paris:Seuil, 1990), 33 – 35 / Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago,IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992),21–23. 1The Technicity of Action – aShort Synthesis 249 of human agency and action. Correspondingly, Idevote fairlylittle attention to the nature of technical artefacts in this study. However,Iconstantlybore in mind theirrich variety,and Ibroached the question of the mode of existence of technicalobjects by discussing the “autonomy” of means, relative to their pro- ducers and users (see Chapter 1, §4 and Chapter 2, §3,2 [point 1]). In the tradition of philosophyand social theory,there are numerous typolo- gies of technical formsofaction (for example, instrumental or goal-rational forms of action) and of the formsofreason guiding such action (as is the case in utilitarianism or rational action theory).However,inthis study, my approach was first of all resolutely non-typological.³ In this,Ifollow Hans Joas in his work on the creativity of action.⁴ ForJoas, creativity is not acategory of social action that has to be added to completeexistingtypologies of rational or normative action,⁵ adimension of action that requires an alternative approach to the typological approaches to human actionand their residual categories. “Creativity”,in Joas’swork, refers to an aspect of all action. In asimilar vein, Iaim to clarify the technical aspect of action. Second,the flux of everydayaction is identifiedasthe primary point of orientation in this theory of action. This insight from pragmatism is confirmed with referencetoAnthonyGiddens (see Chapter 5, §3.1). Establishingthe primacy of the flux of action allows us to draw on pragmatist and phenomenological philosophies of action in which we can then analyse the relation between continual living-forth (Hinleben)and the myriad of hindrances to asimple flow of action.⁶

 See Chapter2,§3.1.  Hans Joas, Die Kreativität des Handelns (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992),inparticular Chapters 3and 4aswell as Ernst Wolff, “‘Technology’ as the Critical Social Theory of Human Technicity,” Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (2016): 333 – 69.  Joas, Die Kreativität des Handelns,15f,213f.  The phenomenological and hermeneuticapproach Ihavefollowed in this book shows aclear familyresemblancewith the main traits of pragmatist thought: anti-foundationalism,fallibil- ism, the social character of the self, the importanceofresearch and metaphysical pluralism (par- aphrased by Joas in Antje Grimmler,Hans Joas and RichardSennet, “Creativity,Pragmatism and the Social Sciences,” Distinktion 13 (2006): 5–31, here 24–25,explicitlyderivedfrom Richard Bernstein, “The resurgenceofpragmatism,” Social Research 59,no. 4(Winter 1992):813–40. This does not mean that this proximity has always been appreciated by scholarship – as is docu- mented by Patrick L. Bourgeois, “Phenomenology and Pragmatism: ARecent Encounter,” in Phenomenology World-Wide,ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka(Dordrecht: Springer,2002), 568–70. Closer to the theme of the technicity of action, the proximity of pragmatism and phenomenology is confirmed by Jens Kertscher, “Washeißteigentlich Primat der Praxis? – WieHei- deggerund Dewey eine erkenntnistheoretische Dichotomie überwinden,” Journal Phaenomeno- logie 32 (2009 – Phänomenologie und Pragmatismus):59–70;and Robert Innes, “Dewey’s Aesthetic Theory and the Critique of Technology,” in Studien zumProblem der Technik (Phäno- 250 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility

In the order of phenomenological constitution, the technicity of actiondepends on anon-technical, mainlybiological thrust (equivalent to Aristotle’s “orexis”) that lies at the centreofthe flux of action(see Chapter 2, §1 and Chapter 3, §2.1 [point 2]). This implies that our consciousness of action is constitutively secondary to the flux of action; to be precise, it results from disruptions of simple acting.⁷ My examination of five forms of incapability that impact on capability (in Chapter 3, §2.1)clarifies the interplaybetween flow and disruption. Disrup- tions of the flow of action vary in intensity.Often they are quite subtle and barely enough to arouse alight monitoringofaction (another term borrowed from Gid- dens, see Chapter 5, §3.1). Even at the level of the flow,actionisexecuted as something meaningful, which accounts for the foothold thathermeneutics can subsequentlygain in the very fibre of action. Third,the primacyofthe flux of action and the pragmatic approach to action that derivesfrom it require us to rethink “technicity”.Instead of resortingimme- diatelytothe means-end teleological schema traditionallyassociated with technical action, Iargued in Chapter 3(§§ 3.1and 3.2) for adistinction between primary and secondary technicity of action.⁸ Primarytechnicity is an attribute of the flux of action,and it results from the acquisition of relatively stable bodilyskills,which are exercised in response to the requirementsand opportunities of each practical context.There is very little action that does not depend on such technicity (some exceptions are reflexes such as suckling,orstates such as being drunk).The fact thatthese skills are exercised in coordination with means of action does not implythat agents neces- sarilyconsciouslyplan the use of these means. Rather,primary technicity is based on the tacit understanding that agentshaveoftheircontext and their spontaneous or habitual response to it.Atthis level, the technicity of actionin- cludes minimalmonitoringofaction and interpretationofthe practical environ-

menologische Forschungen15), ed. Ernst Wolfgang Orth (Freiburg, and Munich: Verlag Karl Alber,1985), 7–42.  It follows from the pragmatist orientation of my studythat when Ireferto“phenomenology”, it alreadyimplies acritique of the consciousness-centredness prevalent in earlyphenomenolo- gy,and incorporates the pragmatic inflexion. Relevant to this point,see Carl Friedrich Geth- mann’scommentary on Heidegger’s “pragmatism” in “Heideggers Konzeption des Handelns in Sein und Zeit,” in Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie,eds.Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert and OttoPöggeler (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), 140 – 76.Also see Mark Okrent, “Hei- degger’sPragmatism Redux,” in The CambridgeCompanion to Pragmatism, ed. Alan Malachow- ski. Cambridge CompanionstoPhilosophy(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2013), 124–58.  The notions of primary and secondary technicity arediscussed further in Wolff, “‘Technology’ as the Critical Social Theory,” 345–47. 1The Technicity of Action – aShort Synthesis 251 ment.Itisnot teleologicallystructured. However,itlends itself to transformation in response to disturbancesinthe expectedcourse of action, and this in turn in- tensifies tacit monitoringtoconscious observation, and to interpretation, ques- tioning and calculation. This opens the waytosecondarytechnicity of action. In response to the new situation, agents can now plan action. This implies deliberation on the ends that these agents want to achieve and on the capabilities and meansbywhich they are to be achieved. Thus primary technicity acquires ateleological structure. Quite often, of course, this teleologicalstructure is alreadyinscribed in the “rules” of the practicesweengagein. However,the whole rangeofpeople’sac- tions remains subjecttoadjustment,both of the “top-down specification” between different levels of intermediary ends and our life plans, and between such more teleologicallystructured action and aspects of people’slife that are not framed in this way(as discussed in Chapter 5, §4 [Task 2]). Fourth,the skill component of the technicity of action is thus much more complex than “traditionaland effective action”.⁹ Numerous factors contribute to an individualization of bodilyskills:transmission is not perfect;there are differences between bodies, differences between levels of talent,changes in the contexts of deployment,different skills are combined in ever new ways,etc.¹⁰ This means that even under the most familiar of circumstances,the deployment of skilful dispositions entails judgment or interpretation¹¹ (seeChapter 2, §3.3).

