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VOLUME LXIV OCTOBER 1984 NO 10
CONTENTS
PAGE 2 RIDE TO THE RIVER OF DEATH: CAVALRY OPERATIONS IN THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN by Malar Jerry D. Morelock. US Army 22 KERMIT ROOSEVELT LECTURE: OFFICER TRAINING AND EDUCATION by General William R. Richardson. US Army 35 TERRORISM: A MODE OF WARFARE by Major Jeffrey W. Wright. US Army 46 CASE STUDIES IN THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE II': THE CAMPAIGN IN THE FALKLANDS by Major Robert D. Higginbotham. US Army 61 SOVIET GENERAL STAFF'S NEW ROLE by Malor Kenneth CUrrie. US Air Force 75 IN DEFENSE OF US STRATEGIC NUCLEAR STRATEGY by John M Weinstein 80 LETTERS 81 NEWS 88 BOOKS contemporary reading for the professional
MILITARY REVIEW,s published monthly in EnglIsh and Spanish and quarterly m Portuguese. Use of funds for pnntmg thIS publIcation approved by the secretary of the Army. 1 December 1983. en accordance with the provisions of Army Regulation 310·1 Second-class postage paid at Leav~n· INorth. KS 66048 S998 and additional entry offices. English·language subscnptlons' $14.00 per year US and APOIFPO; $16 00 foreIgn. and $9 00 for US MIlitary Academy and Reserve Officers' Training Corps cadets and OffIcer CandIdate School candidates. Smgle copIes $1 75 US and APO/FPO: $200 foreign Address all mail to Military Review. USACGSG. Fort Leavenworth. KS 66027·6910 Telephone 1913) 684·5642 or AUTOVON 552·5642 Unless otherWise stated. the views herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof. BaSIS of offICIal dIStributIon is one per general officer and one per five field grade officers of the Active Army. and one per headquarters (battalIon and hIgher) 01 the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve. Postmaster Send Change of address Information to MIlitary Review. USACGSC. Fort Leavenworth. KS 66027 6910
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RIVER OF DEATH
This article. by a member of the 1983-84 class of the US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC). won the 1984 Arter-Darby Military History Writing Award for excellence in professional scholarship. Competition is open to all members of each USACGSC regular c/fUlS. Students are invited to write a historical essay on a military topic that is selected annually. Entries arejltdged on originality. scholarship. style and overall value to the literature of the military profession. The 1984 win ning article examines the employment of cavalry in the Chickamauga Campaign.
the opportunities been fully appreciated Introduction at the time by the opposing commanders, either one might have snatched a stun ning victory. Instead, the Federal commander, Major HE American Civil War's bloodiest General William S. Rosecrans, after bril T two days occurred on 19 and 20 Sep liant early maneuvering. was relieved of tember 1863 along a sluggish creek south command, while Confederate General of Chattanooga. Tennessee. Ironically. Braxton Bragg settled for a bloody, mar that creek's Cherokee Indian name trans ginal triumph which only prolonged the lates as the "River of Death.'" At the tac Confederacy's agonized death throes. tical level, this vicious fight through the Beyond that. this campaign, which saw thick woods bordering Chickamauga both success and failure of cavalry doc Creek was a classic infantry struggle of trine. serves as a striking example of the desperate assaults against hastily differences between the tactical and prepared breastworks of felled trees and operational levels of war. shallow trenches. Cavalry was unsuited for free oper ation in this tangle of brush and trees and. in its traditional role. had Civil War Cavalry Development. little effect on the outcome of the two-day Organization and Doctrine slaughter. Those troopers involved in the fight on 19 and 20 September were not on horseback and functioned as infantry. To fully appreciate the role of the But, when the Chickamauga Campaign cavalry during the Chickamauga Cam is examined at the opecational level. the paign. it is necessary to briefly review the opposing armies' movements fro~ cavalry's previous development, organi· January through September 1863 clearly zation and employment. In the opening incorporated cavalry operations and were months of the ,war, the Confederacy en significantly influenced by the mounted joyed an advantage in having effective arm. Opportunities for decisive moves cavalry units. The reasons for this were were available on several occasions as a more of necessity and lifestyle than of result of the actions of the Federal and design. Confederate cavalry corps. Indeed. had Although all Southerners were not born
CoPyn9ht '\l 1984 by Major Jerry D. Morelock. US Army.
3 MILITARY REVIEW
horsemen, the exigencies of daily life in winter, without tents or wagons, opera the rural, agrarian South led more to the ting ill a country poorly supplied with everyday use of the horse as a mode of forage, combating for the most part velY transport. Therefore, a greater proportion superior numbers, from the feeble begin- I of Southern soldiers were familiar and nings of one year ago, when its operations comfortable with horse travel. The life were mostly within the· infantry lines, it style of the South's upper classes-in has become master of the field, and which riding and horsemanship were inte hesitates not to attack the enemy wher gral parts-helped to produce a corps of euer it finds him. This great change, due leaders uniquely adapted to commanding chiefly to the joint efforts of both officers large bodies of high-spirited horsemen.} and men, has been greatly promoted by During the early days, Confederate caval giving them arms in which they had confi ry units-most of which were organized dence, and by adoption of the determined and employed as large units-literally use of the saber." rode rings around the smaller, poorly The Federal and Confederate cavalry trained, poorly led Federal detachments. forces were organized into troops (or com As the war progressed, however, the panies), regiments, brigades, divisions South began to lose its early advantage. and corps (see Figure 1). A Federal regi General Joseph "Fighting Joe" Hooker ment usually comprised 12 troops of 80 to organized the cavalry of the Army of the 100 men each. Four to six regiments con Potomac into a corps, thereby enabling it stituted a brigade, and two or three bri to compete on an equal basis with the gades made a division. Two or three divi large Confederate units. Other Federal ar sions formed a cavalry corps that consti mies soon followed suit. With better or tuted the cavalry for a field army. The ganization and hard-won battles, the Fed Confederate organization was similar ex eral cavalry improved rapidly. cept that regiments usually contained 10 This, coupled with the fact that the companies of 60 to 80 men each. Brigades Federal cavalrymen were always better could have from two to six regiments, and equipped than the Confederates, meant divisions might have up to six brigades. that, by 1863, Federal horsemen were Like their Federal counterparts, Confed equal if not better than those of the Con erate cavalry corps were made up of two federacy.' During this same period, the or three divisions.' South experienced an inevitable decline in Cavalry doctrine, at that time, pre· the quantity and quality of remounts, as scribed three major missions: scouting well as an inconsistent supply of good and screening, raids and fighting. As an weapons and accouterments.' Rosecrans, army's traditional "eyes," a cavalry the commander of the Army of the unit's primary responsibility was to ag Cumberland, discussed this dramatic gressively conduct the reconnaissance turnaround in his official report at the necessary to keep the commander in conclusion of the Chickamauga Cam formed of enemy movements, strength paign: and dispositions. Without this crucial and I cannot forebear calling the special at essential information, the army com tention of the General·in-Chief . .. to the mander was virtually blind. Additionally, conspicuous gallantry and laborious serv the cavalry force was to screen friendly ices' of ,this arm [cavalry]. Exposed in all movements from enemy observation, as weather, almost always moving, even in well as deceive the enemy commander
4 October Civil War Cavalry Organization Federal and Confederate xxx 2 to 3 Corps dlvlsrons
xx 1 to 3 brigades 0""'''" x x 4 to 6 regiments 1 to 6 [2r"" 00
r-----'--.,. Troopl Company
Federal Confederate
~ 85 to 100 enlisted 60 to 80 enlisted ~ ~ 3 to 4 officers 3 to 4 officers ~
1984 5 MILITARY REVIEW about the disposition and location of (pistol. One regimental commander of friendly forces. mounted troops during that battle attrib· The inherent mobility and demonstrat uted the small number of casualties in ed capacity for the independent opera his units to the fact that ;.'in each position tion of cavalrv units led to their increased occupied for any length of time [we] con· use as raiders' against enemy lines of com structed temporary breastworks which munication. Although the raids were protected us from the fire of small arms. "8 sometimes spectacular affairs that in volved thousands of mounted troopers, the results were not alwavs worth the Cavalrv at Chickamauga 7 losses of men and horses. • The cavalry's mission to stand and fight when necessary was seen more fre During the Chickamauga Campaign, quently as the w.ar progressed. Cavalry the first duty of cavalry units was to pro· men usually .fought dismounted when vide the commanders with detailed infor· they opposed infantry and on horseback mation on enemy dispositions and maneu· when facing other cavalry units. The day verso The overwhelming need for an accu· of the successful massed cavalry charge rate picture of enemy movements over against an infantry line had been brought great distances in rough, mountainous to an end by the development of the rifled country mandated this high priority. Si· musket and the use of the trench or rifle multaneously, the cavalry had to also pit. Dismounted troopers, especially screen its own army's movements from those armed with reliable, repeating car enemy observation. bines, could more than hold their own in The cavalry's secondary mission in this an assault or defense. campaign was to fight when necessary, By the time of Chickamauga, cavalry delay, repel or destroy the enemy at key men were as familiar with the spade and points. Although important at the taco ax as they had been with the sword and tical level, this mission was overshadowed RIVER OF DEATH
't by the primary responsibility. The other divisions." Major General Joseph "Fight duty. raids. was to have little impact on ing Joe" Wheeler commanded the left this campaign. The failure to properly ap wing corps. Divisions were led by Briga preciate the importance of these missions. dier General John A. Wharton of Texas coupled with the inability to aggressively and Brigadier General William T. Martin, follow up successes. resulted in the a transplanted Kentuckian turned Missis Federal commander fighting blind and sippi lawyer." the Confederate commander clinging to a The right-wing cavalry corps was led by bloody. hollow victory. the battle's most famous cavalryman, The Federal forces had about 9.000 Brigadier General Nathan Bedford For troopers organized into a corps of two rest. Dynamic, aggressive and gifted with divisions to perform these missions.' The an untutored. natural ability to command cavalry corps was commanded initially by in battle. Forrest had refused to serve Major General David S. Stanley. a 35- under Wheeler as a result of Wheeler's ac year-old West Point graduate. On 15 Sep tions in an earlier battle. Forrest's corps tember. when Staniey became iII. the com was composed of divisions commanded by mand went to Brigadier General Robert Brigadier General Frank C. Armstrong Mitchell. a professional politician turned perhaps most famous because he fought soldier. The Federal divisions were ably on the Union side at the First Battle of commanded by Colonel Edward Moody Bull Run before resigning his Federal McCook (cousin to the famous "fighting commission-and Brigadier General John McCook" family which included Major Pegram who was doomed to die outside of General Alexander M. McCook. the XX Petersburg. Virginia. shortly after his Corps commander at Chickamauga) and wedding in 1864." Brigadier General George Crook who later gained postwar fame while chasing Geronimo in the Southwest.'· The Opening Moves: In addition to the standard cavalry Murfreesboro and Tullahoma units of the Federal Army. Rosecrans detached and mounted the 1st Brigade. 4th Division. XIV Corps, in an attempt to The campaign which ended in the alleviate a shortage of mounted troops. bloody. two-day ordeal at Chickamauga Commanded brilliantly by Colonel John actually began in January 1863, with the T. Wilder. this so-called "Lightning Bri Federal and Confederate armies camped gade" used its privately purchased in or near Murfreesboro, Tennessee. the Spencer repeaters with telling effect dur scene of the recent Battle of Stones River. ing the campaign. Consisting of six Michi Despite daily prodding by the War De gan. Illinois and Indiana regiments and partment, Rosecrans seemed unin backed up by the 10 artillery weapons of terested in leading his Army of the Cum eventual pharmaceutical entrepreneur berland against Bragg's Army of the Ten Captain Eli Lilly's 18th Indiana Battery. nessee which was forced by circumstances the unit proved to be a steady. formidable to be on the defensive. force." Instead, both commanders launched The Confederate cavalry numbered ap their cavalry corps on a series of fruitless proximately.14.500 men and was orga raids. Wheeler attacked Fort Donelson nized into two corps, each having two without success in February. Ro~ecrans
7 MILITARY REVIEW lost a detachment trying to cut Bragg's river north and south of Chattanooga to lines of communication in March. Forrest watch for Rosecrans' approach and iden tried the same maneuver against Rose tify the intended crossing sites. Although crans' lines of communication and failed. this effort was extensive, it proved to be And Brigadier General John Hunt of little use in discovering Rosecrans' in Morgan conducted his famous raid into tentions since the screen was deployed en Ohio and Pennsylvania which ended in his tirely on the Confederate side of the capture. Between January and June 1863, river." This failure to aggressively recon the Confederates lost 4,000 cavalrymen, noiter the Federal disposition and move and the Federals lost 3,300 in these ments kept Bragg in the dark and denied debilitating raids." Neither side could af the Confederates full use of the water bar ford the losses. but the cavalry·poor rier. Federals were especially sensitive to Rosecrans. on the other hand. used ca~ualties in the mounted arm. cavalry very effectively to deceive Bragg When Rosecrans finally moved against as to his main crossing sites. Although Bragg in late June (see Figure 2), the the Federal commander waited more than results were spectacular. He skillfully a month before moving south, he once used Stanley's cavalry corps, which was again skillfully outmaneuvered the sta supported by the army reserves, to move tionary Confederate forces. Keeping the against Bragg's open left flank at Shelby· main body of his force well away from the ville. Bragg was convinced that this was river to conceal his intentions, Rosecrans the Federal main effort. Rosegans was used mounted troops in a series of demon allowed to march the bulk of his troops strations across from and northeast of around Bragg's right Hank, thus forcing Chattanooga. 'rhis drew attention away the Confederate Army to withdraw to from his intended main crossing site Tullahoma." Four days after the start of which was southwest of the city.'" Wilder, this maneuver, Rosecrans moved again whose mounted brigade performed much against Bragg's supply lines by seizing of this deception, described the action in crossings over the Elk River which was to his official report: Bragg's rear, The result was the with We then commenced making feints as if drawal of the Confederate forces all the trying to cross the river at different points way to Chattanooga, south of the Ten for 40 miles above the town [Chatta nessee River. Bragg probably feared be nooga), and succeeded in so deceiving ing trapped with the river at his back" In them as to induce them to use an entire ar only nine days, Rosecrans had forced my corps to prevent the execution of such Bragg to withdraw across the formidable !Io a purpose, they working every night forti river barrier at the cost of only 560 casual· fying the south bank of the river at every ties." feasible crossing for miles above. Details were made nearly every night to build fires indicating, large camps, and by Crossing the Tennessee River, 1;.\ throwing boards upon others and ham 16 August to 3 September mering on barrels and sawing up boards and throwing the pieces in streams that would float them into the river, we made Bragg established cavalry screens them believe we were preparing to cross which extended many miles along the with boats. This was kept up until Chat·
8 October RIVER OF DEATH Tullahoma to the Tennessee River, June-August 1863
, Murfreesboro IRl 26 June ," I " \
" \ \ \ \ \ Manchester \ " \ \ ~30 June V
Fed . Federal Conf . Confederate
tanooga was evacuated. 21 side's Army of the Ohio which was operat These activities served to reinforce ing ncar Knoxville. I t was not until a week Bragg's preconceived opinion that Rose after the three Federal corps had closed on crans' forces would cross northeast of the river and nearly completed their cross Chattanooga to facilitate cooperation by ing that Bragg discovered the truth-too Federal Major General Ambrose E. Burn- late to oppose the Federal main effort."
1984 9 MILITARY REVIEW
Chattanooga, writing that: The Search for Bragg's Supply lines, In a country so utterly destitute we can 4 to 10 September not for a moment abandon OUr line of com munications and unable to detach a suffi cient force to guard it, we must necessari Once safely across the river, Rosecrans' ly maneuver between the enemy and our force began to move south and east supplies." against Bragg's main supply link, the Bragg began the evacuation of Chatta Western and Atlantic Railroad (see nooga on 8 September. He gave up the Figurl? 3). Attempting to duplicate his city wiijfout a fight and started to concen earlier successes at Tullahoma and Elk trate his forces near Lafayette, Georgia, River, Rosecrans sent his three corps approximately 20 miles south. Mean along parallel but Widely dispersed routes while, Wheeler's and Forrest's cavalry to crOSS the rugged, mountainous terrain corps were scouting the Federal move and threaten the railroad. Alexander Mc ments, providing Bragg good information Cook's XX Corps swung the farthest concerning the movements of Rosecrans' south, near Alpine, while Major General dispersed army." Unlike their timid Thomas L. Crittenden's XXI Corps screen along the Tennessee River a few followed the river north of Lookout Moun· weeks earlier, the Confederate cavalry tain to occupy Chattanooga. men actively and effectively performed In the middle, Major General George H. their primary role. . Thomas, who on 20 September would win Rosecrans' predicament-none of his everlasting fame for his rock-steady per three corps were within supporting dis formance, pushed his XIV Corps over the tance of each other-resulted from the dis low spots on the rugged ridges euphemis· persion of his units, his failure to insist tically called" gaps" in this country. More that his cavalry units scout and screen his than 40 miles of heavily wooded, steep entire front, and a fixation that Bragg's ridges that contained only a few poor army was demoralized and fleeing in dis roads that linked the scattered villages order." Bragg had been planting desert· and mountain gaps separated the flanks ers and agents to spread rumors for some of Rosecrans' army. Already substantial time, hoping to plant this very idea in ly outnumbered in cavalry troopers, Rose' Rosecrans' mind. The 4th Indiana Cav crans concentrated all but two brigades of alry reported on 25 August that: horsemen on his exposed right Isouthern) Last evening 6 men, deserters from flank. The two remaining brigades were Bragg's army at Chattanooga came into located on the far left near Chattanooga. our camp. They report Bragg's army com Ominously, there was nothing in front of pletely demoralized, desertions taking Thomas' XIV Corps in the center except place by hundreds, and the officers mak the forbidding terrain and the Confeder ing little or no efforts to restrain or keep ate Army." their men. . It is some",hat ironic that the very ma These men report further that Bragg is neuver that would soon bring the Federal evacuating Chattanooga and moving Army to the brink of defeat actually ac toward Atlanta!' complished its intended purpose. Once With no cavalry to scout the hills in Rosecrans' true movements were dis· front of him, Thomas blindly pushed his covered, Bragg was obliged to evacuate lead division, commanded by Major
10 October Rosecrans Searches for Bragg's Supply line, 4-10 September 1863
~s8;~ 1 C~ttanooga 1e~~ ~ X "\ XXI fed r:;:7I \ Cnttenden ~ \ XIV MI~5lDnary Minty .. Thoma~Rldge !} ;,¢g To Lafayette. ~". ~., ,l ~ 4 September '. ~. ,~., , sf \,; ,, 'f;S.. I . .t~ .. ~ IJ:QiJ
Fed • Federal Conf Confederate
General James S. Negley, far forward into badgered, bullied or ordered to assault, the vicinity of McLemore's Cove and Dug and this unique opportunity was lost." Gap on 9 September. Like the exposed neck of a turtle protruding out of its shell, Negley's clivision lay vulnerable for two Rosecrans Concentrates, agonizing days while Bragg tried in vain 11 to 18 September . to cajole his recalcitrant suborclinates in to attacking. Unfortunately for the Con· federates, neither Major General Thomas It was this near·clisaster for Negley's C. Hindman's division nor Lieutenant division rather than the efforts of the General Daniel H. Hill's forces could be cavalry scouts that began to alert Rose-
1984 11 MILITARY REVIEW crans to his army's precarious position. vanguard of Bragg's infantry, as the Con For the next several days, the Federals federate crossings of the Chickamauga in frantically taced northward to concen· force began on 18 September. Minty was trate therr forces before the Confederates finally forced back from Reed's Bridge in could strike. While these movements were the north, but Wilder's men, the devastat under way, Bragg tried to seize one final ing fire of their Spencer repeaters backed opportunity to destroy part of Rosecrans' up by Lilly's artillery battery, stubbornly army by directing Lieutenant General held on to the critical Alexander Bridge Leonidas Polk's corps to strike Crit crossing site throughout that day," Rose tenden's northernmost Federal corps near cranS credits this stand with buying one Lee and Gordon's Mill on West Chicka more crucial day for concentrating his mauga Creek. Once again, Bragg's inten army: tions were frustrated when Polk, whose His [Wilder's) command also merits the forces outnumbered the Federals, could thanks of the country for its noble stand not be persuaded to attack." at the crossing of the Chickamauga, where The cavalry of both sides had little ef his and Minty's cavalry brigade resisted fect on the operations during this final the enemy so obstinately on the afternoon closure of the two armies into the dark, of the 18th as to give us that night to an· tangled woods along Chickamauga Creek. ticipate him on the Rossville road. 32 The bulk of the Federal cavalry remained All of these actions, although sharp and far to the south of Lafayette. It scouted hotly contested, served only as a prelude. and patrolled the Federal right flank and The bloodiest two days of the war were made brief, tentative contacts with about to begin. Wheeler's Confederate troopers who were performing the same duties on Bragg's left flank. Mitchell assumed command of The BaHle, 19 and 20 September the Federal cavalry corps at this time. When he arrived at cavalry headquarters, he: The Battle of Chickamauga itself was a ... found Major General Stanley danger bloody series of infantry assaults back ously sick. On the morning of the 15th he and forth through the thick woods where was compelled to turn over the command cavalry and artillery were of little use. A of cavalry to [Mitchell}, and return to close inspection of the ground over which Nashville for treatment. 30 the two armies struggled shows a rolling, The twO cavalry brigades in the north dense woodland cut intermittently by a with Crittenden-Colonel Robert H. G. few forest trails and country roads, with a Minty's 1st Brigade, 2d Division, and scattering of isolated farms and cleared Wilder's mounted brigade (see Figure fields. The woods were so thick in places 4)-found much action as a result of their that whole divisions were swallowed up screening positions along Bragg's intend· and lost from view. Lacking terrain in ed crossing sites of the Chickamauga and which the troopers could capitalize on the aggressive, belligerent style of For their horses' mobility, the cavalry units rest's Confederate troopers who protected involved in the actual fighting of 19 and that flank. Minty's and Wilder's forces 20 September were dismounted and acted became engaged in some sharp actions more as infantry than as a mounted arm. with Forrest's cavalrymen, as well as the The battIe began with reconnaissance
