Peter Hart. Mick: The Real Michael Collins. New York: Viking, 2006. xxi + 426 pp. $17.00, paper, ISBN 978-0-14-303854-2. Reviewed by Timothy McMahon Published on H-Albion (August, 2006) Peter Hart, the leading young historian of the was emblematic of a generation of young Euro‐ Irish War of Independence, has produced an en‐ peans.) Better educated and more mobile than gaging, vivid, yet uneven biography of the revolu‐ their parents, they were drawn to cities and tionary politician Michael Collins. Anyone famil‐ towns, often to clerical, trade, or civil service posi‐ iar with Hart's earlier works (including the su‐ tions, yet they were also frequently frustrated by perb The IRA and Its Enemies [1998]) knows that their lack of mobility once they reached a certain he brings considerable gifts as a storyteller and point on the career ladder. For Collins, and for analyst to bear on his subjects. In this instance, he many hundreds of other young Irish, this point eschews the tropes of prior works on Collins-- came after emigration from rural west Cork to most notably the tendency to portray him as an London, where he entered with gusto into the mi‐ Emerald Pimpernel. The author restricts himself grant milieu, joining organizations such as the only to sources that are readily available (letters, Gaelic Athletic Association, the Gaelic League, and police reports, cabinet and committee minutes, di‐ most importantly the Irish Republican Brother‐ aries, and newspaper accounts), thus avoiding a hood. pitfall of prior Collins scholarship, in which au‐ Still, the author's treatment of the Irish-Ire‐ thors have utilized papers that subsequently dis‐ land movement--with its endless committees, appeared. Moreover, unlike his predecessors, he splits, and self-appointed republican "elect"--bor‐ devotes substantial chapters to Collins's childhood ders on caricature. Organizational ruptures and and early adult life, detecting in them patterns of feelings of righteous indignation toward one's ri‐ behavior that would become essential in his rise vals were the stuff of all emerging associational to power within the Irish republican movement. networks across the United Kingdom and the Con‐ Hart is surely correct that Collins exemplified tinent at the turn of the twentieth century: what his generation of young Irish men and women. made this one different was that a particular fac‐ (One might carry the point further and say that he H-Net Reviews tion seized control of it at an auspicious moment, Collins drank, swore, and smoked into the wee i.e., in the aftermath of Easter 1916. hours, unlike many of his abstemious and devout‐ Hart makes clear that the success of revolu‐ ly Catholic fellow revolutionaries. Of course, the tionary republicanism in those years was due, in fact that he developed what Hart refers to as a no small part, to Michael Collins, who proved to "kind of court" of admirers, who helped him to be much more than just another Mick on the entertain visiting guerrilla leaders at Vaughan's make. With his ruthless drive, his ability to en‐ Hotel, suggests that he was far from alone in pur‐ courage his fellows at moments of despair, and suing these more dissolute--and suspect--pursuits his determination to succeed at all costs, he sepa‐ (p. 265). More importantly, he was difficult to rated himself from the pack of potential leaders work with: combative and headstrong, he bullied through a formula honed in his London commit‐ colleagues and, occasionally, worked around them tee days. Linking himself to slightly older men‐ to achieve his desired results. The revolutionary tors, such as his cousin Jack Hurley and his IRB Minister of Defense, Cathal Brugha, was merely sponsor Patrick Belton, he made contacts that the best-known (and bitterest) co-worker with opened doors for him later in life. He also secured whom he crossed swords, but we learn from Hart positions, such as secretary or treasurer, on teams that their feud may have originated in a clash of and committees that enabled him to remain near personalities, with Collins the initial aggressor. the center of the action while spreading his con‐ The Big Fellow's most important eventual antago‐ tact and knowledge base. Most importantly, he nist was, of course, his chief, Eamon de Valera, chose wisely and acted resolutely. Hart demon‐ but as presented by Hart, the two retained "a gen‐ strates repeatedly that at key junctures in his life, uine partnership, with de Valera projecting a sup‐ Collins faced decisions about matters as mundane portive and tolerant presence" until after the as whether to emigrate to America or to move to treaty irrevocably divided them (p. 265). Such a Dublin and as profound as whether to accept the judgment may surprise, but it is backed up with Articles of Agreement with Britain