Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 2 (author’s prepublication version)
On 21 March 1960, white police in the town of Bureau, the signature of his employer Sharpeville, South Africa, opened fire on a each month, and other particulars … the large crowd of peaceful black protesters, reference book must be shown on killing perhaps a hundred of them and injuring demand to any policeman or any of the many more. This massacre dramatically publi- fifteen different classes of officials who cized the protesters’ cause internationally.1 require to see it. Failure to produce it on This case starkly illustrates how violent demand constitutes an offence.2 attacks on peaceful protesters can be counter- productive. I tell the Sharpeville story with Pass offences often led to fines or imprison- special attention to tactics that might increase ment, with a thousand people charged every or decrease the scale of backfire. In the day. For the black population, the pass laws conclusion, I note how these tactics relate to were a potent symbol of their oppression. The the five main methods of inhibiting or ex- rally in Sharpeville was a protest against these pressing outrage. laws. In 1960, whites ruled South Africa. In the Sharpeville was set up by the South African system called apartheid, blacks, who government as a model community, with row composed most of the population, could not upon row of housing for blacks who would vote and were given only the worst jobs at low travel to work in nearby cities. Residents of pay, so their standard of living was far below the nearby black town of Topville — seen by that of whites. Blacks had separate, inferior the government as too close to white suburbs education. Their movement was restricted: to — were encouraged to relocate to Sharpeville. travel, male blacks had to possess a “pass,” Filled with many recently arrived families analogous to an internal passport. By 1960, seeking a better life, Sharpeville did not have a pass documents were held in a “reference strong local economy or traditions. There were book” that contained about 35,000 residents, of whom some 20,000 were children. It was like a large anonymous the holder’s name, his tax receipt, his suburb, stable and without a militant repu- permit to be in an urban area and to seek tation. work there, permits from the Labour Nevertheless, Sharpeville residents were affected by the unrest sweeping the country. For many decades, white rule in South Africa 1. Philip Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity: had been met by resistance, including mass Sharpeville and its Massacre (New Haven, opposition to pass laws from the early decades CT: Yale University Press, 2001) is the of the twentieth century. The African National definitive treatment of the Sharpeville mas- Congress was the primary vehicle for black sacre. The account here, except for material opposition to apartheid. Through the 1950s, about the international reaction, is drawn the ANC was totally committed to nonvio- largely from this source. For the purposes of a backfire analysis, heavy reliance on Frankel’s book is not problematic because Frankel did 2. Ambrose Reeves, Shooting at Sharpeville: not structure his study using a backfire The Agony of South Africa (London: Victor framework. Gollancz, 1960), 51.
8 Justice Ignited lence. For example, in 1959 the ANC called seriously harmed over the weekend, the for a one-month boycott of potatoes, which clashes and shots made them apprehensive, were a suitable boycott target for both fearing an impending bloodbath.5 Of course, economic and symbolic reasons. Thousands of residents subject to police assaults might well blacks, jailed for pass law violations, were put have been even more apprehensive. But it is under the supervision of farmers and made to important to be aware of the state of mind of pick potatoes with their bare hands. Though the police in order to understand what was to potatoes were a diet staple, the boycott was come. taken up eagerly and continued for three On Monday morning, 21 March, only a few months before the ANC called it to a close.3 residents left Sharpeville to go to work. In the late 1950s, the ANC was increasingly Instead, most of the town’s population challenged by the Pan Africanist Congress gradually joined the rally outside the police (PAC), which took a more militant stance. In station. The crowd eventually numbered March 1960, the PAC organized protests 18,000 to 25,000, including many children. against the pass laws, with 21 March set as the The organizers of the rally had no well- date for rallies around the country. developed plan of action, nor any system for Being an anti-apartheid organizer was a crowd control. A few crowd members had risky business. The South African Police were weapons, mainly sticks and knobkerries, club- well in control, with paid informers providing like weapons made from saplings with roots information about activities of both the ANC on their ends. There was some antagonism and PAC. Through their informers, police toward the police, but at the same time there were aware major protests were being planned were elements of a carnival, “happy-go-lucky” around the country, but were misled about the atmosphere. There was no plan to attack the date. PAC activists discovered the police police station. The few weapons carried in the agents and fed them false information.4 crowd served to boost morale rather than to aid In terms of black protest, Sharpeville was an attack.6 quiescent compared to other areas. Neverthe- In the Sharpeville police station, facing the less, PAC activists