12 October RIVER OF Situation, 18 September 1863..
x f-'... Minty 0 ~eed's Bridge ~
•'Ill Fowler's II Ford
>< A / ."fiR lambert's /V, Ford ~ f Figure 4 failures on both sides, Bragg did not know 19 September (see Figure 5) when he "was that Thomas' XIV Corps was already ordered to move with fms] command north of Crittenden, thereby dooming down the road toward Reed's Bridge and Bragg's plan to outflank Rosecrans on the develop the enemy, which was promptly north, Rosecrans, on the other hand, was done .... "lJ For the rest of that day and unaware that Bragg's entire army had most of the next, Forrest's cavalrymen' crossed Chickamauga Creek. Despite the fought as infantry, hurling themselves on stiff Federal cavalry resistance at the foot against the northern part of the bridges on the previous day, neither side Federal line in sueh a manner that their aggressively used cavalry to determine leader recorded, "The charges made by the other's exact dispositions or maneu Armstrong's division in the battle of vers. Instead, they would blunder into Chickamauga would be creditable to the each other in the woods, the Confederates best drilled infantry. "l< In the Federal forcing a gradual compression of the lines, Wilder's brigade fought dismounted Federal line, its anchor fixed on Thomas. throughou t most of both days and became In characteristic fasmon, Forrest ini the right anchor of the Federal battle line, tiated the action for the Confederates on The Confederate infantry tried but could 1984 13 MILITARY REVIEW not dislodge Wilder's men from their posi September. Longstreet's corps, on loan tions: from the Army of Northern Virginia for In these various repulses we had this campaign, executed what proved to thrown into the rebel columns which at be the decisive 'assault by hurling five tacked us closely massed, OVer 200 rounds divisions at the right center of the Federal of double-shotteei, 10 pounder cannister, line at approximately ll30 on 20 Septem at a range varying from 70 to 350 yards ber." Unfortunately for the luckless and at the same time kept up a constant Rosecrans, Confederate Brigadier fire rpith our repeating rifles, causing a General Bushrod R. Johnson's division, most fearful destruction in the rebel which was leading Longstreet's attack, ranks. After this we were not again that hit the Federal line at precisely the point day attacked." where, shortly before, Federal Brigadier Except for Forrest and Wilder, the re General Thomas J. Wood had pulled his mainder of the cavalry on both sides had division out of the line in response to a little effect on the tactical fight on 19 and message from Rosecrans. The resulting 20 September. Mitchell and thc majority breakthrough split Rosecrans' army of the Federal cavalry corps remained asunder, sending most of his right wing south of the main battle area, near Craw reeling back toward Chattanooga, the fish Springs and the nearby fords of the panicked masses sweeping the Federal Chickamauga. Mitchell's report for 19 commander with them." September states that his command: Only the determined actions of Thomas ... moved rapidly up the valley, with to rally the remnants on Snodgrass Hill some slight skirmishing until it arrived at and the timely arrival of units of Major Crawfish Springs, where it was halted, General Gordon pranger's Reserve Corps formed in line of battle, and remained prevented the complete rout of the Feder posted at this point during the remainder al Army. After withstanding repeated of the day. 36 Confederate assaults against his posi While the crucial phase of the battle tions on Snodgrass Hill and Horseshoe raged desperately throughout 20 Ridge, a stand which earned for him the September and the Federal Army's fate sobriquet" Rock of Chickamauga," Thomas hung in the balance, Mitchell's "com retired in good order that evening." mand was engaged all day in guarding fords on Chickamauga Creek."" Wheeler, with the left wing of the Confederate Retreat and Pursuit to Chattanooga, cavalry, contented himself with much the 20 and 21 September same activities, including some sharp skirmishing near Crawfish Springs. Meanwhile, the Confederate and The Federal cavalry began to cover the Federal infantry continued their bloody retreat of the Army of the Cumberland as struggle through the woods and fields to soon as Mitchell received word of the the north. After a series of inconclusive disaster to the right divisions on the after actions on 19 September, Bragg threw his noon of 20 September ..Quickly catching army, which was then organized into two up to the retreating 'units, Mitchell's "wings" under Polk (right) and Lieuten horsemen covered the withdrawal of the ant General J ames Longstreet (left) broken divisions up the Chattanooga against Rosecrans' infantry on 20 Valley and into the city. He took some 14 October RIVER OF DEATH Chickamauga Battlefield, 19-20 September 1863 Ringgold's Bridge ~ -".r::.: ''. fed . federal ConI· Confederate 1984 15 MILITARY REVIEW pride in these efforts and asserted "that struct our passage. there was never work more opportunely I think we ought to press forward as done on the battlefield than the work of rapidly as possible." the cavalry on the 20th of September at Bragg, however, perhaps transferring Chickamauga."'! After Thomas' retire his own feelings of physical and emotional ment from the positions on Snodgrass exhaustion to his entire army, declined to Hill late on 20 September, Mitchell's: follow up his victory and decided on a pro ... whole command stood in line of bat tracted siege of Chattanooga. His other tle all day in Chattanooga Valley, with fre cavalry corps, Wheeler's, joined in the quent skirmishing. The enemy's cavalry general pursuit late on the afternoon of 20 were in sight all day, but no severe attack September, starting from the vicinity of was made." Lee and Gordon's Mill, and stopped about The fact that "no severe attack was a mile and a quarter from Chattanooga. made" on the Federals was not due to a The campaign of Chickamauga had ended. lack of effort by Forrest whose troopers, The battle for Chattanooga was about to once again mounted, began a vigorous begin. pursuit of the retiring enemy immediately after the battle_ Forrest's men aggressive ly pursued the Federals all the way to Cavalry Successes During Chattanooga. Along the way, they con . the Chickamauga Campaign ducted sharp actions with the Federal '. rear guard cavalry units: Our next engagement with the enemy Despite the infantry character of the was with Colonel Minty's brigade of fighting on 19 and 20 September;, the mounted infantry, being a part of the rear Chickamauga Campaign clearly demon guard of General Rosecrans' army. After strated the methods of Civil War cav~4"Y driving his skirmishers for a mile, we employment. Both sides enjoyed sonj.e, found him strongly posted on Missionary success. Ridge." Rosecrans' Tullahoma Campaign was Forrest's keen grasp of the situation an excellent example of the mounted allowed him to instantly recognize the arm's ability to deceive an enemy concern tremendous rewards which would accrue ing true dispositions, maneuvers and in if the whole Confederate Army vigorously tent of friendly forces. The Federal pursued the beaten enemy. Forrest paused cavalry effectively prevented its oppo briefly to scribble a note to his Army com nents from discovering that it constituted mander: only a portion of the Federal Army while We are in a mile ofRossville-have been Rosecrans' main effort turned the Con on the Point of Missionary Ridge can see federates' opposite flank. Chattanooga and everything around. The The Federal cavalry operations during enemy's trains are leaving going around the crossing of the Tennessee Riv.er . the point of Lookout Mountain. The demonstrated the effective use of small prisoners captured report two pontoons but mobile bodies of mounted soldiers to thrown across for the purpose of retreat convey adeception plan to the enemy and ing. I think they are evacuating as hard as tie up a large portion of the opposing ar they can go. ,my. Rosecrans credits Wilder's troopers They are cutting timber down to ob- with much of the crossing plan's success: 16 October RIVER OF DEATH Having in my general report, given an of medicinr!s, camp equippaf(e, and a great outline of the brilliant part taken by I1l1mber of wounded prisoners besides Wilder's brigade in the great demonstra ovor 100 surgeons." tions on the enemy's front above Chatta Bragg's failure to follow up on this suc nooga, I respectfully call attention to t fu! cessful cavalry pursuit was not the fault facts that hr! was able 10 attract almost of his cavalry. two divisions of rebels to tho t part of I he river, and that for thirty days som(' of Ills command were daily skirmishing with Ih" Cavalry Failures During the enemy while our troops crossed beloll'.'·· Chickamauga Campaign The Confederate cavalry corps of Wheeler and Forrest served Bragg well from 4 through 10 September by conduct While it provides examples of success ing effective scouting and screening ful cavafry employment. this campaign is operations. These units maintained con filled with the failures of cavalry doctrine stant contact with Rosecrans' widely dis and operations as well. The meaningless persed corps and simultaneously managed raids that both sides conducted from to provide an effective screen for Confed February through June 1863 failed to erate movements. As a result. Bragg was alter the strategic situation of either side aware of his opponent's dispositions while and served only to drain the hard-to Rosecrans remained generally ignorant of replace cayalry resources of each army. Confederate movements. Wheeler wrote With the Confederates losing 4,000 that this was accomplished hy ensuring troopers and the Federals losing 3,300. that his: these raids were worse than useless. ... commands kept the enemy continu The Confederate cavalry failed in its ally observed and full reports concerning primary mission at Tullahoma. Deployed him were several times each day sent to on both wings of Bragg's army. its first army headquarters. Several columns of responsibility was to discover Rosecrans' the enemy's cavalry u'ere pushed over the true movements. Instead, the Federal mountain. all of which were successfully commander was able to move the bulk of driven back. '" his army completely around the Confeder A final Confederate cavalry success was ate right flank before Bragg realized what the vigorous, hard-pressed pursuit con had happened. ducted by Forrest's and Wheeler's These screens by the Confederate troopers from 20 to 23 September_ It not cavalry along the Tennessee River also only furnished Bragg timely information failed to uncover Rosecrans' main cross about the enemy's true disposition and ing sites while there was time to react. state of morale. but it allowed the collec The Confederate cavalry. which was de tion of a large amount of badly needed and ployed only on the Confederate-held bank hard to acquire supplies. Wheeler wrote of the river. could not aggressively or ac that his men: curately probe the Federal lines to locate _ .. followed as rapidly as possible. cap the enemy's main effort. As a result. turing about 1,000 prisoners, 20 wagons Bragg was once again maneuvered out of and a large amount of arms and ordnance position. stores. About dark we also captured five The cavalry failure with the greatest large hospitals with a considerable supply potential for decisive effect on the cam- 1984 17 MILITARY REVIEW paign, however, was Rosecrans' failure to beaten Federals with the bulk of his forces use his widely dispersed corps to scout after Forrest had discovered the true and screen while Bragg's forces withdrew situation prevented a marginal Con from Chattanooga from 4 through 10 Sep· federate victory from becoming a decisive tember. This prevented him from deter one. Although the failure was Bragg's and mining Bragg's true disposition-an act not his cavalry's, it should be included in that nearly proved fatal to Rosecrans' ar this article because of the extreme signifi my. The Federal command's preconceived cance of a lost opportunity and the fact notions concerning the state of the Con that the cavalry's vigorous pursuit had federate Army contributed to this failure created it." and tended to negate the potential posi tive effects when good intelligence was forthcoming. Reaction to a report of Conclusions enemy dispositions submitted by Minty, whose unit was operating in front of Crit tenden's XXI C'\I'ps, illustrates this prob· The army commanders were kind to the lem: cavalry units in their postbattle assess The major general commanding {Crit ments, Mention of only a few of the tenden] directs me to acknowledge the cavalry's several failures can be found in receipt of your report of this date inform official reports. Instead, the significance ing him that Forrest is at Ringgold, Long of the cavalry actions during the cam street at Dalton. Pegram at Leets, and paign must be deduced from the facts that {Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar] can be discovered. Rosecrans closed out Buckner at Rock Spring: all this would in the book on his cavalry operations by dicate infantry which the major general writing: commanding cannot believe." As to the cavalry . . , as an arm of the Crittenden would come to believe it all service it has been equal to its duty on all too well a short time later when this same occasions, and on the 18th, 19th and 20th Confederate infantry came howling out of of September it behaved with conspicuous the woods toward his battle lines. Only gallantry, covering our shattered right the reluctance of Bragg's subordinates to and protected our trains in the valley of obey his orders saved Rosecrans from Chattanooga Creek on the 20th. , , ' defeat during this crucial time, The losses of the cavalry appear in the Poor tactical use of the mounted arm by accompanying report, 43 killed, 132 each side kept both commanders ignorant wounded, and 283 missing, making a total of each other's dispositions on 18 and 19 of 458 .... 50 September, Bragg did not know that Bragg was equally complimentary al Thomas had pushed his XIV Corp to the though, by the time he penned his final far left of the Federal line, and Rosecrans report, he and Forrest had had a violent was unaware that Bragg's army had argument and a falling out which had to crossed the Chickamauga on the night of be mediated by President Jefferson 18 September. This ignorance contributed Davis." Bragg wrote: to the confusion and to the lack of coor During the operations by the main dinated action on each side on 19 Sep {orces on the 19th and 20t/~ the cavalry on tember, the flanks was actively and usefully ,Finally, Bragg's failure to pursue the employed, holding the enemy in observa- 18 October RIVER OF DEATH (ion and threatening him or assailing him been as decisive as the same failure would as occasion offered. have been on the larger, operational scale. From the report of Major General This illustrates by comparison the signifi· Wheeler•... it will be seen what important cant differences in scope and the ultimate service was rendered both all the 20th and impact of the two levels of war, 21st by his command. especially ill the Likewise, Bragg's tactical ignorance on capture of prisoners and property alld III 18 September is insignificant when com· the dispersion of the enemy's cavalry pared to his ignorance of the situation at Hrigadier General Forrest's report will Tullahoma and during Rosecrans' Ten show equally gallallt alld ['a!uab!e servo nessee River crossings. Consistently ices b.v his command all the right '.J maneuvered out of position after position, During the Chickamauga Campaign. Bragg was saved chiefly by Rosecrans' each army's cavalry enjoyed spectacular failure to use his cavalry effectively, successes. However. each also suffered Finally, it was Bragg's misappreciation significant failures at both the tactical of the opportunity provided by his cav· and operational levels, alry to follow up his tactical victory with Although the cavalry successes proved a pursuit to crush the enemy, thereby heneficial to the respective commands, it sealing a decisive victory in the campaign was the failures and misapplication of which demonstrates clearly the dif cavalry doctrine which were potentially ferences bet ween the tactical and opera· decisive and better illuminate the dif· tionallevels. ferences between the tactical and opera· Effective employment of cavalry and a tional levels of warfare. After his hril· proper appreciation of the mounted arm's liantly successful maneuvering in June, Civil War doctrine would have given each Rosecrans' dismal failure to maintain con· commander the tools needed to produce a tact with Bragg's forces nearly doomed stunning, decisive victory during the his army and could have cost him the cam· Chickamauga Campaign. Instead, the paign, A similar failure in reconnaissance campaign proved to be only a hard ride to at the tactical level on 18 September was the "River of Death" for Rosecrans' and importllnt to the battle but could not have Bragg's cavalrymen. NOTES 1 GII'.I"II"I TuCker CtlJCI 1984 19 MILITARY REVIEW mounted arm 5 counlorp,ul to William J HLHdcc 5 Tactics tor In American CIVil War, Wilh Special Reference 10 Raids on Com' lantry and provides an IntOfostmg look a\ perIOd ofgLlnl7Ll\IOn Jnd rnUf1lCatlOns, Western Theater," In luvaas, op cll The short but In drill teresllng article wrtllen In the t930~ by BritISh military theOrist Lid· 7 See CogginS, op elf, Gra'y, op cll, P 138, LInd Grady dell Hart seems to credit these raids with havmg much moro effeci McWhlney and Porry D Jam!Cson Attack and Ow CIIIII War than do other observers since thoy apparently represented to him a MIII/ary TacticS and the SOllthern Hefltage. Unll/crSlty of AlabJma perfecl opportunity to IliustfLIte his Ideas on mobility and the ·'111- Press, Unlverslly Ala 19B:?, p 133 Raids were more spectacular d,rect approach" m;) hlstoflcal selllnQ and captured tho ImaginatIOn much moro than Simple recon 16 See Stanley F Horn, The Army of Tennessee A Military nillSS3ncc and screening miSSions However. raids soldom con History, Babbs Morrill Co, NY, 1941, pp 23436, Dyer, op cit, P IrIbuled materially 10 tho Success 01 a campaign and often caused 105 Tho Wost Pomt AI/as of Amorlcan Wars, op Cit, and Jordan the L1bsence 01 the cLlvalry al crlllc<11 titTles The most notable ex and Pryor, op Cit, P 292 ample at thiS IS probably J E B Stuart's absollce at GoUY5burq. re 17 Horn,op Cit, pp 23637, The West Pomt Atlas of Ameflcan counted In Longacre, op Cit. pp 12 13 Some contemporary Euro WilfS,OP Cit, and Jordan and Pryor, op Cit, P 293 pean observers began to attach much Import to caval'y ri1lds, but 18 Dyer,op Cit, HIe West PoInt Atlas of Ameflcan Wars, op Cit, more inSightful and thoughtful observors, such as the FrenCh ot and Liddell Hart, op CIt, P 293 flcer De Thomasson, correcl1y Interpreted the American le';sons of 19 Forrest's troopers patrolled from Chattanooga north to cavalry omploymeP1t Dc Thomasson, "La Cavalene AmerlcaJne Kingsport, Tennossee, while Wheeler's units took up POSitions on dans 101 guerre de la secession" Cited In Jay Lu~aas, TIle Military Lookout Mountain and Sand Mountain from Chattanooga south to Legacy ot the CIVil War The European inhefl/ 20 October RIVER OF DEATH 34 WarQf the Rebellion A CompllotIen or the Offlc.al RecoF(1s 01 fU#('Ij, and that ho rooe bac~ Nmsolf, aitel sending CQuHer'S and the Union ana Conie!1erate ArmlOS, OP Clf, P 526. and Wyeth, op golling no ropllOS and fOuntJ G(1nnrol Bragg a<;II:6p He urged Ihat c"/f, P 229 Forrost"s troopers fought dlsmounled all day on 19 they movo on m purSUIt at oncn Bragg a<;ked how he Gould September and most 01 20 Sep1ember rhelr steady we!Hlrcssau move an army withOut supphos, as hIS men had Olthausled them rank!> whiCh advanceo time aod 3g310 um:Jer gaillng fire cau!O.ed Forretl'5 reply wa~ "General Bragg, we can get all the supplies Ouf Hili 10 ask 'Wt'lal Infantry i5c IhaP The reply came, ' That IS For army needs 11'1 ChaHanooga ' Bragg rnad(l: no reply aM Forres! loda rest's cavalry, Sir away dlsgustod See also Jord.;!.n and Pryor, Of) Cit, pp 349 51 L¥ 16 War of tne RebellJOn A ComplliJ(lDfl 01 fne Oll/clal ReCOlds of tie, op Cit, P 236, ano War- 01 thE' Rebellfl)fJ A Camp/fatton Qf file (hp Union and Conlel.1l:'ra/e ArmICS, op Cit" Part I, p 448 Offle'JI Recrm1s at IhI'! Umon and Confe(J(UfJte A,m,es, Of) Cit ,Pan 36 Ibrd. p 093 lV. p6S1 37 Ibid 4~ Ibid. Part I. p 19 38 Jordan and Pryor. OJ) CIt, p 339 and Tucker, op Cit, pp 46 Ibid, Part II, p 520 260~4 47 ford p 521 39 Henry, ap clf p 189 del>cflbes this pha!'.e of the ba1Ue . The 48 Ibid, Part C p922 Union fight aM r:ont(lr ml)lt(ld Bnd broke In flight for Chattanooga, 49 llcldellliaTt, ap e't p 329, ptJu'Ilsout that Bragg erredgreallY c.arrylng with them jn the ruso 1'101 o,.,ll' Ihe (lIIIISion commanders In allowmg , no efteclllle PUf$l.lI1" 01 hiS beaten enemy the 1'0'10. corps (;omman{lers, but 4)y'on the commander ot the Arm" SO Wlll 01 rhu Rebul/lon A Compilation of the Olhelal Records of General Rosecrans, and the Assistant Secretary of War, Charle!.> A tlJ~ Umon 8IHI ConfO;;lemff? Armies, 01> Cit, P 79 Dana who wes there as a speCial observer tor Sf'cretary [EdWin M I 51 Forrest, at tliS best when In Indo pendent command and never Stanton A few bflgades maintained then flgh.tlng orgar.Ili:l:tlOn and art (lasy subOrdinate, flnal!y exploded at Bragg when hetrl€d to put made thell way northward tn IOtn [Major General Georgo S 1 FOIFosl os troopors once again UndCH Wheeler's command W\taft, Thomas, who dOublM back part of 01;; Hoops to meet Itw op CIt pp 2"243 and 2"1, recordS the ob~(lryatlons of 01 J B onsl(;l\.lght &ee fhe West Pamt Atlas Of Am(>f{C8n WafS OJ) Cif Cowan form>;t''> ctlH~1 surgeon whO lI\>ltne""sed Formsl s stormy Map 114. ana Horn, op Cit, P 264 confrontation W!tI"I Bta99 In Ih€' army commander s tent Aller 40 The West Paml Atlas Of Amer,can WafS, 011 ('I' and Horn ref!J5lng Bf<.lgg S pfQHcred handSh!)\.;e FarIes! said, "I have stooo OP Cit. po 2&7 69 YOUr rneimnue:.::. au long a::. j Intend 10 You have played Ihe pari Of a 41 WOr a/We FletU!f/lofi A CamJ)lf:Jl,onol tile OfllclIJl Rpc{,lIds of oarnn(\d Scoun(lrct. and are a coward, and II you were any par! oj a the Union and Con/eamate Arm.es op Clf, P 894 man I wouljj slap your JaW!! .;Ind fo'ce )'ou 10 resent II YOI) maya'S 42 Ibid, P 893 well not Issl.le an'Y more orders to mo for I .... 111 nol obey thom and I 43 Ibid _ Part II p 529 ""Ill hold 'You per",onally rC'SPO!1'Slole for any lurther Indlgmties yOu 44 Forrest ..... as furiouS wllh Bragg lot n{,lt purSuing the defeated pn(lpavor to mfllct upon me You have threalened to arr(H.! me lor FederalS and l'oeallng a (J(t(.1t>!'10 "'Iclary IJIJVtHl'l rJp Clf, P 244 nol Obeying your ardors ptomplly L dare yOu. to do II ')nd I sa~ to mcord5 that Forre&f follm"ed up hiS noH~ to Sr"gg WIth a pef$onal you Ihat If you ever again try \0 Interfere WIth me or ~IO<;'J;, my path II VISit to attempt to get the !Jlter 10 pursue Formst lold lCOlonel R will br at thO perli Of your hlo PreSlden! Jellerf.>on DavIS nol B Kyle whO Ha",€llea with h,m that1 he wOuld nO 'Onger Serve under ... IShlOq to los.e Fonesi'& ot)VlQus. laleDjs lor thecavs.e 01 the strug Bfa~m, tt1.at he was not competent to Command ,my army, tttallt'lc gllnq Confpt1rrac't, uuanged fOf 1M IIP!y raval~i'man to hn,sf1!t>e army had whipped the F"odernls badi)- at Chlckamaoga and fhat he waf In II"I{H.. penaeni commarlO wllh t'Us commanO. had lolloweo them almost to Ihe 51,ml.lfi)S 01 ~2 War of the Rpbefllon A CompilatIon of thp OtflCIJ I ReCf)fOS 0' ChUltllrlOOoa that Ihey W(!ftJ demorailled an(j o:o"ld have baSil cap the LJnJ(}n and Confedet;lfe ArmlOS Op clf P('!r! Il P J MajorJerry D Morelock is currently aSMgned to the Leadership Branch, Human Resources Directorate. Office of the Deputy Ch"f of Staff for PeTs.anne}, lVashmgton,. DC He recewed a B.S. from the US M'lItary Academy /USMAI. an M S {'Om Purdue Umversity and an M.M.A S from the USACGSC where he graduated In 1984 He has commanded artillery batteries at Fort Sit, Oklahoma. and in VIetnam. taught at the US Army r1.eld A rttllery SchooL served as a com· pany tactical artie.r at the USMA;and "rued as 53 and executive officer of a NA TO artillery group m US ArmY1 Europe Fifth POMCUS Site Opens. The first of three new sites for the pre-pOSitioning of aquipment configured to unit sets (POM CUS) for a fifth division has been completed in the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). More storage sites are expected to.be completed this fall and next spring. These sites will store a sixth POMCUS package. The completion of the Sixth POMCUS package will meet the US government's commitment to NATO.-Army Logistician. 1984 21 Kermit Roosevelt Lecture: In 1945, the US Congress enacted legislation which authorized the Kermit Roosevelt Fund and established in the “War Depart ment” a Board of Trustees to implement and administer an change program ‘for the purpose of fostering a better understanding and a closer relationship between the military forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom by sponsoring lectures or courses of instruction. . . . The ini tiatives for the annual exchange of military lecturers originated with Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt whose husband died while serving on active duty with the US Army in 1943. The first exchange took place in 1947. In 1984, the US Army lecturer in the United Kingdom was General William R. Richardson, commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia. 22 / October TRAINING AND EDUCATION S A US Army officer, I am deeply slogan, gradually gained a kind of accept honored to speak in the name of ance, began to look as if it stated the ob Kermit Roosevelt. Roosevelt was a vious and now is sometimes used as tanta soldier who served in two wars with dis mount to proof of incompetence. The term tinction-in both the British and US strikes the imaginations of most so forci Armies-and who is a fitting symbol of bly as to make any explanation seem re the bonds that unite us as nations and in dundant. People know what they mean the profession of arms. I share his convic when they use it and, when they do, they tion that the strengthening of those are generally understood. The military bonds will serve our hopes and aspirations mind lacks imagination, wants for crea for the preservation of world peace. tivity and is insufficiently flexible. Cine The United Kingdom and the United matic caricatures and literary States are joined not only by a common ings drive this point home. heritage but by a vast treasure of common This belief has also been supported by a principles and ideals, a history of shared body of learned writing. Samuel P. Hun campaigns and longstanding mutual com tington, in his classic book, The Soldier mitments. As citizens of free and the State: The Theory and Politics of we strongly believe that lives are best Military Relations. observed that lived. our values best preserved and our the military mind is thought to be “disci ideals best nourished when our nations plined, rigid, logical [and] scientific” but are at peace. But we also understand that not “flexible, tolerant [or] intuitive.” H. peace is maintained through strength and G. Wells believed the professional mili that weakness invites aggression and tary mind was “by necessity inferior and unimaginative,” and Brodie has As military officers, we believe the key written that, “when it really becomes con to strength and peace is total competence spicuous as such, the military mind is in waging war. By thoroughly preparing usually performing stupidly.” ourselves, our soldiers and our units for It is, then, not new or unusual to ex battle, the risk of war is thereby reduced. press anxiety about military proficiency. This is an obligation which we in the Ar In fact, we can become accustomed to it, my share with other services, and an obli accepting the expression of such misgiv gation we accept as both a moral and pro ings as normal and proper topics for socio fessional imperative. logical, historical, political, poetical and Preparing for war, however, is a diffi other literary exercises. Sometimes we cult and demanding endeavor and, from recognize this commentary as exhibiting time to time, we are obliged to examine grossly simplified versions of the past and whether we could be doing better than we reflecting a penchant for high, wide and are. One widely used and especially in unfounded generalizations. We sense that fluential expression has implied our un such generalizations ignore traditions of suitability for the task, reminding us of professional thought reflected in the what we do not want our officers to ex careers of officers like Colonel G. F. R. emplify. Henderson and General Sir John W. I refer to the phrase “the military Hackett. We know, too, they do not ac mind” which first acquired the status of a count for the genius of commanders like 1984 23 MILITARY REVIEW -- Field Marshal Lord Archibald P. is create an enlightened military mind. or Field Marshal Lord William Slim. My hope is that these reflections on Yet, we must never become complacent, subject of mutual importance will provide callous or indifferent to criticism. For, in insights of use to you and contribute to an this dangerous world, where we seek the understanding of our common interests proficiency that will first keep the peace for the future. Certainly, it is vital that of and then prevail should war occur, each of ficers today be steadfastly alert to the us must develop a military mind-in the salient factors of military thought and positive sense. It must be a mind steeped practice that will shape the battlefield of in the methods, procedures and funda the future. The reasons are clear enough. mentals of the profession, but bold, orig Daily, a barrage of news stories empha inal and creative in their application: a sizes the potential danger: the continuing mind that is tactically competent and proliferation of nuclear weapons, steadily technologically current yet sensitive to worsening economic conditions and social the variable and incalculable human fac disorder in numerous parts of the world, tors in war; a mind that understands the the increasing rise of various militant uses of knowledge and intelligence, the revolutionary movements, the developing importance of fitness and the power of intensification and diffusion of terrorism, good character. It must be a mind the growing number of technically sophis tempered by systematic training broad ticated armies and our enduring depend ened by progressive education and deep ence on access to foreign markets and ened by increasing experience, both real materials. Of course, in the case of the and vicarious. In short, it must be a mind Falkland Islands and Grenada, we re that rigorously and continuously pursues learned to expect the unexpected. mastery of the art and science of war. Most disturbing is the formidable mili This prelude brings me to my subject: tary force now in the hands of leaders officer training and education. Both the whose ideologies and purposes are incom British and US Armies strive to develop patible with our own. During the last two sound military minds in their officers, decades, the Soviet Union has undertaken enrich their competence and thoroughly a massive buildup in military capability and systematically prepare them for war. across the board, and it has expanded How we go about this enterprise is a mat both its influence and military presence ter of great import and the focus of my around the globe. remarks. Specifically, I want to outline Today, we must be capable of defending some attitudes and conditions that have against massive land forces, against influenced the professional development equipped surrogates and against indige of officers, to examine what their effect nous paramilitary forces and terrorists. has been and, finally, to suggest a direc We must be capable of operating in tion for the future. For the most part, you jungles, mountains, deserts and cities or will recognize that I am speaking about on rolling plains. We must be prepared to the US Army. But I will also draw upon fight with other services and allies, and the history and experience of the British we must be capable of deploying quickly. army where it seems to be illustrative. We must provide the support to sustain What we are both trying to do, I believe, combat operations, and we must maintain 24 October TRAINING AND EDUCATION the tactical and technical wherewithal to development today. It does not make win. long-term sense to limit our assessment to These are formidable challenges, but short-term costs and benefits. By care there are more. The rate of advance in fully and thoroughly training and weapons systems, organizations and doc educating officers, we develop habits of trine has quickened. The increased scope thought and inquiry that will render these and complexity of operations, the acceler officers incurably curious about the pro ated tempo of battle and the rapid fession and its improvement. change in technology represent quantum The styles and substance of officer change. Today’s divisions must tomorrow training and education change with the operate like yesterday’s corps. Today’s times. Indeed, they must. But the battalion commanders must think like tasks remain the same: to develop yesterday’s generals. And today’s of the nature of future war and to must be bolder and more creative prepare officers to fight and win. As as than their forebearers in order to maintain sistant commandant of the US Army In and resupply the fighting forces. fantry School in the 1930s and later as the All of this demands an officer profes chief of staff during World War II, Colo sional development system of excellence. nel George C. Marshall told the students Yet, anyone familiar with the complexi and faculty at Fort Georgia, “to ties of developing and fielding an army in study the first six months of the next the face of constrained resources is aware war.” Marshall was powerful in pro that competing requirements must be moting the certain preparation of officers balanced. Money spent on operating ac for an uncertain future, contributing to counts cannot be spent on investments. this endeavor some highly original and Money spent to expand mobilization valuable concepts. capability cannot be used to improve ex Much has been written about Prussia’s isting forces. The national economy, emergence as a formidable military power social needs, politics and other external in Europe stemming from reforms follow matters influence the size of the army. the ing its defeat at Jena in 1306. But defeat number of battalions and divisions, train on the battlefield need not be the only im ing and exercises, and the rate of equip petus for reform. The US experience be ment and weapons development. Prior tween the world wars provides a case in ities have to be established, and the legiti point. That US Army was a small force mate claims of others on national re consisting of about 150.000 men, and it sources must be respected. In any case, was scattered among small posts across skillful practitioners in the art and science the United States and its territories. For of war must be developed today or they some, the period was admittedly a pleas will not be available tomorrow. ant interlude of golf, horseback riding and There is, I submit, a correlation socializing. But most officers used the tween our status now and our capability time to train themselves in their craft. in the future. If we wish to judge the At Leavenworth, the Army War College vitality, the capacity and the efficiency of and other schools, officers learned to plan, the army of tomorrow, no better measure think and decide through exercises in can be found than the state of officer logistics, mobilization and war planning. 