Menrisky 1

Le voile du journalisme:

Metaphorical and analytical inquiry into press coverage of a national French

debate

______

A Thesis Presented to

The Honors Tutorial College

Ohio University

______

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for Graduation from

The Honors Tutorial College with the degree of

Bachelor of Science in Journalism

______

By

Alexander Menrisky

March 2012

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This thesis has been approved by

The Honors Tutorial College and the Department of Journalism

Ohio University

______

Professor Bernhard Debatin

Thesis Advisor

Professor, Journalism

Honors Tutorial College Director of Studies, Journalism

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Dr. Jeremy Webster

Dean, Honors Tutorial College

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the support, assistance, and love from many people who have been a part of my research process and undergraduate career. First, my mother and father, who read every draft along the way.

Thanks as well to Aunt Cynthia Walsh, who set the ball rolling for my research in

France, and to Ted Lazo, who allowed it to continue. Thanks of course to Anna

Topaloff and André Gerin as well for their help in my research, and to Annie Sugier, who helped get my interviews in place.

Above all, thanks to Professor Bernhard Debatin, without whose help this thesis would have been impossible to complete. No professor has been as cooperative with my eccentric work habits, early deluges of results, and overreaching attempts, especially where graduate school applications were involved. Thank you, as always, for your guiding hand over the course of these four years.

This project would not have been possible without the generous funding and support received from the Provost’s Undergraduate Research Fund and Dean Jeremy

Webster and the Honors Tutorial College Dean’s Discretionary Fund.

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ABSTRACT

In April 2011, a law went into effect in France that would no longer allow

Muslim women to don the full veil in any public location. News coverage of the event was heavy, in the French press and internationally. American coverage of the issue was widespread across a number of partisan papers and Web sites. Throughout the coverage, journalists used a number of linguistic devices to convey the debate in terms appropriate to their audiences. This thesis examines the language used by these journalists to cover the ban of the full-face veil in France, particularly metaphorical language. Through a variety of theoretical approaches, this thesis studies the metaphors, valence, and framing of articles from a sample of French and American publications in order to determine ways in which the two samples present news. The ban in France serves as a constant tying these articles together, and allows for a comparison of news reportage styles between the two populations. The project finds that the French sample as a whole approaches its news writing on a more neutral level, where the American sample uses more inflammatory language. In addition, it reveals ways in which these two countries view international debates through the press.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ...... 8

Part 1: Literature Review ...... 10

Chapter I: The Definition of Laïcité...... 10

Tolerance...... 11

“Cultural Community” and the Relationship between the French Press and

Laïcité ...... 14

Comparisons with the American First Amendment...... 18

Laïcité and Versions of the Ban in Other Countries ...... 19

Chapter II: Muslim Women and the Veil ...... 22

The Hijab, Niqab, and Burqa, and Their Significance ...... 22

Religious Freedom and the Veil Contested in Europe ...... 26

The Role of Colonialism ...... 29

Women Fighting Women ...... 33

Chapter III: Laïcité and the Ban in France: A Chronology ...... 36

The Law of 1905 and the Separation of Church and State ...... 36

World War II and Sixty Years of Immigration ...... 37

The Creil Affair and the Stasi Commission ...... 39

The Law of 2004 ...... 43

Chapter IV: The Law of 2010 and Its Discussion ...... 47

Part 2: Research and Conclusions ...... 51

Chapter V: Methodology ...... 51 Menrisky 6

Metaphor Theory ...... 51

Metaphor and Orientalist Discourse in Journalism ...... 56

Research Questions ...... 58

Sample...... 61

Metaphor Analysis ...... 64

Valence Analysis ...... 67

Framing Analysis ...... 70

Chapter VI: Discussion of Findings and Results ...... 72

Metaphor Analysis ...... 72

The Ban as Aggressor or Defender ...... 82

Valence of Topic ...... 85

Valence of Tone ...... 87

Relationship of Metaphors to Valence ...... 92

Framing Analysis ...... 93

Chapter VII: Conclusions and Further Questions ...... 99

Metaphor Analysis ...... 99

Valence of Topic ...... 101

Valence of Tone ...... 102

Framing Analysis ...... 104

Testimony from France ...... 105

Summary of Major Findings ...... 108

Limitations ...... 109 Menrisky 7

Questions for Further Research ...... 110

Bibliography ...... 113

Appendix A: Bibliography of Articles from Sample ...... 126

Appendix B: Valence Ratings across Samples ...... 152

Tables and Charts

Table 1: Metaphors sorted by metaphor ...... 73

Table 2: Metaphors sorted by subject ...... 79

Table 3: The ban as aggressor or defender in the total sample ...... 82

Table 4: The ban as aggressor or defender in the American sample...... 83

Table 5: The ban as aggressor or defender in the French sample ...... 84

Table 6: Topic valence distribution by sample ...... 85

Table 7: Tone valence distribution by sample ...... 88

Table 8: Percentages of neutral scores versus more radical scores in tone valence in

the American and French samples ...... 91

Table 9: Frames within total, American, and French samples ...... 96

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INTRODUCTION

In July of 2010, the French legislature approved a ban on a full veil in all public settings; the law was met with both heavy support and criticism on the part of foreign nations and religious and feminist groups within France as well as the U.S.

The law was in part an extension of earlier legislation in 2004 that banned the veil in schools and places of public, government employment. The issue was one of laïcité: this extreme separation of church and state, and the belief that “state” encompasses the entire social sphere, and that “church” resides only in the private one. After the French law of 2010 passed, effectively banning the wearing of “ostensible” religious symbols in public—most notably the burqa and niqab—and during the discussion of the law prior to and after the law’s passage, a deluge of media attention blossomed in the

French and international press. The American press also directed a large amount of attention to the issue. Due to the prevalence of the Muslim population in this issue, the media attention also incorporated many of the metaphorical techniques used over the past decade—most notably rhetoric involving the War on Terror. The prevalence of metaphorical language in these articles allows for an opportunity to study the different ways language impacts news presentation in the American and French press.

Through a fusion of three different theoretical approaches—metaphor analysis,

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and valence analysis, and framing analysis—this thesis accomplishes a qualitative analysis of a sample of articles from a sample of

American and French news publications in order to draw conclusions about differences between American and French news presentation. This is in large part a Menrisky 9

result of the valence analysis—which in turn depends on the metaphor analysis—that determines the favorability or unfavorability toward a topic by a given writer. Because of the sparse nature of literature on this most recent debate, I conducted interviews in

France with journalists, Muslims, academics, and government officials in late

November and early December 2011.

The history of this debate will be discussed in large part over the course of the next few chapters. This thesis is not intended to support or refute the French law; my personal opinion has no bearing on the research conducted over the course of this project, nor in the presentation of the results or history of the debate.

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PART 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER I: THE DEFINITION OF LAÏCITÉ

The central problem of the concept of laïcité has been cited many times as being the fact that it is a nearly impossible word to translate into another language from French. Many European countries associate it solely with France’s historical background in tolerance and separation of church and state (Willaime, 2009, 24). It is also oftentimes simply translated to mean “secularism,” and this definition comes mostly from its use to separate church and state in France over the past century. The

French conception of laicité here implies that “unless the state remains secular, freedom of religion for all is under threat: privatizing religious belief ensures space for the practice of every religion” (McKinnon 138). Murat Akan, however, describes

France as “the land of universalism, where laïcité has been taken as the very antithesis of multiculturalism” (Akan 237). Jean-Paul Willaime argues further that laïcité “must not be identified with the French system of church-state relations” and that it is “a

European value” (Willaime, 2009, 23). Perhaps most loosely, Khaled Beydoun described it as “premised on liberal notions of French nationalism” (Beydoun 191). It is clear that laïcité is not an easy term or concept to characterize or describe. I have included this section as a discussion of laïcité and its importance in France, as well as its relationship with methods of toleration and degrees of toleration in general.

The word laïcité is derived from the Greek laikos, from laos, meaning

“people.” The word first arose during the Middle Ages, when it was used to refer to

Christians who were not part of the clergy. During the second half of the nineteenth Menrisky 11

century, the word became synonymous with the neutrality between different conceptions of religion and philosophy as the proposed separation of church and state was designed (Koop 112). More specifically, in France it was initially “a critical perspective against the ideological monopoly of the Catholic Church” (Thomas 377,

Morin), originally proposed as a pluralistic initiative, but one that has transformed into strict secularism.

Tolerance

It is important to realize that France’s method of banning religious symbols in the name of laïcité, while not a pluralistic endeavor, is still a form of tolerance.

McKinnon makes the distinction between two competing civic forms of toleration: the liberal-pluralist and the republican-secularist models, also referred to as the Anglo-

Saxon “community” and French “assimilationist” models (McKinnon 125, Beriss 8).

The liberal-pluralist model, observable in the United States and the United Kingdom, is a method by which fewer constraints are placed on religious practice, sexual preference, and other varying practices in the public sphere; in short, citizens are able to make it known in public if they’re Catholic or Muslim, gay or straight, etc., and not suffer legal consequences. The alternative, the republican-secularist model, also expresses tolerance, although it may be more accurate to write that it enforces tolerance; as Herbert Marcuse writes in Repressive Tolerance, the republican- secularist model (although this term is not used in his paper) can also be denoted as pure tolerance, in which the state forces the population to be equal by restricting differences (Marcuse). This is the model that is evident in France: laïcité dictates, for Menrisky 12

France, that a secular nation rests on a completely secular public sphere, in which all representations of religion must be constrained to the private sphere. McKinnon points out that both of these models are consistent with “the idea of a compelling state interest, but each . . . yields very different policy recommendations” (McKinnon 127).

Marcuse adds that “the function and value of tolerance depend on the equality prevalent to the society in which tolerance is practiced” (Marcuse 96). In other words, tolerance is only as universal as the limits of a given society. This would no doubt appeal to a European audience, given the large collection of states with different cultures, goals, and histories.

It might help to here lay out several key components of tolerance. Nicholson sets six factors that are necessary for tolerance to be practiced in a civil society, the most important of which is perhaps the first: difference, defined as a situation in which

“what is tolerated differs from the tolerator’s conception of what should be done, valued, or believed” (McKinnon 128, Nicholson). Indeed, tolerance under this definition may operate in both models, as “value conflicts, along with efforts to resolve them by way of legitimate procedures, are an inherent component of democratic pluralism” (Mushaben 197). Nicholson also identifies importance, opposition, power, non-rejection (the tolerator does not exercise the power to not tolerate the subject), and requirement (toleration is a moral imperative) (Nicholson).

Both the liberal-pluralist and the republican-secularist models fit within the definition of tolerance as given by these components, and indeed, regardless of which method is used, tolerance is often the best choice, as “on some accounts, toleration is required Menrisky 13

because the alternative to toleration is war, and war is too costly—in all sorts of ways—as a method for negotiating oppositions” (McKinnon 129).

From these methods and definitions, laïcité can also be “understood in terms of individual autonomy: in the laïque polity, laws are made and policies enacted that encourage individuals to think and act free from the domination and influence of non- democratic groups within society.” However, it can additionally be interpreted as

“civic loyalty” and “active citizenship” (McKinnon 138-139). The French interpretation tends more toward civic loyalty, and in its definition of laïcité dictates that religious affiliations be removed from public life and be confined to the private.

Willaime approaches laïcité from a different direction: rather than study it as solely a French value, he considers its overall European significance. He breaks this idea down into three key principals:

(1) freedom of conscience, thought and religion, which includes the freedom to have or not to have a religion, to change one’s religion and to practise it, subject only to respect for the law, democracy and human rights; (2) equal rights and duties of all citizens, irrespective of their religious or philosophical beliefs, which means that government and the state must not discriminate against persons because of their religious or philosophical positions; (3) the respective autonomy of the state and religions, which signifies that they each enjoy freedom and independence with regard to the other, subject to respect for the law and democracy (Willaime, 2009, 26).

If one considers what might be called the French definition of laïcité from McKinnon given above, one can see that this definition fits within Willaime’s given above, but with the added component that the public sphere is no space for religious practice.

Willaime also writes that “the notion of the laïcisation of laïcité is intended to underline the fact that laïcité is no longer thought of as an alternative to religions but Menrisky 14

as a principle for managing the pluralism of religious and nonreligious convictions in civil society” (Willaime, 2009, 33). It must be noted that France does not forbid the practice of religion, but instead, “French secularism furnishes its citizens with this freedom of choice, but compels them to confine it exclusively within the private bounds of their homes” (Beydoun 197).

“Cultural Community” and the Relationship between the French Press and Laïcité

This confinement of heterogeneous social and religious practice to the private sphere is reflected in an idea of Frenchness, or a particularly “French” way of life or citizenship. This French identity is demonstrated in that “participation in the affairs of the state is based on membership in this national cultural community, rather than on legal citizenship. Ideologically, then, political community is, in France, identical to cultural community” (Beriss 2). In fact, newcomers to the country “are expected to leave their distinct practices and values at the border, and accept laïcité if they would like to become part of French society” (Beydoun 198). The French civic imperative is that the French are individuals first and members of an ethnic or religious community second (Eko & Berkowitz, Chapman & Frader). It is important to recognize this idea of Frenchness and a civic, cultural community especially when considering the French press’ relationship to laïcité and a secular society. Equality in France is achieved by assimilation rather than the acceptance of diversity. In theory, all immigrants would be absorbed into French culture and leave their old beliefs and customs behind. But the large influx of Muslim immigrants in the second half of the twentieth century led to an especial focus on this particular group, and given the West’s conception of Islam as a Menrisky 15

somewhat stricter, more fundamentalist religion, it quickly became the cornerstone of the debate on religious speech in these countries that have a concept of laïcité

(Mushaben).

The Jyllands-Posten Mohammad cartoons controversy of 2005 showed a trend across Europe in which papers from numerous countries wrote in support of press freedom and freedom of expression. The controversy started in September of 2005 when Flemming Rose, the cultural editor of the paper, “commissioned cartoons on

‘the face of Mohammad’ to counter the allegedly growing atmosphere of self- censorship in matters concerning Islam and Muslims due to a fear of violent attacks by

Islamist extremists” (Debatin, 2007, 227). Twelve cartoons were published that depicted the Prophet in a violent light. By October peaceful protests began in

Copenhagen. Criticism arrived even more heavily in the form of complaints by Middle

Eastern diplomats. A growing hostility toward the cartoons in the Islamic world led to further protests in Islamic and other Eastern countries, and the Danish government began to urge its diplomats and citizens to return from these countries. In February

2006, Iran broke economic agreements. Other European countries and publications, however, began to defend the cartoons. By March of 2006, the Danish Director of

Public Prosecutors announced a ruling that the cartoons were in keeping with the country’s own law (Debatin, 2007).

Many other papers began republishing the cartoons in the wake of the controversy, in part because of its newsworthiness, but also to make a statement that free expression is important (Eko & Berkowitz). However, Lyombe Eko and Daniel Menrisky 16

Berkowitz claim that this issue unearthed yet another within the French press on the subject of national unity versus religious pluralism (Eko & Berkowitz, Bernand). Eko and Berkowitz claim that in the wake of the cartoon controversy, Le Monde

“represented French secular republican ideology and the right of free expression” together, in favor of the non-pluralistic aspect of laïcité. I disagree with their argument for two reasons: first, for the irreconcilability of the right to free expression and the republican-secularist model (an error I believe they make early on in their presentation), and second, for reasons that will be discussed later in this paper and shown by this project’s results. Regardless, their analysis of French newspapers’ methods of presenting the news is valuable to understand how the French press approach newsworthy events and what this says about its relationship with laïcité

(beyond my disagreement with their above claims).

Shazia Iftkhar also found reason to believe the French media defended laicité, although in a more pertinent issue to this present paper: Iftkhar asserts that “media narratives consistently portrayed the headscarf as self-evidently a threat to the principle of laïcité and the project of the law banning ‘ostensible’ religious signs from the schools as a reasonable solution to the ‘problem’ of the headscarf” (Iftkhar i). This research, however, focused on broadcast media rather than print or online stories. The bulk of the analysis was also conducted by studying the questions television hosts posed to guests: both news and more entertainment-based “talk show” media were studied. The findings suggested that “ultimately, the headscarf is portrayed not just as a sign of religious fundamentalism, but religious fundamentalism with a political goal Menrisky 17

to subvert Republican principles from within the nation and the democracy, and practicing Muslims are portrayed as incapable of reason and of understanding of

Republican principles, and disloyal to the nation” (Iftkhar 16). This opinion was gathered from statements by politicians on television, questioning related to why certain guests were “for the voile” or “against republican values,” and targets inviting

Muslims to speak on why women were viewed as second-class citizens, and where in the Koran veiling is mandated (this particular question will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter). These and several other factors drove Iftkhar to conclude that veiling as treated unfavorably by television media.

French journalists value news analysis over news reporting, preferring to be

“the judge of the event and a guide for reader opinion,” believing this is “more important than being a witness to the event” (Eko & Berkowitz 5, Albert). This can be observed as true later in this paper in my discussion on observed frames of my sample: the frame of “Discussion,” in which the matter was parsed out in the article and approached from multiple perspectives in a general exploration rather than a story on a specific event, was much more prevalent in the French sample. Conversely, stories covering solely events were more common in the American sample. It has also been observed that French journalism is more concerned with “a tradition of literary style, intellectual elegance, and Gallic ‘logic’ than in the terse exposition of facts” (Gaunt &

Pritchard 185) and that “the press is not an instrument of commercial profit, but an instrument of culture; its mission is to give accurate information, defend ideas, serve the cause of human progress” (Bellanger et al. 319). Le Monde is singularly identified Menrisky 18

as being nationalistic and anti-American in tone, and serving the purpose of a forum for intellectuals to the center-left (Eko & Berkowitz 6-7, Jeanneney).

Eko and Berkowitz hold that journalists approach France’s “emphasis on national unity over multicultural and religious pluralism” as understanding journalism to hold an “expressive right,” the duty of protecting which is a “civic responsibility”

(Eko & Berkowitz 7-8). They observe the French press’ frequent defense of the right to free expression, which I have observed as well in the course of this project.

However, their study suggests that the French press is not in support of individual freedom of expression.

Comparisons with the American First Amendment

Jeremy Gunn compares the French laïcité with the American term “religious freedom,” although he points out that, while these concepts play similar roles in each society, they carry very different meanings (Gunn). In addition, there is a difference in the two concepts’ operation as national credos, as “the American First Amendment is distinguishable because it does not operate as doctrine, but rather as a doctrinally neutral platform ensuring its citizens the right freely to exercise any religion”

(Beydoun 191).

America’s approach to religious tolerance is much more similar to France’s earlier model of a pluralistic state, as “the American religious ‘experiment’ was founded on religious neutrality and tolerance,” born almost exclusively out of colonists’ express and original desire to escape religious persecution. In fact, and in many ways quite ironically, “the American Free-Exercise tradition was modeled after Menrisky 19

what Thomas Jefferson observed on his visits to France, which left him quite smitten with the state’s tolerance of French society’s diverse religious and confessional affiliations.” In addition, he found that the French “shared his own belief that religion must be ‘wholly exempt from civil society,’ as memorialized by France’s [first]

Constitution of 1791” (Beydoun 196, Noonan 461-462). Where France changed, however, “the specific enshrinement of secularism was not adopted into the United

States’ Constitution, as it would be the case in France. Secularism was not a fitting solution for Americans, given their experience with religious persecution at the hands of the English monarchy” (Beydoun 196-197).

Another marked difference between the American and French approaches to tolerance and the veiling issue involves their legal methods for exploring problems in the debate. France’s codified civic legal system (as opposed to the United States’ common law system), for example, dictates that all legal changes be codified as statutes and other recorded laws, while “in contrast with the situation in France, legal decisions in the US leveled against covering have been made by the courts and not the legislature” (Beydoun 209). In addition, most of these cases have revolved around issues of removing headscarves and full veils in important State matters, such as when testifying at a trial or when having one’s State Identification card or Driver’s License photograph taken (Beydoun).

Laïcité and Versions of the Ban in Other Countries

Other countries have their own versions of the ban or of laïcité. Spain’s 1978 constitution, in Article 16, reads that “no religion shall have a state character” and that Menrisky 20

“the public authorities shall take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish society and shall consequently maintain cooperative relationships with the Catholic Church and other religions” (Willaime, 2009, 27). However, the issue herein, and the reason this article singles out the Catholic Church, is that it makes a distinction between religions with “well-known roots” and those that have recently emerged in the country

(Willaime, 2009, 27). This distinction presents a new problem when considering

France’s debate: Islam, being a recent phenomenon of immigration to the West (to be discussed below), doesn’t necessarily have the “well-known” roots that Catholicism and Judaism might.

Belgium also passed a law banning the burqa and niqab in public shortly after

France did in 2011, and had long before utilized its own version of laïcité: Belgium is not secular, but rather has six recognized religions (Islam included), and laïcité as an expression of Humanist groups is considered a “seventh recognized religion”

(Willaime, 2009, 28). Germany employs a law similar to the French 2004 law banning the veil in schools, prisons, and other government-funded workplaces and locations

(Mushaben); the debate surrounding Germany’s own law was similar to the initial discussion preceding France’s first law, and will be discussed in further detail below.

Turkey also has laws prohibiting young Muslim girls from veiling, although Turkey is not a democratic state and certain aspects of its own laïcité are markedly different, in that it offers Islam religion classes in state schools and the state pays imams. The

United Kingdom allows Muslim girls to veil, but their veils must match the school uniforms’ colors (Willaime 24). Menrisky 21

It is apparent that laïcité can be defined a number of ways depending on its context. Willaime points out that, in order to truly define laïcité as it exists as a not- solely-French concept, one must take an historical study of all countries into account.

