Read Ebook {PDF EPUB} Himalayan Blunder The Angry Truth About 's Most Crushing Military Disaster by J.P. Dalvi ISBN 13: 9788185019666. Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster. J. P. Dalvi. This specific ISBN edition is currently not available. The Indian military setback against the Chinese attack in 1962 called for an honest critique. Quite a few books written by Army officers have tried to tell their version of the untold story. Quite a few books written by Army officers have tried to tell their version of the untold story. Dalvi's account of the Sino-Indian War is by far the most remarkable and authentic. He was presenting the theatre of war throughout, commanding a brigade and was held captive by the Chinese for seven months. In discussing the day-to-day events from 8 September to 20 October 1962, the author graphically tells the truth which only a participant could experience and know. The background of the war is drawn from his first-hand information as a high-ranking military commander. "synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title. Shipping: FREE Within U.S.A. Customers who bought this item also bought. Top Search Results from the AbeBooks Marketplace. 1. Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster. Book Description Condition: New. A+ Customer service! Satisfaction Guaranteed! Book is in NEW condition. Seller Inventory # 8185019665- 2-1. 2. Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster. Book Description Hardcover. Condition: New. Brand New!. Seller Inventory # VIB8185019665. Himalayan Blunder. Himalayan Blunder was an extremely controversial war memoir penned by Brigadier John Dalvi. It dealt with the causes, consequences and aftermath of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, that ended in Chinese People's Liberation Army inflicting a defeat on India. The title seems to allude to the "Himalayan miscalculation" that Gandhi discusses in his autobiographical article for April 14, 1919, [1] and which retained this title as Chapter 33 in Gandhi's autobiography. [2] :469. Brigadier Dalvi served in the Indian Army and gives a first-person account of the war. The book was banned by the Indian Government after its publication. [3] Because of the book, the term "Himalayan blunder" came to be used as a synonym for colossal failure in the context of Indian politics. [ citation needed ] Contents. The Content [ edit | edit source ] The book begins with the narration of Brig. Dalvi's days in the DSSC, Welllington. He narrates an incident where a guest faculty, a retired British official, after hearing that Nehru had signed Panchsheel agreement with and had decided to give up the post in that the British had maintained in Tibet to check Chinese advance, interrupted his class and warned that India and China would soon be at war and people in this class would be fighting it. Brig. Dalvi remembers that he was very angry with the gentleman questioning the authority of the gentleman to criticise the leader of his country. Brig. Dalvi also examines the position of Tibet vis-a-vis India and China. The British, he says, had insight into China's imperial ambitions. They had therefore cultivated Tibet as a buffer state. Expectedly, the Chinese attacked Tibet in 1950 and captured it. India did not protest the attack [ citation needed ] owing to Nehru's China-friendly policy [ citation needed ] . The Chinese began constructing roads from Tibet leading to near . The Chinese had two major claims with respect to Indian territories - 1) Aksai Chin in the northeastern section of Ladakh District in Jammu and . 2) British-designated North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), which is the present-day state of . The War [ edit | edit source ] When the war broke out on September 8, 1962, Nehru was away from India. The Chinese attacked simultaneously on the Ladakh area and NEFA. They managed to capture 11,000 km² of area in Aksai Chin and substantial area in NEFA. The commander of IV Corps, General B.M. Kaul was not on the front lines and was in Military Hospital, Delhi, recovering from an illness. Dalvi further alleges that B.M. Kaul was promoted to the position of General supplanting more capable, and senior officers because he was personally close to Nehru. According to Dalvi, the Indian Army lacked leadership, equipment for mountain warfare, weaponry, and basic essentials like warm clothing, snow boots, and glasses. Brg Dalvi lavishes praise on his brigade's courage, bravery, and grit in face of superior opposition. Despite gaining territory, the Chinese army declared a unilateral ceasefire, while still maintaining the status quo . Brig. Dalvi was taken as prisoner of war along with the soldiers of his brigade. He was subsequently imprisoned for six months. Dalvi also records how China had meticulously