1984 25 MILITARY REVIEW Competition was intense, particularly at communications, given little time to plan Leavenworth. But there was also em and routinely made to contend with the phasis on teamwork which would pay im unexpected. Ingenuity and imagination portant dividends during World War II were emphasized. when it came to maneuvering divisions One of Marshall’s first orders was that and corps and supplying combat theaters. “any student’s solution of a problem that If this period was the great age in officer ran counter to the approved school solu training and education in the US tion and yet showed independent creative and I am suggesting it was-the reason thinking would be published to the class.” was because training, teaching and in Military history was stressed. Under structing were viewed as worthy service Marshall’s tutelage, students published by the best minds of the day. Infantry in Battle, one of the best his I have already mentioned Marshall. He torical books on small-unit tactics ever stands out as a stubbornly peculiar figure written in the US Army. Perhaps Mar and an exemplary one. Marshall was pecu shall’s greatest strength was his ability to liar in his unflagging belief in the possi teach and inspire by example. A student bilities and potential of training and once complained that the 20 minutes Mar education. He was exemplary in his abil shall had allotted him to present a mili ity to open and inspire minds. tary history lecture was too short. Mar As the assistant commandant at the In shall’s response was to rise from his seat fantry School, Marshall immediately set and summarize the US Civil War in 5 to work teaching a generation of officers minutes. to think clearly about the battlefield. He During Marshall’s five-year tenure at insisted that the school “get down to the the Infantry School, 150 future World essentials, make clear the real difficulties, War II generals passed through as and expunge the bunk, complications, and students, and another 50 served as in ponderosities.” Apart from emphasizing structors. Yet, his influence cannot be simplicity and flexibility, he stressed the easily quantified. Inspired by the brilliant methods and principles of command, as teachers that Marshall assembled, such well as the value of tough, demanding, as Major Omar Bradley, thousands of US practical field exercises. officers developed into mature tacticians, Before coming to the Infantry School, planners, trainers and leaders. Marshall had observed a training exercise What the US experience between the where an officer had failed to execute an wars shows is that success in a training envelopment because he lacked sufficient and education environment is a predictor information to write an elaborate order. of success in the profession. And the cor Upon learning that the man had stood relation becomes greater when the quality first in his infantry class, Marshall re of the institution is taken into account. solved to get his hands on the school and A good school experience enlarges both teach officers to conduct operations under theoretical and practical knowledge, as the normal conditions of war. Under Mar well as the capacity and motivation to ac shall, students were often issued foreign quire more. Apart from launching officers or outdated maps, provided sketchy in on challenging careers, schools develop telligence, compelled to operate without new ideas and pioneer new methods. They 26 October TRAINING AND EDUCATION encourage vision, imagination, originality ward officer training and education. Some and knowledge of the difference between of this attitude, it seems clear, flows along risk and gamble. Instructors and currents from the past. students alike are obliged to think about Historically. both British and US of war and its conduct and to transmit their ficers have been disinclined to practice thought in articulate and comprehensive and study their profession. As Michael ways. This provides an opportunity to Howard, Correlli Barnett, Brian Bond capture and disseminate a better under and others have pointed out, the only standing of war throughout the army. qualifications required of the Duke of In 1946, in an address to senior US of Wellington’s officers were sufficient ficers at the Pentagon, Sir Winston money to purchase a commission and the Churchill singled out the intellectual prep support of the regiment’s colonel. aration of US officers before the war as a Only after the Crimean War did the significant factor in the final victory. He British army adopt the practice of pro stated: viding officers with professional training That you should have been able to pre during peacetime. The beginning of the serve the art not only of creating mighty US Civil War quickly showed that most armies almost at the stroke of a wand- officers were incapable of but of leading and guiding those armies training or fighting units larger than a upon a scale incomparably greater than battalion, despite being West Point anything that prepared for graduates and good engineers. dreamed of; constitutes a gift made by the Dread of innovation and intellectual officer corps of the United States to their complacency have typified more than a nation in time of trouble, which I earnest few. In 1911. General Sir William F. ly hope will be forgotten here. . I remarked that what confounded shall always urge that the tendency in the him most was “the entire absence of the future should be to prolong the courses of thinking faculty in nine out of ten instruction at the colleges rather than to officers.” The inclination even today to abridge them and to equip our young of assume that someone else is doing the ficers with that special technical profes thinking, innovating, writ sional knowledge which soldiers have a ing has been widely recognized. Lament right to expect from those who can give ing what he called the “in-box men them orders, if necessary, to go to their tality” of US officers, former Chief of deaths. Professional attainment, based Staff General E. C. Meyer identified the upon prolonged study, and collective “principal casualties” as “creative think study at colleges, rank by rank, and age ing, innovative application, and reasoned by age-those are the title reeds of the discourse.” commanders of the future armies, and the An attitude among officers that train secret of future ing and education lacks utility, then, has I am well aware that the US Army of to been around a long time. It seems again to day is not the Army of the 1930s. Clearly. have surfaced in the US Army during the many things have changed. But accom last decade. Whether it has surfaced in panying those changes has been an appar the British army is. of course, a question ent shift in the attitude of US officers to beyond my expertise. But it does seem 1984 27 MILITARY REVIEW that these things are cyclical. So. I want duction of courses in the art and science of to cite some examples and implications of war. A generation of officers was taught US attitudes toward training and educa that the study of leadership, tactics, strat tion, leaving you to determine if they are egy and was an embel relevant to your own experience today. lishment rather than the proper focus of The unfortunate attitude I am describ military education. ing has expressed itself through a belief In institutions, ca that the principal job of officers is to dets concentrated more and more on be manage, direct and give orders and that coming engineers, economists and training and education are out of the ers and less and less on becoming fighters Army’s mainstream. Some officers, culti and combat leaders. In company-level vating the image of a man of action, have courses. training was too often conducted regarded serious study of their profession in the classroom so that young officers as an unsoldierly pastime. Others have seldom applied what they learned on the pursued a variety of subjects running the ground. AL colleges and war colleges, gamut of academic disciplines. But few courses in tactics, strategy and planning have applied themselves with vigor and were pushed aside by courses on manage discipline to mastering the art and science ment, political science and psychology. of war. Meanwhile, senior officers selected for Some have urged that professional de high-level and command often at velopment be relegated to units and that tended civilian universities. Their commanders alone be accountable for classmates were rising corporate execu what their officers learn and know. This tives. The principles and techniques argument no doubt has a certain momen taught were directed at managing a cor tary attractiveness. We must have com poration. manders who are teachers, and there is The consequences of these trends have much in a unit for officers to learn. Yet, of been twofold. First, insufficient attention ficers cannot receive a first-rate military has been given to the intangible human education while attending to unit respon qualities so critical in war. Second, of sibilities. They must act in units, for the ficers have wrongly been taught that tech most part, on the basis of what they nology is more important on the battle already know. The foundation for a field than tactics. Today, the Army has prehensive understanding of military art embarked on a course to reverse these and science must be laid in the school trends of the past and set the house. Yet, several factors underlie and things that have gone wrong. reinforce skepticism about the efficacy of Apart from teaching the proper sub military schools. jects, military training and educational First, during the last decade, our institutions must provide the right at schools were not totally successful in pre mosphere for learning, an atmosphere paring officers to perform as well’as we that is the result of joining shared values wanted them to, and many could have with intellectual seriousness. The part profited by instruction they never re played by instructors in creating this at ceived. The proliferation of various cur mosphere is central. Former commanders ricular offerings led to a corresponding re and staff officers transmit their 28 October edge to the next generation so that stu and development, and a dozen or more dents see the connection between the other specialized endeavors. Few would skills they are learning and their future re deny the requirement for specialists or for sponsibilities. This atmosphere, once lost, the need to send them to civilian univer is difficult to recapture. When instructors sities, to have them train with industry have not themselves experienced it, they and to give them time to master the com are in no position to help create such a plexities of their jobs. To be sure, techni climate for others. cal and administrative proficiency is a Although there is lively and inspired valued asset and a necessary requirement teaching going on in US Army schools, we for any officer to function effectively. have yet to create the invigorating atmos But a once healthy trend may have, in phere we want. Experienced officers, forced certain respects, run out of control. By en to decide whether to expand the horizons couraging the pursuit of specialization, of a younger generation or accept any one we have risked losing the tactical exper of a number of other assignments, usually tise, the leadership and the sense of pur choose the latter, principally because of pose upon which an army’s success in the perceptions held about the place and combat depends. station of instructor duty. Professional US officers today are pulled by oppos reputations today are not made in the ing forces-on the one hand, to maintain schoolhouse, and there is a feeling of am competency in and contact with the larger bivalence about teaching because it is not questions of their calling and, on the other regarded as a premier job. hand, to devote their time and efforts to a Unlike the British army today, where pursuit not directly related to war. Given every general officer has taught at the demands of the battlefield today, a Sandhurst or Shrivenham, those full immersion in the fundamentals and who instruct in the US Army are typically intricacies of our craft is required-not an less honored and rewarded than those who occasional dip! devote their talents to other areas. How The officer corps must be composed pri ever, we are now beginning to change that marily of those who are, first and fore perspective. We are striving to increase most, leaders and skilled practitioners on the experience level of our faculties, to the battlefield. The expertise needed here push expertise into the service schools reaches far beyond the span of any specif and to re-establish the correlation be ic specialty, single discipline or parochial tween duty in schools and success in the interest. Army. My visit to the British army earlier What, then, should be required of of this year furthered my resolve to make ficer training and education in the future? change where it is needed. The exact requirements are somewhat elu US attitudes about officer training and sive. But we can identify the main con education have also been affected by spe siderations and bring to bear some perti cialization. The functions that armies per nent experience. What we are after, I form have expanded immensely, and more think, is a blend of enduring objectives and more officers have become increasing and traditions, together with a willing ly concerned with finance, supply, public to change in the light of changing relations, personnel management, research times. Basically, I believe officers’ 1984 29 MILITARY REVIEW tiveness and chances for success depend loyal servant to the country and its ideals. heavily on three areas. These are charac But it is also true that the values neces ter, knowledge and skills, and the ability sary to defend a free society are not iden to apply military judgment and analysis. tical with the values of the society itself. I to the first of these: character. Our job is Lo produce combat leaders who We in the profession of arms have al can train and lead units capable of ways maintained that there is a necessary ing missions under conditions of severe tie between learning and conduct and that hardship, searing emotion and extreme the formation of character lays down the danger. This requirement necessitates a foundation upon which the rest of an of broad range of activities that would no ficer’s development will eventually rise. doubt be considered dubious in a civilian Military institutions have concerned university. Yet, this fact is not always ac themselves not only with what officers cepted or understood. know but with what they are and with What is intriguing to some is the possi what they do. bility of closing or at least narrowing the It was not only a West Point professor gap that separates a military institution of drawing at the turn of the century who like West Point from a good university. suggested that the Army should “guide There are those who argue against charac the perceptions toward moral truth, teach ter building altogether on the grounds the discipline of passion, and cultivate the that smacks of elitism. The very word power of right perception and action.” “character,” they say, conjures up the Hackett has also reminded us that the specter of an idea once used to guard the “very efficiency” of the army depends privileges of the affluent or well-born and upon “fortitude, integritv. self-restraint, suggests a certain class or culture. personal loyaltv to other persons. and There is also another kind of argument the surrender of the individual to the com which leads in the same direction. It en mon good.” Military institutions must courages the relaxation of standards of not only espouse these values: they must behavior and performance traditionally also insist that officers make them their associated with the formation of charac own. ter. Its proponents maintain that less dis The British Regular Commissions Board cipline, greater freedom and more per provides an excellent means of sonal autonomy are incentives to develop screening out those who might reject ing judgment and maturity. While attrac these values, as well as those who lack the tive in principle, the application of this intellectual, physical or other special ap argument has rarely borne out its optimis titudes needed by potential leaders. I tic hopes. What is lacking are perspective have recently proposed examining the and an appreciation for the long-term im procedures to see if they might pact. have some application in the US Admittedly, the process by which char In developing character, one problem acter is built and military values are in that arises concerns the relationship be stilled is a complicated affair. But two tween civilian and military norms of crucial factors stand out. They are a de behavior. So far as the military profes mand for high levels of performance and sional is concerned, he must first be a substantial discipline. Experience has 30 TRAINING AND EDUCATION shown that the majority of young people and movement, emplacing machineguns, are capable of more than they will custom designating targets for artillery and iden arily demand of themselves under condi tifying enemy weapons systems are fun tions of total freedom. Clearly, a preoc damentals of soldiering, and too many of cupation with autocratic methods will not ficers have carried handicaps based upon shape good officers or inspire commit deficiencies in these areas into higher ment. But high standards, sound disci grades. pline and performance under stress are Moreover, those officers who cannot preconditions for proper character and perform tasks expected of soldiers lack leadership development. confidence in themselves and cannot win The influence of military institutions on the respect of their men. The tendency is students must be in the direction of en then to retreat from leadership responsi couraging the practice of habits and bilities, focusing instead on administra canons that are mastered only by vigor tive tasks. As the British experience in ous self-cultivation and self-discipline. the Falklands re-emphasized. knowledge Military schools must exact hard tasks, of the wares and craft of soldiering require the budgeting of energies and de secures the status of junior officers in the mand a high measure of conduct and be eyes of those they lead. havior. They must apply these injunc Institutional training plays a vital part tions not only to the course of study but in developing the necessary skills. Yet, as to the entire range of activities. They indicated earlier, the responsibility is must, in short, imbue those they tram and also shared with the chain of command. teach with a strong, well-ordered sense of Commanders cannot take the tactical and duty which has characterized all success technical competence of officers as an arti ful and exemplary officers. cle of faith. Senior officers must teach The cost of defeat is too great to aban their subordinates, they, in turn, their don the development of character and subordinates, and so on down the line. In values that have historically been order to acquire the advantages that quired on the battlefield. Certainly, one follow from the full exploitation of battle lesson from the Vietnam era was clear. field initiative, for example, commanders When officers become uncertain about have tocommunicate their overall tactical their values, confused about their purpose scheme clearly and then give subordi and lead in ways scarcely sanctioned by nates flexibility in execution. their traditions, then soldiers, units and Before this can be done, however, of the country are poorly served. ficers must be taught how to apply tac A second task of training and education tical principles to the infinite variations in is to increase knowledge and skills. Of terrain. They must read theground where ficers must know weapons systems. tac they will fight and know its impact on the tics. the enemy and how to write and weapons and equipment for which they speak effectively about these things. are responsible. They must recognize its They must be capable of dealing with advantages and disadvantages in order to combat at their own level, and they must ahead, develop alternative courses be well-grounded in the skills of those of action, take the initiative and present they lead. Employing techniques of fire the enemy with changing situations that 1984 31 MILITARY REVIEW cause his collapse. They must move rapid theory and exchange theory, not to men ly from dispersed positions to the critical tion a dozen or so leadership models. point of the battle. They must understand When the personality characteristics by the effects of darkness, rain, snow, fog which one group of officers were taught and ice. proved ineffective in differentiating good In the defense, they must know the loca leaders from poor ones, another group was tion, size, direction and extent of enemy set to restructuring situations to make avenues of approach into their area. In the them fit their personality. When this offense, they must exploit the fleeting op proved infeasible, a third group was portunities for maneuver and react taught to construct leadership grids and promptly to sudden changes. They must encouraged to seek a nine-by-nine style of improvise, take risks and act simultane leadership. ously. All of these theories have in common All of this requires good teaching, to the unspoken assumption that a leader gether with tactical instincts that are cul has only to find the right method, the tivated to a fine art in the feel of the definitive procedure, and then all of the mature tactical leader for the battlefield. problems of leadership must inevitably The heart of this feeling consists of the ac yield before it. But the difficult thing quisition of a corpus of knowledge con about leadership is to enable people to cerning techniques. Such techniques or develop whatever potential they may ways of doing things on the battlefield are have. And this is a practical problem developed through battle drills, innova rather than a theoretical problem, an af tive maneuvers and command and control fair of concern, caring, improvisation and procedures. Officers must master existing practice rather than system. techniques and-much harder-learn to US Army schools today have abandoned create new and better techniques them the theoretical approach of the past and selves. Little of this is acquired in the put the teaching of leadership back on a classroom. The difference between practi practical foundation. Emphasis is now be cal and abstract knowledge has been too ing placed on the staples: the ability to long ignored. provide for the welfare of soldiers, to Nor does one become a leader by mas teach and communicate effectively, to tering the finer points and more abstruse counsel others and supervise their activi aspects of behavioral science. The most ties, to build tactical and technical compe difficult task facing any officer is to in tence, to plan efficiently and to make deci spire and engender the courage needed to sions. overcome the uncertainty and fear, the We are still not providing, however, suf death and destruction, of war. Yet, when ficient opportunity to practice. British we trace our approach to leadership dur schools, I believe, do a much better job of ing recent years, we find it generally setting young officers in situations where following the changing currents of aca some of what Karl von Clausewitz called demic theory. “friction” is involved. Therefore, it is Over the years, we have taught trait essential that we follow your lead and theory, situation theory, interactionist focus more on developing in our officers theory, humanistic theory, contingency the practical leadership that is learned 32 October TRAINING AND EDUCATION through application in the field. must know how to make an estimate or an The third area where expertise is needed appreciation of the situation, how to is that of military judgment and analyti develop alternative courses of action and cal skills. Both are important not only in how to write a concept of operations. preparing good plans but in avoiding While these analytical tools are not ends hideous errors. This has not always gone in themselves, the intellectual discipline the way we wanted it to. In his book, My resulting from their habitual use is criti Early Life: A Roving Commission, Church- cal. They provide a systematic process for ill described his experience of being proceeding through the details of mission, gated as a forlorn hope to a crammer” enemy, terrain, troops available and time upon twice failing the entrance examina to arrive at a sound decision. They should tion to Sandhurst. The crammers, wrote be ingrained into all officers’ thinking Churchill, “knew with almost papal infal through constant practice. libility the sort of questions that would be Clearly, part of the necessary sophisti asked, so that no one who was not a con cation that officers must have to make genital idiot could avoid passing thence decisions is to understand where facts into the army.” In 1919. one lieutenant leave off and judgment takes over. It has colonel likened the West Point approach been said that being able to make this dis to the art of war as “teaching mathemat tinction is especially important for a staff ics by requiring the student to memorize officer because he should aspire to provide the theorems and principles without ap only the facts to the commander. I cannot plication to examples.” Years later, J. F. quite accept this, but certainly staff of C. Fuller asked, “Why do so few soldiers ficers as well as commanders must know think? Because so many have never been the difference. taught to do so.” Various kinds of practical and theoreti Several years ago, the Army War Col cal knowledge are relevant to good mili lege examined the state of planning in the tary judgment. These include knowledge US Army and concluded that the ability of the capabilities of weapons and sup to develop effective and executable plans, porting systems, understanding doctrine particularly in innovative and nontradi and tactics, sensitivity to the uniqueness tional modes, constituted a large defi of soldiers and various units, and an ap ciency. Part of the problem was attrib preciation for the principles and insights uted to the operationally permissive en provided by military history. vironment during Vietnam that failed to There is a story about the old staff col reinforce the need for thorough and lege days when officers would be told that logical planning. But the crux of the prob an enemy force was located behind a hill lem was that our schools were not teach visible in the distance. The instructor ing officers how to think, plan and decide. would then observe the class to see which Today, we must emphasize how to think students looked to their maps for the solu rather than what to think. This requires tion and which looked at the hill. The emphasis on process as well as former were thought to be strategists: the on using and applying the basic analytical latter, tacticians. tools of our profession rather than on Today’s officers must be both. They reaching the school solution. Officers must base their decisions on a solid 1934 33 MILITARY REVIEW standing of what is on the map and the that a disciplined environment and high realities of the ground. know levels of demand are prerequisites for the principles of read con development. I have also tried duct war gaming and cultivate to convey m,v conviclion knowledge, and creative But they skills and judgment are best developed their results against difficulties through an experience always inherent in and opera followed by and stressful field tions on the ground. Mastery of the training. science of war rests on both Today, both the British and the US Ar and practical foundation-and a mies very good armies. Your superb good one at that. I see no other way. system adds that dimension of In summing up these thoughts about cohesion and camaraderie that officer training and education, I would we arc now also trying Lo capture. Part of point out that ours is a profession which your mystique is bound up in the lore and demands the pursuit of excellence. Even of in the perfection of team in the case of the outstanding of work and in the fascination with the study ficer, there is still for and practice of tactics and leader Our orientation toward ship You have made the profession of profession to he of enriching noble one. Lhose areas where the for contri you and me as professional soldiers, bution is the greatest. the art and science of war must be afforded Sometimes our attention can di the proper measure of our energy, study, verted, and we have LO bring it back to and respect. Then, someday, fundamental concerns. I have suggested somewhere. sometime. when you and I are that those concerns today should be called upon Lo fulfill responsibility fying character and values, enlarging pro for which we, and we alone, are morally fessional knowledge and skills, and im and professionally charged, we will be proving military judgment. I have said ready LO fight, and we will prevail. 