Because such a study takes time, and France is the subject of this project, I will stick exclusively to France’s history of laïcité, separation of church and state, and the foulard affair as it has existed for the past twenty years. But first, it is important to observe Muslim women themselves, the role of the hijab, and the social, political, and economic arena into which this debate and these women have been thrust.

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CHAPTER II: MUSLIM WOMEN AND THE VEIL

While the debate over the full veil ban is deeply entrenched in discussion over secularism, laïcité, and national identity, it is important not to forget that at the heart of the debate are the French Muslim women who veil, many of whom “simply do not see the irreconcilability of being both veiled and French” (Beydoun 203), and the significance—social, religious, or otherwise—of the veil or headscarf itself. It is important to understand this garment and the women who wear it before detailing

France’s path to this most recent ban, and to scrutinize the veil’s historical context and contest in Europe.

The Hijab, Niqab, and Burqa, and Their Significance

The word hijab encompasses definitions as varied as the interpretations of its requirements by Islamic religious texts. It can mean the literal veil, a more general piece of head covering, or even the metaphysical “illusion” (Martin, et al. 71).

Popularly, it has come to mean specifically the veil worn by Muslim women, but often refers to any degree of covering worn by Muslim women as a general term. Broader still, it defines a standard of modest dress, a system recognized by many followers of

Islam. Indeed, women are not the only ones bound by laws of hijab set down by

Sharia—Islamic law—there are requirements for men’s dress as well, though these are lesser debated and publicized than the requirements—or lack thereof—for women

(Martin, et al. 71).

The hijab as a type of veil, however, is not alone in its practice. Similar is the foulard, a simple headscarf that covers the woman’s hair and neck, and the source of Menrisky 23

the generalized name for the debate in France over the headscarf controversy: the foulard affair. The 2010 law, however, targets only two types of veil: the burqa and the niqab. The former, however, is rarer in France and the rest of Europe, and “even though many here mistakenly call it a burqa, the garment worn by women here is a niqab, an improvised cover in black with no religious or traditional significance beyond what a wearer or observer gives it. Some of these women may be rebels, demanding control over their bodies and recognition within a Western culture whose social values they reject” (Sciolino). The burqa and niqab are differentiated in that the burqa covers the entire body from head to toe, with a small screen covering the eyes: the woman is totally obscured. The niqab, on the other hand, is also a full veil, but in place of a screen, a small slit reveals the woman’s eyes (“Les different types de voile islamique”). These are both in the legal and journalistic literature on the 2010 ban referred to collectively as the “full veil.” For the purpose of simplification, I will refer to all of these garments throughout this project simply as “the veil,” unless special significance is given to a certain type.

Some debate is open, however, as to the religious requirement of the veil.

Many contest that the Koran mandates its use, as there is no specific mention of hijab, burqa, etc. Still others in France argue that the veil is not of religious significance to begin with, but has become a political tool. Indeed, there is a widespread Western belief that women are forced to veil by husbands, fathers, or brothers, although many

Muslim women testify that when they veil, they do so by their own choice and with no political, “subversive” motive. But the culture of Islamic veiling is divided by Menrisky 24

motivation. While it is true that some women wear the veil because they are forced to, even in Western countries, some women wear it because they feel empowered in their faith. Some wear it to carry on a tradition. Some wear it to promote modesty.

Regardless of the reason, it is commented by several researchers that the majority of veiling Muslim women in the west don the veil because they choose to, for any number of reasons (Gehrke-White).

The veil is justified most often as a symbol of, and in order to protect, the modesty of Muslim women, and “although not all Muslim women wear veil, it is an important religious practice mentioned in the Koran” (McKinnon 133). As previously mentioned, there exist many interpretations of this passage and several others.

Requirement by religious leaders generally turns to the Koran, of course, but the ambiguity of the religious texts leaves interpretation open.

Joyce Marie Mushaben compares the following two samples of text, taken from the Koran and the Bible (Mushaben 196). She also points out that with each religion there is a varying interpretation of the text based on many factors. The text from the Koran reads: “Prophet, enjoin your wives, your daughters, and the wives of true believers to draw their veils close round them. That is more proper, so that they may be recognized and not be molested” (The Koran 299, 33:59). This is compared with text from Corinthians in the Bible:

Every man who prays or prophesies with his head covered dishonors his head. And every woman who prays or prophesies with her head uncovered dishonors her head—it is just as though her head were shaved. If a woman does not cover her head, she should have her hair cut off; and if it is a disgrace for a woman to have her hair cut or shaved off, she should cover her head. A man ought not to Menrisky 25

cover his head, since he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of man. (Holy Bible 1294, 1 Corinthians 11:4-7)

It is important, of course, to note that the Bible here carries its own vague passage that could be interpreted as mandating some form of covering. Where the Islamic text is concerned, Beydoun claims that “the Koran alone, if read purely from a textual disposition [i.e. studied purely as its text above], does not legally mandate female covering as generally practiced by Muslim women today” (Beydoun 192).

Where requirement is concerned, in East and West, the four largest Sunni interpretations expect that women remain covered at all times in public and in prayer.

It is worth mentioning that Sunni is considered orthodox and fundamental even among

Muslim groups. It is generally required that the cover not be form-fitting, and to hang loosely and cover all but the face, and in some cases also the face (if a burqa or niqab is required). Muslim groups are even further divided on the issue of whether the face should be covered. A common justification for a woman’s covering, on the part of religious authority and veiling Muslim women themselves, is that a woman should dress in a way that does incite a member of the opposite sex or render her sexually attractive. In strictly fundamentalist cases, the only men permitted to look upon an unveiled woman are close male family members, such as brothers, fathers, and spouses. (Hsu 403).

In recent years, many Western Muslim women have opted out of wearing the veil. Because of the many different interpretations of the Koran, progressive Muslims often don’t see this as a problem, and in some cases even openly denounce the veil, especially in France and other Western countries (Gehrke-White). Menrisky 26

At the time of the Creil affair in 1989, the catalyst that set in motion the ban of

2004 discussed in detail below, a survey by Le Monde showed that sixty percent of those interviewed associated Islam with radical violence, 66 percent viewed it as antiprogressive, and 71 percent viewed it as radical and fanatical” (Beriss 6). At the time of the law of 2004, female Muslims in France were numbered at 1.7 million, of which 61 percent held French nationality. An article in Elle at the time revealed that, of the female Muslims interviewed, 86 percent did not veil, and 91 percent felt well- integrated into society. Fiffty-one percent claimed they were religious and practicing, and 29 percent were not practicing. Forty-nine percent of these women were in favor of the law of 2004 (Koop 124, “Cent ans de laïcité à la française”). Young women and girls who veiled in the early 21st century were estimated to number from 1500 to “a few thousand” (Kramer), the highest number of which only represents roughly one percent of Muslim students in France. “Of that generous number, only roughly 300 cases were considered problematic” (Thomas 381). As of 1999, France had a total

Muslim population of about 5 million (Eko & Berkowitz). This minority (France’s largest) accounts for at least 40 percent of France’s legal foreign residents. In addition, roughly 6 percent of all French students in public schools are Muslims without French nationality (Singh 188).

Religious Freedom and the Veil Contested in Europe

Before France’s veil debate culminating in the 2010 law, there were several cases in German courts that set precedents for religious freedom in Europe. While these cases have not had a direct impact on French law, they are indicative of the trend Menrisky 27

that has swept across Europe. Perhaps the most telling was a Bavarian case banning religious symbols in public schools though notably crucifixes (Mushaben 184). The verdict was announced in dangerous proximity to the September, 11 2001 attacks.

This, of course, fueled the fire against religious speech in Europe, and directed it especially against Muslims (Mushaben).

An especially important figure in the debate over veiling in Germany was

Fereshta Ludin, a woman who found her faith in Saudi Arabia and was raised by a mother who did not veil. She has been known to speak out against violent and repressive treatment of Saudi women, but she wears the scarf as an affirmation of her faith all the same, drawing a distinction between veiling and submission (Mushaben

184). She was denied admission to a public school in 1998, preceding a German state vote that ruled by majority “not to adopt a general headscarf ban for schools and universities” (Mushaben 184-185). When Ludin contested the decision to deny her enrollment, she claimed the action “violated state neutrality.” In 2002, the Federal

Administrative Court ruled that the school was not obligated to admit Ludin. But then, in 2003, the High Court stated that no state law banned headscarves per se, and she could therefore not be barred from public school enrollment or employment.

Mushaben writes that Ludin “claims that her headscarf is erroneously equated with support for the very political developments she had sought to escape when she left

Saudi Arabia for Germany, that is, the oppression of women” (Mushaben 185).

Similar to Germany, France’s own headscarf debate revolves primarily around public schools. “At issue is not neutrality but laïcité, described as ‘an immutable pillar Menrisky 28

of the French Republic,’ the ‘cornerstone of national unity,’ and the ‘leavening of integration.’ Here, too, individual religious freedom, curiously depicted as a type of ghetto-driven communitarianism, is seen to undermine the common good, the vivre- ensemble” (Mushaben 186, Mushaben’s emphasis). As discussed above, France’s cultural identity is its national identity. Equality is not the acceptance of various cultures, but the assuming of one. France itself underwent its own string of radical

Islamic terrorist attacks, specifically bombings in Paris, events that fueled the controversy and strengthened the belief that veiling was undertaken as a political statement (Silverstein).

Justice Winfried Hassemer of the German High Court posed the question, “Is

[a headscarf] just a pure piece of clothing, a sign of religious conviction, or a symbol of integration denied?” (Mushaben 188). This is complicated by the fact that there are two methods of integration: a government can open its arms to a variety of cultures and allow for an amalgamated, pluralistic society, or it can filter different customs in favor of one central culture. The difference between the American and French approaches is that one “focused on the needs of individuals, the other insisting on the well-being of the collective” (Mushaben 188). But the United States has had brushes with public school cases as well. Indeed, just as authorities are unable to require prayer or religious iconography or speech in public schools, they are unable also to prevent individuals from expressing their religious affiliation. In 2004, an Oklahoma school district was forced to change its dress code and pay a girl reparations after suspending her twice for wearing a scarf (Barnes). Indeed, the needs and actions of Menrisky 29

young students are often considered overlooked and overdramatized as political proselytism. Many commentators believe the laws, while being rightly enacted, have been justified for the wrong reasons, and see the scarf as not an issue of political speech, but one of enforced religious tradition and the continuing marginalization of different groups. There is a large camp that believes the ban should not be enforced under terms of national identity, but that “the opposition of the French state to the hijab might be justified by reference to a concern for the rights of the Muslim girls rather than non-Muslims” (McKinnon 137).

Mushaben believes that a multitude of factors are impacting recent cases, however, including conflicting ideas of feminism, many of which view Islamic fundamentalism as being directly linked to this method of dress, and thus again to oppression. Some scholars are critical of the idea of secularism in schools where the equation of Muslim students to political adversaries is concerned, and believe that “the simplistic formula, headscarf = female oppression = Islamicization = threat to freedom and democracy, may well mirror the post-9/11 climate but it draws upon arcane notions of neutrality and secularism unbefitting a global age” (Mushaben 188).

Perhaps a larger factor Mushaben and many other scholars notice in the debate is the role of postcolonial immigration and economic unrest.

The Role of Colonialism

An important concept to consider when viewing this issue is that of colonialism, “and the turbulent decolonization processes that followed post-World

War II liberation struggles throughout Africa” (Mushaben 191). Beydoun writes, Menrisky 30

“France’s volatile relationship with Islam was most sharply evident in their colonial experiments across the Mediterranean into North Africa” (Beydoun 197). This is particularly true for Algeria, the origin of many of the Muslim immigrants of the past half century (Iftkhar 5). Many African Muslims moved to France in the midst of political and economic struggles, resulting in what is today still a largely African-

French Muslim population. During this wave, some European nations were harshly strict on nationalization requirements. France, however, was more concerned with language skills and had shorter residency requirements. After a time, France implemented jus soli, granting citizenship to the children of immigrants. But the influx of immigrants—and with them their cultures, their varying ways of life—strained the

French ideal of a national identity. And despite integration into European society, some critics believe that “for the European, the veil was the most obvious symbol of the inferiority of the colonized” (Thomas 376).

Adding to the large numbers of immigrants was the hasty manner in which they were assimilated (similar mass influxes in the United States have ended in similar results)—such a rapid influx of people necessitated a place to put them. Mushaben believes that the immigration wave itself was not necessarily the primary problem where the coming labor issue was concerned, writing that “increasing hostility toward

Arabs, Africans, and Asians has not been triggered by new waves of migration. . . .

The problem is sooner homegrown, insofar as policy makers of the 1960s and 1070s relegated increasing numbers of low-income migrants to mass housing projects and banlieues, without supplying the infrastructure necessary for their assimilation” Menrisky 31

(Mushaben 190). There was not enough room in the cities, and so the immigrants were resigned to slums and hired for cheaper labor. Because such a great volume of immigrants passed into the country in a short span of time, it was harder for a laïque assimilation to take place, and thus was created “an embittered meta-debate over the preservation of national identity in the face of accelerated European integration, exacerbated by fears of global terrorism” (Mushaben 192).

The fact that laïque assimilation couldn’t keep up with the speed of colonialism may explain why there has been a gradual push to weed out any outstanding religious symbols. But one cannot deny the existence of a fear factor in the efforts. Why, for example, would Muslim headscarves be under attack, but not

Christian crosses? One answer may be that “the bearers of Christian symbols, such as habit wearing nuns, stand in a different tradition and have already proved their neutrality towards the state” (Buseman via Mushaben 195). It may also be that personal crucifixes are not as “ostensible” as the veil. Jewish symbols, once targeted quite heavily, have already been restricted. The most appropriate answer, however, might be the belief that an underlying political message hides behind the wearing of the veil. Given the anti-Islamic hype given the Middle East’s role in the past two decades’ attacks of terror, it is not very difficult to see where wearing headscarves can be interpreted not necessarily as just religious speech, but as political speech as well.

Mushaben remarks that Hermann Kues of the German Union parties stated, “It is a matter of tolerance with regard to day-to-day religious practices among non-Christian religions. [But] this tolerance cannot go so far as to pen entry to the civil service to Menrisky 32

symbols like the headscarf and the challenge it poses to dominant values. That would invariably lead to conflicts” (Mushaben 195). The simple fact is that Christian symbols are not viewed as a threat, or at least not as big of one.

But contemporarily, the postcolonial discussion is very much a political one.

The West in some cases is a representation of an oppressor, despite its methods of integration. A reverse intolerance has been known to occur. N. M. Thomas even points out that “in Algeria, men sometimes verbally and physically harass young women in

‘Western’ dress” (Thomas 375). But on the Western side, Muslims and Muslim women are gaining ground. It was reported that “between 1976 and 1995 female literacy in urban areas increased by 160 percent (120 percent for men); by the late

1990s, over 50 percent of all university students were female, rising to 62 percent in

2003 (Mushaben, 202). Muslims of both sexes have advanced significantly in education. The Averroes Lycée opened in September 2003 as the first Muslim high school in France. Twelve boys and six girls attended at the time of its opening. The school is funded privately through tuition and donations and “is owned by the Islamic league of the North, an organization that has strong ties to the fundamentalist Union of

Islamic Organizations of Force” (Ganley, 2003). The method of tolerance or integration aside, the standard of living and level of opportunity have indeed been raised for these immigrants placed in impoverished quartiers.

The pattern of immigration and its situation in the chronology as a whole will be discussed in further detail below.

Menrisky 33

Women Fighting Women

As discussed above, there are many reasons a woman will choose to wear the veil. Oftentimes these reasons fulfill a social purpose, as “not every young Muslim woman sees the headscarf as a political symbol. Muslim youth who feel rejected by mainstream society, female or male, will attempt to carve out positive identities for themselves based on the very symbols used to exclude them” (Mushaben 198). Just as moody American teens will dress in black to create a personal style or attract attention, sometimes young Muslim women just want to find a way to express themselves and a faith they feel is marginalized (Gehrke-White). Approached from an educational standpoint, instead of a political, the debate might appear very different. Mushaben writes, “rather than worrying about what goes on the heads of Muslim girls, educational authorities should be caring about what is taking place in the heads of these girls—shaped by role conflicts at home, parents unable to help with homework, macho brothers who get all the attention, etc.” (Mushaben 204). Other critics claim that banning the veil will result in the very situation the government wishes to prevent: girls will feel targeted, drop out, return home, and become wrapped in a deeper fundamentalist tradition (Koop).

It is in the public, social sphere, however, that many veiled Muslim women meet their greatest enemy: other women. While one feminist will proclaim her right to don the veil and feel empowered by the action, another will claim such a motion as oppressive fundamentalism. An incident in 2003 saw a large group of prominent women from Berlin and Brandenburg made an appeal to German lawmakers to not Menrisky 34

ban headscarves in public workplaces. Before they could make their appeal, however, a group of “autonomous feminists” countered them, “claiming to be the real defenders of women’s rights” (Mushaben 200). This is a perfect example of differing feminist schools of thought treading on each other’s toes in this battle. “Women who would deny other women the right to choose do not advance the equality cause,” writes

Mushaben. “One has to address Muslim parents and German-Muslim youth at the level at which they wish to be understood and accepted” (Mushaben 205).

In May 2009, Egyptian feminist and novelist Nawal El Saadawi gave a speech at the University of California at Riverside, part of which heartily denounced the veil, suggesting “that being moral does not mean to hide one’s hair, but rather to be responsible” (Imre et al. 386). Many of the young women in the audience challenged her proclamation, one in particular responding passionately that the veil offers protection against disrespect and the “sexualization and commercialization of female bodies.” Her argument was that veiling forces men to listen to her rather look at her, something she feels empowers her (Imre et al.). Other women have described the veil as a shield that protects their sense of self and acts as “a barrier between her and an unfamiliar and potentially hostile world” (Thomas 376, Moghadam).

Muslim women themselves have the most to say on their encounters in their communities, even when they find themselves at odds with other Muslim women.

There are businesswomen, doctors, politicians, and many others who have stories about the veil and their fight to keep it or escape it (Gehrke-White 264). One woman, a participant in a BBC forum on the role of women under Islam, comments: Menrisky 35

I would really appreciate it if those living in the West would get to know me first before I am judged. I hear people speaking ‘on my behalf,’ making everyone aware of how ‘oppressed’ I am. I wonder how many people know how it feels to sit back and watch the media and society make such assumptions about you. I personally find this more oppressive than any Shari’ah law (Mahmood).

But oppression is not the central issue in France, and the quest for a national identity is what has ultimately driven the government on its long path to the most recent ban of

2010.

Menrisky 36

CHAPTER III: LAÏCITÉ AND THE BAN IN FRANCE: A CHRONOLOGY

The Law of 1905 and the Separation of Church and State

In 1792, the French State was “de-Christianized” under Enlightenment principles that had been brewing for the century preceding the French Revolution, the most important of these being the rights of the individual, expressed today in France’s maxim liberté, égalité, fraternité (Iftkhar 4). However, much of the State’s function was ceded to the Catholic Church in the fledgling democratic society (Eko &

Berkowitz 2). The Church took control of many public functions, including education, health services, and even some prisons (Koop 113). This situation was reversed by the historic law of 1905, at which time all control of the State was transferred to the State itself, and the Church was declared an entirely private institution.

Prior to the passage of the law of 1905, France began to pass a number of laic laws, most notably in education, in the late nineteenth century. This began as a direct response to the growing diversity in the “anti-republican religious orders of the Jesuits and the Assumptionists,” two orders that were perceived as a threat to laïcité and the

Catholic Church (Akan 241). The Jesuits were perceived as having an especially strong foothold in education, and the Assumptionists in the press (Akan 241).

Eventually, Pope Leo issued the Ralliement, a call encouraging French Catholics to defend Catholicism within France and to follow the Republic (Akan 241). The law of

1905, passed on December 9, was implemented as a regulation of pluralism, and firmly separated church from state. Menrisky 37

The law started with a guarantee of freedom of religion: “La République assure la liberté de conscience. Elle garantit le libre exercice des cultes sous les seules restrictions édictées ci-après dans l’intérêt de l’ordre public”1 (“Loi du 9 décembre

1905” Article 1). It continued by forbidding religious symbols on public façades and monuments, excepting cemeteries, religious buildings, and museums. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly for the future, it handed control of the schools to the State.

Fifty-three years later, the Constitution of 1958 proclaimed that “la France est une

République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale . . . Elle assure l’égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d’origine, de race, ou de religion”2 (Koop

115). It is important to note that France incorporated secularism into its legal doctrine, and not religious neutrality (Beydoun 198). This is perhaps what fully separates laïcité from the separation of church and state observed in the United States.

World War II and Sixty Years of Immigration

The full effect of the law of 1905 proved to be short-lived, if only briefly interrupted. During the Vichy Regime under the Nazi occupation of the Second World

War, Marshal Pétain reintroduced the catechism in public schools and reinstated state aid to religious schools (Akan 245, Tippett-Spirtou 52). While the catechism ended when the war did, the funding continued for a good many years as conservative governments of the 1950s succeeded in continuing such legislation. As a compromise,

Prime Minister Michel Debré enacted the Debré law on December 31, 1959, shortly

1 “The Republic assures freedom of conscience and guarantees the free exercise of religion under the sole restrictions dictated hereafter in the interest of public order.” 2 “France is an indivisible, laïque, democratic, and social Republic . . . the State assures equality under law for all citizens without distinction of origin, race, or religion.” Menrisky 38

after the establishment of France’s final constitution to date, which continued funding private education; 90 percent of the funding was slated for Catholic schools (Akan

245).