were able to mobilize crowd, were some 400 police, half with support from a large proportion of the town firearms, plus Saracen tanks with machine population. Over the weekend prior to the guns. This was ample firepower to quell any rally, PAC activists went door to door telling disturbance. Nevertheless, the police perceived residents about the protest scheduled for a threat from the large crowd as it pressed Monday. During the nights that weekend, against a thin wire barrier in front of the there were numerous spontaneous demonstra- station. tions and clashes with police. Protesters The police were poorly informed and seri- chanted and came armed with sticks; the ously stressed. The white police lived outside police attacked with whips and batons. In one Sharpeville, had few personal links with the incident, numerous objects were thrown at residents and had no sense of what animated police, who attacked with batons. But the them. The police believed the crowd “lusted crowd did not retreat or disperse and the police for white blood,” seeing “cultural weapons” fired 42 rounds, killing at least two residents. such as knobkerries as tools for attack. This Someone in a nearby house fired two shots, was a serious misreading of the situation.7 missing police. The police, as well as being misinformed Despite the police’s greater arsenal and and stressed from the weekend’s events, were killing power, and the fact that no police were
3. Albert Luthuli, Let My People Go (London: 5. Ibid., 78–82, 86. Collins, 1962), 217–19. 6. Ibid., 100. 4. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 64. 7. Ibid., 100, 99. Sharpeville 9 not well commanded. Police leaders were who were injured, removed by family or unaware of the full weaponry held by the friends and who later died. It seems reasonable police. (There were both white and black to say perhaps a hundred died.9 Many more police present, but only white police had were injured. firearms.) Just as important as the number of deaths Poor organization and poor information on was the manner by which they occurred. Most both sides set the stage for disaster. On the of the victims were shot in the back as they police side, there was poor coordination of fled from the police. The firing continued long forces and a false belief that the crowd was enough for some police to reload their intent on attack. As hours went by and the weapons and continue. Some police used soft- protest continued, the tired and stressed police nosed bullets that cause horrific exit wounds. remained on duty. Meanwhile, most partici- These antipersonnel bullets, commonly called pants in the rally were treating the event much dumdums, had been banned by the 1899 more lightly. At one point, an aircraft buzzed Hague Declaration; any force that used them the crowd, for unknown reasons. Far from would look very bad in world opinion.10 being intimidated, crowd members treated this In 1960, South Africa was a respected as part of the festivities. member of the international community. It had At 1.30pm, a drunk in the crowd named a long established, well functioning system of Geelbooi produced a small caliber pistol. A representative government, though crucially friend tried to stop him and two shots were limited to whites. It had a prosperous economy fired into the air. At the same time, a key — again mainly benefiting whites — and was police official named Spengler stumbled. seen as a valuable trading partner. It had many Some in the crowd leaned forward. A consta- supporters internationally. At the same time, ble helped Spengler to his feet. A few pebbles there was considerable opposition to the were thrown from the crowd and one hit the apartheid system, most obviously among the constable. The constable heard “shot” or black South Africans but also among segments “short” and fired. Spengler deflected the of the white population (especially the constable’s shot, but it was too late: the English-speaking segment) and in many other constable’s shot triggered the police to fire countries. Among opponents, apartheid was 4000 rounds into the crowd, killing dozens of seen as a system of racist oppression. people and wounding many more. But only some perceived apartheid as There are many views about these events, abominable. It had a fairly bland exterior. with police claiming they were defending Apartheid was a system of oppression and against the threatening crowd and PAC exploitation but not one of brutal violence supporters believing the police intended mass conspicuous to outsiders. To be sure, the South killing. My account here follows the detailed African police and military were essential to historical reconstruction by Philip Frankel in implementation of government policies such his authoritative book on the Sharpeville as the pass laws, but they mostly appeared as massacre titled An Ordinary Atrocity. agents of an administrative, routine law- According to Frankel, the massacre was not enforcing process, not as outrageous jack- premeditated. It was a mistake but, once firing booted thugs. started, it continued, having unleashed deep- To many people worldwide, apartheid was seated anxieties among the police.8 abhorrent in itself as a system of racial oppres- The official figure for the number of people sion, irrespective of the legalities by which killed by the police was 69. Frankel notes that this is certainly too low, as there were 24 or so victims removed by the police, plus others 9. Ibid., 150–52. 10. Eric Prokosch, The Technology of Killing A Military and Political History of Antiper- 8. Ibid., 116–18. sonnel Weapons (London: Zed, 1995).