planned the attack while officially it maintained a different posture. Dalvi also examines the aftermath of the war. The detractors of Prime Minister Pandit held Defence Minister Krishna Menon and General Brij Mohan Kaul responsible for the debacle and both of them resigned. Mr. Ravi Belagere, a Kannada journalist, has translated Himalayan Blunder into Kannada. The translated Kannada version has allowed Indian readers to read more about causes for the defeat of the Indian army against China. Dalvi J P. Transport Economics (Routledge Library Editions: Transport Economics) Dalvi, M.Q.,Tyson, W.J.,Stubbs, P.C. Published by Routledge, 2018. Used - Softcover Condition: Fine. Paperback. Condition: Fine. Himalayan Blunder. J.P. Dalvi. Published by Natraj Publishers, 2011. New - Hardcover Condition: New. Condition: New. pp. 506. More buying choices from other sellers on AbeBooks. Himalayan Blunder ( The curtain-raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962) Dalvi, Brigadier J. P. Published by Thacker & Company Limited, Bombay, 1969. Used - Hardcover Condition: Fair. Hardcover. Condition: Fair. No Jacket. Hardcover. Light green cloth boards with black lettering on spine. 506 pages. Title page dated 1969 as is copyright page. This book is in fair condition. Boards are stiff. Corners bumped. A stain on the front board. Spine sunned. Binding is tight but shelf cocked. Pages are clean but heavily underlined with blue pen. Overall a nice copy. Some black & white photos. Himalayan Blunder (The Curtain-Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962) J. P. Dalvi. Published by Thacker and Co., Bombay, 1969. Used - Hardcover Condition: Very Good. Hardcover. Condition: Very Good. Dust Jacket Condition: Poor. Hard cover published by Thacker and Co. In Bombay in 1969. Blue covers with black lettering on spine. Ends of spine are faded. Corners of covers are bumped. Bottom edge of front cover has a small indentation near spine. Covers are bowed some. Inside front cover has a bookplate from a previous owner. Two colored foldout maps are attached in back of book. Book is in good condition. Dust jacket is in very poor condition. Front inner flap is loose, edges are worn and torn, with missing pieces, and corners are worn and torn. 8vo, 506 pages, 1.7 lb. ; 8vo 8" - 9" tall; 506 pages. HIMALAYAN BLUNDER. (The Curtain-raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962) Dalvi, Brig. J.P. Published by 1969 Second edition Thacker, Bombay., 1969. 506pp. Index. 2 folding maps. A critical account of the engagements in which the author was taken prisoner by the Chinese. Very good. Himalayan Blunder. (The curtain-raiser to the sino-Indian War of 1962). Foreword by Frank Moraes. Dalvi, Brigadier J.P.: Published by Bombay, Thacker & Company,, 1969. Used - Hardcover. 22 cm, Ln. (Cloth). 506 S. (p.) Im Schnitt etw. angeschmutzt. In englischer Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 750. Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster. J. P. Dalvi. Published by Natraj Publishers, 2003. Used - Hardcover Condition: Good. Condition: Good. A+ Customer service! Satisfaction Guaranteed! Book is in Used-Good condition. Pages and cover are clean and intact. Used items may not include supplementary materials such as CDs or access codes. May show signs of minor shelf wear and contain limited notes and highlighting. China went to war against India on this day 55 years ago. But the planning began much earlier. The Indo-China war began on October 20, 1962. A new book states that it was China that decided to go to war. Chinese preparations for the war obviously began long before October 1962 – and the November 1961 meeting where Nehru had outlined his Forward Policy. Even if there already were new roads and military camps in the area, tens of thousands of more People’s Liberation Army [PLA] troops and tons of supplies, including heavy military equipment, had to be moved over some of the most difficult terrain in the world. Mao sent altogether 80,000 Chinese soldiers to Ladakh and the eastern Himalayas to attack India. Supply lines had to be established and secured to the rear bases inside Tibet. Once across the border, it was also apparent that the Chinese had detailed knowledge of the terrain, where the Indian troops were stationed, and how to best attack them. This was well before China had access to satellite imagery. Aerial surveillance from spotter planes would also have been impossible at that time. China depended entirely on human intelligence collected by its agents in the field, which would have taken time in the North-East Frontier Agency [NEFA]’s rough and roadless terrain. But China’s agents would also be confined largely to areas where the local population spoke languages and dialects related to Tibetan. It was nearly impossible for the Chinese to