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>> Policy Brief ISSN: 1989-2667

Nº 191 - 2015

Enabling or evading? Germany in the Middle East

Kristina Kausch

Something is shifting in German foreign policy. ’s tradi- tional reluctance to engage in abroad has marked >> highlights it as a security free- as far as its European and transatlantic allies are concerned. Since reunification, Germany’s foreign policy has fo- • Germany’s influence in the cused largely on securing commercial interests to support the coun- Middle East and North try’s export-oriented economy, with the result that Germany has been is limited, and nowhere in the coined a ‘geo-economic’ international actor. More recently, however, a is its role potentially number of events have intensified debates on the maturity of German game-changing. foreign policy. During the crisis, came to realise that their (EU) partners actively wanted the country • But Berlin’s role in shaping to assume a leadership role. The speech by President Joachim Gauck EU positions, its close at the Security Conference in January 2014 both expressed with , its good relations and framed a new narrative for German foreign policy. More recently, with Iran, and its growing as the unravelling of the Middle Eastern status quo advances at great partnership with the speed, it is time for a more purposeful role for the EU’s strongest GCC bestow it with some member in dealing with developments in the Middle East and North geo-political influence. Africa (MENA). • As the unravelling of the Middle Eastern status quo The deep-seated rejection of military deployments abroad by the advances at great speed, a German electorate has made successive governments in Berlin more purposeful role of the reluctant to increase Germany’s role as an international security actor EU’s strongest member is due. – beyond technical and humanitarian missions. Since the ’s first troop deployments abroad in (1999) and Enabling or evading? Germany in the Middle East

2 >>>>>> (since 2001), the 2003 US-led intervention in apart from some oil from Libya and , but pushed German public opinion firmly back practically no gas. Until the fall of the Gaddafi towards anti-. Chancellor Merkel regime, Libya was Germany’s oil supplier in has stressed that rather than being a front row the Arab . The deteriorating security situa- military power, Germany should focus on tion in Libya, however, will likely require Germa- ‘enabling’ friendly governments to contribute ny to seek other suppliers. to the peaceful resolution of conflicts (a posture for which in 2012 controversially In light of periodical crises with and, most coined the term ‘Merkel Doctrine’). Critics have recently, the 2014 crisis over , the need qualified such position as a populist tactic to to reduce Germany’s dependency on Russian gas to German export interests and avoid direct imports has been exposed. Without alternative military action abroad. pipelines in place, however, options to substitute Russian gas with that from the Middle East are Looking eastward rather than southward, limited. Germany has no liquefied natural gas Germany’s engagement and profile in the (LNG) import terminals to receive LNG from MENA region has been limited. In addition to the Persian Gulf. To reduce dependency on Rus- its commercial interests and desire to contain sia, Germany aims to buy more in the EU (e.g. migration, broader regional security concerns are ). Over the long run, Germany’s Energie- the main driver of Germany’s partnerships and wende (energy transition) policy aims to reduce approach in the region. fossil fuel use and cover half of its electricity con- sumption with renewables by 2030.

Berlin’s economic stakes The volume of German trade with Arab states has more than doubled since 2002, reaching The impact of developments in the Middle East €50 billion in 2013. Berlin maintains the closest on global commodity prices is a concern for Ger- commercial ties with the countries of the Gulf many, which imports 97 per cent of its oil and 86 Cooperation Council (GCC): in 2012, German per cent of its gas. Unlike many other EU mem- exports to (mainly hydro-chemical ber states, however, Germany does not source products and petrochemicals) and Saudi exports much energy from the Middle East (see Figure 1), to Germany increased over 71 per cent and 28

Figure 1 Main energy suppliers to Germany (2012, percentage of total imports) Source: International Energy Agency, Country Profile Germany

23% 37% 13% 36%

Russia Russia UK Norway Norway 7% Crude oil Libya Natural gas Other Nigeria Other 25% 12% 9%