In the midst of this organization and reorganization, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms went into force in

1953 after being created in the Council of Europe and signed in 1950. It was ratified by France in 1973, and 46 other European countries had signed. The Convention, within the framework of what constitutes liberal democracy, “guarantees . . . freedom of thought, of conscience and of religion (which includes the freedom to change religions or have none) and prohibits any discrimination, in particular that based on sex, race or religion . . . the only restrictions that can be placed on it come from measures that ‘are necessary in a democratic society’” (Willaime 29). The Convention is a legally binding body and text, but in some ways more than a simple legal doctrine: it represents what Willaime interprets as an ethos, or a common conception of respect for shared human rights in Europe as a whole (Willaime, 2009, 30).

This period also saw a massive wave of immigration to France for thirty years following World War II, much of this from North African Muslims (Koop 111).

During this period of “les Trente glorieuses”3 (so called by economist Jean Fourastié), immigrants were completely assimilated into the culture as laïcité dictated, educated and integrated by trade unions and schools (Beriss 1, Noiriel, Koop). When the economic crisis of the 1970s began, however, another wave of immigrants was observed as temporary laborers shuffled into the country, leading to increasing

3 “Thirty glorious years” Menrisky 39

tensions between immigrants and native French and what quickly became a full- fledged labor issue. Immigrants began to assert their ethnic identities for the following thirty-year period, up until the cusp of this issue. However, as the economy resituated itself in the 1980s and 1990s and immigration continued, the public view of immigrants transformed: now no longer viewed as a labor problem, they were seen as a social problem (Beriss 2, Grillo, Schain), even in conjunction with a budding anti- racist movement in the country (Thomas 378). These immigrants, Muslims especially,

“began to insist on the right to be different, to have non-French cultural identity, while, at the same time, claiming political rights within France” (Beriss 2).

The Creil Affair and the Stasi Commission

The beginning of the debate over the ban on headscarves began in October

1989 at a state school in Creil, where a Muslim girl was expelled for wearing the hijab after the principal asked her to drop it to her shoulders during classes, while allowing her to veil on the school grounds. Two other girls were reprimanded for veiling with the third, but agreed to drop the veil during class. All three of these girls were legal foreign residents (Singh 189). The principal of the collège Gabriel-Havez in Creil,

Ernest Chenière, had the fear that permitting veiling would lead to other demands by students on religious grounds that could disrupt the classroom in a culturally diverse region of the country (Beriss 1, McKinnon 133). In fact, his principal concern was not one of religious neutrality, but one of classroom participation. Lionel Jospin, the

Minister of Education, overturned the principal’s decision, stating that “the school is made for receiving children not excluding them” (from Singh 191, Wayland). In Menrisky 40

November of that year, the Conseil d’état, or Council of State, judged that “secular education . . . is an element of the legal separation of church and state in France, a guarantee of neutrality of the state in religious affairs. It is thus illegal to discriminate in terms of religion for access to education” (Beriss 11). The ruling also judged that the headscarf “was not in and of itself a contravention of the principal of laicité, but could be tolerated in schools as long as it was not accompanied by behaviour such as proselytism” (Iftkhar 1). Jospin’s judgment also encouraged school administrators to discourage the headscarf, but to allow it if the girls insisted on wearing them. After the

Creil incident, the Haut Conseil à L’Intégration was established. It identified certain public spaces, especially schools, as being the most important in which integration should occur for children and new citizens (Iftkhar 9). The school was not seen only as a grounds for integration, however: it was viewed as no less than the arena in which women’s oppression could be eliminated (Thomas 379).

Jospin’s own decision was in turn reversed in 1994, when a new Minister of

Education, François Bayrou, stated that “conspicuous and provocative religious symbols” could not be allowed in the classroom (McKinnon 133). However, keeping

“religion out of the schools in France was not, as in the United States, originally a matter of religious freedom, but rather was designed to remove education from a

Church which rejected the principles upon which the Republic was founded” (Beriss

3, Prost). The foulard affair in schools was indeed not the first debate over religious symbols in schools, though perhaps the most notable for this project. Over the years Menrisky 41

since the law of 1905, however, it became apparent that the state believed that, in theory, progressive education could eliminate the very desire for religion (Beriss 3).

Theoretically, French public schools are where origins and symbols of difference are left behind; ethnic identity is abandoned at the door and students exit as

French citizens. To represent oneself as a follower of a particular doctrine is to undermine the school’s intention. Koop writes of a speech delivered by Jacques Chriac in 2003, in which he stated that the schools are the source of French identity (Koop

113). In addition, there was a fear that religious symbols or membership in a particular community would increase discrimination; “without these symbols all students were equal” (Beriss 5). Additionally, there existed a widely held belief that the veil was a sign of the oppression of women, and “if children are allowed to carry signs of their oppression into the schools they will not be liberated” (Beriss 7). Conversely, however, those fearing the schools’ strict policies believe that “the danger in rejecting children for religious reasons resides in pushing them towards more extreme positions” (Beriss 9). In short, when Muslims are penalized for expressing their faith, they will regroup and cloister themselves in sheltered, marginalized communities that will become radical and antiprogressive. Jospin, on one occasion, stated that he believes it is more important to prevent conflicts between groups than to reduce difference; otherwise no problem is solved (Beriss 11).

Shortly after the Creil altercation, President Jacques Chirac established the

Stasi Commission, named for the head of the commission, Bernard Stasi, to explore the question of secularism and religious symbols in the public sphere. The commission Menrisky 42

was made up of primarily scholars and intellectuals (Akan 239). On 11 December

2003, Chirac received La Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la République,4 or the Stasi Report (Akan 238). It stated that “In comparison to the context of 1905, French society has changed: the hold of the

Catholic Church [on society] is no longer perceived as a threat” (Akan 240,

Commission 38). The report went on to detail the growth of Islam and African,

Maghrebi, and Middle Eastern populations in France. In addition, it encouraged

Muslim girls to attend private schools rather than state (Akan 246). Perhaps most importantly, it stressed that the situation was a threat to the security of the French people, and that it was important to “affirmer une laïcité ferme qui rassemble,”5 to bring the people together and unify them (Koop 120, Commission). But overall, the

Commission heartily believed that, “as symbols of the traditional subordination of women in the Islamic world, [headscarves] impede the development of girls in autonomous persons” (Commission). But regardless of its suggestions, the report was met with heavy criticism that it provided too few concrete recommendations (Thomas

384).

In opposition, many of the outspoken supporters of the headscarf were Jewish and Christian religious leaders, who “argued that the veil or headscarf was a cultural as well as a religious symbol and more importantly they argued, a new definition of secularity was needed to take account of differences and different treatment” (Singh

190, Feldblum). Regardless, the government was in a position to allow Chirac to “call

4 The Commission’s report on the application of the principal of laicité in the Republic 5 . . . it was important to “affirm a strong, unifying principal of laïcité.” Menrisky 43

for the immediate adoption of a national ban on all ‘signs and dress whose wearing leads to the immediate recognition of the [wearer’s] religious belonging, which is to say the Islamic veil, whatever name one calls it, the Jewish kippa, or a cross of massively excessive dimensions.’” Chirac’s government, failing to take into account the Stasi Committee’s “twenty-six recommendations, which focused on greater legal equality for religious groups” in a number of different areas (Mushaben 186-187), was prepared to commence legislation.

The Law of 2004

After the Stasi Commission reported its findings, Luc Ferry, Minister of

Education, presented a proposal for a new law (Koop 121). Members of the National

Assembly of France voted on 10 February 2004 to ban the hijab and other “ostensible” religious symbols (e.g. Jewish yarmulkes, Catholic crucifixes, and Sikh turbans) by a margin of 494 to 36. Seventy percent of the French population was in support

(McKinnon 132). The Bill was passed on 15 March 2004, and the law went into effect—and expelled two girls—on 20 October. On 3 March, a new law was adopted that altered the education code with an article (L. 141-5-1) detailing that manners of dress that ostensibly “manifest a religious adherence” were liable for disciplinary procedures (Akan 240, Projet du loi). Despite the wide support of the population, however, those “who criticized the law emphasized that the law was in contradiction with laïcité, or that it was raising and fighting manufactured problems, and evading the real problems of gender in equality, racism and unemployment” (Akan 238,

Baubérot, Balibar, Terray, Scott). Iftkhar posits that, on the supporting side of the Menrisky 44

debate, the media identified three central dangers the headscarf posed to laïcité: “(a) communitarianism (a French social concept meaning the privileging of a particular community identity over national identification) and a threat to national unity, (b) a threat to equality of the sexes, (c) the fear of a rise of a militant, fundamentalist Islam within France” (Iftkhar 2, Bowen). According to Thomas, the issue surpassed even the fall of the Berlin Wall in front-page news (Thomas).

The central precept of the law was that “les religions doivent passer de la sphère publique . . . à la sphère privée de l’intimité et de la conviction, c’est-à-dire ‘de l’ostensible’ au ‘discret,’ du signe communautaire au signe personnel”6 (“Loi du 15

Mars 2004”). In short, that “ostensible” symbols expressing religion were to be moved from the public sphere totally to the private. It specified its intent by proclaiming that

“dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse est interdit”7 (“Loi du 15 Mars 2004”). This decree was oddly prophetic: it expressed an intent to move religious symbols totally from one sphere to the other, and yet only did so in schools (and other State buildings); it wouldn’t be until 2010 that the principle would expand to include the entire public sphere. As was to happen during the passage of the law of 2010, the law of 2004 was seen to have split the socialist party and the rest of the government, the socialists generally denouncing a ban (Thomas).

6 “. . . religion must pass from the public sphere . . . to the private sphere fitting of the intimacy of religious conviction ; that is to say, from the ‘ostensible’ to the ‘discreet,’ from the public sign to the personal sign.” 7 “. . . in public schools, the wearing of signs or attire by which students ostensibly display a religious affiliation is prohibited.” Menrisky 45

While the central driving factor of the 2004 law was France’s secular doctrine, many commentators have noted the growing concerns for national security that arose in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Especially after the September

11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States’ World Trade Center and Pentagon, distrust of Islam began to have less to do with labor and economics than with security and xenophobia. Islamic practices began to lose religious meaning to non-Muslims, and began to be viewed as entirely political statements. In short, “Islam and the headscarf were politicized” (Beydoun 189-190). Women particularly were at risk of demonization, as the headscarf is arguably the most “ostensible” and visible religious symbol a Muslim can display. Some critics have argued that the freedom of Muslims in America and other Western countries has dipped significantly lower than that of fellow citizens, especially when symbols of religious faith, such as the headscarf, are displayed. The “War on Terror,” a critical term when discussing journalistic coverage of Muslims in the West, began as well, and in many ways served only to widen the gap between Muslims and the West and bind the conceptions of Islam as a religion and Islam as a political tool (Beydoun 200). Subsequent terrorist attacks in London and Madrid served to bring the issue of national security even closer to France. Some scholars claimed that this War on Terror only served to fill a gap left by the Cold War, one for which the West was in need of an “ideological foil” (Beydoun 201). The result of this growing security concern, coupled with the preexisting economic difficulty, was that the French government in large part found the headscarf and other outward displays of religious symbols to be a threat to France’s goal of preserving a national Menrisky 46

identity: religious symbols served only to create a sectarian atmosphere. Interesting to note is that French Jews faced a similar accusation earlier in the twentieth century and before, as their strong faith caused them to be identified as considering their religious identity more important than their French (Beydoun 203).

The situation produced two competing justification for the bans; it can be observed that “the argument could take two forms: (1) that worries about the increased birthrate of Arabs in France might swamp a recognizable French culture justifies the ban; (2) that wearing the hijab is a potentially destabilising form of political protest by

Muslim girls against the state” (McKinnon 135). In all likelihood, the drive for the bans was a result of a combination of these two arguments: both of them indicate a concern over the preservation of French national identity. The law of 2010 firmly cemented this developing precaution in the French legal, political, and social system.

Menrisky 47

CHAPTER IV: THE LAW OF 2010 AND ITS DISCUSSION

On 26 January 2010 the French Parliament began to call for the adoption of a law banning the full-face veil in public. Although much of the political rhetoric behind the ban claimed that the ban was again targeted at all “ostensible” religious symbols, many critics claimed that the ban was “centrally motivated by the Muslim headscarf” and that the further push toward secularism was also driven by Islamophobic discontent, caused in large part by the economic and social uncertainties discussed above (Beydoun 188). At this time, the UMP (President Nicolas Sarkozy’s party to the right), the Modern Party, and Le nouveau centre were all in favor of a law banning the full veil. The Green and Communist parties, among several others, were not in favor

(“Voile integral . . .”). On 30 March, the Council of State declared that a ban was viable, but was very vulnerable to legal contest. President Nicolas Sarkozy officially declared himself in favor of a full ban on April 21. And finally, on July 13, l’Assemblée nationale, or the National Assembly, adopted the bill (“Le projet de loi . .

.”). The movement for a ban was spearheaded by André Gerin, Minister of the

Communist Party and member of the National Assembly. Gerin’s time as mayor of

Vénissieux, an area of high Muslim population, drove him to become a driving force in the bill’s progression.

The proposition for the resolution given 27 April 2010 and approved on 13

July states at its outset that “tous les pays, en Europe et dans le monde, sont confrontés au développement de pratiques radicales dont la forme la plus visible est l’apparition Menrisky 48

de femmes circulant, dans l’espace public entièrement voiles – burqa ou niqab.”8

(Proposition 4). The proposition goes on to say that these women are living on the margin of society, and that the whole of France cannot simply approach this phenomenon “indifferently,” as “le visage est la partie du corps qui porte l’identité de l’individu”9 and “parce que les femmes sont les seules concernées, le port du voile intégral place la femme dans un rapport de subordination à l’homme”10 (Proposition

4). The actual proposition states that the National Assembly intended to take a stand against violence taken against women and “affirme que l’exercise de la liberté d’expression . . . ne saurait être revendiquée par quiconque afin de s’affranchir des règles communes au mépris des valeurs, des droits et des devoirs qui fondent la société”11 (Proposition 7). The proposition was further described by La Croix as affirming that “la dissimulation du visage est contraire aux valeurs qui ‘garantissent la cohésion nationale’ et porte atteinte à la dignité de la personne”12 (“Projet de loi . . .”).

The punishment meted out for offense is a 150 euro ($215 USD) fine and possible citizenship classes, but no arrest. Those who force women to veil are subject to up to a year in prison and a 30,000 euro ($43,000 USD) fine (Associated Press). The language of the law bans not only veils, but any face-coverings in public space, with several exceptions: masks and helmets worn for health reasons and sports, and masks at

8 “. . . every country, in Europe and the world, is confronted by the development of radical practices, of which the most visible form is the emergence of women moving in the public sphere entirely veiled in burqa or niqab.” 9 “. . . the face is the part of the body that carries the identity of an individual. . .” 10 “. . . because only women are concerned, the full veil places women in a position of subordination to men.” 11 “. . . affirms that the exercise of freedom of expression . . . will not be claimed by those who attempt to pass those common rules, rights, and duties that form the basis of our society.” 12 “. . . the covering of the face is contrary to the values that guarantee national unity and affect personal dignity.” Menrisky 49

carnivals and other public celebrations are allowed (Doland). The bill itself was

“worded to trip safely through legal minefields,” avoiding such words as “women,”

“Muslim,” and “veil” (Ganley, 2010).

On 14 September 2010 the Senate examined the bill, and the majority voted in favor. The Green and Communist parties did not take part in the vote (“Le projet de loi

. . .”). The government itself, in an unanticipated move, submitted the bill for scrutiny to the Constitutional Council, which endorsed the ban early in October 2010. Critics of the ban accused Sarkozy as using the ban to stigmatize Muslims and boost his support in the approaching presidential election, after gathering a record low of approval ratings in opinion polls throughout the time of the debate (Vinocur). The Catholic

Church joined opponents in warning the government against a ban, potentially fearing later censure of more overt Christian symbols (Reuters 2010). The Turkish Prime

Minister Tayyip Erdogan also criticized the French government’s new law (Reuters

2011). The ban’s most threatening critique arrived when the government received a violent, confirmed video message from Osama bin Laden in October 2010, demanding that the government allow Muslim women to veil.

After what was described as a “grace period” following the law’s approval to the time it was put in effect, the law entered force on 11 April 2011. Demonstrations followed the enactment and a number of veiled women were arrested, although their crime was cited as taking part in an unauthorized protest and not for wearing the veil

(Rustici). One Muslim woman in particular said of the law and France, “J’ai Menrisky 50

l’impression d’être amoureuse d’un home qui me crache au visage”13 (Le Bars).

Indeed, in response to the law, many Muslim women who wear the veil simply stopped leaving their homes (“Déclaration…”). By May 2011, one half of the women in France who typically veiled had removed it, according to Rachid Nekkaz, a wealthy property owner who vowed to pay the fines of all women punished for wearing the veil (Baume). Many of the affected women spoke of leaving France, and many met abuse and encouragement to leave, with much of the abuse coming from other

Muslims. Law enforcement officials also met challenges, commenting that the ban proved to be incredibly difficult to enforce. The police do not have authority to remove the veil by force, but they can transport offenders to local stations and administer the fine or require citizenship classes. In some cities, the police were wary of taking action for fear of causing unrest (Erlanger 2011).

According to a Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, 82 percent of France supported the ban around the time of its effect, with majorities from other European countries joining: 59 percent in Spain, 62 percent in the United Kingdom, and 71 percent in Germany. In America, however, only 28 percent approved of a ban on the full veil, with 65 percent disapproving (Prothero).

13 “It feels like I’m in love with a man who has spat in my face.” Menrisky 51

PART 2: RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER V: METHODOLOGY

Metaphor Theory

While the general conception of news reporting is that journalists are to present events in as neutral and unbiased a light as possible, a journalist who tries his or her absolute best to purge a story of all tone and slant is hard-pressed to exterminate the more pervasive and perhaps subtly telling mechanics of language that exist as metaphor in speech and writing. At times metaphor is used in novel form, in a poetic manner that is used ostensibly by some to make a comparison and proclaim a judgment; for others it is used to praise or preen. Some writers deliberately frame an issue and some do so unintentionally; it is this very fact that makes a metaphor analysis of the news surrounding the ban on the head scarf so valuable.

The conception of the role of metaphor in language has changed drastically over time, even in the past ten years. Lakoff and Johnson have provided an extensive account of how metaphor has insinuated itself into the very foundation of communication, even recently supplementing their studies with hard scientific data

(Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). Metaphor is as important to language as words themselves. Lakoff and Johnson propose that metaphors are the links between abstract ideas and linguistic description; difficult-to-handle emotional concepts and conceptual ideas are explained in terms of sensorimotor experience; for example, time, an un- seeable concept, and thus difficult to explain in terms of itself, is automatically described in terms of something else, as demonstrated by Johnson and Lakoff’s “Time Menrisky 52

Is Money” metaphor, or “the Future Is Ahead.” These most basic metaphors that are hardwired into the human consciousness are called primary metaphors. Here are a few more examples:

Good Is Up Bad Is Down More Is Better Bigger Is Better Affection Is Warmth Inflation Is an Entity

All of these primary metaphors are classifiable as orientational metaphors or ontological metaphors, depending on their mode of comparison. For example, “Good

Is Up” is an orientational metaphor because “good” is explained in terms of physical orientation, in this case “up”; similarly, “Inflation Is an Entity” is an ontological metaphor because “Inflation” is given being (Lakoff and Johnson also describe this particular metaphor as a case of personification—especially when inflation is treated as an enemy).

While primary metaphors are the building blocks, what Lakoff and Johnson describe as complex metaphors serve as the tip of the iceberg of the rest of the metaphorical world. Complex metaphors are metaphors built out of more basic, ingrained primary metaphors. For example, “A Purposeful Life Is a Journey” can be broken down into several primary metaphors, such as: “A Person Living a Life Is a

Traveler,” “Life Goals Are Destinations,” and “A Life Plan Is an Itinerary” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). These simpler metaphors are deeply rooted in our consciousness: we often think of life in these terms. Taken together, they create a vividly realized picture that may or may not also be conceptually ingrained. Lakoff and Johnson Menrisky 53

describe this process as a kind of “mapping,” in which relationships among primary metaphors are connected in a large web that overall represents the concept of the complex metaphor. The more generalized and poetic conception of metaphor, the use of metaphorical comparisons in order to embellish language and create new comparisons, is labeled by Lakoff and Johnson as novel metaphor. More specifically, when used in a poetic sense in a work of literature, novel metaphor is identified as poetic metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

Conceptually, there is no difference between the primary metaphors and the concepts they represent. Lakoff and Johnson use metaphors for love as an example— otherwise, how would we be able to describe what love, a complete abstract, is? These conventional metaphors that are inseparable from their subjects are “dead metaphors, frozen into literal expressions” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 119). For example, I can have a bright idea, or observe that the stock market has crashed: my ideas are not literally illuminated, and nor has a physical being called the stock market fallen down, but we recognize these metaphors so well for what they represent, they have become irrevocably embedded in the language.

Lakoff and Johnson eschew the idea of metaphor in language fitting into any subjective or objective category (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980); instead, they favor the idea that metaphor is solely experiential, and its use is what fills these other two more widely accepted categories of discourse and thought. Christopher Johnson conducted a study based on the idea of conflation, when two concepts or sensorimotor activities are muddled in an early stage of development. He studied specifically the metaphor Menrisky 54

“Knowing Is Seeing” (as in “I see what you’re saying”), and discovered that the two concepts were conflated in a period of early childhood prior to the use of metaphor; in other words, something was not known to the subject child unless it was seen, and when the child saw something, he knew it existed. When they are conflated, the two concepts are attached, and after growing, we come to express these components one in terms of the other (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). Srini Narayanan’s neural theory of metaphor goes a step further to suggest that physical neural connections are made during these stage of conflation, and that in adulthood these metaphorical ways of expressing one thing in terms of another are literally indivisible (Lakoff and Johnson,

1999).

