NOUSˆ 00:00 (2018) 1–27 doi: 10.1111/nous.12264
Why Maximize Expected Choice-Worthiness?1 WILLIAM MACASKILL AND TOBY ORD University of Oxford
This paper argues in favor of a particular account of decision-making under nor- mative uncertainty: that, when it is possible to do so, one should maximize expected choice-worthiness. Though this position has been often suggested in the literature and is often taken to be the ‘default’ view, it has so far received little in the way of positive argument in its favor. After dealing with some preliminaries and giving the basic motivation for taking normative uncertainty into account in our decision- making, we consider and provide new arguments against two rival accounts that have been offered—the accounts that we call ‘My Favorite Theory’ and ‘My Fa- vorite Option’. We then give a novel argument for comparativism—the view that, under normative uncertainty, one should take into account both probabilities of different theories and magnitudes of choice-worthiness. Finally, we further argue in favor of maximizing expected choice-worthiness and consider and respond to five objections.
Introduction Normative uncertainty is a fact of life. Suppose that Michael has £20 to spend. With that money, he could eat out at a nice restaurant. Alternatively, he could eat at home and pay for four long-lasting insecticide-treated bed nets that would protect eight children against malaria. Let’s suppose that Michael knows all the morally relevant empirical facts about what that £20 could do. Even so, it might be that he still doesn’t know whether he’s obligated to donate that money or whether it’s permissible for him to pay for the meal out, because he just doesn’t know how strong his moral obligations to distant strangers are. If so, then even though Michael knows all the relevant empirical facts, he doesn’t know what he ought to do. Or suppose that the members of a government are making a decision about whether to tax carbon emissions. Let’s assume that they know all the relevant facts about what would happen as a result of the tax: it would make presently existing people worse off, since they would consume less oil and coal, and would therefore be less economically productive; but it would slow the onset of climate change, thereby increasing the welfare of people living in the future. But the members of the government don’t know how to weigh the interests of future people against the interests of presently existing people. So, again, those in this government don’t ultimately know what they ought to do. In both of these cases, the uncertainty in question is not uncertainty about what will happen, but rather is fundamental normative uncertainty. Recently, some