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Enabling Or Evading? Germany in the Middle East

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Enabling Or Evading? Germany in the Middle East >> Policy Brief ISSN: 1989-2667 Nº 191 - jaNuary 2015 Enabling or evading? Germany in the Middle East Kristina Kausch Something is shifting in German foreign policy. Berlin’s tradi- tional reluctance to engage in military action abroad has marked >> highlights it as a security free-rider as far as its European and transatlantic allies are concerned. Since reunification, Germany’s foreign policy has fo- • Germany’s influence in the cused largely on securing commercial interests to support the coun- Middle East and North Africa try’s export-oriented economy, with the result that Germany has been is limited, and nowhere in the coined a ‘geo-economic’ international actor. More recently, however, a region is its role potentially number of events have intensified debates on the maturity of German game-changing. foreign policy. During the Eurozone crisis, Germans came to realise that their European Union (EU) partners actively wanted the country • But Berlin’s role in shaping to assume a leadership role. The speech by President Joachim Gauck EU positions, its close alliance at the Munich Security Conference in January 2014 both expressed with Israel, its good relations and framed a new narrative for German foreign policy. More recently, with Iran, and its growing as the unravelling of the Middle Eastern status quo advances at great partnership with the speed, it is time for a more purposeful role for the EU’s strongest GCC bestow it with some member in dealing with developments in the Middle East and North geo-political influence. Africa (MENA). • As the unravelling of the Middle Eastern status quo The deep-seated rejection of military deployments abroad by the advances at great speed, a German electorate has made successive governments in Berlin more purposeful role of the reluctant to increase Germany’s role as an international security actor EU’s strongest member is due. – beyond technical and humanitarian missions. Since the Bundeswehr’s first troop deployments abroad in Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan Enabling or Evading? Germany in the middle east 2 >>>>>> (since 2001), the 2003 US-led intervention in apart from some oil from Libya and Algeria, but Iraq pushed German public opinion firmly back practically no gas. Until the fall of the Gaddafi towards anti-militarism. Chancellor Merkel regime, Libya was Germany’s main oil supplier in has stressed that rather than being a front row the Arab world. The deteriorating security situa- military power, Germany should focus on tion in Libya, however, will likely require Germa- ‘enabling’ friendly governments to contribute ny to seek other suppliers. to the peaceful resolution of conflicts (a posture for which Der Spiegel in 2012 controversially In light of periodical crises with Russia and, most coined the term ‘Merkel Doctrine’). Critics have recently, the 2014 crisis over Ukraine, the need qualified such position as a populist tactic to to reduce Germany’s dependency on Russian gas play to German export interests and avoid direct imports has been exposed. Without alternative military action abroad. pipelines in place, however, options to substitute Russian gas with that from the Middle East are Looking eastward rather than southward, limited. Germany has no liquefied natural gas Germany’s engagement and profile in the (LNG) import terminals to receive LNG from MENA region has been limited. In addition to the Persian Gulf. To reduce dependency on Rus- its commercial interests and desire to contain sia, Germany aims to buy more in the EU (e.g. migration, broader regional security concerns are Norway). Over the long run, Germany’s Energie- the main driver of Germany’s partnerships and wende (energy transition) policy aims to reduce approach in the region. fossil fuel use and cover half of its electricity con- sumption with renewables by 2030. BERLIN’S ECONOMIC STAKES The volume of German trade with Arab states has more than doubled since 2002, reaching The impact of developments in the Middle East €50 billion in 2013. Berlin maintains the closest on global commodity prices is a concern for Ger- commercial ties with the countries of the Gulf many, which imports 97 per cent of its oil and 86 Cooperation Council (GCC): in 2012, German per cent of its gas. Unlike many other EU mem- exports to Saudi Arabia (mainly hydro-chemical ber states, however, Germany does not source products and petrochemicals) and Saudi exports much energy from the Middle East (see Figure 1), to Germany increased over 71 per cent and 28 Figure 1 Main energy suppliers to Germany (2012, percentage of total imports) Source: International Energy Agency, Country Profile Germany 23% 37% 13% 36% Russia Russia UK Netherlands Norway Norway 7% Crude oil Libya Natural gas Other Nigeria Other 25% 12% 9% 10% 14% 26% policy brief - nº 