34 October MILITARY REVIEW ble. killed 241 military personnel and Providing extraordinary insight wounded more than 100 others.” The into the importance of terrorism as a truck was laden with the equivalent of strategic weapon, the well-written and more than 12,000 pounds of TNT.” frank report should spur changes within The Federal Bureau of Investigation the DOD as did lessons learned from the Forensic Laboratory described the bomb kidnapping of Brigadier General James L. as the largest conventional blast seen Dozier. The Long Commission Report by tke explosiue experts community finds: the. device was of such magnitude that The 23 October catastrophe underscores major damage to the land the fact that terrorist warfare can have a ing team] Headquarters building and significant political impact and demon nificant casualties would probably strates that the United States, and specif resulted if the truck had not ically the Department of Defense is inade penetrated the multina quately prepared to deal with this threat. tional force] defensive perimeter, but had Much needs to be done on an urgent basis, detonated in the roadway, some 330 feet to prepare U.S. military forces to defend from the building.” against and counter terrorist The Report of the DOD Commission on It is arguably the single most impor Beirut International Airport Terrorist tant unclassified document on terrorism Act, 23, 1983, provides findings available today within the DOD. The and lessons that are of equal or greater im Long Commission Report is an instruc portance to the Army than those from the tive document for military officers of all 1983 Urgent Fury operations in Grenada. ranks and assignments. In Grenada, the United States engaged a The attack inflicted a stunning blow to conventional enemy force using predict the US Marine force in Beirut as well as to able tactics and weapons. In Beirut, the the nation’s policy and prestige. The blow Marine Corps suffered a terrorist act of sapped the will of the US Congress and unprecedented lethality. Our forces were people to continue a military role in the prepared for what waa found in Grenada: Lebanese conflict. History will probably they were unprepared for what happened judge the bombing as both a tactical and a in Beirut. strategic defeat for the United States. The Department of Defense (DOD) “The terrorists sent the United States a Commission on the Beirut International strong political The first and Airport Terrorist Act of 23 October 1983 most far-reaching observation of the Long was established by the secretary of Commission was that the bombing: defense. Its purpose was to conduct a was tantamount to an act of us “thorough and independent inquiry into ing the medium of terrorism. all of the facts and circumstances sur warfare, sponsored by sovereign states or rounding” the terrorist bombing and to organized political entities to achieve examine the security measures and the political objectives, is a threat to the rules of engagement at the time of the at United States, and is increasing at an tack.’ The commission’s report was issued alarming on 20 December 1983. It is commonly The report concludes that there has known as the Long Commission Report been a “three to four fold increase in after the commission’s chairman, Ad terrorist incidents since 1968.” During miral Robert L. J. Long, US Navy, the past decade, more than half of the 36 October TERRORISM recorded terrorist activities were against cent of the total involved Middle Eastern facilities and personnel of the United Terrorists.“‘” With the Beirut bombing, States. As evidenced by more than 666 terrorism is fully established as a mode of deaths in 1983. terrorism is increasing in warfare.” lethality.‘” The systematic, carefully orchestrated Even excluding the massive carnage of which see in the Middle East the 23 October bombing of the BLT represents a dimension of warfare. Headquarters building in These international terrorists, unlike their has already killed more people in traditional counterparts, are not seeking than in an.y otker year in recent to make a random political statement or history.‘? to commit the occasional act of intimida State-sponsored terrorism is also in tion on behalf of some ill-defined, creasing, particularly in the Middle vision of the future. For them, ter East.” Between 1972 and 1982, 140 ter rorism is an integrated part of strategy in rorist incidents were perpetrated by there are well-defined political and sovereign “Of this total, military objectives.‘” 90 percent occurred in the three year A terrorist bombing overcame the theo period between 1980 and 1983 retical military advantage of a Marine The remains of the US Marine Corps battalion landing team headquarters after the 23 October 1983 terrorist bombing MILITARY REVIEW phibious unit, supported by aircraft car secure the objectives of nation&policy by riers, a battleship and the nation’s com applying force or the threat of force. bined intelligence capability, to gain a ma Military strategy sets the fundamental jor political victory of strategic impor conditions for operations. OPERA tance to the terrorists and their sponsors. TIONAL: The operational level of war The commission concludes that the act uses available military resources to attain was committed by a revolutionary organi strategic goals within a theater of war. zation with indirect, if not the direct, in Most simply, it is the theory of larger unit volvement of Syria and The bombing was politically motivated Both of these definitions have been and directed against US policy in made obsolete by the Beirut attack. They Lebanon in the sense that no attempt was should be refined to incorporate made to Marinepositions or to sponsored terrorism that is executed by the Marines from the small units to secure national policy ob While there were other important mili jectives and attain strategic and opera tary targets in Beirut, the defeat of a US tional goals within a theater of war. element, particularly a military element, Army thinking concerning the role of had the greatest symbolic and strategic campaigns as the centerpiece of the opera importance. The terrorists correctly tional level of war requires modification. guessed that such a blow would have a State-sponsored terrorism has added a tremendous effect on congressional and new dimension to our concept of cam public opinion and might cause the paigns as “sustained operations designed removal of US elements from the multina to defeat an enemy force in a specified tional force. The attack achieved total sur space and time with simultaneous and se prise and total destruction of the target quential Terrorists simul but, most importantly, the objective of taneously attacked elements of the multi defeating strategy was This national peacekeeping force-the US national undertaking of Syria and/or Iran headquarters and the French exhibits a new dimension of the strategic with truck bombs. Then, 13 days later, and operational levels of war. they penetrated the Israeli military com US Army concepts, doctrine and tac pound in Tyre, Lebanon, with another tics, although addressing terrorism, do truck bomb, killing 60 In less not adequately address the spectrum of than two weeks, state-sponsored terror state-sponsored terrorism revealed in the ists killed 338 members of the military Long Commission Report. Revisions are forces of three of the world’s great mili needed in these areas to incorporate con tary powers: Israel, France and the sideration of the threat posed by sophisti United cated state-sponsored terrorism. This is Terrorism has fully emerged as the de particularly true of Field Manual (FM) finitive weapon that can enable nations 100-l. The Army, and FM 100-5, Opera with inferior military forces to gain a tions. The Beirut attack also brings into degree of strategic equality with the question the definition of the strategic world’s major industrial powers. Ter and the operational levels of war as rorism is an alternative to the acquisition described in FM 100-5: nuclear weapons. It is also an alterna Military strategy tive to developing large conventional employs the armed forces of a nation to forces. The key, and in some cases only, TERRORISM strategic weapon for these nations is ter means of influencing public opinion and rorism. Terrorism, with its associated legislative action in the It violence, offers the small and less power sharply focuses political and governmen ful nations an option for influencing the tal attention on the strategic objective of policies and behavior of larger and more the terrorists and toward modifying the powerful nations. strategy and policies of the crucial in Underdeveloped nations, revolutionary an opponent’s political situation. groups and radical states will be quick to political grasp the significance of the deaths of the in the losers defeated. but 241 Marines and the later change in US into politically untenable policy. Terrorism is crucial to this For a growing number of states ter it is easily deterred by rorism has become an alternative means firepower or the of esca of conducting state business and the ter lation. Terrorism. therefore. provides an rorists themselves are agents whose expedient form of capable of the state can easily deny.‘” the political situa Terrorism impacts on the hearts and tion with minimum and coqt.‘” minds of free nations. A similar incident Terrorism is a potent perpetrated against the Soviet Union’s Another view of remains of the Marine Corps headquarters that was destroyed on 23 October 1983 1984 MILITARY REVIEW military forces in Afghanistan would bombs used in both attacks employed a have the same effect, as the Soviets do not “gas enhancement technique” to magnify have to answer to public opinion or to the their explosive On the morning of press. Unfortunately, the success of the 23 October, the French force’s compound October massacre will oncourage was also attacked.“” groups and states to refine and further Attacks and numerous threats of terror use of terrorist acts against the military ist attack forced the multinational peace forces of the Western democracies. keeping force to react rather than An examination of the Beirut bombing, The terrorists were able to impose their using the principles of war contained in will on the United States, set the terms FM shows the of ter for their chosen form of warfare and select rorism as a means to defeat an enemy’s the place of confrontation or battle. Pa strategic objectives. It also shows why tience and planning allowed the terrorists terrorism is an attractive instrument of to Lake decisive offensive action against national power to a growing number of na weaknesses in security. The Marines’ tions. The Beirut bombing was unques defined mission, concentration and static tionably an outstanding application of the defenses allowed the terrorists freedom of principles of war. States willing to use ter action in deciding when and where they ror as an instrument of national policy would will come to the same conclusion. Mass: “Concentrate combat power “Every military operation at the decisive place and The should be directed toward a clearly de bomb that was driven into fined, decisive, and obtainable objec the lobby of the headquarters building tive.““” The terrorists’ major objective achieved the necessary “The was to get the multinational peacekeeping massing of forces, together with the force out of Lebanon-this being the proper application of the other principles strategic objective of the groups and of war, may enable numerically inferior states behind the attack. They wanted to forces to achieve decisive battle send a political and ideological message to In this instance, the terrorists the United States that would cause a ma achieved both strategic and tactical jor reconsideration of this country’s role results. in the peacekeeping force and policy in the Economy of force: “Allocate mini Middle East. mum essential combat power to second To achieve these objectives, the ter ary efforts.“‘” The attack by surrogates rorists needed a symbolic target of US or unconventional warfare elements presence. The heavily defended Marine allowed Iran and/or Syria to achieve battalion landing team headquarters was strategic ends without using their conven the largest concentration of US military tional forces, expending major resources forces in Lebanon. A large number of or putting their population or territory at Marines in one prominent building gave risk. Symbolically, the terrorists defeated the terrorists a target that would allow the military force of a superpower at the them to achieve their strategic objective. cost of the driver of the yellow Mercedes . “Seize, retain, and exploit Benz truck.“’ the This group of terrorists Maneuver: “Place the enemy in a was the same group that had bombed the position of disadvantage through the flex US Embassy in Beirut in April 1983. The ible application of combat At 40 October TERRORISM first glance, this principle of war was not a vides strategic mobility and maneuver significant factor in the Beirut bombing. “on the cheap” to attack targets of stra More detailed study shows that it is ap tegic, political or symbolic importance. At the tactical level, they were also able In the strategic sense. the terrorists to strike at multiple locations after tra showed that they could maneuver within versing some distance from their staging the theater of operation and strike at the areas. Conventional air, ground or naval weakest point of our defenses to gain a units would undoubtedly have been de strategic advantage. If this was tected moving toward the Beirut Airport, sponsored terrorism, which the Long but the terrorists were able to move un Commission believes that it was. the detected. By using terrorism rather than agents of Iran and Syria were able to conventional forces, the enemy was able move across considerable distances and to maneuver against the US forces. political boundaries to strike at their pre Unity of command: “For every ob selected target. In essence, terrorism jective, there should be unity of effort The US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, just after it was bombed by terrorists on April 1983 1984 MILITARY REVIEW under one responsible The tactical intelligence operalions: pau terrorist actions were clearly under the city of HUMINT.” An amalgamation of command of a single leader commanding a many nations, factions, religions, ethnic disciplined and dedicated force. The and language groups, the Middle partmented nature of terrorism limits the East’s complexities compound US prob number of individuals involved in an lems with HUMINT and provide terror operation. State-sponsored terrorism pro ists a degree of security. vides the terrorist leader with high-level Surprise: “Strike the enemy at a Lime planning, resource, logistic and opera and/or place and in a manner for which he tional support that are beyond the means is unprepared. The attack achieved sur of “conventional’‘-that is, prise.“” The true genius of this attack is sponsored-groups. This support allows that the objective and the means of attack the designated terrorists to concentrate were beyond the imagination of those on execution of the mission by focusing all responsible for Marine They efforts on the common goal of a successful were also beyond the imagination of the attack. chain of command supporting the US ele “Never permit the enemy ments of the multinational peacekeeping to acquire an unexpected advantage.“‘” force and our national Al At both the tactical and strategic level, though the US forces had general infor the terrorists protected themselves from mation about terrorist activities and the surveillance, observation, detection and likelihood of a car bomb, they lacked the interference, thus allowing freedom of ac specific information that would have pro tion during the planning and execution vided the necessary Terrorists stages of the bombing. The terrorists and count on surprise as the key element of the states supporting them exhibited their plans. In Beirut, total tactical and keen knowledge of Marine dispositions, strategic surprise was achieved. US security measures and the capability Simplicity: “Prepare clear, un of allied intelligence services to detect complicated plans and clear, concise They were able to reduce their orders to insure thorough understand vulnerability to US tactical and strategic ing.“” The plan was simple in both the intelligence units and systems supporting planning and the execution phase. Mini the US Marine force. The Long Commis mal forces were needed at any point. Few sion points out that: resources were needed throughout. The The USMNF commander did not have plan did not require extensive command effective U.S. Human Intelligence and control or synchronization of forces. MINT) support. The paucity of U.S. con The material and capability needed to trolled HUMINT is partly due to U.S. build the massive truck bomb were read policy decisions to reduce HUMINT col ily available in Lebanon.‘* A driver for the lection suicide mission was also It can be surmised that the terrorists The DOD definition of terrorism is: knew of this weakness and took advan the use or threatened of tage of it. The movements of terrorists are or violence by a not easily detected by technical intelli ration against or property gence systems such as satellites and with the intention of coercing intimi radars. Terrorism successfully challenges dating societies. often the weakest aspect of our national and ideological purposes. 42 October TERRORISM The Long Commission finds that the than by a Soviet motorized rifle regiment DOD definition needs to incorporate the in the Fulda Gap. The Fulda Gap threat is reality that sovereign states may use ter one of greater magnitude, but the ter rorism directly or through rorist threat is of greater certainty. The Definitions of terrorism found in Army Long Commission Report concludes that: regulations, and training circulars, international acts endemic such as Training Circular 19-16, Counter to the Middle East are indicative of an ing on U.S. Army Installations. alarming world wide phenomenon that need similar revisions. With the Beirut poses an increasing threat to U.S. person bombing, definitions of terrorism have nel and entered the gray area between an unlaw We are naive if we believe that state- ful criminal act and an unlawful act of sponsored terrorism against US military war. It is my judgment that, if terrorism forces and activities will be limited to is state-sponsored, it should be defined as areas outside of the North American con an act of war. tinent. It is inevitable that some state- Since the end of World War II. modern sponsored terrorist group will attempt to Western military forces have been in send a message to the American people by volved more frequently in protecting ur striking a blow within the Continental ban areas, key population centers and ter United States or the Americas. It is not ritory than in maneuvering against a con hard to imagine state-sponsored terror ventional force on a multidimensional ism targeting US forces conducting exer battlefield. Army forces can count on cises in Honduras. Significant US mili continuing to be employed on foreign soil tary casualties in Central America would in security, peacekeeping and defensive be the catalyst for strong and swift public roles. Just as the Marines were tied to and congressional action to change US static defensive positions in Beirut, the foreign policy in the region. Army will be assigned missions that limit The symbolic importance and vulnera the execution of Battle doctrine bility of many military installations make and place the force at risk to terrorist at them targets for terrorists. A bomb was tacks. exploded at the National War College at US Central Command and US Euro Fort Lesley J. Virginia, on 26 pean Command geographic areas of April The Officers’ Club at the responsibility are the principal battle Washington Navy Yard was damaged by ground for state-sponsored terrorists. If a bomb on 20 April Fort the Iran-Iraq War spreads, the US Cen and the Washington Navy Yard are used tral Command may be called upon to pro by military officers and senior DOD of tect the many key port facilities. ficials. refineries, oil fields, religious shrines and Other bases and prominent facilities urban areas of the region. Such a mission that are of historical and symbolic impor is primarily defensive in nature and may tance are the US Military Academy, West place our soldiers in fixed positions and Point, New York; Fort Benning, Georgia; installations making them vulnerable to Fort Bragg, North Carolina: the Boston state-sponsored terrorism. Navy Yard, Massachusetts; Andrews Air We must recognize that the US Army is Force Base, Maryland; and Fort Leaven- more likely to be attacked by a terrorist worth, Kansas. Such places have a signifi group fomented and/or controlled by Iran cant number of senior military officers 1984 43 MILITARY REVIEW and visitors present at any given time. with political and diplomatic actions, by Our facilities and institutions will un the National Security fortunately continue to be the targets of The Long Commission correctly points terrorists and probably even state- out that “much needs to be done, on an sponsored urgent basis, to prepare U.S. military The various schools of the military serv forces to defend against and counter ter ices have trained thousands of foreign of rorism.““” The significance of state- ficers from countries such as Israel and sponsored terrorism, particularly from Iraq that are bitter enemies of each other nations of the Middle East, poses a and of the terrorist states, Iran and Syria. serious threat Lo our forces worldwide. We have also trained during the past The Army must take immediate action to quarter-century numerous officers of improve training, security and support to countries which are no longer our allies commanders that will limit the effec and, in many cases, are adversaries. tiveness of terrorism. The Long Commis For example, since 1960, several hun sion Report should be used to aid these ef dred officers from countries whose gov forts. ernments are now hostile to the United The Beirut bombing was a watershed States have graduated from the US Army event for terrorism. We must learn from Command and General Staff College this symbolic defeat of our military forces (USACGSC). Many of these graduates and rapidly take measures that will pre have been purged, killed or are no longer vent future terrorist triumphs. We have employed by their governments. But it is already paid for these lessons with the not unreasonable to assume that some of blood of 241 Marines. We must learn the these individuals are loyal members of lessons offered in the Com their nation’s government and involved in mission we cannot af determining national strategy and ford to underestimate adversaries targets for state-sponsored terrorism. again. During the past 25 years, two Cuban, 149 From a terrorist the true Iranian, 14 Iraqi, six Libyan, 23 Nicara genius of this attack is that the objective guan and three Syrian officers have and means of attack beyond the graduated from the imagination of those responsible for The principal recommendation on ter Marine rorism in the commission’s report is: We must understand that terrorism is a that the Secretary of Defense direct fully established mode of warfare. We the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a must place as much emphasis on its broad range of appropriate military study, and prevention, as we do on other responses to terrorism for review, along forms of warfare. 44 TERRORISM currently the bat Headquarters. US Army and Command, Fort He from the Island and an from and is 1984 of the USACGSC He has served Korea and West Germany and as Warfare Company Military Review Binders. Keep your back issues of the Military Review in a sturdy, hard-covered binder. Available in maroon with gold lettering, the binders hold 12 issues and are $8.00. Orders should be sent to Military Review, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 1984 45 Case Studies e In the Law of Land Warfare Ill: The CaDlpaign in the Falklands Major Robert D. Higginbotham, US Army FALKLANDS On many occasions. the fightin.9 between British and Argentine forces in the Falklands War was fierce. Such conditions com pound the difficulties associated with strict adherence to the law of land warfare. This article e.l:amincs the available evidence from the Falklands fighting to determine the degree of com pliance b!l both sides. the time. represented the latest tech The Fleet Sails nology. Admittedly. weapons and equip ment had changed dramatically in the 80 years separating the two conflicts. The CCORDING to the author of one of repeating rifles. machineguns. artillery A the more or less "instant'" his pieces with smokeless powder propellant tories of the recent war in the Falkland Is and telephones of the war in South Africa lands. the "farewell to the Fleet at Ports had been replaced by radios. jamming de· mouth was reminiscent of the departure vices. radars. laser range finders. cluster of the Army and Navy to the Boer War. bombs. scatterable mines. jet and piston 1899-1902.'" In addition to the aircraft. missiles and greatly improved boisterous' and sentimental farewell. small arms. machineguns and artillery. several other similarities bet ween the Sec In addition to the weaponry and other ond Boer War and the war hetween the materiel that were of the latest design in British and the Argentines in the Falk both wars. the Falklands War was fought lands are readily discernihle. over a piece of ground. The Falklands Both wars were fought with what. at Campaign had a definite beginning. a mid· MILITARY REVIEW die during which the fighting took place drawn by independent journalists who and a definite end. It was described by one were eyewitnesses to the conflict. Finally, writer as a classic 19th-century punitive both belligerents appear to agree with expedition.' this assessment. One other area of similarity between the The British view of the matter was two conflicts has appeared-for the most stated by John Nott who, at the time of part, the fighting in the Falklands was the war, was the British secretary of state conducted according to the law of war. for defence. The British took about 11,400 The law of war is now increasingly referred prisoners during the war. They had antici to as the "law of armed conflict" to take pated the possibility of perhaps half that into account those situations where, as in number and had shipped tents from Great the Falklands, the word "war" may not be Britain to house prisoners. Unfortunate fully applicable, but the need for rules to ly, the tents went to the bottom of the sea govern the conflict certainly exists. when the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk by As was true of the Boer War,' those who Argentina. As a result of this loss. have written about the war in the Falk prisoners were housed in cold storage lands have made the point that the "cam sheds Ithe refrigerative apparatus was paign was fought with remarkable de turned off). in sheep "pens" lacLually cency on both sides:" It was as "clean" buildings) and in whatever other build as war can ever be. and the word" atroci ings could be made available. The short ty" has not yet been applied to any of the age of housing for prisoners led to what incidents that occurred during the fight some might argue was at least a technical ing. violation of the "Geneva Convention Rel There was some joking about the sub ative to the Treatment of Prisoners of ject during lectures to British troops en War" when housing was provided aboard route to the islands. The question was ship.' posed: "What do you do if you find Nott admitted the situation posed a a wounded enemy?" The response was problem but added that the procedure was "Blow his head off." Next question: found reasonable under the circumstances "What do you do if there is a TV crew by a representative of the International watching,!" Next answer: "You treat him Committee of the Red Cross who was in as one of your own. "8 Apart from this the islands as an observer. It further ap shipboard jocularity, there have been no pears that these prisoners were never in allegations of serious, deliberate viola any danger of attack by their own armed tions of the rules. forces because hostilities had ceased Of course. writing about this topic so before any prisoners were put on board. soon after the event suffers from the fact The prisoners themselves commented of . that not everything relevant to the matter ten that the conditions aboard ship were is yet known, especially from the Argen superior to those on the Falklands where tine side. Nevertheless, it seems reason the weather had been truly miserable. able to conclude that the law of armed The British were sensitive to the politi conflict was usually observed. This con cal climate and did provide law of war clusion is buttressed by the relative pauci training for the troops en route to the is ty of instances in which there may have lands although the soldier-students may been violations. And the general conclu not have taken the training with an alto sion that the rules were obeyed has been gether serious attitude. How much em- 48 October FALKLANDS phasis was placed on this type of training observance of the law of war in the Falk is not known. A member of the force pub· lands. In particular. the Argentines found Iished an article in both British and US no violation of the law in an incident in military journals describing the rigorous volving the shooting of a prisoner who training the troops received, but he does had been set afire following the explosion not mention training in the law of war.'O of some ammunition. This incident is Nott, however, said that such training discussed more fully later in this article. would receive more emphasis in the fu· In addition to the government position, ture, indicating a genuine concern on the a recent book of interviews with Argen part of the British." tine veterans of the war has been pub Getting the Argentine view of the law lished. Their views regarding the effective of war climate in the F(llklands is some· operation of the law of war during and what more difficult. Part of the problem of after the fighting are mentioned in these their impression stems from the language interviews. Their assessment is generally barrier. On one occasion. several Argen· favorable. tine soldiers were fearful of being killed b~' Despite the agreement of both sides and the British because of stories they had the journalists in the field that it was a heard before their capture. When a clean campaign, the few violations that British guard was trying to explain that did occur provide an excellent vehicle for they should not try to escape by means of the discussion of the basic principles of an elaborate pantomime of what would the law of war as they were applied in a happen if there was an escape attempt. a setting more modern than the Second chaplain happened to walk up, and the Boer War. These six principles, distilled prisoners mistakenly concluded that they from the Hague Convention," the Geneva were about to be shot." Similar incidents Conventions 15 and the customary law of could easily cloud the Argentine view of war as it has developed through the cen British conduct. t uries, are: A second difficulty in getting an ac· ., Enemy prisoners of war and civilian curate picture of the Argentine view of detainees are entitled to humane treat the Falklands from a law of war perspec ment. tive lies in the attitude of the Argentine e US soldiers are entitled to similarly government following its defeat. How humane treatment should they become clear the picture may ever become lies in prisoners of war. doubt. Major General Mario Benjamin • Orders to commit violations of the Menendez was ordered into arrest for 60 law of war must ultimately be disobeyed. days for pUblishing. without army permis' • Superiors who order violations of the sion. lv/a/vinas: Testimony of the Gover law of war to be committed are criminally nor This book was about the general's responsible for such orders, as are subor short career as governor of the Malvinas. dinates who carry out such orders. the Argentine term for the islands. • Violations of the law of war must be Perhaps with a change in government, reported. • this information will be more freely avail· • Employment of combat techniques able. designed to cause unnecessary suffering, According to United Press International, destruction of property or death not an official Argentine government" report related to mission accomplishment is for has commented favorably on the British bidden. 