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Digital Communications Protocols Security & Privacy Compatibility Features & Usability Sustainability E2E E2E Offline Local Decentralized Active Open Open On Anonymous E2E E2E Default Audit FIDO1 Desktop Mobile Apple AOSP Messages messaging File Audio Video Phoneless or Federated Open IETF [1] TLS Client Server Premise [2] Private Group [3] [4] / U2F Web Web Android iOS [5] Win macOS Linux *BSD Terminal MDM [6] [7] [8] Share Call Call [9] [10] Spec [11] Introduced Element/Matrix TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE PARTIAL TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE 2014 XMPP TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE PARTIAL [12]TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE [13] TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE 1999 NextCloud Talk TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE 2018 Wire TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE PARTIAL TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE 2014 Jami TRUE TRUE TRUE N/A [14] N/A TRUE TRUE FALSE [15] TRUE FALSE N/A [16] FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE PARTIAL PARTIAL[17] [18] 2016 Briar [19] TRUE TRUE TRUE N/A [20] N/A TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE N/A [21] FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE 2016 Tox TRUE TRUE TRUE N/A [22] N/A TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE N/A [23] FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE [24] TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE 2013 Kontalk TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE PARTIAL 2014 DeltaChat TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE [25] TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE PARTIAL FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE PARTIAL 2017 BitMessage TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE 2014 Ricochet TRUE [26] TRUE TRUE N/A [27] N/A TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE N/A [28] FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE 2016 PSYC-2 TRUE TRUE TRUE N/A [29] N/A TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE N/A [30] FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE 2013 Status.im TRUE TRUE TRUE N/A [31] N/A TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE N/A [32] FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE PARTIAL FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE 2016 Scuttlebutt TRUE TRUE TRUE N/A N/A TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE 2014 Rocketchat TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE PARTIAL [33]PARTIAL [34] FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE 2015 IRC TRUE PARTIAL TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE 1988 Mattermost TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE 2016 Zulip TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUETRUE [35] TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE 2014 Orbit TRUE PARTIAL TRUE N/A [36] N/A TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE N/A [37] TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE 2015 Mumble TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE 2005 Spectrum TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE 2011 Signal TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE [38]FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE 2014 Semaphor TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE 2016 Keybase TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE 2017 Surespot TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Silence TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE Telegram TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE PARTIAL FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE 2013 SMS/MMS TRUEBROKEN [39] TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE PARTIAL IMS/RCS TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE Discord TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE 2015 Gitter TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE Duo TRUECLAIMED [40]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE CLAIMED [41]CLAIMED [42]CLAIMED [43]FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE Keeperchat TRUECLAIMED [44]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE CLAIMED [45]CLAIMED [46]CLAIMED [47]FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE 2017 Wickr TRUECLAIMED [48]FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE CLAIMED [49]CLAIMED [50]CLAIMED [51]FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE Threema TRUECLAIMED [52]FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CLAIMED [53]CLAIMED [54]CLAIMED [55]TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE 2012 Whatsapp TRUECLAIMED [56]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE CLAIMED [57]CLAIMED [58]CLAIMED [59]FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE 2009 iMessage TRUECLAIMED [60]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE CLAIMED [61]CLAIMED [62]CLAIMED [63]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE MS Teams TRUECLAIMED [64]FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE CLAIMED [65]CLAIMED [66]CLAIMED [67]FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE Facetime TRUECLAIMED [68]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE CLAIMED [69]CLAIMED [70]CLAIMED [71]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE Line TRUECLAIMED [72]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE CLAIMED [73]CLAIMED [74]CLAIMED [75]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE Viber TRUECLAIMED [76]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE CLAIMED [77]CLAIMED [78]CLAIMED [79]FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE 2010 Facebook TRUECLAIMED [80]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE CLAIMED [81]CLAIMED [82] FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE Skype TRUECLAIMED [83]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE CLAIMED [84] FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE Kakaotalk TRUECLAIMED [85]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE CLAIMED [86] FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE Hangouts TRUECLAIMED [87]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE Zoom TRUECLAIMED [88]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE Slack TRUECLAIMED [89]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE Reddit Chat TRUECLAIMED [90]FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE Twitch TRUECLAIMED [91]FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE Instagram TRUECLAIMED [92]FALSE
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