“The literal meaning of metaphor is ‘to carry over’; metaphor symbolically transfers aspects of one object to another, even if the objects are in no way connected”

(Steuter and Wills 3). This definition offers a wide range of possibilities in the realm of language and representation, but does not necessarily betray the intricacies necessary to a close analysis of what metaphor reveals about a story’s valence, or the positivity or negativity of its representation of the subject.

How does a study of metaphor in a body of literature facilitate understanding of valence? Given that many of these metaphors are deeply enough ingrained as to be nearly subconsciously used, the terms used to describe events, people, and concepts are often telling of how an author is positioned on a subject, even if the author consciously makes an attempt to remain unbiased; some of these metaphors are so Menrisky 55

deeply ingrained they are overlooked when writing, and there are ways to determine how these metaphors reveal valence.

Debatin further classifies metaphor, breaking down background metaphor (his roughly equitable term to Lakoff and Johnson’s dead primary metaphors, those that cannot be extricated from the language and are nearly forgotten in use) and complex metaphor into classifications based on how emphatic or resonant a metaphor is

(Debatin, 1995). A highly emphatic metaphor can be described as irreplaceable, while a highly resonant metaphor is one with a large number of implications attached to it.

For example, an emphatic metaphor is one that, removed, could change the meaning of a sentence. One that is resonant is suggestive, and points to, in the case of this project, orientalist or gendered implications. By rating metaphors as emphatic or resonant (e.g. very emphatic, moderately emphatic, and minimally emphatic), and comparing how emphatic a metaphor is with how resonant it is, it is possible to isolate the metaphors that drive the underlying opinion of the story, and ultimately determine its valence as favorable or unfavorable, positive or negative. Minimally emphatic and resonant metaphors are “weak”; a metaphor that is highly emphatic or resonant but minimally represented by the other quality, or one whose qualities are both moderate, is a “neutral” metaphor; and a metaphor that is both highly emphatic and resonant is

“strong.” By observing these “strong” metaphors, a map of the complex metaphors across the story can be drawn, and conclusions can be drawn regarding what impact these metaphors have on the valence of a story, or the general attitude of a story. Menrisky 56

Furthermore, metaphor allows for larger comparisons to be among news stories when the subject is the same but the frame is different.

Metaphor and Orientalist Discourse in Journalism

Islam has been a popular choice of study for metaphor theory since its inception, but perhaps in no frame more than the War on Terror. Several studies have been conducted on the use of metaphor in several different countries’ and publications’ use of metaphor to combat terror, and how this language has had bearing on the Islamic world. Steuter and Wills’ At War with Metaphor is one such example, and provides insight into metaphors previously used to describe, categorize, or chastise Muslims in journalism. Steuter and Wills explored particularly the use of violently charged metaphor and war imagery in the media and government propaganda following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the

Pentagon. A pattern is observed devolving Middle Easterners into fanatics and animals, creatures that have upset the civilized American way of life who need to be exterminated. Steuter and Wills track the media’s constant repetition of certain images and metaphors, citing metaphor’s “influential function” in leading public opinion, where the public generally will only recognize metaphor’s “decorative function” (Steuter and Wills).

The East was transformed, “shaped by ongoing metaphors . . . as populated not by individuals but by aggregates, by chaotic masses of humanity” (Steuter and Wills

27). Animal metaphor (“The Vermin Have Struck Again”) and exterminationist rhetoric crafted an image of the oriental as something sub-human, as violent and Menrisky 57

animalistic, and something to be wiped out. The repetition of this imagery, of the

Middle East as being possessed of something so basely non-Western to be almost alien, only served to perpetuate an orientalist discourse, which sets the East apart as

“Other,” and allows the West to define itself based on what it is not: fanatic, dangerous, easily destroyed, and repressive of women. As Steuter and Wills pointed out, war and animal metaphor was the most pervasive when covering issues of terrorism or the Middle East post-9/11; this fact serves as an interesting basis for this study, approaching a very different issue with the same key players.

Richardson undertakes a similar study, using CDA rather than strictly metaphor and studying word choice, syntax, and other linguistic tools to determine moods and analyze underlying meanings (CDA will be discussed in further detail below). His findings showed that presentation of war in journalism depended heavily on which player was being represented at a given time. For example, when comparing the United States and Iraq as represented in news stories, he found that, where the U.S. always issued warnings, Iraq made threats in similar circumstances. While Iraq and

Islam are of course not mutually exclusive, the representation of the East as a general construct, he shows, is often easily muddled together in journalism (Richardson 103).

Edward Said’s eponymous study of orientalism and how it has skewed

Western notions of Eastern culture offers some insight into the role journalism plays in representation of the Middle East and Islam, but he gives a more focused look specifically at how this trend has played out in journalism in recent years in Covering

Islam. Together, these books provide an in-depth explanation of how Islam and the Menrisky 58

East are presented in Western culture by the media and by government propaganda: as violent warmongers and religious fanatics, who are primitive enough to be easily defeated, who are culturally deficient enough as to need the aide of the West, and in some cases as sensual and exotic, although this representation has faded in light of the recent waves of terrorist mania (Said, 1978, 1981). Perhaps most important is the idea that the East is culturally behind by a number of centuries, especially in the department of the treatment of women. The repetition in the media of these ideas, and the oftentimes loose substitution of words such as East, Islam, and Orient, has confused the terminology and the way the West views the orient. Eastern, Islamic, and terrorist become interchangeable, even when the Islam in question is even practiced in the West (Said, 2981).

Through a variety of studies, it has been shown that specific language used and the linguistic constructions in which it might be found have a strong bearing on readers’ interpretations and how journalism presents Islam as a whole. Prior research suggests that the media have portrayed Islam as being in a lesser state of being than

Western civilization, and that Muslims are fanatics, children, violent insurgents, or oppressed women. These previous studies provide insight into and perhaps even a basis for comparison with the issue of the French ban on the burqa and niqab.

Research Questions

When approaching analysis of tone and metaphor in journalism such as this, in which metaphor, framing, cultural theory, topic, and tone all play important roles, it is important to divide research questions in a manner that will most efficiently allow for Menrisky 59

the study of results based on the components involved. When approaching my study of these articles, I considered these five questions:

Research Question 1: What metaphors can be identified in these articles, how frequently are they used, and which, if any, are used cross-culturally, in both the

French and American publications? – How best are they defined? How are these metaphors spun in the longer narrative of the debate? Are these metaphors focused more heavily on the French law or on Muslims and headscarves themselves? Do these metaphors favor the law in France or vilify it, or do they fall somewhere in between?

What role does orientalist discourse play in these articles where metaphor is concerned?

Research Question 2: What is the topic valence of these articles? – Did the events of the debate seem to hinder or help the law? How much media coverage was there of events or people that were detrimental to the law or the veil? How does the topic valence impact interpretations of media coverage of the ban and its path?

Research Question 3: What tone valence is apparent in these articles when considering testimony and other quoted material, and how does metaphor indicate it? –

Is the tone sympathetic or derogatory toward certain parties? Does the tone suggest support for the Muslim women or support for the government? Are the Islamic players in question belittled or vilified? Are they presented as burdened or ennobled? Are the

Muslim women presented as subjugated by the state or by their faith? How does this contribute to the valence of the articles? Is there an indication of an Eastern or Menrisky 60

Western feminist stance? Are Muslim women considered as trapped or liberated by their faith?

Research Question 4: What frames are used in the writing of these articles? –

How do they divide the debate into a manageable picture of the overall debate? How do the frames differ in American and French publications?

Research Question 5: All of the above considered, how is the American journalistic representation of this debate different from or similar to the French representation? – Do the American publications, based on this sample and the valences, seem to support the law? Do the French publications, based on this sample, support the law? Are the American and French publications comparable in their coverage and/or support (or lack thereof)? What does this say about how the French publications approach laïcité? In regards to question one, how do the appropriate metaphors represent this distinction?

After having considered all of the above research questions, it became clear that my methodology was to be dictated by four key analyses: a metaphor analysis; a valence analysis divided into two parts, one for topic and one for tone; and a framing analysis.

Considered en masse, the answers to these questions allowed me to formulate conclusions on the way the French and American media presented the public ban on the burqa and niqab in France when the issue was brought to the French parliament, when the law was passed, and when it took effect. By studying the valence that resulted from the use of metaphor in regards to orientalist and/or Islamophobic Menrisky 61

discourse (or lack thereof) and the tone used to introduce testimony and quotes, as well as the overall tone of the article in regards to Muslims, the law, and laïcité, I was able to draw conclusions as to whether the national ideal of laïcité was trumped by a universal one of free expression.

Sample

My method of data collection started with the collection of a sample of articles that would best represent various media perspectives on the issue of the ban. I chose several American and French print and online publications that I believe represent a wide sample of journalistic example; I chose the publications I did based on political slant (more conservative or liberal, or left or right), readership (numbers and distribution), and/or region (distribution). For those publications situated primarily online, region obviously had little to do with classification. Perhaps, however, the most important qualification for choosing these publications is that, in each country, these papers are read nationally (and in some cases internationally), and frequently cite each other as events occur. In addition, several of the French publications cited some of these American publications (most heavily The New York Times), and several of the

American publications cited some of the French ones (La Croix was the most cited

French publication in American publications).

The American publications I chose were The New York Times, CNN.com,

MSNBC, The Huffington Post, and Fox News (online). The French publications I chose were Le Monde, L’Express, Le Figaro, La Croix, and Metro. The breakdown of the numbers of articles taken from each publication and each country is as follows: of Menrisky 62

the total of 147 articles, 77 were taken from American publications and 70 from

French publications. Of the 77 articles from American publications, 17 came from The

New York Times, 18 from CNN.com, 11 from MSNBC, 19 from The Huffington Post, and 12 from Fox News. Of the 70 articles from French publications, 22 were found in

Le Monde, 19 in L’Express, 16 in La Croix, 6 in Le Figaro, and 7 in Metro.

The actual collection of articles was a degree more difficult than choosing the publications; initially, I executed a keyword search on each site and set date constraints, searching back through January 2010 (the beginning of the contemporary veil debate as it concerns the law). For the American publications, I searched such terms as “France,” “French,” “veil,” “Islam,” “Muslim,” “law,” “burqa,” etc. in a number of combinations. The search ((France OR French) AND (veil OR niqab OR burqa) AND (law OR ban)) within the date constraint January 1, 2010 through May

31, 2011 yielded the best results. For the French publications, I searched the appropriately translated terms, excepting the unnecessary “la France.” I scanned all the search results in the relevant time period to ascertain if the topic was related to the ban. Later, I refined my search by additionally combing archives of these publications, most notably LexisNexis, prompted by events described below, and using the same keyword search as above. An important note regarding the date: there were five outlying articles that fell outside my time constraints (there were four prior to 2010 and one from June of 2011). These I included in the sample, however, for their value in reporting on discussion of a ban, even before a draft ban was written in early 2010. Menrisky 63

I originally encountered problems accessing stories from Le Monde: the paper’s Web site employs a strict pay wall that blocks Internet users from viewing articles without paying a fee. Fortunately, LexisNexis holds archives of Le Monde through my desired time period, and I was able to access the appropriate stories through a time constraint and keyword search. While other of these publications, perhaps most notably The New York Times, also use some form of pay wall, theirs were loose enough that a collection of these articles required no payment or search for a way around the wall.

Important to note is that, for several of the publications, stories from certain wire services were reported, and these were included in the sample for their pertinence to the subject. The incidences in which this occurred are as follows: Associated Press

(AP) articles were found extensively on and used from Fox News’ site and minimally on and used from The Huffington Post, MSNBC’s site, and The New York Times’ site.

Several Agence France-Presse (AFP) articles were used from La Croix’s, L’Express’, and Metro’s sites, and the entirety of Le Figaro’s articles were from this wire. Several

Reuters articles were found on and used from L’Express’, MSNBC’s, and The New

York Times’ sites. One article from the Maghreb Arab Press (MAP) was used from

L’Express’ site. I included these articles in my sample and have them listed in the bibliography under the ten publications. Because they were distributed by these publications, I have included them as such, and believe they qualify for my reasons to choose the publications I did.

Menrisky 64

Metaphor Analysis

When conducting the metaphor analysis, I followed relatively closely

Schmitt’s process as set forth in “Systematic Metaphor Analysis as a Method of

Qualitative Research.” After the necessary articles from the appropriate time period were collected, I began a close reading of each of them, identifying important key words that can be used literally or metaphorically. “Systematic metaphor analysis attempts to reconstruct models of thought, language, and action. It follows indicators found in historical writings on philosophy that the metaphorical model determines thought” (Schmitt 11). Schmitt determines that the first step in gathering metaphors is to gather background metaphors, those found in books, other articles outside the focus group, and even academic works. I pursued this end prior to my study of the selected articles with a multitude of texts (as described variously above), but also throughout my study of the articles in question, and after their study. The background metaphors have been previously discussed above. The reason for exploring these background metaphors is to determine what metaphorical language is already being applied to the topic elsewhere, and thus to provide a base for the metaphor analysis of the chosen texts.

Schmitt identifies the next step of the process as pinpointing the metaphors of a sub-group (Schmitt 14). The sub-group of my research is the collection of 147 articles from the ten publications identified above. This process starts with the “identification of metaphors and deconstructive segmentation of the texts” (Schmitt 14). To identify the appropriate metaphors, I first found phrases that could be interpreted beyond a Menrisky 65

purely literal meaning. Second, I determined the source area, or the cultural or sensorimotor point from which the literal meaning is transferred. Lastly, I determined the target area, the second idea that pulls meaning from the source. These targets and sources I organized by metaphor in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The two most important columns were denoted by “target” and “source,” but additional columns were made for other important information, this being the article the metaphor appeared in, the order in which that metaphor appeared in the article (to make it easier to find the metaphor again when rereading the article), whether the author used the metaphor or if it was found in quoted material, and the date of the article, which was used as the primary organizer of the spreadsheet (at first). I made a separate spreadsheet for each publication, for a total of eight, which were later to be compared.

A final column was also added after the targets and sources were collected, this being for the identifying “Target Is Source” qualifier, these being constructed in the next step of the analysis.

During this initial collection of metaphoric language, it quickly became apparent that a collection of every metaphor in each article was inadvisable, even impossible. I was able to quickly identify certain metaphorical constructs as irrelevant to my analysis; these were the “dead” metaphors of Lakoff and Johnson, or the

“background” metaphors of Debatin, those that have become so ingrained in the

English or French language that they are thought of as literal, as something indivisible from the pattern of language itself. For example, expressions involving light or clarity were quickly ruled out, as were ideas of the law “violating” rights. In addition, Menrisky 66

metaphoric language that did not have any bearing on the ban, burqas, niqabs,

Muslims, Islam, and other important players and concepts in this debate were not included in the analysis. To determine which metaphors were most important, and thus had an impact on the debate at hand, it was important to consider carefully how emphatic or resonant the metaphors encountered in the texts were, following Debatin’s model.

After the collection of these myriad targets and sources, general patterns can be observed after the example of Lakoff and Johnson’s research. All of the metaphors assembled can be reconstructed into a smaller number of “Target Is Source” metaphors that are prevalent in the collected articles. I created in Excel a metaphor

“map” identifying which metaphors were used in which articles, if the author used the metaphor or if it was drawn from within a quote, and the publication, author, and date of the article the metaphor was identified in. After reconstructing all of these metaphors into their appropriate, simplified “Target Is Source” constructions, I synthesized the metaphors and organized them in two different groupings: by metaphor category and by subject (or target).

I created three “levels” of identification for each of these two metaphor groupings and sorted them all in a separate chart for each type of classification system, so the general pattern of metaphors can be observed, as well as how metaphors were used in an overarching scheme to identify or express certain objects, events, or people.

Each metaphor grouping had its own spreadsheet, and each spreadsheet comprised three pages: levels 1, 2, and 3. The first page, “Level 3,” which was the most specific, Menrisky 67

contained all three levels of identification and was sorted by level 3: the initial “Target

Is Source” reconstructions. The “Level 2” page contained the level 1 and 2 metaphors and was sorted by level 2, a number of broader categorizations. Finally, the “Level 1” page contained only level 1, the broadest categorizations, and their metaphor counts. I kept careful track of numbers when organizing these metaphors, and was able to identify which metaphors were the most prevalent throughout the sample of articles and which were less, as each spreadsheet contains a careful tabulation of the metaphors, their numbers in French and American publications, and their totals. These two separate spreadsheets allow for two different classification systems of these metaphors to better show how the issue was metaphorically represented. Level 3, the most specific, was necessarily the same for both of the categorizations, by metaphor and by subject, as it was merely the complete list of the reconstructed “Target Is

Source” metaphors and their numbers.

Valence Analysis

Once I had collected all the metaphors, I began work on the valence analysis, which “measures the degree to which news reporting is positive, neutral, or negative toward the subject matter it covers” (Aepli 79, Zhang). After studying the results of the metaphor collection and sorting, and using the master map identifying which articles and publications the metaphors were used in, and in what volume they were used, I began to reread the sample of articles with a fresh eye and additional attention, making use of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA, which “involves an analysis of texts as they are embedded within, and relate to, social conditions of production and Menrisky 68

consumption” (Richardson 39), requires giving close scrutiny to such elements of the articles as the choice of words and their various meanings; sentence structure and syntax; cases of simplification, generalization, or presupposition; rhetoric; and the narrative as a whole (Richardson). While reading each article carefully to analyze these areas, I also used my metaphor map as a supplemental material to help me determine the frame valence of each story in two different areas. Because of the complex nature of this debate, and the odds at which it was observed the authors’ opinions matched with the actual progression of the law, valence was determined for both tone and topic, each of these based on the article’s presentation of events and attitudes surrounding the law, not the veil. Valences were measured on a five-point scale, with 1 = very negative, 2 = somewhat negative, 3 = neutral, 4 = somewhat positive, 5 = very positive.

Valence of topic was conducted by studying carefully the events or discussions covered by the article and what bearing these events or discussions had on the progression of the law or its passage. For example, an article covering the approval of the ban at any given point in the process of its passage might have gained a rating of a

4 or 5, depending on the body that gave approval and at which point in the ban’s journey this approval came at. Similarly, implementation of the ban earned a score of

5, as the implementation was a very positive event for the ban. Conversely, a story covering the denunciation of the ban by a foreign official, such as President Barack

Obama or the Prime Minister of Turkey (both valid and extant examples) might be Menrisky 69

classified as either a 1 or 2, depending on the vehemence or gravity of the denunciation.

Valence of tone was identified in a similar fashion, but rather than represent the weight events or discussion had on the ban in its journey to passage, the rating shows the attitude, or tone, of the author of the story, again toward the ban, and not the veil. Opinion editorials proved, as might have been expected, the easiest to rate in this system, as positivity and negativity are essentially spelled clearly out from the beginning. A more obscure example, however, might be the use of a certain word or phrase with negative connotations. Choice of more or less testimony from a certain side of the issue can also skew the tone, as occurred several times when critics of the ban were represented better than supporters, and also when testimony from a supporter only was given without room for words from, say, a veil-wearing woman.

The articles, all of which I had printed out and sorted by publication and date of article, were heavily edited during the course of this stage of my analysis, and extensive notes, highlights, and underlines were made in the course of my reading.

Using these notes and the specific phrases I found important to an analysis of the sort discussed above, I was able to most accurately identify the valences as I found them.

These notes and interpretations were recorded solely among the text of the printed news stories, and were not organized in an Excel spreadsheet or other document. The upper right-hand corner of each article bears my notations for each valence, as well as my identification of the frame of the article, discussed in the next section.

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Framing Analysis

During my analysis of the valences of the articles, I was also able to identify the frames used in the writing of these articles. Frames are, in essence, “packages” of stories that allow them to be more readily understood by readers (Scheufele, Entman).

As a result, the frame of a story in many ways also points readers into a direction by which to understand it. My framing analysis occurred concurrently with my valence analysis: for each article I read, I at once determined the valences of topic and tone and also the frame in which the story fit. When determining these frames, I solely used frames found within the sample, and ignored any frames on coverage of Islam in general. These frames fit into relatively broader categories, and as I proceeded, I realized that several layers were in effect here as well, and several of the frames I identified fit into broader categories that still serve to appropriately represent how these stories and the information was packaged for the audience.

For my analysis I used Gamson and Modigliani’s constructionist approach and as a guide utilized Aepli’s paper on framing in news stories covering China’s air pollution during the 2008 Olympics. Using these methods, I identified themes within the stories that could easily be defined by different components of the debate or by the approach the articles took to describing certain events or persons. Additionally, frames may also have been identified by their method of discussion, as many of the articles, rather than cover a specific type of event or stage in the course of the law’s progression, provided discussion on the debate as a whole, or served as an arena solely for testimony from Muslim women. Menrisky 71

The goal of the framing analysis is to better categorize the articles for presentation and to create a more thorough view of the different frames that represented this debate throughout the entire sample of articles. Several of the articles could conceivably have been placed in a number of frames, and in these cases I chose to place it in the frame category that was most predominant in the text.

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CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND RESULTS

In this discussion on the findings and results of my analyses, be aware that I use two blanket terms throughout. “Ban” in this chapter and the next refers to the law at all stages of its journey: its drafting, passage, implementation, etc. “Veil” likewise refers chiefly to the niqab and burqa that the ban targets.

Metaphor Analysis

My first research question asked after the presence of metaphors in these stories and what metaphors are most prominently used to describe the ban, the veil, and the debate linking them. As described above in the chapter on methodology, I began by conducting a thorough reading of the sample of 147 articles and logging the

TARGET Is SOURCE units found therein. At first it was troubling to me which metaphors were important to include and which were not. The two metaphorical areas that gave me the most trouble were metaphors of clarity and light and metaphors expressing “violation” of laws. I decided that these metaphors, though interesting, may be classified as Debatin’s “dead” metaphors: they are too ingrained in the language and offer no further commentary on the ban or veil.

