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Persentase Hasil Perhitungan Suara Sah Pemilu Presiden/Wakil Presiden Tahun 2009 Menurut Provinsi Persentase Hasil Perhitungan Suara Sah Pemilu Presiden/Wakil Presiden Tahun 2009 Menurut Provinsi Pasangan Calon Presiden dan Wakil Presiden Provinsi Total Suara Sah Megawati Soekarno Putri/ Prabowo Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono/ Muhammad Jusuf Kalla/ Wiranto Subianto Boediono Aceh 2.4 93.3 4.4 2,245,119.0 Sumatera Utara 0.0 93.3 6.7 4,539,195.0 Sumatera Barat 5.9 79.9 14.2 2,287,153.0 Riau 23.7 64.1 12.2 2,345,315.0 Kepulauan Riau 26.5 64.4 9.1 748,576.0 Jambi 29.2 59.4 11.4 1,560,500.0 Sumatera Selatan 39.6 54.1 6.4 3,838,344.0 Bengkulu 23.2 64.1 12.6 850,231.0 Lampung 24.1 70.2 5.7 3,992,345.0 Kepulauan Bangka 38.6 48.7 12.7 549,694.0 DKI Jakarta 20.4 70.4 9.2 5,035,956.0 Jawa Barat 26.2 65.1 8.7 22,104,722.0 Banten 27.0 65.1 8.0 5,149,798.0 Jawa Tengah 38.3 53.1 8.7 17,490,429.0 DI Yogyakarta 28.1 61.7 10.2 1,975,647.0 Jawa Timur 30.4 60.3 9.3 19,450,762.0 Bali 51.9 43.0 5.1 1,912,337.0 Nusa Tenggara Barat 8.3 74.6 17.1 2,269,826.0 Nusa Tenggara Timur 41.3 52.7 6.0 2,134,794.0 Kalimantan Barat 37.1 54.0 8.9 2,286,206.0 Kalimantan Tengah 42.3 48.3 9.4 1,016,711.0 Kalimantan Selatan 21.8 64.0 14.2 1,728,858.0 Kalimantan Timur 27.6 51.9 20.5 1,605,372.0 Sulawesi Utara 31.2 54.8 14.0 1,262,275.0 Gorontalo 6.5 44.2 49.3 545,504.0 Sulawesi Tengah 8.4 50.5 41.1 1,324,798.0 Sulawesi Selatan 4.0 31.6 64.4 4,222,786.0 Sulawesi Tenggara 8.0 45.6 46.4 1,094,115.0 Sulawesi Barat 4.6 50.8 44.6 578,929.0 Maluku 24.5 53.7 21.8 787,985.0 Maluku Utara 20.3 38.9 40.7 551,513.0 Papua 5.6 74.1 20.3 1,860,096.0 Papua Barat 10.5 74.0 15.6 424,043.0 Luar Negeri 14.0 69.1 17.0 340,410.0 Total Perolehan Suara 26.8 60.8 12.4 121,504,481.0 Sumber: Komisi Pemilihan Umum Hasil Perhitungan Suara Sah Pemilu Presiden/Wakil Presiden Putaran Pertama Tahun 2004 Provinsi Pasangan Calon Presiden/Wakil Presiden Jumlah Hamzah Haz/ Agum H. Wiranto/ Salahudin Wahid Megawati/ Hasyim Muzadi Amin Rais/ Siswono Yudohusodo Susilo BY/ Jusuf Kalla Gumelar Nanggroe Aceh Darusalam 204,534.0 120,226.0 1,195,823.0 519,197.0 88,836.0 2,128,616.0 Sumatera Utara 934,213.0 2,233,777.0 798,790.0 1,523,612.0 105,687.0 5,596,079.0 Sumatera Barat 610,847.0 121,254.0 741,811.0 518,648.0 57,228.0 2,049,788.0 Riau 504,017.0 460,328.0 397,761.0 677,761.0 44,092.0 2,083,959.0 Kepulauan Riau 81,816.0 153,138.0 128,551.0 224,334.0 9,437.0 597,276.0 Jambi 364,651.0 273,925.0 155,974.0 520,145.0 28,437.0 1,343,132.0 Sumatera Selatan 640,294.0 1,127,608.0 341,716.0 1,241,095.0 50,644.0 3,401,357.0 Bengkulu 253,986.0 155,657.0 121,483.0 196,057.0 12,480.0 739,663.0 Lampung 881,715.0 896,581.0 359,285.0 1,430,729.0 58,297.0 3,626,607.0 Bangka Belitung 82,250.0 179,777.0 58,759.0 165,657.0 11,656.0 498,099.0 DKI. Jakarta 499,455.0 1,172,891.0 1,415,582.0 1,988,306.0 121,924.0 5,198,158.0 Jawa Barat 5,341,526.0 5,095,705.0 3,562,173.0 7,100,175.0 810,519.0 21,910,098.0 Banten 922,299.0 1,193,414.0 796,758.0 1,706,548.0 172,971.0 4,791,990.0 Jawa Tengah 3,943,032.0 5,807,127.0 2,409,138.0 5,276,432.0 820,273.0 18,256,002.0 DI. Yogyakarta 334,067.0 557,133.0 558,068.0 576,012.0 28,293.0 2,053,573.0 Jawa Timur 5,076,454.0 5,896,278.0 1,902,254.0 7,458,399.0 599,806.0 20,933,191.0 Bali 210,784.0 1,115,788.0 48,472.0 654,127.0 9,791.0 2,038,962.0 Nusa Tenggara Barat 723,484.0 223,204.0 436,073.0 715,838.0 68,382.0 2,166,981.0 Nusa Tenggara Timur 432,823.0 1,344,116.0 58,341.0 312,777.0 8,757.0 2,156,814.0 Kalimantan Barat 415,492.0 821,577.0 185,097.0 477,724.0 113,244.0 2,013,134.0 Kalimantan Tengah 170,193.0 296,335.0 88,439.0 303,123.0 23,976.0 882,066.0 Kalimantan Selatan 353,732.0 211,881.0 339,993.0 600,156.0 103,429.0 1,609,191.0 Kalimantan Timur 246,715.0 337,458.0 255,665.0 558,900.0 31,459.0 1,430,197.0 Sulawesi Utara 451,663.0 389,135.0 47,309.0 355,436.0 13,380.0 1,256,923.0 Gorontalo 402,162.0 39,647.0 39,569.0 31,210.0 12,624.0 525,212.0 Sulawesi Tengah 455,167.0 119,917.0 101,877.0 539,624.0 17,865.0 1,234,450.0 Sulawesi Selatan 678,445.0 381,385.0 476,483.0 2,854,774.0 57,728.0 4,448,815.0 Sulawesi Tenggara 361,386.0 108,905.0 74,496.0 398,544.0 11,907.0 955,238.0 Maluku 288,091.0 269,611.0 40,392.0 100,748.0 8,887.0 707,729.0 Maluku Utara 181,373.0 98,459.0 75,404.0 102,353.0 6,272.0 463,861.0 Irian Jaya Barat 38,425.0 102,191.0 18,221.0 148,675.0 3,538.0 311,050.0 Papua 157,702.0 202,295.0 126,429.0 465,424.0 43,776.0 995,626.0 Luar Negeri 43,995.0 62,381.0 36,745.0 95,644.0 14,266.0 253,031.0 Jumlah 26,286,788.0 31,569,104.0 17,392,931.0 39,838,184.0 3,569,861.0 118,656,868.0 Sumber: Komisi Pemilihan Umum.
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