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The Intractable Sino-Indian Border Dispute: a Theoretical and Historical Account

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The Intractable Sino-Indian Border Dispute: a Theoretical and Historical Account The Intractable Sino-Indian Border Dispute: A Theoretical and Historical Account Stephen Westcott BA (Hons), MA (IR) This thesis is presented in candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Murdoch University, 2017 ~ i ~ Declaration I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution. ………………………………………………………….. Stephen Westcott ~ ii ~ Abstract The Sino-Indian border dispute remains one of the most significant points of tension between Asia’s two rising powers, generating numerous military standoffs and diplomatic incidents since the founding of the two countries. Yet, despite the importance of the Sino- Indian border dispute in the geopolitics of both states, there have been no theoretical examination to date as to why the Sino-Indian border dispute has become and remain intractable. The lack of a proper theory regarding the intractableness of the Sino-Indian border dispute is symptomatic of a wider dearth of serious theoretical studies investigating why and how interstate border disputes become and remain intractable. This dissertation, therefore, attempts to answer a research question that has not been properly addressed in the scholarly literature on interstate border disputes: “why has the Sino-Indian border dispute become and remained intractable and thereby difficult to resolve?” Utilising neoclassical realism as a guide, I propose and test one core hypothesis: China and India have maintained their irreconcilable positions towards the border dispute because any attempt at resolution, whether by making painful and unpopular concessions or by attempts to annex the territory by force, is against the interest of three sets of actors in both states. These three actors correspond with Kenneth Waltz’s three levels-of- analysis; that is the individual state leaders, the state’s governing institutions and the State as an actor operating in the international system. When these actors approach an interstate border dispute, there are three general policy strategies available: to escalate, to compromise or to maintain the status quo. For different reasons, actors from both China and India typically consider escalatory and compromise strategies too risky and reject them as options. Thus, maintaining the status quo becomes the default policy for both sides. Consequently, despite several rounds of border negotiations and numerous ~ iii ~ confrontations, the Sino-Indian border dispute remains intractable, a state of affairs that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. ~ iv ~ Table of Contents Declaration: ii Abstract iii List of Abbreviations: viii Acknowledgments: xi Chapter One: Introduction 1 The research puzzle 2 Research question and significance of this dissertation 7 Literature review 9 Previous studies into interstate border disputes 9 Previous studies on the Sino-Indian border dispute 14 Theoretical framework 18 Neoclassical realism and its insight 18 The levels-of-analysis explanation 23 Methodology: 42 Data collection: 44 Dissertation structure: 46 Chapter Two: The History of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute: From Imperial Frontier to the Special Representatives Meetings 50 Introduction 51 The origins of the border dispute 52 The western sector 52 The eastern sector 61 The emergence and entrenchment Sino-Indian border dispute: 74 1950-1961: From misunderstandings to intransigence 74 The 1962 Border War and its aftermath 82 Restoring bilateral relations and developments in the 1980s 90 Post-Cold War developments: 98 The pacification of the border 98 The return of tensions 102 Concluding remarks 106 Chapter Three: The First Level of Analysis: The Interests of the Chief Executive and the Sino-Indian Border Dispute 108 Introduction 109 Poliheuristic choice theory and intractable interstate border disputes 110 Chinese leaders and the Sino-Indian border dispute 117 Mao Zedong 119 ~ v ~ Deng Xiaoping 125 Jiang Zemin 127 Hu Jintao 129 Xi Jinping 132 Indian leaders and the Sino-Indian border dispute: 136 Jawaharlal Nehru 138 Indira Gandhi 145 Rajiv Gandhi 148 The minority governments: 1989-2014 150 Narendra Modi 155 Concluding remarks: 157 Chapter Four: The Second Level of Analysis: Interests of the Domestic Governing Institutions and the Sino-Indian Border Dispute 159 Introduction: 160 Governmental politics model of foreign policy formation and implementation:161 The governing institutions and their interests 163 The decision game 169 The action game 173 China’s governmental politics: 174 The Chinese policymaking process towards the Sino-Indian border dispute 177 The Chinese Communist Party and the Sino-Indian border dispute 189 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Sino-Indian