There were roughly 1500 metaphors pertinent to the debate identified in the entire sample of 147 articles. There were roughly 1000 in the American sample of 77 articles and 500 in the French sample of 70. There was metaphorical language used in all of the articles studied. The use of metaphor covered a wide range, with some articles containing use of as few as one metaphor, and others containing a count of up Menrisky 73

to 43. The highest number in the American sample was 43, with the highest in the

French being 29.

As described above in the methodology, I organized the collected metaphors by two elements, each organization containing three levels of classification. The first is organization by metaphor, in which I classified the metaphors in a more readily understandable system by basic overarching structures of metaphor. The first level contains broad metaphorical structures, the second includes the more specific metaphors, and the third contains the many TARGET Is SOURCE identifications.

Table 1 below shows the breakdown of metaphor categories when sorted by metaphor.

Table 1 Metaphors sorted by metaphor

Battle/War Aggressors/Weapons/Attacks Defended/Fought for Targeted/Attacked Armies/Allies Enemies Other battle metaphors Battlefield Protectors Environment Environment Physical separation Other environment metaphors Fire Storms/Floods Game Hurdles Participants Moves Other game metaphors Journey Destinations/Goals Obstacles Travelers Guides Paths/Locations Other journey metaphors Living Entities Animals Negative personification Other living entity metaphors Friends/Family Parental/Authority figures Growth Tyrants/Exterminators Objects Machines/Vehicles/Crafted objects Tools Other object metaphors Structure Women as objects Other Abstract Representations Puzzle Pieces Other metaphors Illness Tests Political Statements Walls/Prison/Servitude

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These categories were defined so as to best organize the metaphors as they arose. “Battle” metaphors were prolific and appeared in nearly every story. Of these, popular subcategories were “Aggressors/Weapons/Attacks,” “Enemies,” and

“Targeted/Attacked.” Popular metaphors in the entire category were “The Veil Is an

Enemy,” “The Ban Is an Enemy,” and of course the generic “The Debate Is a Battle.”

The sheer mountain of metaphors in this category, to be discussed at more length below, only serves to conform earlier discourse on the metaphor of war and its place in the Western cultural atmosphere, both in America and in France. While none of these metaphors involved suggestions of terrorism, as much of the war metaphors of the past decade of press have (especially those concerning the East), war metaphors are still seen here to be the dominant form. “Game” metaphors were similar to

“Battle” metaphors in that they often involved sides, moves, and camps; however, I have chosen to distinguish the two due to the “Game” metaphors’ more innocent nature and less flagrant metaphorical language. Metaphors involving races and hurdles were common in this category, such as “The Vote Is a Hurdle” or “The Ban Is a

Runner.” The most common of these was the overarching “The Debate Is a Game.”

The category “Environment” does not refer exclusively to the natural environment, but to the physical environment as a whole; such metaphors here as were popular include fire metaphors such as “Fear Is a Flammable Object” and flood metaphors such as “The Debate Is a Flood.” Physical separation was also a common metaphor category, with imagery suggesting a physically divided land mass in France being relatively common. Somewhat similar, “Journey” metaphors were also popular, Menrisky 75

the most numerous of these being the eponymous “The Debate Is a Journey.” There was also a great deal of metaphorical language suggesting travelers and traveling companions, such as “The Ban Is a Traveler” or “The Ban Is a Guide.” Equally common were metaphors suggesting destinations or obstacles, the two most popular of these being “The Ban Is a Destination” and “The Law Is an Obstacle,” respectively.

“Living Entities” is a category that includes all personification, and as such was a large category across the board throughout the study. Of the personification, the ban and Islam were personified most frequently; the veil was personified a surprisingly low number of times in comparison. Another popular metaphor was “The

Veil Is a Tyrant,” used chiefly by quoted sources and referencing the veil’s masking properties and uses in fundamentalist cultures. The ban, however, is at several points personified as an exterminator. “Object” metaphors were similar to “Living Entities,” excepting the obvious lack of implied life. The most popular of these involved structural supports and architecture; examples of these are “Minorities Are a Structural

Foundation” and “Freedom Is a Structural Foundation.” These metaphors generally took one of two forms: the structural support or the object being structurally supported: contrast “The Ban Is a Structural Foundation” and “The Ban Is Structurally

Supported.” Laws, religion, and many other concepts were described metaphorically as tools. Another important subcategory here is “Women as Objects,” in which many metaphors were used, chiefly by quoted sources and at times perhaps erroneously, to describe women and their position in fundamentalist societies. Menrisky 76

The “Other,” more unconventional metaphors were strange and varied, and fit into none of these broader, convenient categories that I could discern. “Abstract

Representations” were common, such as “The Veil Is a Symbol of Faith.” This category I created to include all metaphors drawn between the discussed subjects and abstractions, ideologies, ideas, and symbols—somewhat strangely, given Lakoff and

Johnson’s tenet that conceptual imagery and abstract thought are grounded through sensorimotor metaphors and description based on physical objects. “The Veil Is a

Symptom,” “The Debate Is an Illness,” and “Islam Is a Painful Spasm” were all common “Illness” metaphors. The “Walls/Prison/Servitude” subcategory was greatest in the “Other” category: President Nicolas Sarkozy on several counts was quoted as using the “The Veil Is a Prison” metaphor a number of times, and others, authors and sources alike, used similar metaphoric speech to describe constraining aspects of the veil and the ban, such as “The Ban Is Slavery,” “The Ban Is a Wall/Prison,” “The Veil

Is a Coffin,” and “The Veil Is Slavery.” There were of course many other unconventional metaphors that fit in absolutely no category or subcategory.

The broadest area of metaphorical language when considering metaphor organized by metaphor was the “Battle” category, which includes all war metaphors, metaphors dealing with violence, and metaphor describing sides or camps in an army or along highly politicized lines. This area made up over one third of the entire sample of metaphors collected. Within this category, over one fifth of the metaphors were identified in the subcategory “Aggressors/Weapons/Attacks.” The two most prevalent of these metaphors that I classified I have reconstructed in the TARGET Is SOURE Menrisky 77

model “The Veil Is an Intruder” and “The Ban Is a Weapon,” the latter of these two by far being the most prominent.

The “Aggressors/Weapons/Attacks” subcategory was not the largest, however; that position was taken by the subcategory “Other Living Entities,” which included all manner of personifications. The most prevalent of these personifications was that of the ban, or “The Ban Is a Human,” a metaphor that additionally occurred more times than “The Ban Is a Weapon,” and indeed was among the top three most widely occurring conceptual metaphors in the entire sample, matched by “The Debate Is a

Journey” and surpassed by “The Debate Is a Battle.” The lowest number of metaphors was recorded in the “Game” category, and within this the “Moves” subcategory, in which were recorded metaphors such as “Religious Belief Is a Playing Card.” This was also the smallest subcategory in the entire sample.

When considering the dispersion of metaphors based on the national samples, the picture becomes very different. “Battle” was a hugely popular metaphor category in the American sample, encapsulating about one third of the metaphors collected and being almost twice as large a category as the next largest, “Living Entities.” Of the

“Battle” metaphors, the largest category was here also

“Aggressors/Weapons/Attacks.” “The Veil Is an Intruder” and “The Ban Is a Weapon” were also here the most used metaphors, as they were in the French sample in this subcategory. Interestingly, in both cases, the American and the French, the majority of these metaphors were used by the author and not by a secondary source, although the margin was much tighter in the French sample than in the American. The Menrisky 78

personification of the ban and the metaphor “The Ban Is a Traveler” were also popular

American metaphors.

The “Battle” category was also the largest in the French sample, but upon observation it can be seen that the numbers in each category are much more evenly dispersed. The second highest here was also “Living Entities,” although a proliferation of “Journey” metaphors can also be seen. Unlike in the American sample, the largest

“Battle” subcategory was “Other Battle Metaphors,” including such conceptual metaphors as “The Debate Is an Aircraft” and “The Mediation Period Is a Truce.” The general metaphor “The Debate Is a Battle” was used most heavily in the French sample, but, interestingly enough, the two next in the ranking were nearly evenly matched, and were “The Veil Is an Enemy” and “The Ban Is an Enemy” (not to be confused with “The Ban Is a Weapon”). To see these two at such odds might strike one as strange at first, but studying who used the metaphors is telling: use of “The Veil

Is an Enemy” was split almost exactly even between authors and quoted sources; “The

Ban Is an Enemy” was used exclusively by authors.

A curious “Battle” metaphor used solely in American publications and that I have labeled somewhat humbly as “The Constitution Is an Army” is one involving passage beyond a muster of constitutional protection. This word “muster” is used many times to describe personified actions by the French constitution, and it is interesting that it should be so widely used. The French constitution itself was the subject of many “Battle” metaphors, foremost among these being the one stated just Menrisky 79

above. Interestingly, the French constitution is also referred to on several counts metaphorically as a handheld tool, both in French and American publications.

Because I believe this first method of organizing metaphors is insufficient to paint a truly telling picture of the metaphorical makeup of this sample, I present here also an additional form of classification, metaphor by subject matter. By this method, one can observe how often metaphorical language was used to describe specifically the ban, the veil, Islam, and several other subjects. Table 2 below outlines this system of classification.

Table 2 Metaphors sorted by subject

Ban The Ban Is a Game, Player, or The Ban Is a Structure or Is The Ban Is Attacked/Defended, an Move Supported Attacker/Defender, or a Weapon The Ban Is a Machine, Gift, or The Ban Is a Traveler or Destination Other Metaphoric Language Other Tangible Object Regarding the Ban The Ban Is a Prison, Trap, or Form The Ban Is an Animal, Human, or of Enslavement Other Living Entity Debate The Debate Is a Battle, Launches The Debate Is a The Debate Is an Illness or Health Objects, and/or Encapsulates Game/Race/Contest and/or Deficiency Camps and Armies Contains Hurdles The Debate Is a Tangible Object The Debate Is an Animal, Human, or The Debate Is a Journey, Treasure, or Other Living Entity Obstacle, and/or Contains Travelers The Debate Is Theater The Debate Is an Environmental Other Metaphoric Language Location Regarding the Debate as a Whole France, Europe, the Government, and/or Culture France Is a Guide, Identity Is a France, etc., Is a Structure or Is Governmental Workings Are an Illness Treasure, or the Law Is an Supported Obstacle France Is a Stadium, or Political France, etc., Is an Animal, Human, Political Bodies Are Battlegrounds, Events Are Moves/Participants or Other Living Entity Armies, Attacked/Defended, and/or Attackers/Defenders France, etc., Is a Machine or Governmental Decisions Are Other Metaphoric Language Other Tangible Object Locations or Political Bodies Rest in Regarding France, etc. Metaphoric Locations Laïcité/Secularism Laïcité Is a Human or Other Living Laïcité Is a Path, Guide, or Treasure Laïcité Is Attacked/Defended or an Entity Attacker/Defender Laïcité Is a Machine or Other Laïcité Is a Structure or Is Other Metaphoric Language Tangible Object Supported Regarding Laïcite

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Liberty Liberty Is a Structure or Is Liberty Is a Treasure or Destination Liberty Is Attacked/Defended Supported Liberty Is a Tangible Object Liberty Is an Animal, Human, or Other Metaphoric Language Other Living Entity Regarding Liberty Muslims/Islam Beliefs and/or Islam Are Tangible Muslims and/or Islam Compared to Other Metaphoric Language Objects Other Humans, Animals, or Other Regarding Muslims and/or Islam Living Entities Islam Is a Journey Muslims and/or Islam Is an Illness Islam Is a Structure or Is Muslims/Islam Are Supported Attacked/Defended or Attackers Veil The Veil Compared to Another The Veil Is an Animal, Tyrant, or Other Metaphoric Language Tangible Object Other Human Figure Regarding the Veil The Veil Is a Gateway to The Veil Is Attacked/Defended, an Extremism Attacker/Defender, a Barricade, or a Risk The Veil Is a Prison The Veil Is an Illness Other Other Illness Metaphors Other Militarized Language Unconventional Metaphors Other Journey Metaphors Other Object Metaphors Other Living Entity Metaphors Other Prison Metaphors

Metaphorical language was most prevalent in the total sample when describing the ban, followed closely by metaphorical description of the debate as a whole. This was not the same for the American or French samples. In the American sample, metaphorical language was greatest in regards to the ban as well, but metaphorical description of the veil ranked second, followed by the French government, Islam and

Muslims, and the debate as a whole, in that order. Metaphors describing the ban in the

American sample held the lead by over 100 instances of metaphorical language, making up roughly one fourth of the American sample’s metaphors. In the French sample, metaphorical language discussing the debate as a whole took the lead by nearly fifty instances, followed by metaphorical language relating to the ban.

Metaphorical language referring to the veil fell roughly in the middle of the ranking in the French sample. Menrisky 81

The largest subcategory in this organization in both the total and American samples lies in the category of metaphor referring to the ban: “The Ban Is

Attacked/Defended, an Attacker/Defender, or a Weapon.” This was also the second largest subcategory in the French sample. This category ended up proving the most interesting in the sample for a number of reasons, to be discussed in further detail in the section below. A common war metaphor was personification of the ban as a hero, villain, victim, or dependent. The ban was represented frequently as attacking the veil or Muslims, as defending Muslim women, as being attacked by opponents, or as being defended by proponents. The ban was metaphorically described as a weapon 19 percent of the time in this subcategory in the total sample. Of this number, 74 percent of these occurrences were found in the American sample; the French count was significantly lower.

It is important to also consider which of these objects or concepts were more often represented metaphorically in which sample. Metaphorical language was used to describe all of these things at more occurrences in the American sample than in the

French, except in the category of laïcité or secularism. Here, there were about 50 percent more occurrences in the French sample. The American sample contained roughly triple the number of instances of metaphorical language describing Muslims and Islam, triple the number of instances of metaphors regarding the veil, triple the number of metaphors describing the French government, and twice the number of metaphors referring to liberty. The French and American samples, however, were nearly equally matched in number of metaphors describing the debate as a whole. Menrisky 82

The Ban as Aggressor or Defender

An interesting trend can be observed concerning metaphors surrounding the ban itself, as an object or a personification. As discussed above, several objects or concepts are metaphorically expressed in terms of war metaphors. It is interesting to look specifically at how the ban itself is presented in terms of war metaphor. There are many occasions at which the ban and the veil are presented as a defender or an aggressor. These metaphors vary as to whether they were expressed by the author or through quotations. I observed that metaphors of this kind concerning the ban were in heavy supply, and it is interesting to see how many times these metaphors were used, and who used them.

It is helpful to break this usage down by nationality of publications, in order to better compare France and the United States’ uses of war metaphor to describe the ban. I begin here with the breakdown over the entire sample. There were a total of 49 instances of metaphors used to describe specifically the ban as an aggressor or a defender. See Table 3 below for the complete breakdown of the entire sample.

Table 3 The ban as aggressor or defender in the total sample

Aggressor Defender Total Author 23 11 34 Quotation 2 13 15 Total 25 24 49

As can be seen, I recorded that, of the total sample, metaphor was used to describe the ban as an aggressor one time more than as a defender. Where the ban is described as an aggressor, the author described it as such far more frequently than the Menrisky 83

testimony did, which might be attributed to the fact that much of the metaphor appropriate for this breakdown that was used in the testimony came from political figures and legislators in France in support of the ban, and so it would not have been described by them as an aggressor. Where described as a defender, the tally is much closer. This occurred in testimony only two times more than it was written by the author. Overall, the author used war metaphor to describe the ban as an aggressor or a defender over half as many times as did the testimony.

The American sample follows relatively closely the overall breakdown of how the ban is described by war metaphor; this can be observed in Table 4 below.

Table 4 The ban as aggressor or defender in the American sample

Aggressor Defender Total Author 16 8 24 Quotation 2 5 7 Total 18 13 31

It comes as no surprise that the American tally holds the majority of war metaphor used to classify the ban; as discussed above, war metaphor is far more prevalent in the American sample than in the French. It can also be seen from the breakdown above that the author described the ban as an aggressor twice as many times as a defender. Both of these figures completely overshadow how many times the ban was described as an aggressor or a defender by interviewed sources. This might indicate a heavier presence of metaphor usage in American media. It might also suggest that the interviewed sources picked their language carefully. Menrisky 84

A much more different picture becomes clear when studying the breakdown of

French publications’ use of metaphor to describe the ban as an aggressor or defender, the breakdown of which can be seen below in Table 5.

Table 5 The ban as aggressor or defender in the French sample

Aggressor Defender Total Author 7 5 12 Quotation 0 6 6 Total 7 11 18

The level of metaphor usage employed to classify the ban in war terms is here much lower than in the American sample. There is also a total absence of metaphor indicating the ban is an aggressor on the part of testimony. Most interesting, however, might be the fact that the author describes the ban as an aggressor more than he or she does as a defender. This is curious due to reasons given below; as the results of this study will show, valence of tone on the whole hovers around neutral in the French sample where it tends to be much more inflammatory in the American sample. Of course, this holds true for how many times metaphor such as this is used between the two samples, but it leaves thought-provoking questions when one considers that, despite the relatively neutral path, there exists any language such as this at all, and that there seems to be more negativity toward the ban on the author’s part here than favorability. This is, however, of course a very small portion of the total metaphor analysis, and does not take into account the other components of Critical Discourse

Analysis. It would be unwise to make a judgment on the French representation of the issue based on these data alone, but these results are interesting nonetheless. Menrisky 85

Valence of Topic

Overall, the largest percentage of stories in the entire sample was seen to have a topic valence of 4, somewhat positive at 25.30 percent of the articles. Interestingly, this did not hold true for the American and French samples: A higher percentage of articles in the American sample were found to carry a score of 5, very positive, at

29.90 percent of the articles, and a higher percentage of articles in the French sample were found to be categorized in the 3 category, neutral, at 32.90 percent of the articles.

The lowest percentage of articles in the total sample was found to be scored at 1, very negative, at 13.60 percent. This was true as well for the French sample at 2.90 percent, but the American sample contained a lowest percentage of 6.50 percent in the 2 category, somewhat negative. The total sample comprises a total of 147 articles: 77 were collected in the American sample and 70 were in the French sample. A full breakdown of the percentages across the samples can be seen below in Table 6.

Table 6 Topic valence distribution by sample Note: Scores are signified as follows: 1 = very negative, 2 = somewhat negative, 3 = neutral, 4 = somewhat positive, 5 = very positive

1 2 3 4 5 Total 13.60% 15.60% 24.50% 25.20% 21.10% 100.00% American 23.40% 6.50% 16.90% 23.40% 29.90% 100.10% French 2.90% 25.70% 32.90% 27.10% 11.40% 100.00%

As a reminder, valences were determined based on the stories’ reflection on and representation of the ban, and not the veil. Therefore, a score of 5, very positive

(Total: 21.10 percent, American: 29.90 percent, French: 11.40 percent), indicates that the events covered by the story represent a major victory for the ban, such as its Menrisky 86

passage through a major legislative body, approval by the Constitutional Council, or placement into effect.

A score of 4 (Total: 25.20 percent, American: 23.40 percent, French: 27.10 percent), somewhat positive, indicates a more modest victory, such as endorsement by a certain politician or organization. This score was also observed in stories which might have been neutral but detailed the acquiescence of various Muslim organizations.

A score of 3, neutral (Total: 24.50 percent, American: 16.90 percent, French:

32.90 percent), indicated a relatively unimpressive effect on the ban; this category often contained stories recapping the debate as a whole or general discussion of the debate (this fact might explain why the French sample contained many more neutral stories—as was touched on above and will be discussed in more detail below, the

French model of journalism is oftentimes more concerned with the analysis and breakdown of issues than the simple reportage of events).

A score of 2, or somewhat negative (Total: 15.60 percent, American: 6.50 percent, French: 25.70 percent), applied most often to stories detailing denunciation of the ban and setbacks to the ban’s progress.

A score of 1, or very negative (Total: 13.60 percent, American: 23.40 percent,

French: 2.90 percent), was recorded for stories that expressed major setbacks in the ban’s progress.

Opinion pieces often earned a score of 1 or 5, depending on the positivity or negativity reflected on the ban by the article; this score was often seen to be reflected Menrisky 87

as the same in the tone valence, as discussed below. There were, however, several opinion pieces that earned a score of 2 or even 3 here for valence of topic; these were pieces that, while expressing opinion and often a negative one, took a more balanced approach to a dissection of the issues involved in the debate and the ideologies and historical contexts surrounding it.

Valence of Tone

As was true for topic valence, tone valence was also measured based on the observed degree of favorability to the ban and not the veil. The total sample saw its highest percentage of articles with a score of 3, neutral, at 48.30 percent. This was also the largest category for the French sample, at 58.60 percent (this is consequently the only valence category of any sample in either tone or topic valence that comprises over half the articles of the sample). The American sample’s largest category was 2, somewhat negative, at 40.30 percent. The lowest percentages were observed in category 5, very positive, in the total sample at 1.40 percent; in category 5, very positive, in the American sample at 2.60 percent; and the same, category 5, very positive, in the French sample at 0.00 percent. The total sample comprises a total of

147 articles: 77 were collected in the American sample and 70 were in the French sample. The complete distribution can be seen below in Table 7.

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Table 7 Tone valence distribution by sample Note: Scores are signified as follows: 1 = very negative, 2 = somewhat negative, 3 = neutral, 4 = somewhat positive, 5 = very positive

1 2 3 4 5 Total 7.50% 38.10% 48.30% 4.80% 1.40% 100.10% American 13.00% 40.30% 39.00% 5.20% 2.60% 100.10% French 1.40% 35.70% 58.60% 4.30% 0% 100.00%

Measuring tone valence was without question considerably more difficult than measuring topic valence. The lines dividing the ratings were here much more blurred, and several times an article seemed to hover between two; oftentimes in these cases it was merely the presence of a certain metaphor or the favoring of certain testimony that tipped the balance. It must also be pointed out that when determining tone valence the distinction between metaphors used by the authors and metaphors used in testimony/quoted material is important; it was not nearly so important to distinguish between the two when determining topic valence. In the discussion below, I make the distinction by using the word “metaphor” to refer chiefly to metaphor used by the author, and make classifications based on testimony by referring to the testimony as a whole. I have presented here the tone valences as I best perceived them based on a number of factors detailed in the chapter on methodology.