191 - january 2015 3 per cent, respectively. German foreign direct in- height of the economic crisis. Dwindling Euro- vestment (FDI) in Arab countries, by contrast, pean defence budgets and fiercer competition in remains limited. According to the United Na- the arms market with Russian and Chinese com- tions Conference on Trade and Development petitors have led German commercial exports (UNCTAD), German FDI stock in North Afri- to non-allies (so-called Third States) to increase ca, after having tripled in a decade (from $1.07 massively from €180 million in 2009 to €843 billion in 2001 to $3.5 billion in 2011), dropped million in 2011, accounting for 62 per cent of by half following the 2011 uprisings to $1.7 bil- German arms exports in 2013. Periodical public lion in 2012. Over the same decade, German outcries about German arms sales to authoritari- FDI stock in West Asia (largely equalling the an Gulf monarchies in recent years have intensi- Middle East and Turkey) increased eightfold fied debates over the need for tighter regulation (from $1.8 billion in 2011 to $14.6 billion in of German arms exports. 2011). The most important destination for Ger- man FDI among Arab countries are the United In 2009-13, SIPRI reports that 17 per cent of Ger- Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Libya and Saudi man arms exports went to the Middle East. After Arabia, although none of these gets close to Tur- decades of intensive bilateral security cooperation, key, which alone holds more German FDI stock Israel remains Germany’s top long-term arms client than all Arab countries taken together. in the region (in 2009-13 it received 8 per cent of total German arms exports). In recent years, how- Germany’s politically most significant export ever, export licenses have skyrocketed to Gulf mon- to the MENA is weaponry and military equip- archies UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as ment. The political relevance of German arms Algeria. In 2012, Germany cleared new arms sales sales stems less from their (comparatively mod- worth €1.2 billion to Saudi Arabia alone (see Figure erate) volumes than from the nature and timing 2), ranking Ryiadh as Germany’s top global arms of exports to unambiguously repressive regimes. client that year. Sales of controversial small fire- Germany is the third-biggest arms seller world- arms increased by 50 per cent in the period 2009- wide, accounting for 7 per cent of global exports, 13, and many of these went to Saudi Arabia and according to the Stockholm International Peace other MENA countries. German-made tank pieces Research Institute (SIPRI). The Merkel govern- and crowd control equipment such as teargas were ment loosened restrictions on arms exports at the cleared for delivery to regimes known for domestic Figure 2 New export licences for ‘weapons of war’,* main MENA destinations (in million EUR, rounded) Source: Source: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi): Rüstungsexportberichte 2010-13. * A list of weapons qualified as ‘weapons of war’ is annexed to the BMWi’s annual report on arms exports (Rüstungsexportbericht). 1500 2010 2011 1237 2012 1200 2013 900 826 673 600 361 357 278 263 266 300 217 244 152 139 125 129 113 54 49 N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 1 0.5 >>>>>> Saudi Arabia Algeria UAE Qatar Iraq Israel Enabling or Evading? Germany in the middle east 4 >>>>>> repression. In 2013, Germany cleared the sale of 62 Figure 3 Leopard tanks to Qatar, marking the first time the German bi- and multilateral net ODA, German government allowed the sale of tanks to main MENA recipients (in million EUR, rounded) an Arab state. German arms exports to the region Source: German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development reflect both a political rationale (strengthening the position of regional partners) and an economic one 1300 Iraq (the Gulf defence market being one of the most lu- crative in the world). Demands to strengthen arms Palestinien Territories export restrictions along ethical criteria have met Egypt with strong opposition from the German arms in- Morocco dustry, and impatience from potential Gulf clients. Yemen 300 Tunisia With the exception of Germany’s military assistance to Israel (which is considered to be a contribution Jordan to Israeli self-defense), German direct arms delivery 250 Syria to strengthen one side of an ongoing conflict is a novelty. The August 2014 decision to deliver arms to Kurdish fighters to counter the Islamic State (IS) 200 in Iraq was adopted by the government and cleared by the Bundestag against the will of the German public, 63 per cent of whom opposed this move 150 (according to an August 2014 Forsa poll). In the area of development cooperation, the MENA 100 region ranks low among Germany’s geographic priorities. The region’s share of Germany’s total 50 bilateral net Official Development Assistance (ODA) fell from 34 per cent in 2007 to 9 per cent in 2012.
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