A Theory of the Budgetary Process Author(S): Otto A
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A Theory of the Budgetary Process Author(s): Otto A. Davis, M. A. H. Dempster and Aaron Wildavsky Reviewed work(s): Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Sep., 1966), pp. 529-547 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1952969 . Accessed: 31/07/2012 15:11 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Political Science Review. http://www.jstor.org The American Political Science Review VOL. LX SEPTEMBER, 1966 NO. 3 A THEORY OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS* OTTO A. DAVIS, M. A. H. DEMPSTER, AND AARON WILDAVSKY Carnegie Institute of Technology, Nuffield College, Oxford, and University of California, Berkeley There are striking regularities in the bud- dence on deviant cases, discuss predictions, and getary process. The evidence from over half of future work to explore some of the problems the non-defense agencies indicates that the be- indicated by this kind of analysis. An appendix havior of the budgetary process of the United contains informal definitions and a discussion States government results in aggregate deci- of the statistical terminology used in the paper. sions similar to those produced by a set of sim- ple decision rules that are linear and temporally I. THE BUDGETARY PROCESS stable. For the agencies considered, certain Decisions depend upon calculation of which equations are specified and compared with data alternatives to consider and to choose.2 A major composed of agency requests (through the clue toward understanding budgeting is the Bureau of the Budget) and Congressional ap- extraordinary complexity of the calculations propriations from 1947 through 1963. The com- involved. There are a huge number of items to parison indicates that these equations sum- be considered, many of which are of consider- marize accurately aggregate outcomes of the able technical difficulty. There is, however, budgetary process for each agency. little or no theory in most areas of policy which In the first section of the paper we present an would enable practitioners to predict the con- analytic summary of the federal budgetary sequences of alternative moves and the prob- process, and we explain why basic features of ability of their occurring. Nor has anyone the process lead us to believe that it can be rep- solved the imposing problem of the inter-per- resented by simple models which are stable sonal comparison of utilities. Outside of the over periods of time, linear, and stochastic.' In political process, there is no agreed upon way of the second section we propose and discuss the comparing and evaluating the merits of differ- alternative specifications for the agency-Bud- ent programs for different people whose pre- get Bureau and Congressional decision equa- ferences vary in kind and in intensity. tions. The empirical results are presented in Participants in budgeting deal with their section three. In section four we provide evi- overwhelming burdens by adopting aids to calculation. By far the most important aid to * The research was sponsored by Resources for calculation is the incremental method. Budgets the Future. We received valuable criticism from are almost never actively reviewed as a whole Rufus Browning, Sam Cohn, W. W. Cooper, in the sense of considering at once the value of Richard Cyert, Nelson Polsby, Herbert Simon, all existing programs as compared to all possi- and Oliver Williamson, research assistance from ble alternatives. Instead, this year's budget is Rose Kelly, and editorial assistance from Jean Zorn. Mrs. E. Belton undertook the laborious 2 The description which follows is taken from task of compiling the raw data. We are grateful Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary to Resources for the Future and to our colleagues, Process (Boston, 1964). Portions of the comments but the sole responsibility for what is said here on the House Appropriations Committee are from is our own. Richard Fenno, "The House Appropriations I See the Appendix for explanations of terms Committee as a Political System: The Problem of and concepts. Integration," this REVIEW, 56 (1962), 310-324. 529 530 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW based on last year's budget, with special atten- will be effective in their political environment. tion given to a narrow range of increases or de- Budget officers in American national govern- creases. ment uniformly believe that being a good poli- Incremental calculations proceed from an tician-cultivation of an active clientele, devel- existing base. (By "base" we refer to common- opment of confidence by other officials (partic- ly held expectations among participants in ularly the appropriations subcommittees), and budgeting that programs will be carried out at skill in following strategies which exploit op- close to the going level of expenditures.) The portunities-is more important in obtaining widespread sharing of deeply held expectations funds than demonstration of agency efficiency. concerning the organization's base provides a In deciding how much money to recommend powerful (although informal) means of securing for specific purposes, the House Appropriations stability. Committee breaks down into largely autono- The most effective coordinating mechanisms mous subcommittees in which the norm of in budgeting undoubtedly stem from the roles reciprocity is carefully followed. Specialization adopted by the major participants. Roles (the is carried further as subcommittee members expectations of behavior attached to institu- develop limited areas of competence and juris- tional positions) are parts of the division of diction. Budgeting is both incremental and labor. They are calculating mechanisms. In fragmented as the subcommittees deal with American national government, the adminis- adjustments to the historical base of each trative agencies act as advocates of increased agency. Fragmentation and specialization are expenditure, the Bureau of the Budget acts as increased through the appeals functions of the Presidential servant with a cutting bias, the Senate Appropriations Committee, which deals House Appropriations Committee functions as with what has become (through House action) a guardian of the Treasury, and the Senate a fragment of a fragment. With so many partici- Appropriations Committee as an appeals court pants continually engaged in taking others to which agencies carry their disagreements into account, a great many adjustments are with House action. The roles fit in with one an- made in the light of what others are likely to other and set up patterns of mutual expecta- do. tions which markedly reduce the burden of This qualitative account of the budgetary calculation for the participants. Since the process contains clear indications of the kind of agencies can be depended upon to advance all quantitative models we wish to develop. It is the programs for which there is prospect of sup- evident, for example, that decision-makers in port, the Budget Bureau and the Appropria- the budgetary process think in terms of per- tions Committees respectively can concentrate centages. Agencies talk of expanding their base on fitting them into the President's program or by a certain percentage. The Bureau of the paring them down. Budget is concerned about the growth rates for Possessing the greatest expertise and the certain agencies and programs. The House Ap- largest numbers, working in the closest prox- propriations Committee deals with percentage imity to their policy problems and clientele cuts, and the Senate Appropriations Commit- groups, and desiring to expand their horizons, tee with the question of whether or not to administrative agencies generate action restore percentage cuts. These considerations through advocacy. But if they ask for amounts suggest that the quantitative relationships much larger than the appropriating bodies be- among the decisions of the participants in the lieve reasonable, the agencies' credibility will budget process are linear in form. suffer a drastic decline. In such circumstances, The attitudes and calculations of partici- the reviewing organs are likely to cut deeply, pants in budgeting seem stable over time. The with the result that the agency gets much less prominence of the agency's "base" is a sign of than it might have with a more moderate re- stability. The roles of the major participants quest. So the first guide for decision is: do not are powerful, persistent, and strongly grounded come in too high. Yet the agencies must also in the expectations of others as well as in the not come in too low, for the reviewing bodies internal requirements of the positions. Stabiltiy assume that if agency advocates do not ask for is also suggested by the specialization that funds they do not need them. Thus, the agency occurs among the participants, the long service decision rule might read: come in a little too of committee members, the adoption of incre- high (padding), but not too high (loss of con- mental practices such as comparisons with the fidence). previous year, the fragmentation of appropria- Agencies engage in strategic planning to tions by program and item, the treatments of secure these budgetary goals. Strategies are the appropriations as continuously variable sums links between the goals of the agencies and of money rather than as perpetual reconsidera- their perceptions of the kinds of actions which tions of the worth of programs, and the practice A THEORY OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 531 of allowing past decisions to stand while coordi- a set of decision rules for Congress and the nating decision-making only if difficulties arise.