penetrate most parts of the NEFA where the local tribal population spoke other, non-Tibetan languages and dialects. Consequently, the areas where the Chinese launched their attacks were carefully selected, and contrary to what many researchers, including those from India, have assumed, relatively limited. There is a common misperception that the PLA overran most of the NEFA and reached the lowlands at Bhalukpong, which now marks the state border between Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. Bhalukpong was abandoned and the PLA’s last encounter with Indian troops was at Chakhu, a small town near Bomdila, south of Rupa. In the east, they did not go much farther than Walong, and the incursions into Subansiri and Siang in the central sector were relatively minor. All these areas have one thing in common. They are populated by Tibetan-speaking people or people speaking languages and dialects related to Tibetan. They were also areas where human intelligence operations had been possible before the war, and where the Chinese, through their Tibetan interpreters, were able to communicate with the locals who had stayed behind once the PLA crossed into the NEFA. Although the Indian Army had retreated from all its positions in the northeastern mountains, it is significant that the PLA did not venture into areas of the NEFA populated by Mishmis, Apatanis, Nyishis, and other non-Tibetan speaking tribes because no on-the-ground intelligence had been collected from there before the meticulously planned war. Those tribal groups would have been perceived as alien and therefore potentially hostile. There were also other preparations that the Chinese had undertaken before the attacks in October 1962. Indian brigadier John Dalvi, who was captured alive with some of his men on October 22, 1962 and remained a prisoner of war in China until May 1963, recorded the events in his book Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth about India’s Most Crushing Military Disaster . Once captured and taken to the other side, Dalvi was able to observe how meticulously the Chinese had prepared their blitzkrieg against India. He discovered that the Chinese had erected prisoner of war camps to hold up to 3,000 men and found out that interpreters for all major Indian languages had been moved to Lhasa between March and May 1962. Not only had tens of thousands of troops been redeployed to the area to be acclimatised to the high altitudes of the border mountains well before the attacks took place, but thousands of Tibetan porters had also been recruited and forward dumps had been established all along the frontier. Even more tellingly, Dalvi noticed that the Chinese had built a road strong enough to hold 7-tonne vehicles all the way up to Marmang near the McMahon Line. All this, Dalvi wrote later, “was not an accident and was certainly not decided after 8th September 1962. It was coldly and calculatingly planned by the Chinese.” While it is not inconceivable that the very final order to attack was given a week or so before the PLA swung into action (which would make sense from a tactical military point of view), it is also important to remember that the 1962 War also had nothing to do with the establishment of an Indian Army post in one of the remotest corners of the subcontinent. That could be seen as a pretext, but even then, at best, a rather flimsy one. Even Mao Zedong had told the Nepalese and the Soviet delegations before and after the war that the issue was never the McMahon Line or the border dispute. China thought that India had designs for Tibet, which, in the 1950s, was being integrated into Mao’s People’s Republic. At a meeting on March 25, 1959, only three weeks after the outbreak of the Lhasa uprising and as the Dalai Lama was on his way over the mountains to India, Deng Xiaoping, then a political as well as a military leader, made China’s position clear: “When the time comes, we certainly will settle accounts with them [the Indians]” And, according to Bruce Riedel, one of American’s leading experts on US security as well as South Asian issues, “[p]robably as early as 1959, Mao decided that he would have to take firm action against Nehru”. Zhao Weiwen, a South Asian analyst at China’s premier intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security, wrote after the war in 1962 that “India ardently hoped to continue England’s legacy in Tibet” and that Nehru himself “harboured a sort of dark mentality”. Those factors, Zhao argued, led Nehru to demonstrate an “irresolute attitude” in 1959. And that “dark mentality”, US-China scholar John Garver quotes him as saying, led Nehru to give a free rein to “anti-China forces” in an attempt to foment unrest in Tibet to “throw off the jurisdiction of China’s central government”. According to Garver, Mao was also present at the