THE PHILOSOPHY OF SECURITY

By ØSTEN UNDÉN

The term of collective security is used in describing the gist of the programme of international policy which has found expression in the Organization It is by no means a new concept: _' it was launched in the days of the , to signify a doctrine to which, equally, the League owed its existence. The policy of collective security was held to have superseded the Great Power policy of equilibrium, at least in . It was usual during and after the First World to place a formidable load of guilt on this policy of Balance of Power It was held to have brought competitive armament, and that armaments had led to Armageddon A set of influential persons in some countries were said to have put the fuse to the powder-magazine, with the German Emperor as their chief instigator, but the gunpowder had itself been amassed by the ope- ration of the system of Balance of Power This system had formed the environment which made a world war possible The League of Nations was built on an entirely new philosophy Solidarity and collective security were to take the place of the at- tempts at uniting the States by into balanced groups It was a basic feature of the new doctrine that States who had looked upon each other as competitors of power, as potential or actual enemies, were now to be associated in a joint organization, with the safeguarding of as its chief purpose. Danger of war and threat of war were to be averted by joint action The point of departure for this programme was doubtlessly that war was sincerely abhorred by all Member nations and that the preservation of peace was regarded as undisputed canon If never- theless peace were put in jeopardy by the aggressive policy of any Member nation, this was to be regarded as an accident, a temporary aberration, which could, and should, be overcome by resolute action on the part of the Organization Any such disturber of the peace ought, strictly speaking, to be amenable to restraint already through appropriate economic boycott but the Organization should also have access, in an emergency, to the military resources of Member States Having such access would in all probability suffice, as a deterrent, for the preservation of peace 1) A conference, held in Oslo, on 20th November, 1954 4

There were, however, many people who were sceptical in regard to the tenets of League philisophy Firstly, it was not long ago that peace as an undisputed good had itself been in dispute and even scorned in some countries, particularly in Germany Could it really be taken for granted that all nations of the League were wholly con- verted to the idea of peace? The course of events would demonstrate how insecure were the foundations of such a belief. The sceptics were proved to be right In due time Fascism and National-Socialism would openly proclaim that expansionist policy, with the use of force, was a legitimate method of asserting oneself in the scramle for power Such slogans swept entire nations off their feet On the other hand it was objected, already at an early stage, that the constitution and structure of the League of Nations suffered from many defects Where were the safeguards ensuring that Member States would live up to their joint responsibility in the event of serious conflict? Guarantees to that effect were zealously pursued by France in particular, but also by the Balkan States, Poland and other nations Such guarantees could be conceived in various shapes. Either the Covenant of the League should be revised with a view to tightening up and defining more sharply the obligations of all Member States Or else (if that was not practicable), regional or separate of mutual assistance should be concluded During the first phase of the League's history the right method was felt to be that of separate military . Later on, League philosophy became more exacting Separate treaties must not have the effect of different groups of States becoming organized aginst each other In order to avoid that risk potential enemies should be associated within the same group The emergence of this doctrine was marked by the Locarno treaties Peace policy ought not to be a matter of alliance in the traditional sense, of bodies owing their cohesion to the common fear of a certain opponent The right way was that of regional security agreements, construed according to the same ideas as the League itself. A security pact for the Balkans, for example, ought to include not only Rumania and but also Hungary, the anticipated enemy. Collective security under the aegis of the League of Nations re- mained a fragile vessel. This was due already to the League's limited range of membership, with the and Russia staying outside. The joined at last but instead there was de- fection from three other Great Powers, Germany, , and Italy. There emerged in this way the outline of a division into Great Power blocs; if not one of East versus West as nowadays, it was