in 1921. In correspondence between the two men, including each case, he left his options open until the last examples of de Valera fulfilling his duty as media‐ possible moment, when he made his decision and tor between Collins and other ministers in his rev‐ worked it to the best of his ability. In the former olutionary cabinet. instance, for example, he moved to Dublin early Unfortunately, not all claims in Mick appear in 1916, linked himself to Joseph Plunkett (a signa‐ as sure-footed, and those less familiar with the pe‐ tory of the Easter Proclamation), and gained an riod than Hart may fnd it difficult to distinguish entrée into the movement's inner circle. In the lat‐ between demonstrated occurrences and the au‐ ter, he signed the fabled "Treaty" that led to the thor's informed speculations. (Indeed readers creation of the Irish Free State at the expense of must wade into the notes pages at the back and republican unity. The Collins who emerges from search for the apposite phrase page by page be‐ these pages was one whose organizational, fnan‐ cause the format of this Viking publication does cial, and political acumen was sharpened through not allow for footnotes in the text.) Two examples experience and wielded with great effect. will suffice. The frst is minor and relates to All of this meant that Collins was loved and Collins's efforts to secure the directorship of the hated, cheered and reviled. Contemporaries de‐ National Aid Association early in 1917--arguably veloped differing opinions of him for a variety of the job from which his later successes sprang. reasons. As Tim Pat Coogan noted in an earlier bi‐ Hart fnds in his subject's application letter that ography (Michael Collins: A Biography [1990]), Collins lied to secure the post, embellishing past work experience. But why, he asks, particularly 2 H-Net Reviews since the IRB was using his expanding network of if--as Hart maintain--Collins's main purpose in connections to secure the position? Hart supplies employing violence was to bring about peace three possible explanations (the desire to impress more quickly, decisively, and on his own terms, a potential future employer, the need to protect a surely it is not a stretch to recognize the validity previously told lie, or the pleasure taken in decep‐ of the sentiment that it was "them or me." tion), but each of these is pure speculation (pp. This volume will not please every reader, par‐ 116-117). The observed overstatement is certainly ticularly those seeking a heroic portrait of its sub‐ of interest, but without establishing a pattern of ject. No doubt some will wish to argue with Hart's hyperbole (perhaps even through deploying ex‐ conclusion that Collins "was not interested in sac‐ amples that Hart refers to in his introduction) rificing himself for others or in upholding any sa‐ such speculation seems pointless. cred principle so it would live on after him," par‐ A more important instance involves one of ticularly since his life was cut short during a civil the central events of Collins's career as director of war that maintained the "freedom to achieve" intelligence in the IRA, that being the attack on "the ultimate freedom that all nations desire and Crown secret service men in their homes that trig‐ develop to" (pp. 425-426). But it is in engaging gered Bloody Sunday in November 1920. Accord‐ such arguments that we come better to under‐ ing to Hart, "Collins is often quoted (perhaps apoc‐ stand the people and forces that shaped our past. ryphally) as saying that he had to get them before As such, Hart's unsentimental and critical Mick they got him. In fact it was the other way around should take its place alongside David Fitzpatrick's ... the hush-hush men did not begin murdering study of Harry Boland, and Tim Pat Coogan's and and torturing until after a dozen of them were T. Ryle Dwyer's works on both de Valera and killed in their homes by the IRA" (emphasis in Collins, for those interested in the Irish War of In‐ original, p. 241). Technically correct, this state‐ dependence. [1] ment splits important hairs. On the one hand, the Note Crown's overlapping intelligence operations were [1]. David Fitzpatrick, Harry Boland's Irish becoming increasingly more coordinated Revolution (Cork: Cork University Press, 2003); throughout 1920, and while the men working in Tim Pat Coogan, Michael Collins: A Biography small groups in Dublin were unique within this (London: Hutchinson, 1990); and, De Valera: Long structure, intelligence operatives working along‐ Fellow, Long Shadow (London: Hutchinson, 1993). side Black and Tans and Auxiliary officers T. Ryle Dwyer, Big Fellow, Long Fellow: A Joint Bi‐ throughout Ireland were engaged in identifying ography of Collins and De Valera (Dublin: Gill and and killing IRA men and couriers.