 According to the famous formula of Marcel Mauss in “Lestechniques du corps” (1934), in So- ciologie et anthropologie (Paris:PUF,1950), 365–86,here, 371.  Ihaveargued for such a “hermeneutic” understanding of the technical disposition of the human body, by enforcingthe phenomenological moments in Bourdieu’stheory of the relation between the habitus and the field, cf. Ernst Wolff, “Technicity of the Bodyaspart of the socio- technical System: The Contributions of Mauss and Bourdieu,” Theoria 76 (2010): 167–87,here 181–84) and by other means in Wolff, “‘Technology’ as the Critical Social Theory,” 345–47. An obvious result of this procedure is the diminishingofthe determinist penchant in Bourdieu’s theory of social reproduction. Working methodologicallyinanoppositedirection – fromthe particular to its generalizations – is Laurent Thévenot’sessay “Le régime de la familiarité. Lescho- ses en personne,” Genèse 17 (1994): 72–101). See also amorerecent articulationofthis part of his work in LaurentThévenot, “Grand résumé de L’Action au pluriel. Sociologiedes régimes d’en- gagement,” SociologieS,http://journals.openedition.org/sociologies/3572, online publication 6 July 2011,last accessed 4May 2019.His and my twoapproaches convergeonthe significance of particular judgments in technical action.  The classical textinthis regardisHeidegger’selaboration on the “hermeneuticas”(hermeneutische Als), in Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag,[1927]1993), especially§§32and 33.OnRicœur’shermeneutic elaboration on it,cf. Andris Breitling, “Paul Ricœur und das hermeneutische Als,” in Vordem Text: Hermeneutik und Phänomenologie im 252 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility

The interpretative demands on action increase as the normal flow of familiar actions is repeatedlyput to the test by changes in the bodily condition and/or context.This demonstrates that the activation of stable skills in relatively stable circumstances (what we call following rules) involvea“phronetic moment”,¹² a hermeneutic moment,afact which can be accounted for onlyifone assumes some form of pre-reflexive monitoring. Moreover,rule-following behaviour is en- forced by relatively standardised technical means and dispositivesorinfrastruc- ture (such as post-offices,school, traffic, etc.).¹³ This enforcement is one of the sources of rule-following behaviour in individuals,but the dispositivesalsogen- erate the context which solicitsthe phronetic moment to arise from rule-following.Onthe whole, most of the time, agents have to deploydifferent skills in different combinations in order to make their waythrough different social and technical contexts (which is the background from which one could recognize the painful experience of absolute repetition in an unchangingenvironment). The effort of composing action into ameaningful course depends on the meaningful natureofaction and interaction, but alsoonthe mediation of actionby the internal, usage and symbolic references of the means deployed (as we saw in Chapter 2, §3.3). However, fifth,this insistenceonunderstanding and interpretationascon- stitutive of action should not be construed as an intellectualistic reduction of action. Due attention to the technicity of action guards us against this fallacy.Let us consider again the skilful bodyininteraction with means. On the one hand, it disposes the agent to act in certain ways when confronted with certain contexts; on the other hand, the absence of other skills makes it harder to do other things and disposes agents by default not to act in such ways.Both the acquired dispositions and the context in which they are activated thus exert enabling and constraining effects on action. Understandingthe technicityofaction from this bodily, non-consciousness-centred perspective is made possiblebythe non- teleological character of primary technicitythatIhavedescribed. Sixth,since anon-typological approach to action allows for an exploration of the technicityofaction of the primary flux of action, and from there of all

Denken Paul Ricœurs,eds.Stephan Orth and Andris Breitling(Berlin: TechnischeUniversität Ber- lin, 2002), 79 – 97.  Cf. Charles Taylor, “To follow arule…,” in Bourdieu. ACritical Reader,ed. RichardShuster- man (Oxfordand Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), 29–44,here41.  See Bruno Latour and Shirley Strum, “Human social origins. Please tell us another origin story!” Journal of Biological and Social Structures 9(1996): 169–87 and Bruno Latour, “On Inter- objectivity,” Mind, Culture, and Activity 3, no. 4(1996): 228–45,where the framingofhuman action by technical dispositivesisdeveloped by contrastingittoan“ethnography” of primates. 1The Technicity of Action – aShort Synthesis 253 its modifications into secondary technicity,itallows us to trace the double effect of enablingand constraining,spread over the wide rangeofhuman actions. How widelythis double effect stretches has been demonstrated by studying the technical dimension of language(Chapter 1), of all culturalacquisition and change (Chapter 2),collective agency(Chapter 4), and ethico-political interaction (Chap- ters 7and 8). In all these domains, agents can attest to being capable of acting under the limitations imposed by constraints.Fivepatterns of enabling/constraining in individual and collective actionwereidentified in Chapters 3and 4, in the form of capability/incapability.First,the biological bodyand the organization of agents lend themselvestothe acquisition of capabilities, but that these capabilities can never be completelymastered. Second, that which agents learn to do makes doing other thingsmoredifficult.Third,action requires combining actions, but not all combinations of actions or combinations of qualities of actions are feasible. Forth, very often, actionisinteraction, which imposes alimi- tation on what can be done and how it can be done if this action is to be meaningful as interaction. Fifth, the means of action can amplify the capability to act in some ways,and reduceitinother ways.Onthe whole, the relation between capability and incapability is almostnever aphenomenon of “all or nothing”. Rather,the myriad of ways in which the differentiation between degrees of capability and incapability are made in action become visible as the adverbial increments of action (where, when, how,towhich degree, etc. something is done).¹⁴ After action, agents can attest to the actions performedaccordingtotheir adverbial specifications. Seventh,inorganized action,asmuch as in individual action, incapability accompanies the exercise of capabilities as aconstitutive moment of action. I have demonstrated that unrealized or unrealizable actionsorqualities of action function like apractical horizonfor the intelligibility of the actions performed. The point of differentiation between capability and incapability is amajor factor determiningthe precise adverbial incrementofactions. Andalthough experience prepares us for the probable outcome of manyactions, there remains avarying

