Conspiracy Theory and Conspiracism in Postwar Literature A dissertation submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Abdulrahman F. Abu Shal August 2020 © Copyright All rights reserved Except for previously published materials Dissertation written by Abdulrahman F. Abu Shal B.A., King Saud University, 2009 M.A., The University of Akron, 2014 Ph.D., Kent State University, 2020 Approved by _______________________________________, Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Tammy Clewell _______________________________________, Members, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Babacar M’Baye _______________________________________ Christopher Roman _______________________________________ Rekha Sharma _______________________________________ Patrick Gallagher Accepted by _______________________________________, Chair, Department of English Babacar M’Baye _______________________________________, Interim Dean, College of Arts and Sciences Mandy Munro-Stasiuk TABLE OF CONTENTS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- v CHAPTERS I. INTRODUCTION -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 A Brief Analysis of Conspiracy Theory and Conspiracism --------------------------- 7 Defining Conspiracy Theory --------------------------------------------------- 10 Defining Conspiracism ---------------------------------------------------------- 13 The Problem with ‘the Paranoid Style’ --------------------------------------- 19 Trust and Distrust in Relation to Conspiracy Theory and Conspiracism ---------- 25 II. THE LIMITS OF CONSPIRACY THEORY IN PYNCHON’S THE CRYING OF LOT 49 AND GRAVITY’S RAINBOW ------------------------------------------------- 30 “Revelation in progress”: Oedipa’s Paranoia and Conspiracy Theory ------------ 37 Clues to the Conspiracy --------------------------------------------------------- 40 Correlations between Clues ----------------------------------------------------- 47 The Accumulation of Clues and Correlations -------------------------------- 50 Considerable Conclusions to Counter Conspiracism ------------------------ 55 “Operational paranoia”: Slothrop’s Experience -------------------------------------- 59 An Onion-Layered Conspiracy ------------------------------------------------- 61 The Discovery of Convoluted Conspiracies ---------------------------------- 64 Slothrop’s Proverbs for Paranoids --------------------------------------------- 67 The Compulsive Intuition to Discover Clues -------------------------------- 68 Confrontations, Confessions, and Confirmations ---------------------------- 72 Documents and Conspiracies --------------------------------------------------- 77 iii The “Plot” to Escape the Plot -------------------------------------------------- 80 Anti-Paranoia as a Possible Response to Paranoia -------------------------- 84 The Limitations of Conspiracy Theory ------------------------------------------------ 87 III. THE LIMITS OF CONSPIRACISM AND SECRECY IN REED’S MUMBO JUMBO ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 91 Secrecy, Secret Societies, and the Conspiracy ---------------------------------------- 99 Secrecy and Political Control ------------------------------------------------- 106 Secrecy vs. Conspiracism: Misinformation and Misbelief ---------------- 110 Conspiracism and the Bias towards Secrecy ----------------------------------------- 117 IV. THE DILEMMA OF CONSPIRACISM IN ECO’S FOUCAULT’S PENDULUM 126 Critiquing Conspiracism and its Flawed Reasoning -------------------------------- 135 Debunking the Evidence: The Templars’ Coded Message ---------------- 136 The Plan: A Fabrication that Challenges the Truth Claim ----------------- 143 The Risks of Conspiracism and Believing Invented Meanings -------------------- 148 WORKS CITED ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 157 iv Acknowledgements ﷽ fgh Bismillah Ar-Rahman Ar-Rahim “In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.” First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Tammy Clewell, for her assistance and guidance, which made my journey as a doctoral student possible since day one. I would also like to thank Babacar M’Baye for his steadfast support throughout this journey. You both have left your lasting marks on my personality. Secondly, I would like to extend my thanks to Christopher Roman, Rekha Sharma, and Patrick Gallagher for your approval to be part of the dissertation committee and for dedicating your personal time and effort. I am truly indebted to each and every one of you. I am grateful to King Saud University for providing me with the opportunity and the scholarship to further my education and do this research. I am also thankful to Kent State University for being my home for years. I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to whoever did the disturbing The Arrivals series in 2008, my first genuine encounter with conspiracism. For my mother, Maimoonah, and my father, Faisal, who raised me to be who I am now but sadly passed away before they see this moment. I miss you so much. For my wife, Anhar, without your endless love and support, none of this would be possible. For my family and friends, whose encouragement helped me through the hardest moments in the United States. v I. Introduction In postwar literature, conspiracy theory manifests differently from one writer to another. The representation of conspiracy theory in literary works forms a spectrum on which writers can be viewed as either participating in its formation, ridiculing it, or positioning their works somewhere in between as they explore much more complex figurations of it. There are writers whose works show neither participation in nor a complete rejection of the conspiratorial narrative by taking a position that views conspiracy theory as a potential yet problematic tool of investigating conspiracies. Conspiracy theories occupy a significant portion of our daily lives. They constitute a multifaceted phenomenon, but they are often reduced to a particular aspect without considering the multiplicity of factors contributing to their existence. Sometimes they are rational; but most of the time, they may emerge from a stubborn worldview or a set of beliefs insinuating that history only unveils through conspiracies. There are distinctions between the two cases. In the first case, conspiracy theories can result from epistemological investigations that attempt to discover actual conspiracies. In the other case, they are connotative of the extreme socio-political view that conspiracies explain everything that happens. This is the distinction between conspiracy theory as an epistemological approach and what shall be called ‘conspiracism.’ The distinction between the two is necessary so that we may understand more about conspiracy theory as a useful tool in isolation from the perilous political worldview of conspiracism. The intricate and interconnected relations between conspiracy theory and conspiracism often result in confusion and misconception. To clarify the terminology from which to proceed, I 1 use the term ‘conspiracy theory’ in the singular form with no definite article to refer to an abstract epistemological approach that allows for the presumption that a particular event resulted from a conspiracy. The term ‘conspiracy theories’ in the plural form refers to actual existing theorized accounts (either rational or irrational) about the presence of conspiracies, whether contemporary or historical, such as the 9/11 conspiracy theories or the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Conspiracism refers to the pathological worldview or belief that everything can be explained and understood as resulting from a conspiracy. The two terms, conspiracy theory and conspiracism, are often conflated because they are both described as resulting from paranoia, a cultural condition. These terms require a more elaborate analysis to understand how they affect each other. The associations between conspiracy theory and conspiracism with paranoia are problematic in many aspects. First of all, there is the issue of paranoia as a concept. It is a clinical term that has entered the colloquial sphere of language to characterize someone’s irrational fear and suspicion that someone else secretly intends to harm them. It refers to a cultural condition explored in both fiction and academic works. Moreover, paranoia is very often used to describe the unjustified fear of conspiracies. This leads to the second issue this dissertation will address, which is the notion of belief in conspiracy theories as a form of paranoia. Whether conspiratorial claims are justified or not, they are often dismissed because they are perceived as paranoid. However, that perception to a certain extent is justified because irrational and unjustified belief in conspiracy theories may be the result of conspiracism, which leads to its conflation with rational conspiracy theories. Therefore, the third issue to be addressed is the lack of distinction between the rational use of conspiracy theory and the culture of conspiracism. By nuancing conspiracy theory as an epistemological method and conspiracism as 2 a worldview, it will be possible to perceive the former as a rational method and the latter as extremely irrational. The following discussions highlight the issues