border dispute 195 The People’s Liberation Army and the Sino-Indian border dispute 198 India’s governmental politics: 203 The Indian Policymaking Process towards the Sino-Indian border dispute 206 The Ministry of External Affairs and the Sino-Indian border dispute 218 The Indian Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence and the Sino-Indian border dispute 220 Concluding remarks: 225 Chapter Five: The Third Level of Analyss: The Interests of the State and the Sino- Indian Border Dispute 228 Introduction: 229 Systemic factors and intractable interstate border disputes: 230 The value of the territory 233 The geopolitical environment 235 Normative factors 240 China’s interests and the Sino-Indian border dispute 246 Territorial considerations 248 Geopolitical considerations 251 Normative considerations 257 India’s international situation and the Sino-Indian border dispute 261 ~ vi ~ Territorial considerations 262 Geopolitical considerations 265 Normative considerations 270 Concluding remarks: 275 Chapter 6: Conclusion 277 Summary: 278 Potential solutions and their flaws 282 Concluding remarks 286 Annexures 288 Annex A: A list of current interstate land border disputes. 289 Annex B, Maps of the Sino-Indian border dispute 306 Annex C: Major negotiations and treaties regarding the Sino-Indian border 314 Annex D: China’s current foreign policy elite relevant to the Sino-Indian border dispute policymaking 318 Annex E: India’s current foreign policy elite relevant to the Sino-Indian border dispute policymaking 321 Bibliography 324 ~ vii ~ List of Abbreviations BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party CCP: Chinese Communist Party CCS: Cabinet Committee on Security CMC: Central Military Commission CSC: Chiefs of Staff Committee CPD: Central Propaganda/Publicity Department DIA: Defence Intelligence Agency DPC: Defence Planning Committee FALSG: Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group FAO: Foreign Affairs Office of the PLA GSD: General Staff Department of the PLA IAF: Indian Armed Forces IB: Intelligence Bureau (India’s) ICJ: International Court of Justice IOSC: The Information Office of the State Council IMCO: International Military Cooperation Office of the PLA INC: Indian National Congress IOR: Indian Ocean Region ~ viii ~ ITBP: Indo-Tibetan Border Police JIC: Joint Intelligence Committee JSD: Joint Staff Department of the PLA JWG: Joint Working Group LAC: The Line of Actual Control LSG: Leading Small Groups MoD: Ministry of Defence (India’s) MEA: Ministry of External Affairs (India’s) MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China’s) MPS: Ministry of Public Security (China’s) MSS: Ministry of State Security (China’s) NAM: The Non-Aligned Movement NDA: National Democratic Alliance (the BJP’s coalition) NEFA: North-East Frontier Agency NITI: National Institution for Transforming India NSA: National Security Advisor (India’s) NSAB: The National Security Advisory Board NSCil: National Security Council (India’s) NSCom: National Security Commission (China’s) NSLSG: National Security Leading Small Group ~ ix ~ PAP: People’s Armed Police PLA: People’s Liberation Army PM: Prime Minister PMO: Prime Minister’s Office PSC: Politburo Standing Committee RAW: Research and Analysis Wing SCFAO: State Council’s Foreign Affairs Office SFF: Special Frontier Force SPC: Strategic Policy Group SRM: Special Representatives Meeting TAR: Tibet Autonomous Region UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UPA: United Progressive Alliance (the INC’s coalition) ~ x ~ Acknowledgments There have been many people who have assisted me both professionally and personally whilst writing my dissertation that deserve acknowledgement. First and foremost, thanks must go to my academic supervisors, Dr Rajat Ganguly and Professor Samuel Makinda, who agreed to take me on all those years ago and have since provided me with many hours of expert advice and guidance. I would like to thank Dr Yvonne Haigh for agreeing to be my PhD committee chair and helping with the administrative side of things. I would also like to thank Professor Bidyut Chakrabarty of Delhi University for facilitating my accommodation during my research trip to New Delhi, India, in 2015, and all those in Gwyer Hall, Delhi University, for making my stay so enjoyable. Special thanks must go to Professor Suba Chandran, Dr Teshu Singh, Ruhee Neog, Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy and all the crew at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies for giving me a base of operations to work from during my stay in Delhi. I wish to single out my fellow research intern at ICPS, Kalpana Jha, whose assistance, directions and company was of incalculable value to me during my stay in India. My thanks are also owed to Professor Mark Beeson, Dr Megan Paul, Dr Ian Cook and Dr Diane Stone for providing some constructive insights into
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