 The term “adverbial increments” is derivedfromMichael Pakaluk’sexcellent exposition on the choiceinAristotle’svirtue theory in Aristotle’sNicomachean Ethics.AnIntroduction (Cam- bridge:Cambridge University Press, 2005), 110ff. The appropriatemid-way between two vices is, according to Aristotle, always relative to the particular agents and their specific contexts. This requiresdiscernment regarding the adverbial increments of action (i.e. agent,object,instrument,manner,time, place, duration, reason,purpose). Ihaveexplained this term in Chap- ter3,§2.2 254 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility degree of uncertainty associated with all action.¹⁵ Onlyatthe moment when an action is performed does this uncertaintygiveway to the fact of aspecific degree of capability which aspecific action allows the agent to attest to. One therefore has to conclude that the ability to attest to one’scapability to act comesabout only(a) through dealingwith uncertainty and (b)through attestingatthe same time to incapability to act otherwise. Iwould claim that the continuous vacillation between expectation/uncertainty and attestation of specific (in)capabilities is the matrix from which practical understanding of actionderives. This in turn serves as akey point of orientation for ahermeneutic theorizing of action. Eighth,inall the steps followed thus far,capability can be demonstrated to be real onlyafter it has been activated in relation to others. Reaffirming aSchütz- ian insight somewhat schematicallysimplified by Ricœur,Ihave insisted that encounters with these others form acontinuum of degrees of anonymity ranging from the most intimate face-to-face interaction to the most impersonal institutional mediation. Both the exploration of organized action in Chapter 4and the insights of space-time distantiation and transmission (from Giddens, in Chapter 5, §3.2 [point 6] and Debray in Chapter 1, §3)provided perspectives on this rangeofmediationsofaction. This is not asocial reduction of all action – the individuation of skill marks the place for an unsocial dimension of action – however,itdoes indicate the very large extent to which our actions are socially shaped and informed. Due attention to the presenceoftechnical means and institutions in action does not changethis fact (see again the technicaldimension of language, Chapter 1). In short,the combination of social and technical mediation forms the milieu in which capabilities can be activated into real action. Ninth,the actions thus acted out by manyagents in turn shape the context of the future action of thoseagents, and of other agents. To some degree, outcomes can be planned, but action always resultsindomino effects of unintended con- sequenceswhich also feed into the context from which people act.And thus in- tended and unintended consequences together exerciseenablingand constraining effects on agents. Another waytorefer to this is to evoke the unequal distribution of roles,functionsand goods, and hence the unequalpossibilities for participation in social relations and infrastructural dispositives. Tenth,deploying an appropriate course of action in agiven context requires acombination of disparate actional elements, similar to the waystory-telling consists of composing disparate elements (time, place, character,etc.). In Chap-

 And disturbances of the expected action areeach amoment of disruption of the flow of action (referredtoabove), but one could expect that the intensity of the disturbance would be pro- portionatetothe significanceofthe divergencefromthe expected outcome of action. 2Ambiguity 255 ter 2(§2), Idemonstrated how significant this similarity is by arguing that “the processofthe acquisition and use of technicalobjects and technical know-how bringsabout an intervention or mediation analogous to that of stories in our ideas and livedexperienceofwhat it is to be human”.Narrative and technical self-understanding both follow the pattern of prefiguration-configuration-refiguration: just as people exist in anarratable way, express theirunderstanding(s) of their livesthrough narrated accounts and rethink their livesinthe light of stories and histories, so people act from acomplex habitus,which is deployed in interaction with means, which action in turn feeds back into theirself-understanding of themselvesascapable agents in ameaningful relation to their world. Further- more, these two patterns of prefiguration-configuration-refiguration are interde- pendent as two dimensions of the understandingand interpreting existenceof agents. Thisintertwinement of narrative with technicity is one of the facts that make the technicityofaction susceptible to hermeneutic theorizing.

2Ambiguity

Since the technical aspect of action is associated with all human action, technicity and the formsofreason associated with it cannot be characterised apriori as good/beneficial or bad/undesirable. The studyofthe technicityofaction can thereforeclaim to logically precede the value judgementsofall theories that could, for the sake of simplification, be presented as techno-optimist and techno-pessimist.¹⁶ Coordination of the technical and normative dimensions of action has to be dealt with in another way, namelyvia an examination of the ambiguity of the technicity of action. The hermeneutic and social theoretic studyofthe technicity of action has to remain resolutelydescriptive and interpretative – practising what Iidentified in the “Intermediary reflection” as “simple exteriority”.However,asexplained there, this does not amount to perfect indifferenceinrespect of critical judgement of people’sliving conditions.Rigorous description and interpretation in- clude dueattention to the practical experience of (in)capability.Thisexperience entails the following components:

 Ihavevoiced my critique of such simplifications in Wolff, “‘Technology’ as the Critical Social Theory,” 334– 35.This all too simple schematization of attitudes (philosophical,theoretical, scientific, religious or other), refers to the millennia of traditions of attempts by human beings to orient themselvesinrespect of matters technical. There is, to my knowledge,nobetter overview on this subject than the twovolumes of Johan Hendrik vander Pot’s Encyclopedia of Technolog- ical Progress. ASystematic Overview of Theories and Opinions (Delft: Eburon, 2004). 256 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility

– As evoked above, interpretation and judgement are alreadypart of action. They are situated in the context-dependentexercise of capabilities in relation to means and otheragents, and are augmented by the tension between the expectation of action outcomes and the incapability to realize these expectations perfectly. – When one is exploring action as something meaningful to agents, one cannot fail to notice that in action something is at stake – it is not amere suc- cession of events.This alsoapplies to the delimited view on the technicaldimension of action. – If it is good to be able to act,asRicœur claims,¹⁷ then the experience of any limitation to action, and even more of the attestation to adecreased capability to act,must be experienced as a crisis.

The hermeneutics of the acting and suffering human adopted in this book can be ahelpful guide in interpreting the stakesand crises of action. Thishermeneutics plots the activation of the series of capabilities (speaking,doing,narrating,imputing¹⁸)against interaction with others (I – you) and the mediation of institutions (I/you – it). But one could with equal validity map the interpretation of stakes and crises of action on this grid (seeChapter 3, §1,Figure 1) to give an account of the frustration of initiative and the deterioration of thatofwhich people are capable. Thismappingcould either renderpeople’stestimonyoftheir own suffering,orcould document what can be learned about what others are (in)capable of. In this sense, both personal attestation (as apractical registration of (in)capabilities) and the interpretation of accounts about others (testimonies, news reports,scholarlystudies and other transmissions of that to which people testify) are located on the borderline between description and normative judgement.Both direct and transmitted attestation are key momentsinwhat,earlyon, Ricœur called an awareness(prise de conscience)ofwhat is going on, and which he considered aspringboard for critique.Let me demonstrate what awealth of experiencesattestation and the documentation of attestation can account for with afew illustrative examples: – On the level of the capabilities of the agent (or I), the de-capabilisations inflicted on the whole gamut of actions maybemapped: speaking(e.g. by being relatively deprivedofeducation in the means by which to articulate one’sgrievances in specific contexts), doing (e.g. by not having at one’sdis-

 This is the implication of his claim that it is the capabilities of people that ultimatelyprovoke our respect,see Paul Ricœur, Lectures 1: Autour du politique (Paris:Seuil, 1991), 164.  Irepeat that the four capabilities, which arelogicallytelescoped intoeach other,represent the whole rangeofhuman actions and, therefore,the list is in principle open. 2Ambiguity 257

posal sufficient means, relative to others, to be able to exercise significant choices of one’slife in ameaningful way), narrating (e.g. by being the subject of socially dominant,discriminatory narratives) and imputation(e.g. by not being able to develop the self-esteem required to participate in meaningful assessments of social events). Numerous otherexamples could be given. The point is the socially inflicted (relative)decapabilisation or maintenance of inequalities of capability. – Likewise the you (or rather,the activation or de-activation of capabilities in relation to people in their direct presence) covers the entire rangeofactions provisionallyrepresented by the four verbs: speaking(e.g. by being reduced to silence or being subject to verbalabuse), doing (e.g. by areduction of capabilities through neglect or physical violence), narrating (e.g. by being un- rightfullyomitted from accounts of praise), and imputing(e.g. by being the victim of unfair judgement,hearingsand sentencing, as in biased legal sys- tems). These examples show that very often the relation to others takes the passive or suffering form of undergoing the actions of others, in the four forms of interaction. – Finally, the institutional mediation (the it)could be subjected to hermeneutic scrutinyfor its effects on people’scapabilities. Accordinglyone could interpret the effect on people’sspeaking (e.g. through the marginalization of forms of discourse and expression in public fora), doing (e.g. through sys- tematic exploitation of categories of labour and maintainingalarge section of certain societiesinjoblessness), narrating (e.g. through symbolic violence by essentialising role attribution), imputation (e.g. by overburdeningsome people with responsibility for the social fate they suffer).

