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Explaining the Low Voter Turnout in Iceland's 2010 Local Government

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Explaining the Low Voter Turnout in Iceland's 2010 Local Government Samtíð 1 (2013), 2 | www.samtid.is 1 Explaining the low voter turnout in Iceland’s 2010 local government elections Grétar Þór Ey órsson, "arcin #owalc$y% Abstract: Voter participation in Iceland (measured as voter turnout) was si ni!icantly lower in the two most recent local overnment elections than ever $e!ore. In the 200% local elections, voter turnout in the countr" dropped $elow &0 percent !or the !irst time since re istration $e an (to '&.' percent) and !ell even !urther to '3.( percent in the 2010 local elections. )#is article presents data on this drop and see*s potential explanations !or it. ,ne #"pothesis is that a major !actor, especially in the 2010 elections, was disillusionment in t#e wake o! Iceland.s eco/ nomic collapse in 200& and the su$se0uent crisis o! pu$lic confidence in parliament. 1nother #"pothesis is that the si2e o! municipalities has to $e taken into account. 1s elsewhere, political participation in Iceland is stron er in smaller municipalities. It is only in the $i er municipali/ ties in Iceland that nationwide political parties in Iceland are active, and it is also there that voter turnout has dropped the most and voters have iven the most support to newly !ormed political parties. Ágrip: 3osningaþátttaka í sveitarst-6rnarkosningum á 7slandi he!ur verið minni í síðustu tveimur *osningum en no**ru sinni 5ður. 7 *osningunum 200% !6r 4átttaka !"rsta sinni undir &0 pr6sent síðan s*ráning #6!st, eða í '&,' pr6sent. 7 sveitarst-6rnarkosningunum árið 2010 minnkaði 4átt/ takan enn o varð aðeins '3,( pr6sent. 7 reininni er 4etta s8nt með 9 num o leitað að m9 ule um s*8ringum á 4essu. :in tilgáta o**ar er að st6rminnkuð 4átttaka í *osningum 2010 s*8rist meðal annars af 6ánæg-u *-6senda í *-9lfar e!nahagshrunsins 200&, s<rstakle a e!tir að ranns6*nars*8rsla 1lþingis *om =t s*9mmu !"rir sveitarst-6rnarkosningarnar. >nnur tilgáta o**ar er að líta verði til stærðar sveitar!<laga í 4essu samhen i. Lí*t o annars staðar í heiminum er *osningaþátttaka á 7slandi meiri í litlum sveitar!<lö um en 4eim stærri. @lo**aker!ið á landsvísu er mest til staðar í stærstu sveitar!<l9 unum. Aar hafa *-6sendur valið n8 st-6rnmálaö!l til !or"stu o *osið í minna mæli en áður. Citation/Tilvísun: Br<tar A6r :"46rsson and Carcin 3owalc2"*, D:xplainin the low voter turnout in Iceland.s 2010 local overnment elections,E Samtíð 1 (2013), 2. httpFGGdx.doi.or G10.12'(2Gsamtid.2013.2 Received/Móttekið: 2011H02H2&. Accepted/Samþykkt: 2012H10H0I. !ublished/Birt: 2013H03H2%. $%&'()%Authors/H+,undar-%This open-access article is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, version 3.0 / Greinin er birt í opnum að"an"i undir CC-#Y 3.0 le%fi (http' creativecommons.or"/licenses/b%/3.0( 2 ?ow voter turnout in Iceland.s 2010 local elections 1& Introduction Voter participation (measured as voter turnout) in Iceland was significantly lower in the two most recent local government elections than ever before. In the 2006 local elec­ tions the average turnout in the country dropped below !0 percent for the first time since registration began (to "!." percent) and fell even further to "#.$ percent in the 20%0 local elections. &his article presents data on this drop and see's potential e(pla­ nations for it. )arty representation at the local level in Iceland has always been wea'. In the %**0 local elections the four parties represented in the parliament (the Al,ingi) only won 26 percent of the seats in local councils (Eyth.rsson %***). &his rate has increased over time/ in the 2006 elections 0$ percent of local council seats were held by the parties in parliament and in 20%0 the rate was also 0$ percent.% 1till close to half of the seats are held by locally organized lists that do not play a role in the national political arena.2 3owever in the four municipalities that are the largest by far 4 5ey'6av7' 8.pavogur 3afnarf69r:ur and +'ureyri 4 the national parties have held almost all of the seats for decades. ;ational politics seem to have been well represented in Iceland<s largest municipalities but to a much lesser e(tent in the smaller ones. Icelandic political scientist =unnar 3elgi 8ristinsson has shown that partisan politics are significantly more evident in municipalities with more than %000 inhabitants and especially so when the population e(ceeds 2000 (Kristinsson 200% pp. %06>%0!). ?e lac' a complete account and analysis of national party presence in local elec­ tions in Iceland. @ut we can put the issue in a comparative perspectiveA research on ;orwegian municipalities has shown that the rate of Bnon>partisanC representation is much lower with non>partisan lists holding between %% and 2% percent of the total local council seats between %*!