10 Justice Ignited this was achieved. But in 1960 this view was actions were taken before medical help was shared by only a minority of western govern- sought. If news of the shootings had been ments. Colonialism was alive and well. Some contained entirely or had only leaked out by countries had gained independence from their word of mouth in dribs and drabs, without an colonial rulers, such as India and Pakistan in authoritative account, this would have reduced 1947 and, in Africa, Ghana in 1957, but many the adverse consequences for the attackers. others remained colonies, including most of But the police efforts to control information black Africa. In Algeria, nationalists were were too little and too late. Not only were fighting a bloody war for independence from there numerous witnesses among Sharpeville France. In Vietnam, a liberation struggle was residents, but some journalists had come to under way against a regime propped up by the Sharpeville for the protest and took photo- U.S. military. Overshadowing the numerous graphs before, during, and after the massa- wars around the world was the cold war cre.12 This sort of photojournalism was much confrontation between the two superpowers, less common in 1960 than it is today: the Soviet Union and the United States, with nuclear arsenals poised to launch devastating It so happened that a reporter, using the strikes. In the late 1950s, a powerful peace resourcefulness which is the stock-in- movement had sprung into existence to oppose trade of the journalist’s profession, was atmospheric nuclear testing and the nuclear able to get — and to get away with — arms race. some photographs of the Sharpeville In this context, South Africa seemed a pillar affray. The chance availability of this of stability in Africa, where independence dramatic record may have persuaded movements were agitating for liberation from editors here and there to give the accom- colonial shackles. The shootings in Sharpeville panying news story a prominent place on threatened to undermine international support their front pages, and these pictures were for South Africa, by providing a stimulus for seen by millions.13 action by those already opposed to apartheid and by weakening the moral position of the Although the police could not contain news South African government’s traditional allies. about the massacre, their efforts at “informa- The shootings, because they were readily tion management” are revealing. Crowd interpreted as a brutal attack by white police members wanted to help the wounded but against the black population, certainly had the were kept away by police, to reduce people’s potential to be counterproductive for the South knowledge of what had happened, to prevent African government, for the South African new protests developing, and to reduce Police as an organizational entity, and for the adverse publicity.14 individual police involved. One goal of the police was to eliminate After the shooting, the immediate reaction information about the use of dumdums. They of the police was to protect themselves from removed the dead bodies of a couple of dozen repercussions from their actions. Some of victims of these bullets. Some had survived them threw stones into the police station in and been taken to hospital. Doctors reported order to give the impression that the threat that most of the wounds were mid-body and from the crowd was greater than it had been: from the rear. Police went to the hospital and the larger the threat, the more easily the shootings could be justified. The police immediately cordoned off the 12. Reeves’ book reproduces 30 photographs. town and took control of communication. Journalists were kept out of the area, being 13. Peter Calvocoressi, South Africa and told the situation was too dangerous.11 These World Opinion (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 2. 11. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 134–35. 14. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 140–41. Sharpeville 11 took away some of the wounded, especially according to Saul Moise, an unfortunate those with injuries indicating use of dumdums. who fell foul of the patrols, was beaten (This was justified on the grounds that these senseless for no apparent reason, thrown individuals were security threats.) The police into prison and then released three weeks conveniently “lost” evidence about use of later without charges.17 dumdums, “misplaced” evidence on the ammunition rounds issued, used and not used. Adding to the repression, armed groups of Later, at the inquiry into the events, no experts white citizens ran patrols in black areas. The on dumdums were called. All in all, cover-up police did not try to monitor these extra-legal of the use of dumdums was quite effective.15 initiatives. From the point of view of most of the The international reaction to the massacre world, the Sharpeville events involved was powerful and extensive. Peter Calvo- massive use of force against an unarmed and coressi, in his book South Africa and World nonthreatening crowd. The police’s heavy use Opinion, said that, “First