10% 14% 26% policy brief - nº 191 - january 2015

3 per cent, respectively. German foreign direct in- height of the economic crisis. Dwindling - vestment (FDI) in Arab countries, by contrast, pean defence budgets and fiercer competition in remains limited. According to the United Na- the arms market with Russian and Chinese com- tions Conference on Trade and Development petitors have led German commercial exports (UNCTAD), German FDI stock in North Afri- to non-allies (so-called Third States) to increase ca, after having tripled in a decade (from $1.07 massively from €180 million in 2009 to €843 billion in 2001 to $3.5 billion in 2011), dropped million in 2011, accounting for 62 per cent of by half following the 2011 uprisings to $1.7 bil- German arms exports in 2013. Periodical public lion in 2012. Over the same decade, German outcries about German arms sales to authoritari- FDI stock in Asia (largely equalling the an Gulf monarchies in recent years have intensi- Middle East and ) increased eightfold fied debates over the need for tighter regulation (from $1.8 billion in 2011 to $14.6 billion in of German arms exports. 2011). The most important destination for Ger- man FDI among Arab countries are the United In 2009-13, SIPRI reports that 17 per cent of Ger- Arab Emirates (UAE), , Libya and Saudi man arms exports went to the Middle East. After Arabia, although none of these gets close to Tur- decades of intensive bilateral security cooperation, key, which alone holds more German FDI stock Israel remains Germany’s top long-term arms client than all Arab countries taken together. in the region (in 2009-13 it received 8 per cent of total German arms exports). In recent years, how- Germany’s politically most significant export ever, export licenses have skyrocketed to Gulf mon- to the MENA is weaponry and military equip- archies UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as ment. The political relevance of German arms Algeria. In 2012, Germany cleared new arms sales sales stems less from their (comparatively mod- worth €1.2 billion to Saudi Arabia alone (see Figure erate) volumes than from the nature and timing 2), ranking Ryiadh as Germany’s top global arms of exports to unambiguously repressive regimes. client that year. Sales of controversial small fire- Germany is the third-biggest arms seller world- arms increased by 50 per cent in the period 2009- wide, accounting for 7 per cent of global exports, 13, and many of these went to Saudi Arabia and according to the International Peace other MENA countries. German-made tank pieces Research Institute (SIPRI). The Merkel govern- and crowd control equipment such as teargas were ment loosened restrictions on arms exports at the cleared for delivery to regimes known for domestic

Figure 2 New export licences for ‘weapons of war’,* main MENA destinations (in million EUR, rounded)

Source: Source: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi): Rüstungsexportberichte 2010-13. * A list of weapons qualified as ‘weapons of war’ is annexed to the BMWi’s annual report on arms exports (Rüstungsexportbericht). 1500 2010 2011 1237 2012 1200 2013

900 826

673 600

361 357 278 263 266 300 217 244 152 139 125 129 113 54 49 N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 1 0.5 >>>>>> Saudi Arabia Algeria UAE Qatar Iraq Israel Enabling or evading? Germany in the Middle East

4 >>>>>> repression. In 2013, Germany cleared the sale of 62 Figure 3 tanks to Qatar, marking the first time the German bi- and multilateral net ODA, German government allowed the sale of tanks to main MENA recipients (in million EUR, rounded) an Arab state. German arms exports to the region Source: German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development reflect both a political rationale (strengthening the position of regional partners) and an economic one 1300 Iraq (the Gulf defence market being one of the most lu- crative in the world). Demands to strengthen arms Palestinien Territories export restrictions along ethical criteria have met Egypt with strong opposition from the German arms in- dustry, and impatience from potential Gulf clients. Yemen 300 With the exception of Germany’s military assistance to Israel (which is considered to be a contribution to Israeli self-defense), German direct arms delivery 250 Syria to strengthen one side of an ongoing conflict is a novelty. The August 2014 decision to deliver arms to Kurdish fighters to counter the Islamic State (IS) 200 in Iraq was adopted by the government and cleared by the against the will of the German public, 63 per cent of whom opposed this move 150 (according to an August 2014 Forsa poll).

In the of development cooperation, the MENA 100 region ranks low among Germany’s geographic priorities. The region’s share of Germany’s total 50 bilateral net Official Development Assistance (ODA) fell from 34 per cent in 2007 to 9 per cent in 2012. Over this period, the bulk of ODA 0 to MENA countries went to Iraq, Egypt, and 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 and Gaza. In the past few years, Germany has reduced its levels to Iraq, and to a lesser degree to Morocco, while enhancing allocations to Tunisia, Jordan and Syria in the wake of the 2011 uprisings. Security concerns

In spite of Germany’s moderate aid levels, the Beyond its economic interests in the Middle country ranks high as a bilateral aid donor in East, Germany seeks to maintain stability, but many MENA countries. For example, Germany has little aspiration – or assets – to pro-actively is Iran’s largest bilateral aid donor, whose shape the larger course of the region. Several contribution – although small in absolute terms policy choices regarding the Middle East have – exceeds the biggest donors by threefold. significantly influenced the wider debate on Although Germany’s position as an aid donor German foreign policy. Germany’s abstention in bestows it some leverage in those countries that the Security Council (UNSC) depend heavily on aid, Germany’s position as a vote on the establishment of a no-fly zone over commercial powerhouse and most influential Libya in March 2011 marginalised Berlin from country in the EU is likely to outweigh any aid- its allies, and was seen by many as a low point related influence. (sse figure 3) for German foreign policy since the end of the policy brief - nº 191 - january 2015