# and 200# (Aars and 5ing'6Db 2000). +ccording to +ars and 5ing'6Db the rate in ;orway falls as municipal si2e increases 6ust as it ap­ pears to do in Iceland. &he rate for ;orwegian municipalities with 20 000 inhabitants or more was below %0 percent (with one e(ception), while in the smallest municipali­ ties (with less than 2 000 inhabitants) it was considerably higherA %!>#2 percent. &he main trend in ;orway in the post>war period is that non>partisan lists have over time won a smaller and smaller share of council seats. Eespite limited and fragmented data % These figures were calculated from the local election database on the Statistics Iceland website (www.statice.is). 2 These figures do not distinguish between the various types of locally organi2ed lists. A considerable proportion of them have through the years been alliances between parties which are distinct at the national level mostly joint left>wing lists or lists formed jointly by left>wing and centrist parties. Samtíð 1 (2013), 2 | www.samtid.is 3 and research on this sub6ect in Iceland the trend seems to be in the same direction as in ;orway even though locally organized lists have considerably higher representation. &he Icelandic local government elections on 2* Fay 20%0 were in many ways of historical significance with stri'ing results in some municipalities. +s pointed out ear­ lier in small and medium>si2ed municipalities non>partisan lists have been common for decades. @ut in the 20%0 elections completely new parties and lists put forth candi­ dates in some of the biggest municipalities 4 and won. In 5ey'6av7' the capital a new protest party called B@esti Glo''urinnC (the @est )arty), led by the well-'nown comic actor H.n =narr won #0 percent of the vote and six out of %0 seats on the city council. In +'ureyri the fourth biggest municipality and largest city in north Iceland a party outside the traditional system called BIisti f.l'sinsC (the )eople<s List) won $0 percent of the vote and six out of %% seats on the city council an absolute ma6ority.# In 8.pa­ vogur a suburb of 5ey'6av7' and Iceland<s second>biggest municipality two completely new outsider parties competed. B;Jstbesti flo''urinnC (the 1econd>@est )arty) won appro(imately %$ percent of the vote (and one council seat) while BListi 8.pavogsbúaC (the List of the )eople of 8.pavogur) received %% percent and one seat. @oth these new parties became part of the ma6ority coalition for the 20%0>20%$ term.$ &his new trend in party representation in the big municipalities is something worth loo'ing at and is evidence of certain challenges to Iceland<s traditional party system at least at the local level. 2& Icelandic voter turnout in historical perspective Ioo'ing as far bac' as data has been collected voter participation in Icelandic local government elections always fluctuated between a ma(imum of !".! percent and a minimum of !%.* percent 4 until the 2006 elections when it dropped below !0 percent for the very first time to "!." percent. In the 20%0 local elections voter turnout reached a new record low of "#.$ percent. In parliamentary elections the long-term trend in participation in Iceland is also clearly downward. )arliamentary election turnout is however historically high compared to other ?estern -uropean countries. Lver the period from %*00 to 2000 the average rate was !"." percent. Lnly Falta Iuxembourg # Iisti F.l'sins was not a completely new phenomenon in Akureyri local politics. It had won seats in the election of 1**! (% seat) 2002 (2 seats) and 2006 (% seat). With si( seats the 20%0 results represented a significant brea'through. $ In both A'ureyri and Rey'6aví' “merged listsC consisting of alliances of the traditional parties had held power during parts of the previous two decades. In Rey'6aví' “5>listinnC was an alliance of traditional left>wing and moderate parties. It won a ma6ority in 1**$ and survived until the 2006 elections when the parties involved decided to end their cooperation. In A'ureyri a left>wing merged list “+'ureyrarlistinn C held the ma6ority between 1**! and 2002. ( ?ow voter turnout in Iceland.s 2010 local elections and @elgium have higher average rates during that period (Bengtsson 200! p. !*/ see also 8ristinsson 200" p. 0%). Gigure % shows voter participation in local government elections (the lower line) and parliamentary elections (the upper line) since %*62.0 Figure 1. Participation in parliamentary and municipal elections in Iceland, 1962-2010. Source: data from Statistics Iceland !!!.statice.is). Karliament (1I%3H200I) Cunicipalities (1I%2H2010) 100 IJ I1.1 I1.( I1.( I0.( I0.3 I0.1 &I.3 &&.3 t I0 &'.% &'.( &'.' u o &J.1 n &'.& r &(.1 &%.% &%.% &3.% u &J &J.I t &J.( &J.1 r &(.% e &3.2 t &2 &2.3 o &0 &1.I ) '&.' 'J '3.( '0 1I%2 1I%% 1I'0 1I'( 1I'& 1I&2 1I&% 1II0 1II( 1II& 2002 200% 2010 'ear of election )articipation in parliamentary elections was higher than in local government elections throughout the period shown in Gigure %.
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