emotions were of firearms was seen as totally unjustified. everywhere much the same — horror, indig- That some in the crowd had sticks and nation, disgust.”18 Governments condemned knobkerries, and that some of them threw the massacre. Anti-apartheid activists were stones, did little to challenge the perception galvanized, obtaining much more support than that the police had used massive lethal force previously. Supporters of the regime were put inappropriately. Albert Luthuli, leader of the on the defensive. For example: ANC, commented that In Norway flags were flown at half-mast The guns of Sharpeville echoed across on public buildings on the day of the the world, and nowhere except among funeral of the Sharpeville victims. … the totalitarians was there any doubt about Brazilian government banned a football the true nature of what had occurred. match in Rio de Janeiro against a South The Government had placed beyond African team; it also recalled its ambas- question the implacable, wanton brutal- sador from Pretoria. At a conference in ity of their régime.16 New Zealand the Prime Minister, Mr. Walter Nash, asked his audience to stand From the police point of view, though, the in silent memory of the dead and the real threat came from the black population, Indian House of Representatives also especially from the organizers of the rally. paid this tribute …19 This perception persisted after the shootings. Police went through Sharpeville making many By comparison, the reaction inside South arrests, including the supposed leaders of the Africa was muted. In the face of a government “disturbances” as well as many others. The clampdown on activists and all dissent, the police beat many of those arrested as well as black population was demoralized rather than others who were not arrested. According to Frankel,
In the initial hours after the massacre most of the police simply combed the 17. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 156–57. streets and vented their anger on often Frankel’s original quotation includes the hapless people who were treated ‘as if bracketed clarifier “[the SAP]” which I have they [the police] were the victims,’ changed to “[the police].” 18. Calvocoressi, South Africa and World 15. Ibid., 147–48, 154–56. Opinion, 34. 16. Luthuli, Let My People Go, 222. 19. Ibid., 3–4.
12 Justice Ignited energized by the events. Within Sharpeville killings did not generate widespread abhor- itself, apathy was more typical than outrage.20 rence. The victims were perceived as The difference between international out- unworthy. Consequently, South African whites rage and the subdued response within South “were staggered by the unanimity of the Africa can be explained by several factors. world’s reaction to Sharpeville,” reacting with Black South Africans were already aware of “dazed incomprehension or truculent self- the iron fist of the apartheid state, through day- justification.”21 to-day encounters with violence and humilia- In contrast, in many foreign countries white tion. For many, the massacre only confirmed racism was neither so virulent nor so wide- what they already knew and so did not cause spread. To be sure, white racism was potent an explosion of resentment and further action. internationally, but it had to confront an Some critics of apartheid saw the massacre increasingly powerful worldwide movement as an expression of the true nature of the South for racial equality, which was supported by African state and immediately assumed the ringing endorsements from the United Nations Sharpeville events had been consciously and other bodies. The extermination policies orchestrated by the police as an exercise of of Nazi Germany had discredited white racism premeditated killing for the purposes of in the eyes of many, making it much harder to intimidation and brutality. Frankel, whose overtly endorse racist policies, though much views I have followed here, rejects both this overt and de facto racism persisted. Speaking interpretation and the opposite one, promoted generally, many more people outside South by the police and government, that put the Africa saw the Sharpeville victims as equal blame on the demonstrators. members of the human community, in other Unlike South African blacks, few interna- words as victims worthy of respect and tional observers were aware of the day-to-day empathy. brutality of apartheid, given the carefully A third factor affecting the South African managed image of legality and order conveyed and foreign responses was the potential for by the South African government and the intimidation. Within South Africa, police ar- willingness of foreign governments and corpo- rested activists as the government strengthened rations to ignore evidence that might disturb its capacity for repression, declaring a state of their political and trading relationships with emergency. This seems to have discouraged a South Africa. The Sharpeville killings broke larger mobilization of resistance. Had the through this conventional image, nurtured by ANC and PAC and other opponents of ignorance and convenience, with a picture