1984 49 MILITARY REVIEW those requmng medical attention re SkirmiShes) ceived it. A submariner had his legs seri ously injured by a missile that passed through the Santa Fe without exploding. One of the first incidents-related to the He was treated by British medical person law of war occurred not in the Falklands nel. proper but on the island of South Georgia. The quality of medical care provided by Between 700 and 800 miles east of the the British to the wounded, without dis Falklands, Argentine troops had occupied Unction between Brilish and Argentine, South Georgia, and the British ultimately was remarkable_ More than 300 major decided to strike there first for a number surgeries were performed, and 100 of of reasons. South Georgia was out of these operations were conducted on Ar range of the Argentine air force and could gentine wounded, Of all the wounded who provide Royal Navy vessels a safe place arrived at proper medical facilities alive, for refueling and maintenance after the only two died.'" Even when expert long voyage south. Presumably, South medical care was not available, every ef Georgia would fall quickly and provide fort was made to provide the best care British politicians and the public a first that was available. On one occasion, an victory. The time required to take South Argentine prisoner was found to have a Georgia back would allow better intel grave head wound. His brains were leaking ligence preparation and more training be into his helmet. British soldiers scooped fore the main event in the Falklands. the extruded material back into the hel South Georgia would be a practice run. met, replaced it on the prisoner's head and The operation was far from the "walk evacuated him. He apparently survived." over" it had been predicted it would be, IG Two days after the capture of South but it was eventually successful. Georgia, an Argentine prisoner was killed On 25 April 1982, an ex-US, World War under the following circumstances: It had II-vintage submarine, renamed the Santa been decided to move the Santa Fe to Fe by the Argentines, was seen on the sur Grytkiven, and a captured submariner face near Grytkiven, South Georgia. The was brought on board to right the vessel. boat was attacked by helicopters firing The British marine assigned to guard the depth charges and missiles. The missiles prisoner during this attempt mistakenly may have passed through the vessel with concluded that the prisoner was either out exploding, but the depth charges were trying to scuttle the boat or fire a torpedo, apparently successful in causing the San and the marine killed the prisoner. ta Fe to put into King Edward Harbor, Whether described as a "serious near Grytkiven, listing badly and leaking incident "21 or an "unnecessary death, "22 oiL By the time British troops went the fact remains that a person guaran'teed ashore, they were met by white flags fly humane treatment by the law of war was ing from the Argentine positions. killed. The number of prisoners the British This incident points up the fact that the took varies in the published reports be law, even if conscientiously observed, can tween 137" and 156, plus 38 civilians." not do more than minimize unnecessary But, whatever their number, they were suffering. Such incidents can never be treated according to the Geneva Conven eliminated because the law of war is ap tions. The white flags were honored, and plied by men, usually very young men, 50 October FALKLANDS carrying loaded weapons and operating Argentine positions on Pebble Island was under extremely stressful conditions. different because of the impact it had on Decisions must be made instantly even the success of later operations. Argentine though death rides on the outcome. Al Pucaras-slow-moving piston aircraft though the death of the submariner designed to attack infantry with bombs should not have happened. both sides and 20mm cannon-flew out of an airstrip were realistic in their attitudes about the on Pebble Island. A radar installation was incident. The British admitted their there. as well as stores of ammunition and mistake and apologized to the captain of fuel. The destruction of these facilities the Santa Fe. The captain accepted the and the equipment was necessary to im apology. and the submariner was buried prove conditions for British ground with full military honors. n troops later in the campaign. The Argentines also did what they British soldiers landed during a howling could to minimize the dehumanizing ef· storm. supported by naval gunfire. The feet that war can have. They were par Pucaras and some other military aircraft ticularly scrupulous in their treatment of were blown up with hand grenades and British dead. A Harrier pilot killed over other explosives. The British also decided Goose Green later in the war WaS buried to destroy civilian aircraft belonging to with military honors "in II ceremony of the Falklanders on Pebble Island. It was considerable dignity."" feared that the Argentines would put Although the British attack on South these aircraft to military use if they were Georgia was successful. it had done rela left intact. tively little to improve the situation for Although the property of noncombat the larger battles to follow. The raid On ants is not normally subject to confisca- British soldier cheCks prisoner of War weapons 1984 51 MILITARY REVIEW tion," if military necessity had demanded' employed by Reyes clearly exceeded what it, private aircraft could have been used was lawful behavior. It was widely re by the Argentines. The British were prob· ported during the war that Argentine ably, therefore, correct in destroying the soldiers were poorly provisioned. The civilian planes. Any dispute that arose truth appears to be that more than ade later between the owners of these aircraft quate stores of food reached the Malvinas and the British government over the ne throughout the campaign, but such sup cessity of their destruction is not governed plies were poorly distributed. Private by the law of war. The law of war protects soldiers who could not depend on their the property of enemy civilians, and leadership to provide food resorted to kill damage claims against the British over ing and eating sheep belonging to the is these aircraft will be governed by munici landers. No compensation was paid for pal-that is, British-law. provisions obtained in this manner." The troops bear responsibility for their acts, but they were placed in a position of ex The Main Event tremity by the poor leadership of officers like Reyes. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, On 21 May 1982, the British landed in that an incident involving a violation of the San Carlos area on East Falkland. The the law of war occurred in the San Carlos Special Boat Service had reconnoitered area where Reyes had served as a role the area some days previously and re model. Some British soldiers were aware' ported the area as being undefended. But that previous reports regarding the pres a final patrol prior to the landing en ence of Argentines were inaccurate, but countered Argentines. When this report not all of the helicopter pilots in the area was received, 24 Special Boat Servicemen had been informed. One helicopter pilot and a marine captain who spoke Spanish who was delivering supplies was still un went in in an attempt to induce a sur der the impression that the area was unde render. The broadcast appeal for sur fended until he was fired upon. The pilot render was answered in three ways-some dropped his load of supplies and escaped. surrendered, others fought and were cap Two other lightly armed escort helicop tured or killed, and others fled.26 ters accompanying the supply ship were Some of the Argentines in the San not so fortunate. Both were shot down in Carlos area were commanded by a Lieu to the sea. The Argentine soldiers present tenant Reyes, and his behavior was fired on the crews of the downed helicop anything but proper under the law of war. ters as they struggled in the water. Before the landing by the British, he had Three of these crewmen were killed, and struck the manager of the San Carlos set the fourth was seriously wounded. Al tlement in the face with a pistol butt. He though the reports of this incident vary as shot livestock and, at gunpoint, took food to the severity of the violation, it is clear and clothing from the islanders. Similar that downed aircrewmen were fired on in threats and thefts of food occurred at the water in violation of the "Geneva Con Douglas as Argentine soldiers retreated vention for the Amelioration of the Condi toward Stanley." . -tion of the Wounded, Sick, and Ship Taking food when necessity demands it wrecked Members of the Armed Forces at may not be criminal; however, the manner Sea. "29 Soon after this incident, an Argen- I 52 October FALKLANDS tine pilot was shot down in the vicinity. at a disadvantage by relying on the other The British leadership ensured that the side to abide by the law of war. For exam pilot received proper treatment and ple. it is treacherous to booby trap the medical attention despite some sugges bodies of the dead because the other side tions that the pilot should be made to pay is obligated by the law of war to collect for what happened to the helicopter al]d bury the dead. It would not be treach crews. 3D ery to booby trap military equipment left The focus of the war shifted after the on the battlefield because the other side is events in San Carlos to Goose Green. The not required by the law of war to police up mission at Goose Green belonged to the such property and does so at peril. 2d Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, Therefore. if the troops who raised the usually referred to simply as "2 Para." white flag were the ones who fired on The battalion was commanded by Lieu Barry. an act of treachery in violation of tenant Colonel Herbert Jones. known as the law of armed conflict occurred. If "H." He was an immensely popular com other troops. unaware of the presence of mander with the troops. and he was known the white flag, were the ones who fired. no as a leader who took risks. Although a de violation occurred." The three British sol termined fighter. he was also "chivalrous diers are just as dead. however. The lesson and scrupulous" in training his troops to here is partly legal and partly practical. treat prisoners properly." He was killed The law requires the white flag to be during the battle. and Major Cris Keeble honored. but the white flag signifies only commanded the battalion during the re the desire of the other side to talk. not nec mainder of the operation. essarily to surrender. Whatever the case During the battle for Goose Green, was at Goose Green. there was no require Argentine soldiers raised a white flag. A ment for the British to expose them platoon leader. Lieutenant James Barry, selves. The hoister of the white flag is the and two other soldiers went forward to ac one expected to come forward. and that is cept what they thought was a surrender, what should have been required of the and all three were killed by enemy fire. Al Argentine soldiers in this case. though some segments of the British The abuse of the white flag introduces a press raged about "treachery," Keeble. further element of stress on the battle whose men were killed as a result of the in field. It also leads to an understandable cident. had a morc sanguine view. labeling anger on the part of the victims of such an it "a mistake in the confusion of battle."" act. whether accidentally or deliberately One reporter indicated that. as the lieu done." Th~ subject of reprisal then sug tenant went forward. a British machine gests itself. A reprisal is an act in viola gun opened fire on a different Argentine tion of the law of war that is done in re position. and return fire caught the lieu- sponse to a violation by the other side. It tenant and his men." . is designed to cause the other side to com Other reports indicated that one group ply with the law in the future. There are a of enemy soldiers was attempting a sur number of prerequisites to the empI,oy render from its position and other Argen ment of a reprisal. tine soldiers in another trench who had The most crucial element of a reprisal not seen the white flag shot down the is the prohibition of retaliation against three British soldiers. It is an act of prisoners of war or civilians who have "treacb:ery" if one side puts the other side been detained." And the policy of the 1984 53 MILITARY REVIEW United States is that reprisals will never tional command authority.'" be taken against civilians regardless of Was the British reaction to the death of whether we have detained them or they Barry a reprisal? In the battle for the are still under the control of the enemy. school house that followed the deaths of Therefore, the only legitimate object of a the three British soldiers at Goose Green, reprisal would be an enemy soldier in the no Argentine soldiers survived. Explo· field who is still a combatant or enemy sives and incendiary grenades were em property. ployed against the soldiers in the school Nevertheless, even an enemy soldier in house at Goose Green, and there was a the field cannot lawfully be the object of a flaming explosion-the result of igniting reprisal that springs only from a motive of ammunition or perhaps grain stored in the revenge. The reprisal is "an unavoidable building:'o In the overall bat tie, the last resort to induce the enemy to desist British lost 17 dead and 31 wounded." Ar from unlawful practices. "17 The very gentine losses were 250 dead and 121 definition of the term indicates that one wounded. prerequisite to reprisal is the exhaustion The proportions of dead and wounded of other remedies designed to bring about led some observers to suggest that reo enemy compliance with the law of war. prisals were taken against the Argentines The Geneva Conventions contain com ei ther over the white flag incident or as a mon articles providing for inquiries into result of the death of Jones, or both. alleged violations. 36 Such inquiries should Others suggested different explanations be made prior to the taking .of a reprisal. of the casualty figures. The law of war The power of the press, if it is present in does not require any effort to wound a the field, as it was in the Falklands, can lawful combatant rather than kill him, nor also be brought to bear in an attempt to does the law require a lawful combatant to bring about future compliance by publi surrender. Well-trained troops making ac cizing past violations. Another factor to curate killing shots do not violate the law consider is whether strict compliance with of war. It is also possible that many of the the law on one side despite a violation by Argentine dead were not killed by British the other will induce future compliance marksmen in the actual fighting but that because of the enemy's desire for future they died as a result of cluster bombs that reciprocal treatment. And, finally, any were employed by the British for several reprisal taken should be proportional to days before the assault. the offenses of the enemy although they Whatever the truth, Argentine propa· need not be in kind. ganda made the most of the figures, ac Because of the many factors that must cusing the British of murdering sur· be evaluated before reprisals can be taken, rendering Argentine troops." The British the decision to do so should be made by did not defend the casualty figures at the highest available authority. The Goose Green on the basis of a reprisal. It United States takes a serious view toward was a lethal battlefield, defended by a the law of war, and a reprisal that is taken staunchly resisting enemy. Had the Brit illegally subjects the officer ordering such ish admitted that there was some anom an act and the men who carry it out to aly arising out of the figures, it would criminal liability under the Uniform Code have been difficult to defend Goose Green 01 Military Justice. It is, therefore, ad as a lawful reprisal. visable to leave the decision to the na- In the first place, the white flag incident 54 October FALKLANDS was not regarded by the commander on jump in the trench and rake it with fire, the ground-Keeble-as an act of and if you see an Argie IArgentine treachery. Second, there was no attempt soldier), it's either him or vou . ... 4J to refer the matter to higher head If the Argentines at the school house quarters, either for the purpose of an in and during the rest of the battle for Goose quiry into the white flag incident or for a Green died as a result of the firepower and decision os to whether repl'isals should be fighting spirit 01 the British, they died taken. And, finally, if the number of lawfully. Justification of the casualty Argentine dead was the result of a re figures on the basis of a lawful reprisal prisal, this was not proportional to the would have failed. number of British killed as a result of the Another matter related to the law of showing of the white flag. war came up in connection with Goose The most likely explanation of the feroc Green. The British found about 30 na ity of the battle for Goose Green was palm cannisters for aerial delivery near given by Keeble: the airstrip at Goose Green." There was Our people are extrem"'y aggressive. also a factory for napalm, complete with They are trained to fight . ... You can't cannisters and directions for making the mince it. You have got to kill the enemy, incendiary. Employed against troops in you havl? got to destroy that machinegUl~ fortified positions, the furious burning of before he destroys you. When YOll fire an napalm consumes SO much oxygen that titank rockets into a trench, a lot of people barricaded troops are asphyxiated. Used die. lfyoll have foUl' people in a trench and against troops in the open, napalm burns a grenade comes in, fVllr pevple die. Every horribly and clings to its victims. Were trench you attack, vou destroy it. You the Argentines in violation of the law of Argentine prisoners of war turn in their weapons 1984 55 MILITARY REVIEW war if they had employed napalm against been locked up under these conditions troops in the open? were better protected when the firefight The only legal obstacle against the use began than were other islanders who re of an incendiary weapon is that it cannot mained in their homes. The goal of the be employed in a way that causes calcu "Geneva Convention Relative to the Pro lated. unnecessary suffering to in tection of Civilian Persons in Time of dividuals. Although napalm admittedly War" is to protect the civilian population causes great suffering. it kills com from unnecessary incidental harm during batants. The effectiveness of napalm used combat. And. during the battle for Goose in the open can be greaLly reduced be Green. several occupied houses were hit cause it does not kill when its burning with small-arms fire and explosives. The capacity is not confined except for tho~e goal of the protection of civilians was struck directly. Napalm is not as effective largely achieved by Argentina almost by in the open perhaps. but there is no legal fortuity. restriction against such use. However. concerning other proper There is a prohibition against the use of treatment. especially regarding the pro hollow-point bullets on the theory that tection of civilian property. there was a they do cause calculated. unnecessary suf failure to meet the standards of the con fering. One journalist reported that some vention. Many of the Falklanders' homes 9mm rounds drilled out as dumdums were were vandalized. Personal property was found at an Argentine supply position. looted. In some cases-the motive for bu t there is no record of them ever being which is difficult to discern-the floors of used. The same writer indicated that houses were smeared with excrement. Argentine weapons were found stored in Argentine prisoners later complained school houses and in hospitals marked that they were not removed from Goose with the Red Cross. but such violations Green rapidly enough to prisoner of war are not widely reported." camps or hospital ships to protect them When the British took Goose Green. from their own air force and the weather." they discovered that the Falklanders Article 23 of the "Geneva Convention Rel there had not always been treated accord ative to the Treatment of Prisoners of ing to the requirements of the "Geneva War" guarantees the movement of prison Convention Relative to the Protection of ers from the combat zone as soon as prac Civilian Persons in Time of War" while tical. However. one wonders whether the captives of Argentina. Some Argentines Argentine demands were based on Article behaved properly toward their detainees. 23 or their fear of civilian reactions to but others did not. One hundred fourteen their OWn violations of the law with re islanders were confined at Goose Green. spect to civilian property." They were not given adequate food or As the British were preparing to move water or access to sanitary facilities. One from Goose Green for the final liberation reason for the shortage of food was that of Stanley (the Argentines had named it the soldiers had taken food from the is Puerto Argentino when they liberated it). I landers. This was due to poor distribu some Argentine troops were ordered by tion. and there seems to have been little their commander to take up defensive excuse for the denial of access to suffi positions in houses belonging to Falk cient water and sanitation. landers. The law of war would permit such Ultimately. however. those who had use of private property if military neces- 56 October FALKLANDS sity so required and if unnecessary dam soldier prisoner without incident, and the age to the dwellings was avoided. How other two followed suit." ever, the Argentine commander went The British searched their prisoners to much farther and ordered his men to kill determine whether they might still be any Falklander who resisted the occupa armed. American soldiers are taught to tion of his house. If the use of the houses search. silence, segregate, safeguard and was a military necessity, occupation could speed prisoners to the rear, Such treat be accomplished with force but without ment is perfectly acceptable under the law killing anyone.'" of war. It appears, however, that some As the fighting moved toward Stanley, British soldiers went too far in this proc an Argentine soldier, identified only as ess and removed heavy overcoats from Juan Carios, gave up his weapon and was their prisoners. The explanation given for employed temporarily as a stretcher this treatment was that the coats would bearer. He and his fellow soldiers were be returned at night when the weather engaged in removing the wounded from was much colder. The theory was that. if the battlefield, but they did not wear the the coats were not taken during the day, armband with the Red Cross on it. the prisoners would freeze when the Whether medical personnel or those tem weather got colder during the night. At porarily performing medical duties wear least some prisoners claimed that their the armband is a decision for the com coats were never returned.'" mander to make. Rut, if the Red Cross is The law permits the taking of military not worn and medical personnel are in property from prisoners but not personal jured because of an inability to identify items or items that are issued for personal them on the field, no violation of the law protection, such as overcoats, protective of war occurs. Carlos was not injured al masks or helmets, at least for as long as though artillery shells were exploding all conditions require the prisoners to keep about him. Artillery is notoriously in these items. Once safely to the rear where discriminate when it comes to identifying these protective items are no longer re the Red Cross worn on an armband, but quired, they can be taken." there were no incidents of British soldiers Prior to the fall of Stanley. some Argen firing on the Red Cross when it was dis tine prisoners were housed in a shed near played and no incidents of firing on Goose Green that was the only suitable medical personnel." place to provide protection from the During the British attempt to take weather. The tents that went down in the Mount Longdon, a group of Argentine sol Atlantic Conueyor were not available. diers spent the night in a concealed There was a fairly large store of Argentine fighting position. The British literally ammunition nearby. British interest was overran their position, one British soldier focused on moving toward Stanley. Ar stepping on top of their overhead cover. gentine interest was focused on a warm, The Argentines were afraid to surrender" dry place to stay but not near their own until one of the three removed his military ammunition. The British could either equipment and handed his weapon to one move the prisoners out of the shelter or of the others. The unarmed soldier left the divert assets from Stanley to move the position with instructions to his fellows to ammunition. The Argentines were given fire on the British if his surrender was the option of moving from the shelter or not accepted. The British took the first moving the ammunition themselves. 1984 57 MILITARY REVIEW Apparently, some engineers volun unavoidable and does not constitute a teered to move the explosives." During violation of the law, but spitting does not the removal, there was an explosion and fall under the heading of humane treat fire. Possibly, the ammunition had been ment. Other prisoners noted peculiar booby trapped:':' A British medic ran into searches. Prior to boarding ships for the the flames and pulled at least two of the return La Argentina, bootlaces and belts Argentine engineers from the fire. One (including private property, not military prison~r could not be reached because of belts) were removed from the prisoners. tbe intensity of the fire. The man was on The law requires that prisoners be per fire. both of his legs were blown off and his mitted to keep their personal property. If abdomen was torn open. The medic, armed the belts and bootlaces were taken as for his own protection, as the Geneva Con some sort of security precaution, that ventions permit, 50 shot the burning might have been permissible. However, Argentine through the head several personal items should have been receipted times." and, if not returned later, the prisoners Other Argentine prisoners later should have been compensated.'" Other thanked the medic for his actions," and than two or three incidents, the British most would regard this as bumane under were generally scrupulous about pro the circumstances. Although an argu tecting personal property. ment could be made that this constituted Conditions aboard ship were better for a violation of the law of war,'" no such the prisoners than they had been in the allegation has been brought t1Y either Falklands. This was especially true in the side,fi O distribution of food which was done effi Once the Argentine soldiers were taken ciently by the British. One prisoner re captive after the fall of Stanley, their called an instance in which the distribu treatment, in the eyes of the prisoners tion of food was left to the Argentines themselves, was regarded as good. One themselves. But the rations were unequal prisoner saw soldiers dismantling an ly distributed, and some went hungry, Argentine Panhard armored vehicle, ap thus prompting the British to return to parently for souvenirs, and he found this doing it themselves." objectionable. The vehicle had become the Despite the language barrier, relation property of the British crown and could be ships between the prisoners and their lawfully removed to Great Britain." How captors were usually good. There was ever, if the vehicle parts were being taken good-natured banter between captors and as souvenirs, there is no violation of the captives. The British even provided law of war as far as Argentina is con Scrabble games to help pass the time. cerned. If such action were an offense Some prisoners believed the British also under British military law as it is under provided something else to help pass the the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the time-they believed their beverages were soldiers responsible could be punished but spiked with a sedative." Whether this is not for a violation of the law of war." true and whether this would constitute a Some prisoners reported being heckled violation of the law of war are interesting by the British after their capture, and questions, The requirement to provide some claimed they were spat upon by humane treatment would not appear to be British soldiers. A certain amount of violated by such a practice as long as it heckling on the part of the victors may be was not injurious to health.'" 58 OctDber FALKLANDS field exercises should be areas of com lessons learned mand concern. Operations plans. whether in training or for contingency operations. should be reviewed by judge advocates to From a law of war standpoint. the ensure that these issues are properly ad Falklands War teaches three things. The dressed. principles regarding the proper conduct of Finally. the law of war is as much a hostilities are as relevant today as they function of leadersbip as is any other area were during the Boer War. The rules can of the military profession. Troops who are be applied in a modern setting. The rules properly trained and properly led have no are not relics of a past era when warfare difficulty in applying the law of war. Prop was somehow more chivalrous and sports· er respect for the law did not interfere manlike than it can be today. but the law with the mission in the Falklands. The of war applies equally well today. British retook the i'slands. and the Argen The violations that did occur point up tines fought back but without resort to the need for training in those areas. Both any significant. large-scale violations of academic instruction and careful atten the law. Proper training supported by tion to the requirement for realistic train good leadership in the field will help en ing in the law of armed conflict during surp an honorably fought campaign.OJ NOTES 1 The dl.llhuf 5 PIE'''IOuo;, (j'SCu';,,'On 01 !hp IZlll ot wiJJ as It ",a~ 271 Treat,es Governmq I and waflVtfJ Department of the Arm~ rlDpltod ,n the Secan,j Boer War appe;3.rf'l;1 on C3p!aln WI Robert D Was.h,nqton DC Oecernber 1956 p 36 H!I]qll'ltlOlhJrn, Ca::.eSluQIO& If) trlt' Law 01 l,lnd Warfare M,IIrlJfl' 15 Gcneva COl'lvent(on RnlatJve 10 Ole Tredtment 0' Ptlsonel~ Re~,el'w Jdnuary 198,1 PO 58 65 at Wa' 12 Augusl 1949 6 US Troat!ot. dnd Other Inl~fnahull,)l '1 The Falkland., War .... a.s over ,n Junp 1982 A half dOlpn or so Agreements (UST) 3316 Treal!e~ anti Other International Acts boo~s 1".')"1) ~,n(.a a.ppeilr~d on Itw ',ubj€,(,.I!Jt;allng (.o!)y"ght Dale'> mAS, Number 3364 71) Untle-d Not,ons tUN} Treaty 801,,% tUNTS) Of 1982 or 1983 135- DA Pamphlet 271 {real,er. Governlflg tan" War/are Oil C,' j Jon'll at!.n F gh! lor the Fdlkla"o~' Sf Marfm <, Prt)5S Inc For complete olat,ol1t. 10 {he other Geneva COnventlon~ s.ee nole'J NY 1982 P 32 .25 29 and 38 <1 ThC' fll 1984 59 MILITARY REVIEW wrock Such crewmen must be rescued, If feasible tactically and con tams some Intervl(!ws ttlat Indica\{) Gurkha fighters were gUIlty there IS no resistance, or they must be left alone See "Geneva Con of Violations 01 the law dunnO the campaIgn The interViews ventlOn for the Amehorallon of the Condition of Ihe Wounded, Sick themselves Indicate Argentine soldiers woro repeating rumors and Shipwrecked Members 01 tho Armed Forces al Sea, 12 August springing from the reputation of the Gurkhas as herce soldiers 1949," 6 UST 3217 liAS Number 3363, 75 UNTS 85, DA Pamphlet Also s(w the annox to "Hague ConventlOn Number IV, 18 October 27-1, TreatIes Governing Land Warfare, op CIt 1907, EmbodYif1g the Regulations Respecllng the Laws and 30 See Haslmgs ana JonklnS,op Cit. "War In Ihe Falklands The Customs of War on Land,"' Statute 2277, T8 Number 539, DA Pam Full Story," op CIt, McGowan and Hands op Cit, Bishop and phlol 271, TW.JflOs Governing Ulna Warfaro, op Cit, Article 52 Witherow,op Cit, and "Geneva ConventIOn for Ihe AmoliorilllDn 01 wtt.ch pormlts reqUISitioning, and FM 27-10, The Law of Land War the Condllton of lhe Wounded, SIC,"" and Shipwrecked Members 01 fare on Clf, paragraph 417 which lImits coercive measures to the Ihe Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 19<19" op Cit amount and kind necessary to secure the property requIsitioned 31 Fo~. op CIt, P XIII Ibid, paragraph 407, permlls tho reqUisitIOning of Immovable prop 32 "War In Ihe F-alklands Tile Full Story," op Cit, P 243 erty and the FM Itse\! (S conSidered a statement of customary taw 33 Fox,op Cit, P 186 Also see Byron Farwell, The Gurkhas, W W NOrian & Co, NY, 34 FM 27 10, The Law of Lana W;]rfare ,op Cit, paragraph 458 1984, for an excellent history of these soldiers These allegations 'The hOisting 01 a white l1ag has flO other Signification In lnterna arc not substantiated Iionallaw (exceptio Hidlcale a de~lIre to commUnicate) 11 hOisted 49 Kon,op Cit, P 119, and "Geneva Convention for ttte Amellora· In actIOn by an 'ndiVidual soldlOr or iJ small party 1\ may Signify tton of the Conullton of the Wounded and Sick Armed Forces In the merely Ihe surrender of that soldier or party It IS essenltal, Field, 12 August 1949,' op ell, Artlc!e 39, refers to the Red Cross therefore to determine '.';llh reasonable cpr!;1lnly thaI the flag IS armbanu shown by -actual authortty of the eroemy commander bel ore baSing 50 'War In the Falklands,' op Cit, P 127 Important action on the assumptIon' CommQ oulmto the open to 51 Kon,op Cit, pp 156 58 accept a "surrender would certainly Qualdy as Important 52 Ibid action" 53 Geneva Convontlon RelaUve to the Trealment of Prisoners 35 Laflin, op cil p 105, and McGowan and Hands. op Cit, P of War, 12 August 1949," op CII, Article 18 "8 54 IOld, Arhcle 52, forbids thc u::;c of prisoners of war for 36 'Geneva Convention Relative 10 the Treatment of Pnsoners dangerous or unheatthy labor unless the pflsoner IS a volunteer In 0/ War, 12 August 1949, 'op Cit, Artlclc 13, and "Geneva Conven· a class'c understatement, removing '"mines or Similar devl!::es' Is tlOn RelaUve to the Protection of C,v,l,an Persons In Tune of War, conSidered by the conventIOn 10 be dangerous labor Only If the 12 August 1949, op Cit, Article 33 Argentmes were Yolunteers was emplOYing them 10 removc cx 37 FM 27-10. The Law of Lana Warfare. op clf, paragraph 497d plosives lawful 38 . Geneva ConventIOn RelatIVe to the TreCltment of Pflsoners 55 McGowan and Hands, op Cit, P 255 01 War, 12 AuguS11949: op CII, Article 132,' Geneva Convention 56 "Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment 01 Pnsoners for the AmelIOration 01 tho Condition of the Wounded Sick, and of War, 12 August 1949," op Cit, Article 22 Shipwrecked Members 01 Ihe Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 57 'War m tho Falklands Tho full Slory:' op Cit, P 246 1949 op CII, Article 52 Geneva ConventIOn Relative to the Pro· 58 McGowan and Hands, op cll, pp 246 and 257 tecllon of C,VIlian Persons If1 Time 01 War, 12 August 1949: op CII 59 Too ready an acceptancG of such an exception In the treat ArlLcle 149, and' Geneva Convontlon for the AmelloratlOn of the mel1! of prlsoners-shootmg them "to put them out of Ihelr Condition of Wounded and Sick Armed Forces In the Field 12 mIsery '-Gould eaSily be abused August 1949," 6 UST 3114 TIAS Number 3362, 75 UNTS31, DA Pam 60 "War In the Falklands The Fult Slory:' op Cit, and Fox op phlet 27-1 Trealles Governing Land Warfare, op CII Article 53 clf, pp4 and 126 39 For a general dISCUSSion of repnsal, see FM 2710, The Law of 61 Annex to 'Hague Convention Number IV, 18 October 1907, Land Warfare, op cll, para9raph 497 Embodying the Regulations Rospoctmg the laws and Customs of 40 "War In the Falklands The rull Story, ' op CII War on Land," op, clf, Article 53 41 Hastmgs and JenkinS, op CII. D 253 62 Under Ihe Urn/orm Code of Mllilary Justice, ArtiCle 103 pro 42 Laffin, op Cit. DP 108 10 hlblls US soldiers from converlmg captured enemy property to per 43 "War In the Falklands The Full Story:' op Cit, DD 233 34 sonal i.Jse or dlsposmg of the property for personal gam 44 'War If1 the Falklands," op cll, P 90 63 "Geneya Convenllon Relative to the Treatment of Pnsoners 45 McGowan and Hands, op cil. p 159 of War 12 August 1949," op CII, Art1cle 18 and FM 27 10, The Law 46 Lafhn op Cit, P 112, and Fox, op Cit, P 198 of Land Warfare, op Cit, paragraph 94 47 'Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Clvdl3n 64 Kon, op efl, pp 84·85 Persons In TIme of War, HI August '949," op clf, Article 27, pro 65 Ibid, pp 107-8 and 173 Vides for humane treatment which '.';ould Include sufficient water, 66 "'Geneva Convention RelatIVe to the Treatment of Prisoners food and access 10 sanitary facliitles, and Ibid, Article 33, forbids 01 War, 12 August 1949," op. CIt, Articles 22 and 26 pillage 67 Department of Defense DHecllve 510077, DOD raw 01 War 48 Damel Kon, Lo~ Chlco~ de fa Guerra (The Boys of Ihe War), Program, Department of Defense, Washmgton DC, 10 July 1979 Dunton Green, New Enghsh L1brary. Eng, 1983, pp 84·85 ThiS book Major Robert D. Higginbotham is the com mand judge advocate, 56th Field Artillery Brigade (Pershing), Schwabisch-Gmund, West Germany_ He received a B.A. from David Lipscomb College and a E.J_ and a J.D. from the University of Missouri and is a 1980 graduate of the USACGSC Assignments include serving with the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, US Army Infantry Center, Port Benning, Georgia, with duty as the legal instructor, US Army In fantry School His article "Case Studies in the Law of Land Warfare" appeared in the January 1983 Military Review. 