Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 2 (author’s prepublication version) 2 Sharpeville On 21 March 1960, white police in the town of Bureau, the signature of his employer Sharpeville, South Africa, opened fire on a each month, and other particulars … the large crowd of peaceful black protesters, reference book must be shown on killing perhaps a hundred of them and injuring demand to any policeman or any of the many more. This massacre dramatically publi- fifteen different classes of officials who cized the protesters’ cause internationally.1 require to see it. Failure to produce it on This case starkly illustrates how violent demand constitutes an offence.2 attacks on peaceful protesters can be counter- productive. I tell the Sharpeville story with Pass offences often led to fines or imprison- special attention to tactics that might increase ment, with a thousand people charged every or decrease the scale of backfire. In the day. For the black population, the pass laws conclusion, I note how these tactics relate to were a potent symbol of their oppression. The the five main methods of inhibiting or ex- rally in Sharpeville was a protest against these pressing outrage. laws. In 1960, whites ruled South Africa. In the Sharpeville was set up by the South African system called apartheid, blacks, who government as a model community, with row composed most of the population, could not upon row of housing for blacks who would vote and were given only the worst jobs at low travel to work in nearby cities. Residents of pay, so their standard of living was far below the nearby black town of Topville — seen by that of whites. Blacks had separate, inferior the government as too close to white suburbs education. Their movement was restricted: to — were encouraged to relocate to Sharpeville. travel, male blacks had to possess a “pass,” Filled with many recently arrived families analogous to an internal passport. By 1960, seeking a better life, Sharpeville did not have a pass documents were held in a “reference strong local economy or traditions. There were book” that contained about 35,000 residents, of whom some 20,000 were children. It was like a large anonymous the holder’s name, his tax receipt, his suburb, stable and without a militant repu- permit to be in an urban area and to seek tation. work there, permits from the Labour Nevertheless, Sharpeville residents were affected by the unrest sweeping the country. For many decades, white rule in South Africa 1. Philip Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity: had been met by resistance, including mass Sharpeville and its Massacre (New Haven, opposition to pass laws from the early decades CT: Yale University Press, 2001) is the of the twentieth century. The African National definitive treatment of the Sharpeville mas- Congress was the primary vehicle for black sacre. The account here, except for material opposition to apartheid. Through the 1950s, about the international reaction, is drawn the ANC was totally committed to nonvio- largely from this source. For the purposes of a backfire analysis, heavy reliance on Frankel’s book is not problematic because Frankel did 2. Ambrose Reeves, Shooting at Sharpeville: not structure his study using a backfire The Agony of South Africa (London: Victor framework. Gollancz, 1960), 51. 8 Justice Ignited lence. For example, in 1959 the ANC called seriously harmed over the weekend, the for a one-month boycott of potatoes, which clashes and shots made them apprehensive, were a suitable boycott target for both fearing an impending bloodbath.5 Of course, economic and symbolic reasons. Thousands of residents subject to police assaults might well blacks, jailed for pass law violations, were put have been even more apprehensive. But it is under the supervision of farmers and made to important to be aware of the state of mind of pick potatoes with their bare hands. Though the police in order to understand what was to potatoes were a diet staple, the boycott was come. taken up eagerly and continued for three On Monday morning, 21 March, only a few months before the ANC called it to a close.3 residents left Sharpeville to go to work. In the late 1950s, the ANC was increasingly Instead, most of the town’s population challenged by the Pan Africanist Congress gradually joined the rally outside the police (PAC), which took a more militant stance. In station. The crowd eventually numbered March 1960, the PAC organized protests 18,000 to 25,000, including many children. against the pass laws, with 21 March set as the The organizers of the rally had no well- date for rallies around the country. developed plan of action, nor any system for Being an anti-apartheid organizer was a crowd control. A few crowd members had risky business. The South African Police were weapons, mainly sticks and knobkerries, club- well in control, with paid informers providing like weapons made from saplings with roots information about activities of both the ANC on their ends. There was some antagonism and PAC. Through their informers, police toward the police, but at the same time there were aware major protests were being planned were elements of a carnival, “happy-go-lucky” around the country, but were misled about the atmosphere. There was no plan to attack the date. PAC activists discovered the police police station. The few weapons carried in the agents and fed them false information.4 crowd served to boost morale rather than to aid In terms of black protest, Sharpeville was an attack.6 quiescent compared to other areas. Neverthe- In the Sharpeville police station, facing the less, PAC activists were able to mobilize crowd, were some 400 police, half with support from a large proportion of the town firearms, plus Saracen tanks with machine population. Over the weekend prior to the guns. This was ample firepower to quell any rally, PAC activists went door to door telling disturbance. Nevertheless, the police perceived residents about the protest scheduled for a threat from the large crowd as it pressed Monday. During the nights that weekend, against a thin wire barrier in front of the there were numerous spontaneous demonstra- station. tions and clashes with police. Protesters The police were poorly informed and seri- chanted and came armed with sticks; the ously stressed. The white police lived outside police attacked with whips and batons. In one Sharpeville, had few personal links with the incident, numerous objects were thrown at residents and had no sense of what animated police, who attacked with batons. But the them. The police believed the crowd “lusted crowd did not retreat or disperse and the police for white blood,” seeing “cultural weapons” fired 42 rounds, killing at least two residents. such as knobkerries as tools for attack. This Someone in a nearby house fired two shots, was a serious misreading of the situation.7 missing police. The police, as well as being misinformed Despite the police’s greater arsenal and and stressed from the weekend’s events, were killing power, and the fact that no police were 3. Albert Luthuli, Let My People Go (London: 5. Ibid., 78–82, 86. Collins, 1962), 217–19. 6. Ibid., 100. 4. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 64. 7. Ibid., 100, 99. Sharpeville 9 not well commanded. Police leaders were who were injured, removed by family or unaware of the full weaponry held by the friends and who later died. It seems reasonable police. (There were both white and black to say perhaps a hundred died.9 Many more police present, but only white police had were injured. firearms.) Just as important as the number of deaths Poor organization and poor information on was the manner by which they occurred. Most both sides set the stage for disaster. On the of the victims were shot in the back as they police side, there was poor coordination of fled from the police. The firing continued long forces and a false belief that the crowd was enough for some police to reload their intent on attack. As hours went by and the weapons and continue. Some police used soft- protest continued, the tired and stressed police nosed bullets that cause horrific exit wounds. remained on duty. Meanwhile, most partici- These antipersonnel bullets, commonly called pants in the rally were treating the event much dumdums, had been banned by the 1899 more lightly. At one point, an aircraft buzzed Hague Declaration; any force that used them the crowd, for unknown reasons. Far from would look very bad in world opinion.10 being intimidated, crowd members treated this In 1960, South Africa was a respected as part of the festivities. member of the international community. It had At 1.30pm, a drunk in the crowd named a long established, well functioning system of Geelbooi produced a small caliber pistol. A representative government, though crucially friend tried to stop him and two shots were limited to whites. It had a prosperous economy fired into the air. At the same time, a key — again mainly benefiting whites — and was police official named Spengler stumbled. seen as a valuable trading partner. It had many Some in the crowd leaned forward. A consta- supporters internationally. At the same time, ble helped Spengler to his feet. A few pebbles there was considerable opposition to the were thrown from the crowd and one hit the apartheid system, most obviously among the constable. The constable heard “shot” or black South Africans but also among segments “short” and fired. Spengler deflected the of the white population (especially the constable’s shot, but it was too late: the English-speaking segment) and in many other constable’s shot triggered the police to fire countries.