of apartheid been better organized, the massacre unmistakable and unconscionable violence. might have triggered an expansion of resis- “Sharpeville,” a word which became synony- tance, but, as noted, demoralization was more mous with the massacre, served as an icon of common. Outside the country, on the other everything wrong with apartheid. hand, the South African police and state had A second factor distinguishing South virtually no capacity for threatening or re- African and foreign responses to the massacre pressing dissent. The risks of opposing was racism. Within white South Africa, blacks apartheid were far less, making possible a were commonly considered inherently inferior. rapid and very public expansion of opposition. Apartheid was a system of institutionalized Peer pressure also played a role. Among oppression — with political, economic, legal, white South Africans, open support for black social, and psychological dimensions — that equality was not easy. L. F. Beyers Naudé, a both reflected and enhanced perceptions of South African minister and supporter of white white racial superiority and justified privilege. The black population was so devalued that the 21. Colin Legum and Margaret Legum, South Africa: Crisis for the West (London: Pall Mall 20. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 160–61. Press, 1964), 75. Sharpeville 13 supremacy, began to reconsider his views after responses as a natural, if over-reactive, the Sharpeville killings. In 1963 he resigned case of self defence could connect very from the ministry “to become a director of a positively with the prevailing persecu- multi-racial Christian Institute.” As a result of tion mentality among white South this challenge to apartheid, he and his family Africans in the aftermath of the massacre suffered “the fate of every dissenter of — including many who would not, other prominence in the Church: social ostracism, than in these exceptional circumstances, reinforced by public attack.”22 Ambrose lend their support to the Nationalist Reeves, Bishop of Johannesburg, who wrote a government … Ultimately, a sympa- powerful book about the massacre, was thetic commission — indeed any com- deported from the country. mission — was essential to smoothing In summary, there were three factors that the panic and fears of a vast array of helped the massacre trigger a much larger international interests with stakes in a reaction outside South Africa than inside: less post-Sharpeville South Africa.23 familiarity outside the country with the brutality of apartheid; a lower level of institu- The Wessels Commission did pretty much as tionalized racism; and less vulnerability to the government had hoped: it whitewashed the reprisals from the South African state. massacre. It did not go into the details of Immediately after the massacre, the South police’s shooting or use of ammunition; the African government decided to hold an inquiry issue of dumdums was hardly pursued. into the events. Internally, the government Potential black witnesses to the commission wanted to show the white population it was in came under strong pressures. Because of control of the situation. Externally, it wanted police intimidation, few of them were willing to demonstrate that South Africa was not an to testify, for fear of reprisals. They also came authoritarian state, to prevent damage to the under pressure from the PAC to follow a country’s reputation in diplomatic and trading “party line” that blamed the police for circles. So the Wessels Commission was set premeditated murder and did not acknowledge up. the role of fear and poor leadership among the In setting up this commission, there was a police. Finally, police simply lied to the dilemma for the government. If the commis- commission, having no fear of any punish- sion was too independent, it might come up ment. Police also destroyed, hid, and fabri- with strong conclusions damning the police cated evidence. and government, thus adding to the bad According to Frankel, the government publicity from the massacre. On the other wanted the commission to move quickly, both hand, if the commission was too subservient to to reassure the international community about the government — if, for example, it the government’s concern and to catch the completely exonerated the police and put all victims while they were still in a state of shock the blame on the protesters — then it would and therefore less able to testify effectively. have reduced its own credibility and done The commission seems to have lived up to nothing to placate international opinion. most of the government’s expectations, at least According to Frankel, the government’s in relation to its marginalization of the preference for the commission was towards the victims’ voices. Concerning the commission’s subservient end of the spectrum: report, Frankel comments that:
A pliant (or partially pliant) commission its overall findings, read four decades which confirmed the vicious intent of the later, are so densely unintelligible, so Sharpeville mob and presented police ridden with double-talk, qualifications,