In this illustration, Ihavemostlytaken individual agents as examples for decapabilisation, but,the whole exercise could be repeated for organized action. And just as one could tracethe increasinginability of people to defend themselves against the loss of capability,soone could use the grid to document successful deployment of the individual or organized capabilities of violence, exploitation, repression and humiliation. In all these cases, such an interpretation of the vi- cissitudes of (in)capability could draw its information from sources ranging from individuals’ testimonytolarge-scale scientific studies of social tendencies. In both individual accounts and scientific studies, one would also find the inter- sectionaland mutual reinforcement of different forms of social suffering (experienced or caused). But even when my studyofsuch experiencesremains com- mitted to the simple exteriority assumed in the “Intermediate Reflection”,this 258 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility does not prevent us from acceptingOkolo’sthesis that “praxistriggers the her- meneutical process and givesitanorientation”¹⁹ (introduced in Chapter 6, §6). Accordingly, numerous aspects of ahermeneutics of social relations of capa- bilisation and decapabilisation have been explored in the chapters of this book. The first chapter endedwith ashortevocation of the common vocation of medi- ologyand hermeneutics, namelypolitical vigilance. The grid of (in)capabilities (above) now givesusabetter idea of what this vigilance would have to be able to identify.Atthe sametime, this vigilance has also to be applied reflexively to the interpreter of individual and collective (in)capabilities – Chapters 2and 6 insisted on the situatedness of the whole hermeneutic undertaking.Ihave re- peatedlypointed out how the technicityofaction produces ambiguous effects. This is true for the use of technical means, but more generally, for the exercise of capabilities (Chapters 2, 3and 4). Most strikingly,itwas possible to identify three paradoxesarising from the technicityofaction. Inamedthese the technical, the organizational and the institutional paradoxes. Each time, that which is indispensable for human action to come to full flourishing (and is in this sense indispensable) retains the possibilityofturning against human beingsand un- derminingtheir agency. Ambiguity and paradoxrefer to stable anthropological structures which generate divergent effects in different historicalcontexts. There- fore neither superb facilitation nor tragic undermining of human initiative can capturethe nature of technicity;itisthe paradoxthat captures the nature of technicity.The mutual adherenceoftechnicityand ethics – explored in Chapters 7and 8 – is aconsequence of the ambiguity and paradox of technicity,for if the same anthropological structure can produce divergent outcomes, and if therefore something is at stake for agents in their actions, somehow,they decide what is preferable. Without at least some inkling of what is preferable, the ambiguity of technicity can onlybestated, not confronted. Since people always know (tacitlyorcon- sciously) that something is at stake in action, their action takes shape under the influenceofnormative considerations.Atthe sametime,for such considerations to be efficient,they need to be pursued by efficaciousmeans. Whatever the normative concerns are, from adescriptive point of view,wehaveevery reason to think thatthey do not simply point in the same direction, for two reasons.On the one hand,culturaldifferences in the largest sense (differences between lin- guistic,national, ethnic, professional or sub-culturalvalues)generate astrange mixture of mutual agreement and disagreement (see Chapter 6, §§5and 6). On

 Okolo Okonda, Pour une philosophie de la cultureetdudéveloppement. Recherches d’hermé- neutique et de praxis africaines (Kinshasa: Presses UniversitaireduZaïre, 1986), 46. 3Responsibility – On the Technicity of Ethico-political Action 259 the other hand, even within arelatively homogenous culturalsetting,conflicting claims need to be arbitrated. Ricœur’sopposition of ethics and deontologyisthe most general formulation of this conflict.All action, in one wayoranother,represents apractical solution to the conflicting concerns that feed into the execu- tion of action. This compromise is what Ricœur refers to as practical wisdom or prudence²⁰,which Ihaveinvoked in the first sentenceofthis conclusion. That said, we still remainmerelyonthe vergeofcritique,asIclaimed in the “Intermediary Reflection”.This is the casebecause, while we do have the means to interpret states of and changes in people’srelative (in)capabilities, we do not have the normative orientation by which to assess and relatively hierarchize people’s “claims-makingbehaviour” and, indeed, their general conduct in specific socio-historical contexts. This impliesthat,using the meansbywhich Iwant to give account of the technicity of action, Ican know that there is agame of normative concerns afoot,but must acknowledge that one cannot participate in the struggle between ethics and deontology and one cannot offer guidance on prudent judgment and action. Still, it is too earlytoend this conclusion. One thing remains, namelyto demonstrate that when this suspension of ethical commitment is lifted, it will turn out that this commitment itself has its own technical dimension. This mayatfirst glanceappear counter-intuitive:the technicity of ethics.Tomake this case, Inow need to reflect on responsibility.

3Responsibility – On the Technicity of Ethico-political Action

At the start of this concluding chapter,Isuggested that philosophicalreflection on the place of ethics in action could takethe desire for practical wisdom (prudence, or phronesis in Ricœur’sreinterpretation) as its starting point and could work out aphenomenological genealogyofsuch action. Iwillingly assume three consequences from this approach. First,Iaccept thatifthere is something like wisdominaction, then it is the outcome of amore or less severe tug-of-war between two contradictory normative logics:the teleological logic of the pursuit of the good life (ethics) and the deontological logic of the prohibition of thatwhich cannot be generalised (morality).²¹ Second, as Ire-affirmed at the end of the pre-

 Irepeatthat the term “prudence” is used in the very specific sense discussed in Chapter8, §1.  In the present context Ihavetoconjecture that this opposition is at least approximately somethingofageneral anthropological fact.For the time beingIsimplyassume that this can 260 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility vious section, normative considerations are part of the very fibre of (in)capable action.Third,since this is the case, the technicity of action has an impact on what prudent action can and should be, and vice versa. However,from this point on, Isteer the reflection in quite adifferent direction to that taken by Ricœur,byintroducing aterminological distinction between practical wisdom(prudence) and responsibility.For Ricœur,these terms are often synonymous, to the point thatone mayread “responsibility” as an appropriate term to encapsulateRicœur’sentire ethico-political philosophy.²² When, in the framework of his hermeneutics of human capabilities, Ricœur develops his ethico-political thought as his response to the fourth of his anthropological questions, namely, “who is the subjectofimputation?”,hesimplyrenders this question in many places as “who is responsible?”.Thus he subsumes the entire ethico-political development of this hermeneutics under responsibility and claims equivalencebetween the agent to whom prudent action can be imputed and the agent of responsible action. By contrast, Iwould like to emphasise that for prudent action to be accept- able as practicallywise,anidea of normative validity is required. Yet, as Ihave made plain since the “IntermediateReflection”,normative validity is not part of the technical dimension of action. Forthis reason, the examination of the technicity of action simplycannot settle this issue and has to proceed while suspend- ing the question of validity.This means that Imay continue to studythe full breadth of human action, even to the extent of taking into account the fact that people de facto consider normative claims to be valid (or invalid), but have to practise amethodological agnosticism with regard to the validity of the norms involved. What remains of practical wisdom when all questions of validity are suspended?Tothis rest,Igive the name “responsibility”.Idefine responsibility as the technical dimension of ethico-political action. Since this diverg- es not onlyfrom Ricœur’sunderstanding of responsibility but also from all scholarship on responsibility known to me, this definition requires some justification.