What first can be observed upon studying the table above is the diminishing of percentages in scores the farther from neutral the stories are. Scores of 5, very positive, were incredibly rare and unrepresented in the French sample; similarly, a score of 1, very negative, was negligible in the French sample at 1.40 percent. The increase seen in the total sample at 7.50 percent was due only to the American Menrisky 89

sample’s more heavy presence of very negative articles at 13.00 percent, the third highest score in the American sample.

A score of 5, very positive (Total: 1.40 percent, American: 2.60 percent,

French: 0.00 percent), was rare across the board. This score was generally observed in articles displaying high praise for the ban; this only occurred in cases of supportive opinion pieces, which were generally marked by victorious war metaphors, extensive metaphorical language on the ban’s position of a defender or victim, and language marking the veil as an enemy.

A score of 4, somewhat positive (Total: 4.80 percent, American: 5.20 percent,

French: 4.30 percent), distinguished stories that used a good deal of metaphorical language painting the ban as a victim or a defender and the veil as an enemy or a prison. These stories occurred less than stories that were even very negative in the total and American samples, but were encountered more often than either extremes in the French sample.

A score of 3, neutral (Total: 48.30 percent, American: 39.00 percent, French:

58.60 percent), was the most popular in the total and French samples, and was nearly the equal of the American sample’s most frequent score of 2. Neutral valences were observed in articles using infrequent metaphorical language, more neutral metaphorical language (to be discussed more fully below), and/or a balance of testimony. In all three samples, the percentage of articles displaying a tone valence of

3 was greater than the percentages of articles with a score of 1, 4, or 5 added together. Menrisky 90

A score of 2, somewhat negative (Total: 38.10 percent, American: 40.30 percent, French: 35.70 percent), was in the case of the total and French samples the second most prevalent rating and in the case of the American sample the most prevalent. These stories were marked by more negative war metaphors such as language painting the ban as an attacker or weapon, more tongue-in-cheek metaphors, and testimony slanted in defense of veiled women.

A score of 1, very negative (Total: 7.50 percent, American: 13.00 percent,

French: 1.40 percent), was seen rarely and almost always in the case of an opinion piece. This score comprises very negative metaphorical language, most often war metaphors, and other language indicators of anger. The cases in which this score was observed in stories other than opinion pieces was in discussion pieces of the sort observed frequently in French papers (to be discussed in more detail below), particularly those that focused almost exclusively on testimony from veiled women against the veil that were still heavily charged with negative metaphoric imagery.

The most interesting difference between the American and French samples is the sizeable difference in ratios between neutral scores and more radical scores. These differences can be observed below in Table 8.

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Table 8 Percentages of neutral scores versus more radical scores in tone valence in the American and French samples Note: These figures are not necessarily statistically significant, but they serve as a fitting illustration of the discussion below

American French Neutral Scores (3) 39.00% 58.60% Moderate Scores (2, 4) 45.50% 40.00% Radical Scores (1, 5) 15.60% 1.40% Moderate + Radical Scores (1, 2, 4, 5) 61.10% 41.40%

It can be observed here that, not only was the neutral scores category in the

American sample smaller than the moderate and radical scores together, it was also smaller than the moderate scores alone. Conversely, the category of moderate and radical scores together is still nearly twenty percent lower than the neutral category in the French sample. Comparatively, the neutral scores category in the American sample is roughly five percent smaller than the moderate scores category and twenty percent lower than the category of moderate and radical scores together. The American and

French samples in this way are reversed: the American sample has roughly 40 percent of its articles in the neutral category and roughly 60 percent in the category moderate and radical scores together, and the French sample has roughly 40 percent of its articles in the category of moderate and radical scores together and roughly 60 percent in the neutral category. It can thus be here seen that the French publications adhered more to the center and wrote on the whole more neutral articles than writers in the

American sample, who wrote many more metaphorically charged articles than neutral ones.

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Relationship of Metaphors to Valence

As may at this point be obvious, the relationship of metaphors to valence was directly tied to how many metaphors were used and in what categories these metaphors fell. Articles with a lower tone valence tended to contain more war metaphors than others, and articles with a higher tone valence tended, on the whole, to contain more journey or game metaphors. This should not come as much of a surprise, given the differences in these categories as concerns the negative or positive connotations of the associations.

Metaphors themselves might be able to be classified based on a tone. The use of more neutral metaphors, such as the ban’s “clearing a hurdle” or acting as a traveler, signified a generally more neutral tone valence. These two above examples were used in a variety of contexts, however: the former was often seen in stories with a tone valence of 3 or higher; the second was observed in stories of all tone valence ratings.

As would be expected, the same trend is observed in more charged metaphors.

A more negative tone was observed where the ban was described as an enemy, aggressor, or weapon, and at times when the author describes such things as that “Mr.

Sarkozy . . . is masterly at this kind of theater” (Erlanger 2010). Such tongue-in-cheek metaphors were observed to have as negative an effect on tone valence as negatively- charged war metaphors.

Within war metaphors further trends may be noticed: most notable of these is the subcategory discussed in detail above, “The Ban Is Attacked/Defended, an Menrisky 93

Attacker/Defender, or a Weapon.” This metaphor category saw a wide range of variation in the valence of its host articles. Unsurprisingly, articles that identified the ban as an attacker or weapon tended to have a lower valence; conversely, articles in which the ban was identified as a defender or under attack tended to have a more neutral or higher valence. Articles in which the ban was described as being attacked varied.

It is also important to consider the speaker of these metaphors: a more direct relationship can be drawn between metaphorical language used and the valence of the article if the metaphors were used principally by the author rather than by quoted sources; where quotes were concerned, it is far more difficult to establish a meaningful connection. Neutral articles, it should be noted, were by no means devoid of heavy metaphorical language; however, in these cases, the language tended to be used more frequently by the sources than by the author, and the author generally presented here a wide range of sources on both sides of the issue. Articles with a more positive or negative valence were also heavily influenced by the metaphor used by quoted sources, and these quotes tended to be used more heavily from one side or another to give the articles their tonal slant. It is important also to remember that metaphor was not the only consideration taken when analyzing these articles for valence.

Framing Analysis

My fourth research question asked after which frames were shown to be the most prevalent in the sample of articles. When I pursued this question, I kept track of which frames appeared in which articles from each national sample, the American and Menrisky 94

the French. Using a variety of methods, including Richardson’s Critical Discourse

Analysis and the overarching metaphor analysis, as well as a general exploration of topics covered by the articles, I was able to determine several levels of framing in the articles. Most apparent were five general frames that were observed in both national samples. Within these five larger frames were smaller subcategories of frames, some of which were observed only in one national sample.

The five large frames are as follows: Proceedings, which includes all articles detailing the path of the ban along its legal route. The subframes for this category are

General Proceedings (articles covering general debate), Commencement (articles covering initialization of the ban), and Approval (articles covering the ban’s approval by various legislative and judicial bodies). The general frame Enactment is used to describe all articles covering the ban’s start on April 11, 2011 and its aftermath, and all events within. The two subframes here are Practice (articles covering the actual initiation of the ban’s force and the following arrests and penalties) and

Demonstrations (articles covering protests and other demonstrations by groups or individuals). The frame I have called Opposition and Support includes all articles profiling individuals and exploring groups who support or oppose the ban. The subframes here are Threats (violent reaction to the ban—this frame covered mostly the stories published in American publications regarding the alleged Osama bin Laden tape warning France against banning the full veil), Opposition (articles covering groups or individuals who are against the ban), Support (individuals or groups who side with the ban), and Government Official (a more generalized frame that includes Menrisky 95

all articles in which a specific government official and his or her role in the ban’s progress or hindrance is covered). Discussion is a wider frame describing articles that provide in-depth discussion of the issue on ideological and legal levels. The subframes here are Discussion (general exploration of the issue, its history, and its legal and theoretical facets) and Women (articles profiling Muslim women in France). The final large frame is Opinion, which includes all columns and other opinion pieces. The subcategories here are general opinion, negative opinion (opinion pieces attacking or criticizing the ban), and positive opinion (opinion pieces in support of the ban). A final category is Miscellaneous, in which all articles are collected that had no place in any of the other frames. It is important to note that many of these articles could have been placed in several of these frames; I chose to place them in the frame that I thought best encapsulated the topic of the article.

Below follows a discussion of the frames as they existed across the three samples of articles. Table 9 below displays the five major frames and the subframes within them, as well as the percentages of their occurrence in the three samples.

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Table 9 Frames within total, American, and French samples Note: There were 147 articles in the total sample, 77 in the American, and 70 in the French

Frame Total Sample (147) American Sample (77) French Sample (70) Proceedings 30% 32.50% 27.10% General Proceedings 14.30% 11.70% 17.10% Commencement 4.80% 5.20% 4.30% Approval 10.90% 15.60% 5.70% Enactment 19% 19.50% 18.50% Practice 15.60% 19.50% 11.40% Demonstrations 3.40% 0% 7.10% Opposition and Support 15.50% 9.10% 22.90% Threats 2.70% 5.20% 0% Opposition 5.40% 2.60% 8.60% Support 2% 0% 4.30% Government Official 5.40% 1.30% 10% Discussion 15.70% 6.50% 25.70% Discussion 10.90% 5.20% 17.10% Women 4.80% 1.30% 8.60% Opinion 12.90% 22.10% 2.90% General Opinion 1.40% 2.60% 0% Negative Opinion 9.50% 15.60% 2.90% Positive Opinion 2% 3.90% 0% Miscellaneous 6.80% 10.40% 2.90% Total 99.90% 100.10% 100.00%

As can be seen, the overall largest frame for the entire sample was Proceedings at 30 percent; there was heavy coverage in the entire sample of the path the ban took as it traveled through the legal and judicial corridors of France’s government. Of these, General Proceedings was the largest subframe at 14.30 percent, and the largest subframe of the entire sample. The smallest general frame was Opinion at 12.90 percent, of which the smallest subframe was general opinion at 1.40 percent. This was also the smallest subframe for the entire sample. I exclude here the Miscellaneous Menrisky 97

category, which contained fewer articles than Opinion at 6.80 percent, but is itself not truly a frame.

The most-used general frame in the American sample is Proceedings, as with the entire sample, at 32.50 percent. Unlike the total sample, however, the American sample’s largest subframe within Proceedings is Approval at 15.60 percent. This percentage matches the Negative Opinion subframe at 15.60 percent, although the general frame Opinion only covered 22.10 percent of the American sample, as there were low percentages of General Opinion and Positive Opinion subframes (at 2.60 percent and 3.90 percent, respectively). The largest subframe overall in the American

Sample, however, is Practice at 19.50 percent. Because there were no articles in the

Demonstrations subframe in the American sample, however, the general Enactment frame contains a lower percentage of articles than Proceedings. In addition to the lack of articles fitting the Demonstrations subframe, there were also no articles in the

American sample falling in the Support subframe. The lowest percentage of articles in a general frame in the American Sample is 6.50 percent, in the Discussion frame.

The general frame covering the largest percentage of articles in the French sample is Proceedings at 27.10 percent, followed closely by Discussion at 25.70 percent. This is a marked difference from the American sample, in which Discussion covered the lowest percentage of articles. This should not be surprising, however, as the French press is noted by several scholars as being a press that affords especial attention to detailed, ideological discussion of an issue in its papers rather than strict Menrisky 98

reportage; it is a generally held belief in the French press that news should not only be reported, but also dissected (Eko & Berkowitz).

Within the Proceedings frame, General Proceedings is the subframe covering the largest percentage of articles in the French sample at 17.10 percent, a figure that is matched by the Discussion subframe. Following this, coverage of specific government officials was at the next highest percentage at 10 percent. The lowest percentages were found in the General Opinion, Positive Opinion, and Threats, none of which contained any percentage of articles in the French Sample. Following these are Negative Opinion and Miscellaneous, both at 2.90 percent. The lowest percentage in a general frame in the French sample is 2.90 percent in the Opinion frame.

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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER QUESTIONS

After considering the evidence presented in the previous chapter, it becomes clear that there is an inconsistency between my data and previous studies on French media representations and metaphorical language regarding Islam in the War on

Terror. What is first notable, however, is that war metaphors were in this sample still very much present. But the valence analysis reveals an interesting trend where media representation of Muslims and the ban is concerned, namely that the French sample covers the issue in a far more balanced fashion than the American. Additionally, the analysis also revealed an interesting relationship between the American and French samples. The following chapter will discuss conclusions reached for each research question and synthesize testimonial collected in France before summarizing the major conclusions and presenting further questions.

Metaphor Analysis

The metaphor analysis showed that previous data indicating that a large degree of war metaphor is traditionally used in stories covering issues centered on Islam is still relevant. However, as will be discussed below, the overall attitude toward Islam, or at least the context in which it was in this case present, was shown to be somewhat different. The prevalence of battle/war metaphors in both samples thus came as no surprise, but it is interesting to note that, where in the American sample the most popular subcategory involved aggressors, weapons, and attacks (whether on the part of the ban or the veil), the French sample was more rife with metaphors involving war engines and strategies as fit into the “Other Battle Metaphors” subcategory. The Menrisky 100

American sample, it can be seen, used a great deal more language expressing actual attacks and violence than did the French sample.

Within the subcategory of weapons and attacks, however, both the French and

American samples displayed an affinity for the two metaphors, “The Veil Is an

Intruder” and “The Ban Is an Attack.” At first this might seem odd: these two metaphors are at such odds that it seems impossible that they would both occur so frequently, especially when the valence ratings show such a low frequency of supportive articles. Further scrutiny of the articles, however, reveals that “The Veil Is an Intruder” was used chiefly by quoted sources. Use of “The Ban Is an Attack” was roughly evenly dispersed between quoted sources and the authors themselves. This suggests unfavorability toward the ban, and confirms the trends observed in the valence ratings.

It is also telling that the largest subcategory of metaphorical language (when sorted by subject) used in both samples was “The Ban Is Attacked/Defended, an

Attacker/Defender, or a Weapon.” Metaphorical language practically swarmed the ban as a subject and represented in a number of ways, as discussed in the “Ban as

Aggressor or Defender” section. Where the author made a metaphorical suggestion as to the ban’s allegiance, in both samples it can be seen that the ban was presented more often as an aggressor than a defender. Conversely, where this dichotomy was presented through quoted sources, the ban was generally painted as a defender; indeed, in the French sample there was no quotation suggesting the ban is an aggressor. These Menrisky 101

trends further suggest unfavorability in large part, and serve to reinforce the valence ratings.

Valence of Topic

Conclusions regarding valence of topic were easy to predict. When following the progress of the ban through France’s legal corridors to the streets, it was relatively simple to trace how the ban fared. For those stories that were more discussion-oriented and related to endorsements or denouncements by public figures, the rating was a bit more difficult, and in some cases directly correlative with the tone valence. Stories fitting into the Proceedings and Enactment frames generally carried positive ratings due to the ban’s overall success. Stories about government officials were seen to be slightly more mixed, as well as discussion stories. Oftentimes the discussion stories’ tone valence ratings were similar to the topic valence ratings: in these cases, where the articles were rationally laid out and presented metaphorical language that seemed to denounce the ban, the topic valence reflected the unfavorability, as the articles seemed to undermine the ban’s legitimacy.

The conclusions here are generally related to frame. Stories reporting events, as mentioned above, had ratings that reflected the ban’s actual progress. A positive event for the ban indicated a positive valence rating. Similarly, stories about public denouncement of the ban or crime that resulted from the ban carried more negative ratings. Opinion stories had topic valence ratings that directly correlated with the tone valence ratings. The Threats subframe was a bit more difficult: in some cases, the negative implications of the story suggested a positive topic valence rating, due to the Menrisky 102

defense of the ban and its standard as a rallying point behind which the French people were able to stand. Where the Enactment frame was concerned, stories about the ban’s practice generally yielded positive ratings, where stories about demonstrations and the ban’s failures showed more negative ratings.

It can be seen that the topic valence was correlative with the ban’s path through the legal process. Metaphor played a large role where questions of the ban’s success were blurred in cases of articles providing discussion or coverage of more tangentially related events, such as endorsement or denunciation, but otherwise the ban’s path and the related valence ratings were fairly straightforward to record.

Valence of Tone

The tone valence analysis yielded what might be the most interesting results of this study. By comparing the results for the French and American samples, major differences in presentation of news can be observed. While it is impossible within the bounds of this study to say if these results are an isolated incident produced by this particular issue, it is likely, based on these results and previous research, that these ratings reveal general differences in metaphor use and style of reporting between the two samples.

The most noticeable difference can be observed when comparing the relationships between neutral scores and more radical scores. The French sample has a notably higher percentage of neutral scores than the American sample; the French sample’s neutral scores are the majority, where the American sample’s more radical scores are the majority. This tells us potentially interesting things about the way Menrisky 103

American and French publications present the news. The framing analysis has shown that the French publications focus more heavily on general discussion articles than the

American sample, but the tone valence analysis has also revealed that French articles are in general more likely to present a story neutrally where metaphorical language is concerned than American articles.

It can also be seen, without necessarily even consulting the tone valence results, that the American publications featured more opinion pieces than the French.

This contributed to the American sample’s higher percentage of more radical stories, but the difference in news presentation by neutral or radical scores between the

American and French samples was not totally reliant on this addition. It must be noted, also, that the majority of these opinion pieces received a score of 1, or 2 in rare instances where the opinion piece was geared toward general discussion, similarly to the French neutral discussion pieces. This can be seen also in the framing analysis, where I broke the Opinion frame down into three categories. The general opinion category contained those opinion pieces geared toward discussion, but it can be seen that negative opinion pieces make up 74 percent of the Opinion frame, and 9.50 percent of the entire sample. The largest part of the entire frame was found in the

American sample. The few opinion pieces in the French sample were solely negative.

It can be seen from these results that the American sample carries more radically charged language than the French. War metaphors contributed heavily to the slant toward negative valence ratings. The French sample hovered near the neutral score, but more radical scores in this sample also tended to be more negative. The Menrisky 104

majority of the total sample was neutral, with negative stories following close behind and positive stories being in the drastic minority. The presentation of this issue is thus shown to be, where not hovering around neutral, more negative overall, which suggests that the print and online news media here sampled did not necessarily support the ban on the full veil.

Framing Analysis

The framing analysis, above all, confirmed earlier research and observation claiming that French publications place an emphasis on stories that dissect issues and present ideological considerations of debates, rather than simply present the news as it occurs. It can be seen that the Discussion frame in the French sample carries over 25 percent of the total articles. This might explain the French sample’s greater neutrality: the discussion articles tended to be constructed of considerations from both sides of the debate, and to synthesize testimony from many different sources. It also comes as no surprise that the French sample carries such a higher percentage of articles detailing opposition and support; the politicians who had a hand in the debate would have been much more well-known in France than in America, and the nuances of the governmental system there better recognized. Coverage of who supported what would not have been nearly as important in the American stories.

When considering opinion pieces, however, it can be seen that the American sample carries a much larger percentage than the French. There is no doubt that these pieces added to the American sample’s greater percentage of more radical valence ratings, but it is interesting to see that the French publications published fewer opinion Menrisky 105

pieces overall in the first place. If the neutrality of the articles is a general trend in

French journalism, this should not necessarily come as a surprise: opinion would seem not to play as a large a role as, say, the general discussion that is discussed above.

The Proceedings and Enactment frames in the total sample made up nearly 50 percent of the sample. From a general standpoint of newsworthiness, this makes sense.

These were the events following the ban’s path through the legal system and to the streets, where its implementation was further documented. These were the more traditional news stories, and the results of the framing analysis here are in keeping with the general conception of what constitutes news. The discrepancies, the discussion stories and opinion pieces, further reinforce conceptions of American and

French journalism: the American sample was populated with hard news stories, and where discussion was concerned, it existed in the form of opinion, which reinforced the overall radical valence ratings of the sample. The French sample showed that its discussion was reserved for larger news pieces that functioned primarily as discussion pieces, but were presented as hard news stories would be, i.e. more neutrally.

Testimony from France

Opinions and testimony were gathered from a number of sources in France between 24 November and 2 December 2011, chiefly in the Paris area. The major contributors were Anna Topaloff, a journalist for the Republican French newspaper

Marianne, Annie Sugier, president of la Ligue du Droit International des Femmes, or the League of International Rights of Women, and André Gerin, a Deputy of the

French communist party in the French National Assembly. Interviews were conducted Menrisky 106

in person and covered a range of issues regarding the overarching debate, its history, the media coverage of the ban, and the results of this project.