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Figure 3 . This experience prompted Germany d’être’. Decisions on German arms exports to the German bi- and multilateral net ODA, to adopt a somewhat more vocal stance on MENA region are routinely consulted with the main MENA recipients (in million EUR, rounded) Syria. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the Israeli government. Germany is Israel’s second Source: German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development recent decision to arm fighting IS was the biggest arms supplier, after the (US). first time that post-war Germany has delivered Some arms purchases, such as , have Iraq weapons to back a specific side in an ongoing been subsidised by the German government by armed struggle. to one-third of the price. Israel is the only country Palestinien Territories in the world whose arms purchases from Germany Egypt Germany’s abstention on Libya was perceived are directly subsidised by the German government. Morocco among GCC partners as a missed opportunity to Palestinian deepen its political ties with the region, especially Yemen Its special relationship with Israel notwithstanding, Territories given Germany’s leadership role within the EU. Berlin maintains good and stable relations Tunisia Some Gulf analysts have with the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah. Jordan As dynamics in argued that the GCC Germany is the fourth-biggest bilateral donor Syria countries see the EU and to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the fight against its member states as po- but maintains no official relations with Hamas. tential security providers Although Berlin welcomed the formation of a IS increasingly for the Gulf. They would Palestinian unity government, it insists on the point towards a like to see Germany tak- Quartet conditions prior to ending the isolation ing the lead in of Hamas. Although German diplomats admit long-term EU security capacities to a two-state-solution to be increasingly unlikely, counteract the security Germany works with the PLO to build its engagement of threats in the Levant. capacities to that effect. Germany was the main force within the EU to push for US State Secretary the coalition, Berlin’s main security John Kerry’s initiative to revive the peace process Germany is likely concerns in the MENA in 2013-14. It also supported the EU’s recently region include: Israeli tougher line on Israeli settlements. to become more security and prospects for a two-state-solution At the same time, however, Germany remains entangled in the for Israel and Palestine; very reluctant to criticise Israel publicly. During dynamics of conflict Iran’s nuclear prolifer- the 2014 , German statements did not ation and the implica- the high Palestinian toll and Berlin tions of an Iranian-Saudi abstained from a United Nations (UN) Human stand-off; and containing the spread of transna- Rights Council vote on a statement condemn- tional and conflicts in and from an in- ing Israeli actions in Gaza. By abstaining from creasingly uncontrollable Levant. the November 2012 UN Assembly vote that indirectly recognised Palestinian independ- Historic responsibility ence, Germany aimed to avoid alienating Israel For the past five decades, Israel has been Germany’s while at the same time not discouraging Palestin- closest bilateral ally in the region, and for Israel, ian ambitions for statehood. Germany’s special Germany is its closest ally after the US. The relationship with Israel both enables and limits two countries have shared a long-term security its options to influence the peace process. Most partnership since the 1960s. In 2008 Angela Arab governments today accept that Berlin’s po- Merkel, who is very popular in Israel, was the sitions and actions on the Israeli-Palestinian dos- first foreign to be invited to sier will never overstep certain boundaries (for address the Knesset. In her speech she underlined example, nobody expects the German Germany’s ‘special historical responsibility for to vote on Palestinian independence, as recently Israel’s security’ as being part of Germany’s raison happened in a number of EU countries). >>>>>> Enabling or evading? Germany in the Middle East