60 October 1 Staff’s Role Major Kenneth Currie, US Air Force In recent years, changes have been made within the Soviet military organization. In this article, Kenneth examines those changes as they relate to the Soviet General Staff and the implications for the future. The expressed tn thrs article those of Stalin’s dictatorship, to be sure, the ex the author and do purport reflect the plication of military doctrine was the sole of Department of the Army, the Depart ment of Defense any other government office prerogative of the party inasmuch or agency.-Editor. Stalin, who personified the party, was the sole articulator of that doctrine-a situa tion that stifled its meaningful develop ESTERN students of Soviet mili The sudden burst of debate over a tary affairs usually repeat Soviet new Soviet military doctrine that followed assertions that the Communist Party de Stalin’s death in 1953 stands as stark termines the country’s military doctrine.’ testimony to the stultifying impact of the Although that view is certainly justified former dictator. in nominal terms, this article argues that, Nikita S. Khrushchev, in turn, also at in operational terms, the view that the tempted to place his personal stamp upon formation of Soviet military doctrine re Soviet military doctrine as demonstrated mains solely within the purview of the by his speech at the January 1960 meet party is mistaken. During Joseph V. ing of the Supreme Khrushchev’s from Problems of March-April 1984. 1984 61 MILITARY REVIEW innovations were resisted by then De no evidence of attempts by the party fense Minister T. Malinovsky and leadership to tinker with force structure a number of disaffected senior military of decisions as Khrushchev tried to do dur ficers. A downturn in Soviet-US relations ing his final years in power. Indeed, cur over the next two years also compelled rent Chief of Staff Nikolay V. Ogarkov’s the Soviet leader to shelve many of his reported role in the Strategic Arms proposals. Nevertheless, Khrushchev was Limitation Talks (SALT) I negotiations is able to carry through his plan to disestab indicative of the close hold with which the lish the ground forces as a separate serv military treats information on Soviet ice arm. But this decision was overturned weapons systems. IL is also indicative of the year after his departure by a new the general parochialism of the Soviet leadership seeking to demonstrate its military leadership and of its keen desire commitment to satisfying the needs of to protect what feels to be its the military. making Since Khrushchev’s ouster, there has In neglecting this record, the been very little evidence of overt at wisdom in this area is misleading. tempts by the party leadership to estab For example, Harriet F. Scott and William lish new directions in Soviet military doc F. Scott, in their standard reference work trine. Rather, what has occurred has been on the subject, see the third stage of a ratification by the party leadership of Soviet military doctrine as extending the precepts of the new doctrine spelled from January is, from Khrush out by military spokesmen in the early chev’s speech-to the present.” In fact, 1960s. This ratification has taken the the doctrine extant today is form of public statements on the need to only to the extent of its partial maintain a strong defense and of internal reliance upon nuclear weapons and ballis party decisions to increase allocations to tic missiles. The former leader’s de-em the military sector of the national phasis of a surface navy, manned economy. The latter trend is apparent in bombers and mass armies has been total the across-the-board expansion of mili ly swept aside in favor of a strong em tary capabilities that prevailed under phasis on combined arms warfare-war Lconid I. Brezhnev and clearly continues fare using all of the nation’s armed forces today, financed by a defense budget that in whatever weapons regime is dictated continues to grow (albeit at perhaps a by circumstances, whether conventional somewhat slower The party leader or nuclear. As a party leader meddling in ship has been content to make very military doctrine, Khrushchev was the general pronouncements on what the last of a line. Moreover, the doctrine he Soviets call the “political content” of propounded was itself an uncomfortable their military doctrine-assertions about aberration in the Soviet pattern. its “defensive nature” and warnings It is more correct to see the beginnings about the destructiveness of nuclear war. of contemporary doctrine in the “Special The military leadership, for its part, ap Collection” cited by Oleg and pears to have been given a relatively free given public form by Malinovsky in his hand in the development of the speech to the Party Congress that technical” aspect of doctrine which fo met in October 1961. Malinovsky argued cuses upon the deployment and combat that victory could be achieved only employment of military forces. There is through the “joint action of all services of 62 October SOVIET GENERAL STAFF the Armed Forces.“’ This combined arms the doctrine work. This is not to deny the doctrine, with its stress upon a nuclear enhanced competence of certain party war-fighting capability, continues to be leaders to make decisions on national de given expression and definition by Soviet fense issues through such bodies as the military writers and spokesmen from Defense Council and the Politburo. Ulti Marshal Vasili D. Sokolovsky to mate authority on security matters con kov. It has not been the subject of de tinues to reside within these organs. Still, tailed public statements by the party not even the most knowledgeable Polit leadership which appears willing buro member-whose concerns must ex this critical area to the theoreticians of tend beyond the military sphere to in the Soviet High Command. No party leader clude vital domestic issues as well-can has publicly challenged the necessity of compete with the depth and detail of being prepared to wage nuclear war knowledge possessed by a military leader although many have decried its destruc like Ogarkov, In the absence of a con tiveness. Party and military leaders alike scious party effort to alter this situation, view a future world war as likely to be the disparity is likely to grow as the mili and agree on the necessity of tary command becomes master of increas dealing any “aggressor” a “decisive re ingly complex weapons technology. buff.” The military may not enjoy a total In other words, the party leadership monopoly on military knowledge, but it has lately commented only upon the pure does occupy a position of unchallenged ly political aspect of Soviet military doc pre-eminence. As a result, while the party trine and only in very general terms at may provide a skeleton for Soviet mili that, The military, for its part, has also tary doctrine, it is the military itself that undertaken to comment upon the political provides the organs and the flesh which component of doctrine, usually referring give this doctrine life. to the need to consider the The military’s dominant role in the for political situation.” There is no clear wall mulation of Soviet military doctrine separating this political component from should not. of course, be taken to imply the military-technical component as far that the Soviet High Command has as the military leadership is concerned. It usurped party prerogatives or achieved does not feel constrained from comment independence from the party. Rather, the ing upon the former aspect, even if the party leadership appears content with party apparently does feel constrained this division of labor. It certainly cannot from elaborating upon the latter. Indeed, offer any meaningful alternative: there is commentary upon the military-technical no influential clique of civilian military side of Soviet military doctrine has been theoreticians (as there is in the West) to the exclusive province of the military. challenge the military’s expertise. From And, as the concede, it is that side the party leadership’s perspective, this of military doctrine which “best explains arrangement should not constitute Soviet moves in the international grounds for alarm, for the party must If the military is the primary elaborator place its imprimatur on what the military of the details of Soviet military doctrine, proposes and make the final decisions this is mainly because its leadership con about whether the nation goes to war. tinues to possess a near monopoly on the This issue of Soviet military autonomy information and skills necessary to make is crucial, for it could raise fundamental 1964 63 MILITARY REVIEW Military Decisionmaking on Doctrine ’ Once the Soviet military has been iden tified as the chief elaborator of military doctrine, one must establish the locus of doctrinal thinking within the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Defense. There is only one organ with the organization and resources necessary to tackle the complex task of developing, refining and improv ing Soviet military doctrine and military science-the Soviet General Staff. Western literature on the Soviet military usually tends to gloss over the role of the General Staff. The focus of such writings is usually upon the Defense Council and the Ministry of Defense, with questions about Soviet foreign policy the General Staff treated as but one goals and means for achieving them. A organ-although an important organ-of hypothetical Soviet polity dominated by the latter. Even in Western studies of the a military leadership-especially one that Soviet command and control system, rela has let it be known that it believes victory tively little attention is devoted to the crit in nuclear war to be “objectively” ical role of the General Staff. The com not a comforting prospect. But mand and control nets are treated as if has the military, in fact, attained auton they were independent entities rather omy? If that condition is defined as com than the nervous system connecting the plete freedom to pursue organizational forces in the field to the General goals independently of other actors in the This analysis, instead, emphasizes the system, then the Soviet military clearly preeminent role of the General Staff with has not achieved autonomy, nor is it ever respect the other organs of the Soviet likely to do so.” Ministry of Defense. The powers of the However, if autonomy is viewed as a General Staff far exceed those of the US continuum on which organizations can Joint Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, the closest achieve greater or lesser freedom of ac analogue to the Soviet General Staff is tion in the conduct of affairs related to probably the German General Staff up to areas of responsibility or expertise, the end of World War II. it becomes much easier to view the Soviet Soviet descriptions of the General Staff military’s involvement in doctrinal issues leave little doubt as to its central role in as a measure of increased autonomy in at the formulation of Soviet strategy, in least that aspect of Soviet defense policy- cluding the military-technical component making. Autonomy by this definition of the country’s military doctrine. One does not necessarily entail a threat to Soviet officer characterizes that compo system stability as long as the party re nent as concerned with: tains ultimate political authority. . . questions of organization, training, 64 October SOVIET GENERAL STAFF and employment of the armed forces in war, the major trends for combat employment. the technical equip ping, and the organizational structure of the armed forces; the development of mili tary art, and the requirements for the combat training of troops and their com bat “This aspect of military doctrine,” con tinues the author, “is much more dynamic when compared with its political aspect” -and it is. by other Soviet accounts, determined primarily by the General Staff. For example, Marshal Viktor kov. chief of the General Staff from 1971 to 1977, described that organ (borrowing the title of Marshal Boris M. kov’s monumental as the “brain of the army” which “directs the develop ment of theory [and] solves current the other organs of the ministry: problems of Soviet military science.” The General Staff coordinates the ac Kulikov then recited a list of tasks that tivities of the of the Armed go a bit beyond the previously stated Forces, the Rear, Civil Defense of the with just the military-technical com USSR, and the main and central direc ponent of doctrine: torates of the Ministry of The General Staff comprehensively This be compared with analyzes and the developing kov’s description of the General Staff military-political situation. determines that appeared in the 1975 Soviet Military the trends in the development of the Encyclopedia: means of waging war and the methods of In the postwar years the General Staff their application, organizes the training . . ensures the coordination of the of the Armed Forces, and ensures their ties of the main staffs of the services of high combat readiness to repel any the Armed Forces, the staff of the Rear Services, the staff of Civil Defense of the A more recent and more subtle indica USSR, and the main and central director I tion of the General Staff’s increased im ates of the Ministry of Defense.‘? portance can be found in the new Military In this description, the General Staff Encyclopedic Dictionary published by merely ensures the coordination of the the Ministrv of Defense whose editorial staffs of the Defense Ministry’s organs. commission was chaired by Chief of the Ogarkov’s 1983 account, by contrast, General Staff Ogarkov. The relevant en argues that the General Staff directly try notes the “enhanced” role of the coordinates the activities of the organs General Staff in the postwar years in en themselves, not just the activities of their suring the country’s “reliable defense.” staffs. This change cannot be explained More significantly, the dictionary notes merely as an omission for the sake of the expanded role of the General Staff brevity, for it clearly suggests an 1984 65 MILITARY REVIEW panded role for the General Staff. draft of the Minisler’s instructions, Indeed, the General Staff now seems to orders, or dispositions before it is signed be the executant of the defense minister’s by the Minister himself.” Ogarkov, ac formal authority within his ministry. Ac cording to this account, must also ap cording to a 1978 history of the Soviet prove the drafts of all 14 deputy armed forces, the defense minister ministers of defense before they are sent “directs” those forces forward to Ustinov. This assures through the General Staff and the main kov’s “prior knowledge of all the impor and central Since the tant matters presented to the Minister of General Staff coordinates the activities of Defense.“” those directorates, it appears to exercise All of this, of course, does not mean considerable authority on behalf of De that Ogarkov has acquired more political fense Minister Ustinov. In a power than Ustinov or usurped his posi similar vein, Soviet listings of the tion as top Soviet military spokesman. Defense Ministry’s organs always place Ustinov is clearly Ogarkov’s superior in the General Staff in first position-ahead, both the political and military hierarchies. for example, of the Main Political Admin And, as a full member of the Politburo istration, led by General Aleksey A. and former longtime overseer of defense Yepishev. which enjoys the authority of a industry, Ustinov wields more real power department of the Communist Party of in the Soviet party and state. (For exam the Soviet Union Central Committee.‘” ple, he apparently was a central player in While the latter fulfills the important the 1982 accession of Yuri task of political indoctrination of Soviet although his role in Konstantin U. troops, its role in the broader operational nenko’s subsequent rise to power is less control of the forces can safely be clear.) Nevertheless, on military doctrine described as minimal at best. In short, and related matters, Ogarkov’s profes there is no institution within the Ministry sional competence may well give him a of Defense (other than the minister him decisive voice. self) that exercises greater authority than Since 1977, significantly, the chief of does the General Staff. the General Staff has been second only to In his capacity as chief of that staff, the minister of defense in protocol rank then, Ogarkov functions as Ustinov’s sec ings. This alters a longstanding tradition ond in command. The former, according in which the commander of the Warsaw to Michael Sadykiewicz, actually “dep Pact forces stood in second position. It utizes for the Minister of Defense in his reflects not only Ogarkov’s personal com As the individual responsible petence bst also the greatly enhanced in for coordinating the activities of all stitutional position of the General Staff organs of the ministry, with more opera as well. tional experience and knowledge than the The strong influence of the General management-oriented Ustinov, Ogarkov Staff is perhaps best exemplified in is probably the best informed member of control (specifically SALT I) negotia the defense hierarchy. Sadykiewicz tions. Most students of Soviet military asserts-not implausibly, given Ogarkov’s affairs concede a significant role to the responsibility to keep on top of all mat Soviet General Staff in the preparation ters within the ministry-that the chief of and defense of substantive Soviet posi the General Staff must countersign “each tions presented during those 66 October SOVIET GENERAL STAFF Because the staff plays a key role in Soviet weapons procurement, military planning and strategic intelligence assessment, it is in a unique position to defend the interests of the Soviet military on arms-control issues. Ogarkov himself was the senior Soviet military delegate to SALT I (at a time when he was also serving as a first deputy chief of the General Staff). and the Soviet military delegation as a whole largely re flected the influence of the General Staff. In turn, the heavy representation on that staff of officers with strong operational backgrounds ensures that any control decisions will take into account their desire to field the forces necessary for some future war. And, in fact, the limitations on Soviet strategic weapons imposed by the SALT agreements appear developing targeting and war plans and to have had little, if any, impact upon with helping to formulate general Soviet weapons military policy. Some Western analysts, for instance, argue that the GOU oversaw the Soviet invasion of Czechoslo General Staff Structure vakia-an assertion which is entirely plausible, given the directorate’s re sponsibilities for operational military The General Staff consists of a number of directorates and departments orga As for broader doctrinal responsibili nized along functional The most ties, it is logical that the directorate with important of the General Staff’s far-reaching planning and control respon gans is the Main Operations Directorate, sibilities within the Ministry of Defense or Operativnoye would also have a key role to play in defin This directorate is probably ing the military-technical aspects of doc headed by First Deputy Chief of the Gen trine. Thus, the is probably the cen eral Staff Army General V. I. tral player within the General Staff in the kov. According to one of his predecessors, formulation of the specific force struc Army General S. M. Shtemenko. during ture-related details of contemporary World War II. the GOU was responsible Soviet military doctrine. For example, the for planning all operations, collecting and center of General Staff activity on SALT analyzing information on the battle situa I appears to have been the Arms Control tion at the various fronts and checking Section (or Department) of the the fulfillment of the orders and direc One Western expert claims that the direc tives of the Supreme High torate played a major role in drafting More recent accounts suggest that this “substantive parameters for SALT and directorate is now also concerned with other arms control 67 MILITARY REVIEW not consistent with this function, sug gesting its subordination to a larger body responsible for international negotiations within the General Staff. If that larger body exists, and if it is indeed headed by Akhromeyev (the only first deputy chief of the General Staff to hold marshal’s rank). it reinforces the indications of a major role for the General Staff in arms control and other international issues related to Soviet military Perhaps the most direct aspect of the General Staff’s involvement in the forma tion of Soviet military doctrine, though, is its responsibility for developing Soviet military science-the study of the phe nomena of armed combat in order to determine the means for achieving vic tory in war. Soviet military spokesmen The arms-control organization within state unequivocally that military science the General Staff appears to have under interacts with doctrine. According to one gone some changes over the past several influential Soviet military volume: years. First Deputy Chief of the General On its military technical side it (doc Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. trine] relies on conclusions and recom Akhromeyev emerged as a major military mendations ‘selected’ by military science. spokesman on arms-control issues after In turn, doctrine evolved on the basis of assuming that position in Before military scientific data has a tremendous that, Akhromeyev was reportedly chief of organizing and mobilizing effect on the the GOU where he may have overseen the development of the Armed Forces and all activities of the Arms-Control Section. military affairs. His continued statements on arms con trol indicate that he may now be in charge History shows that military of a separate directorate within the becomes more scientifically objec General Staff which is responsible for in tive and, therefore, more the greater ternational negotiations. its reliance on the evaluations The existence of such a directorate and conclusions of military would be consistent with the Soviet em Within the General Staff, there are two phasis on arms control despite the twists organs principally responsible for the and turns in Soviet-US relations over the development of Soviet military science al years. Its existence is also suggested by though all staff directorates and depart the presence of a Legal and Treaty De ments are theoretically responsible for partment, headed by General Nikolay F. contributing to its growth. The two prin Chervov, within the General Staff. cipal organs are the Military Science Di has been a frequent commentator on rectorate and the Voroshilov General intermediate-range nuclear force Staff Academy. Other military academies However, the title of his department is (particularly the Frunze Academy) also 68 October SOVIET GENERAL STAFF play a role in developing military science, and the General Staff coordinates their involvement in this area through the various services and through the Defense Ministry’s Main Directorate for Military Educational Institutions. The Voroshilov Academy. according to it official history, had, as of 1976. more than 150 scientists engaged in the preparation of textbooks and training manuals and in the “elaboration of the major problems of military science and the art of The academy spon sors military scientific conferences deal ing with a variety of issues, conducts war games and disseminates the of its studies throughout the armed forces. The most immediate benefits of such research are, of course, passed on to current students at the academy-senior field sponsors military scientific conferences grade officers destined to hold high-level and a variety of relevant publications, operational commands. probably including the restricted journal According to Kulikov, the focus of the of the General Staff, Voyennaya academy’s military scientific endeavors Military Thought). during the period 1965-76 included the Still, other key concerns of the “elaboration of theory” on the “organiza technical component of Soviet military tional development” and doctrine involve the organizational struc strategic employment” of the armed ture best suited for effectively pros forces, the examination of the “problem ecuting a war and the manpower neces of troop control“ and the analysis of the sary to flesh out that structure prior to “postwar development of military affairs, the onset of hostilities. Such tasks are the taking into account the experience of the responsibilities of the Main local wars of When such Mobilization Directorate-the third Gen statements are matched with the military eral Staff directorate whose activities in reorganization that has reportedly taken teract with evolving Soviet military doc place in recent and with the quali trine in a major way. As is the case with tative improvements in Soviet command the other organs of the General Staff, and control they suggest the relatively little is known about this direc scope of the academy’s efforts to perfect torate. However, Sokolovsky has given and apply Soviet military science. an indication of the scope of some of its The Military Science Directorate likely functions: portedly oversaw the publication of the The General Staff determines the time famous Special Collection of documents required to develop a comprehensive that led to the development of the revised mobilization plan and gives dispatching Soviet military doctrine of the data to the military This directorate, established in 1959. troops, and military registration and 1994 69 MILITARY REVIEW for keeping track of the forces at the fronts.” Consequently, the GLA VUPRAFORM suffered a loss of power, although it tem porarily maintained an Organization and Personnel Department. Despite these changes, there remained a number of structural redundancies until May 1943 when the GLAVZJPRAFORM was dis banded and all of its functions were trans ferred to the General The officers of the newly recreated Organization De partment worked closely with the opera tions officers-of whom Shtemenko was chief-and the information they provided was crucial to the planning of future operations. According to Shtemenko: They could always answer one’s ques tions as to the sire of any division on any listment offices only after sector of the front, its losses, and the time has made its decisions concerning the it would take to get new troops. And they scope of the mobilized Armed Forces and could provide similar data on any corps, the rate of of natural army, front, for the Armed Forces as a whole. About they knew exact Shtemenko, too, provides some insight ly where, how, end in what strength they into the responsibilities of this director being formed, their degree of combat ate. He notes the numerous organiza readiness, the locations en route to the tional changes made necessary by the front, etc. The hard-working organization course of combat and the arrival of new officers were the right hand of the opera weapons and personnel in 1943, and he tions officers.” argues that such changes “could not be Under contemporary conditions, when decided apart from the General Staff.” the Soviets stress the need for preparing Unfortunately, there was an overlap be for war ahead of time in order to avoid a tween the General Staff and the Main Di repeat of the disaster of June 1941. the rectorate for the Formation and Staffing importance of the Main of the Troops of the Red Army, or the Mobilization Directorate has probably GLA VUPRAFORM, created as an entity grown apace. The directorate must keep directly subordinate to the (the track of increasingly complex formations, supreme Soviet military-civilian strategic compute losses in the fog of war and staff during World War II) in 1941. The satisfy projected manpower needs in the exigencies of combat, however, eventual midst of intensive, possibly nuclear, com ly made it necessary to revive the Orga bat conditions. It must also keep tabs on nization Department within the General the multimillion-man reserve force and be Staff, with responsibility for “drafting or prepared to draw these individuals back ganizational and other directives, for into the active armed forces at virtually a follow-up on their implementation, and moment’s notice. In sum, the Main 70 October SOVIET GENERAL STAFF nization-Mobilization Directorate has a vital role to play-in combination with the other General Staff organs previously described in preparing for some future The General Staff and the Defense Council Whether the chief of the General Staff is also a member of the Defense the especially secretive high-level body that presumably has ultimate authority over Soviet strategy-continues to be a source of contention. Sadykiewicz, along with a number of other scholars and analysts, asserts that there are no mili tary representatives on the council, not more military members on the Defense withstanding Ogarkov’s vast responsi Council than on the Politburo. Since there bilities within the Ministry of Defense. is only one ‘military” member of the (Ustinov is not included in the category of Politburo-Ustinov-there must be other military members since he is not a profes members of the High Command on the sional military officer.) Rut Ogarkov Defense Council if the source is correct. probably is called on frequently to attend The logical candidates are the first dep Defense Council meetings, given his keen uty ministers of defense. Their member grasp of the relevant issues. Therefore, ship can also be inferred from scattered even if he is not a formal member, his references to them as leading military and viewpoint undoubtedly carries great “state” figures-a formula implying their weight. Indeed, Sadykiewicz claims that membership in a formal state body, prob Ogarkov’s “opinion may have crucial in ably the Defense fluence on the resolutions and decisions” A third argument focuses on staff sup of the Defense Council because he is the port for the Defense Council regardless of “principal representative of the strategic whether Ogarkov is a member. There is interests of the Ministry of Defense, and no evidence that the council is supported often of the entire body of the Soviet by its own staff agency or secretariat. armed This tends to confirm the lack of a role for Another viewpoint suggesting that the the Defense Council in the day-today chief of the General Staff exercises great leadership of the armed forces. Instead, influence on the Defense Council argues such leadership devolves upon the Minis that Ogarkov-along with the other first try of Defense and its executive agent, deputy ministers of defense-is actually a the General Staff. The Defense Council full member of that body. The best may, therefore, depend upon the General evidence for this comes from a Soviet Staff for necessary staff support func scholar who asserted that there were tions. If true. this clearly puts the 1984 71 MILITARY REVIEW Staff in a position to set the agenda gave after his forces shot down a Korean and formulate the options to be discussed Airlines passenger plane in September at the council’s meetings.