be demonstrated, even while Iamawareofthe scholarlyclaims to the historicity,particularly,of deontology.  The issue is somewhat morecomplex than Ican demonstratehere,because Ricœur does not use the notion of “responsibility” consistently – see Ernst Wolff, Political Responsibility for aGlo- balised World. After Levinas’ Humanism (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2011), 245–48. 3Responsibility – On the Technicity of Ethico-political Action 261

3.1 Technicity of Ethico-political Action and the Need for Normative Orientation

Classical philosophiesofresponsibilitytend to take two forms: some promotere- sponsibilityasthe essence of ethics itself, while others theorize the structure of ethical conduct in relation to other forms of normative thought.Let us consider these in turn: – The first tendency equates responsibility with ethicity itself. The stronger ethics is equated with ethicity,the more responsibility becomes normatively void or purelyformal. This is the case in Husserl, Weischedel, Levinas and perhaps also Weber.²³ Arguably, the most significant objections against such views of responsibility are related to this indeterminacyinpractice. In the case of Levinas,for instance,responsibility without content opens itself up to the threat of anarchic violence.²⁴ On the otherhand, as in the case of Weber,one can cite thoseamong his readers who align him with bound- less decisionismand the concomitant cult of the leader.²⁵ – The second tendency makes responsibility dependentonotherforms of ethical or normative thinking. This can be seen in authorssuch as Jonas, Apel

 Cf. Edmund Husserl, “Meditationüber die Idee eines individuellen und Gemeinschaftsle- bens in absoluterSelbstverantwortung,” in Erste Philosophie (1923/1924),Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion,Husserl Gesammelte WerkeBand VIII, ed. Rudolf Boehm (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 193–202; Wilhelm Weischedel, Das Wesen der Verantwor- tung.Ein Versuch (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, [1932] 1972); Emmanuel Lévinas, Totalité et infini. Essai sur l’extériorité (La Haye:Martinus Nijhoff, [1961] 1998) and Max Weber, “Politik als Beruf” (1919), in Gesammelte politische Schriften,Postdamer Internet-Ausgabe (followingthe “Marianne-Ausgabe”), (1999), 396–450, https://www.uni-potsdam.de/verlagsarchivweb/html/ 494/html/PS.pdf, last accessed 5February 2021. Levinas’srecurrent use of the imperative “Thou shaltnot kill!” is an excessive verbalisation of what – if one follows his own presentation – is nothingmorethan the merely formal imperative of responsibility for the other. My uncertainty in the case of Weber is based on the fact that at the beginningofhis “Pol- itics as aVocation,” he seems to present the collapse of the stateintoanarchy as anegativenor- mative point of reference of political responsibility.  This objection is developed in Ernst Wolff, De l’éthique àlajustice. Langage et politique dans la philosophie de Lévinas (Dordrecht: Springer,2007), 383–99 and Ernst Wolff, “The Quest for JusticeVersus the Rights of the Other?” in In Levinas’ Trace, ed. Maria Dimitrova (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing,2011), 101–11.  On these readings, see for instance, Sylvie Mesure, “Rationalisme et faillibilisme,” in Histoire de la philosophie politique. Tome V, Les philosophies politiques contemporaines,ed. Alain Renaut (Paris:Calmann-Lévy,1999), 149 – 84,especially151– 53. 262 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility

and, of course,Ricœur.²⁶ Hereresponsibilityisalwaysunderstood in terms of another meta-ethical commitment,the validity of which is separately established. Often scholars workinginapplied fields of ethics have opted for a deontologicalsupplementationofthe theory of responsibility, since this fits in snuglywith the practice of professional codes.However,there are also more classical philosophicalapproaches that advocate supplementation from deontology (Apel, Jonas), and again such thinkers includeother sup- plements(Ricœur usesboth teleologicaland deontological moments in age- nealogical reconstruction of the capability of responsible decision-making).

Both these tendencies seem to concur thatatheory of responsibility cannot,by its own devices,provide the normative reference according to which judgements and actions are to be qualified as “responsible”:either it side-steps the question of responsible action by focusingonethicity,oritfocuses on responsible action while out-sourcingthe question of validity to other modes of philosophising.In- stead of identifying this as aweakness of either or both of the two tendencies, I conclude that they rather point to something important about responsibility,and that Iexplicitlyaffirm.Responsibility shares an essential feature of all technicity of action: it is unable to generate from and for itself the ultimate criteria of its excellence. Andone has to add that the reason for this is that responsibility is best understood as the technicityofethico-political action. Yet, as Ihaveargued in Chapters 7and 8, there is no excellenceofaction which is not materialised by the capability of agents and their deployment of means. If responsibilityisthe technicity of ethico-political action, then studying responsibility amounts to studying effortstoactualise excellence in action.The reason for this is not that technicityand responsibility represent merelythe means to ends, but that excellence exists only as an attributeofaction (of which technicityisanessential component) – excellenceasrecognized by agents or onlookers. Having demarcated the place of responsibility in relation to the technicityof action and afullyvalidated ethical theory,wenow have to examine more closely the character of responsibility that would fit in this space. Which qualities of re- sponsibilitymake it asuitable fit for the technicity of action examined in this book?And how does our understandingofresponsibility affect what we mayex- pect of ethico-political action?

 Cf. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung.Versuch einer Ethik fürdie technologische Zivilisa- tion (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, [1979]1984); Karl-OttoApel, Diskurs und Verantwortung.Das Problem des Übergangs zur postkonventionellen Moral (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988) and Ricœur, Soi-même comme un autre / Oneself as Another. 3Responsibility – On the Technicity of Ethico-political Action 263

3.2 Responsibility as aKey to Thinking Action in an EraofUncertainty

What then are the general features of responsibility which would commend it as acomponent of the technicity of ethico-political action? – Reflection on responsibility in the widest sense has avery long history.Its antecedents stretch as far backasthe traditions of reflection on guilt(for retrospective responsibility) and obligation (for prospective responsibility).²⁷ However,apart from very few exceptions,²⁸ reflection about responsibility in the strict sense starts after the First World Warwith Weber’sspeech on “Politics as avocation”.²⁹ It would requireastudyonits owntotrace the ge- nealogyofthis terminphilosophyand social theory.For my current purpos- es, Imerelyconjecturethat in some form all human societies attribute re- sponsibilitytohuman action, but that it emergeswith particular salience as adilemma duetothe normative challenges and uncertainties of social life under the conditions of late modernity.Atleast two of these conditions should be called to mind: (1) the increasing uncertainty,complexity and risk involved in decision-making – induced by rapid and unpredictable social and technical change³⁰ – and (2)the increasing loss of effectiveness and credibility of foundationalistapproaches to normative decision-making,ac- companied by an increase in conflicting claims of validity (Weber’s “polythe- ism”).³¹ Both these conditions are at work as much in the Global South³² as