Anna Topaloff drew the distinction between two debates: that of the foulard and that of the burqa. This most recent law, she claims, was a product of the second of these debates, which is one that arose partly from issues of security and safety and partly from the pre-existing foulard affair, begun in the late 20th century with the Creil affair. However, Topaloff believes that this most recent law is in many ways superfluous, due to the first law of 2004—which already banned the veil in government buildings and schools—and another law that prohibits use of the full veil when driving (a safety hazard). “Créer une loi—qu’est ce que ça va faire?” Topaloff said. “Qu’est ce que ça va changer pour elle [the veiled woman]? Pas la stigmatisé, la différence, et créer des problèmes un plus. Moi, je ne suis pas pour la bourqa, mais je ne comprends pas la loi.”14

Annie Sugier, while also not “for” the burqa, is an avid supporter of the law, believing it to be a constriction of women’s rights. But for the purposes of this project, far more interesting than their opinions on the law or veil is their interpretation of the results of the four analyses. After having studied the varying valence scores in the

American and French samples, and reviewing the chart in which the radical and neutral scores are compared (Table 8), both offered very interesting interpretations of why the French press would appear far more neutral than the American, especially when research shows that the majority of France supports the law, and that the French

14 “Making a new law—what will that do? What will that change for her [the veiled woman]? Not the stigma, not the difference, and it will create new problems. Personally, I’m not for the burqa, but I don’t understand the law.” Menrisky 107

press would be expected to reflect this attitude. In fact, Topaloff pointed out that Le

Monde as a publication is very favorable toward the law, and yet its valence scores were as neutral as its fellows’. Topaloff describes the phenomenon as a disruption of an equilibrium the journalists are trying to create. When journalists who favor the law try to present the issue in as neutral a light as possible, they succeed or in some cases push the tone past the line of this equilibrium, and into an area that appears more unfavorable toward the law. Topaloff even goes so far as to say that this drive for equilibrium is what sets the French press apart from the American. “C’est le paradoxe de la neutralité de la presse française,” Topaloff said. “Je croix que c’est un enjeu, une paradoxe. C’est différent avec la presse américaine. On n’avait pas cette prétention de la neutralité. On n’avait pas ce paradoxe.”15 Sugier, on the other hand, suggested the discrepancy wasn’t so much the result of a search for this journalistic equilibrium, but merely an attempt on the part of the journalists or publications to avoid seeming racist.

Both Sugier and Topaloff agreed that the French press as a whole follows a model that favors discussion and the inclusion of many sources and ideas. They also suggested that this model offers readers and viewers a better, more complete grasp of events and allows them to formulate opinions in ways the American press does not.

André Gerin had nothing to say about the valence scores of the articles and samples, and discussed primarily the history of the event and the role of the French press in general, agreeing with Topaloff and Sugier that French papers offer a more

15 “That’s the paradox of the neutrality of the French press. I think it’s a tricky game, a paradox. It’s different with the American press. There’s no pretention of this kind of neutrality. You don’t have this paradox. Menrisky 108

well-rounded discussion-oriented system of journalism that allows readers to access all sides of an issue and form well-founded opinions.

Summary of Major Findings

This study has confirmed earlier analyses of news coverage of issues involving

Muslims showing that Muslims and Islam are often portrayed in terms of war and violence; the war metaphors in this sample were most numerous. However, the valence scores indicate an interesting reversal: the war metaphors in general seemed to more often paint the veiled women as victims and the ban as a violent aggressor. This is a marked difference from research discussed in the literature review suggesting that the French media have generally been hostile to Muslims. However, it is worth noting that there is a significant degree of discussion of freedom of expression in this debate.

Past studies have generally studied Muslims in relation to the War on Terror.

Furthermore, testimony from professionals in France has suggested that this discrepancy is the result of journalists and publications actively trying to present their stories more neutrally—an attempt that appears to be missing in many of the American stories.

The American sample demonstrated a much more obvious outcry against the ban in its use of metaphor, often tongue-in-cheek and presenting the ban as an aggressor. The ban was also frequently presented as an aggressor in the French sample, but the majority of the stories was less radically negative, and tended to stick to neutral language and lengthier discussion-framed articles. More positive stories were generally limited to opinion pieces. The reasons for these differences are unclear; Menrisky 109

it may be that the French sample, so close in proximity to the issue, took a more neutral approach in light of the delicacy of the national situation and in an attempt to not appear racist, as Sugier suggested, and that the American press, not nearly so invested in the issue, felt free to speak. Regardless, the presentation of the issue through metaphorical language and other linguistic cues in the French sample was far more neutral than that in the American sample, which was much more negatively representative of the ban.

It is important to last note that the veil was generally defended, not touted as a hero or defender in its own right. Throughout the entire sample, the veil was presented as a victim, often helpless, and in need of defense from third parties. Thus, orientalist themes were still present in the media representation of Islam, but the indication of violence on the part of Muslims was not present; only the need for help was demonstrated by the language.

Limitations

A project of this type was bound to meet several limitations, not least of which was the difficulty of collecting some of the samples. On a similar note, the data are bound by the samples from the publications that were collected; a different collection of publications may have yielded different results, but I chose the publications I did in an attempt to create an evenly distributed sample. Other publications may have been equally as appropriate, but for the sake of the scale of the project, I found it necessary to limit the number of publications I used. Menrisky 110

Additionally, the number of journalists I was able to interview in France was limited by a number of factors, not least of which was the difficulty I found in gathering names and contact information for journalists who are familiar with the issue. Those I did gather I collected through the aid of personal contacts. Certain of the writers of stories that appeared in my sample had stories that frequently were published on the topic; unfortunately, I was unable to reach any of these people. My time frame for work in France was relatively small, but this happily did not turn out to be a major limitation.

Questions for Further Research

This project revealed much about the way American and French publications have covered the issue of the 2010 ban on full Islamic veils in France and the way metaphors are used to demonstrate a journalistic attitude, but there are many more questions that might be leveled at the debate and the journalistic coverage of it, as well as French news writing in general. First and foremost of these, perhaps, is: Are French publications more likely to carry stories that are on the whole more neutral toward their subjects than their American counterparts? Are we to understand these data as implying that American news stories are largely more slanted and biased? This fact is suggested by the above results, but it would be interesting to conduct an identical, or very similar, project while focusing on a very different issue as the subject.

Regarding the question of French journalistic neutrality, an interesting study might be to compare news coverage of two or more similar but different issues or debates by a similar method. It is possible, of course, that this issue, being considered Menrisky 111

widely more sensitive than others, has been treated with more caution in the news media, and journalists have been careful to step lightly around coverage of the ban. It would be interesting to see if a similar pattern of neutrality is observable in coverage of other issues, both those that are drastically different than the veil debate and those that are very similar. Similarly, a study of this issue covering a larger time frame, and thus incorporating more areas of debate at different points of the chronology, might yield different results. It would be interesting to see if overall representations of the issue or conclusions drawn regarding methods of news coverage would be affected by a study not restrained by an 18-month time frame.

The same principle is true for the American sample; would a similar study yield similar results where other issues are concerned? The data show that, despite the

American sample’s overall disagreement with the ban, there is still evidence suggesting heavy war metaphor and more radical opinions toward the issue than is apparent in the French sample. Granted, war metaphor has been shown to be used frequently where stories involving Islam are concerned, but would equally radical language and positions be observed in a valence analysis of articles covering an issue that does not involve Islam, the veil, or terrorism? Equally interesting would be to study media representations in other countries, namely other European countries that are considering or have passed similar bans, such as Belgium, or others that have passed older versions or no legislation, such as Germany or the United Kingdom.

Middle Eastern publications, such as Al Jazeera, would also be well worth considering. Menrisky 112

Lastly, the question of freedom of expression has come to my mind. How is the principle of freedom of expression tied to these observed trends? Can the more radical position of the American sample be attributed to a more fierce loyalty to rights of freedom of expression and religion? Do the data then consequently suggest a less forceful assertion of free expression rights in France? I am immediately inclined, with no completely applicable data to support me, to say no, but how might one best measure data collected in search of such an answer? This project certainly does not have the capacity to answer such a question. Freedom of expression is a vague subject, and difficult to measure as a principle guarded by the media. I am unwilling to say that the results of this study offer any concise answers, but I would venture to say that, even though the American sample displays more aversion to the ban while the French sample remains more neutral, there was still a much smaller portion of the French sample that displayed itself outwardly in support of the ban, and I would venture to suggest that this might indicate an unwillingness to completely deny a religious freedom. More likely, however, are the suggestions made by Topaloff and Sugier, claiming that the French press is in search of an equilibrium of journalistic neutrality that does not exist—or no longer exists—in the American press.

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La Croix

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actu/2010/01/21/01011-20100121FILWWW00767-la-burqa-s-invite-aux-vux-

de-sarkozy.php.

Agence France-Presse. “Laïcité: Guéant rassure les musulmans.” Le Figaro. N.p., 15

Mar. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-

actu/2011/03/15/97001-20110315FILWWW00556-laicite-gueant-rassure-les-

musulmans.php.

Agence France-Presse. “Voile intégral: un rassemblement interdit.” Le Figaro. N.p., 8

Apr. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-

actu/2011/04/08/97001-20110408FILWWW00589-voile-integral-un-

rassemblement-interdit.php. Menrisky 133

Agence France-Presse. “Voile: une prière devant un commissariat.” Le Figaro. N.p.,

21 Apr. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-

actu/2011/04/21/97001-20110421FILWWW00516-voile-une-priere-devant-

un-commissariat.php.

Fox News

Associated Press. “France’s ban on face-covering Islamic veil met with defiance.” Fox

News. N.p., 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/04/11/france-bans-face-covering-

islamic-veil-1300456722/.

Associated Press. “France’s Constitutional Council endorses veil ban.” Fox News.

N.p., 7 Oct. 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/10/07/frances-constitutional-council-

endorses-veil-ban/.

Associated Press. “France’s constitutional watchdog endorses veil ban.” Fox News.

N.p., 7 Oct. 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/10/07/frances-constitutional-council-

endorses-veil-ban-427989156/.

Associated Press. “French ban on Islamic veils enters force.” Fox News. N.p., 11 Apr.

2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

Associated Press. “French diplomats face fallout abroad as bid to ban Islamic veils

irks allies - and tourists.” Fox News. N.p., 4 Sept. 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011. Menrisky 134

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/09/04/french-diplomats-face-fallout-

abroad-bid-ban-islamic-veils-irks-allies-tourists/.

Associated Press. “French parliament passes ban on Islamic face veils.” Fox News.

N.p., 13 July 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/07/12/french-veil-ban-set-pass-lower-

house-parliament-legal-challenges-likely-later/.

Associated Press. “Suspicion of polygamy stokes France's veil debate.” Fox News.

N.p., 25 Apr. 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/04/25/suspicion-polygamy-stokes-

frances-veil-debate-2141920563/.

Associated Press. “UAE to citizens: Respect law abroad, even veil ban.” Fox News.

N.p., 23 May 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/05/23/uae-citizens-respect-law-abroad-

veil-ban/.

Associated Press. “Woman ticketed in France for wearing face veil.” Fox News. N.p.,

12 Apr. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/04/12/woman-ticketed-france-wearing-

face-veil-536356715/.

Chesler, Phyllis. “France is brave and right to ban the burqa.” Editorial. Fox News.

N.p., 18 Apr. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/04/13/france-brave-right-ban-burqa/. Menrisky 135

Chesler, Phyllis. “Why France is leading the way in the battle for women's freedom.”

Editorial. Fox News. N.p., 15 July 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

Rittgers, David. “France could find better ways to counter extremists than by banning

the burqa.” Editorial. Fox News. N.p., 18 Apr. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/04/13/france-better-ways-counter-

extremists-banning-burqa/.

The Huffington Post

Charlton, Angela. “French Ban on Islamic Veils Enters Force.” The Huffington Post.

N.p., 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-

wires/20110411/eu-france-veil-ban/.

Charlton, Angela. “French Burqa Ban Enforced as Woman Receives Ticket.” The

Huffington Post. N.p., 12 Apr. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/12/france-burqa-ban-

enforced_n_848240.html.

Corbet, Sylvie. “France Moves Towards Banning Muslim Veil in Public.” The

Huffington Post. N.p., 21 Apr. 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/21/france-moves-towards-

bann_n_545829.html.

Doland, Angela. “France BURQA BAN: French Parliament Approves Ban on Face

Veils.” The Huffington Post. N.p., 13 July 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/13/france-burqa-ban-french-

p_n_644433.html. Menrisky 136

Doland, Angela. “France Moves Closer to Ban on Burqa-Style Veils.” The Huffington

Post. N.p., 6 July 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/06/france-moves-closer-to-

ba_n_636139.html.

Doland, Angela. “French Lawmaker: Burqas Are ‘Walking Coffins.’” The Huffington

Post. N.p., 12 July 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/12/french-lawmaker-burqas-

ar_n_642777.html.

Ganley, Elaine. “French Call for Veil Ban in Public Buildings.” The Huffington Post.

N.p., 25 Jan. 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/25/french-call-for-veil-

ban_n_435226.html.

Ganley, Elaine. “French Senate Passes Full Islamic Veils Ban.” The Huffington Post.

N.p., 14 Sept. 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/14/france-passes-full-

islami_n_716449.html.

Ganley, Elaine. “Muslim Women Face Choices as France's Veil Ban Looms.” The

Huffington Post. N.p., 4 Apr. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/05/frances-muslims-react-as-

_n_845113.html.

Ganley, Elaine. “Veil Ban in France: Parliament Lays Groundwork, Sarkozy Wants

Full Ban.” The Huffington Post. N.p., 11 May 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011. Menrisky 137

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/11/veil-ban-in-france-

parlia_n_571328.html.

Ghouse, Mike. “French Burqa Ban Sets a Dangerous Precedent.” Editorial. The

Huffington Post. N.p., 14 Apr. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-ghouse/french-burqa-ban-sets-a-

d_b_849157.html.

Greenfield, Kent. “France and Belgium Have Banned the Burqa. Should America

Follow Suit?” Editorial. The Huffington Post. N.p., 9 June 2011. Web. 29 Aug.

2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kent-greenfield/france-and-belgium-

have-b_b_873600.html.

Harney, Jehan S. “Should the French Veil Ban Concern the West?” Editorial. The

Huffington Post. N.p., 17 May 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jehan-s-harney/should-the-french-veil-

ba_b_579360.html.

Hughes, Michael. “French Ban Veils Sarkozy's Political Ambitions.” Editorial. The

Huffington Post. N.p., 1 May 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-hughes/french-ban-veils-

sarkozys_b_559601.html.

Keaten, Jamey. “61 Arrested over Banned Paris Muslim Veil Protest.” The Huffington

Post. N.p., 9 Apr. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20110409/eu-france-islamic-veils/. Menrisky 138

Price, Robyn Carolyn. “Banning the Burqa: Behind the Veil of France's New Law.”

Editorial. The Huffington Post. N.p., 15 Apr. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robyn-carolyn-price/banning-the-burqa-

behind-_b_849937.html.

Rustici, Camille. “France Burqa Ban Takes Effect; Two Women Detained.” The

Huffington Post. N.p., 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/11/france-burqa-ban-takes-

ef_n_847366.html.

“Sarkozy: Full Veil Not Welcome in France.” The Huffington Post. N.p., 18 Mar.

2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/14/sarkozy-full-veil-not-

wel_n_423221.html.

Vanzini, Pierre-Baptiste. “Woman Fined for Wearing Islamic Veil while Driving in

France.” The Huffington Post. N.p., 23 Apr. 2010. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/23/woman-wearing-islamic-

fac_n_549790.html.

L’Express

Agence France-Presse. “Copé joue son va-tout sur la burqa.” L’Express. N.p., 7 July

2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011. http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/cope-

joue-son-va-tout-sur-la-burqa_904830.html.

Agence France-Presse. “Guéant veut ‘rassurer’ le Conseil français du culte

musulman.” L’Express. N.p., 17 Mar. 2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011. Menrisky 139

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/gueant-veut-rassurer-le-conseil-

francais-du-culte-musulman_973149.html.

Agence France-Presse. “Niqab au volant, une ‘victoire des intégristes’ pour l'imam de

Drancy.” L’Express. N.p., 14 Dec. 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/religion/niqab-au-volant-une-victoire-

des-integristes-pour-l-imam-de-drancy_944967.html.

Agence France-Presse. “Un débat sur le voile intégral dégénère.” L’Express. N.p., 18

May 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011. http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/un-

debat-sur-le-voile-integral-degenere_893144.html.

Armede, Heven. “Des femmes en niqab arrêtées lors d'une manifestation.” L’Express.

N.p., 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/des-femmes-en-niqab-arretees-lors-d-

une-manifestation_981738.html.

Armede, Heven. “Le voile intégral vu par les musulmanes.” L’Express. N.p., 13 Apr.

2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011. http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/le-voile-

integral-vu-par-les-musulmanes_982546.html.

Benhaiem, Annabel. “61 interpellations lors d’une manifestation contre la loi anti-

burqa.” L’Express. N.p., 9 Apr. 2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/61-interpellations-lors-d-une-

manifestation-contre-la-loi-anti-burqa_981201.html. Menrisky 140

Benhaiem, Annabel. “Ces féministes qui défendent le voile.” L’Express. N.p., 13 July

2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011. http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/ces-

feministes-qui-defendent-le-voile_904685.html.

Chartier, Claire, Julie Joly & Noria Ait-Kheddache. “Voile intégral: le malaise des

musulmans.” L’Express. N.p., 19 May 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/voile-integral-le-malaise-des-

musulmans_892898.html.

Gouëset, Catherine. “Une loi sur la burqa, c’est ‘tuer une mouche avec un bazooka.’”

L’Express. N.p., 19 May 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/une-loi-sur-la-burqa-c-est-tuer-une-

mouche-avec-un-bazooka_893291.html.

Joly, Julie. “‘Beaucoup de musulmans étouffent.’” L’Express. N.p., 6 Oct. 2010. Web.

30 Aug. 2011. http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/beaucoup-de-

musulmans-etouffent_925127.html.

“Jusqu'où doit aller le respect de laïcité ?” L’Express. N.p., 25 Mar. 2011. Web. 30

Aug. 2011. http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/jusqu-ou-doit-aller-le-

respect-de-laicite_976115.html.

Maghreb Arab Press. “‘La laïcité, c'est la loi de 1905, on n'a qu'à l'appliquer.’”

L’Express. N.p., 29 Mar. 2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/religion/la-laicite-c-est-la-loi-de-1905-

on-n-a-qu-a-l-appliquer_977076.html. Menrisky 141

Reuters. “Copé va lancer un débat sur la laïcité en avril.” L’Express. N.p., 16 Feb.

2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

Reuters. “La crise a accentué les phénomènes racistes en Europe.” L’Express. N.p., 8

July 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe/la-crise-a-accentue-les-

phenomenes-racistes-en-europe_904912.html.

Saulnier, Julie. “Comprendre le débat sur le voile intégral.” L’Express. N.p., 19 May

2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/comprendre-le-debat-sur-le-voile-

integral_886805.html.

Saulnier, Julie. “Les Niqabitch, mini-short et maxi-voile.” L’Express. N.p., 4 Oct.

2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011. http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/les-

niqabitch-mini-short-et-maxi-voile_924851.html.

Saulnier, Julie. “Voile intégral: la résolution avant le projet de loi.” L’Express. N.p.,

11 May 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/voile-integral-la-resolution-avant-le-

projet-de-loi_891092.html.

Zénon, Laurie. “‘Nadia, une féministe en burkini.’” L’Express. N.p., 20 Apr. 2011.

Web. 30 Aug. 2011. http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/religion/nadia-

une-feministe-en-burkini_984768.html.

Menrisky 142

Metro

Agence France-Presse. “Le CFCM appelle à la retenue.” Metro. N.p., 27 Apr. 2010.

Web. 30 Aug. 2011. http://www.metrofrance.com/info/les-representants-du-

culte-musulman-appellent-a-la-retenue/pjdz!TYcIHod2nmgZclk2O4HA/.

Bogaert, Alexandra. “Une loi à visage découvert.” Metro. N.p., 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 30

Aug. 2011. http://www.metrofrance.com/info/une-loi-a-visage-

decouvert/pkdj!t6Ienenk02febGPzvhX9gw/.

Bogaert, Alexandra. “Voile intégral: les élus hésitent.” Metro. N.p., 17 Dec. 2009.

Web. 30 Aug. 2011. http://www.metrofrance.com/info/voile-integral-les-elus-

hesitent/pilp!LPAuN4aBVtNBxpb5zoob3g/.

Hizzir, Hamza. “Des lycéennes musulmanes en robes longues menacées d'exclusion?.”

Metro. N.p., 23 Mar. 2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.metrofrance.com/info/des-lyceennes-musulmanes-en-robes-

longues-menacees-d-exclusion/mkcw!TDx67xFrHa0oU/.

Hizzir, Hamza. “Voile intégral: une loi qui ravive les tensions.” Metro. N.p., 19 May

2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011. http://www.metrofrance.com/info/voile-integral-

une-loi-qui-ravive-les-tensions/mjes!oYcuNm340QvBw/.

Hizzir, Hamza. “Voile intégral: de 150 à 15 000 euros d’amende.” Metro. N.p., 30

Apr. 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011. http://www.metrofrance.com/info/voile-

integral-de-150-a-15-000-euros-d-amende/mjdD!sMyTj61M5Xj6/. Menrisky 143

“Pas de loi européenne pour la burqa.” Metro. N.p., 29 June 2010. Web. 30 Aug.

2011. http://www.metrofrance.com/info/pas-de-loi-europeenne-pour-la-

burqa/mjfB!kOkYWxX8fG4M/.

Le Monde

Note: All stories from Le Monde were retrieved from LexisNexis Academic, accessible here: http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/.

“Burqa: Mme Alliot-Marie craint qu’une loi ne soit inapplicable.” Le Monde 26 Jan.

2010: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug. 2011.

Hammarberg, Thomas. “L'interdiction de la burqa est inutile.” Editorial. Le Monde 28

May 2010: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug. 2011.

Jaxel-Truer, Pierre & Stéphanie Le Bars. “L’UMP affiche une conception ferme de la

laïcité.” Le Monde 6 Apr. 2011: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug.

2011.

Le Bars, Stéphanie. “À la veille débat sur l'islam et la laïcité, tout ce que l'UMP aurait

du lire sur le sujet.” Le Monde 5 Apr. 2011: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic.

Web. 6 Aug. 2011.

Le Bars, Stéphanie. “Burqa: comment organiser le dialogue prévu par la loi.” Le

Monde 14 July 2010: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug. 2011.