same meeting as Deng in March 1959, and the Chairman said that India “was doing bad things in Tibet” and therefore had to be dealt with. Mao, however, told the assembled members of the inner circle of the Chinese leadership that China should not condemn India openly for the time being. Instead, India would be given enough rope to hang itself, quo xingbuyi bi zibii , literally “to do evil deeds frequently brings ruin to the evil doer”. China was waiting for the right moment to “deal” with India. But first, it needed precise and accurate intelligence from across the border. Findings by Nicholas Effimiades, an expert on China’s intelligence operations, reveals that the Chinese began sending agents into the NEFA and other areas two years before the military offensive. “The PLA gathered facts on India’s order of battle, terrain features, and military strategy through agents planted among road gangs, porters and muleteers working in border areas.” These agents, Effimiades states, “later guided PLA forces across the area during offensive operations. junior PLA commander – disguised as Tibetans – had reconnoitred their future area of operation.” ‘Two years before the military offensive” began in October 1962 means at least a year before the Forward Policy was conceived, which makes it hard to argue that India’s moves in the area provoked China to attack. Furthermore, the date, October 20, 1962, for the final assault after years of preparations was carefully chosen because it would coincide with the Cuban missile crisis, which the Chinese knew about beforehand through their contacts with the leaders of the Soviet Union. With Soviet missiles on Cuba, the Chinese were convinced that the USA would be too preoccupied to pay much attention to a war in the distant Himalayas. Excerpted with permission from China’s India War: Collision Course On The Roof Of The World , Bertil Linter, Oxford University Press. India China War. Respond to this article with a post. Share your perspective on this article with a post on ScrollStack, and send it to your followers. China a baggage left by Jawaharlal Nehru: BJP's Jitendra Singh, says 'still paying for 1962 Himalayan tragedy' Union Minister Jitendra Singh launched a scathing attack on the Congress and Rahul Gandhi saying that China is a baggage left by his great grandfather Jawaharlal Nehru. Key Highlights. 'In context of China, Congress started criticizing without realizing or conveniently forgetting that China is a baggage left by Rahul Gandhi’s great grandfather Jawaharlal Nehru' 'India still paying for the Himalayan tragedy of 1962' China has sent a large number of troops to the Line of Actual Control as reinforcement. New Delhi: Rattled by the criticism from the Congress over China’s incursion in eastern Ladakh, Union Minister Jitendra Singh took a swipe at the grand old party calling China a "baggage left by Rahul Gandhi’s great grandfather Jawaharlal Nehru." Nehru had walked through the streets of Delhi along with Zhou Enlai during his trip to India in 1960 with people around chanting 'Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai' and then whatever happened is history, said Singh adding that India was still paying for 1962 Indo-China Himalayan tragedy. 'Chou en Lai has lied to me so often that I do not feel like trusting him anymore' In 2007 a declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report termed Chinese diplomatic efforts a “five-year masterpiece of guile, executed and probably planned in large part by Chou en Lai.” It further said that Chou “played on Nehru’s Asian, anti-imperialist mental attitude, his proclivity to temporise and his sincere desire for an amicable Sino-Indian relationship.” The intelligence report further quotes Nehru as telling one of his sources that Chou en Lai has lied to him so often that he does not feel like trusting him anymore. Chinese do not regard us as their friends: Sardar Patel to Nehru in 1950. Brigadier JP Dalvi, an Indian Army officer during the Sino-Indian War of 1962, in his masterpiece ‘Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster’ writes: “1962 was a National Failure of which every Indian is guilty. It was a failure in the Higher Direction of War, a failure of the Opposition, a failure of the general staff (myself included); it was a failure Responsible Public Opinion and the Press. For the Government of India, it was a Himalayan Blunder at all levels.” In a letter addressed to Nehru in 1950, Sardar Patel had said, “even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends.” The tension between the nuclear-armed neighbours has been brewing over China’s stiff opposition to India laying a key road in the Finger area around the Pangong Tso (lake) apart from construction of another road connecting the Darbuk-Shayok-Daulat Beg Oldie road in Galwan Valley.