 Cf. the lemma “Verantwortung” in Handbuch Ethik, eds.Marcus Düwelland Micha Werner (Stuttgart: Metzler,2011), 541–48.  Cf. Benjamin Constant, De la responsabilité des ministres (Paris:H.Nicolle, 1815) and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, L’idée de la responsabilité (Paris:Hachette, 1884).  Etienne de Villiers, Revisiting MaxWeber’sEthic of Responsibility (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018).  The fact that the philosophyofresponsibility has proventobevery productive in the sub- discipline of the philosophy of technology speaks to this point.This is particularlyvisible in the philosophyoftechnologyinGermany. See Hans Lenk and Matthias Maring, “Verantwortung in Technik und Wissenschaft,” in Handbuch Verantwortung,eds.LudgerHeidbrink, Claus Lang- behn and Janina Loh(Wiesbaden: Springer VS,2017), 715 – 31 and some of the importantmile- stones: Hans Sachsse, Technik und Verantwortung.Problemeder Ethik im technischen Zeitalter (Freiburg: VerlagRombach, 1972); Hans Lenk, Konkrete Humanität. Vorlesungen über Verantwor- tung und Menschlichkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), Hans Lenk and Matthias Maring, eds., Technikverantwortung:Güterabwägung – Risikobewertung – Verhaltenskodizes (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag,1991); Günther Ropohl, “Das RisikoimPrinzip Verantwortung,” Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften 5(1994): 109–20;and Armin Grunwald, “Verantwortungsbegriff und Verantwortungsethik,” in his Rationale Technikfolgenbeurteilung.Konzeption und methodi- sche Grundlagen (Berlin: Springer,1999), 175 – 94.  Read, for instance, Weber’s “Politics as aVocation” together with his “ScienceasVocation”. 264 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility

in the Global North, albeit in different manifestations (as reflected in Chap- ter 6, §6). – Generally, theories of responsibility tend to take the situatedness of ethical or political judgementand action seriously.³³ Again Weber can be taken as para- digmatic: one can onlyunderstand what it means to have avocation for (responsible) politics once one has carefullytaken account of the specificities of the social phenomenon of politics in which an individual politician has to act and interact.Inasimilar vein, anumber of philosophers have worked on establishing aphenomenologyofthe types and dimensions of responsibility. They have mapped the distinguishable aspects of responsibility:temporality (prospective,retrospective), subjectivity (individual responsibilityorco-responsibility), conditionality (formal, informal, legal, contractual), and mo- dality (responsibility for action, for failingtoact or preventing someone from acting).³⁴ Sometimes, the dimensions of responsibility are summarised in aformula, for instance: Xtakes responsibility for Y, in X’scapacity as X1 before instance Aand with appeal to aset of criteria M.³⁵ Thisisofnosmall

This is not to denythat philosophers of responsibility have also engagedinanattempt to construct aphilosophyofresponsibility as the very foundation of ethics.Hans Jonas’sefforts in this regardare telling:after havingattempted to present ametaphysicsofethics (responsibility as the foundation of all ethics), he later questions the validity of his own attempts.Compare Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung, with Hans Jonas, PhilosophischeUntersuchungen und metaphysische Vermutungen (Frankfurt am Main, and Leipzig:Insel: 1992).See my commentaries Ernst Wolff, “Responsibility in an EraofModern Technology and Nihilism, Part 1. ANon-Foun- dational Rereading of Jonas,” Dialogue 48, no. 3(2009): 577–99 and “Responsibility in an Eraof Modern Technology and Nihilism, Part 2. Inter-connection and Implicationsofthe TwoNotions of Responsibility in Jonas,” Dialogue 48, no. 4(2009): 841–66.  Cf. Olúfémi Taiwò, HowColonialismPre-Empted Modernity in Africa (Bloomington, IN,and Indianapolis,IN: Indiana University Press,2010); Elísio Macamo, ed., Negotiating Modernity:Af- rica’sAmbivalent Experience (Dakar,and London, Pretoria: Codesria Books and others,2005); Manuel Castells, “‘The Rise of the Fourth World’:Informational Capitalism,Poverty,and Social Exclusion,” in End of Millennium (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); Chapter 2and region-specific chapters in Handbuch Moderneforschung,eds.Friedrich Jaeger,WolfgangKnöbl and UteSchneider (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler,2015).  Obviously, the simplest reductionsofresponsibility to obedienceofthe stipulations of ethical codes cannot do justice to this point.  Hans Lenk, “Typen und Dimensionen der Verantwortlichkeit,” in Konkrete Humanität. Vor- lesungen über Verantwortung und Menschlichkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), 261–84 and in Heidbrink et al., Handbuch Verantwortung,especiallythe chapters by Janina Loh, “Struk- turenund Relata der Verantwortung,” 35–56,and by Hans Lenk, “Verantwortlichkeit und Ve- rantwortungstypen: Artenund Polaritäten,” 57–84.  Roughly similar to Hans Lenk and Matthias Maring, “Deskriptive und normative Zuschrei- bungvon Verantwortung,” in Hans Lenk, Zwischen Wissenschaft und Ethik (Frankfurt am 3Responsibility – On the Technicity of Ethico-political Action 265

interest for my point.The typesand dimensions of responsibility reflect both the complexity of the socio-historical context of decision-making and acting and the adverbialqualificationsofthe prospective actions under evaluation: who?when?where? how?bywhich means?bywhat strategy? through which trade-offs?etc.³⁶ The combination of the dimensionsofresponsibility and the adverbial qualifications of responsible action describe the capabilities activated, as well as the ways in which meansare deployed in the act of re- sponsibleaction, i.e. the technicityofethico-political action. Moreover,this helps us to see that the situatedness of action and of decision-making is not asecondary aspect of responsible action, but has an impact on the very content of the notion of responsibility.Finally, the dimensions of responsibility allow one to appreciate the fact thatclaiming responsibility to be the technicity of ethical and political action is not the same as claiming that the technical aspects of action exhaust the meaning of ethico-political action. Ide- fend the thesis that ethics and politics cannot do without dueconsideration for the technicityofaction. – The situatedness of responsibility and its dimensions implies tacit or calcu- lated judgement of the appropriateness of action for aparticularcontext. This judgement pointstoamarkedly hermeneutic concept of responsibility. This fact is in accord with the general hermeneutic nature attributed to action throughout this study. Only as part of the hermeneutic and technical nature of ethico-political action under contextual demands can aconcept of re- sponsibleaction meet the four criteria which Ihaveidentified for it elsewhere.³⁷ (i) Responsible decision-making has to be able to coordinate ethical considerations with strategic ones. This inevitablybringsthe question of mutualsacrifice of these considerations into the ambit of responsible action.The cases examined in Chapter 8illustrate this point vividly. (ii) Re- sponsibleaction has to be undertaken from the complex anatomyofthe forms and dimensions of responsibility (as discussed above, following

Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 76 – 100,here 81;and Günther Ropohl, “Das RisikoimPrinzip Verant- wortung,” 111. See also the commentary by Micha Werner, “Die Zuschreibungvon Verantwor- tung.Versuch einer Annäherungvon Handlungstheorie und Ethik,” in Zukunftsverantwortung in der Marktwirtschaft,eds.Thomas Bausch, et al. (Münster: LIT, 2000), 85 – 109.  Here Ifollow again Michael Pakaluk’sreading of Aristotle’sunderstanding of the discern- ment regarding the adverbial increments of action (i.e. agent,instrument, manner,place, duration, purpose, etc.), as discussed in Chapter3,§2.2. Aristotle’svirtue theory presents us with a precursor of responsible decision-making – not onlythrough his notion of phronésis,which Ri- cœur redefines,but in providing arudimentaryphenomenologyofthe natureofthe phronetic judgment.  Wolff, Political Responsibility, 213–19. 266 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility

Lenk). (iii) Reflection on responsibility needs to accordthe context of action sufficientattention. Thiscontext consists not onlyofthe social and normative expectations of interactional partners (see Chapter 6), but alsoofthe means of action,broadlyunderstood – bodilyskills, chemical substances, artefacts,instruments (physical or intellectual), media of communication, organizations,institutions, etc. (see Chapters 1and 2).(iv)Responsible judgment cannot simplybeoriented to conformity with established principles or values of action; it has to be able to takeinto account the problematisation of the very norms which can be justified under unproblematic circumstances.Responsible actionhas to be “found” in the horizon of reflection of equity,i.e.the revision of the “letterofthe law” by appeal to the “spirit of the law”.Mandela’sreflections on violence illustrate this point (Chapter 7, §3). – Sometimes responsible action consists simply of complying with rules or following generallyaccepted practices. One should not sneer at this fact – those who are acquainted with the personal and social harm inflicted by nepotistic and corrupt innovations on rules in bureaucracies and companies know to appreciate this aspect of responsibility.However,compliancewith rules is arather singular manifestation of responsibility and has to be con- ducted under vigilant observation from asecond-order responsibility which has to test the desirability of compliance. More typically, acting responsibly requires serious effort,since boththe course of action and the hope of suc- cess are uncertain. Striving to find responsible action steers agents right into the thicket of capability-incapability relations in action, and this holds for individual action as much as for organized action (see Chapters 3and 4). Every responsible actioncomes at the price of acompromise, which means thatsomething of what it aspired to had to be relegated to the sphere of the unrealizable (i.e. incapability). Hence, in agreementwith our findings on (in)capability,the incapability fullytorealizeall aspirations of responsible action remains the horizon of intelligibility of the course of action adopted, and this is true even for the most honest attemptstofind the best course of action. Responsibility is the taskofconfronting the uncertainty,ambiguity and paradox of contexts by composing actional (in)capabilities under the weight of ethical and moral concerns. Evidently, then, the reflection on re- sponsibilitytowhich my studyleads is not that of an applied ethics of technology(but it does not exclude this either). It is aphilosophyofresponsibility as such. 3Responsibility – On the Technicity of Ethico-political Action 267

3.3 The Fragility of Responsibility

In this outline of responsibility,Istrovetoremain true to its complexity in real- life action, and more particularlyasanaspect of the technicity of action. Failure in this respect would easilylead to fatalism (neglect of the potential of agency) or moralism (neglect of anyregardfor the inevitable use of powerful meansin complex situations).Myattempt to steer clear of these fallacies can be gauged by the relation Iassume to two other thinkers on responsibility. On the one hand, Ihavebeen guided by Weber’sinsight that responsible decision-making and action are worthyofthis label onlyifthey take into consid- eration the means for its realization – in the caseofpolitics, this is the means particulartopolitics,namely “power backedupbyviolence”,³⁸ and the uncertainty of outcomes associated with the deployment of such means. However, whereas Weber delvedinto the sociological constitution of politics, Iadopted adifferent perspective on “means”,inthe formofanexploration of the technicity of action. My intention is not to downplaythe sociological perspective – my recoursetothe work of social scientists in this book vouch for this sufficiently – but simplytobenefit from ahermeneutic view on action to account for the complexity of the technicity of ethico-political action. In this, my book complements Weber’sground-breakingstudy on responsibility.However,unlike Weber,(a) Ido not focus on the highesttiers of decision-makers;(b) Idonot accept the distinction between unreserved role obedience (in the form of bureaucratic responsibility) and charismatic decision-making (in political responsibility), and (c) Ihave allowed for amuchbroader view on the legitimate recourse to violence in modern states than the one which informs his view on responsibility.³⁹ Ienquire into the responsibility of all people, as potentiallypenetrating all action in all social contexts. Whoever speaks about human capabilities and the means by which actions are mediated has to think about responsibility.⁴⁰

 Max Weber, “Politics as aVocation,” in From MaxWeber: EssaysinSociology,transl. Hans Heinrich Gerth and Charles Wright Mills (London: Routledge,1991), 77–128, here119.  See Karl vonHoldt’sidea of violent democracy,discussed in Chapter8,§2.1.  One can gaugethe contemporary potential of the notion of “responsibility” in socio-political matters by consulting, for instance, Heidbrink et al., Handbuch Verantwortung,and the three vol- umes of Ludger Heidbrink and Alfred Hirsch, eds., Verantwortung in der Zivilgesellschaft. Zur Konjunktureines widersprüchlichen Prinzips (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag,2006), Staat ohne Verantwortung? Zum Wandel der Aufgaben von Staat und Politik (Frankfurt am Main: Cam- pus Verlag,2007) and Verantwortung als Marktwirtschaftliches Prinzip.Zum Verhältnis von Moral und Ökonomie (Frankfurt am Main: CampusVerlag,2008). 268 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility

But Ialso situate myself in relation to another keythinker about responsibility:Emmanuel Levinas.⁴¹ Levinas was absolutelyright in claiming that “[e]ver- yone will readilyagree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality”.⁴² Although Ihavenot confronted this question in this book,Ihave indicated its significance (see Chapter 6, §5). However,the reason for the daring originality of Levinas’sphilosophyisatthe same time the sourceofits failuretopresent us with aviablenotion of responsibility: it attempts to construct anotion of responsibility (as the essence of ethics itself)out- side of the demands of practical philosophy. The resultisaphilosophyofrespon- sibility coupled with the pathos of an appeal to the urgencyofresponsible action,but which is simplynot convincing,since it fails to work through the dif- ficulties associated with the capability of the ethico-political agent to respond to this task and this appeal, in other words, it neglects an examination of the nature of ethical agency.Insum, his ethical and political thought lacks an accom- panying reflection on the inevitable mediation of the plurality of mutuallyconflict- ing responsibilities of the ethical agent for the plurality of others and thus lacks reflection on the competence and means of the agent of responsibility who has to act in aparticularcontext.⁴³ Ihope this book has gone some waytowardclarify- ing the technicity of action and towarddemonstrating whyreflection on ethics and politics cannot do without it. The degreetowhich an agent is able to exercise responsibility could be at- tested to retrospectively,aspart of the compositeofthe adverbialincrements of a course of action,orprospectively as the anticipation in reflection of the responsibility thatanagent willlaterbeable to attest to. At least three fragilities affect both of these forms of responsibility.