Le Bars, Stéphanie. “Burqa: le Conseil d’État rejette l'interdiction générale.” Le

Monde 31 Mar. 2010: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug. 2011. Menrisky 144

Le Bars, Stéphanie. “En voile intégral et désormais ‘hors la loi,’ des femmes

témoignent.” Le Monde 12 Apr. 2011: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6

Aug. 2011.

Le Bars, Stéphanie. “L'islamophobie et l’interdiction de la burqa dénoncées par

l'UOIF.” Le Monde 6 Apr. 2010: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug.

2011.

Le Bars, Stéphanie. “M. Copé maintient la pression pour une interdiction générale du

port de la burqa.” Le Monde 28 Jan. 2010: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web.

6 Aug. 2011.

Le Bars, Stéphanie. “Niqab: M. Fillon sollicite l'avis du Conseil d’État sur une loi

d’interdiction.” Le Monde 26 Jan. 2010: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6

Aug. 2011.

Le Bars, Stéphanie. “La ‘persuasion’ des policiers face au niqab.” Le Monde 12 Apr.

2011: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug. 2011.

Le Bars, Stéphanie. “Les politiques contraintes de se positionner sur la laïcité.” Le

Monde 15 Dec. 2010: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug. 2011.

Le Bars, Stéphanie. “Pragmatique, le PS se convertit au projet de loi interdisant le

burqa.” Le Monde 7 July 2010: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug.

2011.

Le Bars, Stéphanie. “Projet de loi interdisant le voile intégral: le ‘consensus

républicain’ s’éloigne.” Le Monde 8 July 2010: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic.

Web. 6 Aug. 2011. Menrisky 145

Le Bars, Stéphanie. “Provocations en niqab face aux policiers désemparés.” Le Monde

12 May 2011: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug. 2011.

“La loi interdisant le voile intégral est entrée en vigueur lundi 11 avril.” Le Monde 12

Apr. 2011: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug. 2011.

“Le projet de loi interdisant le port du voile intégral adopté en commission.” Le

Monde 25 June 2010: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug. 2011.

Plouguerneau, Yveline Pallier. “Courrier burqa: perplexité, crainte, opposition.”

Editorial. Le Monde 6 Feb. 2010: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug.

2011.

Roger, Patrick. “L’interdiction du voile intégral le 6 juillet a l’Assemblée nationale.”

Le Monde 24 June 2010: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug. 2011.

“Une dizaine de manifestants contre la loi interdisant le niqab.” Le Monde 13 Apr.

2011: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug. 2011.

“Une trenteine de femmes portant le niqab verbalisées en un mois.” Le Monde 13 May

2011: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug. 2011.

“Voile intégral: Claude Guéant a envoyé la circulaire d’application aux préfets.” Le

Monde 5 Apr. 2011: n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 6 Aug. 2011.

MSNBC

“Arrests made as French veil ban takes effect.” MSNBC. N.p., 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 30

Aug. 2011.

Associated Press. “France moves closer to banning full Muslim veil.” MSNBC. N.p.,

15 Jan. 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011. Menrisky 146

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34874754/ns/world_news-europe/t/france-

moves-closer-banning-full-muslim-veil/#.TlzyfV3hKuI.

Associated Press. “French panel: Ban veils in public facilities.” MSNBC. N.p., 26 Jan.

2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35064478/ns/world_news-europe/t/french-

panel-ban-veils-public-facilities/.

Elbaum, Rachel. “EU governments walk fine line in veil debate.” MSNBC. N.p., 20

Mar. 2007. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

Ganley, Elaine. “France moves to ban wearing of full Muslim veils.” MSNBC. N.p.,

14 Sept. 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39175408/ns/world_news-europe/t/france-

moves-ban-wearing-full-muslim-veils/.

Ganley, Elaine. “French cabinet begins review of veil ban bill.” MSNBC. N.p., 29 May

2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37231998/ns/world_news-europe/t/french-

cabinet-begins-review-veil-ban-bill/.

Maceda, Jim. “Debate over religious symbols divides France.” MSNBC. N.p., 9 Feb.

2004. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4106422/ns/world_news/t/debate-over-

religious-symbols-divides-france/#.TlzxfF3hKuI. Menrisky 147

“Report: 3 held in France after scuffle over burqa.” MSNBC. N.p., 18 May 2010. Web.

30 Aug. 2011. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37209477/ns/world_news-

europe/t/report-held-france-after-scuffle-over-burqa/#.Tlzy-V3hKuI.

Reuters. “Militants seek attacks on France over full veil ban.” MSNBC. N.p., 13 Apr.

2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42570006/ns/world_news-europe/t/militants-

seek-attacks-france-over-full-veil-ban/.

Reuters. “Turkish PM attacks France for ban on full face veil.” MSNBC. N.p., 13 Apr.

2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42569743/ns/world_news-

europe/#.Tlz0Ul3hKuI.

Vinocur, Nick. “France starts ban on full-face veil.” MSNBC. N.p., 11 Apr. 2011.

Web. 30 Aug. 2011. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42529058/ns/world_news-

europe/t/france-starts-ban-full-face-veil/#.Tlzz1l3hKuI.

The New York Times

Associated Press. “France: Assembly Starts Debate on Veil Ban in Public Places.” The

New York Times. N.p., 6 July 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940CE4D81530F934A35754C

0A9669D8B63&scp=1&sq=France:%20assembly%20starts%20debate%20on

%20veil%20ban%20in%20public%20places&st=cse.

Audi, Nadim. “France: Draft Veil Ban Approved.” The New York Times. N.p., 19 May

2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011. Menrisky 148

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/20/world/europe/20briefs-

France.html?scp=1&sq=France:%20Draft%20Veil%20Ban%20Approved&st=

cse.

Baume, Maïa de la. “Enforcing Veil Ban, the French Have Stopped 46 Violators.” The

New York Times. N.p., 11 May 2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/world/europe/12france.html?scp=1&sq=

Enforcing%20veil%20ban,%20the%20French%20have%20stopped%2046%2

0violators&st=cse.

Bennhold, Katrin. “A Veil Closes France's Door to Citizenship.” The New York Times.

N.p., 19 July 2008. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/19/world/europe/19france.html?scp=1&sq=

A%20veil%20closes%20France%27s%20door%20to%20citizenship&st=cse.

Erlanger, Steven. “Face-Veil Issue in France Shifts to Parliament for Debate.” The

New York Times. N.p., 26 Jan. 2010 Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D07E0DC143AF934A15752

C0A9669D8B63&scp=1&sq=Face-

veil+issue+in+France+shifts+to+parliament+for+debate&st=nyt.

Erlanger, Steven. “France Enforces Ban on Full-Face Veils in Public.” The New York

Times. N.p., 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/world/europe/12france.html?scp=1&sq=

France%20enforces%20ban%20on%20full-

face%20veils%20in%20public&st=cse. Menrisky 149

Erlanger, Steven. “France: Full-Face Veil Ban Approved.” The New York Times. N.p.,

7 Oct. 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/world/europe/08briefs-

France.html?scp=1&sq=France:%20Full-

face%20veil%20ban%20approved&st=cse.

Erlanger, Steven. “France: Senate Passes Bill on Facial Veils.” The New York Times.

N.p., 14 Sept. 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/15/world/europe/15briefs-

France.html?scp=1&sq=France:%20Senate%20passes%20bill%20on%20facia

l%20veils&st=cse.

Erlanger, Steven. “France: Veiled Driver's Fine Rescinded.” The New York Times.

N.p., 14 Dec. 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/world/europe/14briefs-

France.html?scp=1&sq=France:%20Veiled%20Driver%27s%20Fine%20Resci

nded&st=cse.

Erlanger, Steven. “France: Warning Over Veil Ban.” The New York Times. N.p., 30

Mar. 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/world/europe/31briefs-

franceveil.html?scp=1&sq=France:%20Warning%20Over%20Veil&st=cse.

Erlanger, Steven. “Parliament Moves France Closer to a Ban on Facial Veils.” The

New York Times. N.p., 13 July 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/14/world/europe/14burqa.html?scp=1&sq=P Menrisky 150

arliament%20moves%20France%20closer%20to%20a%20ban%20on%20facia

l%20veils&st=cse.

Fuchs, Brian. “The French Ban on Wearing a Full-Face Veil in Public.” Letter. The

New York Times. N.p., 17 Apr. 2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/18/opinion/l18veil.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=T

he%20French%20ban%20on%20wearing%20a%20full-face%20veil&st=cse.

“Government-Enforced Bigotry in France.” Editorial. The New York Times. N.p., 11

Apr. 2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/opinion/12tue3.html?scp=1&sq=Govern

ment-enforced%20bigotry%20in%20France&st=cse.

Hussein, Azhar. “The French Ban on Wearing a Full-Face Veil in Public.” Letter. The

New York Times. N.p., 17 Apr. 2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/18/opinion/l18veil.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=T

he%20French%20ban%20on%20wearing%20a%20full-face%20veil&st=cse.

Reuters. “France: Catholic Church Rejects Ban on Full Face-Veils.” The New York

Times. N.p., 1 Feb. 2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/world/europe/02briefs-

France.html?scp=1&sq=France:%20Catholic%20church%20rejects%20ban%2

0on%20full%20face-veils&st=cse.

Reuters. “Veil Leads to Fine for French Driver.” The New York Times. N.p., 23 Apr.

2010. Web. 30 Aug. 2011. Menrisky 151

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/europe/24france.html?scp=1&sq=

Veil%20Leads%20to%20Fine%20for%20French%20Driver&st=cse.

Sciolino, Elaine. “The French, the Veil and the Look.” Editorial. The New York Times.

N.p., 16 Apr. 2011. Web. 30 Aug. 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/weekinreview/17BURQA.html?scp=1&s

q=The%20French,%20the%20veil%20and%20the%20look&st=cse.

Menrisky 152

APPENDIX B

Valence Ratings by Article across All Publications

CNN

Topic Tone Article Date Valence Valence French parliament debates burqa ban 7/6/2010 3 3 Burqa ban passes French lower house overwhelmingly 7/13/2010 5 4 Europe's burqa wars: broad support for banning veils 7/13/2010 1 2 Veil ban a symbol of hypocrisy, fear 7/15/2010 1 1 A French fairy-veil, sans happy ending 7/16/2010 1 1 Muslim women who wear the hijab and niqab explain their choice 7/17/2010 1 1 Opinion: The media is obsessed with how Muslim women look 8/30/2010 1 1 French senate approves burqa ban 9/15/2010 5 3 French burqa ban clears last legal obstacle 10/7/2010 5 3 France threatened in alleged Bin Laden tape 10/27/2010 1 3 Bin Laden tape is real, French say 10/28/2010 1 3 French politics will not be swayed by Bin Laden tape, Sarkozy says 10/29/2010 1 3 France's burqa ban in effect next month 3/4/2011 4 4 France's controversial burqa ban takes effect 4/10/2011 5 2 2 arrested as France's ban on burqas, niqabs takes effect 4/12/2011 4 3 First woman cited under France's veil ban 4/12/2011 5 2 Burqa ban turns a right into a crime 4/14/2011 3 1 France's Islamic veil ban spurs passionate reaction worldwide 4/27/2011 1 2

Menrisky 153

La Croix

Topic Tone Article Date Valence Valence Faute de consensus, les députés cherchent une issue sur la burqa 1/26/2010 4 2 François Fillon annonce une loi sur le voile intégral 1/31/2010 4 3 Déclaration des évêques de France sur le voile intégral 2/1/2010 2 3 Le Conseil d'Etat déconseille l'interdiction totale de la burqa 3/30/2010 2 2 L'interdiction de la burqa pourrait résister à l'épreuve du droit 5/19/2010 3 3 François Fillon veut rassurer les musulmans de France 6/27/2010 3 3 Elus de droite et de gauche tout près du consensus sur le voile intégral 7/4/2010 4 3 Pourquoi elles n'ont pas choisi le voile intégral 7/12/2010 3 3 L'assemble nationale vote l'interdiction du voile intégral 7/13/2010 5 3 La loi sur le voile intégral sera difficile à mettre en œuvre. 9/13/2010 3 3 Six mois pour convaincre les femmes voilées 9/13/2010 2 3 Le Parlement interdit le port du voile intégral dans l'espace public 9/14/2010 4 3 L'interdiction de la burqa soumise au filtre du Conseil constitutionnel 9/15/2010 3 3 Nicole Ameline a convaincu la majorité d'interdire la burqa 12/26/2010 4 2 Le port du voile intégral bientôt verbalise 5/4/2011 3 3 Le premier bilan de la loi sur le voile intégral divise 5/11/2011 4 2

Menrisky 154

Le Figaro

Article Date Topic Valence Tone Valence La burqa s'invite aux vœux de Sarkozy 1/21/2010 2 3 Burqa: "raisonnable de s'identifier" 1/22/2010 2 3 Burqa: la Licra "favorable" a une loi 6/11/2010 4 3 Laïcité: Guéant rassure les musulmans 3/15/2011 4 2 Voile intégral: un rassemblement interdit 4/8/2011 2 3 Voile: une prière devant un commissariat 4/21/2011 2 3

Fox News

Topic Tone Article Date Valence Valence Suspicion of polygamy stokes France's veil debate 4/25/2010 3 3 French parliament passes ban on Islamic face veils 7/13/2010 5 3 Why France is leading the way in the battle for women's freedom 7/15/2010 5 5 French diplomats face fallout abroad as bid to ban Islamic veils irks allies - and tourists 9/4/2010 2 2 France's Constitutional Council endorses veil ban 10/7/2010 5 3 France's constitutional watchdog endorses veil ban 10/7/2010 5 3 France's ban on face-covering Islamic veil met with defiance 4/11/2011 2 3 French ban on Islamic veils enters force 4/11/2011 5 2 Woman ticketed in France for wearing face veil 4/12/2011 4 2 France could find better ways to counter extremists than by banning the burqa 4/18/2011 1 1 France is brave and right to ban the burqa 4/18/2011 5 4 UAE to citizens: Respect law abroad, even veil ban 5/23/2011 4 3

Menrisky 155

The Huffington Post

Topic Tone Article Date Valence Valence French call for veil ban in public buildings 1/25/2010 4 3 Sarkozy: Full veil not welcome in France 3/18/2010 4 3 France moves towards banning Muslim veil in public 4/21/2010 4 3 Woman fined for wearing Islamic veil while driving in France 4/23/2010 3 3 French ban veils Sarkozy's political ambitions 5/1/2010 1 1 Veil ban in France: Parliament lays groundwork, Sarkozy wants full ban 5/11/2010 4 3 Should the French veil ban concern the West? 5/17/2010 1 2 France moves closer to ban on burqa-style veils 7/6/2010 4 2 French lawmaker: Burqas are 'walking coffins' 7/12/2010 3 3 France BURQA BAN: French parliament approves ban on face veils 7/13/2010 5 2 French senate passes full Islamic veils ban 9/14/2010 5 2 Muslim women face choices as France's veil ban looms 4/4/2011 3 2 61 arrested over banned Paris Muslim veil protest 4/9/2011 5 4 France burqa ban takes effect; two women detained 4/11/2011 4 2 French ban on Islamic veils enters force 4/11/2011 5 2 French burqa ban enforced as woman receives ticket 4/12/2011 5 2 French Burqa ban sets a dangerous precedent (OPINION PIECE) 4/14/2011 1 1 Banning the burqa: Behind the veil of France's new law 4/15/2011 1 2 France and Belgium have banned the burqa. Should America follow suit? 6/9/2011 3 3

Menrisky 156

L’Express

Topic Tone Article Date Valence Valence Voile intégral: la résolution avant le projet de loi 5/11/2010 4 3 Un débat sur le voile intégral dégénère 5/18/2010 2 3 Comprendre le débat sur le voile intégral 5/19/2010 3 2 Une loi sur la burqa, c'est "tuer une mouche avec un bazooka" 5/19/2010 2 2 Voile intégral: le malaise des musulmans 5/19/2010 3 2 Copé joue son va-tout sur la burqa 7/7/2010 4 3 La crise a accentue les phénomènes racistes en Europe 7/8/2010 2 2 Ces féministes qui défendant le voile 7/13/2010 2 2 Les Niqabitch, mini-short et maxi-voile 10/4/2010 2 2 "Beaucoup de musulmans étouffent" 10/6/2010 3 3 Niqab au volant, une victoire des intégristes" pour l'imam de Drancy 12/14/2010 4 3 Copé va lancer un débat sur la laïcité en avril 2/16/2011 3 3 Guéant veut "rassurer" le Conseil français du culte musulman 3/17/2011 4 3 Jusqu'ou doit aller le respect de laïcité 3/25/2011 3 3 "La laïcité, c'est la loi de 1905, on n'a qu'a l'appliquer" 3/29/2011 3 2 61 interpellations lors d'une manifestation contre la loi anti-burqa 4/9/2011 2 3 Des femmes en niqab arrêtées lors d'une manifestation 4/11/2011 5 3 Le voile intégral vu par les musulmanes 4/13/2011 3 3 "Nadia, une féministe en burkini" 4/20/2011 3 3

Metro

Topic Tone Article Date Valence Valence Voile intégral: les élus hésitent 12/17/2009 4 4 Le CFCM appelle a la retenue 4/27/2010 2 2 Voile intégral: de 150 a 15 000 euros d'amende 4/30/2010 4 4 Voile intégral: une loi qui ravive les tensions 5/19/2010 3 2 Pas de loi européenne pour la burqa 6/29/2010 3 3 Des lycéennes musulmanes en robes longues menacées d'exclusion? 3/23/2011 3 2 Une loi a visage découvert 4/11/2011 5 3

Menrisky 157

Le Monde

Topic Tone Article Date Valence Valence Burqa: Mme Alliot-Marie craint qu'une loi ne soit inapplicable 1/26/2010 2 3 M. Copé maintient la pression pour une interdiction générale du port de la burqa 1/28/2010 3 2 Niqab: M. Fillon sollicite l'avis du Conseil d'Etat sur une loi d'interdiction 1/31/2010 3 3 Courrier Burqa: Perplexité, crainte, opposition 2/6/2010 2 2 Burqa: le Conseil d'Etat rejette l'interdiction générale 3/31/2010 1 2 L'islamophobie et l'interdiction de la burqa dénoncées par l'UOIF 4/6/2010 2 4 L'interdiction de la burqa est inutile 5/28/2010 1 1 L'interdiction du voile intégral le 6 juillet a l'Assemblée nationale 6/24/2010 4 3 Le projet de loi interdisant le port du voile intégral adopte en commission 6/25/2010 5 3 Pragmatique, le PS se convertit au projet de loi interdisant le burqa 7/7/2010 4 2 Projet de loi interdisant le voile intégral: le "consensus républicain" s'éloigne 7/8/2010 3 2 Burqa: comment organiser le dialogue prévu par la loi 7/14/2010 2 2 Les politiques contraintes de se positionner sur la laïcité 12/15/2010 3 2 A la veille débat sur l'islam et la laïcité, tout ce que l'UMP aurait du lire sur le sujet 4/5/2011 3 3 Voile intégral: Claude Guéant a envoyé la circulaire d'application aux préfets 4/5/2011 4 3 L'UMP affiche une conception ferme de la laïcité 4/6/2011 4 3 En voile intégral et désormais "hors la loi," des femmes témoignent 4/12/2011 3 2 La "persuasion" des policiers face au niqab 4/12/2011 5 2 La loi interdisant le voile intégral est entrée en vigueur lundi 11 avril 4/12/2011 5 3 Une dizaine de manifestants contre la loi interdisant le niqab 4/13/2011 5 3 Provocations en niqab face aux policiers désemparés 5/12/2011 4 2 Une trenteine de femmes portant le niqab verbalisées en un mois 5/13/2011 5 3

Menrisky 158

MSNBC

Topic Tone Article Date Valence Valence Debate over religious symbols divides France 2/9/2004 3 2 EU governments walk fine line in veil debate 3/20/2007 3 2 France moves closer to banning full Muslim veil 1/15/2010 4 2 French panel: Ban veils in public facilities 1/26/2010 4 3 Report: 3 held in France after scuffle over burqa 5/18/2010 3 2 French cabinet begins review of veil ban bill 5/29/2010 4 2 France moves to ban wearing of full Muslim veils 9/14/2010 4 2 Arrests made as French veil ban takes effect 4/11/2011 5 2 France starts ban on full-face veils 4/11/2011 5 2 Militants seek attacks on France over full veil ban 4/13/2011 1 2 Turkish PM attacks France for ban on full face veil 4/13/2011 2 3

Menrisky 159

The New York Times

Topic Tone Article Date Valence Valence A veil closes France's door to citizenship 7/19/2008 4 2 Face-veil issue in France shifts to parliament for debate 1/26/2010 3 2 France: Catholic church rejects ban on full face-veils 2/1/2010 1 3 France: Warning over veil 3/30/2010 2 3 Veil leads to fine for French driver 4/23/2010 4 2 France: Draft veil ban approved 5/19/2010 4 3 France: assembly starts debate on veil ban in public places 7/6/2010 3 3 Parliament moves France closer to a ban on facial veils 7/13/2010 5 3 France: Senate passes bill on facial veils 9/14/2010 5 3 France: Full-face veil ban approved 10/7/2010 5 3 France: Veiled Driver's Fine Rescinded 12/14/2010 2 2 France enforces ban on full-face veils in public 4/11/2011 5 2 Government-enforced bigotry in France 4/11/2011 1 1 The French, the veil and the look 4/16/2011 3 2 The French ban on wearing a full-face veil: Letter 1 4/17/2011 1 1 The French ban on wearing a full-face veil: Letter 2 4/17/2011 5 5 Enforcing veil ban, the French have stopped 46 violators 5/11/2011 4 3