“” All three of the preceding arguments On a larger scale, the prerequisites of a would probably agree on one point: the superpower status based almost wholly General Staff-through its influence on upon military power could compel the the Defense Council, direct or indirect-is party leadership to accord the military in a good position to shape not only the ever greater autonomy in military military-technical dimension but also the As long as military strength political dimension of Soviet military doc mains the in Soviet trine. The intense involvement of the perceptions of national power and pres General Staff in such matters as arms tige, the military will have a strong, even control makes that body indispensable to determinate, say in the formulation of the Defense Council. And it is very prob Soviet military doctrine. And as long as ably the Defense Council, according to this doctrine dictates that the entire one Western expert, that “approves system must prepare itself in peacetime doctrinal and strategic formulations.“‘” for the contingency of global nuclear war, In performing that task, the council ap it is the General Staff that will continue pears to depend heavily upon the General to enjoy the decisive role in explicating Staff and its agencies for the vital infor Soviet strategy. Thus-barring an unfore mation on Soviet forces and capabilities seen radical shift in Soviet perceptions of necessary to make decisions consistent the utility of military power as an instru with Soviet national interests. ment of foreign policy-the influence of the General Staff within the Ministry of Defense will very likely remain great. Implications for the Future These factors augur well for the Soviet professional military leadership in the coming years. At the same time, they The General Staff’s reach now extends could pose a problem for the party leader throughout the Soviet Ministry of De ship. The pre-eminence of the General fense. Nearly all high-level commanders Staff under Ogarkov-its probable over are graduates of the Voroshilov General sight of virtually every activity of the Staff Academy, and their careers appear Ministry of Defense and its influence at to be regulated as much by the General the highest levels of military Staff Personnel Directorate as by the making in the USSR-may produce the Main Personnel Directorate of the elitist, exclusivist mind-set about which, Ministry of Defense. This officer corps Roman Kolkowicz argues, the party must possesses greatly enhanced technical at some point become This is competence compared to its predeces not to say that the party is already cast sors’. It is also an officer corps which is ing wary glances over its shoulder for the increasingly confident of the capabilities “man on the white horse.” Nevertheless, of its forces and the perspicacity of its by surrendering certain prerogatives to strategy despite its current problems in military leadership, the party is creating Afghanistan. himself, of course, the conditions for ever greater military in typifies this self-assurance-as displayed volvement in policymaking. Or there may in the highly unusual press conference he even be (should the party be beset by an 72 SOVIET GENERAL acute internal or external crisis) military ly, he will continue to boost the status of intervention to preserve the Soviet state that body and use it as one of his primary and the High Command’s prerogatives instruments of power. within it. The party gives no indication of Altogether, to paraphrase Alfred G. concern about this problem. however. it is not too difficult to envisage Such speculation aside, what is the like a situation in which the entire Ministry of ly near-term future of the General Staff? Defense functions, in essence, as a Gen Its prestige is likely to be still further en eral Staff “writ large.” The global scale hanced if now appears likely) Ogarkov and complexity of Soviet military opera is selected as the next minister of de tions argue for an effective central com fense-possibly within the coming few mand and control organ, and the General years, considering the age of Ustinov. Staff under Ogarkov has performed that Given Ogarkov’s solid background in role admirably. It has dealt effectively operational and technical matters, his with all sorts of crucial matters from established stature as a strategic arms control to military assistance and thinker”” and his clear-cut position as sec from nuclear targeting to esoteric mili ond in command of the ministry, he tary science. It is quite clearly the center emerges as the obvious choice for the of activity within the Ministry of defense portfolio. In this context, it is per Defense. Beyond that, the Soviet General haps significant that it was Ogarkov Staff may take on the characteristics of rather than Ustinov who identified many such organs in the past. It may nenko as the new head of the Defense come, in the words of another Western Council in early 1984.‘” Although it can observer, to “possess, accumulate, and be argued that Ogarkov. as defense exercise vast-although often minister, might choose to downgrade the power in the social, political, and eco role of the General Staff in order to con nomic of the entire Soviet solidate undisputed authority, more state. NOTES 73 MILITARY REVIEW 7 Major Kenneth US Air Force. has an analyst of affairs with the Defense Intelligence Agency and Head. quarters. US Air Force. He is currently working on his Ph.D. in political studies George Washington. D 74 John M. Weinstein The current national security policy is unquestionably costly and not without risk. But reliance on a policy of flexible response, an obviously credible capability for nuclear retalia tion and the maintenance of balanced forces has kept the peace for almost four decades. HOIJGHTFUL debate about US credibility, their efficacy and their ex nuclear arms policy has intense pense. It is important to remember in this for almost four decades. For most of this debate that the current and planned mod period, and especially in the wake of ernization of the US strategic arsenal is Day After” presentation which assumed intended to stabilize, not destabilize. the the breakdown of deterrence, this debate deterrent balance. has addressed the rationality and moral Despite variations in US declaratory ity of various deterrent strategies, their statements, the basic tenet of US nuclear 1984 75 MILITARY REVIEW policy has remained relatively stable. would represent themselves as the only Since the advent of the nuclear age, deter group opposed to nuclear war, argue that rence has been the cornerstone of US na deterrence will fail eventually due to an tional security policy. The essence of this arms race which is out of control and US deterrent strategy is the maintenance of a doctrine which is unrealistic and danger credible force that presents unacceptable ous. The critics’ arguments, when carried risks to an aggressor contemplating polit to their extreme, demand that we revise ical blackmail or violence at any level our views on the efficacy of strategic de against the United States or our allies. To terrence and seek some alternative guar be credible, our forces must be capable of antor of our national interests. preventing a military outcome favorable Barring capitulation, these arguments to the objectives and interests of any lead to terms that cannot be translated in potential aggressor. Thus, the great to a policy that could diminish the threat paradox of deterrence is that the risk of of conventional aggression or nuclear war. conflict is minimized only by demonstrat This is essentially because there are ing steadfast national resolve and main crucial conditions and flaws in the current taining forces fully prepared and capable structure of world order. These flaws are: of engaging an enemy at any level of con Nuclear weapons exist, cannot be flict. disinvented and likely will continue to ex To this end, successive administrations ist for the foreseeable future. have sought to provide the president with Rivalry and insecurity are perma a range of options at the strategic as well nent features of a world of sovereign as any lower level of conflict to respond to states. the location, scale and scope of any adver Soviet security interests are often at sary’s aggression. These options have not dangerous variance with our own. been developed because we believe that a In this context, the fundamental dilem nuclear war can be limited. Rather, these ma is how the United States can prevent options exist for the purpose of making it one abomination (the militant global ex clear to the Soviets, who have developed pansion of Soviet control) by threatening and deployed massive numbers of to retaliate with another (nuclear destruc strike counterforce weapons and espouse tion). More specifically, why does the a military doctrine designed to support United States continue to improve its limited war options, that no conflict nuclear capability if we conclude that its scenario could result in the attainment of strategic or theater use would be so their political objectives. mously destructive as to surpass limits Critics of US nuclear doctrine. who of proportionality and discrimination? October NUCLEAR STRATEGY Those who pose this question often fail or unique characteristics of to distinguish between means and ends. based ICBMs-that is. secure, real-time The possession of nuclear weapons is not communication which maximizes firing intended to promote war. Their acquisi and targeting flexibility, responsiveness tion and possession in today’s world are and reliability, a short time-to-target meant to deter rather than to fight a capability and accuracy. nuclear war by achieving strategic bal Furthermore, deployment on US terri ance between contending nuclear states. tory raises the stakes greatly for any at If there is one clear conclusion of the tacker by making the credibility of US nuclear strategy debate, it is that a stra retaliation more certain. The deployment tegic balance stabilizes and strengthens of the will do much to redress nuclear deterrence, thereby minimizing the current imbalance of created the likelihood of nuclear war. It is also im by the Soviet Union’s deployment of portant to realize that strategic balance and providing a limited has little meaning when assessed only in modernization of the aging US missile terms of the total numbers of weapons or force and support of US arms-control ini megatonnage. Indeed, there is no direct tiatives hy demonstrating US resolve not relationship between the total number of to permit the Soviet Union to acquire weapons or firepower deployed by a state strategic superiority. and the probability of war. Rather, the In a similar vein, the current deploy key considerations are: ment of the highly survivable The relative balance of power be class submarine and the planned 1989 tween the adversaries. deployment of the missile will Their resolve and perceptions of this strengthen deterrence and crisis stability. balance of power. The new missile, when deployed, will The force structure of their respec partially offset the Soviet Union’s advan tive arsenals. tage in land target kill capability and will The balance of power, then, must be place at risk a wider range of Soviet measured in terms of an intricate net as value hard targets such as missile silos sessment of the total current and pro and command centers. Also, the quietness jected capabilities and vulnerabilities of of the submarine and the long the composite force structures. Thus, im range of the missile (which will proving weapons systems or developing a the submarines to patrol waters under or variety and capabilities, by pro close to US protection) improve the viding added force options or robustness, system’s survivability and thus improve is likely to stabilize the strategic balance. crisis stability. This added stability derives from the added Long-range bombers constitute another credibility that flexible options might pro flexible leg of the strategic Triad. They vide. can be placed on ground or airborne alert The quest for force robustness and sta or launched on warning. They are bility lies at the heart of the president’s unique in that they can be recalled. The strategic modernization program. The de deployment of the BIB bomber and the ployment of the missile and Advanced Technology Bomber (Stealth) the future deployment of a mobile, will give the United States modern warhead intercontinental ballistic missile bombers to replace the aging The (ICBM) are intended to preserve the portion of this modernized force on alert 1984 77 MILITARY REVIEW will be able to survive a Soviet attack and ties, and the search for a more survivable penetrate Soviet air defenses into the next basing mode for the are in century. Finally, a new bomber force will tended, in part, to contribute to the be a more effective and survivable plat robustness of our deterrent posture. form for air-launched cruise missiles. In light of the ominous increases in Finally, the initiative to improve the Soviet strategic capabilities, there is no hardness and redundancy of the nation’s inconsistency in improving nuclear command, control, communications and forces. Most strategic theoreticians who intelligence network ensures that have grappled with this issue agree that more effective control will remain over the following events are destabilizing: our strategic forces and reduces the one-sided disarmament, one-sided escala chance that our adversaries will perceive tion, and targeting plans or weapons nuclear decapitation as an attractive capabilities that allow for or proscribe cer possibility. In concert with the ongoing tain behaviors unilaterally. Thus, at effort to improve the nation’s defenses is tempting to achieve the requirements of the attempt to constrain the upward, stable nuclear deterrence while negotiat spiral of offensive weapons through ing with the Soviet Union to achieve a control negotiations while acknowledging mutual and verifiable substantial reduc the government’s responsibility, however tion of forces is a rational and morally con difficult, to protect its citizenry. sistent position. Unilateral reductions Although such an argument is hardly in and unbalanced nuclear freezes may be vogue, it should be noted that such flexi well-intended, but they are dangerous ble options also serve a moral dimension. leaps over observable historical, political Should deterrence fail, the ability to con and military realities, in general, and duct a wide range of military options is superpower relations, in particular. the only by which the United During periods of perceived major force States could avoid unleashing a total and imbalances between contending nuclear indiscriminate retaliatory strike on the states, even the smallest crisis risks dan Soviet Union. Because it is neither effec gerous escalation. The most stabilizing tive nor moral to threaten to do what one deterrent should, therefore, discourage would not or should not do, US nuclear the entire spectrum of mischief, not just search and force structure decisions have naked military aggression. Accordingly, had proportionality and discrimination as the primary goal of US nuclear policy for their goals. Hence, improvements in tar more than 30 years has been to prevent geting precision, efforts to secure the na the escalation of lesser conflicts to nuclear tional command authority and facili war. Nuclear force balance continues to be October NUCLEAR STRATEGY an imperative of that policy because forces has kept the peace for almost four clear path has been found that removes decades. Apparently, nuclear deterrence superpower dependence on nuclear forces works because each side, its for from the deterrent purposes they serve. self-preservation. exhibits an understand This does not mean, of course, that the able dread of unleashing such awesome superpowers should eschew nonmilitary destructive power. If a just peace is one of methods of maintaining peace. Economic our highest values, then our deterrent interaction, diplomacy and cultural ex strategy should be judged by the degree changes are among the necessary initia to which it ultimately contributes to that tives in this regard. Arguments that an value. administration would be foolish to rely only US nuclear policy should continue to be nuclear weapons to assure its de shaped by a deep commitment to a stable fense and pursue its interests also are and lasting peace which is secure from ag valid in the converse: National security gression and oppression. The tools of cannot be pursued without these weapons power have no inherent morality. Moral which are an undeniable component in the principle is only reflected by the inten complex mosaic of superpower relations. tions of man and his society using these The current strategy unquestionably is tools of power in pursuit of national in costly and could be viewed as not being terests. US nuclear and conventional without risk. Yet, our reliance on a policy strategy has as its primary mission of flexible response, an obviously credible the preservation of peace-the only capability for nuclear retaliation and the ronment in which US national interests maintenance of balanced superpower can survive and flourish. US Army Tests Israeli Radar. The US Army has procured four in novative Israeli radar systems for use by the 9th infantry Divi sion, Fort Lewis, Washington. The radar is the EL/M2706 point defense radar, a product of Elta Electronics Industries Ltd., a subsidiary of Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. An outstanding feature of the is its portability. It can be carried by a single soldier although the system includes a transmitter/receiver, antenna and display.-Electronic War fare Digest, All Rights Reserved. 1994 79 ~ETTERS Keeping AMSP on Track range, that range (up to 75 kilometers for a Lance missile) is sufficient to meet Lhe Colonel Huba Wass de Czege's article. requiremenLs of maneuver commanders "Challenge for the Future: Educating according to the most recent doctrine. Field Grade Battle Leaders and Staff Of And ranges are being increased with the ficers" (Military Review, June 1984), is on introduction of new weapons systems and the mark. I have read the precis of the Ad rocket-assisted projectiles. vanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) Field artillery ammunition, while main of the US Army Command and General ly antipersonnel in nature as stated in the Staff College, and it is certainly an ex article, can be used for the destruction of citing step and an investment in the buildings. Every artillery lieutenant is in future of our Army and our nation. But structed in these techniques. Concrete beware-in a few years or less, there wjll piercing fuzes are in the inventory, as are be wizards in our midst who will attempt point-detonating fuzes with a "delay" set· to derail this effort. In doing so, they will ting. Other artillery options are also avail amass formidable data on costs, man able-any unit support officer can provide hours, manning difficulties in the field, further information. and so forth. Then, too, there will be ir The battle simulation BLOCK resistible urges to continuously tinker BUSTER, fielded in June 1983, is de with the course by the well-intentioned at signed to teach company-level leaders to Fort Leavenworth. When these things plan and execute military operations on surface-and thev will-the AMSP urbanized terrain (MOUT). It is currently leaders must have a'lready set the precon available. Training is regularly conducted ditions for winning. in builtup areas in the Federal Republic of Germany. As stated in the article, Ger Col H. T. Fincher Jr" USA. many is covered with villages, towns and US/UN Military Observer Group, Jerusalem cities. It is nearly impossible to conduct training without using these urban areas. The Field Artillery Officer Advanced MOUT Training Addressed Course includes a MOUT exercise. The course stresses proper utilization of all I am writing to express my concern types of terrain, including urban terrain. I with John J. Mahan's article, "MOUT: would like to assure Mahan that MOU'!' The Quiet Imperative," published in the training is certainly not ignored and that July 1984 issue of the Military Review. it is being conducted regularly. The article is based on some premises which I feel are not factual, Capt Jeffrey c. Smith, USA, Although field artillery is limited in Lawton, Oklahoma Letters is a feature designed expressly to afford our readers an opportunity to air their opinion.s and ideas on military topics. It is not restricted to comments or: rebuttals on previously published material but is open to any variety of expression which may stimulate or improve the value of thought in the military community. The right to edit is reserved by the staff of the magazine and exercised primarily in deference to available space.-Editor. 80 October ~EWS UNITED STA TES PLSS IN FLIGHT TESTS The US Air Force's new Preci sion Location Strike System (PLSS) has entered flight tests with prom ising results. The first flight from Palmdale, California, was the first test of the system in an aircraft en , " vironment, interfacing it with the avionics of the TRt aircraft. PLSS, being developed by Lock heed Missiles and Space com pany, consists of a mix of ground· based and airborne electronics which will provide an Integrated, men ted aircraft. It will detect the lethal capability for the suppres electronic emissions from enemy sion of enemy air defenses. It is in radars and relay that data to a tended for use by US tactical <:lir ground-based central processing forces, especially in Europe, from station. standoff positions against a varie The station's computers analyze ty of tactical targets, day or night, the data, comparing inputs from in all kinds of weather. multiple aircraft to identify the ra In an operational scenario, PLSS dar type and precisely pinpOint its will be carried aboard a triad of or location. This information is im biting TRt aircraft, detecting en mediately transmitted to a tactical emy air defense systems which de air control center where a decision pend on gUidance and detection ra to attack can be made. PLSS can dars to control antiaircraft artillery then direct the strike aircraft to ac and air defense missiles. The sys curately computed points for the tem will consist of specialized dis release of weapons on the tance-measuring and other equip target.-NA TO's Sixteen Nations, ment aboard the highly instru- All Rights Reserved. The MIlitary ReView, the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General Staff College assume no responsibility for accuracy of Information contained in the News section of thiS publication. items are printed as a service to the readers No offiCial endorsement of the views. opinions or factual statements IS Intended - Editor. 1984 81 MILITARY REVIEW M1 TANK MAINTENANCE TRAINERS First deliveries of M1 tank main tional maintenance trainer. The tenance trainers have been made simulation model panel trainers to the US Army Armor School at are large, desk-size training sta· Fort Knox, Kentucky, and the US tions featuring a subsystem of the Army Ordnance School at Aberdeen M1 and the M1 troubleshooting Proving Ground, Maryland. Tank test sets. Everything is interactive turret mechanics at the two loca· with the student and operated in tions are using the trainers in in· the same manner as on a real tank. structional courses designed to The panel, connected to a desk·top master the troubleshooting proce simulator, is controlled by a 32K dures required for the removal and computer. In addition, there is a replacement of Ml turret assem· high-speed visual system that pro· blies. vides assistance messages, warn· Developed and produced by the ings and pictorial representations Educational Computer Corpora· of components of the subsystem tion, Orlando, Florida, the trainers during each training exercise. Per· consist of two simulators: a part formance record keeping and stu task simulation model panel train· dent information are immediately er and a full-fidelity turret organiza- available through a cathode-ray 82 October NEWS tube (CRT) and printer. these simulators over the actual The full·fidellty trainer is a com equipment are expected to be sig· plete simulation of the M1 turret niflcant. Further, Army officials ex and STEIM1 test set, combining pect a marked improvement in stu· troubleshooting practice with "ac dent training by virtue of repetitive tual conditions" training in the troubleshooting practice which is removal and replacement of turret not available on actual equipment. components. In both the full·fidel An added benefit is more personal ity and panel trainer, the instructor instructor time for the student is able to instantly program faults because less time is required for tllrough his console. tedious fault insertion. Cost savings through the use of ARMY AVIATION MUSEUM The Army Aviation Museum feet of display area, a gift shop and Foundation recently approved the the parking lot. This construction final plans for the construction of is estimated to cost $1.2 million the US Army Aviation Museum at and will be located on the corner of Fort Rucker, Alabama. The muse Andrews Avenue and Headquar· um is to be incrementally built in ters Road at Fort Rucker. two phases. The first Increment of Any organizations or individuals phase I is scheduled to begin interested in contributing to the sometime In the spring of 1985, museum fund may mail contribu pending final plan approval by the tions or pledges to: The Army Avia Office, Chief of Engineers in Wash· tion Museum Foundation Inc., Post ington, DC. Construction of the reo Office Box H, Fort Rucker, AL mainder of phase I and all of phase 36362. For further information, con II will start when resources tact Colonel Howard E. Brown, become available. director of development, at (205) The first increment of phase I in 598-250B.-US Army Aviation cludes the entrance, 40,000 square Digest. 1984 83 MILITARY REVIEW MH53E HELICOPTER TESTED The MH53E airborne mine sleds on a 450-foot cable attached countermeasures (AMCM) heli to a boom in the main cabin. The copter recently completed a series tests were conducted in various of dynamic tow tests in the Gulf of sea staies, wind directions and Mexico. The tests were conducted speeds, at several aircraft gross by the Naval Systems Center and weights and at center-ot-gravity the Naval Air Systems Command. locations. Additional Navy development and The MH53E is a derivative of the operational tests are to follow. In three-engine CH53E Super Stallion the tests, the MH53E prototype, which is in service with the US which is built by Sikorsky Aircraft, Marine Corps and Navy and is the towed Navy anti mine hydrofoil free world's heavy-lift champion. 84 October NEWS The lifting ability translates into in hours. Additional interna( auxiliary creased towing ability in the tanks can be accommodated, and MH53E for heavier sleds. Produc the MH53E can be refueled in tivity will be increased relative to flight. the earlier RH53D helicopter which • Modified Hamilton Standard proved the worth of airborne mine dual digital automatic flight con sweeping in Suez and in Haiphong trol system with such features as Harbor. Airborne minesweeping is automatic approach to and depar also safer as well as faster than ture from hover, coupled hover, surface mlnesweeping. tow cable tension hold and tow The MH53£ has a high degree of cable skew-angle hold . commonality with the CH53E, with • Composite material tail rotor changes to adapt it to the AMCM blades which currently are being mission. Some of the principal tested. The composite blades will changes are: have essentially unlimited fatigue • Enlarged sponsons-the larg lives. est co-cured composite helicopter The Navy has a current require structures in the world-with a ment for 35 MH53Es, with produc total fuel capacity of 3,200 gallons, tion deliveries scheduled to begin allowing a tow time-on-station of 4 late in 1986.-Sikorsky News. JAPAN SPACE INITIATIVE ANNOUNCED A Japanese government ad build a permanent space station. visory panel recently unveiled an The centerpiece of Japan's new ambitious space development pro space program, officials said, is gram that will seek to place Japan the proposed H2 rocket. It IS ex among the top space nations by pected to cost slightly less than the beginning of the 21st century. $900 million, at current exchange The program, approved by the rates, to develop. Scheduled for Space Activities Commission, pro completion in the early 1990s, the vides for the development of a H2 will be powered by liquid fuels rocket that would be capable of -a technology now being devel hurling a 2-ton satellite into the oped for the H1 rocket. Unlike the earth's orbit. This feat requires six N2 rocket-currently the principal times as much power as Japan's launching vehicle for Japan's current rockets can offer. The com r H1-which Is mission, which serves as an ad nowsatei~'tes- u er d velopment-theth~e H2 visory panel to the prime minister, project will b developed through also recommended that Japan Japan's own s ace technology. take an active role in a US plan to Japan Report. \ 1984 85 MILITARY REVIEW SWEDEN RBS70 GETS NIGHT SIGHT Bofors Ordnance of Sweden, in veillance radar. The latter is to be conjunction with Ericsson Radio developed by Ericsson and will be Systems and Hagglund & Soner, is based on the HARD J-J band, three developing a new version of the dimenSional, pulse-Doppler radar RBS70 (MR, Oct 1983, p 77) surface with a range of about 10 kilome to-air missile system which can be ters. The new radar will give ex used at night. The new system, tremely precise target data with designated the RBS70M: is intend range, azimuth and elevation. The ed to supplement the currently third member of the team, the coor fielded man-portable daylight dinator, receives data from the air system. force combat command center. A new launcher is being de The fire control vehicle will carry signed with two missile tubes, with a crew of six, including the driver, the sighting system being and each fire unit will include a mounted on a servo stand and in second vehicle to transport the cluding a laser guidance beam, a missile equipment and four men, television camera and an infrared including the driver. Hagglund & camera, the autonomous stand giv Soner has received a contract to ing greater flexibility. The missile develop the vehicles. Bofors is also operator and fire controller, developing a new round for the sys together with the coordinator, will tem, designated the RBS70 Mark 2. be in the trailer of one Bv-206 Miniaturization of the electronics cross-country vehicle. The will permit a larger sustainer motor operator will have a television within the same airframe, giving an monitor used in conjunction with increase in range of 1 kilometer. the camera to keep the missile on The new round will be available to target via a joystick. supplement existing rounds and The fire controller, who doubles should be operational at about the as a radar operator, receives target same time as the RBS70M in the data from the central surveillance early 1990s.-Military Technology, radar or the roof-mounted local sur- © 1984. 