6 >>>>>> From a regional perspective, Germany’s arms sales clear that Germany would not be part of a mili- to Saudi Arabia serve Israel’s interests. At a time tary intervention in Syria but would seek to agree when the Saudi-Iranian competition for regional a common position within the EU. Four years af- dominance develops into the most marked feature ter the 2011 Arab uprisings, German diplomats of regional order, Israel looks favourably on admit that hopes for an imminent end to the Syr- deepening military ties between Germany and the ian have evaporated. In the meantime, GCC states. This underscores Israel’s tacit alliance Germany carries on assisting the Syrian people with Ryiadh in its shared interest in countering with a half-hearted and low-key approach. With Iranian influence. political options scarce and military action ruled out, German policy in Syria has been focusing on Ending Iran’s isolation humanitarian aid and diplomatic efforts – which Among EU member states, Germany has had are, as one German diplomat told this author,‘a the best relations with post-1979 Iran. It is Iran’s drop in the ocean’. second-biggest trade parter and most important aid donor. Among the Iranian public, Germany Germany has, however, dedicated a special effort has a very positive image. Since the beginning of to the dossier, having given refuge to over Merkel’s tenure in 2005, Berlin has aligned itself 70,000 until 2014, including with US and Israeli tougher stances and calls for many key opposition figures. The Syrian economic sanctions, while also strengthening opposition has an office in Berlin. Upon taking Saudi Arabia’s position through arms sales. office under the Grand Coalition, Steinmeier Germany is a member of the P5+1 nuclear talks and Defence Minister der Leyen also pushed with Iran. Within this grouping, Berlin has been through a Bundeswehr participation in destroying taking a middle position between Washington Syria’s stockpile of chemical weapons (which and pressing Iran, and and Moscow’s Merkel had suppressed in her previous governing reluctance to corner Teheran. Foreign Minister coalition to appease the then coalition partner, Steinmeier has been pushing for a comprehensive the liberal FDP). In October 2014, Berlin hosted deal to be concluded quickly, in an effort to re- an international conference on the Syrian refugee integrate Iran into the international community crisis intended to help neighbouring countries and avert nuclear proliferation. The German cope and reduce the prospects of regional security government has been arguing that a deal with Iran spill-over. The German security services have also would remove a roadblock to solving other been working to monitor and contain the flow of regional security challenges. Awaiting the end of foreign fighters between Germany, Iraq and Syria the sanctions regime under a possible long-term – an effort likely to gain further impetus following nuclear deal, German businesses are primed to the recent Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris. maximize their commercial advantage. In Iraq, Germany enjoys a generally positive image Syria, Iraq and transnational jihadism owing to its opposition to the 2003 invasion. Mindful of the criticism its hesitation over Libya Nevertheless, Germany’s role and ambition in engendered, on Syria the German government has Iraq is marginal. One diplomat admitted to this been struggling to reconcile a policy of restraint author that in Iraq Germany was ‘dropping aid with the need to remain in sync with its North over the but (had) otherwise no clue Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies. Ber- what to do’. The above mentioned August 2014 lin recognised the Syrian National Coalition as decision to deliver arms to Kurdish was the legitimate representative of the Syrian people a highly controversial . Taken against early on. In 2011, Merkel pushed for the background of the IS siege on Iraqi Yezidis, a UNSC resolution against Assad and sided with the move was justified by Merkel primarily on the opposition. More broadly, however, German’s humanitarian grounds. Although the government Syria policy has been hesitant. Merkel made it had initially ruled out troop deployment, by policy brief - nº 191 - january 2015

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December the cabinet had approved the sending with security crises in the MENA suggest that of 100 German troops to train Kurdish fighters. German foreign policy may be slowly starting to The objectives and strategy underlying these shift. decisions, however, remain unclear. As dynamics in the fight against IS increasingly point towards a Kristina Kausch is head of the Middle East and long-term engagement of the coalition, Germany programme at FRIDE is likely to become more entangled in the dynamics of the conflict. This Policy Brief belongs to the project ‘Transitions and Geopolitics in the : links and implications for international actors’, led by Conclusion FRIDE and HIVOS. We acknowledge the generous support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany’s influence in the Middle East is Norway. For further information on this project, limited. Nevertheless, Berlin’s role in shaping please contact: Kawa Hassan, Hivos (k.hassan@ positions within the EU, its close alliance with hivos.nl) or Kristina Kausch, FRIDE (kkausch@ Israel, its good relations with Iran and its growing fride.org). partnership with the GCC states mean that it is far from being a toothless geopolitical actor in the e-: [email protected] MENA. Germany’s reluctance to even consider www.fride.org deploying military power has marginalized it as a player in most of the Middle East’s major hotspots. Acting largely as a reluctant bystander, German deliberations on the MENA have tactily prioritised reactive firefighting on security matters and the conservation of the political status quo.

The combination of rhetorical moral ambition, primacy of commercial interests and military passivity positions Germany’s approach to the MENA as a prime example of the West’s prioritisation of superficial stability in the Middle East. In Palestine, Germany’s reluctance to put pressure on Israel has favoured the status quo in Gaza. In Syria, Germany has been as inconclusive as its international allies in advocating non- intervention without advancing better options. Germany’s role in the Iran negotiations has been positive and constant. If and when Iran comes back in from the cold, however, Germany is likely to prioritise commercial relations and Tehran’s collaboration on regional issues over domestic reforms. Germany’s priority is avoiding conflict, but with the EU’s neighbourhood in turmoil, both its focus on the stability of authoritarian regimes and its security free-riding appear increasingly unsustainable. Recent decisions by Berlin to adopt a more proactive stance in dealing

The views in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of FRIDE and Hivos. www.fride.org www.hivos.net