1 the Crown Court in Northern Ireland ___
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Neutral Citation No. [2012] NICC 3 Ref: GIL8403 Judgment: approved by the Court for handing down Delivered: 20/01/12 (subject to editorial corrections)* THE CROWN COURT IN NORTHERN IRELAND ______ THE QUEEN -v- MARK HADDOCK AND OTHERS ________ GILLEN J [1] At the end of the prosecution case, counsel on behalf of each of the defendants made an application that there was no case to answer on each of the counts in this indictment. Charges [2] There are fourteen accused on 37 counts on the indictment before me dealing with five different aspects of criminality. They are as follows. In connection with the murder of Thomas English on 31 October 2000 Mark Haddock, Darren Stuart Moore, Alexander Thomas Wood, Jason Loughlin, John Bond, David Miller, Ronald Trevor Bowe, Samuel Jason Higgins and Philip Laffin have been charged with: • On Count 1 the murder of Thomas English on 31 October 2000. • On Count 2 offences contrary to Article 17 of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 with possession of firearms or ammunition with intent to endanger life. Mark Haddock, John Bond, David Miller, Samuel Jason Higgins and Philip Laffin are jointly charged with: • the offence of hijacking contrary to Section 2(1)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 1975 on count 3. • false imprisonment contrary to common law on Count 4. 1 • possession of a firearm with intent contrary to Article 19(1) of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) 1981 on the count 6. Alexander Thomas Wood, Jason Loughlin and Ronald Bowe are charged with: • grievous bodily harm contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against the Person 1861 on Count 6. Neil Pollock is charged with: • possession of items intended for terrorist purposes contrary to Section 32(1) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 on Count 7. • doing an act with intent to pervert the course of justice contrary to common law on Count 8. William Hinds is charged with: • assisting offenders contrary to Section 4(1) of the Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) 1967 on Count 9. David Samuel McCrum is charged with: • doing an act with intent to pervert the course of justice contrary to common law on Count 10. John Bond is charged with: • doing an act with intent to pervert the course of justice contrary to common law on Count 11. In connection with an attack on Keith Caskey on 30 January 1996 Mark Haddock, Darren Stuart Moore, Alexander Thomas Wood, Jason Loughlin, John Bond, Mark Thompson, Philip Laffin and David Jason Smart are charged with: • the offence of grievous bodily harm with intent contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 on Count 12. 2 In connection with an attack on Archibald Galway and William James Galway Mark Haddock, Alexander Thomas Wood, John Bond, David Miller and Mark Thompson are charged with: • the offence of grievous bodily harm with intent contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 on Count 13. • common assault contrary to Section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 on Count 14. • kidnapping contrary to common law on Count 15. • false imprisonment contrary to common law on Count 16. In connection with an attack on Alan Webster on 19 December 1996 Mark Haddock, Darren Stuart Moore, Alexander Thomas Wood, John Bond, David Miller, David Jason Smart and Samuel Jason Higgins are charged with: • wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 on Count 17. In connection with belonging to a proscribed organisation namely the Ulster Volunteer Force. Mark Haddock is charged with such an offence: • contrary to Section 28(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 on Count 18. • contrary to Section 30(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 on Count 19. • contrary to Section 11(1) Terrorism Act 2000 on Count 20. Alexander Wood is charged with such an offence: • contrary to Section 28(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 on Count 21 • contrary to Section 30(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 on Count 22 • contrary to Section 11(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 on Count 23. 3 Jason Loughlin is charged with such an offence: • contrary to Section 28(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 on Count 24. • contrary to Section 30(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 on Count 25. • contrary to Section 11(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 on Count 26. Darren Stuart Moore is charged with such an offence: • contrary to Section 28(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 on Count 27. • contrary to Section 30(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 on Count 28. John Bond is charged with such an offence: • contrary to Section 28(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 on Count 29. • contrary to Section 30(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 on Count 30. Samuel Jason Higgins is charged with such an offence: • contrary to Section 28(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 on Count 31. • contrary to Section 30(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 on Count 32. David Miller is charged with such an offence: • contrary to Section 28(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 on Count 33. • contrary to Section 30(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 on Count 34. Ronald Trevor Bowe is charged with such an offence: • contrary to Section 30(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 on Count 35. 4 Philip Laffin is charged with such an offence: • contrary to Section 28(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 on Count 36. • contrary to Section 30(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 on Count 37. Legal principles governing the applications [3] In instances where a judge sits with a jury the principles governing submissions of no case to answer are to be found in R v Galbraith 73. Cr. App. R. 124 (“Galbraith”) and R v Shippey (1998) Crim. LR. 767 (“Shippey”) as applied in R v Courtney (2007) NICA 6 and Chief Constable v Lo (2006) NICA3. See also R v P [2011] NIJB 225 and the helpful comments of Judge LCJ recently in R v F the Tines 25 July 2011 CA. In the case of Galbraith Lord Lane CJ described the principles in determining whether a direction of no case to answer should be made as follows: “How then should the judge approach a submission of ‘no case’?- (1) If there is no evidence that the crime alleged has been committed by the defendant, there is no difficulty. The judge will of course stop the case. (2) The difficulty arises where there is some evidence but it is of a tenuous character, for example, because of inherent weakness or vagueness or because it is inconsistent with other evidence – (a) where the judge comes to the conclusion that the Crown’s evidence taken at its highest, is such that a jury properly directed could not properly convict on it, it is his duty, on a submission being made, to stop the case; (b) where however the Crown’s evidence is such that its strength or weakness depends on the views to be taken of a witness’ reliability, or other matters which are generally speaking within the province of the jury and where on one possible view of the facts there is evidence on which a jury could properly come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, then 5 the judge should allow the matter to be tried by the jury.” [4] In R v William Courtney the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland expressly adopted the approach followed in The Chief Constable of the PSNI v Lo when adapting these principles to the context of a non-jury trial. The following passages from Lo were approved: “(13) In our judgment the exercise on which a magistrate or judge sitting without a jury must embark in order to decide that the case should not be allowed to proceed involves precisely the same type of approach as that suggested by Lord Lane in the second limb of Galbraith but with the modification that the judge is not required to assess whether a properly directed jury could not properly convict on the evidence as it stood at the time that an application for a direction was made to him because, being in effect the jury, the judge can address that issue in terms of whether he could ever be convinced of the accused’s guilt. Where there is evidence against the accused, the only basis on which a judge could stop the trial at the direction stage is where he had concluded that the evidence was so discredited or so intrinsically weak that it could not properly support a conviction. It is confined to those exceptional cases where the judge can say, as did Lord Lowry in Hassan, that there was no possibility of his being convinced to the requisite standard by the evidence given for the prosecution. (14) The proper approach of a judge or magistrate sitting without a jury does not, therefore, involve the application of a different test from that of the second limb of Galbraith. The exercise that the judge must engage in is the same, suitably adjusted to reflect the fact that he is a tribunal of fact.