22. Ibid., 31. 23. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 188.
14 Justice Ignited
and refutable logic as to defy both legal Finally, intimidation transforms both the reasoning and ordinary comprehension.24 willingness of participants to contribute to a struggle over meaning, as well as intervening The commission’s report was both obscure on one side in the struggle. and relatively favorable to the police. My account here mentions only a small part Sometimes it seems events are so obvious of the copious detail provided in Frankel’s that they “speak for themselves.” The Sharpe- book An Ordinary Atrocity. I’ve given special ville massacre became such a symbol of the attention to material relevant to backfire. One brutal reality of apartheid that it is easy to thing is clear: the massacre did indeed backfire assume its meaning was transparent to all but on the South African government in the the most prejudiced of observers. Yet a closer international arena, energizing apartheid’s look reveals complexities. What “actually opponents and putting its supporters on the happened” was quickly obscured by the back foot. Had the government and the police divergent agendas of black activists and the anticipated events in Sharpeville, there is little police, each of whom adopted simplistic, self- doubt they would have done everything serving accounts. It is fair to say there was a possible to avoid the unprovoked and uncon- struggle over the interpretation of events. Of trolled shooting at an unarmed crowd that course, more nuanced treatments such as appeared unconscionable to most neutral Frankel’s are not faultless; history is always observers, and turned “Sharpeville” into a open to rewriting on the basis of new evidence symbol of the brutality of apartheid. and ways of thinking. But in the aftermath of the massacre, the struggle over interpretation Conclusion was a matter of dire urgency for both support- ers and opponents of apartheid, with carica- The Sharpeville massacre was a disaster for tures serving as tools in a struggle for the South African government, particularly allegiance. because it damaged its international reputation. But the struggle was more than a matter of The shooting of protesters, though intimidat- interpretation of an event. Also involved were ing to them, had the wider long-term effect of cover-ups and attempted cover-ups. A totally weakening the position of the white police and effective cover-up makes an event invisible to government in ruling a majority black popula- outsiders and makes interpretation irrelevant to tion. So it is reasonable to say the shooting them (though still relevant to those in the backfired: it was worse for the government know); a partially effective cover-up, such as than if it had not happened. concerning the use of dumdums, slants the The police and government took a range of basis for making interpretations. Devaluation steps to reduce outrage from the shooting. of the victims profoundly affects the meaning These can be readily classified into the five of the events. Similarly, an official investiga- categories presented in chapter 1, as follows. tion such as the Wessels Commission trans- Cover-up. South African police cordoned forms meanings by giving the stamp of Sharpeville and tried to control communica- approval to a particular interpretation.25 tion out of the town. This effort largely failed, with information and photographs about the massacre made available to the world. 24. Ibid., 192. The police removed evidence of the use of dumdum bullets. Dead bodies with evidence of 25. Austin T. Turk, Political Criminality: The dumdums were removed from the protest site, Defiance and Defense of Authority (Beverly surviving victims of dumdums were taken Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 146, says “The Republic of South Africa may well have the world’s most elaborate legal structure for the repression of political resistance of all kinds.” Wessels Commission. I thank Jeff Ross for This is compatible with the role played by the this reference. Sharpeville 15 from the hospital, and evidence of the issue beating and arresting residents. The govern- and firing of dumdum rounds was removed or ment soon declared a state of emergency, destroyed. This cover-up was fairly successful: giving legal backing for the increased repres- the issue of dumdums did not play a signifi- sion that was already occurring. Arrests and cant role in the outrage over the massacre. threats also reduced the ability and willingness Devaluation. South African blacks were to report on the use of dumdums. However, devalued in the eyes of most South African intimidation had little effect on international whites due to overt and institutionalized opinion. racism. International observers, though, were Intimidation was effective in limiting testi- much less likely to have such a low opinion of mony to the Wessels Commission, helping South African blacks. Indeed, the fact that the turn its report into a whitewash. Likewise, massacre was carried out by white police cover-up reduced the commission’s access to against black protesters made it a potent information. symbol of racist brutality. White South African racism thus muted outrage within the Although the police and government used all country, whereas international anti-racism five methods of inhibiting outrage, in the end magnified it. they were mostly unsuccessful: the massacre Reinterpretation. The police perceived the turned out to be counterproductive for them. Sharpeville crowd as physically menacing and Shooting protesters in cold blood was widely the product of a deeper anti-white threat. Thus perceived as a gross injustice; once informa- it was easy for the authorities to endorse the tion and images about the shooting were view that the primary responsibility for the communicated internationally, the efforts of events was held by the crowd and its organiz- the government to blame the protesters and ers, dubbed “agitators.” give a semblance of justice through the The Sharpeville protest was part of the Wessels Commission were too little and too wider mobilization organized by PAC activ- late to undo the damage. ists. Again, this was perceived as a serious threat to law-abiding citizens. However, this Acknowledgements picture of the crowd as the aggressor and the I thank Truda Gray, Philip Kitley, Jeff Ross, police as victims who inadvertently used too Greg Scott, and Tom Weber for valuable much firepower did not sell well in other comments on drafts of this chapter. countries. On the other hand, PAC activists and other black sympathizers portrayed the Sharpeville events as premeditated murder. This interpretation resonated with those inclined to believe the worst about apartheid. Official channels. After the massacre, the government quickly established the Wessels Commission to serve as a symbol of the government’s commitment to justice, due process, and the search for truth. In order to reduce outrage without disturbing the status quo, the commission had to be seen to be fair and independent yet in reality produce a whitewash. This seems to be pretty much what happened, though it is unclear how much effect the commission had on opinion inside and outside the country. Intimidation. Immediately after the massa- cre, the police went through Sharpeville