Senator Feinstein Accuses Attorney General of Playing Politics with Nation’S Top Prosecutors
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An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice U.S. Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility Office of the Inspector General July 28, 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................ i CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION................................................................. 1 I. Scope of the Investigation.................................................................. 1 II. Methodology of the Investigation ....................................................... 2 III. Organization of this Report ............................................................... 3 CHAPTER TWO BACKGROUND.................................................................. 5 I. Monica Goodling ............................................................................... 5 II. Kyle Sampson ................................................................................... 6 III. Susan Richmond and Jan Williams................................................... 7 IV. Department Components and Personnel ........................................... 7 V. Hiring Standards ............................................................................ 11 A. Department Career and Political Attorney Positions ............... 11 B. Legal Standards..................................................................... 12 CHAPTER THREE GOODLING’S ROLE -
Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys
Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys Sara Sun Beale* The reputation and credibility of the Department of Justice were badly tarnished during the Bush administration. This article focuses on concerns regarding the role of partisan politics.1 Critics charge that during the Bush administration improper partisan political considerations pervasively influenced a wide range of decisions including the selection of immigration judges, summer interns and line attorneys; the assignment of career attorneys to particular details; the evaluation of the performance of United States Attorneys; and the decision whether and when to file charges in cases with political ramifications. The Inspector General’s lengthy and highly critical reports have substantiated some of these charges.2 The first two Inspector General (IG) Reports found that the Department improperly used political criteria in hiring and assigning some immigration judges, interns, and career prosecutors.3 The third report * Charles L.B. Lowndes Professor, Duke Law School, Durham, N.C. I would like to acknowledge the outstanding research assistance provided by Michael Devlin, Meghan Ferguson, Amy Taylor, and Molly Brownfield, and the helpful comments of Norman Abrams, Albert Alschuler, Rachel Barkow, Anthony Barkow, Candace Carroll, Colm Connolly, Ronald Goldstock, Bruce Green, Lisa Kern Griffin, James Jacobs, Susan Klein, Daniel Richman, and Adam Safwat. Of course any errors are my own. 1 Other serious concerns about the Department have been raised, particularly in connection with its role in the war on terror. For example, the Department has been the subject of intense criticism for legal analysis that led to the authorization of brutal interrogation techniques for detainees. -
Disciplining Criminal Justice: the Peril Amid the Promise of Numbers
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril amid the Promise of Numbers Mary De Ming Fan* Introduction ........................................................................................................... 2 Governing Governance and the Manufacture of "Objective" Visibility ............ 1O A. The Law of Making Performance Visible ................................................ 14 B. Difficulties Defining Criminal Justice in the Idiom of Targets .............. 16 C. Bending the Bounds of the Officially Sanctioned .................................. 24 II. Expressive, Expiatory "Deliverables". ............................................................. 27 A. At the Point of Policy Failure ................................................................... 30 B. Numbers that Do Not Attain Aims ......................................................... 36 C. What Expiation by Numerical Proxy Effaces ......................................... 42 1. Aim ing Beyond the Baseline ............................................................ 42 2. Effacing H igher Aim s ........................................................................ 49 III. Toward a Policy Embrace of Values and Numbers in Qualitative Context ... 57 A. Q ualitative Perspective ............................................................................ 57 B. How Law and Policy Can Be Conducive to Qualitative Evaluation ........... 59 C on clusion ................................................................................................................... -
Unofficial Transcript
1 RPTS JOHNSON DCMN BURRELL COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, D.C. UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT INTERVIEW OF: KARL C. ROVE Tuesday, July 7, 2009 Washington, D.C. The interview in the above matter was held at 2138 Conference Room, Rayburn House Office Building, commencing at 9:00 a.m. 2 Appearances: For COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY: ADAM B. SCHIFF, MAJORITY MEMBER J. RANDY FORBES, MINORITY MEMBER ELLIOT MINCBERG, MAJORITY CHIEF COUNSEL - INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT ERIC TAMARKIN, MAJORITY COUNSEL SAM BRODERICK-SOKOL, MAJORITY OVERSIGHT COUNSEL PHIL TAHTAKRAN, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR FOR CONGRESSMAN SCHIFF DANIEL M. FLORES, CHIEF MINORITY COUNSEL, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW RICHARD ALAN HERTLING, REPUBLICAN DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF/POLICY DIRECTOR CRYSTAL ROBERTS JEZIERSKI, REPUBLICAN CHIEF OVERSIGHT COUNSEL ZACHARY N. SOMERS, MINORITY COUNSEL WILL HUPMAN, LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT FOR CONGRESSMAN FORBES 3 For MR. ROVE: ROBERT D. LUSKIN, ESQ. KATIE BIBER, ESQ. Patton Boggs LLP Attorneys at Law 2550 M Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20037-1350 For FORMER PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY: EMMET T. FLOOD, ESQ. Attorney at Law Williams & Connolly LLP 725 Twelfth Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20005 For WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL'S OFFICE: JASON GREEN, WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL CHRIS WEIDEMAN, WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL BLAKE ROBERTS, WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL For JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: 4 JOHN R. TYLER, CIVIL DIVISION 5 Mr. Schiff. We are here this morning for a transcribed interview of former White House official Karl Rove, pursuant to the March 4th, 2009 Agreement of Accommodation between the House Judiciary Committee and the former Bush administration. Mr. Rove, please state your full name and address for the record. -
Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking Forward
Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 2009 Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking Forward Daniel C. Richman Columbia Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons Recommended Citation Daniel C. Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 58 DUKE L. J. 2087 (2009). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2464 This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. POLITICAL CONTROL OF FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD DANIEL RICHMANt ABSTRACT This Essay explores the mechanisms of control over federal criminal enforcement that the administration and Congress used or failed to use during George W. Bush's presidency. It gives particular attention to Congress, not because legislators played a dominant role, but because they generally chose to play such a subordinate role. My fear is that the media focus on management inadequacies or abuses within the Justice Department during the Bush administrationmight lead policymakers and observers to overlook the -
An Investigation Into the Removal of Nine U.S
U.S. Department of Justice An Investigation into the Removal of Nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006 U.S. Department of Justice U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Office of Professional Responsibility September 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 1 I. Methodology of the Investigation ....................................................... 2 II. Organization of this Report ............................................................... 4 CHAPTER TWO BACKGROUND.................................................................. 7 I. U.S. Attorneys .................................................................................. 7 II. Selection of U.S. Attorneys................................................................ 8 III. Department Evaluation and Interaction with U.S. Attorneys ............. 9 IV. Backgrounds of Department Officials.............................................. 10 A. Alberto Gonzales ................................................................... 11 B. Kyle Sampson ....................................................................... 11 C. Monica Goodling ................................................................... 11 D. Paul McNulty ........................................................................ 12 E. Michael Elston ...................................................................... 12 F. David Margolis ...................................................................... 13 G. William Mercer ..................................................................... -
The Yates Memorandum and Corporate Criminal Liability
ALL STICK AND NO CARROT: THE YATES MEMORANDUM AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY Paul J. Larkin, Jr. and John-Michael Seibler Late in 2015, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates distributed a memorandum innocuously entitled Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, also colloquially known as the Yates Memorandum, to senior officials at the United States Department of Justice.1 It represents the most recent effort by the Justice Department to keep the promises it has long made to hold individual directors, officers, managers, and employees criminally accountable for corporate wrongdoing. Yates hopes to achieve that goal by directing the upper echelon of the Justice Department to follow a far more aggressive game plan than the department has recently pursued in the investigation of corporate wrongdoing. This approach seeks to take maximum advantage of the breadth of liability that American criminal law imposes on a corporation for the actions of the individuals who carry out its business. Under current law, a corporation can be held liable for almost any misconduct committed by a director, officer, or employee as long as that action can plausibly be said to have been * © 2016, Paul J. Larkin, Jr. All rights reserved. Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation. M.P.P., George Washington University, 2012; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1980; B.A., Washington & Lee University, 1977. * © 2016, John-Michael Seibler. All rights reserved. Legal Fellow, The Heritage Foundation. J.D., Washington & Lee University, 2015; B.A., Boston University, 2011. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. -
Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S
S. HRG. 110–61 PRESERVING PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE: IS THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLITICIZING THE HIRING AND FIRING OF U.S. ATTORNEYS? HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION FEBRUARY 6, 2007 Serial No. J–110–10 Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary ( U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 35–798 PDF WASHINGTON : 2007 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 Jun 19, 2007 Jkt 035798 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\35798.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JON KYL, Arizona RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN CORNYN, Texas BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island TOM COBURN, Oklahoma BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director MICHAEL O’NEILL, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director (II) VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 Jun 19, 2007 Jkt 035798 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\35798.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC C O N T E N T S STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS Page Feingold, Hon. -
The Mcnulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and Corporate Cooperation: Individual Rights and Legal Ethics
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law CUA Law Scholarship Repository Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 2008 The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and Corporate Cooperation: Individual Rights and Legal Ethics Sarah Helene Duggin The Catholic University of American, Columbus School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons Recommended Citation Sarah Helene Duggin, The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and Corporate Cooperation: Individual Rights and Legal Ethics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341 (2008). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 2007 SYMPOSIUM The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and Corporate Cooperation: Individual Rights and Legal Ethics SARAH HELENE DUGGIN* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF FEDERAL CORPORATE COOPERATION POLICIES AND ONGOING EFFORTS TO EFFECT ADMINISTRATIVE, LEGISLATIVE, AND DOCTRINAL CHANGE .................... 349 A. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL CORPORATE COOPERATION POLICIES ............................. 349 B. THE McNULTY MEMORANDUM ..................... 356 1. PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS ............................ 357 a. W aiver Requests .............................. 357 b. -
An Empirical Investigation of the US Attorney Firings in 2006
School of Economic, Political and Policy Studies Haphazard, Systematic, or Both? An Empirical Investigation of the US Attorney Firings in 2006 UT Dallas Author(s): Banks Miller Rights: ©2018 by the Law and Courts Organized Section of the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved. Citation: Miller, Banks and Brett Curry, "Haphazard, Systematic, or Both? An Empirical Investigation of the US Attorney Firings in 2006," Journal of Law and Courts 6, no. 2 (Fall 2018): 379-403. This document is being made freely available by the Eugene McDermott Library of the University of Texas at Dallas with permission of the copyright owner. All rights are reserved under United States copyright law unless specified otherwise. Haphazard, Systematic, or Both? AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE US ATTORNEY FIRINGS IN 2006 BANKS MILLER, University of Texas at Dallas BRETT CURRY, Georgia Southern University ABSTRACT In 2006, the Bush administration directed nine US attorneys to resign. This decision was a partial cause of the attorney general’s departure from the administration, and it prompted investigations and congressional hearings. Seen as largely ad hoc, we argue that theory predicts a more systematic decision-making process. We investigate this empirically and find, consistent with literature on principal-agent theories and bureau- cracy, that performance on easily monitored metrics and adverse-selection concerns predict the firings. We explore the implications of these findings for efforts to centralize decision-making in the Department of Justice and to exert political control over US attorneys. As the federal government’s principal litigators, US attorneys (USAs) occupy a central role in the justice system. -
Federal Bureau of Investigation (Part Ii)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (PART II) HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION APRIL 23, 2008 Serial No. 110–99 Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 41–904 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Aug 31 2005 12:31 Aug 12, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 H:\WORK\FULL\042308\41904.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41904 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., JERROLD NADLER, New York Wisconsin ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California ZOE LOFGREN, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MAXINE WATERS, California DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah ROBERT WEXLER, Florida RIC KELLER, Florida LINDA T. SA´ NCHEZ, California DARRELL ISSA, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MIKE PENCE, Indiana HANK JOHNSON, Georgia J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio STEVE KING, Iowa LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois TOM FEENEY, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California TRENT FRANKS, -
Train Wreck at the Justice Department: an Eyewitness Account
Train Wreck at the Justice Department: An Eyewitness Account John McKay † In a series of early morning phone calls on December 7, 2006, seven United States Attorneys were ordered to resign. Despite initial denials, it would later be revealed that two other U.S. Attorneys had also been ordered to submit their resignations, bringing the total number to nine. Each was given no explanation for the dismissal and most were led to believe that they alone were being dismissed, raising the specter of unstated wrongdoing and encouraging silent departures. Those dis- missed uniformly cited the maxim that they “served at the pleasure of the President” and most sought to avoid publicly disputing the Justice De- partment or the White House. So what happened? Why were the nine dismissed? Were political considerations allowed to trump the proud heritage of non-partisan, inde- pendent prosecutions in a Justice Department widely trusted as the guardian of civil rights? Did the White House or senior Justice Depart- ment officials direct the removal of U.S. Attorneys for failing to satisfy local partisans or to retaliate for certain public corruption prosecutions? Have officials lied to cover up wrongdoing and to avoid criminal prose- cution? Can the damage to the Justice Department be undone, restoring the role of federal prosecutors as disdainful of politics and devoted to accountability, fairness, and the firm execution of the nation’s laws? These questions were the subject of a public forum on May 9, 2007, sponsored by Seattle University School of Law, and serve in part as the basis for this Article by one of the participants of the forum (and a fired U.S.