86 October NEWS UNITED KINGDOM ELECTRONIC HAND GRENADES A new range of hand grenades The electronic circuitry is has been developed to overcome enclosed in an injection-molded the major drawback to these de Acetal plastic top which can be vices-the throwing "signature." electrically tested before being The traditional method of igniting firmly attached to the waterproof most types of hand grenades in extruded aluminum body of the volves a safety pin, a flyoll lever, a grenade. The detonator can also be spring-driven striker, a percussion independently checked, and the cap, a length of safety fuze and, whole assembly is cheaper to pro eventually, a detonator or squib to duce than the Bouchon igniter. The initiate the contents of the electronic fuze unit is now stand grenade. This chain of events in ard on all Haley & Weiler hand volves a number of interfaces, any grenades and is currently used for one of which can fail, but, more CS smoke, Signaling smoke. significantly from the user's point screening smoke, stun, fragment8- of view, it has a distinctive lion and Illuminating types.-Jane's slgn8ture in action. There is the Defence Weekly, if'1984. "ping" of the lever as it flies off, the crack of the percussion cap as it is struck and often the fizzing of the fuze as it burns, all of which can alert an enemy to what is about to happen. Consideration of these factors led Haley & Weller of Draycott, Der byshire, England, to develop a gre nade fuze which is absolutely si· lent in operation. The mechanical system has been abandoned, and reliance is placed on a microelec· tronic circuit in conjunction with a detonator. The necessary power supply is small and has a minimum shelf life of 10 years. It is also capa ble of initiating 1,000 detonators al though it is required to perform on ly. once in its lifetime. Such a sim· pie electrical circuit could well be Initiated by a push button on the grenade but, to keep a familiar ap pearance and method of operation, the standard lever has been re tained. Instead of flying off, however, it remains on the grenade after it has been thrown. 1984 87 ~OOKS . THE ANTAGONISTS: A Comparaliv, Combat Assessment 01 Given this ideal. Gabriel finds both the the Soviet and American SoldlElr by Richard A Gabriel 209 US and Soviet armies deficient. UtiliZing Pages Greenwood Press Westport Conn 1984 S2995 empirical data to an unheralded extent, he Analysis of the relative merits of the analyzes the attitudes of soldiers. NCOs US and Soviet armed forces has aroused and officers to assess their morale. storms of controversy in recent years. discipline and unit loyalty. Gabriel con This volatile debate has concentrated cludes that soldiers of both armies are upon force levels. weapons systems and isolated from their fellows and alienated military budgets. not least in the pages of from their units. as evinced by rampant ~he Military Review itself. alcoholism and drug abuse. Moreover. he Richard A. Gabriel. widely known for believes that NCOs of both armies lack his co-authorship of Crisis in Command. essential experience. insofar as Soviet brings a fresh perspective to this discus cycles of conscription and a US shortage sion. In his new book. The Antagonists. militate against sufficient time in service. he focuses upon small-group cohesion as Worst, Gabriel sees Soviet training pro the primary determinant of combat per grams and US rotational policies as a formance. Contrasting recent statistical catastrophic influence upon officers. surveys of the US Army with attitudinal resulting in estrangement from their men. polls of former soldiers among Soviet Both armies seek to compensate for emigres. Gabriel assesses each army's these deficiencies by doctrinal "quick ability to sustain combat. Coincidentally. fixes," The Soviets, on the one hand. rely he also launches a critique of the manage on ide'ology to motivate their troops. rial philosophy now followed by the US Americans. on the other hand. depend Army officer corps. upon the utility of an army career and a Gabriel derives his concept of small managerial approach to leadership. group cohesion from the legendary S, L. Neither doctrine. according to Gabriel. is A. Marshall. In his book. Men Against likely to give a soldier good reasons to Fire. Marshall discovered that US fight for his country. soldiers in World War II fought out of The Antagonists takes a significant loyalty to their fellows. not because of step forward in the comparison of US and ideological or heroic fervor. Gabriel has Soviet armed forces, By extending the developed this earlier analysis into a analysis of small-group cohesion to the positive prescription. Optimally. soldiers Soviets. Gabriel brings us closer to a real ought to bond into self-sufficient teams. world assessment of their capabilities. At cemented by highly experienced noncom the same time. he continues the critique of missioned officers (NCOs). This small the US Army that was begun in Crisis in group supplies the psychological sup Command. Consequently. this book port necessary for the individual soldier merits a place on the shelves of every US to withstand the stress of combat. Of officer. Their counterparts at the Frunze ficers should lead these teams by personal Military Academy will be studying it example and battlefield judgment; mana closely. gerial 'preoccupations only undermine that rol". Steven D. Stinemetz, New York University 88 October BOOKS DEZINFORMATSIA Activo Measures in Soviet Strategy by front organizations, the employment of RIchard H Shultz dnd Roy GOdson 211 Pages Pergamon Press ElmslOr. NY 1984 $1995 clolhbouna $1295 agents of influence and the use of Soviet paperbound forgeries. In Chapter V, Shultz and Godson pre Dezin[ormatsia is a concise, timely, in sent the responses to a series of questions formative and well-written book. It pre by two former Soviet bloc intelligence of sents a detailed analysis of an array of ficers who specialized in covert political Soviet overt and covert techniques, ahtiu techniques in the 1960s and 1970s. This nyye (active measures), for influencing narrative portion of the book provides events and behavior in and the actions of unique insights into the way Soviet foreign countries. Prior to the 1960s, ac leaders conduct covert operations and the cording to Drs. Richard H. Shultz and means used by Moscow to evaluate their Roy Godson-scholars who have published effectiveness. Chapter VI summarizes the extensively in the areas of international major findings of the study. It considers security affairs and intelligence studies policy implications for Western strategy the term dezinformatsia was used in some inasmuch as the Soviet leadership "will circles to describe these instruments. The continue to employ and perhaps export authors provide ample evidence that active measures operations against the propaganda and political influence tech N A TO allies in the near and more distant niques constitute significant instruments future." of Soviet foreign policy and strategy. Dezinformatsia is a valuable contribu The organizational format of the book tion to Western studies on Soviet affairs. is excellent, providing the reader with fac I t examines an area that has received lit tual data and insights into how the tle scholarly study. The authors should be Soviets closely integrate .. active commended for their fine efforts. The measures" into their overall strategy. As book is highly recommended for the in the case with military, economic and policymaker, the military professional diplomatic instruments. the authors and the serious student of national securi write: ty. . . thp Kremlin designs and employs these measures to support Mrategir objec Col James B MotieV. USA. Retlfed tiues and operations . .. presumably . .. to achieve enhanced global power and m [luence, if possible without employing REBEL The Life and Times of John Singleton Mosby by Kevrn military force. H SleDel 345 Pages 51 Martrn s Press NY 1983 After a brief introductory chapter, the $18 go book is divided into five parts. Chapter II delineates the concepts, doctrine and William W. Blackford, an acquaintance organizational and financial structure of John Singleton Mosby and the author which Moscow has devised to create ac of War Years With Jeb Stuart, said of tive measures. Next, Shultz and Godson Mosby: examine the overt propaganda campaign There was nothing about him then to in conducted by the Soviets between 1960 dicate what he was to be-he was rather a and 1980 to divide the West by disrupt slouchy rider, and did not seem to take ing and splitting the NATO Alliance. In any interest in military duties. ... We all Chapter IV, the authors demonstrate how thought he was rather an indifferent the Soviets operate secretly to promote soldier. and enhance the effectiveness of their This was Blackford's first impression overt propaganda through the manipula of Mosby when, in April 1861, Mosby tion of Soviet-controlled international joined the Washington Mounted Rifles. 1984 89 MILITARY REVIEW Robert E. Lee was to say of him just two OMAHA BEACHHEAO: 6 Juno-13 June 1944. Edlled by the years later, "Hurrah for Mosby! I wish I Historical SectIOn, European Theater of Operations Staff 200 had a hundred like him!" Pages Battery Press. NashVille. Tenn 1984 $2650 During this time, Mosby became the most daring of the Confederate cavalry Tllis enlightening and comprehensive commanders. He and his ragged band of study of one of the hardest assault land guerrillas swept across western Virginia ings in military history is a reprint of the inflicting damage to vulnerable flanks of US War Department's American forces in the Union Army. They derailed and burned action series, The series was originally trains, cut supply lines, stole federal pay published in 1945. It is a monumental rolls and, in general, caused great embar publication that honors the 40th anniver rassment to Union commanders. sary of D-day. The text opens with a de Rebel goes beyond the exploits of tailed account of Operation Neptune and Mosby, however; Kevin H. Siepel has un the original D-day invasion plans. Omaha covered the very character of Mosby. A Beachhead presents a vivid explanation quiet Virginia lawyer and a deeply com of the many variables and critical prob mitted family man, he had a deep love for lems that had to be dealt with in planning his Virginia and yet believed in the pres a tactical operation of this magnitude. ervation of the Union. But, in May 1861, The high point of the book is the de Mosby said, "Virginia went out of the tailed and graphic accounts of the action Union by force of arms, and I went with in the attack on the four sections compos ber." Siepel also takes Mosby beyond the ing Omaha Beach, These accounts pro war years and brings attention to his vide a vivid look at the horror that was little-known political career. These years, D-day. It begins with the long, wet until his death in 1916, were filled with cramped ride to the beach in the landing turbulence because of his profound hones craft, with bullets clanging off the sides, ty. He battled with the State Department to the dropping of the ramps and the over corruption among the officials in the slow, deadly advance into enemy fire and Orient when he was consul to Hong Kong into history, These accounts are made and over his views of issues of the day. He more real and personal by the individual also battled the Southern conservatives first-hand reports of the action. who wanted to keep the Civil War alive, The book presents a well-documented while he stressed putting that behind account of the first 'assault waves of the V them and moving forward with the Union. Corps and captures the essence of that This is Siepel's first book. A student of well-worn maxim, "If something can go American history, he has meticulously re wrong it will." As the first assault waves searched the appropriate material. Thus, hit the beach, the rehearsed plans started he has created a truly great historical to go amiss. Those soldiers who survived work on Mosby, a most colorful individ the long walk to the beach found them ual. The book is very well-written and fac selves pinned down-unable to fall back. tual, and it easily holds the attention of The account captures the horror, confu the reader. Relatively little has been writ sion and the valor of these men, beset by ten about Mosby, the man; Siepel has extremely heavy casualties and the loss finally given us a comprehllnsive work of key weapons and communications that will stand alongside works of other equipment, Included are heroic examples great leaders. Rebel is recommended for of that decisive factor that pried the stag both the student of war and politics and nated troops off the beaches: leadership for the casual reader. by example. The book is sequentially organized to Lt Col Laurence T. Byam, USAR, Retired provide the reader a clear understanding 90 October BOOKS of the overall conflict. Of extreme impor The book is subdivided into three sec tance are 25 maps of the assault and 71 tions. One deals with a general overview, photographs. Cleverly juxtaposed are followed by a section on functional prob various accounts of the German reactions lems (defense, economics, Third World and plans for halting the Allied advance. and energy) and one on regional issues This complex operation is unraveled (the USSR, China, Europe, Latin through a method that both the general America, Africa and the Middle East). reader and specialist can easily digest and What emerges is a composite collage of appreciate. Tlus text was written for and competing influences which,constrain any about soldiers and captures the war as policy which may he put forward. Present they fought it. policies are shown to be inadequate, but no alternative policies are advanced in a Capt Charles E Thompson III. USA. convincing manner. Instead, one becomes 7th Engineer Brtgade. US Army, Europe increasingly aware that reality is more complex than a set of simple beliefs and that, with the growing multiplicity of ac· tors in the world, all policies are doomed EAGLE DEFIANT Umted States Foreign PolicV m Ihe 1960, to the category of "inadequate." Ameri Ed,led by Kennelh A Ole Roberl J l 'eber dnd Donald Rolh Child 404 Pages 1!ttle Brown & Co Boston Mass 1983 cans, therefore, must become accustomed $1795 to a substantial gap bet ween .. aspira tions" and "capabilities." Relying on input from 15 leading Eagle Defiant does not map out a blue· authors who bring together an impressive print for foreign policy. But wise policy backgro'und of specialized knowledge con· depends on understanding, and under cerning specific issues and regions, the standing is what this book is all about. editors of this book set out to place the policies of the Reagan administration into Lt Col Leslie E. Hagle, USA, "structural and historical perspective," Vepartment of Jomt alld ComDmed Operations, USACGSC Their fundamental proposition is that US administrations of the 19708 followed a "strategy of adjusting to international in· terdependence while the Reagan adminis UNCERTAIN POWER The Struggle lor a Nalional Energy Policy Eoiled by Dorolhy Zinberg 260 Pages Pergamon tration is questioning both the need to ad PreIs. Elmstora NY 1983 $32,0 Clolhbound $1195 just and the methods of adjustment." paperbou,a With this approach established in the pref ace, it should be no surprise to the reader Uncertain Power is a collective work by that the majority of articles, while they several academics with recognized experi vary in quality and style, portray signifi ence in the energy issues confronting con cant shortconlings in present policies. temporary society. But, despite the impli However, regardless of individual polit cations of the title, the book is less con ical preferences and personal feelings cerned with the usual issues of energy about President Ronald Reagan's ap production and utilization than the proach, this book is highly recommended political conditions in the United States for its insights into the problems which that have frustrated efforts to create a na face US decision makers, The lessons to be tional energy policy and strategy. learned are not so much in terms of which In their analysis of the difficulties fac policies do not work but in understanding ing governmental policy makers, the the many "contradictory and correlative authors present a lucid and concise dis interests" which impact upon and in cussion of the constraints faced by the fluence US policy. US political system. They illustrate, for 1984 91 MILITARY REVIEW example, how energy experts and scien authors note, the political resolve neces tists frequently confuse both the public sary to move in such a direction will be and government officials with conflicting difficult in the absence of a new, clearly guidance and predictions which reflect perceived energy crisis. the experts' backgrounds and disciplines as well as their best opinion. Maj Marion T. Davis, USA The authors also show the limitations and inherent prejudices contained in "scientific" evaluations such as cost BATTLE FOR SPACE by CurllS Peebles 192 Pages Beauforl benefit and quantified-risk analysis. All Books. NY 1983 $1895 of these inputs result in a political system overwhelmed by the demands of groups What is the role of space in the defense advocating their own preferred energy of the free world? What technological de solution. We have, as one contributor velopments have forced the United States argues, less an energy than a political to reconsider its space policies? What re problem which demands a "political solu search and development projects are the tion." In this sense, Uncertairz Power ex Soviets conducting that threaten to pro pertly uses the energy issue to illustrate duce a major shift in power? In Battle for thi.s problem of democracy that one noted Space, Curtis Peebles discusses these political scientist has described as a pecu questions and many others which have liarly American "Democratic Distem the highest level of significance in our per." military community. Two of the essays in the book are of par Born in the 1950s with space flight and ticular note but for very different reasons. high-altitude observation for military in Graham Allison and Albert Carnesale's telligence, growing in the 1960s and chapter on nuclear power stands as a well 1970s with the development of lasers and balanced and reasonable assessment of satellite technology, and maturing in the this controversial topic in a work that 1980s with antisatellite systems and the generally reflects an antinuclear bias. death of detente, the battle for space is Richard Sclove's article, "Energy Policy now breaking into public awareness and and Democratic Theory," which would will demand an increasing role in US seem to be the keystone of the entire strategic planning in the future. work, is excessively judgmental and This book contains a description of the heavily laden with intellectual supposi history of the military development of tion. Selove apparently dislikes all cur space. We are all aware of peaceful uses, rent procedures for energy decisionmak but many of us are probably unaware of ing, including both market mechanisms the massive efforts by the United States and government regulatory practices. He and the Soviet Union to develop military would evidently prefer a national election systems for deployment in space. Atten prior to the undertaking of any major tion is devoted to various satellite tech energy project. This essay is both unrea nologies, including the use of satellites for sonable and irrelevant. communication, observation and weapon Uncertain Power is an excellent illus system platforms. There is an interesting trator of the difficulties involved in reach discussion of satellite vulnerability and ing reasoned energy policies. I t concludes ways to defend against attacks on satel with Dan Yergin's plea that we must lite systems. This discussion includes seriously address the need for a national killer satellites and "dark" satellites. The energy policy in the event that the cur significance of directed energy technol rent calm in the energy situation is transi ogy (President Ronald Reagan's ray guns tory rather than permanent. But, as the -laser and particle beam weapons) is dis- 92 October BOOKS cussed along with other. perhaps more sino to a place of safekeeping with the immediately aVailable. anti satellite tech Hermann Goring Division. Some 15 cases nologies. The ramifications of developing of artwork were appropriated by the Ger these weapons are explored. mans. incidentally, and presented to Go The book is very readable and presents ring at his birthday party that year. But. an excellent introduction into the impor according to the authors' research. the tance of space technology to our defense. Germans never used the monastery for It is not a research volume for the devel military purposes even though they opment of space policy but is carefully worked inside the monastery as they documented with sources from unclassi shipped out the artwork. fied references. It also has a glossary that In fact. however. the authors found that is helpful for readers unfamiliar with the the Germans did have their military technical jargon. The hook is reconunended defenses built up adjacent to the monas to readers wishing to develop an under tery proper. Of course. in the heat of bat standing of issues and developments in tle. many of the US and Allied leaders, as military technology applied to space. well as rank-and-file soldiers. were con vinced that the Germans had fortified the leon 0 Godfrey. monastery and were using it for a defen Combmed Arms OperatIOns Research ActIVIty sive strongpoint. Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Freyberg's New Zealand division and the United Kingdom Indian division MONTE CASSINO by DaVid Hapgood and DaVia R,Chardson were given the mission of attacking the 269 Pages Congdon & Weed NY 1984 $1795 monastery and demanded it be bombed in preparation for the attack. Monte Cassino was one of Europe's Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark. the finest monasteries. having been founded US Fifth Army commander. was not in by St. Benedict in A.D. 529. For 14 cen favor of the bombing but. nevertheless. turies. it overlooked the Liri Valley and went along with the British commander. the southern route to Rome. It had with· General Sir Harold Alexander. for political stood attack on several occasions but. on reasons. The British could not have stood a cold February morning in 1944. the the political heat that would have been tides of World War II washed over it. Two generated had the monastery not been hundred and thirty-nine US bombers bombed in preparation for this key attack. dropped almost 500 tons of bombs on the lIenee. the home of the Benedictines was ancient home of the Benedictine monks. laid low. Hapgood and Richardson claim reducing it to a pile of rubble. that. ironically. no German soldiers were This attack became one of the more con killed in the attack-only several hundred troversial assaults of World War II in the Italian peasants who had sought refuge European theater. David Hapgood and there and several monks as well. David Richardson have examined the The bombing was a propaganda victory story in detail from the view of the Ger for the Germans who then claimed that mans and the Italians. They have done an the Third Reich was the saviour of Euro excellent job of piecing together an in pean culture and that obviously the teresting and seemingly accurate account Americans and the British were the de of the entire event beginning in the au" stroyers a la the Visigoths of the fourth tumn of 1943 and ending with the capture century. Further. the bombing gave the of Rome in June 1944. Germans the excuse they needed to move As the Allied war effort moved slowly troops into the wreckage of the monastery up the Italian boot. the Germans hegan to and use it as a reinforced defensive evacuate art treasures from Monte Cas- strongpoint. So tactically commanding 1984 93 MILITARY REVIEW was this position and so skillful was the concise discussion of why General John B, German defense that the v were able to Hood sent his army in a frontal assault stall the Allies drive to';'ard Rome for against an approximately equal number three more months. Finally, in the middle of strongly entrenched Union troops who of May, the Allies' managed to outflank possessed overwhelming superiority in ar the monastery positions and open t.he t.illery. This question of Hood's rationale road to Rome, and judgment becomes even more impor For the Allies, the destruction of Monte tant when one considers that the final Cassino was politically very expensive charge took place in the open for a dis and militarily a dubious necessity. For the tance of abou t half a mile. Whether one Germans, needing tactical successes in agrees with the conclusions of the the dark year of 1944, Monte Cassino was authors, the issue of ordering frontal made to order, proving that the forces of assaults against entrenched infantry the Third Reich were more than a match armed with the rifled muskets being used for the Allied invaders. But, for both at the time is the central historical tac sides. Monte Cassino is a reminder of a tical issue of the Civil War, slow-moving. costly campaign fought While many historians of the US Civil under the worst of circumstances. War have addressed this question, some Military Review readers may wish to contributing an entire book to the discus add this well-researched, well-written sion, none of the answers is completely , volume to their collection. satisfying. While it is easy to fault Hood, especially since his defeat and casualties Col Robert G Clarke. USA. shattered the Confederate Army of Ten Headquarters. Commander in Chief, PaCIfic, Hawaii nessee, making the task of Major General George H. Thomas at Nashville that much easier subsequently. it was no more than what General Robert E. Lee ordered FIVE TRAGIC HOURS: The Battle of Franklin by James Lee at Malvern Hill and the third day at Get McDonough and Thomas L Connelly 217 PQy~s University 01 Tennessee Press. Knoxville, Tenn 1983 $1750 tysburg, General William T. Sherman at Kennesaw Mountain, and General Ulys· Two very distinguished military histori ses S. Grant at Cold Harbor and through ans, James L. McDonough and Thomas L. out the Petersburg Campaign. With the Connelly, bring their considerable exper subsequent development of the machine tise to this study of the Battle of gun. the tactical problem of overcoming ·Franklin. 30 November 1864. Their back dug-in small arms became more acute. In ground and depth of knowledge show deed, the British experience during the clearly in this book; it is. quite simply, the Battle of the Somme during World War I best currently in print on the subject, shaped and affected their strategy and Five Tragic Hours is also a model of what operations during World War II. can be done with the "new" military There are a few questionable aspects of history in many ways, The actions of the the book, perhaps showing some lack of senior commanders, the even ts of the bat operational experience in command on the tle, the tactical deployments-the opera battlefield on the part of the authors:For tional history-are not slighted as is often example. Major General John M. Scho the case nowadays. In addition, however. field stationed himself across the river McDonough and Connelly provide us with away from his infantry during the battle. glimpses of the personal reactions of the It is true that he was on high ground and soldiers as they viewed the carnage of could see most of the battle, But he was that stormy battlefield. too far away to influence it even though he The maj or strength of the book is its was near a large part of his artillery, 94 October BOOK{" Messages and orders could be sent and against such fearful odds without falter\ received no faster than the speed of a ing. At Cold Harbor. for example, the horse. heavy skirmish lines of experienced Union In short. Schofield was not at the criti regiments tended to dig slit trenches once cal place at the critical time when Hood's they saw what awaited them. There must infantry managed to break through the have been something more than just Union lines, albeit temporarily. Mc Hood's disdain for Joseph E. Johnston's Donough and Connelly excuse. even de cautious defensive tactics and reliance on fend, Schofield, arguing that he was wor the spade. translated into verbal abuse of ried about being outflanlwd on the Union the Army of Tennessee's fighting spirit, left. This does not distinguish Franklin that motivated these men to put them from most major battles of the Civil War; selves in harm's way. This is not a fail both armies usually had their flanks hang ing of just this book, however, but of ing unhinged and unsecured by friendly most studies of the Civil War-and other forces. Moreover, Brevet Major General wars. James H. Wilson's cavalry was skir Nevertheless, despite these reserva mishing against General Nathan B. For tions, this is the best book available on rest's, and the artillery near Schofield the Battle of Franklin. It belongs on the could have taken a severe toll of a serious bookshelf of every professional soldier in threat. terested in the military history of the Finally, McDonough and Connelly fail Civil War. to address adequately, if at all. the more difficult question of why the battle Lt Col Walter Scott Dillard, USA. seasoned Army of Tennessee came on Oepartment of History. USMA NEW BOOKS RECEIVED Thl" h'ltwv; h pro\ld('d to hnng n:~NHI\t publJ<,hl?u proff''''1I:onJI hook .. to the> nUl'nUon of r~ad('r'" He\w", ... of tnt'''£' hook .. have a!\"eud\· hprn <,ohcJted from our rurrl?nt rt',,!('wer<, OtlW! honk., tIr(l .i\clllahl(l fot H'\lt'w 11\ quohfll'11 prolc'" ..,wnn/<. For mformatlOn aboul tht' Book Rf>\H'\" Pro,;:r.IJn,('Qlltul,,'t ;l..lr Phillip R Onltl'l Roo~ ... Editor .It !lJI3~6l"\V}61:.! or AUTOVON ,;:'2 ")6,12 Rook ... [1fe not ofh~f(>d for "vip throur;h thl' /1"j,llfIJr\, Rn WI' THE AMERICAN ROLE IN VIETNM1 AND EAST ASIA. 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[eJi\ed by James A Greehe and FranCISco Calif 1984 $2295 Clothbound S8 g~ PJper Brenl Scowcrolt 331 Pages Oelgeschlager. Gunn & Ham bound BOSion Mass 1984 $2750 (loll1bound 51250 paper' A FLYING TIGER'S OIARY by Malar General Chacles R Bond bound Jr USAF Retired and Terry H Anderson 248 Pages Texas THE CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER, A & M University Press College Station Texas 1984 $1595 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin by WdllJmson Murray 494 LEE AND GRANT' A Dual BIOgraphy by Gene SOlllh 413 Pages Prmceton University Press Princeton N J 1984 Pages McGraw-Hili Book Co N Y 1984 $1795 ,5000 clott1bollnd $1950 paperbound THE DYNAMICS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION by S1ephen STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ARMY TO THE YEAR M Meyer Foreword by Joseph S Nye Jr 119 Pages 2000, Edlled by Roberl H Kuppennan and W,llraPl J Taylor University of Chicago Press Chicago III 198~ $2000 Jr 540 Pages leXington Books. 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Edited by Roger W Lotchln 242 Pages Praeger PubliShers ~i~:t~~~~~oRb~el~s ~~~~~i~:a~t~et:i;\~a~~eTianc~c:,'I:~a~;lg~~ * NY 1984 YUrlY Tys-Krokhma\luk 449 Pages Vantage Press N Y l!:I OPERATION BARBAROSSA: Strategy and Tactics on the 1972 ~ Eastern Front, 1941 by Bryan I Fugate 415 Pages PreSidiO LITTLE SHIP, BIG WAR: The Saga 01 DE343 by Commander z Press, NavaJO. Calli 1984 $2250 Edward P Stallord. USN, Relrred 336 Pages William Mar· [ INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DIMENSIONS·OF SPACE. Eallea row & Go N Y 1984 $17 95 ~ by Urr Ra'anan and Rober! L Ptallzgrall Jr 324 Pages Ar GUATEMALA: A Country Study. Edited by RlCllJrd F Nyrop ~ chon Books, Hamden, Conn 1984 $3250 (64 Pages US Government Printing Office Washington 0 C C:z THE GRUNTS by Charles R Anderson 238 pages Berkley 1983 w> Books. NY 1984 $3 50 NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE' Enduring Dilemmas, Present 8 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY' Choices and Limits. Edltea Prospects by Leon V Sigal 181 Pages Brookings InstitutIOn. by Slephen J Glmbala 371 Pages Praeger Publishers N Y WaSlllPglon, 0 C 1984 $22 95 clothbound $8 95 paper' 1984 $34.95 bound -;t 96 October National Guard History Old"r Ihdll till' l'll1l!'d St.,!.", lil" ,\llll\ \'llhlll;') (iu,uti ild' I Ill' 1"llgl",I.l·onlil1l!' (lu .... Ill .... !nl\ pf .J1l\ IlllIJl:lr\ {Ug,Il11/,1I1f11l III tilt, (Otlllll\ ... \ :\ .... dB OlJlgln\\th III lht' valh mllllLl l'{~IH'l>Pl \\lllt.'h PiO\ldvd fot tht l l'onUl10n dt.'fen"-p. J t:::-- oll~ln ~'dn !H' {l .1('\.(/ h,H'h to f hi' tll "" \ tldl .... III t lIt' 1it h ClIIl! un. To PIO' tt't't lht,jl lht, .... lind hnItH'''' fhl' .... l'ltlt,) ... hnmi"d Ingdl!t'r to form' t, .. ttl1 h';'lIld ... ,'· 01' mllHLJ 01 gdl1l/.;1I Inn"', ,-'qIJlppt,d .tnd Ildlilt'd ,!('("IJ(ling tll fIll' ltpvd<.: of th"lllilll'" A .... 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MPftl/11, • liS. ArmY",R,rlriid;'.fId Major (PJ Mlch~.l M. Firg~ilDn. USArmy " '