3.3a Fragility of Responsibility as Mediated, Practical RelationtoSelf The first fragility of responsibility arises from the finitude of agents. In Chapter 3, §2.3,Idescribed finitude as the point of differentiation between capability and incapability in practice. It is not possible to overcome the contextuality,perspec- tivism or limitations of one’sview on acontext of context.Admittedly, by acquir- ing more information, engagingincareful reasoning and through consultation

 My critique of Levinas on this point is summarised in Wolff, Political Responsibility, 167–68.  “On conviendra aisément qu’il importeauplus haut point de savoir si l’on n’est pas dupe de la morale.” Lévinas, Totalité et infini,here 5/Totality and Infinity:AnEssay on Exteriority (Dor- drecht: Kluwer, 1991), 21.Onthe context of this citation cf. Wolff, De l’éthique àlajustice,52–60.  Cf. Wolff, Political Responsibility, 166. 3Responsibility – On the Technicity of Ethico-political Action 269 with others, the boundaries set by these limitations can be shifted. Andthat is good. But they can never be fullyovercome. Moreover,our ability to take responsibility for that which we deem worthyof doing so could be augmented by the invention of new means (technologies, forms of organization, institutions, etc.) and by the initiative to new interactions. However,asthe meansofour action become more powerful, and the organization of our interaction becomes more varied, the consequences of these initia- tivesalsobecome more extensive and the ambiguities and paradoxesofthe technicity become more acute. Consequently, the demands made on our responsibility become more complex, while our ability to calculate the outcomes of actions cannot keep up with these developments. Ahermeneutics of responsibility thus has to conclude that taking responsibility depends on the features of the actional possibilitiesofagents in every specific context,that is, the variety of their capabilities and the degrees to which these could be activated through the intermediary of theirmeans. Responsibility as acomplex feature of human capability is, as Aristotle alreadysaid of the practice of virtues, always relative to us.⁴⁴ Agents attesting to their ability to takere- sponsibilityfor something (retrospectivelyorprospectively), do so exactlyinpro- portion to the incrementsofcapability they are able to activate(or anticipate being able to activate) and relative to specific actional contexts.

3.3b Fragility in HoldingResponsible Ihavedefined responsibility as an aspect of action. But action itself is an ambiguous phenomenon: part initiative,part consequenceofenablingand constraining social and material circumstances.One should thus be careful not to over- look the fact that responsibility is both something assumed by agents for themselves and something imposed on them by others. Moreover,like all acquisition of capabilities, learning responsible actionischaracterised by the ambiguity of augmented ability and internalized constraint, captured in terms such as “habitus” or “discipline” (discussed in Chapter 2, §§1and 3.1). Theextent to which responsibility is exercised by agents in asocio-institutional milieu, or rather imposedonthem by this milieu,has to be amatter of dispute. It is therefore not possibletodeclare the social fact of responsibility categoricallypositive.Itis

 Because of the hermeneutic constitution of agency, coupled with the understanding of responsibility as the technicity of ethico-political action, therecan be no question of secretlypro- motingasovereignist view of subjectivity.Itherefore think that Frieder Vogelmann’scritique of philosophical responsibility discourse, in Im Bann der Verantwortung (Frankfurt am Main: Cam- pus Verlag,2014), does not applytowhat Ipresent here. 270 Conclusion: Technicity of Action and Responsibility rather one of the tasks of ahermeneuticstudyofthe technicity of ethico-political action to give an account of the ways in which organized actionand the institutional mediationofaction assign people to positions of responsibility for which the (in)capabilities available to them maybeinsufficient (in other words, to give an account of overtaxing of people by holding them responsible).⁴⁵ At the same time, one has to refrain from simplyequating responsibility with asocial imposition. After all, since all agency requires institutional mediation to be acquired and practised, it would be problematic to expect that responsibility can be assumed onlyinakind of free-floating social vacuum. Responsibility exists onlythrough and for its social context.InChapters 7and 8, we examine the fact that even living under conditions of severe injusticeorsocio-economic pre- carity does not make people ethicallyindifferent.Those living at the edge would consider attributing theirnorm-sensitivity to nothing more than the interioriza- tion of social pressures as dehumanizing.⁴⁶ Besides, this would attribute apriori to them alack of agential initiative which is not matched by their exercise of choices and acting accordingtostrategies in practice. The ambiguity and even sometimes the undecidability between the passive and active side of responsibility is the second fragilization of responsibility.

3.3.c FragilityofJustification Aparticular fragility infiltrates responsibility because of its dependency on something non-technical: its justification in terms of norms, values or ethics. Even aview on action, which is restricted to the technicity of ethico-political action, has to give account of this fragility,since agents sensitive to the call of re- sponsibilityare affected by it.The reason for this fragility has to do with the loss of certaintyabout normative orientations in general, due to the underminingof tradition and religion by science, social changes that have resultedinaloss of

 The negative side of responsibility attribution has been studied in social scienceand philosophy. It is quitecloselyrelated to the issue of risk management,aspresented with referenceto Elísio Macamo in Chapter4,§4.2. See also Vogelmann, Im Bann der Verantwortung. ;Jean-Louis Genardand FabrizioCantelli, “Êtrescapables et compétents: lectureanthropologique et pistes pragmatiques,”SociologieS [Online], Theory and research, Online since27April 2008, http:// journals.openedition.org/sociologies/1943, last accessed 28 April 2019;and Jean-Louis Genard and FabrizioCantelli, “Pourune sociologie politiquedes compétences,” Les Politiques Sociales 70, nos.1–2(2010): 103–20.SinceIhave givenincapability its dueplace, also in relation to responsibility,this critique does not applytome. Quite the contrary,Ihave provided at least some of the means by which to describe the undue imposition of responsibility.  This does not mean that Ihaveoverlooked the tragedyofaninteriorizationofvictimhood – cf. Chapter8,§3.2. 3Responsibility – On the Technicity of Ethico-political Action 271 the authority of institutions, the declining credibility of philosophies of history and the plurality of contradicting normative claims in and between societies. These phenomena, which have been known and studied for manyyears,⁴⁷ have been partiallydealt with in Chapter 6. On the one hand,one mayrecall that responsibility represents exactlythosemodes of action that are supposed to confront this uncertainty headon(see §3.2,above), but,onthe other hand, it has to be underscored that uncertainty undermines justification and thus ac- cords responsibility an essential fragility. This fact has implications for all action, since responsibility could in principle applytoall action.However,itcomes most clearly to the fore in such actions that connect directlywith justification. Hereone has to think about claims-making practices to which Ihavementioned in this book – with reference to authors such as Charles TillyorBoltanski and Thévenot – or about theorizing and philosophising which are reflexive actions (as Ihaveemphasised in Chapter 6). All these actionsare subject to the sameambiguities and paradoxes, duetothe technicity of action in general, but also due to the fragility of responsibility.Finally, if critique requires the supplementation of simple exteriority with anormative justification that would enable one to assume complex exteriority,⁴⁸ it has to be expected thatsuch acritique will also be marked by this fragility.

 The historical development on modernity discourses is rendered wellinJaeger et al., Hand- buch Moderneforschung, especiallythe chapters by Gerald Hartung, “Philosophie,” 204–15,and WolfgangKnöbl, “Soziologie,” 261–74.  See discussion in “IntermediateReflection,” §§2and 3.